Fahr Al Din Al Razi on the Knowability of Gods Essence and Attributes

1 For Greek philosophers see, for example, H.A. Wolfson, “The Knowability andDescribability of God in Plato and Aristotle,” in his Studies in the History of Philosophy andReligion, ed. I. Twersky and G.H. Williams, Cambridge, Mass. 1973, vol. I, pp. 98-130(henceforth Wolfson, “The Knowability”). For Muslim and Jewish philosophers see, forexample, S. Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to Al-Fˆrˆb“, IbnBˆ[[a, and Maimonides,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. I. Twersky,Cambridge Mass. and London 1979 (henceforth Pines, “Limitations”), pp. 82-109. G. Endress, “The Limits to Reason: Some Aspects of Islamic Philosophy in the B�yidPeriod,” Akten des VII Kongresses für Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft, ed. A Dietrich, Göttingen1976, pp. 120-125.

2 For a refutation of the ]ahmite position which is based on a mixture of Qur"ˆnicverses and speculative arguments see my Anthropomorphism & Interpretation of the Qur "ˆn in

FAÝR AL-DíN AL-RËZí ON THE KNOWABILITY OFGOD’S ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES

by

BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

Bar-Ilan University

What human beings can know about God’s essence and attributesis a question which has occupied the minds of both philosophers

and theologians.1 Since the beginning of the second/eighth centuryMuslim theologians have dealt with this question, generally coming totwo opposing conclusions: a. God’s essence cannot be known; and b.God’s essence can be known. Similarly, opinions diVered concerningHis attributes. Actually, the Qur"ˆn itself can serve as a source for dis-cussion of this issue. The Qur"ˆnic verses “There is no thing like Him”(42.11) and “There is no one equal to Him” (112.4) prove, when takenliterally, that God’s essence and attributes cannot really be known, forGod is unlike anything. However, Muslim speculative theologians havefound Qur"ˆnic verses, which do not diVerentiate between God’s essenceand attributes, wanting, and, therefore, sought to provide speculativeanswers to this question. ]ahm ibn êafwˆn (d. 129/746), who seemsto have been the � rst theologian to deal with this topic, stated thatGod is not a thing (Òay")2 which may be understood as “God is not a

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2002 Arabica, tome XLIX,2

knowability of god’s essence 205

being”. Like Plotinus, ]ahm comes to the conclusion that God is nota being, because He is in� nite and unde� ned. Consequently, God isother than creation and totally transcendent, which means that He isabove all attributes.3 Another conclusion which one can draw from thedenial of God’s being is the impossibility to apply attributes, which areunderstood as entities existing in God, to God, for that which is nota being cannot be divided into parts and be composite like createdthings.

Presenting corroboration neither Qur"ˆnic nor speculative, ëirˆr ibn’Amr (d. 200/815), îaf§ al-Fard (� . at the beginning of the ninth cen-tury), and Sufyˆn ibn Saúbˆn (or Sa¢tˆn)4 believed that God wouldcreate a sixth sense in the Resurrection whereby people would knowGod’s essence. Thus God’s essence can be known only by a divine act.Most of the speculative theologians, Mu’tazilites, Ýˆri<ites, Ó“’ites, andMur<i"ites, rejected this view.5

The head of the Ba§ran school of the Mu’tazila Ab� al-HuÅayl al-’Allˆf (d. 235/850) derives from God’s incorporeality and simplicity thatHis attributes are identical to His essence. In other words, the attrib-utes belong to the divine essence but tell us nothing about it. HenceGod is absolutely transcendent. One cannot perceive or de� ne Hisessence by the intellect. Only through God’s acts, which can be knownthrough the signs He leaves in the universe, can we know about Him.However, Ab� al-HuÅayl holds that to see God in the world to comemeans to know Him. Like most of the Mu’tazilites, he does not statethe object of this knowledge, and we can only assume that by knowingGod he means knowing His essence. Two Mu’tazilites, HiÒˆm al-Fuwa “(d. before 218/833) and his disciple ’Abbˆd ibn Sulaymˆn (d. 250/864)go further in asserting the impossibility of man’s knowledge of God’sessence, claiming that since God is incorporeal He can be perceived

the Theology of al-Qˆsim ibn Ibrˆh“m-Kitˆb al-Mustarshid, Leiden 1996, pp. 72-83. On thepossible in� uence of the Kalˆm discussion of Òay" on Ibn S“nˆ’s diVerentiation betweenessence and existence see R. Wisnovsky, “Notes on Avicenna’s Concept of Thingness(Óay"iyya),” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10(2000), pp. 181-221.

3 R.M. Frank, “The Neoplatonism of ]ahm ibn êafwˆn”, Le Muséon 78(1965), pp.399-402.

4 A Mur<i"ite jurisprudent and speculative theologian. Al-Ýayyˆ , Kit̂ b al-inti§ˆr, ed.H.S. Nyberg (Cairo 1925) with A.N. Nader trans. into French, Beirut 1957, p. 140, n. 112. He was probably a contemporary of ëirˆr and îaf§.

5 Al-AÒ’arî, Maqˆlˆt al-islˆmiyy“n wa-i¢tilˆf al-mu§allîn, ed. H. Ritter, rep. Wiesbaden1963, p. 216, ll. 3-5, p. 339, l. 14-p. 340, l. 3. Some Mur<i"ites held the view of thesixth sense. Ibid. p. 154, ll. 2-3.

neither by the senses nor even by the intellect.6 ’Abbˆd’s perception ofGod’s transcendence and the ineVability of His essence are expressedin several ways. Unlike most of the Mu’tazilites, he refuses to ascribeany meaning to anthropomorphic expressions and also refuses to inter-pret them metaphorically. He agrees to utter these expressions onlywhen reciting the Qur"ˆn. ’Abbˆd also rejects expressions which implymutual relations between God and man, the possibility of man’s turn-ing to God, and the possibility of man’s causing God to act.7 He evenshuns employing the terms kˆ"in (being) and maw<�d (existent) as attrib-utes of God with the aim of not impugning God’s transcendence.According to him, maw<�d is a name which indicates nothing aboutGod’s essence. Apparently in� uenced by Plotinian sources, he seems tohave held that God is “other than being”. Therefore, terms applyingto beings cannot be applied to Him. Since God is absolutely other, Hecannot belong to a genus or have something which diVerentiates betweenHim and other beings. Hence, He cannot be de� ned.8 ’Abbˆd’s notionof God’s absolute otherness dictates his relation to the divine attrib-utes. For him attributes are identi� ed with names, and both are referredto as acts. As acts they do not refer to God’s essence but merely tothe traces He leaves in the universe.9

A contemporary of ’Abbˆd, the Zaydite Imˆm al-Qˆsim ibn Ibrˆh“m(d. 246/860), who was in� uenced by Mu’tazilite teachings to a greatextent,10 diVers from the Mu’tazilite teaching on God’s attributes whenmaking God’s absolute diVerence from creation His sole attribute.11

This notion coincides with al-Qˆsim’s answer to the question of “whatis God”. “He is He” says al-Qˆsim expressing thereby the idea of theabsolute transcendence of God about whose essence nothing can beknown.12

206 binyamin abrahamov

6 Abrahamov, “’Abbˆd ibn Sulaymˆn on God’s Transcendence, Some Notes,” DerIslam 71(1994), p. 109f. Pines, “Limitations,” pp. 92, 95.

7 Ibid., p. 111.8 Ibid., p. 117f.9 Ibid., p. 119f.

10 B. Abrahamov, Al-Qˆsim ibn Ibrˆh“m on the Proof of God’s Existence, Kitˆb al-Dal“l al-Kab“r, Leiden 1990.

11 W. Madelung, Der Imam al-Qˆsim ibn Ibrˆh“m und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen, Berlin1965, pp. 112-114. B. Abrahamov, “The ÿabaristˆnis’ Question, Edition and annotatedtranslation of one of al-Qˆsim ibn Ibrˆh“m’s Epistles,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam11(1988), p. 28.

12 Abrahamov, ibid., pp. 26, 29. Cf. Ibn îazm, Al-Fi§al f“’l-milal wa ’l-ahwˆ" wa ’l-niúal,Beirut 1983 (henceforth Ibn îazm, al-Fi§al ), vol. I, part 2, p. 175.


