CHAYfER III

FACTORS IN ARMS DISPERSAL

64

South Asia is comprised of a rich mosaic of pluralism, its national societies are

deeply divided vertically and laterally by linguistic, ethnic, cultural, caste and

religious cleavages. A salient feature of recent developments in South Asia has been

the frequent occurrence of incidents of political violence, which result from conflicts

between ethnic communities, religious groups or caste groups. Small arms dispersal

. is a significant contributing factor in this situation. Arms dispersal is only one part of

the overall arms acquisition. Availability of modern weapons, communication systems

and financiers have made it easier for political violence to thrive. Political violence

is characterised by the use of small arms. The grey market, which supplies them, is

much too large and dispersed to make any meaningful action feasible. 1

Earl ier, the hand guns made of poor materials were not capable of withstanding

substantial pressure of the government. Later on more Sophisticated small arms were

manufactured. Comparedto the bolt-action short range rifles, heavy machine pistols

and bulky cases of TNT, the violent groups of today uses smaller, automatic, long

range sniper rifles with night sights: pocket pen pistols, and small compact, brief-case

sized explosive packs to cause massive destruction to life and property. 2 Modern

arms and ammunition also enable a rebel to cause much more damage single-handedly

in a single strike than what could have been caused by a group of people previously.

The flow of sophisticated weapons and ammunition is assured through open purchases

in various arms bazaars. No arms license is heeded, as it was. Weapons meant for

Mujahideen during the Afghan Crisis made en route to South Asia. Narco-terrorism

IS on the rise. Drug-mafia supply arms and money to the violent groups. Also, various

foreign assistance increase the intensity of political viQlen~. So we find that there are

Times of India (New Delhi), 3 February 1992.

2 Maj. General Virinder Uberoy, Combating Terrorism (New Delhi, 1992). pp.51-52.

65

four factors in arms dispersal to South Asian region which escalates violence. These

factors are the following:

ARMS BAZAARS·

The question of political violence is closely linked to the procurement of

weapons. Once violence begins, sophisticated weapons considerably increase its level

and intensity. 3 Today, these small arms are easily available from the international

open arms bazaars. Anybody can go and purchase these arms and ammunition against

cash payment. Due to these open markets arms are flooded in South Asia and there

is the easy accessibility of arms to the militant groups.

Anns Bazaars in Pakistan

During the Afghan war and in its aftermath Pakistan has been turned into one

vast ammunition dump. Many of the weapons, meant for the Afgh~n warring factions,

were siphoned off along the way because the Afghari pipeline was "extremely badly

organised and poorly thought out" to the point that it leaked "profusely and virtually

ruptured". 4 As a result, AK-47 assault rifles and automatic of various brands,

rockets, explosives and anti-tank weapons are available in the booming open air

weapons marts of Peshawar and its suburbs, North Western Frontier Province

(NWFP)5 in general and in some locations inside Baluchistan. The tribal areas of

NWFP and Baluchistan have traditionally been involved in arms manufacture since the

3

4

5

Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar: The Companies, The Dealers, the Bribes: From Vickers to Lockheed (London, 1977), p.24.

Christopher Smith, "Light Weapons - The Forgotten Dimension of the International Arms Trade", Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1994 (London), p.280.

The name of NWFP is changed recently to Pakhtunkhwa but the new name is not used in the chapters.

66

early years of the 20th century ... but the Afgha':1 war brought radical changes, in the

quality and quantity of the arms and ammunition produced in these areas, in their

trade and their broader implications. 6 The arms markets are controlled by tribal

chieftains. In NWFP, arms, mainly from Saudi Arabia, China, Egypt and Turkey, are

plentifully available. Now-a-day, mainly the arms are of Turkish origin and AK-47

is seen all over because it is easy to handle such weapons.7 With the sharp increase

in quality and quantity of small arms, the prices reduced significantly which became

helpful to the buyers. Because of the abundance of stockpiles in the province,

Kalashnikoves are down from Rs 35,000 to Rs 12,000 apiece.8 These markets

operate beyond the control of the Pakistani authorities. Anyone with purchasing power

can obtain any weapon system.

In Pakistan, arms bazaars are located at Darra Adam Khel which is supposedly

the biggest open arms market in the world.9 It is fifty kilometers south of the

Pakistani frontier city of Peshawar. "Buying a gun is not such a problem in Pakistan.

All it needs is a short trip from Peshawar down the scenic and historic highway to

Kohat, through the Afridi country that once saw so much bloodshed between the

proud, unrelenting tribes and the invading British armies. Midway through, just before

the bend in the highway climbing steeply on the Sikh Kamar (the Sikh Hill) ... lies the

6

7

8

9

A.K.M. Abdus Sabur, "Pakistan: Ethnic Conflict and the Question of National Integration", BlISS journal (Dhaka), voUl, no.4, qctober 1990, p.507.

Interview with Dr.Chris Smith, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, in London, 23 July 1996.

Mohammad Riaz, "Black to Business", Newsline (Karachi), vol. I. no.2. May 1990. p.39.

Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (Lahore, 1992), p.135.

67

shanty town of Darra Adam Khel". 10

The Darra area is mainly governed by tribal laws where Pakistan authorities

have no control. "A police post short of the town warns the visitor that he is entering

tribal region at his own risk, governed not by Pakistani laws bllt by age old tribal laws

and Pakhtunwali, the Pathan code of conduct, honour and vengeance." 11 No one

really seems to be sure when the arms trade at Darra began in so systematic a fashion.

But it is widely known that in both the World Wars the British had recruited large

number of Pathan artisans to work in ordnance factories and with combat units,

repairing and servicing weapons. Their skills' have come down the geQerations. 12

Traditionally, these tribals were selling only the moSt popular hand guns and

rifles. It was famous at that time as Darra-made. But as the Soviets entered

Afghanistan, along with the subcontinent politics they also changed the fate of Darra.

The markets were suddenly started flooding with better and good quality small arms.

The sellers and manufacturers sell every lethal weapon any individual or private army

could ask for as openly as shoes and toileteries would be sold elsewhere in the

world. 13 "There are 100 to 300 arms dealers in Darra where there are about 100

shops. Day in and day out, rebels, since the Afghanistan civil war, slip across the

borders in groups of two or three and head for Darra to buy guns. Each gun is sewn

into a tight-fitting muslin bag. Then ail the guns are sewn together into another muslin

10

11

12

13

Shekhar Gupta, wDarra Adam Khel: Anus for the Asking", India Today (New Delhi), vol. 14, no.14, 31 July 1989, p.58.

ibid, p.58.

ibid, p.60.

ibid, p. 58.

68

bag and passed to the right places. "14

Arms of different varieties are available at Darra. Kalashnikovs of all makes,

local and foreign, still in its shipping grease, and for a surcharge of extra thousand

rupees, the ones with folding butts that makes them convenient to hide under a blanket

or inside a loose kurta. "In 1980, the cost of an AK-47 was $1500, but with the glut

of weapons brought about by the war it has plummeted to $750 by 1987. "15 For

fortified targets, the rocket-propelled grenade launchers, RPG-7 are also plentily \

available. One street in the bazaar could provide enough anti-aircraft guns to equip

a light air-defence regiment. 16 The dreaded mUlti-barrel rocket-launcher, popularly I

known as Stalin's organ, an entire ack-ack gun, a shoulder-fired antitank missile,

deadly mines of all shapes and applications, mine-sweeping equipment boxes of

gelatine along with detonators by the gross, the esoteric; sniper's rifles for

assassinations, drum magazines, I<.alikov, sophisticated gas masks for chemical

warfare and landing wheels off a shot-down MiG - useful for making a smooth-riding

on cart have been available there. l7 "But the more favoured weapon here is the

Chinese-made BM-I rocket launcher which is cheaper, lighter and easier to handle

besides being freely available as the Chinese had supplied far too many of these to the

Mujahideen. "18

14

IS

16

17

18

New York Times, 14 April 1981.

Yousafand Adkin, n.9, p.135.

Gupta, n.l0, p.59.

P.J.O. Rourke, "The Afghan Trail", Sunday (Calcutta), vol.l6, no.38, 20-26 August 1989, p.84.

Gupta, n.lO, p.59.

69

Also, the enormous volumes of 'junk' discarded following the catastrophic

blast in Pakistan's Ojheri ammunition dump outside Rawalpindi trickled into the Darra

market, upsetting old equations. 19 Though th~ Ojheri ammunitions were damaged

and written off, the Darra experts, in repairing arms, shape up these again into the

deadly weapon. In this arms bazaar no one asks the buyer's name, address or

intentions, what matters is the bulge in the pocket.

Further, guns are freely for sale in Karachi's bazaars where as little as Rs

12,000 buys a Kalashnikov rifle, Rs 25,000 a rocket launcher and less than Rs 40,000

a machine gun.20 In the Karachi underworld it is even possible to rent a I

Kalashnikov by the hour for a few pounds. 21 Sohrab Goth, an Afghan-dominated

Karachi slum, is one of the biggest dens of arms. The smugglers' den is Bara bazaar

in Sohrab Goth where they openly trade in contraband arms like AK-47 rifles, rocket

launchers etc.22

"Some sources also maintain that Gulistan in Pishin along with the Surkhab

camp in the Pir Alizai jungle form the biggest arms and drugs market. People can buy

any kind of arms from here with total impunity undeterred by the law-enforcing

agencies."23 Also, the Quetta-Chaman road, the Chagai district, the Girdi jungle,

the towns of Landi Kotal and Miram Shah are the major areas of arms production.24

19

20

21

22

23

24

ibid, p.61.

Financial Times (London), 7 April 1988.

Observer Magazine (London), 13 November 1988.

Ameneh'Azam Ali, "Pakistan: EdlInc Strife". l"aia Today. vol. 12. 110.1, 1-15 January 1987, p.95.

Mohammad Riaz, n.8. p.39.

Times of India, 24 August 1994.

70

These flourishing arms bazaars were assisted by the anarchic conditions in the region

and the drug production and smuggling activities.

Recently, Sind emerged as one of the world's largest underground arms

market.25 Prior to Afghan war gun was unknown to Sind campuses. At present, it

is a part of campus life. Fire arms are plentily available. This market is mostly

dominated by the students and young politiCal activists.

The extent to which buying and selling is taking place can be gauged from the

prevailing price of one of the hottest selling commodities today: Kalashnikovs. As the

world's most unusual arms bazaar lies in Pakistan, it is frequented by the

subcontinent's various extremist and violent groups.

Arms Markets in India

In recent years, India has been witnessing a vertical rise of weapons mart at

various places inspite of strong vigil by the law and order authority and police

personnel.. The factors leading towards the opening up of underground and open air

market are many. Firstly, the Afghan war and its aftermath resulted in the selling of

weapons to the dealers inside Indi~. Pakistan acts as a medium to sell those'weapons.

Secondly, the weapons shop gives a good amount of money to the seller. As the

violence takes place, there increases the demand for weapons. Last but not the least,

the neighbouring countries, in order to create terror and violence, supply large volume

of light weapons to the arms bazaars. And, drug barons also play an important role

jn using carriers to transport weapons.

In India, Bihar has always had a very active small armS culture. In general the

people of Bihar have a fascination for guns and mostly the middle-class men own light

25 The Hindu (Madras), 14 September 1990.

71

weapons with or without licence. Earlier, conflicts and wars in this region have been

important sources of light weapons. "Amongst the small arms circulating in Bihar are

several type of weapons from the Second World War period such as the Thompson

sub-machine gun and the Sten MK4 - local people probably picked up weapons

abandoned during the Japanese offensive. Chinese copies of the Soviet SKS rifle, the

Type 56 Carbine and the Type 56 Light Machine Gun - a copy of the Soviet RDP -

are available as are Papapscha (PPSch-41) 9mm sub-machine guns. "26 Further, the

Bangladesh War of 1971 resulted in the transfer of light weapons to Bihar. Even

American-made weapons made en route to the extremist elements of Bihar. 27

Of late, Bihar is known for the increased use of local-made weapons of

appalling quality which are available in various arms factories and weapons shops.

There have been both legal and illegal factories. Munger district of Bihar has India's

largest illegal arms cottage industry.28 There is a State-owned ordnance factory

which makes weapons of various types and designs. Besides, workers from such

factories provide expertise in making weapons. Even after their retirement, the

workers, with the acquired skill, go back to their native places an~ make arms and

explosives and sell it off. Even skilled persons train the unemployed ones so that they

engage themselves in making arms and earn money. Mini-gun factories have been

located at the near-by places of Munger. The- places are Barde village, Sankarpur

Mahuli, Suturkhana and Gauripur.29

26

27

28

29

Chris Smith, The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan and Northern India (London, 1993), pp.34-35.

Interview with a Police Officer of Buxar, Bihar, 13 September 1996.

Ranjit Bhushan, ·Caste Bullets Ricochet. .. ·, Outlook, vol.3, no.15, 9 April 1997, p.8.

Interview widl a Police Officer of BliXar, Bihar, 13 September 1996.

72

The pla~s like Mokama, Begusarai, Biharsharif, Nalanda, Betia town, Giridih

and Gaya are famous for the easy availability of weapons. 30 According to a local

person of Patna, in the places like Ranchi, Jamshedpur and Purnia, one can easily get

country-made weapons against direct cash payment. The colloquially known katta

(pistol type) is widely used and available in all local arms bazaars and factories.

Blacksmiths and machine shops make such weapons with their skill. The steering pipe

of vehicles, bicycle rods, and the tractor hood-pipes are used to make katta and other

rifles. Kattas are "designed as a cut-off Enfield 7.62 and have machined barrels made

from alloy-steel. Also, .303 kattas are produced. "31 In katta, made up of steering

pipe, usually .315 ammunition and the hard spring of the watch are used. 32

In addition, the arms and ammunition of various brands have been available

there. The foreign-made weapons like AK-47, AK-56, 9mm pistol and automatic

carbine are available at high prices. Also, country-made .303 pistol, .38 revolvers,

12 bore big rifles, .45 gun, .22 rifles, Mauser and Sten gun are available. Duplicate

guns and rifles are also made by arms factories with a larger accuracy. The Hatia

place of Ranchi is famous for such weapons. 33 Besides selling weapons, the traders

rent out the arms for immediate and short-term use. The charge depends upon the

urgency and usually varies from Rs 200 to more than thousand rupees. This charge

also depends on the quality of the weapon to be rented out. 34

30 Interview with a Press Reporter of Jamshedpur in Jl!Jllshedpur. 17 September 1996.

31 Chris Smith. n.26. p.33.

32 Interview with a Press Reporter in Jamshedpur. 17 September 1996.

33 ibid.