It is worth noting that the traditionalists have regarded dealing withmetaphysical issues as an innovation which can lead to heresy. Thereforethey have prohibited such an act stating, for example, the followingtradition “Think of God’s creation and not of His essence”.13 Somespeculative theologians among them, however, have stressed the impos-sibility of knowing God’s essence, but they have given no speculativearguments in favor of this view.14

Contrary to the theologians’ teachings above, which are reported inthe primary sources in a fragmentary manner, al-ýazˆl“ discusses thetopic in an extensive way mainly in his al-Iqti§ˆd f“ ’l-i’tiqˆd15 and al-Maq§ad al-asnˆ f“ Òarú ma’ˆn“ asmˆ" allˆh al-úusnˆ.16 First, note that al-ýazˆl“ includes a discussion of God’s existence in his views on God’sessence. Possibly these echo Ibn S“nˆ’s thesis that states, unlike createdbeings, in God there is no diVerence between essence and existence.17

Second, God’s essence is described in both positive and negative ways.God exists in pre-eternity (qidam) as well as in post-eternity (baqˆ"), Heis one and can be seen (mar "iyy). We shall soon refer to the last point.As for the negative side, God is neither a substance, nor a body, noran accident, He cannot be found in a speci� c direction, and He doesnot station Himself on the Throne.18 The important point al-ýazˆl“makes in our context is the possibility of knowing God’s essence in alogical way.19 Even seeing God is possible, in al-ýazˆl“’s view, becauseGod can potentially be seen (mar "iyy bi ’l-quwwa). If there is any obsta-cle to seeing Him, it is not God’s essence but something outside Hisessence.20 However, by seeing God al-ýazˆl“ does not mean physicalseeing but a kind of complementary intellectual perception. Just as one

13 B. Abrahamov, Islamic Theology, Traditionalism and Rationalism, Edinburgh 1998, p. 9f.Cf. al-Maqdis“, Kitˆb al-bad " wa ’l-ta"r“¢, ed. Cl. Huart, Baghdad 1962 (rep. of Paris1899), vol. I, pp. 78-80.

14 Al-]uwayn“, al-’Aq“da al-Ni½ˆmiyya, ed. Muúammad Zˆhid al-KawÆar“, Cairo 1948,pp. 14-16. We shall immediately treat al-ýazˆl“’s approach to the knowledge of God’sessence.

15 Ed. Ibrˆh“m Agˆh Çubukçu and Hüseyin Atay, Ankara 1962 (henceforth Iqti§ˆd ).16 Ed. Fadlou A. Shehadi, Beirut 1986 (henceforth Maq§ad ).17 Cf. Ibn îazm, al-Fi§al, vol. I, part 2, p. 175, l. 5: “Concerning God, existence is

essence” ( fa"l-anniyya f“ allˆh ta’ˆlˆ hiya al-mˆ"iyya).18 Iqti§ˆd, pp. 24-79. Idem, Iúyˆ" ’ul�m al-D“n, Al-Maktaba al-Ti[ˆriyya al-Kubrˆ, Cairo

n.d. (henceforth Iúyˆ"), vol. I, pp. 105-108.19 Iqti§ˆd, p. 49f.20 Ibid., p. 61.


knows of things devoid of shape and measure, such as power and love,one can know God’s essence.21

A passage in the Iúyˆ" further shows that God is not absolutely tran-scendent and that it is possible to know his essence with diVerent degreesof understanding depending on the ability of the knower. Al-ýazˆl“divides re� ection on God’s glory and greatness into two parts, the high-est of which is the re� ection on His essence, attributes, and the mean-ings of his names. The prohibition mentioned in the famous tradition(see above) not to meditate on God’s essence is explained by al-ýazˆl“as deriving from the peril of perplexity involved in such an act. However,he points out that the righteous (al-§idd“q�n) may think about God’sessence, but they cannot continue their thinking for a long time. Asmall part of the knowledge attained by this re� ection is that God isneither in a place nor in any given direction, that He is neither insidethe world nor outside it, and that He is not connected to the worldnor separated from it. Because there is peril in meditating on God’sessence, most people should refrain from it; rather they should thinkabout God’s majesty through His wonderful acts which are revealed inthe universe.22

Contrary to God’s relative transcendence which al-ýazˆl“ presentsin the Iúyˆ" and Iqti§ˆd, in MiÒkˆt al-anwˆr23 and al-Maq§ad al-asnˆ f“ Òarúma’ˆn“ asmˆ" allˆh al-úusnˆ he posits God’s absolute transcendence. Inthe former work he states that God is the only real existence and thatHe is too great to be perceived by an entity whose existence in notreal, namely, the human being. God alone knows His essence, for eachobject of knowledge is under the domination of the knower to a cer-tain extent, and due to God’s greatness, it is inconceivable that Heshould be under the domination of anyone. Actually, al-ýazˆl“’s con-clusion in MiÒkˆt regarding God’s transcendence and the impossibilityto know His essence is based on his discussion in Maq§ad. In this lat-ter work, he states that the real meaning of essence (Åˆt) is that throughwhich a thing is what it is, or that which makes a thing this de� nitething.24 To describe an essence means to answer the question of what

21 Ibid., p. 67f. Iúyˆ", vol. IV, pp. 312-315. For a discussion of this kind of seeingsee my Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism, The Teachings of al-Ghazˆl“ and al-Dabbˆgh, CurzonPress (forthcoming).

22 Iúyˆ", vol. IV, p. 434.23 MiÒkˆt al-anwˆr, ed. ’Abd al-’Az“z ’Izz al-d“n al-Sayrawˆn, Beirut 1986, pp. 137-

139 (henceforth MiÒkˆt).24 Cf. Metaphysics , 1029b, 15: “What, then, you are by your very nature is your


a thing is (mˆ huwa).25 Now, according to al-ýazˆl“, God’s attributesand His names say nothing about His essence. Were we to point to aperson and ask “what is it?”, the phrases “he is tall” or “he is white”would not constitute answers to the question, which is about the per-son’s essence.26 Al-ýazˆl“ undoubtedly refers to the components ofde� nition, namely, genus and diVerence. Thus the de� nition of thehuman being’s essence is not his being tall or white, but his being arational animal. His being an animal refers to his genus, and his beingrational diVerentiates him from other animals.27 Since knowledge of athing means knowledge of its essence,28 it follows that God’s essencecannot be known, for God does not belong to any genus, nor can Hehave a speci� c diVerence.29 Although the last conclusion does not appearexplicitly in al-ýazˆl“’s text, it is implied by the context. Even thephrase “necessarily existent” (wˆ<ib al-wu<�d ), says al-ýazˆl“, does notexpress the de� nition of God; it merely shows that no cause is neces-sary in order for Him to exist. And the statement “each thing derivesits existence from God” means that we ascribe acts to Him. In � ne,all we say about God are names, attributes and ascriptions; we are notreferring to His essence.30

What is then the way to know God, asks al-ýazˆl“? To illustrate theanswer, he gives the example of a child or an impotent person whowants to know what the pleasure of sexual intercourse is. There aretwo ways to convey this knowledge: a. To liken this pleasure to anotherpleasure which a child or an impotent person experiences; and b. Toexperience this pleasure. Neither of the two ways are applicable, for

essence.” Trans. W.D. Ross in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon, New York1941, p. 786.

25 Maq§ad, p. 26.26 Ibid., p. 49f.27 Cf. Posterior Analytics, II, ch. 10, 93b, 29, ch. 13. Ibn S“nˆ, Kitˆb al-Na<ˆt, ed. Ma[id

Fa¢r“, Beirut 1985 (henceforth Ibn S“nˆ, al-Na<ˆt), p. 114f. Al-]ur<ˆn“, Kit̂ b al-ta’r“fˆt,ed. G. Flügel, Beirut 1978 (rep. of Leipzig 1845 henceforth al-]ur<ˆn“, Ta’r“fˆt), p. 87.“îadd”, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden 1960- (henceforth EI 2), vol. III, p. 20f. InTahˆfut al-falˆsifa (trans. by M.E. Marmura, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, Provo, Utah1997, p. 111), al-ýazˆl“ refutes the philosophers’ stand that “the First cannot share withanother in terms of genus and diVer from it in diVerentia . . .”

28 Maq§ad, p. 50, ll. 2-3.29 Ibn S“nˆ, Al-Ishˆrˆt wa ’l-tanb“hˆt, ed. J. Forget, Leiden 1892 (henceforth Ibn S“nˆ,

Ishˆrˆt), p. 144f. Cf. Ab� al-Barakˆt al-Ba©dˆd“, Kit̂ b al-mu’tabar f“ ’l-úikma al-ilˆhiyya,îaydarabad 1939, (henceforth Ab� al-Barakˆt, Mu’tabar), part 3, p. 129. According toAristotle, since God can be de� ned in terms of genus and species, He can be known.Wolfson, “The Knowability”, pp. 110-112.

30 Maq§ad, p. 50, ll. 5-12.


the � rst does not give the real pleasure, and the second is irrelevantto a child or an impotent person. In al-ýazˆl“’s view, both ways applyto man’s knowledge of God. The � rst is insuYcient to provide us withtrue knowledge of God, since we describe Him through attributes andnames taken from our life. When we say “God is living” (úayy), weliken God’s life to our life, but we cannot know for a certainty whatGod’s life really means, just as an impotent person cannot really knowthe pleasure of sexual intercourse even if it were depicted in terms of the sweetest pleasures which he does experience. We know Godthrough the attributes taken from our experience, and this, of course,is not real knowledge of God. Therefore one must add to this knowl-edge the negative statement that God is not like other things. Thusthere is no real correspondence between the attributes we ascribe toGod and His attributes. In fact, for al-ýazˆl“ the attributes are nameswhich describe God in human terms. Only God knows the real mean-ings of His attributes. The second way, the way of experience is blocked,for man cannot attain divine attributes for then he would become God.Consequently, only God knows God. Asked what then is the object ofman’s knowledge of God, al-ýazˆl“ answers that the object of thisknowledge is to know that man is unable to really know God.31 However,man can know the traces God leaves in the universe, namely His won-derful acts. In this kind of knowledge human beings vary, inasmuch asthe more things a man knows about God’s acts, the more his knowl-edge exceeds that of other people.32

In sum, we see in al-ýazˆl“ two basic approaches to the topic underdiscussion. On the one hand, he states that God’s essence can be known,while on the other he denies this possibility. It seems that in his earlierworks he advocates the � rst approach, and in his later works writtenunder the in� uence of the teachings of the philosophers, he advocatesthe second approach. An examination of the chronology of the workscited above shows that Iúyˆ" and Iqti§ˆd were composed before Mishkˆtand Maq§ad.33

31 Cf. Maimonides, Dalˆlat al-úˆ"ir“n, ed. I. Joel (on the basis of S. Munk’s ed.),Jerusalem 1931 (henceforth Maimonides, Dalˆlat), p. 95, l. 5: idrˆkuhu huwa al-’a<z ’annihˆyat idrˆkihi. Trans. S. Pines, The Guide of the Perplexed, Chicago 1963 (henceforth Pines,Guide), vol. I, p. 139. Cf. D. Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der JüdischenReligionsphilosophie des Mittelalters, Gotha 1877 (henceforth Kaufmann, Attributenlehre), p. 444f.,n. 127.

32 Maq§ad, pp. 50-57.33 The books which constitute Iúyˆ" were written between 489/1095 and 495/1101


A similar reversal concerning the knowledge of God’s essence is foundin the writings of the Ash’arite theologian Fa¢r al-D“n al-Rˆz“ (d. 606/1209).34 In his works in� uenced by the tenets of the speculative theol-ogy (Kalˆm), he adheres to the teachings of his theological school stat-ing that God’s essence can be known. He argues that we know of God’sexistence which is not separate from His essence, hence we necessar-ily know His essence. Otherwise God would be known and not knownat the same time, which is an absurdity.35 However, in his later works,al-Ma ̂ lib al-’ˆliya min al-’ilm al-ilˆh“,36 Mafˆt“ú al-©ayb,37 and Kitˆb ma’ˆlimu§�l al-d“n,38 with the exception of an earlier work, namely Kitˆb al-mabˆúiÆ al-maÒriqiyya f“ ’ilm al-ilˆhiyyˆt wa ’l- ab“ ’iyyˆt,39 he expresses a con-trary view. To this view we devote the remainder of our paper.

In Ma’ˆlim al-Rˆz“ clearly states that human beings cannot knowGod’s essence. He proves this by pointing out that man’s knowledgeof God is divided into four parts: a. Knowledge of His existence (wu<ûd );b. knowledge of the modality (kay�yya) of His existence, meaning pre-eternity (azaliyya), post-eternity (abadiyya), and necessity (wu<�b); c. neg-ative knowledge, namely that He is neither a body, nor an atom, noran accident; and d. His relations (i¶ˆfˆt) with the world, meaning Hisbeing knowing and having power. God’s essence is described by theseattributes, but is diVerent from them.40 Though here our author doesnot elaborate on this diVerence, he will do so in Ma ̂ lib.41 Like al-ýazˆl“ in his second phase, al-Rˆz“ seems to hold that essence meanswhat makes a thing that which it is, and that the attributes do not

in al-ýazˆl“’s period of retirement. M. Bouyges, Essai de Chronologie des Oeuvres de Al-Ghazali (Al-Gazel), edited and updated by M. Allard, Beirut 1959, p. 42. Iqti§ˆd wascomposed during 488/1095 before al-ýazˆl“ left Ba©dˆd. Ibid., p. 34. MiÒkˆt’s date ofcomposition is a little while before 500/1106-7. Ibid., p. 66. And Maq§ad was composedafter the Iúyˆ". Ibid., p. 47.

34 About al-Rˆz“ see G.C. Anawati, EI 2, vol. III, pp. 751-754.35 Muúa§§al afkˆr al-mutaqaddim“n wa ’l-muta"a¢¢ir“n min al-úukamˆ" wa ’l-mutakallim“n, ed.

îusˆyn Atˆy, Cairo 1991 (henceforth Muúa§§al ), p. 439.36 Ed. Aúmad îi[ˆz“ al-Saqˆ, Beirut 1987 (henceforth Ma ̂ lib).37 Or al-Tafs“r al-kab“r, Dˆr Iúyˆ" al-TurˆÆ al-’Arab“, Beirut n.d. (henceforth Mafˆt“ú).38 Ed. Sam“ú Da©“m, Beirut 1992 (henceforth Ma’ˆlim).39 Ed. Muúammad al-Mu’ta§im bi-Allˆh al-Ba©dˆd“, Beirut 1990 (henceforth MabˆúiÆ).40 Ma’ˆlim, p. 57. For c and d see, Ab� al-Barakˆt, Mu’tabar, part 3, p. 129. Ab� al-

Barakˆt has exercised great in� uence on al-Rˆz“. S. Pines, “Études sur Awúad al-ZamˆnAb� ’l-Barakˆt al-Baghdˆd“,” in The Collected Works of Shlomo Pines, Jerusalem and Leiden1979, vol. I, p. 1. (This article was � rst published in Revue des Études Juives CIII (1937),pp. 3-64, CIV, pp. 1-33.)

41 See p. 223f. below.


show the thing’s “whatness”. An explanation of the diVerence betweenthe attributes and the essence is given in Muúa§§al as the view of thosewho hold the unknowability of God’s essence. First, they say that theessence is diVerent from the negation of other things; that God is nota body says positively nothing about His essence.42 Second, concerningGod’s relation with the world which is described through His attributeof power (qudra), they state that even the essence of this attribute isunknown, for we only know that this power has an eVect on the act.Likewise we do not know the essence of the attribute of knowledge;we only know that it is something which causes an act to be carriedout in a perfect manner. Moreover, even if we know the essences ofthe attributes, this does not necessitate the knowledge of God’s essence.It follows that we cannot know God’s essence. The second proof isbuilt on the basis of three kinds of perception: a. sensual perception;b. perception of what occurs in one’s soul;43 and c. perception of theintellect. Knowledge can be attained by each of these three perceptionmodes or by diVerent combinations of them. The divine essence can-not be perceived by any of these perceptions,44 hence it is not knownto us.45 Al-Rˆz“ gives no explanation for this conclusion. We can onlyassume that the holders of this view would say that God is totally tran-scendent, which means that we cannot describe Him in terms of humanperception, whether material, emotional, or intellectual.

It is worth noting that in Mabˆú“Æ, al-Rˆz“ grades possible objects ofknowledge according to their power of existence. At the highest mag-nitude stands the necessary existent (wˆ<ib al-wu<�d ) whose power ofexistence is absolute, because it needs nothing in order to exist. Thegrade of the separate intellects and the spiritual substances follows. Thelowest magnitude of existence, almost bordering on non-existence, iscomposed of primordial matter (al-hay�lˆ), time, and motion. At themiddle magnitude, between the strongest and weakest, there are bod-ies, colors and all modalities and quantities. Human intellect is unableto perceive the highest magnitude of objects of knowledge because of

42 Cf. Maimonides, Dalˆlat, p. 92, ll. 3-4. Pines, “Limitations,” p. 98.43 Al-Rˆz“ seems to point to one kind of necessary knowledge, that knowledge which

one derives from one’s feelings and emotions, such as sadness, happiness, hunger, andso on. For necessary knowledge in Islamic theology see my “Necessary Knowledge inIslamic Theology”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20,1(1993), pp. 20-32.

44 Literally: “The divine essence is outside these three kinds (of perception)” (al-mˆhiyyaal-ilˆhiyya ¢ˆri[a ’an hˆÅihi al-aqsˆm al-ÆalˆÆa).

45 Muúa§§al, pp. 439-441.


the brilliance of their power, just as the light of the sun dazzles theeyes of the bats. It also cannot perceive the lowest magnitude, notbecause of its weakness, but because of the objects’ weakness, just asman’s sight cannot perceive minute objects. Human intellect is capa-ble of perceiving only the intermediate range of objects.46 Here it isnot God’s transcendence or otherness which causes human inability toperceive Him, but rather His power of existence which diVers fromothers’ powers in its intensity, but not in its essence. In other words,when God is included in the hierarchy of existents, He resembles otherexistents at least with regard to existence, and diVers from them byvirtue of having the greatest power. The result, namely our inabilityto perceive Him, is the same, but the explanation diVers.