34 Interview with a local person atPatna. 14 September 1996.

73

Explosives and crude bombs are also available in local arms markets. Giridih

area is famous for hand grenades and Falitc?5 bomb. These bombs are made up of

Lal Sada Masala powder (mixture of potash and soda) and stuffed in a larda (Pan

Masala) container or any container of around same size. 36 This has an explosive

capacity ranging from 2 to 4 metres. Further, making of cartridges for guns is very

easy for them. They make powder from Arhar plant then add sulphur, potash and

ranga (from iron) to it. Then within two to three minutes make cartridges and use for·

guns.37

The price rate of small arms vary from one place to aflother. The factory rate

also is cheaper than the other places.

Table 3.1

Price List of Small Anus in Bihar

Types of Arms Factory Rate Other Places -

Katta Rs 400 to Rs 500 Rs 1000

Rifle Rs 800 to Rs 1000 Rs 1800 to Rs 2000

Revolver Rs 2000 to Rs 2500 Rs 3000 to Rs 4000

Ammunition for .303 Rs 80 to Rs 100 Almost same at the and for .315 rifle factory rate.

Source: Information gathered from a Police Officer of Bihar, 13 September 1996.

35

36

37

In case of FaLita bomb. it's uppe'r cap is removed by one's teeth and is thrown. This explodes and kills people.

Interview with a Press Reporter of Janlshedpur in Jamshedpur, 17 September 1996.

Interview with a local person at Patna, 14 September 1996.

74

Kalashnikov rifles are also available at various places of Bihar. AK-47 costs

around Rs 80,000. 38 Besides Kalashnikovs, US-made Lama pistols are also used.

As the violent groups are unable to afford the high cost of such pistol, these pistols

are usually gifted to them by underworld mafia. 39

In India, Tamil Nadu is the cheapest place to buy arms such as the Ak-47.40

The seeming transformation of the industrial city of Coimbatore into a major, weapon

manufacturing base is a clear indication of the inroads of Tamil militants in Tamil

Nadu. First evidence of this came in June 1989 when, with the state under President's

rule, the security forces raided an arm manufacturing unit at A varampalayam in

Coimbatore, run by the activists of a breakaway faction of the Dravida Kazhagam who

were staunch supporters of Tamil militant groups.41 The Tamil militants also

preferred this place only because of the availability of skilled technical labour capable

of doing precision work .

• :!.- The militants have converted nine~districts of Tamil'Nadu -into bases for"war

supplies. They are Co i mbatore , Periyar (Erode), Salem, Dharmapuri, Tiruchi,

Thanjavut, Pudukottai, Madurai and Ramanathapuram. The arms manufacturing

factories in Coimbatore churn out thousands of grenades and detonators a day. "The

task cut out for Coimbatore was manufacturing guns and grenades and getting spares

38

39

40

41

Jnterview with a Press Reporter in Jamsbedpur, 17-September 1996.

ibid.

B. Muralidhar Reddy, "A Close Call", Frontline (Madras), vol.8, no.3, 2-15 February 1991, p.30.

V.Padmanabban, "LITE: The Arms Base", Frontline, vol.8, 110.17,17-30 August 1991, p.1IO.

75

for AK-47 assault rifles n. 42 Tamil militants also set up an automatic unit at

Ganapathy in Comibatore under Gowrishankar apart from three manually operated

units in the na~e of Ravichandran.43 Coimbatore has also been a transit point for

coordinating the dispersal of arms to the coast via Tiruchi and to liaise with new hide­

outs set up in Mysore and Bangalore. Further,. Tiruchi has been the main source of

detonators which come from licensed local dealers in explosives, who obtain the

components from multinational companies like ICI India Ltd. at its Gomia factory in

Bihar. 44 Also, various explosive inputs come from Erode, Salem, Dharmapuri and

North Arcot. Various missiles like Arul-89 and Arul-90 are manufactured in ordinary

factory units.

Further, the Tamil extremist groups openly sell arms at Muthuppettai town.45

Here also they impart training in the use of these arms where the security forces

cannot reach easily. Whenever the militants face security danger they hide the box full

of arms and ammunition in swamps. In Tamil Nadu, L TIE of Sri Lanka, Punjab

extremists and ULFA militants are regular customers.

In the north-eastern part of India many local arms bazaars are operating.

Blackmarkets are particularly thriving in Dimapur of Nagaland, Shillong, Hojai town

of Assam and Moreh. Earlier, Dimapur was serving only .38 market but by 1987

much larger selection of weapons were available.46 The M-16 became available at

42

43

44

4S

46

Vincent D. Souza, "Tracking the Tigers", The Week (Kerala), vol. 9, 00.34, 18 August 1991, p.33.

ibid, p.34.

ibid, p.33.

India Speaks (New Dellii), vol.3, no.31, July 1990, p.19.

Tara Kartha, Role of Light Weapons in Militancy - The Cqse of Assam (New Delhi, 1996), p.9.

76

Rs 40,000 while theAK Chinese copy (M-22) was quite expensive, that is, Rs 1.5

lakh; a Sterling was available for between Rs 65-70,000.47 The Hojai township, on

the other hanq, has been dominated by Muslim immigrants where arms bazaar

reportedly coexits with a thriving perfume industry.48

Now the leading industrial city of Uttar Pradesh, Kanpur, is being flooded by

arms manufactured in the factories of Pakistan. It is learnt that these weapons have

been stocked in various godowns for weapons from which militants buy arms and -

disperse it to other extremist groups. Such weapons are reportedly stored in

Chauraganj, Basonganj, Colonelganj, Chakeri and Railbazar.49 Weapnos of the

lower calibre as well as the Indian Sten gun (Sub machine gun 9mm carbine) were

freely available in Kanpur. Besides, grenades of Indian-make were available for Rs

500 a piece while the .32 sold for Rs 15,000 or less. 50

Further, intelligence sources revealed that a veritable arms bazaar is operating

in Saharanpur, Bulandshahar, Muzaffarnagar and Meerut of Uttar Pradesh. 51 The

arms are smuggled from aqross Rajasthan, Gujarat and to some extent the Punjab

border. From there they are distributed among arms vendors. The arms from these

bazaars are being transported to as far as the north-eastern India and Kashmir. The

popular 9mm pistol costs about Rs 25,000 and a box of 10 pistols anything between

Rs 2 to 2.5 lakh. 52 The Kalashnikov assault rifles are available in Kairana, Baghpat,

47 ibid.

48 ibid.

49 India Speaks, vol.3, no.IB, I May 1990, p.27.

50 Kartha, n.46, pp.9-1O.

51 The Pioneer, 2 May 1997.

52 ibid.

77

Bulandshahar a.nd Khurja which cost around Rs 35,000 to 40,'000 per rifle. 53

Arms Bazaar in Other Places

There have been clandestine shipment of arms and ammunition from open arms

market of Singapore, Thailand, and China. The case of Singapore became evident

when the militants were nabbed by the Indian navy and coastguard in the 10 nautical

miles east of Karaikol coast in Pondicherry in 1991. The seized ship had a stockpile

of explosive materials which make up the lethal devices that the L TIE has now

become notorious for. "The inventory of items seizeq by the 'Q' branch of the Tamil

Nadu police included loads of nails and studs, 26 cases of 1.5 volt battery cells, 24

cans of fine aluminium powder, 24 bottles of sulphur, two bottles of potassium nitrate

and two bottles of activated charcoal from the boat. A combination of these provides

the trade mark 'Improvised Explosive Devices' of the LTIE".54 Also, a precious

diary and incriminating documents were seized from the ship. "The diary was a

veritable inventory of all the arms and ammunition smuggled by the vessel since

March 21, 1991. The list of articles included Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) and

RPG to conventional weapons such as rifles and stocks of explosives" .55

In Thailand, Bangkok and Chantaburi province are famous arms bazaars. 56

AK-47s are said to Cost just over $20 apiece in these arms marketS as compared to

more than $400 in the international market. Hand grenades are available for as low

53

54

55

56

ibid.

The Hindu (Gurg;lon), 17 November 1991.

ibid, 11 November 1991.

S; Satyanarayall, "The Anus Bazaar: Skeletons in the Thai Anny's Clipboard", Frontline, vol.ll, llo.2, 15-28 January 1994, p.53.

78

as Rs 7. 57 Chiang Mai of Thailand is also reportedly famous for supplying rocket

launchers and anti aircraft shoulder launched missiles to the north-east militants. 58

"Kashmir and P.unjab militants have been attempting to source weapons from Thailand

in recent times. The Thai-Cambodian border, where arms are available freely, is also

bel ieved to have been visited by Tamil separatist guerrillas from Sri Lanka". 59

Further, in China, Peking and Mah Fong village are famous for their huge

arms bazaars.60 Combat aircraft, armoured vehicles (mainly tanks) and light arms,

-including the Chinese version of AK-47 automatic rifles, are plentily available there.

Rebel" forces visit these places for the easy availability of arms.

Intelligence reports also indicated that the militants use ships that bring in arms

from the arms markets of Jakarta, Indonesia.61

A List of Small Anus Generally Used in Political Violence

The violent groups are known to possess an assortment of weapons which they

purchase from the open arms bazaars. The array of the weapons the militants purchase

from these arms bazaars are the following:-

57

58

59

60

61

ibid. p.56.

Kartha. 11.46. p.15.

Satyanarayan, 11.56. p.56.

David Bonavia. "China: Cheap and Deadly". Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong). vol. 136, no.21. 21 May 1987. p.33.

T.S. Subramanian, "Sri Lanka: The Unsung Heroes". Frontline. 15-28 Apri11989, p. 103.

• AK-47 • AK-54 • AK-56 • AK-74 • Thompson Sub-machine gun • Sten Sub-machine gun • Ml Carbine • Uzi Firearms .' M52 Pistol • Makarov Pistol • Tokarev (TT-33) Pistol • RGD-5 Anti-personnel Hand Grenade • SAM-7 Strela (Arrow) • M-26 Grenade • RGP-7 Portable Rocket Launcher • M-20 Pistol • G-4 LMG • G-3 Machine Gun • G-2 Machine Gun • M -46 Grenade • M-16 Rifle • M-21 Rifle • M-22 Rifle • 12 bore gun • 32 Revolver • 22 Country-made Pistol • Self Loading Rifle • Airgun • G-l Rifle • 9mm Pistol • 455 Revolver • M-9 Rifle • M-ll Rifle ,. T -56 Assault Rifle • AR-15 Automatic Rifle • AR-16 Automatic Rifle

-- '--AKSU-74-Sub-machirteGun-

• RPG-2 • RPG-7 • HE-36 Hand-made Grenade. • Dragunov Rifles and Explosives • Pasilon 200 a mortar. • RDX, Petn and Semtex Plastic Explosives

79

• Chinese BM-1 Rocket Launcher • 30 Pistol • Kenpro KT-zz frequency Synthesiser used for

internal communication • Multibarrel Rocket Launcher otherwise known as

Stalin's Organ • Ack-ack gun • Kalikov • Sophisticated gas masks for Chemical warfare • Arul-89 missile • Arul-90 missile.

80

"The mainstay of the militants is, of course, the AK-47 rifle, which is light,

handy and automatic firearm with a foldable butt and a fantastic rate of fire. It is a

three-in-one weapon as it can be used as a rifle, a carbine and a machine gun. "62

Table 3.2

Approximate.Price of Different Small Anns

Anns Kalashnikoy Rifle (Russian) Kalashnikov Rifle (Chinese) Kalashnikov Rifle (local remake) RPG-7 Rocket Launcher Anti-aircraft Gun Stalir.'s Organ Multibarrel Rocket Launcher Chinese BM-l Rocket Launcher Anti-Personnel mines (per dozen) Anti-tank mines (per dozen) -Kalashnikov Bullets (local per hundred)-' Kalashnikov Bullets (Soviet per hundred) Sten Gun Hand Grenade Rockets

62 Times of India, 10 February 1992.

Rupees 13,000 10,000 3,000

20,000 45,000 55,000 28,000

1,000 5,000

--60 90

12,000 1,400 3,800

Incendiary Bomb Explosive Charges 30 pistol 9mm Ammunition 30mm Ammunition G-3 rifle G-3 Ammunition Dragunov AR-15 RDX Mine Sweeping Equipment Gas mask

81

3,500 3,500 7,000

15 8

7,000 27

1,00,000 30 to 40 thousand

80 thousand to 2 lakhs per kg. 10,000

500 A right vision goggle which has a range about 50 metres 41akh

Source: India Today, vol.14, no.14, 31 July 1989, p.60. Mainstream (New Delhi), vo1.26, no.39, 9 July 1988, p.32.

Besides this "a newspaper in London published a 'rate card' in 1987, listing

weapons easily purchasable in Pakistan's border areas. The Pakistan prices, it should

be noted, are about 50 per cent lower than those prevailing internationally. "63 The

'rate card' is elaborated in the following Table.

63 Akhbar-e-Watan (London), 28 January - 4 Febniary 1987, p.16, quoted in Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account (London, 1988), p.241.

Table 3.3

Rate of Small Anns in Pakistan Rupees

Arms

T & T mine Kalashnikov tracer bullet Anti-aircraft bullet (Egyptian-made) Rocket launcher shell American Rifle Chinese Rifle Russian Rifle Sten gun (Russian) 30 bore Anti-tank rocket launcher Kalashnikov Ak-47 Rifle G-3 Automatic Rifle 7.62mm automatic weapons

Source: Mentioned in Footnote no. 63.