In MabˆúiÆ al-Rˆz“ also introduces four proofs for the unknowabil-ity of God’s essence. a. This proof is based on the principle that theknowledge of a cause necessitates the knowledge of its eVect. Thus ifwe perceived the essence47 of the necessary existent, we would perceivethe essences of all things with their necessary qualities (or concomitantslawˆzim)48 without using proofs. The fact that we do not know theessences of all things proves that we do not know God’s essence.49 Thisproof is reminiscent of al-ýazˆl“ contention that to know God’s essencemeans to be God.50 b. What man knows about God are universal attrib-utes (lit. universal things: um�r kulliyya),51 namely that He is necessaryexistent, immaterial, knowing and having power. Because of this uni-versality, it is possible that others would share these attributes withGod. However, His personal identity (or ipseity huwiyya Òa¢§iyya)52 preventssharing attributes with Him. So what we know are universal attributes,

46 MabˆúiÆ, vol. I, p. 500f.47 Here he uses the term úaq“qa.48 For the term lˆzim (pl. lawˆzim) see al-]ur<ˆn“, Ta’r“fˆt, p. 199f.49 MabˆúiÆ, vol. II, p. 521f.50 See p. 210 above.51 Kulliyy means that which is related to the whole, that which constitutes a part of

the whole (al-mans�b ilˆ al-kull kulliyy). Al-]ur<ˆn“, Ta’r“fˆt, p. 195. Cf. Sayf al-D“n al-Ëmid“, al-Mub“n f“ Òarú ma’ˆn“ alfˆ½ al-úukamˆ" wa ’l-mutakallim“n, ed. îasan Maúm�d al-Óˆ� ’“, Cairo 1983, p. 72, no. 17. According to Ab� al-Barakˆt, kulliyy is a form in themind by which many concrete existent things or things perceived by the mind can bedescribed (al-kulliyy ma’nan f“ ’l-Åihn tatta§ifu bihi aÒyˆ" kaÆ“ra maw<�da f“ ’l-a’yˆn aw muta§awwaraf“ ’l-aÅhˆn). Mu’tabar, p. 12.

52 For huwiyya as a term designating individuality see S. van den Bergh (trans.), Averroes’Tahˆfut al-Tahˆfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), London 1978 (rep. in one volume ofLondon 1954 ed.), part 2, p. 131 (n. 5 to vol. I, p. 224). A.M. Goichon, “Huwiyya”,EI 2, vol. III, p. 644.


but His essence remains unknown. Al-Rˆz“ continues the course of hisproof by presenting a disjunction: Either God’s personal identity isdiVerent from His essence or a necessary part of it (lˆzima li-mˆhiy-yatihi ). The � rst possibility determines that just as God’s personal iden-tity is not known to man, so too His essence. According to the secondpossibility, if the necessary part of the essence is unknown, the essenceis necessarily unknown, for if the essence which is the cause of the nec-essary part were known, the necessary part, which is its eVect, wouldalso be known.53 c. There are two ways to know things. The � rst isthe way of personal experience, such as the feelings of pain and pleasure,and the second is the way of likening, such as to teach an impotentperson the pleasure of sexual intercourse by likening it to the sweet-ness of sugar. By this means one does not attain the essence of thepleasure sought for, but only a general aspect of it. Here al-Rˆz“ isundoubtedly in� uenced by al-ýazˆl“ even in employing the example oftasting sugar.54 However, elsewhere he quotes Ab� al-Barakˆt who saysthat one can know the essence of a thing through the perception ofthe senses, for example, the perception of heat through touching a hotthing.55 Now, says al-Rˆz“, God’s essence is not present in our soul,meaning that we cannot experience it like we experience feelings, andHis essence is likened to what one knows only through negative attrib-utes and relations. It follows that God’s essence is not known to man.56

In the passage al-Rˆz“ quotes from Ab� al-Barakˆt it is stated that thehuman being cannot perceive God’s essence like he perceives the heatof a thing. However, if such a perception were possible, one would askif there is a special organ for this perception, or if no such an organexists then only the substance of the rational faculty can operate butonly when material impediments are removed. However, on the basisof the assumption that such a perception is possible by this organ, oneshould ask whether this organ is created or not.57 Ab� al-Barakˆt regardsall these means as possible, because there is no clear-cut proof throughwhich one can negate or aYrm them. However, at present, humanbeings are not capable of perceiving God’s essence. This conclusion

53 MabˆúiÆ, vol. II, p. 522f.54 See above p. 209f.55 Óarú asmˆ" allˆh al-úusnˆ (or Lawˆmi’ al-bayyinˆt Òarú asmˆ" allˆh ta’ˆlˆ wa ’l-§ifˆt), ed.

ÿaha ’Abd al-Ra"�f Sa’d, Beirut 1990 (henceforth al-Rˆz“, Óarú), p. 102.56 MabˆúiÆ, vol. II, p. 523.57 I do not know why Ab� al-Barakˆt puts forward two such possibilities.


serves Ab� al-Barakˆt as the point of departure for his statement thatGod’s greatest name (al-ism al-a’½am) cannot be known, because a namecan be given only to what is known. Only when we know God’s essence,will we be able to know His greatest name. Hence if God illuminatesthe heart of one of His servants with the light of the knowledge of Hisessence, possibly He will also give him this name.58 d. Intellection isachieved through the impression which the form of the object knownleaves on the knower. This form must be equal to the essence of theobject known. If we knew the Creator, the form impressed in our intel-lect would be equal to His essence and His essence would be transmittedto many persons, which is an absurdity.59 We shall see that al-Rˆz“accepts Ab� al-Barakˆt’s notion that man can know God’s essence onlyif God provides him with such knowledge.60

Ma ̂ lib is one of al-Rˆz“’s last works. It can be characterized as ametaphysical work which combines AÒ’arite theology with philosophy.Al-Rˆz“ regards metaphysics (al-’ilm al-ilˆh“ ) as the loftiest science, forthe rank of a science is measured according to its object. Since theobject of this science is God’s essence and attributes, and God isabsolutely the loftiest existent, al-’ilm al-ilˆh“ is the loftiest science.61 ThatGod is the loftiest existent is proved through several statements: a. Heneeds no one; b. He is absolutely simple, which means that He is notdivided into parts which compose His essence; c. He is necessarily exis-tent by virtue of Himself, while everything outside Him is possible byvirtue of itself and needs a cause, in order to exist; d. God is not onlythe cause of the things’ existence, but also of their continuance andnon-existence; and e. Existence is more exalted than non-existence.God, who is necessary existent by virtue of Himself, is not subject tonon-existence. In contradistinction to God’s nature, everything outsideHimself is possible existent by virtue of itself. If we consider the pos-sible existent in itself, it is non-existent.62

Metaphysics is the most exalted science not only because it dealswith the most exalted object, namely God, but also because practicing

58 Al-Rˆz“, Óarú, p. 103.59 Ibid., p. 523f.60 See below p. 221.61 In his estimation of metaphysics, al-Rˆz“ was very probably in� uenced by Ibn

S“nˆ’s introduction to al-Ilˆhiyyˆt of al-Óifˆ" (ed. G.C. Anawati and Sa’“d Zˆyid, Cairo1960, p. 15, henceforth Ibn S“nˆ, Ilˆhiyyˆt) in which he states that metaphysics is themost excellent science on the most excellent object (or because of the most excellentobject—af¶al ’ilm bi-af¶al ma’l�m).

62 Ma ˆlib, vol. I, part 1, p. 37f.


metaphysics causes man to attain the most exalted pleasure, that is thespiritual pleasure, or the spiritual felicity, which is sought by virtue ofitself and not as a means to attain something else.63 There are severalreasons to prefer spiritual to material pleasure: a. Man shares materialpleasure with animals, but they surpass him in it. Whoever engages inmaterial pleasures resembles animals;64 b. material pleasure does notlast, while spiritual pleasure continues to exist;65 c. man’s inborn disposi-tion ( � ra) judges that material pleasure is contemptible, whereas dimin-ishing it is regarded as preferable;66 and d. spiritual happiness leadsman to the holy worlds. In typical Rˆz“an manner, by which tradi-tional proofs come after philosophical ones,67 our author also states thatprophetic pieces of evidence show that ignorance of this subject engen-ders eternal punishment, while knowledge of it brings eternal happiness.68

Another reason for preferring this science above all others is thedeep satisfaction with his own essence which the perfect human being(al-insˆn al-kˆmil )69 feels when dealing with it.

According to al-Rˆz“, even worldly aVairs are not carried out prop-erly without knowledge of the origin of this world and its destination(al-mabda" wa ’l-ma’ˆd ). By this knowledge he means metaphysics whichincludes man’s knowledge of God, His angels, books, messengers, andthe Day of Judgment. If the religious laws were absent, social orderwould disappear, and man would not be safe from injury.

In sum, says al-Rˆz“, the origin of goodness and happiness is thisknowledge, and whoever perceives it stands in the highest human rankwhich equals the lowest angelic rank.70

63 Cf. Ibn S“nˆ, Ilˆhiyyˆt, pp. 17-24. Ab� al-Barakˆt, Mu’tabar, p. 11f.64 According to Ibn S“nˆ, internal pleasures are stronger than sensual pleasures, the

more so concerning the intellectual pleasures which transcend the internal ones. IbnS“nˆ, IÒˆrˆt, p. 191.