82

Rate

50 30

150 300

5,000 18,000 22,000

3,500 25,000

15,000 to 16,000 13,000 to 25,000

23,000

As arms are plentifully available at will, it creates social and political turmoil

in the region as a whole. Itposes a great threat to civil and political order of the

country as the militants use these arms against the governmental. authority. Martin

Luther King rightly said: "by our readiness to allow arms to be purchased at will and

fired at whim~ we have created an atmosphere in which violence and hatred have

become popular pastimes". 64

THE MUJAHIDEEN FACTOR

The Soviet military intervention m Afghanistan and the Soviet military

presence across the sensitive Khyber Pass aggravated the South Asia's security

problems. Afghanistan, once one of the world's most isolated, untouched societies,

64 Martin Luther King, quoted ill M.H. Askari, "Pakistan's Security and Drugs/ Anus Mafia", Strategic Digest (New Delhi), yoU7, 110.12, December 1987, p.2304.

83

was brutally transformed by the Soviet intervention into a superpower military testing

ground.65 The Soviet intervention lent greater legitimacy to the "xenophobic

Afghans" by giving them the role of fighters for the liberation of their homeland and

foreign occupation. Then a resistance movement by the Mujahideen or "Holy

Warriors" began building up in the name of Islam and national sovereignty against the

then Soviet troops and Soviet supported Afghanistan government. Furthermore, it

invited US response in the form of massive aid to the Afghan Mujahideen in terms of

sophisticated arms and money. "Based on the doctrine of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)

American policy aimed first through clandestine arms shipment, at keeping the

invading Soviet army from occupying the whole country and then at making the cost

of just holding on so high that the Soviets would decide to bring their forces

home".66 The US aid to the Afghan Mujahideen channelised through Pakistan and

Pakistan was inexorably drawn into the vortex of Afghan crisis. This trauma emanated

from both the huge inflow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Kalashnikov culture

of the gun-totting Mujahideen that affected large parts of the territory. In subsequent

years the rapidly changing scenario in Afghanistan loomed large over the South Asian

horizon. And, in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 the Mujahideen

organisation were freed to push the countries of South Asia down the steep slope

toward political violence by dispersing their small arms to various militant

organisations.

Before we delve into the discussion of dispersal of arms to the Mujahideen and

later on by the Mujahideen groups to the various areas in South Asia, we must know

65

66

Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. eds .• Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency. and Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York. 1988). p. 183.

Shah M. Tarzi. "Politics of the Afghan Resistance Movement". Asian Survey. voI.3l, no.6. June 1991. p.492.

84

the historical backdrop of the conflict.

~oricalBackdrop

Afghanistan was encompassed by the then Sov~et Union on the North, by a

narrow strip of Chinese territory on the North-East, by Iran on the West, by Pakistan

on the South and Pakistan occupied portion of India on the South-East. Further, the

Baluch-inhabited areas of Pakistan and Iran separate the southernmost part of that

land-locked country from the Arabian sea. During the 1930s and 1940s Afghanistan

lay in one of the more peaceful corners of world politics or at least, not right in the

middle of a crisis region. 67 This state of affairs changed very soon after the end of

the Second World War, with the beginning of the East-West conflict, dominated by

the rivalry between the then Soviet Union and the United States.68

The Afghan polity "has been torn by endemic tensions between the largest

ethnic group, the Pashtuns, and a variety of conquered ethnic minorities. The Pashtuns

have been increasingly unable to assert the position of unchallengeable dominance to

which they feel entitled as the 'true' Afghans. Non-pashtuns constituted at least 35 per

cent of the population of Afghanistan prior to the Soviet occupation - possibly as much

as 45 per cent - and their relative strength has grown in the wake of large-scale

Pashtun refugee. movement to Pakistan. "69 During the decades immediately

preceding the establishment of Communist rule in 1978, the politicised Afghan elites

consisted of three distinct groups: Western-oriented intellectual, who made up the

largest segment; Soviet - oriented communist factions; and Islamic fundamentalist

67

68

69

Gunter Knabe, "The 'Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan", Central Asian Survey (Oxford), vol. 7, .nos:2-3, 1988, p.134.

ibid.

Klare and Kombluh,eds., n.65, p.185.

85

elements with Moslem Brotherhood links in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. 70

None of these groups had substantial independent organisational networks in the

countryside and they were all depending on alliances with local tribes and ethnic

leaders who held the real power.

Until its destruction in 1973 the monarchy had provided the role focus of

political legitimacy and authority in Afghanistan for more than three centuries. In

1973, the monarch, Zahir Shah, was dethroned in a bloodless coup led by Mohammad

Daoud, his cousin and former Prime Minister with the aid of the small but well

organised group of Parachami communists.71 Daoud declared Afghanistan a republic

and pronounced himself President. The next five years saw successful PDPA

penetration of the ranks of the civil service and military. The erstwhile Soviet Union

increased aid to the new republic and Afghan army officers were sent for training in

Moscow. Under Soviet guidance the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA

reunited in 1977. On 27 April 1978, PDPA-Ied elements of the Army and Air force

launched a coup d'etat, killing Daoud and establishing a one-party state, the

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (ORA). With the overthrow of the Daoud

government Afghanistan set foot on a new and crucial phase of its history. In the

wake of the Saur72 revolution, a progressive, leftist and secular government was

established in Kabul under the veteran revolutionary leader Noor Mohammad Taraki,

leader of the Khalq faction of the PDPA. After assuming power Taraki immediately

70

71

72

ibid.

The People's Democratic PaI1Y of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded in 1965 by a small band of dedicated Marxists including Taraki and Kannal. The PDPA fell to bickering as members of its two factions, the Khalq or People's group and the Parcham or banner group"' failed to get along. The Kbalqis are generally uneducated Pashtu- speaking people from rural areas while the Parcham is come from the Persian speaking urban elite.

'Saur' refers to the mondl in the Afghan Calender, April, by Western reckoning, in which dIe coup occured.

86

proclaimed that the policy of the new regime would be Afghan nationalism, social and

economic justice under Islam, and non-alignment in foreign-policy.73 Hence he

introduced a radical programme of agrarian, economic and socio-political reforms

which have brought the Afghan sOCiety out of the darkness of pre-feudal backwardness

to the light of modernisation and progress.

But the radical reforms earned the wrath of the religious bigotry, tribal

parochialism, rural oligarchy and feudal aristocracy. Further, the forces of

conservatism were mortally hit by such reforms. The counter-revolutionary elements

fled the country sought refuge abroad, particularly in Pakistan and, with

encouragement, aid and training from several countries began armed incursions from

their sanctuaries into Afghanistan. Hundreds of members of the rival Parcham faction

were rounded up and jailed. Some were shot. Armed resistance to the new'

government began within a few months. Afghan farmers and villagers bitterly objected

to government 'reforms', including efforts to confiscate land and change Islamic

marriage customs. And the foreign involvement in support of counter-revolutionary

movement intensified. Further, the government's problems were compounded by the

schisms within the revolutionary front.

Outright political violence came in March 1979 when thousands of soldiers and

civilians rose up against the government. "Nooristan was the first province to revolt,

followed by Hazarajat Badakhsan, Paktiya, Nangarhar, Kapisa, Uruzgon, Parwan,

Bagdghiz, Bulkh, Ghazni and Farah. In Herat thirty Russian advisers and their

families were brutally murdured and hundreds of Khalqis and Parchamis were

assassinated in the rural areas. "74 By September 1979, 30,000 people were in jail

73

74

Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past. Present and Future". Asian Survey. vo1.24, no.4, April 1984, p.379.

ibid. p.380.

87

and 12,000 had been executed. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, leader of the

oppressed Parcham faction of the PDPA, staged a successful counter-coup against the

Khalq government.· Taraki was executed.

Mujahideen forces won a great victory over the government's forces in

October 1979, some 150 miles south-east of Kabul. With the People's Republic on the

point of collapse, 85,000 Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan on 27 December

1979.75 Within a few months the Soviet troops were boosted to 1,15,000. Following

the intervention Moscow installed Babrak Karmal, former Afghan ambassador to

Czechoslovakia, as the new President.

The Soviet intervention was unacceptable to many of the Afghan society. It

provoked countrywide resistance which had four centers - the traditional elite, the

religious class, the fundamentalist, and nationalist groups in the rural areas. Though

the Islamic resistance to the Afghan government began long before the Soviet

intervention of December 1979 and even before the communist coup of April 1978,

the Soviet intervention lent greater legitimacy to the opposition groups, the

Mujahideens, by giving them the role of fighters for the liberation of their homeland

from foreign intervention.

The ripple effect of this intervention in Afghanistan was felt in the coming

years, not only in that region but also in the relationship between the then Soviet

Union and the US, thereby increased the intensity of the Coid War. This Afghanistan

experience provided a unique case study of what happens when American low­

intensity warfare doctrine and Soviet counter-insurgency strategy meet in a third world

sitting. 76·

75

76

Allen K. Jones, US Conunittee Report for Refugees on "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Will They Go Home Again?" (New York), December 1982, p.3.

Klare and Kombluh, eds., n.65, p.183.

88

As the resistance to the then Soviet intervention was led by the Mujahideens

so we must know 'who are the Mujahideens'?

Mujahideen Organisation

The resistance in Afghanistan is led by a large number of local groups, large

and small, active on scattered warfronts inside the country often isolated from each

other. There is no homogeneous military structure in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan,

village is the base for any military organisation. In a village the people have lived

together and know each other's habits. Loyalties forged are very deep, so it is rare

that a government can infiltrate such a system. The dependence is totally on an

efficient leader within the tribe. Panjshir, Mazar and Herat are three examples of this

area in which the villages are engaged in resistance movement.77 These voluntary

recruited resistance fighters are known as Mujahideen or "Holy Warriors".

Mujahideens are the armed resistance men who have enrolled permanently for

the whole of Afghanistan.78 But in a traditional-bound country like Afghanistan it

is very difficult to organise along those lines, for here the people have always lived

free and away from the government's influence. As the war developed, the

Mujahideen crossed the boundaries of villages, districts and provinces and tried their

best to form organisation around regional bases. Many of the Mujahideen groups are

affiliated to Afghan parties based in exile in Pakistan and Iran. The leading political

parties have their headquarters in Peshawar.

77

78

There have been two forms of resistance in Afghanistan: one is spontaneous,

Mohamma4 Es' Haq, "The Present Situation in Afghanistan". Central Asian Survey, vol. 6, no. 1, 1987, pp. 125-26.

Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, 1986), p. 172.

89

unorganised and uncoordinated; the other is organised into certain established

groups.79 The unorganised form of resistance draws on primordial loyalties - family,

kinship, subtribe, tribe and region. The organised resistance, on the other hand, draws

on the educated middle class for its leadership and seeks support from ethnic groups

as well as across ethnic lines. The active members of the resistance are always

organised.

The Mujahideens have combined into two major alliances: Islamic

fundamentalists and moderate nationalists or traditionalists. The Islamic

fundamentalists want basic changes in the old institutions under which they lived, by

force if need be. Others, the traditionalists, essentially want to bring back the

institution overthrown by the then Soviets.

The schisJIls within the Mujahideen groups reflect the myriad divisions

characterising the'Afghan society which consists of a number of major linguistic and

ethnic groups. BlIt since the Mujahideen believes in the justice of their cause, the

general moral within these resistance groups is always high. They, further, realise that

the 'Jihad' or 'Holy War' in Afghanistan like any other war of liberation would be a

military-political eqgagement. So after several attempts all the parties, irrespective of

internal rife and petty ambitions, were able to form a coalition to fight against the

Soviet interventionists. Seven major parties formed a coalition. According to agreed

constitution each party would retain its independent activities but try and coordinate

them with the rest. And with this began the genesis of arms transfer to the Mujahideen

rebel group and the concomitant dispersal of these arms within the South Asian

subcontinent.

79 AmiD, D.73, p.380.

90

Arms Shipment to the Mujahideen

Initially the Mujahideen fought the War in the conventional and primitive tribal

style. They were loosely organised and highly armed with old British Enfield Rifles

and German submachine guns of the Second World War period and a few AK-47s,

captured from Government troops. However, with the passage of time, the arrival of

sophisticated weapons, and the training of substantial number of guerrillas, they have

become refined in their tactics. The new weapons mainly came from three sources:

some were captured from the enemy through capture or defection; arms provided by

foreign countries and; arms purchased from local arms markets. Though the first and

the second source turned out to be the consistent of all, the foreign assistance became

important for the resistance to survive.

The first authorisation for aid to the Mujahideen came in a secret finding of

the then US President Mr. Carter. "The external flow of covert arms began as a

trickle in those first months following the Soviet incursion, but by October 1980 the

Carter administrati~n and key Muslim States committed themselves to a substantial

increase in aid levels. The arms' passage through several hands can obscure or erase

the supplier countries of origin especially when that is the very aim of covert

operations. Arms passed out in Mujahideen camps are usually said to have come from

defectors when in reality at least some of them have moved through the pipeline

established for such clandestine purposes. "80 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

of the USA was assigned to carry out the covert mission, its first of this nature and

magnitude since the Angolan civil war. 81 The main sources of supply were the

USA, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Britain and many other countries all of which have

80 Carl Bernstein, Quoted in Grant M. Farr and John G. Merriam, eds., Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival (Boulder, USA, 1987), p.73.

81 . New York Times, 16 February 1980.

91

funded or provided sophisticated infantry weapons, mainly small arms, mines and

ammunition.