65 Possibly this is an echo of al-Fˆrˆb“ ’s Ërˆ" ahl al-mad“na al-fˆ¶ila, ed., trans. andcommentary R. Walzer, Oxford 1985, ch. 13, para. 5, pp. 204-206, 408-412.

66 In Ibn S“nˆ’s view, those whose inborn disposition ( � ra) is in a sound state, havepleasure when they hear a statement on spiritual issue. IÒˆrˆt, p. 196.

67 Cf. my “Religion versus Philosophy—the Case of Fa¢r al-D“n al-Rˆz“’s Proofs forProphecy”, in a monographic volume of Oriente Moderno on the theme: Religion versus sci-ence in Islam: a medieval and modern debate, ed. Carmela BaYoni 19 (2000), pp. 415-425.

68 Ma ˆlib, p. 38f.69 By al-insˆn al-kˆmil in this context, al-Rˆz“ does not mean, it seems to me, the

perfect mystical personality known from the mystical literature (See A. Schimmel, MysticalDimensions of Islam, Chapel Hill 1975, index, and EI 2, vol. III, pp. 1239V.), but a manwhose intellect is perfect.

70 Ma ˆlib, p. 39f. In placing whomever is well versed in metaphysics in the highest


However, in al-Rˆz“’s view, one cannot attain certainty in dealingwith some parts of metaphysics, and one must be satis� ed with themost appropriate (al-awlˆ) knowledge of some metaphysical matterswhich are attainable rather than absolute and certain knowledge.71

Several arguments are put forward to prove this contention. The foun-dation of the � rst argument is man’s knowledge of his own essencewhich is the most manifest object of knowledge. However, man’s intel-lect cannot fully attain this knowledge because of its hiddenness. Thus,if one cannot absolutely know one’s own essence, the more so regard-ing God and His attributes. That man has some knowledge of his ownessence is proved through the fact that whoever knows something, nec-essarily knows that he knows it. But the statement that man knows hisown essence is not clear enough, for what do we mean, asks al-Rˆz“,by saying “I”. Does “I” mean the structure of my body, or my body,or an attribute of my structure, or a substance separated from my body?Intelligent people are perplexed concerning the answer to the question:what do we mean by saying “I”? Now, if concerning one’s own essencethere is no clear knowledge, the more so concerning God’s essence.That is because God’s essence absolutely diVers from all the possiblethings.72 Moreover, one is perplexed also regarding the knowledge ofthe body, and the essence of time and place. Philosophers were dividedon the de� nition of place. Whereas Plato, his followers, and the philoso-phers who preceded him held that place is an expression of extensionof the space or void (al-bu’d al-mumtadd ), Aristotle and his followers heldthat place is an expression of containing surface (al-satú al-muú“ ), andthey denied the existence of void.73 Perplexity prevails also in philo-sophical discussions about time. Surprisingly, here al-Rˆz“ does not

human rank and the lowest angelic rank, al-Rˆz“ follows the epistles of the Brethrenof Purity. Rasˆ"il I¢wˆn al-êafˆ", Beirut 1957 (rep. of Ýayr al-D“n al-Zirikl“’s ed. Cairo1928), vol. IV, pp. 276-281. I.R. Netton, Muslim Neoplatonists: An Introduction to the Thoughtof the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwˆn al-êafˆ"), London 1980, p. 36f.

71 According to Pines, Maimonides is of the opinion that no scienti� c certitude canbe achieved regarding objects outside the sublunar world. Pines, “Limitation,” p. 93f.For a contrary view see H.A. Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,”Maimonidean Studies III (1992-3), pp. 49-103.

72 Ma ˆlib, vol. I, part 1, pp. 41-43.73 Ibid., p. 43f. In Aristotle’s Physics (212a, 6) the exact de� nition reads: “The bound-

ary of the containing body at which it is in contact with the contained body.” The BasicWorks of Aristotle, trans. of the Physics by R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, p. 277. For adiscussion of this topic see, for example, S. Sambursky, The Concept of Place in LateNeoplatonism, Jerusalem 1982.


detail the various views on the topic.74 As for the essence of the body,scholars also have diVerent opinions; some of them hold that the bodyis composed of atoms (al-a[zˆ" allat“ lˆ tata[azza"u),75 while others regardthe body as in� nitely divided. Consequently, one must hold the mostappropriate views which are possible concerning the subjects mentionedabove, and if this is the case regarding the most manifest matters, themore so concerning God’s essence, greatness, and attributes. Add tothis, says al-Rˆz“, the problems which confront those who deal withthe strongest intellectual � eld, namely geometry, and you will reach thesame conclusion.76

In his second argument, al-Rˆz“ makes a comparison between thefaculty of sight and the intellect. Concerning their objects, both facul-ties have three equal states: a. The faculty of sight cannot perceive tinyobjects such as a grain of dust; b. When a man looks at bright objectslike the disk of the sun, he imagines darkness at the middle of the sun,which is not the real state of the sun. That is because the faculty ofsight is blinded by the strong light of the sun such that it cannot per-ceive the sun as it really is; seeing becomes distorted;77 and c. Thethird category of objects lies at the middle between strength and weak-ness. Such are accidents subsisting in the bodies of this world whichman can absolutely perceive. In principal, the same division exists withregard to the objects of the intellect: a. Human intellect cannot exactlyperceive weak objects of knowledge such as the measures of tempera-ments (marˆtib al-amzi[a), or changes which occur in the body, for theseare weak states which disappear rapidly; b. Holy substances such asGod’s essence and His attributes and essences devoid of connection tomateriality are so strong that the human intellect cannot perceive them.Here al-Rˆz“ uses an expression which resembles the second categoryof objects of the faculty of sight. This is “the illumination of His lofti-ness” (iÒrˆq <alˆlihi ). The parallel state of distorted seeing, in terms of

74 Ma ˆlib, ibid., p. 44, ll. 1-5. On time see, for example, S. Sambursky, The Conceptof Time in Late Neoplatonism, The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities Proceedings, vol. II,no. 8, Jerusalem 1966.

75 For Islamic Atomism see S. Pines, Studies in Islamic Atomism, trans. from German(� rst published Berlin 1936) by M. Schwarz and edited by T. Langermann, Jerusalem1997. For the opponents of atomism see ibid., pp. 12-26.

76 Ma ˆlib, ibid., pp. 44-46.77 Cf. Plato, Republic, VII, 515f. Ab� al-Barakˆt, Mu’tabar, p. 7. For references to

Jewish philosophy see Mose ben Maimon, Führer der Unschlüssigen, annotated trans. byA. Weiss, Hamburg 1972, p. 206f., n. 29.


the intellect, is perplexity; and c. Middle objects of knowledge, whichare neither absolutely weak nor strong are perceived by the intellect.78

In the third argument al-Rˆz“ diVerentiates between two kinds ofknowledge: a. perception (ta§awwur); b. judgment (ta§d“q)?79 Elsewhere,he de� nes these two as follows: “If we perceive a certain thing, we canrefer to it in two ways; either we consider it as it is, without judgingit neither through aYrmation nor negation, and this is ta§awwur, or wejudge it either through aYrmation or negation, and this is ta§d“q.”80 Inother words, ta§awwur is to form a concept of a thing, while ta§d“q isto judge this concept as true or false. According to al-Rˆz“, there arefour kinds of ta§awwur: a. Perception of the sensibles; b. necessary percep-tion of feelings and emotions; c. perception by inborn disposition ( � ra)of essences (mˆhiyyˆt) such as existence and absence, oneness and plu-rality, necessity, and possibility and impossibility;81 and d. When com-posed in diVerent ways, the three preceding kinds of perception, whichare self-evident, serve as foundations for other perceptions. The act ofcomposition is carried out either by the imagination or by the intel-lect. For example, the faculty of imagination can perceive a sea madeof quicksilver, for the faculty of sight perceives both sea and quicksil-ver. Likewise the intellect can join two objects of perception such ascopartner and God to form another object, namely God’s copartner.But as the intellect knows that God is absolutely one, it draws the con-clusion that the statement “God’s copartner” is impossible.82 Al-Rˆz“concludes thus that pieces of knowledge or perceptions (ta§awwurˆt)attained by the intellect may only originate from these four sources.And because judgments (ta§d“qˆt) are conditioned by perceptions, theformer are con� ned to the latter.

78 Ibid., pp. 46-49.79 Cf. al-Tahˆnaw“, KaÒÒˆf i§ ilˆúˆt al-fun�n, ed. Lu f“ ’Abd al-Bad“’, Cairo 1972, vol.

II, part 4, p. 231. According to al-]ur<ˆn“ (Ta’r“fˆt, p. 61), ta§awwur means the exis-tence of the form of a thing in the intellect (úu§�l §�rat al-Òay" f“ ’l-’aql ), and ta§d“q is toregard by choice the fact informed as truthful (an tansuba bi-i¢tiyˆrika al-§idq ilˆ al-mu¢bar).On these terms in philosophy see H.A. Wolfson, “The Terms Ta§awwur and Ta§d“q inArabic Philosophy and Their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents, The Muslim World(1943), pp. 114-128.