In the beginning, the US government was broadly divided into two camps with

respect to the purpose of the covert aid programme: those who view aid as part of a

two track policy in which the US simultaneously pursues a Soviet force withdrawal

through a negotiated settlement, and others who discount the possibility of a

withdrawal but support unlimited weapons aid for its own sake as a means of raising

the costs of the occupation.82 To start with, the OS provided financial assistance of

about $30million for the purchase of Soviet-style weapons manufactured in Egypt and

China. 83 During the period from 1980 to 1986 the US orchestrated an expanding

multilateral programme of some $1.2billion in weapons aid to the resistance involving

at least $750million in Congressional CIA appropriations together with additional

helps from China, Saudi Arabia, ~gypt and others. 84

For the first five years, the US provided the guerrillas with weapons designed

and manufactured by the erstwhile Soviet Union or other East Bloc countries so they

could deny that the US was supplying such assistance.85 Further, West German

newspaper 'Frankfurter Rundschau' reported that "in purchasing weapons the CIA

takes particular care to see that the arms sent into the DRA are of Soviet-make or

high-quality imitations of arms manufactured in the Warsaw Treaty states. Purchases

of Soviet arms are intended to confirm the Western allegation that the anti-Afghan

82

83

84

85

Klare and Kombluh, eds., 0.65, p.200.

Chicago Tribune, 22 July 1981, quoted in Rasul Bakhsh Rais. Afghanistan'S Uncenain Transition after the Cold War (Karachi, 1994), p.213.

New York Times, 15 February 1980.

New York Times, 18 April 1988.

92

actions are undertaken by insurgents who manage to get hold of arms in action against

the Afghan troops and not by gangs armed and trained in neighbouring Pakistan". 86

This policy of relying exclusively on Soviet-model weaponry reflected the dominant

influence of relatively moderate CIA element led by then Deputy Director John

McMahon, who emphasised the importance of "plausible deniability" of American

involvement. 87

During the first few years the US supplied AK-47 Kalashnikovs, RPG-7

anti-tank guns, ground-to-air missile launchers,sophisticated land mines and portable

heat seeking SAM-7 missiles. These all were of Soviet model. But the .turning point

came in 1986 with the arrival of larger amounts of sophisticated weapons under a

covert CIA programme. The Mujahideen got British-made Blowpipe, the American­

made Red Eye portable anti-aircraft rocket sets, American M-l assault rifles and

Stinger missiles. By March 1986, amid growing emphasis on the Reagan doctrine as

a central theme of the President's foreign policy, it was decided at an inter-agency

meeting to provide Stingers for insurgents in Afghanistan and Angola along with

upgraded aid for the Nicaraguan Contras and the resistance in Cambodia.88 Unlike

the Blowpipe, which is guided with radio controls, the Stinger is a 'fire and forget'

weapon that automatically homes in on its target. The Stinger's kill probabilities made

it a dangerous weapon. It changed the course of war by restoring Mujahideen's morale

which was badly hurt by the Mi-24 'Hind' gunships. The US Senator Dennis

86

87

88

Frankfurter Rundschau (West German), quoted in D. Borisov, "Who is Behind the Afghan Counter-Revolution", International Affairs, no. 1, January 1982, p.42.

KJare and Kornbluh, eds., n.65, p.20!.

Washington Post, 5 March 1986.

93

DeConcini described it as "the ultimate terrorist weapon ... 89 During the latter part

of 1986 some 1,000 stingers, the first of many shipments, were turned over to the

Mujahideen. Majority of which directed to Hekmatyar's Islamic Party.90

The Stinger decision reflected a broader escalation of American involvement

- in Afghanistan that culminated in the leap from $470 million in the 1986 CIA budget

to $630million in 1987.91 American fund earmarked for the Afghan conflict was

deposited in a secret Swiss bank account which was also used as a source of funds for - -

weapons aid to Nicaragua and Angola. 92 The CIA drew on this Swiss account for

purchases of Soviet-model weaponry from China, Israel and international arms

dealers. The Bakhtar News Agency of Kabul reported that under a secret agreement

signed between the CIA and the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, Afghan counter­

revolutionaries are to receive the weapons captured by Israeli invaders during the

aggression against Lebanon. 93 Further, it is said that the US had paid Israel $35

million for a variety of Soviet-model weaponry captured in the 1982 Lebanon

fighting. 94

The US was training Afghan guerrillas in the use of chemical weapons. The

CIA is reported to be training about 100 Mujahideens per month in arms smuggling

89

90

91

92

93

94

Dennis Dee:oncini , quoted in William D. Hartung, "US Weapons at War", A World Policy Pap.er Specwl Report, Prepared by the Arms Trade Resource Centre of the World Policy InstItute, 1995, p.17.

Chris Smith, ri..26, p. 7.

Washington Post, 3 December 1986.

ibid.

V .Stepanov," Afghanistan on the Path of Revolutionary Change". International Affairs. May 1984. pp.30-31.

Klare and Kombluh, eds, n.65. p.203.

94

and use. 95 Media reports often claimed that the US provided more than $230milJion

or more every year, regarding material and financial help and also for training the

fighters. 96 The Washington Post of 8 May 1987 reported that the CIA has spent $3

billon on arms and ammunition for Afghan rebels - half of it put up by the American

taxpayers. It was their secret arms procurement branch that was kept busy. Further,

the Mujahideen had contacts with private manufacturers. The rebel groups had offered

$5million to Mr. Dominick Spadea of the Camden County in the US for 10,000

weapons. 97

Moreover, the high-ranking representatives of the administration, military

personnel and Congressmen often visiting Pakistan were doing their efforts towards

stoking up the war against the Afghan people and fanning enmity and hatred against

the DRA and the then Soviet Union. Under the cover of CIA sponsored seminars,

conferences,symposia and ordinary meetings,. American representatives have been

trying to boost the morale of the battered bandits, assuring them of invariable US

.r.:" .. supportand urge them. to escalate the undeclared war-. 1:here is·ahost of anti-Afghan

organisations, like the "Freedom House" or "Freedom Research Foundation",

established and functioning in the USA under CIA auspices. 98

Hence there seems little doubt that a considerable portion of the military aid,

making its way into Afghanistan Mujahideen, has been procured by American help.

95

96

97

98

Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modem War: The Afghan and Falklands Conflict, Vol.lII, (Boulder, 1990), p.65.

Patriot (N~w Delhi), 24 September 1991.

New York Times, 5 January 1986.

Vsevolod Semyonov, nTl}e Creeping Aggression Against Afghanistan~, internationnlAjJairs, llo.lO, October 1986, pp. 66-67.

95

China effected major arms supplies to the Afghan rebels both immediately

through its common border with Afghanistan called the "Wakhan Corridor" and via

Pakistan. In January 1980, US Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, then visiting China,

obtained an agreement with their government which permitted overflight of Chinese

territory fo~ planes carrying arms destined for the resistance. 99 Further, the US

Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, during his visit to China, agreed to supply US

small arms to China for their subsequent delivery to the counter -revolutionary gangs

in Afghanistan. 100 If the-border between Pak-istanand Afghanistan were closed, the

Chinese would take over the transhipment of weapons - permitting planes to unload

in China and providing Chinese personnel to carry the cargo across the rugged

Chinese-Afghan frontier. 101 ,

Chinese weapons, particularly rockets and anti-aircraft guns, were available'to

the Mujahideen in large quantities which got confirmed in a seizure of weapons during

the clashes with guerrillas in the suburbs of Kabul in early 1985. A letter from the

Central Committee of the Afghan Communist Party to its Chinese counterpart said that

China had supplied the rebels with mortars, recoilless guns, RPG anti-tank rocket

launchers, anti-aircraft weapons,SAM-7s artillery rockets, and other kinds of war

technology.102 Further, China supplied around 2000 heavy machine guns, 1000

anti-tank rockets, and nearly half a million rounds of ammunition to the rebels through

99

100

101

102

Carl Bernstein, "Antis for Afghanistan", The New Republic (Washington), vol. 185, 18 July 1981, p.9.

Borisov, n.86, p.38.

Bemstein, 11.99, p.9.

Louis Eales, "Afghan Protest to China", Jane's Defence Weekly (Surrey), vol.3, 110.7.16 February 1985, p. 249.

96

the Pakistani army.103 Besides. China was supplying its own copies of Soviet

designed weaponry: AK-47 automatic rifles. 12.7 and 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine

guns, 107 and 122mm rocket launchers-. mortars. and anti-tank and anti-personnel

mines.104 More effective than the heavier costlier equipment from the West.

Chinese arms supplement the Soviet weapons captured by resistance fighters and the

fact that in most cases the parts and ammunition for both types is similar and

interchangeable. 105

Apart from arming the Mujahideens with modern weapons, China set up some

training bases in the province of Xinjing. Also, China had set up training camps in

South Sinkiang where rebel recruits were trained in the use of SAM-7s.106 "Peking

maintains close contacts with the pro-Chinese groupings Shole Jawid and Sorha and

with reactionary organisation Moslem Brothers. After undergoing special training in

China many members of these groupings were smuggled into Afghanistan for

committing acts of terrorism and sabotage." 107 Furthermore. China was reported

to have 300 advisors working in Pakistan. 108 A Chinese team imparted training to

the Pakistani instructors which lasted for eight weeks and was unique in that the

103

104

105

106

107

108

Husain Haqqani.· Afghanistan: Deadly Winter Games·, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol. 127, no.6, 14 February 1985, p.24.

Scott R. Mc Michael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan (London, 1991). p.29.

Haqqani, n.l03, p.24.

Times of India, 3 November 1984.

The Truth About Afghanistan: Documents. Facts.Eyewitness Reports, compiled by V. Ashitkov, K. Gevorkyan, A. Polonsky, V. Svetozarov (Moscow, 1981), p.1l3.

Cordesman and Wagner, n.95, p.57.

97

'Chinese brought an attractive young woman as their weapon-training interpreter. 109

Saudi. Arabia undertook the major financial role. The Saudis, who bankroll

much of Pakistan's military budget, have kept a firm hand on the Pakistanis pushing

them - at the US urging - to keep their border open for the transfer of weapons. 110

Saudi aid included 300 anti-tank rocket launchers, 1000 light anti-tank rockets, 10,000

machine guns, heavy guns and mortars (purchased from China) and 20,000 boxes of

ammunition. 111 The Saudi funds earmarked for the Afghan conflict had been

deposited in a secret Swiss bank account. In the beginning Saudi Arabia provided

about $30 million each for the purchase of Soviet-style weapons manufactured in

Egypt and China. 112 The Saudis, reportedly, contributed $525million for

Afghanistan in 1985 and 1986. 113 Further, the orthodox wahabi groups in Saudi

Arabia supplemented the US governmental aid effort by a significant separate pipeline.

Equally important was the support rendered by Egypt. It provided training for

the Afghan guerrillas and served as the major source of arms - supplying weapons

obtained from the erstwhile Soviet Union during the years of Egyptian-Soviet

friendship and tons of replicated Soviet armaments, turned out in the factories on the

outskirt of Cairo. 114 In February 1 ~80, the Egyptian Defence Minister boasted that

his country was training as well as sending arms to the Afghans in guerrilla

109

110

111

112

113

114

Yousaf and Adkin, n.9, p.89.

Bernstein, n. 99, p. 9.

Cordesman and Wagner, n.95, p.57.

Carl Bernstein, 'US Weapons for Afghanistan", Chicago Tribune, 22 July 1981.

Washington Post, 20 June 1986.

Bemstein, 0.99. Also see New York Times, 14 February 1980.

98

warfare. 115 Confirmation of Egypt's such role was provided by the then President

of Egypt, Anwar Sadat. In an interview to the US NBC Television Company he

imprudently disclosed the fact that for the previous twenty one months the USA had

been making secret payments for Egypt's military supplies to the Afghan-counter

revolutionaries, US planes had been used to deliver Soviet models at Egyptian

plants. 116 He told "the US sent me airplanes and told me, 'please open your stores

for us so that we can give the Afghanis the armaments they need to fight', and I gave

the armaments." 117 He also said that Egypt is determined to double its assistance

until the glorious Afghans regain their liberty and establish their national system with

their own full will.llB Although more sophisticated weapons including the

surface-to-air missiles were supplied, the weapons clearly remain in the small arms

category. Egypt also had projects under the Arab Military Industry Organisation

(AMIO) and was capable of manufacturing increasingly sophisticated weapons some

of which were finding their way into the hands of the Afghan resistance. 119 The

CIA also procured, via Egypt, large amounts of Technovar anti-personnel mines

originally produced in ltaly.120 Egyptian arms also came through Pakistan's North

Western Frontier Province (NWFP).

115

116

117

118

119

120

Washington Post. 14 February 1980.

Borisov. n.86. p.42.

San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 1981. p.ll.

.New York Times. 28 December 1980.

Grant M. Farr and John G. Merriam. eds .• Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival (USA. 1987). p.84.

Mark L. Urban. War in Afghanistan (London. 1988). p.187.

99

Further, it is also believed that the countries like West European nations, Iran,

Israel, Libya, North Korea, Turkey and Japan were also involved in the dispersal of

arms to rival factions in Afghanistan. Britain was supplying sophisticated

surface-to-air missiles to the Afghan. rebels in collaboration with the US, the cost and

scope of which would make it one of the biggest covert arms trade in recent

decades. 121 Britain's supply of Blowpipe anti-aircraft missile increased the

Mujahideen's war capability. In 1984, Britain had extended £18million to the Afghan

counter-revolutionaries. 122· Further, speaking before the Afghan refugees and local

poputation of Nassir Bagh in the environs of Peshawar the then British Prime

Minister,Ms Margaret Thatcher, confirmed the intentions of the British government

to maintain its aid to the Afghan counter- revolutionaries. She promised that London

would allocate £2,000,000 in addition to the previously allotted £5,800,000 for their

needs. Seeking to boost the morale of the counter-revolutionaries, Thatcher stated that

Britain would not be satisfied until Afghanistan was free. 123

It was also said that Pakistan had been feverishly shopping for sophisticated

but comparatively light weapons from some West European countries particularly Italy

and West Germany. Arms industry circles in London were agog with suggestions that

the then Zia administration - probably with American support and consent - was

exploring the possibility of making a secret deal with Italy for purchase of military

equipment and weapons especially 'ground-to-ground' and 'ground-to-air' missiles and

other modern firing weaponry. And it is said that a considerable part of this

. consignment would be delivered through Islamabad to the Afghan rebels operating

121

122

123

Indian Express (New Delhi), 18 June 1987.

Kabul News Times, 27 February 1983.

Borisov, n.86, pAO.