80 Muúa§§al, p. 81. According to Ibn S“nˆ, ta§awwur is � rst knowledge which is at-tained by de� nition and the like, while ta§d“q is attained by analogy and the like. Al-Na[ˆt, p. 43.

81 In Islamic theology the � rst three kinds are included in necessary knowledge (’ilm¶ar�r“). See note 43 above.

82 Ma ˆlib, vol. I, part 1, p. 49f.


To this introduction al-Rˆz“ adds what he already proved, that is,God is totally diVerent from all the sensibles known to us. If God sharedwith the sensibles in some aspects and diVered from them in otheraspects, the part in his essence which shares with the sensibles wouldbe other than the part which diVers83 from the sensibles. This wouldmean that His essence is composed of parts which is an absurdity.Hence God’s essence is absolutely unperceivable by the human intel-lect.84 And since judgment is based on perception, there is also no wayto judge, namely, to aYrm or to negate His essence. According to al-Rˆz“, the only way open to man to know God is to examine perfec-tion and imperfection with regard to the human being, and from thisknowledge to move to the knowledge of God. That is because one canperceive the absolute entity through the perception of the limited entity.85

Thus it is possible to perceive God’s perfection through the perceptionof man’s perfection without adding to God the attributes of man. Al-Rˆz“ admits that this is general knowledge about which one can say itis the most appropriate knowledge attainable by man.86 However, al-Rˆz“ here runs a risk of expressing anthropomorphism, for the diVerencebetween God and human being turns out to be a diVerence of quan-tity and not of quality.

The fourth argument looks at the subject matter from another angle.Passing from the known to the unknown is understood only in threeways: a. Inference of the eVect from the cause (al-istidlˆl bi ’l-’illa ’alˆal-ma’l�l ); b. inference of the equal (al-musˆw“ ) from the equal; and c.inference of the cause from the eVect. Concerning God, the � rst twoways are of no avail, because, I suggest,87 � rst, God, the object forwhich we thirst is the cause and the world is the eVect, and second,there can be no analogy between two absolutely diVerent entities. Theonly way which remains, says al-Rˆz“, is to ascend from the impres-sion (aÆar) or eVect to whomever makes it (mu"aÆÆir) or to the cause,namely God. Again basing himself on the hierarchy of existents which

83 Here the text has al-mu¢ˆla a (= to associate with) which should be replaced byal-mu¢ˆlafa (= to diVer from).

84 Cf. Pines, “Limitations,” p. 92.85 Very probably this is al-Rˆz“’s intention when he states that “the absolute is a

part of the limited essence” (al-mu laq <uz" min mˆhiyat al-muqayyad ) meaning that somemeasure of the absolute exists in the limited essence.

86 Ma ˆlib, vol. I, part 1, p. 50f.87 Here al-Rˆz“ gives no explanation.


occurs in Rasˆ"il I ¢wˆn al-êafˆ",88 al-Rˆz“ states that man’s rational soulstands at the lowest magnitude of the holy existents which are devoidof matter, namely the angels. The rational soul ascends from its knowl-edge of itself to the knowledge of its cause, and from the latter toanother cause and so forth, till it reaches the presence of the neces-sary existent by virtue of itself. As a corroboration for the notion thatGod occupies the highest magnitude, he cites several Qur"ˆn verses,for example, “and that the � nal end (al-muntahˆ) is unto thy Lord”(Qur"ˆn 53.42).89 Since the rational soul is weak, most people do notsucceed in escaping the world of senses, thus ascending to higher states.An extraordinary minority does ascend from the world of sensibles tothe world of imaginations, and out of them a few people ascend fromthe world of imaginations to the world of intelligibles. However, in theworld of intelligibles there are also many ranks of the holy spirits. Manyexcellent intellects pass away in the lights of holy spirits. Only thoseendowed by God with a divine soul reach the holy presence.90 In thiscontext al-Rˆz“ mentions God’s necessary existence; there is no refer-ence to His essence and attributes. He seeks to prove that metaphysicsis a diYcult � eld which only very few people can handle. The wholepassage is a blend of the theory of emanation and ê�f“sm. ê�f“sm isfurther mentioned in the third chapter as the second way to reachGod, the � rst path being re� ection and analogy.

In his � rst approach, al-Rˆz“ does not deal with God’s essence, butonly with the proof of His necessary existence through the examina-tion of the sensibles which are possible by virtue of themselves. By wayof implication we can once again draw the conclusion that all we canknow about God is His necessary existence and not His essence orattributes. The second way is called the way of the people of asceticpractice (a§úˆb al-riyˆ¶a). Such people purify their hearts by mention-ing only God, thereby acquiring high lights and divine secrets. Accordingto al-Rˆz“, there are several ranks of human souls, the highest amongwhich are the souls whose inborn dispositions turn them to love Godand to know Him deeply. Other souls achieve some qualities of theformer, but in a weak state. Still others, being immersed in the worldof senses and imaginations, are devoid of any inclination toward spir-

88 See above p. 216.89 A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted, Oxford 1983. See also Qur"ˆn 42.53, 57.3.90 Ma ˆlib, ibid., p. 51f.


itual and divine matters. To illustrate this division, al-Rˆz“ employs theparable of mountains and the minerals therein. Mountains and hills aredivided into two kinds, those which contain minerals and those whichdo not. The second kind are more numerous than the � rst. Mountainswhich have minerals are divided in turn into those which contain baseminerals such as sulfur and petroleum, and those which contain pre-cious minerals such as gold and silver. The former are more numerousthan the latter. Moreover, the quantities of the base minerals are greaterthan the quantities of the precious minerals. Concerning the preciousminerals, investigations show that in some mountains one has to workhard to � nd small amounts of gold, while in others a great quantityof gold is easily found. Between these two extremes, there are manydiVerent degrees. So on a spiritual yardstick, human souls are like themountains, and the lights of man’s knowledge of God are like the pre-cious minerals. Many souls are devoid of any inclination to the worldof spirituality, while others diVer in their degree of spirituality and intheir ability to achieve spirituality. Just as it is conceivable that a moun-tain may conceal a cave full of gold, so it is also conceivable that per-sons separated by generations may be gifted with a cave of spiritualitythat is full of God’s lights of majesty.91

Al-Rˆz“ further details his conclusions from this parable. First hestates that engaging in ascetic practice, even if it is done intensively, isno guarantee to attaining a state of spirituality. This notion appears inal-ýazˆl“’s treatment of the question concerning the truest way to per-ceive God. Al-ýazˆl“ believes that although ascetic practice may bringone to perceive God, it is more likely to lead the ascetic astray by falseimaginations, if he did not learn the sciences before practicing asceti-cism.92 Also another idea found in al-ýazˆl“ might be al-Rˆz“’s source:Not everybody who attains something of the divine matters, attains theobjective, meaning full knowledge of God, for due to God’s in� nitegreatness, it is impossible to reach this objective. Hence the hierarchyof happiness is in� nite.93 Al-Rˆz“ emphatically states in his teaching

91 This brings to mind Stoic tradition according to which the wise person is rare. S. van den Bergh, The Incoherence of the Incoherence, London 1954, vol. II, p. 206, n. 363.F. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, Philosophy and Orthodoxy, London 1958, p. 36. Cf. BabylonianTalmud, tractate Sukka, fol. 45b.

92 Iúyˆ", vol. III, p. 19f. For a detailed discussion of al-ýazˆl“’s stand see my “Al-Ghazˆl“’s Supreme Way to Know God”, Studia Islamica 77(1993), pp. 149-152.

93 Iúyˆ", vol. IV, p. 315. See my Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism, The Teachings of al-Ghazˆl“ and al-Dabbˆgh, Curzon Press (forthcoming), part II, ch. 4.


that not everyone who takes the path of the ê�f“s reaches that whichhe seeks, namely nearness to God. However, he does not deny thatascetic practice has some in� uence on the individual. Al-Rˆz“ ends thissection with Aristotle’s statement to the eVect that “Whoever wants tobegin seeking the divine knowledge should create in his soul anotherdisposition,” which means, according to al-Rˆz“, that one should inten-sively sever his connections with the senses and imagination.94

In what he calls the second and the third maqˆms (ways, lit. stations)to reaching divine knowledge, al-Rˆz“ does not deviate from the ideasstated above; to reach divine knowledge one should think only of God,for the core of one’s soul, or its principal disposition � ts God’s presence.By this disposition al-Rˆz“ seems to regard the inner part of the humansoul as divine. However, the soul’s connection to the body prevents itfrom reaching its divine point. Anyhow, al-Rˆz“ recommends the wayof re� ection before engaging in ascetic practice to escape mistakes whichderive from man’s awareness sometimes that his highest mystical statesare the highest objective which can be attained. This awareness mayhinder the attaining of the true objective.95 In sum, for reaching thehighest degrees possible for man of knowledge about God, al-Rˆz“ placesthree conditions: a. Perfection of re� ection; b. perfection of ascetic prac-tice; and c. � tness of man’s soul with the divine. Also here, al-Rˆz“does not state that man can truly know God’s essence and attributes.