100

from Pakistan. 124 West Germany also extended £60million aid to the Afghan

counter-revolutionaries. The prestige weapon of 1981/82 was the Heckler and Koch

G3 of West German design. 125 West German leaders including the erstwhile

Chancellor Helmut Kohl invariably made a point of demonstrating their solidarity with

bandit chiefs visiting that country. West German citizens illegally penetrate into

Afghanistan together with mercenary bands to conduct subversive activities against its

government.

Besides, some weapons destined primarily for the Khomeinist Shiite groups

entered Afghanistan from Iran. Also, several private organisations, sympathetic to the

Mujahideen cause, raised funds from various countries, more from the Middle-Eastern

countries, and purchased weapons in the international arms market for the

Mujahideen. There have been recurring stories that the USA has used Turkey as an

offshore supplier. The CIA purchased 60,000 rifles, 8,000 light machine guns and

over 100 million rounds of ammunition form Turkey albeit from obsolete stocks and

in appalling conditions. 126 It was, also, reported that France and Sweden provided

funding, supplies, and personnel (France only) for medical support to the

resistence. 127 In addition, the rebels used bullhorns, supplied by Japan, to unnerve

the troops when they had them surrounded. 128

124

125

126

127

128

Ahmed Malik, "And Now Italian Arms for Pakistan", Democratic World (New Dellii), vol. 15, no. 22, 1 June 1986, p.8.

John Fullerton, The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan (London, 1984), p.77.

Chris Smith, n.26. p.6.

Me Michael, n.104, p.30.

ibid. p.33.

101

Even though it is seven years since Moscow withdrew its troops from

Afghanistan, 'the war in this benighted country drags on because of continued external ,

support by way of cash and miliwy supplies to the combatants.' Rich Arab countries

and Central Asian countries are replacing the US as financiers. The rebel groups are

also recruiting volunteers from Arab countries to fulfill their dream of an Islamic

State. "The 'Islamic victory, in turn, is attracting new funds through a 'shadowy

network; of wealthy Arab donors. These private backers are now bankrolling specific

battles and supporting an influx of non-Afghan Muslim volunteers ready to martyr

themselves for the rebel cause." 129 Further, the Mujahideen also gained from the

recent Gulf War. Deliveries of the weapons commenced earlier the month of

September 1991 and the bulk of it was delivered to the Mujahideen. "Soviet-made

T -62 tanks and other weaponry captured by the allied forces from the Iraqis during

. the Gulf War has been gifted to the Afghan Mujahideen .... It icludes apart from the

tanks, four barrel ZK-l, anti-aircraft guns, 120 M.Vc and 130mm artillery prices and

hand guns. ,,130

Hence Mujahideen's military capabilities has substantially improved with the

. inflow of sophisticated weapons from a number of sources. They now possess various

quality of weapons like individual weapons, heavy weapons and collective weapons.

(See Appendix III). Substantial quantities of these arms a~d ammunition came in via

Pakistan from various outside backers, notably the US, China, West European and

Gulf countries. Here, it is pertinent to discuss Pakistan's middleman role in regulating

the deliveries of arms to the Mujahideen group.

129 The HiruJu (Madras) • 3 December 1991.

130 Times of lruJia. 24 September 1991.

102

Pakistan's Middleman Role

Pakistan assumed a crucial role in the Afghan civil war. The 1,200 mile border

Pakistan shares with Afghanistan appeared to be increasingly vulnerable to Pakistan

and Soviet intervention. Claimed to be a key actor in the area, Pakistan extended

protection to the Mujahideen fighters, let them organise on its territory and allowed

foreign-supplied weapons to cross into Afghanistan. Situated in strategic place,

Pakistan was the beneficiary of generous attention. Without Pakistan their could have

been no Afghan resistance movement. 131

Pakistan's championing of the resistance struggle was due to geo-strategic and

domestic imperatives. The first objective was the removal of Soviet forces from

Afghanistan. There was deep concern that Moscow, through material support, would

escalate ethnic separatist movements in Pakistan's Baluchistan and the NWFP. The

second goal was the early return of Afghan refugees for the exiles might have an

undesirable impact on their economy and society. Third, the involvement of Pakistan

contributed to regime survival by helping to neutralise General Zia-UI-Haq's critics.

Fourth, Zia being a staunch anti-Communist, intended to use the war and Pakistan's

role as a frontline state to defend Islam against Soviet-sponsored Communism. Fifthly,

there was the desire on the part of Pakistan to block the revival of Afghan nationalism

and gain recognition of the international boundary.132 Last but not the least,

Pakistan knew that it would profit enormously in terms of money and arms by being

a major conduit.

131

132

Marvin G. Weinbawll. Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder, USA, 1994). p.ll.

ibid. pp.ll-I3.

103

Pakistan from the outset sought to orchestrate much of the conduct of the

Afghan war. Pakistan's involvement in the Afghanistan civil war began with the

Communist coup of April 1978. Further, Pakistan was subjected to pressure from a

number of countries to support Afghan violence and act as a conduit for material to

the resistance movement. An important role was assigned by the CIA of the USA to

Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (lSI). It's work was to liaison with Afghan

resistance groups and funnelling arms supplies to them as well as for coordination of

the armed units of the resistance in Afghanistan territory. The CIA deposited funds

each month in the lSI-controlled bank account. This money was used for Party offices,

construction and maintenance of warehouses, puschase of rations and clothes,

transport and allowance and salaries for leaders and officials respectively. 133

"Arms deliveries to Afghan mercenaries are directed by a special Coordinating

Committee of the Council led by Mr. Brezezinski and approved by President Carter.

The arms are channelled through Pakistan. This is the most important effort of its

kind ... since the operation that aided the mercenaries fighting against the Afghan

people. "134

The CIA arranged regular airlifts of Afghanistan-bound weapons to Pakistan

where the arms were distributed by the lSI Directorate in close cooperation with the

CIA station in Islamabad. The CIA also arranged for the arms to be shipped via Oman

to Karachi 135 and loaded into heavy trucks which. carried them to Afghan frontier.

The first ship carrying arms and ammunitioh for Peshawar arrived in Karachi from

Britain in June 1979. These weapons, mostly Soviet-made, were bought by the CIA

133

134

135

Yousaf and Adkin, n.9, p.106.

The Undeclared War: Imperialism vs. Afghanistan, cited in L. Humanite (Moscow, 1980), 18 February 1980, p.5l.

Smith, n.26, p.5.

104

for the Mujahideen in the open market. At Karachi port authority accounts were

settled in cash, manifests were merely labelled 'defence stores' and customs officials

were not involved. For this reason, nobody really knew how much weaponry was

imported during the 1980s, although one estimate speculated that the US covert

programme provided more than 4,00,000 Kalashnikov rifles up until mid-1991. 136

Further, lSI continued to send trucks fun of weapons to the Hizb-i-Islami forces in

Gardez. It also established a few 2,000 to 2,500 strong army units manned by

veterans of the Afghan army equipped with tanks, artillery and combat vehicles. 137

Some fifty five border bases were located just inside Pakistan to assist an easy

flow of weapons. Most of them were clustered around the main entry points near

Parachinar and Chaman, north-west of Quetta. There were six main routes leading

into Afghanistan - starting in the north from Chitral a high route led to the Panjsher

valley, Faizabad and the northern provinces; from Parachinar (the Parrot's Beak) via

Ali Khel into Logar provinces which was the busiest route through which 40 per cent

of supplies passed; from Miram Sha~ via Zhawar again into Logar provinces; from

Quetta to Chaman to Kandahar and nearby provinces; through Girzi jungle and;

through Iran. Apart from Karachi to Quetta there was one main pipeline via

Rawalpindi and Peshawar to the border. 138

Weapons, thus, poured steadily. Arms reached Pakistan by both ship and

aircraft and were then trucked under military supervision to the border areas. At the

frontier, weapons were recorded as they entered Afghanistan. 139 Next, these arms

136

137

138

139

D.C. Isby, quoted in Smit11, 11.26, pp.8-9.

Y ossef Bodansky, "Borders and Alignments Begin to Change in Central Asia", Defence and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy (London), vol.20, lIos.7-8, July-August 1992, p.IS.

Yousaf and Adkin, n.9, pp. 109-1 10.

Edward Girardet, Ajghnistan: The Soviet War (London, 1983), p.67.

105

were distributed among the Mujahideen's armies and units on Afghan territory. "They

are delivered by caravans of as many as 600 camels, groups of two or three camels,

donkeys, small Toyotas crossing into the country over the mountains or smuggled in

over open roads." 140 The animals used were camels, horses and mules. Camels

were helpful for arid lands and long routes. Both Afghan and Argentine horses were

employed for long distance, strategic carrier of supplies from the border to the

operational bases. Also Chinese mules were used to transfer the mortar, the heavy

machine guns or the Single Barrel Rocket Launcher (SBRL) and its ammunition to the

actual firing point, or very close to it. 141

With the passage of time, the weapons supplied via Pakistan increased in

numbers and sophistication. In March 1985, the Reagan administration arrived at a

decision to sharply intensify US covert action as a means of allowing the Mujahideen

to defeat the Soviets. CIA's task was to purchase arms and equipment and arrange I

their transportation to Pakistan; provide funds for the purchase of vehicles and

transportation inside Afghanistan and Pakistan; train Pakistani intructors on modern

and sophisticated weapons; provide satellite photographs and maps for lSI's

operational planning; provide radio equipment and training. 142 As the arms

dispersal became more in numbers, large depots were located in Pakistan, by far the

largest at Ojhri camp, a military installation on the outskirts of Rawalpindi. At

Rawalpinidi, Pakistan "had a fleet of 200 vehicles, mostly five - or ten -ton trucks

with false and frequently changed number plates, with which to move the weapons

further down the pipeline. All the boxes had to be brought to the camp from the

140 Alexander Prokhanoy, "Afghanistan", lnternntional Affairs, no.8, August 1988, p.l?

141 Yousaf and Adkin, n.9, p.109.

142 Yousaf and Adkin, n~ 9, pp.95-96.

106

railway station to be separated, checked and stored in the warehouse." 143 In one

estimate, at least 80 per cent of all arms and ammunition used in Afghanistan passed

through the warehouse at Ojhri.l44

Further, Pakistan allows training facilities for the Mujahideen rebel - a similar

role is being played in the context of Punjab and Kashmir - in camps set up on its soil

where experts from the USA, Britain, France, Egypt, China, Pakistan, Iran, and other

countries train rebels in guerrilla warfare. The training was based on the principle of

'mission-oriented'. Once a mission had been decided and a commander selected, then

the team would be responsible for the training of that commander and his

Mujahideen. 145 There were more than 300 American instructors alone in these

camps.146 They provided training to Pakistan's Army instructors. In the case of

new weapons, particularly anti-aircraft weapons, American trainers ran courses for

Pakistani instructors; they then trained the Mujahideen. 147 Chinese instructors were

taking an active part in training terrorist bands on Pakistani territory who were later

sent to Afghanistan to conduct subversive operations. The US, British and Chinese

instructors were training over 70,000 men for operations against Afghanistan. 148

" According to a report by Pravda, there are interventionist training centres in

the areas of Peshawar, near the towns of Miram Sahn, Bannu, Chitral Parachinar,

Kohat and Yasin in the NWFP, near Queta, Pishin and Nushki in Baluchistan and

143

144

145

146

147

148

ibid, p.l00.

ibid, p.lOl.

ibid, pp.114-116.

Stepanov, 0.93, p.30.

Yousafaod Adkill. u.9, p.116.

The Truth About Afghanistan: Decuments Facts. Eyewimess Repons. n.102, p.122.

107

elsewhere" .149 Besides, training centres were also set up at Badjaur-Momand

region, Warsak, Job etc. The Afghan authorities said there were 110 training camps

for rebels in Pakistan: even conservative estimates tell that about 70 such camps were

functioning. 150 Furthermore, a Mobile Training Team (MIT) was established by

Pakistan to provide syllabus and training aids. 151

As a consequence, special teams and crews were trained in the use of light as

well as heavy weapons. Some factions trained mine warfare, demolition and explosive

experts. They also provided ideological and literacy training. Massoud established

special groups to operate the more sophisticated weaponry and he deveJoped his own

training programmes in Panjshir valley with indigenous experts. 152 Also, "an ex­

ORA Army Colonel, who reportedly, had received commando training in Great

Britain and the Soviet Union and had worked with the US Special Forces in Vietnam,

established an excellent training camp in Pakistan. He offered fOllr to six weeks

courses for upto 400 trainees at a time." 153 On an average between 4000 to 5200

Afghans were being trained in Pakistan every year in the technique of guerrilla

warfare. 154 And, from 1984, through 1987, over 80,000 Mujahideen went through

Pakistani training camps. 155

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

Perala Ratnam, Afghnistan's Uncertain Future (New Delhi, 1981). p.73.

Times of India. 3 November 1984.

Yousaf and Adkin. n.9, p.1l7.

Me Michael, n.104. p.37.

ibid. pp.36-37.

Patriot, 18 January 1980.

Yousaf and Adkill, n.9, pp.28-29.

108

Moreover, China took the help of Pakistan in channelling military hardwares.

China was also reported to be supplying to Pakistan military equipment, small arms,

automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and air defence missiles for rebel groups fighting

inside Afghanistan. China was. also reported to be flying cargo planes into Pakistan

on a regular basis. 156 The weapons, ammunition and equipment are delivered to

the Mujahideensfrom China to Pakistan by the sea Tianjin to Karachi and then along

the Karakoram highway to the Pakistani border. 157

The Pakistani authorities not only permitted foreign aids for the Mujahideen

to be channelled through Pakistan, but also organised their distribution to them. In due

course, the arms, channelled through Pakistan for the Mujahideen, started dispersing

to the adjoining areas of South Asian countries, thereby increased the potentiality of

political violence.

Impact Upon Pakistan

For Pakistan, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan presented a unique

opportunity to closely lirlk itself with the foreign countries in order to get massive

doses of military and economic aid. But Pakistan's security environment worsen~ and

became more complex. Pakistan now faces the socio-economic and political strains,

being caused by the presence of a large number of Afghan refugees on its territory.

There have been frequent references to Pakistan's "Kalashnikov Culture", an

intensification of violence in the society imported by the Afghans. And, the frequency

of the acts of political violence and terrorism within Pakistan has accelerated to an

alarrr.ing level.

156 Times of India, 4 January 1980.

157 The Daily Telegraph (London), 5 January 1980.

109

Afghan refugees constitute a potentially destabilising nation within Pakistan.

As the population of Afghanistan is mostly rural, conservative, and strongly Islamic,

. the communist government's policies met with stiff opposition in the countryside,

particularly among the Nuristanis and the Pushtuns of eastern and southern

Afghanistan. 158

A very small number of these refugees, estimated by the Government of Pakistan at around 1500, fled Afghanistan between 1973 to 1978 as political exiles from Daoud regime. The vast majority, however, entered Pakistan in consequence of the coup d'etat on 27-28 April 1978, the subsequent Soviet invasion in late December of 1979, and the estimated escalation of hostilities between the Soviet-controlled Kabul Government and resistance fighters. The bulk of these refugees live in official refugee camps located in NWFP and Baluchistan, both bordering Afghanistan. Several newer camps have been opened in the Punjab. Significant numbers of Afghan refugees also live outside refugee camps, either in the villages or the cities of Pakistan. The largest number of non-camp refugees are found in the city of Peshawar, located less than 40km from the Afghan border. 159

Most of the refugees belong to the Pushtun tribes who comprise the majority

in Afghanistan. Other groups represented in the refugee population are the Tajiks,

Uzbeks, Turkomans, Badakshanis, Hazaras and Nuristanis. In one estimate, roughly

one-quarter are adult males; the remaining three quarters are women, children and

elderly males. 160

Because of the presence of Afghan refuge~s on Pakistani soil and the

continuing resistance inside Afghanistan, Pakistan was being drawn to the edge of

political violence. Refugees are regularly blamed for civil disord~r. The Pakistani

police accused the refugees of involvement in 75 per cent of the crimes committed in

158 Jones, n.75, p.2.

159 Farr and Merriam, eds., n.119, pp.160-63.

160 Jones, n.75, p.5.

110

the NWFP during 1991. 161 The refugees over the years developed vested interests.

They got absolute freedom to move freely. With their free movement and because of

their eagerness for money they started a traffic in arms. An increasing number of

Afghans stationed in Pakistan were getting equipped with sophisticated arms out of the

supplies meant for the rebels. Most of the Afghan refugees ask for arms rather than

food.162 The refugees upset the existing sectarian and ethnic balance in Pakistan.

US weapons sqpplied to Afghan Mujahideen are being freely used by the leaders of

the Mohajir movement and Afghans in Karachi and Hyderabad. 163 The armed

Afghans lead to civil war with the Punjab is and the Sindhis on one side, and the

Pathan, both Pakistani and Afghan, on the other. 164 Violent ethnic conflicts in the

metropolitan areas of the Sindh were blamed on the refugees. 165 Further, in the

Kurram agency, the refugees outnumbered the locals and in the sectarian clashes over

200 died. 166

Further, the agents of Afghan Intelligence Service, KHAD, have been

extremely active in creating riots in refugee villages and generating antagonism

between the refugees and locals. They come into Pakistan in the guise of refugees

with the object of spying and creating tensions. KHAD works in close collaboration

with KGB, the Russian intelligence agency. Also, both are responsible for periodic

161

162

163

164

165

166

Aziz Siddiqui, The Herald (Karachi), vol.23, no.5, May 1992, p. 40a.

The Hindu, 23 January 1983.

Patriot, 10 November 19S6.

P.B. SiqIta, "The Afghan Problem", IDSA Journal (New Dellii), vo1.16, no.2, ~tober-December 1983, p.127.

Aftab A.Kazi, "Ethnic Nationalism and Super-Powers in South Asia: Sindhis and Baluchis', Journal of Asian and African Affairs q ... ondon), voU, no.l, July 1989, p.7.

The Muslim (Pakistan), 29 July 1987.

111

bomb blasts in areas of civilian concentration. "More air raids take place now than

before. Bombs are planted by KGB agents in public places, especially Peshawar,

where a large number of refugees are living. "167

The illegal sale and spread of weapons throughout Pakistan was also linked to

the Afghans. The Afghan rulers continuously supplied arms to certain tribes in

Pakistani territory 'with a view to establish a sympathetic tribal militia. Further, since

both Pakistani officials involved as well as Afghan leaders served as conduit for the

weapon supplies to the resistance groups, it was alleged that much of these arms are

siphoned off by them and sold on the black market for personal profit. The local arms

industry, already formidable, also grew to keep pace with the demands of the

Mujahideen.

"The arms supplied by the US to the rebels might find their way to illegal

markets like Sohrab Goth market in the outskirts of Karachi in Pakistan which sparked

off ethnic riots and civil violence. It now appears that 'Bara' market in Pakistan have

reached a saturation point." 168 While accusing the CIA of gross mismanagement

of the arms pipeline to Mujahideen, the US Congressmen emphasised that 40 per cent

of ttie total arms aid is siphoned off along the way by corrupt officials, Afghan leaders

and Mujahideen" .169 By some estimates about a quarter of the arms from the US,

Saudi Arabia and China were thought to have been diverted for use by Pakistani

167

168

169

I

Mohammad Es' Haq, n.77, p.129.

Syed Ziaullah, "The Afghan Accord - Dangerous Implications", Democratic World, YoLI7, no.17, 24 April 1988, p.lO.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan". Strategic Digest, yo1.l8, 110.4, April 1988, p.533.

112

secessionists, bandits and others. 170 More than ever, with more small arms in

circulation, Pakistanis were using weapons to settle differences.

Further, the Afghans had long been active in the heroin trade which escalated

during the Afghan war. Opium grown in Afghanistan was typically brought into

Pakistan by trucks and mules returning from trips carrying CIA-purchased arms into

Afghanistan. 171 The guns that accompanied the explosion of drugs added to the

social destabilization of Pakistan. Refugees were also accused of deep involvement in

transnational arms and drugs trafficking.

Thus the anarchy of the Afghan conflict threatens to engulf Pakistan where

arms are plentiful and political violence and riots are now commonplace.

Repercussions on India

The arms and ammunition, reportedly being shipped across Pakistani-rugged

frontier with Afghanistan, did not necessarily find their way to Afghanistan. A large

part of the weapons found its way into the hands of the anti-India violent groups

operating from Pakistan. The India-Pakistan border from Kashmir to Kutch is as

porous as it has always been. A grim reality facing India is the backwash of the

Afghan conflict, represented by weapons getting through to terrorist groups in

India. In Even the Indian terrorists are being given training -in the use of these

weapons in camps outside Peshawar.

The weapons, acquired by the Mujahideen from foreign countries, have found

their way into the hands of the Punjab terrorists. After the arms reach the Pakistan

170

171

172

"Silent Voices # 1", a Report by the Refugee Council in association with the British Agencies Afghan Groups, cited in Weinbawll, n.131, p.64.

WeinbauIll, n.131, p.65.

Times of India, 3 February 1992.

113

border, couriers are responsible for delivering the cache to Punjab. Sikh militants

fighting in the Punjab region have large quantities of Chinese-type-56 assault rifles of

the kind that were supplied in large numbers to the Afghan war by the CIA, indicating

a likely spill over of the Afghan pipeline into this conflict as wel1. l73 There are

already reports of the Stinger missiles and rockets supplied by the US to Mujahideen

, being used in strife-torn Punjab. Also, numerous weapons recovered from the

Khalistani extremists which bore the Chinese and Russian marking, the same as the

weapons with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. It is generally felt that the rockets,

rocket launchers and AK-47 rifles, that the Punjab militants have acquired, might have

come from the Afghan refugees. Mujahideen with their huge stockpile of arms may

introduce an entirely new element to the Punjab tangle. 174 In the training bases for

the Mujahideen also Khalistani Commando Force (KCF) activists get training.

There is also the increasing role of Afghan Mujahideen in the other parts of

India. The Afghans are believed to be training Kashmiris from the valley. They are

also sending arms and ammunition to the terrorists and brainwashing them with

anti-India Islamic fundamentalism. Afghan Mujahideens are better trained in

sop~isticated arms and guerrilla warfare than the Kashmiri militants to suit Pakistan's

purposes in Jammu & Kashmir. Afghans because of their complexion and appearance

can easily pass off as Kashmiris which factor, apart from the factor of their intensive

tra:ining and easy availability, may be the primary reason for Pakistan's preference for

them. 175 Pakistan's plans to smuggle in 10,000 armed subversives acquires

considerable significance when viewed from the angle that the plan could well be to

173

174

175

Hartung, n.89, p.18.

Ash Narain Roy. "Soviet Pull-Out: Itllplicatioll'> for the Region", Link (New Delhi), vol. 30.no.39, 1 May 1988, p.19.

Blitz (Bombay), 7 July 1990.

114

infiltrate Afghans posing as Kashmiris, in batches, on a large scale. 176 Dr.

Najibullah, the then President of Afghanistan, made a pointed reference that a close

linkage is now being knitted between the Kashmiri terrorists and a section of Afghan

Mujahideen through the good offices of Pakistan. 177

Further, many Afghan resistance leaders including officials of the interim

governinent, had for some time been hinting at a readiness to give direct military

assistance to an armed struggle inside Kashmir. 178 At a Jama'at-i-Islami sponsored

conference on Kashmir in Lahore in January 1993, a Jama'at leader boasted that his

party had sent' 35,000 Mujahideen to fight in Kashmir. He claimed to the

embarrassment of government officials in attendance that these Mujahideens had

earlier been engaged in the Afghan jehad. 179 Moreover, Pakistan's lSI acts as a co­

ordinator of any links among the Afghan Mujahideen and violent groups in Kashmir.

It is learnt that the arms meant for the Afghan Mujahideen are now getting

dispersed to the violent groups within India. This dispersal of arms intensifies the

tension of political violence inside the country. Thus the rush of more diffusion of

small arms to the rebels, though it is through Pakistan, is fraught with grave

consequences.

A perusal of the above description shows that South Asia, more particularly

Pakistan and India, is the worst affected area in this context. Since the Soviet

intervention large quantities of small arms and ammunition have flooded in South

Asia, which are available against cash payment or for services rendered.- Here,

176

177

178

179

ibid.

NationaL Herald (New Delhi), 6 September 1990.

Frontier Post (Lahore), 4 February 1990.

Newsline (Karachi), February 1993. p.86.

115

Mujahideen embarked upon a course of action which resulted in the horizontal

proliferation of weapons in South Asia. Thus the Mujahideen is very much responsible

in dispersing small arms and training facilities to the various secessionist movements

in the adjoining areas inside the region which sparks off intra-state and inter-sate

political violence.

THE DRUG MAFIA

South Asia is a major region where drug production, trafficking, violence and

terrorism go hand in hand. In South Asia, drugs have permeated every layer of society

and increasingly the social and political structures are getting dominated by the drug

mafia. The unique geographical frontiers of this subcontinent is very much prone to

subversion. The long open border, both on the East and West, provides an unlimited

scope to the drug mafia to carryon its nefarious operation rather freely. Drug

trafficking is a transnational phenomenon, for their operations involve transactions that

regularly flow across national boundaries thereby posing severe threat to national and

international security. The drug cartels keep on changing their entry points. For

instance, when Punjab of India was fenced, the carriers shifted to the border areas of

Rajasthan and Gujarat. For them distance is not a matter of concern.

The illegal drug production and drug trafficking are linked closely to the illegal

arms trade and international terrorism. Since militants need a lot of money to buy

arms, they find drug smuggling the best way to make money. Side by side, the drug

smugglers sell arms to the extremist groups. "The clandestine arms market and the

drug mafia both travel along the same route and sustain each other in causing havoc

and destruction" .180 This has been amply proved time and again in South Asian

180 Askari, 11.64, p.2304.

116

region which have been the victims of political violence. The drug mafia is very well

organised for this job which would be evident from the following narrative.

Drug Trafficking Network in South Asia

The cultivation and refinement of drugs, enmeshed with drug trafficking, has

profoundly affected the basic social and political structure of South Asian region. The

first group of drug traffickers in a world map were perhaps the Chinese and Arab

traders who carried on the trade of opium some 300 years ago along the Silk Route,

connecting the far eastern Chinese city of Sanghai to Turkish town of Constantinople.

Drug trafficking was not a major concern then. But at the turn of this century it poses

a serious threat.

In the continent of Asia two .major drug production and trafficking routes

operate. The first one is the 'Golden Triangle', comprising of Myanmar, Laos and

Thailand. "The Goldan Triangle is bounded by the Mae Sai and Mekong rivers at the

point where the borders of Laos, Thailand and Myanmar meet, creating a virtually

unpoliced territory of about 75,000 sq. miles .. Here the topographical and climatic

conditions are ideal for the cultivation of opium. "181 "In the 'Golden Triangle',

1,550 tons of opium is produced, with Myanmar accounting for 1,200 tons, Laos for

300 tons and Thailand, for 50 tons. Processing about 450 tons of opium yields 45 tons

of heroin, five tons of which is shipped to Europe and 2.5 tons to the United

States." 182 Of late, businessmen have started calling the 'Golden Triangle' area as

'Golden Quandrangle', a name designed to reflect the fact that one more nation,

181

182

Ravi Shastri, "Insurgency and Drugs: The Deadly Alliance", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi). vo1.l2, no.l. April 1987. p.41.

International Affairs Gues! Club. "Drug Trafficking", Intenzational Affairs. no.l. January 1991, p.106.