Al-Rˆz“ doubts not only man’s knowledge of God’s essence, but alsoman’s knowledge of God’s attributes. In his view, there is a direct con-nection between these two perceptions. The problem begins with God’sessence. If we judged that God’s essence equals the objects of our senses,soul, and intellect, God would be possible existent by virtue of Himself(mumkin li-Åˆtihi ), for these objects are possible existents by virtue ofthemselves. Since God is necessary existent by virtue of Himself, it isinconceivable that He should be possible existent by virtue of Himself.On the other hand, to regard God as totally diVerent from the objectsthat we perceive by our intellect will lead to perplexity and to inabil-ity to know something about God. To sum up, the two ways—onewhich relies on the equality between the objects perceived by man andGod’s essence, and the second which denies any equality between Godand these objects—do not yield knowledge about God’s essence. Thisconclusion severely aVects the knowledge of God’s attributes, for if one

94 Ma ˆlib, vol. I, part 1, pp. 55-57.95 Ibid., p. 58f.


cannot know God’s essence, how can one describe Him by attributesof greatness and holiness?96

The treatment of our knowledge of God’s attributes is carried outthrough stating two possibilities: either His attributes are diVerent fromHis essence (mu©ˆyira li ’l-Åât), or identical with His essence (al-§ifˆt ’aynal-Åˆt). The � rst possibility entails that God’s essence is composed ofmany essences, and each composite thing is possible existent, while Godis necessary existent by virtue of His essence.97 This argument cancelsGod’s attributes as parts of His essence. As for the second possibility,one can know the essence of each attribute while overlooking God’sessence. But if there is identity between the essence and the attributes,this knowledge is impossible. Furthermore, each attribute has an essenceof its own which diVers from other essences. Now, if the attributes wereidentical with one essence, the essence would be composed of manyessences which is an absurdity.98

Another argument against man’s knowledge of God’s attributes takesas its point of departure man’s experience. God’s knowledge of the par-ticulars and the universals is necessarily in� nite. Likewise, God’s poweraVects all possible existents. However, that one attribute treats in� niteobjects in such a way that each treatment does not interfere with anotheris a phenomenon unknown to man from his experience. Consequently,it is diYcult for the human intellect to perceive such a phenomenon.99

Here, as in the previous arguments, the diYculty to know God’s attrib-utes derives from the inborn inability of man’s intellect, while thediYculty mentioned above derives from the intellect’s conclusion on theimpossibility to de� ne the relation between God’s essences and attrib-utes. The unde� nability of this relation hinders the possibility of man’sknowledge of God’s attributes.

In the second part of Ma ̂ lib, al-Rˆz“ continues his discussion onthe knowledge of God’s essence and attributes in a more detailed form.It is an elaboration of his discussion in Ma’ˆlim.100 To recapitulate, whatwe know about God is four things: a. His existence; b. the modalityof His existence (His being necessary existent by virtue of Himself andHis being eternal); c. His relations with the world (His knowledge of

96 Ibid., p. 60.97 Cf. Mafˆt“ú, part 24, p. 128 (Commentary on Qur"ˆn 26.23).98 Ibid., p. 61.99 Ibid.

100 See p. 211 above.


all things); and d. negations concerning God (He is not in a place, Heis not composed of parts). None of these four kinds of knowledge pro-vide knowledge about God’s essence. Al-Rˆz“ reasons that what weknow about God is not knowledge of His essence. As for God’s exist-ence, it is an attribute existing in God’s essence, not His essence. Thesame judgment applies to His being eternal, because if the knowledgeof existence is not a knowledge of the essence, the knowledge of themodality of existence is more likely not to be a knowledge of the essence.Also God’s essence is not an expression of what is negated from Him.Al-Rˆz“ seems to state that when we say, for example, that God is notan accident, we actually say nothing about what He really is. Likewise,the knowledge of God’s relations to the world does not provide us withknowledge of His essence.101 The knowledge of these four things nei-ther necessitates the knowledge of His essence, for by this knowledgewe only know He is a certain thing, nor what He is. Al-Rˆz“ concludesthis argument by saying that since we know only these four kinds ofknowledge about God, and since we reason that they neither provideus with knowledge about God’s essence nor necessitate such a knowl-edge, we cannot know God’s essence.102

The second argument, which was already discussed above, is basedon the division of knowledge into perception (ta§awwur) and judgment(ta§d“q), the latter being a branch of the former. As mentioned above,perception or knowledge is divided in turn into four parts, perceptionof sensibles, of feelings and emotions, of intelligibles, and of the objectsof both the intellect and imagination. Since God’s essence is not anobject which belongs to either of the four parts of perception, it remainsunknown.103 In the third argument al-Rˆz“ brings forth the philoso-phers’ statement that knowledge of the essence of a cause entails knowl-edge of its eVects. Hence, if one knows God’s essence, he necessarilyknows all possible existents, which is an absurdity. Al-Rˆz“ also putforth the philosophical idea, which is the foundation of the fourth argu-ment, to the eVect that knowledge of a thing means the existence ofthe form of the object known in the knower. Consequently, man’s sup-posed knowledge of God’s essence means the existence of the form ofGod’s essence in man, which is again an absurdity.104

101 Cf. Mafˆt“ú, part 24, p. 128f. (Commentary on Qur"ˆn 26.23).102 Ma ̂ lib, vol. I, part 2, pp. 88-90.103 Ibid., p. 90f. See p. 219f. above.104 Ibid., p. 92.


At the basis of the � fth argument lie three premises according tothe � rst of which, if we limit a universal nature ( ab“ ’a kulliyya)105 by auniversal limit, the essence which is limited will be also universal. Forexample, a man, who is a part of a group or a species, may be quali� edby a universal, such as knower, and the combination “a man who isknower” is a universal. In such a manner one can attach many uni-versal attributes to a universal entity, thus keeping the latter in its uni-versal state. In the second premise, al-Rˆz“ makes a distinction betweena universal and a particular (al-Òa¢s“, al-[uz"“ ), the latter being a certainthing. Thus “man” is a universal, while Zayd is a particular. Accordingto the third premise, God is a particular, not a universal. Now al-Rˆz“argues that all which we ascribe to God are universals, which meansthat we make Him a universal, while God’s essence is a particular.106

Consequently, we cannot know His essence. This argument seems weakto me, because, for example, one of the universals mentioned by al-Rˆz“ is God’s being a necessary existent by virtue of Himself which isGod’s speci� c quality that no one shares with Him, hence it is a par-ticular. Al-Rˆz“ is aware of this diYculty; he is asked about the attribute“one” which applies, according to the questioner, to God alone. Al-Rˆz“’s answer seems unconvincing; he asserts that the knowledge thatGod is one and that no one shares with Him His oneness is knowl-edge of a universal thing, explaining that “one” can be the � rst (alif )or the second (bˆ") in a series, and in each case it is one that no oneshares with it its place.107 It is possible to save this argument from itsweakness only by referring to Ibn S“nˆ’s statement concerning this term.In his view, the term kull“, which attests to many, may apply either tomany in existence, such as the word “man”, or to many which can beimagined ( f“ <awˆz al-wahm), such as the word “sun”.108

The sixth argument consists of the statements that God is in� nite,while the human intellect is � nite. By God’s in� nity, al-Rˆz“ means Hiseternity. That which is � nite cannot perceive eternity, because eternityhas no limit, whereas man’s intellect perceives things in terms of limits.109

105 See above p. 213.106 Cf. Mafˆt“ú, part 24, p. 129 (Commentary on Qur"ˆn 26.23): “The knowledge

that an entity has a certain concomitant (lˆzim) does not provide knowledge on the indi-viduality of the entity’s essence, because it is not inconceivable that diVerent essenceswould share the same concomitants.”

107 Ma ˆlib, vol. I, part 2, pp. 92-94.108 Al-Na[ˆt, p. 45. This example also appears in Ab� al-Barakˆt. Mu’tabar, p. 13.109 Al-Óahrastˆn“ (al-Milal wa ’l-niúal, ed. êidq“ ]am“l al-’A ˆr on the basis of ’Abd


In the seventh argument our author states that “knowledge is a kindof overcoming the object known” (al-’ilm naw’ ist“lˆ" ’alˆ al-ma’l�m).Whoever does not know something feels inability with regard to theobject of knowledge. If the intellect could know God’s essence, it wouldovercome God in some respects. But overcoming belongs to God alone,and human beings must remain in a state of inability with regard toGod.110 Like the sixth argument the eighth argument addresses to theweakness of the human intellect, but from another point of view. Theintellect cannot deal with two objects of knowledge at the same time,the more so it cannot deal with the highest object of knowledge, namelyGod’s essence.