117

China, has been added to the Golden Triangle for its notorious role m drug

trafficking. 183

On the other hand, the 'Golden Crescent', which cuts across Pakistan,

Afghanistan and Iran, have been the world's major producing area. The geopolitical

environment of the 'Golden Crescent' is largely similar to that of the 'Golden

Triangle'. "The region has been traditionaly autonomous with a tribal system of

government prevailing in most parts whether it be eastern Afghanistan or western

Pakistan. These tribes have been virtually independent. Opium cultivation and use has

been an ancient custom of the region. Moreover, most poppy growers in the 'Golden

Crescent', as in the 'Golden Triangle', have realised that larger profits are to be made

by refining opium themselves. Thus heroin laboratories have sprung upon both in the

Crescent as they did earlier in the Triangle" .184 Further, this region provides for

60 per cent of the heroin reaching America and 80 per cent of the heroin destined for

Europe. IS5

When the 'Golden Triangle' was the nerve centre of the narcotics trade, it was

also bedevilled by a series of insurgencies. The 'Golden Triangle' connection

grad L1all y weakened in the early 1970s. But quite clearly in the late 1970s there

developed a sudden increase in drug trafficking from the 'Golden Crescent' area. "The

only significimt development in the area in the middle of 1978 - when the reported

spurt in drug trafficking from the Pak-Afghan border started - was the begining of the

Afghan insurgency in the wake of the 'Saur' revolution of April 1978". The aid and

support being extended by various countries to the rebel groups in Afghanistan have

183

184

185

Times of India, 7 March 1994.

Shastri, 11.181, pp.42-43.

S.R. Chowdhuri, "Pakistan's Poppy Politics", PTI Feature. F-625, p.l.

118

been contributing indirectly to the increase in drug trade. It is believed that

"Washington's decision to channel billions of dollars in weapons and financial backing

to the Afghan rebel groups in the 1980s, without close scrutiny of the some of the

Afghan leaders involved, contributed to a climate in which sorne of those l~ders

turned to heroin trafficking." 186 Also, the rebels were harvesting opium that,

according to the rebel commanders and fighters, helps finance their war against troops

of the Soviet and Afghan armies. I87 Moreover, since the Soviet intervention in

Afghanistan and the closure of the westward shipping route, Pakistan and India of

South Asian region have become major transhipment points for Golden Crescent

heroin. I88

The Case of Pakistan

In South Asian region, Pakistan is one of the worst victims of the drug mafia's

operation. The illicit traffic in drugs is Pakistan's most profitable business today. In

Pakistan, the drug mafia are the most formidable force threatening the very roots of

Pakistan society. A new drug culture emerged leaving its deep imprint on the national

fabric. The international drug dealers have turned Pakistan into their main

"laboratory" (for processing their raw ma.terials into heroin).

There were three factors which contributed to this development. Firstly, with

the downfall of the Shah of Iran, heavy penalties were imposed on those engaged in

186

187

188

John F. Bums, "Heroin Scourges Million Pakistanis" ,Afghanistan Forum (East Hampton, New York), vol.23, nos.2-3, March-May 1995. p.2.

New York Tinws. 18 June 1986.

S~stri, n.181, p.50.

119

drug production and sale. 189 Ayatollah Khomeini's ban on narcotics production and

usage compelled Iranian narcotic dealers and middlemen to go underground and

abroad. Many fled to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Gulf States in search of new

pastures. Their skill and long experiences helped in making narcotics production and

international drug trafficking more worrisome. Their influx into Quetta and Karachi

of Pakistan provided Pakistani drug dealers an access to transnational network. They

also financed the Helmand valley region to become an important opium producing

region during the 1980s and helped to rebuild clandestine smuggling routes through

Iranian Baluchistan-via-Sistan and between the Makran coast and the Gulf ports. 190

Next, "with the continued stalemate on the Afghan warfront, the Pak-Afghan

border region is turning into the world's largest and most accessible heroin and

hashish market" .191 As the Mujahideen organised their holy war from Pakistan,

they looked for the possible source of funding. The rebels then invest in heroin

laborat()ries to increase their revenue to buy weapons. So the Afghanistan-Pakistan

border became the likely spot for large scale drug production. Afghanistan has

traditionally been well-known for poppy cultivation in the region. Opium is grown in

its South-central part around. Kandahar. The eastern and southern provinces of

Afghani$tan are seen as the largest poppy-growing areas. In Afghanistan's Nangarhar

province, bordering Pakistan, a bountiful opium crop is being harvested and the feudal

headmen who in large part control separate insurgent forces also control much of this

189

190

191

Thomas Carney, "High in the Khyber", Rolling Stone (New York), lio. 407, 27 October 1983, p.45.

US CIA Report on "Heroin in Pakistan: Sowing the Wind", reproduced in Friday Times, vol.5, no.25, 26 August ~ I September 1993, p.3.

Ahmed Rashid, "Drug Bazaars", The Herald, vol.2, no.4, April 1990, p. 68.

120

trade. 192 In some areas of Nangarhar province around Jalalabad, it is estimated that

98 per cent of the cultivated land is under poppy.193 According to a report

published in 1996, Afghanistan registered a 33 per cent increase in opium cultivation·

from 29,180 hectares to 38,740 and a 32 per cent increase in opium production from

950 to 1,250 metric tons in 1995. 194 The Afghan war resulted in the influx of three

million refugees which encouraged drug production. Many of the refugees streaming

into Pakistan brought opium seed with them. 195 The region along the

Afghanistan-Pakistan border has long been settled by nomadic tribes, "where due to

a complex combination of factors like the tribal code of honour, inefficiency of

Islamabad's writ over these areas and the generation of high profits that new high

value narcotic substances like heroin bring, the refining process continues without any

disturbance. "196 Thirdly, the United States mainly under the pressure from its

NATO allies began to offer heavy subsidies to Turkey as an inducement for

eradicating poppy cultivation. Until then Turkey has been the major producer of

poppy which in fact was one of its major cash crops.

The net result of these factors was that the drug produced in Iran, Afghanistan

and Turkey began to be pushed into the tribal region along Pakistan's NWFP. The

192

193

194 .

195

196

Times of India, 18 June 1982.

Times (London), 20 May 1994. . International Narcotics Control Strategy (INCS) Report on Afghanistan, US Deparunent of State, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters, lOth Annual Report, Washington DC. 1996.

I

Quoted in PervaiZ Iqbal Cheema, ."Menace of Drug Trafficking in South Asia", a paper presented in an lqternational Seminar on "Ethno-Sectarian Conflicts and Internal Dy~cs of Regional SecuritY in South Asia", organised by the School of Internatio~ Studies. Jawabarlal Nehru University at India International Centre. New Delhi. 2-4 Septem~r 1996, p.4.

New York Times, 31 July 1980.

Aabha Dixit, "Narcotics Plague Pak Society", Prout (New Delhi), vol.3, no.17, 8-14 June 1991, p.32.

121

NWFP is the heartland of the 'Golden Crescent', an opium growing area stretching

across Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Dozens of small drug markets have sprung up

just inside the tribal belt.

Historically, NWFP areas of Pakistan have been major poppy-growing areas.

The areas are in the Mahaban range of Gadoon-Amazai in Swabi district, Buner, parts

of the Malakand Protected Area, and in the upper side valleys of the Panjkora river

in Dir. With the outlawing of poppy and crop. substitution programmes in Gadoon,

Buner and Malakand, poppy cultivation expanded in Dir, Mardan, Kalam areas north

of the Khyber Pass and Mohmand and emerged in the Federally Administered Tribal

Areas (FAT A) regions of Bajaur and Khyber. 197 The FAT A areas include Kal

Dhaka, Mansehra and Buner. Cannabis grows wild throughout Pakistan and is

cultivated mainly in"Chitral. 198 The terrain is hilly, and only a fraction of the area

is rain-fed or irrigated so that average productivity for crops other than opium is low.

In addition, the crop is widely used medicinally, and many growers are long­

accustomed to deriving as much as two-thirds of their annual cash income from its

sale.

Most of the crop from Afghanistan and Pakistan is refined in the laboratories

set up in Pakistan, and has an estimated potential yield of some 350 tonnes of heroin

a year. 199 Refineries have been set up at various places all over Pakistan. In 1989-

90 it was estimated that around 100 mobile refineries for the conversion of opium to

morphine base and from morphine to heroin were operating particularly in the Khyber

197

198

199

US CIA Report, n.I90, p.5.

US State Department Publication, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, April 1994, p.243.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), Background Brief on Trends in International Drug Trafficking, March 1995, p.2.

122

Agency on the Pak-Afghan border. 200

The narcotics is now produced in Baluchistan, Peshawar and Karachi for sale

in the international market. Nushi and Chagai district are concentrated of refining

centres. In the Chagai district of Baluchistan at least 12 refineries were

operating. 201 Dalbandin town of Chagai district is considered the largest trading

point for most of the heroin produced in the border areas of Afghanistan like Wilayat

district in Helmand Valley.202 The Girdi jungle, where the Afghan refugees are

settling, is also mentioned as another major heroin processing and storage point. 203

Other areas detected include Okar Camp, Posti Camp and Barabachah.204 Koh-i­

Sol tan at the southern end of Helmand just across the border inside Pakistan had a

complex of heroin laboratories, controlled by Hekmatyar.205 "Another major area

stretches from Anam Bostai to Malik Siah Koh on the border with Iran. In the NWFP,

the main areas of drug cultivation are th~ Golden Area. Bannu Malakand Agency and

Dir and the major heroin laboratories are located in Khyber Agency. "206 Further,

opium production in Pakistan is estimated at 180 tonnes annually and most of the

processing into heroin is taking place in several small factories set up in Tirah area

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

AlisonJamieson, "Global Drug Trafficking", Conflict Studies, no.234, September 1990, p. 10.

NinnaJ Mitra, "The Heroin Highway", Sunday (Calcutta), vo1.l6, no.19, 9-15 April 1989, p.30.

Aabha Dixit, "Narco-Power : Threatening the Very Roots of Pak Society", Strategic Analysis, vo1.14, no.2, May 1991, p.195.

ibid.

ibid.

Alfred W. Mc Coy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Trade, 1991, pA58.

Aabha Dixit, n.202, p.195.

123

of the Khyber district bordering Afghanistan. 207 Moreover, "more than nine-tenths

of the heroin laboratories are found in Landi Kotal at a distance of 16km from the

Afghan border. These laboratories are owned by Pakistani and Afghanistani

tribesmen. "208

Heroin's cheap and easy availability in Pakistan is primarily due to the annual

flood of 1000 metric tons of opium from Afghanistan.209 Most of the heroines

make en route to various drug bazaars inside Pakistan. After the outbreak of the

Afghan war and the influx of Afghan refugees, Baluchistan turned out to be a great

drug bazaar, said Yasin Baloch, former Chairman of the Baluch Students

Organistion.210 Karachi's Sohrab Goth has been famous as a big open air bazaar

for heroin. 211 Besides, the arms bazaar of Landi Kotal,212 Jamrud, Bara Bazaar

and Darra Adam Khel of NWFP are piled high with heroin. In 1988, the wholesale

price of 1kg heroin was Rs 30,000 compared to £20,000 - £30,000 wholesale in

London. 213 The price of a kilo of opium in the later part of 1994 in the Pak­

Afghan border cost around £66. In Pakistan, one Kilogram of herotn with 90 per cent

purity fetches about $2,600 and the price shoots up to $60,000 when it crosses the

207

20S

209

210

211

212

213

Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 18 May 1994.

Khaqan Babar, "Pakistan's Narcotics Problems", Journal of Rural Development and Administration (Peshawar), vo1.21 , no.4, Autumn 1989, p.139.

Mohammad Riaz, "Drug Control on Priority", Pakistan an{l Gulf Economist (Karacbi), vo1.8, no.13, 1-7 April 1989,p.l1.

Newsline, May 1993, p.5.

Observer (London), 21 December 1986.

Observer Magazine (London), 13 November 1988.

Financial Times (London), 7 April 1988.

124

Atlantic and reaches the United States.214 Ten Kilos of opium make one kilo of

pure heroin which can sell for £75,000 in London - or more than £6,00,000 in the

street where heroin has 10 per cent purity or less. 215

With its long coastal belt and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan,

Pakistan's geographical position is ideal for drug trafficking. There are several sea and

land routes through which more than $30billion worth of drugs find its way into

Europe and America.216 "According to an expert estimate quoted in the Bangkok

Post in March 1982, about 1000 tonnes of opium from the 'Golden Crescent' is

smuggled Qut of Pakistan and Afghanistan each year to the world markets. Two third

of this amount originates from Pakistan itself. "217 Sohrab Goth, Shah Faisal

Colony, Natha Khan Goth and Malir have become centres for drug trade.

The Iranian narcotic dealers poured their money for producing poppy in the

Helmand Valley in Afghanistan and made use of the old smuggling routes between

Makran coast, Karachi and the Gulf countries.218 The coast of Makran has become

. a popular route for drug trafficking where drug are transported in small boats from

the coas~1 areas to the high seas, where they are loaded on ships. The port of Karachi

and the surrounding coastal areas has long been used by drug barons to ship big

consignments of heroin to Africa, Europe and the USA. Karachi, the main drug

entrepot in Pakistan is served by main roads coming through Baluchistan via Kalat and

Las Bela and the National Highway through Hyderabad. The heroin comes into

214

215

216

217

218

R.C. Dikshit and Giriraj Shah, Narco Terrorism (New Delhi, 1996), p.60.

Times, 5 November 1994.

Times of India, 1 September 1993.

Times of India, 18 June 1982.

S.R. Chowdhury, 0.185, p.2.

125

Karachi by road in trucks mostly owned by Frontier Pakhtuns and is spread to

warehouses located deep in Pakhtun and Mohajir enclaves in the city.219 There are

two commonly used routes from Karachi. The first is via Red Sea to Yemen and to

southern Europe and the other one is the African route via Somalia and Ethiopia to

Kenya and onwards. 220 Another study reveals that Pakistan's "heroin now flows

to the west by air and sea from Karachi via the Gulf States and Damascus, as well as

via India and Lagos. The trafficking of heroin to Europe was facilitated by Pakistani

hashis smuggling organisations ... 221

In Baluchistan, drug caravans were moving about unhindered, loading their

cargo on to RORO boats for the onward journey to Europe and Asia.222 In NWFP,

the main heroin bazaars in Landi Kotal and Bara link the Khyber Pass opium route

from Afghanistan to the traders of Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi.223 From

Peshawar, the capital of NWFP, "the heroin is taken by road to Islamabad and

Karachi, and sent either overland to Bombay224 or across the water to the Near

East. The final destinations are Europe and the USA. "225 Most of the drugs

reaching Lahore come principally through two routes - Bannu-Kohat-Di Khan­

Mianwali-Sargodha-Faisalabad-Bhai Peru and the GT Road - Narang Mandi -

219

220

. 221

222

223

224

225

US CIA Report, n.19O.