Al-Rˆz“ does not ignore the arguments of those who advocate man’sknowledge of God’s essence. He brings forward four arguments andthe rejoinders to each of them. The � rst argument is based on theterms ta§awwur and ta§d“q mentioned above.111 Every judgment (ta§d“q)must be preceded by the knowledge (ta§awwur) of the subject (maw¶�’ )and the predicate (maúm�l ).112 In the proposition (qa¶iyya)113 “God’sessence is unintelligible to the human being” (úaq“qatuhu ©ayr ma’q�la114

li’l-¢alq), the subject is “God’s essence” and the predicate “unintelligi-ble . . .” Whoever ascribes this predicate to this subject has to knowboth the subject and the predicate. Thus it is proved that the verac-ity of the statement “His essence is unintelligible” is founded on theknowledge of His essence as the subject of this proposition. However,when we negate a subject through a predicate, we actually aYrm theformer’s existence, which means that the negation is false; when wenegate our knowledge of God’s essence we aYrm that we know it. Thusthe proposition “God’s essence is unintelligible . . .” is false, meaning

al-’Az“z Muúammad Wak“l’s ed., Beirut 1997, p. 271) quotes a saying of Socrates tothe same eVect: “His knowledge, power, generosity, and wisdom are in� nite. Reasoncannot describe them, and if it described them, they would be � nite.” Cf. Judah Ha-Levi, Kit̂ b al-Radd-wa ’l-dal“l f“ ’l-d“n al-Åal“l (Kuzari), ed. D.H. Baneth (in Hebrew char-acters), Jerusalem 1977, V, ch. 21, p. 226, ll. 11-12: “If we perceived His essence, Hewould be imperfect” (law adraknˆ úaq“qatahu lakˆna Åˆlika naq§an f“hi ). Kaufmann, Attributenlehre,p. 326, a 190.

110 As we have seen this argument was also expressed by al-ýazˆl“. See above p. 208.111 See p. 219 above.112 For these two terms see Ibn S“nˆ, al-Na[ˆt, p. 51f. K. Gyeke, Arabic Logic, Ibn

ÿayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge, Albany 1979, p. 167f.113 For this term see al-]ur<ˆn“, Ta’r“fˆt, p. 184.114 In the last part of the argument, which deals with attributes and states, al-Rˆz“

uses the word ma’l�ma (known).


that the essence is intelligible. The same argument applies to a subjectsuch as “God’s essence from the point of view of some of its attributesand states.” In � ne, a contradiction arises whenever we predicate insuch a manner essence or attributes and states.115

The second argument in favor of man’s knowledge of God’s essencebegins in the same form of the � rst one, namely, every judgment ispreceded by the knowledge of subject and predicate. Suppose we aYrmthe existence of attributes to God’s essence, and we aYrm these attrib-utes as predicates, what is the subject of these attributes? Al-Rˆz“ pro-poses two possibilities: a. The subject is the essence by virtue of itself(the way the essence is in itself ); and b. the subject is the essence fromthe point of view of other attributes. I assume that al-Rˆz“ has thoughtabout propositions such as “God’s essence is identical to His attributes”(a) and God’s essence as understood through some attributes is identi-cal to His attributes” (b). In the � rst case the essence, as a subject,must be known. In the second case, one should ask how the attributesare related to the essence. If they are related through other attributes,an in� nite series will ensue, which is an absurdity. If, on the otherhand, we � nally come to aYrm one attribute of the essence by virtueof itself, this essence, as a subject in a proposition, must be known.116

In principle, the two arguments state the same view, that is, in aproposition the subject must be known. Therefore, al-Rˆz“ replies toboth of them, bringing forward the following proposition: “That whichis not known is not subject to a judgment (lit. cannot be judged),” (mˆlˆ yak�nu muta§awwaran lˆ yumkinu al-úukm ’alayhi ). Now, according to theargument of those who advocate man’s knowledge of God’s essence, asubject in a proposition must be known. It follows that the subject inal-Rˆz“’s proposition must be known, and this leads to a contradiction,namely, that which is not known is known.

The third argument begins with the premise that we know some-thing about God. There are three possible kinds of knowledge: a.Knowledge of God’s essence by virtue of itself; b. knowledge of Hisattributes by virtue of themselves, not by virtue of their relation to Hisessence, and c. knowledge of His attributes by virtue of their relationto His essence. The � rst possibility means that we know God’s essence.The second possibility is false, because to know something by virtue of

115 Ma ˆlib, vol. I, part 2, p. 95f.116 Ibid., p. 96.


itself is diVerent from knowing it by virtue of its relation to anotherobject. In other words, to perceive the characteristics of knowledge asit is in itself is diVerent from perceiving knowledge as an attribute ofGod. According to the third possibility we know the attributes by virtueof their existence in God’s essence, and this knowledge is knowledgeof His essence. That is because the knowledge that a thing occurs inanother is conditioned by the knowledge of these two things (the thingthat occurs and the thing in which the former occurs), which meansthat we know this speci� c essence.

The fourth argument begins with the statement that “there is nocontroversy concerning our knowledge that God is a substance (Åat)which exists by virtue of itself (annahu Åˆt qˆ"ima bi ’l-nafs).117 The objectof this knowledge is either the perfection of this substance, or part ofthe essence of this substance (<uz" min a<zˆ" mˆhiyyat tilka al-Åˆt), orsomething else outside the essence of this substance.” The � rst possi-bility is what we are looking for, while the second possibility necessi-tates that this substance is composed of two parts or more, which meansthat the substance is a possible thing, for each composed thing is pos-sible. If God’s essence is possible, this contradicts its existence by virtueof itself. The third possibility is more likely to be rejected, for His beinga substance is an attribute outside the substance, which means that thesubstance is an expression of an attribute diVerent from the substance,not an expression of the substance. It follows that the substance is nota substance which is self-contradictory.118

Al-Rˆz“ rejoins to both the third and the fourth arguments statingthat if we know God’s essence we mean by it its being existent byvirtue of itself, not being in want of something else, and this is a neg-ative understanding. Negations are outside the scope of essences whichmeans that they teach nothing about the essences.119 Concluding thissection, al-Rˆz“ says that human beings cannot attain the knowledgeof God’s essence by their intellect.

In sum, we have seen that, like al-ýazˆl“, al-Rˆz“ in his later workschanged his mind concerning man’s knowledge of God’s essence and

117 Here the term Åˆt should be translated as substance.118 Ibid., p. 97.119 Ibid., p. 98. Cf. Maimonides, Dalˆlat, p. 95, ll. 2-3: wa ’l-salb lˆ yu’arrifu Òay"an bi-

wa<hin min úaq“qat al-amr al-laÅ“ suliba minhu al-Òay" al-laÅ“ suliba (“negation does not giveknowledge in any respect of the true reality of the thing with regard to which the par-ticular matter in question has been negated.” Pines, Guide, vol. I, p. 139 (part 1, ch. 59).

adopted the philosophical position that His essence cannot be known.120

He developed a set of arguments in favor of the unknowability of God’sessence not neglecting some arguments in favor of knowability andreplying to them. It seems that in his � nal approach, he was in� uencedby al-ýazˆl“’s later works and by Ab� al-Barakˆt al-Ba©dˆd“. The grow-ing in� uence of philosophy on theology undoubtedly caused both al-ýazˆl“, and, to a greater extent, al-Rˆz“ to elaborate on the knowabilityof God’s essence, a theme which had only been partially discussed inprevious generations mainly by early Mu’tazilite theologians who werein� uenced by philosophy. Al-AÒ’ar“ (d. 324/935) and early AÒ’arites,such as al-Bˆqillˆn“ (d. 404/1013), and al-]uwayn“ (d. 478/1085), andthe eponym of the Mˆturidite school of theology Ab� Man§�r al-Mˆtur“d“(d. 333/944) in his Kitˆb al-tawú“d did not discuss this issue, althoughthey sometimes pointed out man’s inability to know God’s essence with-out introducing arguments.121 After al-Rˆz“ the speculative theologianshave continued to examine this issue122 but, to the best of my knowl-edge, no other thinker has dealt with it as extensively as al-Rˆz“.


120 According to Ibn al-’Arab“’s (d. 638/1240) famous disciple êadr al-D“n al-Qunaw“(d. 673/1274), all the learned people agree that God’s essence is unknown. Al-Murˆsalˆtbayna êadr al-D“n al-Qunaw“ wa-Na§“r al-D“n al-ÿ�s“, ed. G. Shubert, Beirut 1995, p. 49.For Ibn al-’Arab“’s view of the unknowability of God’s essence see W.C. Chittic, Ibnal-Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination, The Su� Path of Knowledge, Albany 1989, pp. 62-64.

121 See n. 14 above.122 ’A¶ud al-D“n al-í[“ (d. 756/1308), Kitˆb al-mawˆqif, with the commentary of al-

]ur<ˆn“ (d. 816/1413), Cairo 1907, part 8, pp. 143-145.

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Fahr Al Din Al Razi on the Knowability of Gods Essence and Attributes