POT, Pakistan Series, 7 June 1993 .

Ben Whitakar, Global Connection: The Crisis of Drug Addiction (London, 1987), pp.322-23.

Tara Kartha, "Southern Asia: The Narcotics and Weapons Linkage" in Jasjit Singh, ed., Light Weapons and International Security (New Deihl, 1995), p.76.

Whitaker, n.221, p.323.

The name of Bombay bas been changed to Mumbai but in this study both the names are used.

Observer Magazine, 13 November 1988 ..

126

Kalakhatai - Balkey routes. 226 These are stockpiled in nearby towns and cities like

Bhai Peru, Sheikhpura, and Batapur to await onward shipment across the Indian

border.227

Further, the Balkan land route originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan goes

through Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Another route goes to Western

Europe. It is considered as a key route of illicit supply of heroin to Europe.228 The

disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new Central Asian states

bordering Afghanistan and Iran opened new and lucrative land routes for the

smuggling of heroin into Europe. Through Afghanistan the routes travel via the

Central Asian republics to Ukraine, Russia and onwards. Central Asian republics like

Kazakhstan, the Kyrgez republic and Turkmenistan witnessed increasing poppy

cultivation, thereby slowly sucked into the vortex of Pakistan-based

narco-trafficking. 229 Also, Tajik narcotics industry has expanded through trade

from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Many of the supplies are reportedly brought by camel caravans through the

hills and valleys of Baluchistan towards Iran. Other shipments go by dhows to

Karachi, where they are loaded on ocean-going vessels heading for the Europe or the

US; Pakistan International Airlines has been a preferred airline for drug

trafficking. 230 Most of the opium grown in the Khyber Pass is taken over the

border into Afghanistan by Kurdish or Pathan tribesmen; from there a proportion goes

226 Aabha Dixit, 0.196, p.33.

227 US CIA Report, 11.190, p.14.

228 Times of India, 23 March 1994.

229 ibid.

230 New York Times, 7 September 1981.

127

to Iran for domestic consumption, some is taken on to Istanbul by Kurds and some is

loaded on to small boats in the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman and taken to Dubai.

A frequently used transhipment point is Karachi, als~ a stage on the Eastern route to

Hong Kong and Singapore. Of late, Saudi Arabia is also being used as a transit point

for small to medium-sized heroin consignments destined to Nigeria and elsewhere in

Africa and onward to Europe and America from Pakistan. "231 "More than 250

Pakistanis, mostly hailing from NWFP and some Afghan refugees have been caught

in Saudi Arabia carrying heroin. "232 Pakistani drug lords are using Nigerian

couriers to run heroin in Europe, while in Pakistan itself Nigerian citizens top the list

of foreign drug arrestees. 233

In addition, it has been reported that army officers and military institutions

have been involved in the drug trade: The vehicles of the army-controlled National

Logistic Cell (NLC) are used as drug carriers. This has been proved when a heroin

consignment from Karachi was intercepted in 1993. "The consignment duly packed

in shipping containers in Peshawar was reportedly brought to Karachi on NLC trucks

and loaded onto the ship on deep sea" .234 It is also reported that trucks from the

NLC "arriving with CIA arms from Karachi often returned loaded with heroin -

protected by lSI papers from police search. "235 Further, it was reported that the

lSI was using the National Narcotics Board's vehicles to ferry drugs across the border

231

232

233

234

235

US State Deparunent Publication, n.198, p.52.

Chowdhuri, n.185, p.3.

US State Deparunent Publication, 11.198,p.lO.

The News (Karachi), 23 September 1994.

Mc Coy, n.205, p.454.

128

into Pakistan for export to the West. 236 The bulk of South-West Asian heorin

bound for Western Europe travels overland from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border in

well armed lorry convoys to Iran, from where it is trans-shipped into container trucks

travelling through Turkey and Central Europe. 237

The traditional methods of narcotics transportation are now replaced with

modern methods of concealment both by sea and air travellers. The soaking of towels

in the personal belongings of a passenger, particularly for heroin, concealment in

toothpaste and shaving cream tubes, layering of false suitcase bottoms, swallowing of

heroin plastic bags, feeling of shoe hills,talcom cans, clothes linings and shoulder

pads, trouser belts, and even the holy books have not been spared in narcotic

transportation. 238 "'The News' of Karachi, in a report, revealed that smugglers in

NWFP and Afghanistan have found in the walnut, a safe carrier of contraband. A

walnut is opened, the kernel is removed and the hollow lS filled with heroin, and then

the two parts of the nut are rejoined with genuine walnuts. Three or four kilos of

filled walnuts can hardly be detected in a sack full of dry fruits". 239

The lSI of Pakistan has been deeply involved in abetting drug trafficking. The

lSI "allowed Afghan resistance groups to trade in nacotics after the cut off in US

assistance and that individual lSI officers participated in the trade, either as part of

236

237

238

239

High Commission of lruJia. LoruJon, A Press Release on Terrorits Activity: The Kashmir Issue, 10 May 1993, p.63.

Foreign aruJ Conunonwealth Office. LoruJon, Background Brief on "Trends in International Drug Trafficking", March 1995, p.2.

M. Toaha Qureshi, "Drug Abuse - A Risk Factor in the National Security", Strategic Digest, voLl7, 110.12, December 1987, p.2311.

Radhakrishna Rao, "Narco-Terrorism, Pakistan's Thriving Business", PTI Feature, F 424, p.3.

129

sanctioned operations or to enrich themselves. "240 Drug trafficking is a big

business in Pakistan and international agencies estimate that drug barons earn about

$2.7billion a year through smuggling and sales in the domestic market. 241

According to one estimate, the Pakistani share of the world narcotics trade is about

120 billion dollars a year. 242 "In August 1992, Pakistan's National Development

Finance Corporation estimated that the black economy of the nation gained 32.5

billion dollars annually from the cultivation,· production and smuggling of illicit

narcotics from the 'Golde~ Crescent'". 243 Hence an exploding trade in heroin and

hashish has brought enormous wealth to the country's drug barons in recent years. In

Peshawar powerful drug mafia frequently deposit money in various banks of Europe

and write to the bank to wire funds to their accounts in Pakistan in order to avoid

moving cash in bulk.

Further, narcotics money fuels the political system, supporting party

organisations and election campaigns, and buying protection for the drug mafia at the

highest political level. Senior military officers were also involved in thriving drug

business. A classified report that the CIA commissioned in 1992 indicated that 13

majors and 2 brigadiers of the Pak Army were involved in narcotics corruption cases

during the martial law period under General Zia-ul-Haq.244 During the 1990 I

election campaigns, Nawaz Sharifs Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (HI) openly embraced

Malik Muhammad Ayub Khan Afridi, also known as Haji Ayub Zakha Khel, Sohail

240 Hindustan Times, 17 September 1994.

241 Times of India. 23 March 1994.

242 Hindustan Times. 17 September 1994.

243 ibid.

244 US CIA Report. 11.190. p.1S.

130

Zia Butt, Haji Iqbal Butt and Aslam Butt, put them in charge of overseeing the

election campaigns and asked them to help finance IJI candidates. They all are reputed

drug barons in Pakistan.245 Recently on 20 April 1995, the Anti-Narcotics Task

Force arrested Munnawar Manj, a Pakistan People's Party Member of National

Assembly from Sheikhpura on the charge of heroin smuggling and suspected linkage

with a powerful network of durg barons. 246

Despite the Soviet withdrawal, the factious groups of Afghanistan still need

money because they are now fighting each other. The villagers hence "have no choice

about growing poppies since they bring ten times' as much money as other

crops. "247 Aid officials and western diplomats in Pakistan believe that the amount

of land under poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has increased by more than 50 per cent

since 1990.248 Such situation penetrates far into Pakistan, distorting the country's

economy and politics.

Thus the establishment of heroin laboratories in Pakistan sparked a productivity

explosion which flooded world markets with relatively inexpensive and high quality

heroin. Also, the international traffickers in Pakistan are well organised and have

close links with smugglers of Western Europe, India, the Gulf States, the USA and

other countries. If this trend continues then Pakistan shall one day have the dubious

distinction of becoming the Panama of the east where the rulers will dance to the tune

245

246

247

248

ibid.

The News, 23 April 1995.

Financial Times (London), 16 June 1993.

Times, 20 May 1994.

131

of the narco mafia.249

India: A Transit Point

During the eighties India emerged as a major transit point for drug traffic. The

reason was obvious. India has been flanked by the world's largest illicit heroin

producing countries. To its West lay the 'Golden Crescent' and to its East lay the

'Golden Triangle'. For the drug mafia, India with its long coastline and vast desert

and forest terrain is a natural stopover. The drug mafia have taken to this route after

the Khomeini regime's crackdown in Iran, strict control of poppy cultivation in

Turkey and the civil war in Afghanistan. Further, the Iran-iraq war contributed

significantly for India being a transit country. 250 Heroin, produced in the Golden

Crescent area, is smuggled all along the ~ ,400 mile border to India, in some cases

along smuggling routes that have existed for more than a thousand years. 251

Narcotics worth Rs 5,000 crore are smuggled ~ia India every year.252

India has become a major transit point of narcotics shipment to the USA and

Europe. In 1986, about 80 per cent of the heroin that hit London came from India but

most of it was produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan.253 Even ~ow India is a transit

country though it does not contribute about 80 percent. Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab

and Kashmir are the main entry points from Pakistan and Afghanistan. The

249

250

251

252

253

Zahid Hussain, "Narco-Power: Pakistan's Paralle1 Government", Strategic Digest, vol. 20, no.6, June 1990, p.2515.

Interview with a Senior Police Officer who was posted on the border, 25 April 1997.

New York Times, 16 March 1986.

Economic Times (New Delhi), 9 May 1993.

New York Tim{!s, 16 March 1986.

132

international border villages of Rajasthan like Sum, Jhinjhinyal, Sogarh, Khiri,

Negdarha, Bamhara, Bali ki Basti, Chauhattan, Khaliphe ki Basti, Umia, Beejota,

Mangolia ki Basti and Devra have become very important in the transhipment of

drugs. 254 The major smuggling routes from Pakistan are Sahiwal (Pakistan) -

Sriganganagar - Churu - Jhujhunu - Sikar - Delhi or Bombay; Sukkar (Pakistan) -

Kishangarh - Ramgarh - Jaisalmar - Jodhpur - Bombay; Kokrapara (Pakistan) -

Munabao - Barmer - Jodhpur - Bombay; and Sahiwal (Pakistan) - Anupgarh - Bikaner

- Sikar - Jaipur - Delhi or Bombay. Another route now is from Peshawar to Lahore

to Amritsar to New Delhi to Bombay.255 Also, the drug is mostly transported in

small country boats called 'Hodas' which sail into Kori Creak of Gujarat and from

there it goes to markets of Gujarat and then to Bombay for export purposes.256 One

more important entrepot of narcotics into India is Karachi. From here it follows the

coastal trade route from Keti Bandar or alternatively from Hyderabad to Badin and

across the Rann of Kutch, or through well-seasoned smuggling tracks over the Thar

desert. 257 It has also been reported that Delhi is being used as a major transit point

by narcotic smugglers for Europe and certain countries in Asia. A well organised

cartel of traffickers first send the carrier to Afghanistan, Pakistan then to Delhi or

Mumbai and from there he would go to Frankfurt, Zurich and then finally reach

London. 258

254

255

256

257

258

Dikshit and Shah, 0.211, p.8t.

Democratic World, vol.t5, 00.35. 31 August 1986. p.8.

Dikshit and Shah. 0.214, p.82.

US CIA Report. 110.190. p.IS.

Times of India, 16 May 1996.

·1

133

It is believed that the drug mafia are operating with the connivance of the lSI

who justify the heroin trade as a means to acquire arms. Recently, a drug cartel,

operating from the state border for the past several years with the active support of

Pakistan's Field Intelligence Unit, a branch of the lSI, has been busted by the Kutch

police. 259 Also, the drug carriers keep on reporting the army personnels of

Pakistan, who are posted on the border, "for the easy transfer of narcotic

substances. 260

Add to this, in India there is cultivation of drugs and production of synthetic

drugs. Drug is cultivated in class one agricultural fields of South Kashmir particularly

in some pockets of Anantnag and Pulwama, districts. 261 There is an alarming rise

in the cultivation of opium and in the smuggling of heroin and brown sugar in Kerala

and Tamil Nadu. Opium is cultivated in Kalrayanmali, Kollimalai, Kumbakkalmalai

in Tamil Nadu and in the Idukki district of Kerala.262 Drugs produced in

Kumbakkalmalai near Munnar reach international markets through two routes. One

is via Manjappatty, Amaravaty, Udumalpet to Coirribatore and the other is through

Vattavada, Kodaikanal and Rameswaram. 263 The airports of Trivandrum and

Madras are now favourite transit points for big time operators specially those who

have an eye on Sri Lankan markets. Sri Lankan Tamils also are responsible for the

rise in the illegal business of drug peddling.

259

260

261

262

263

Times of India, 14 March 1994.

Interview with a SeniQr Police Officer who was posted on the border, 25 April 1997.

India Speaks, vol.2, no.41, 9 October 1989, p.22.

ibid, vol.3, no.38, 18 September 1990. p.23.

ibid.

134

Further, India and Myanmar border 264 border in the north-east has long

been a transit point for drugs. There are large number of indigenous laboratories near

the Indo-Myanmar border and Tahang and Kalemyo in Myanmar are major heroin

producing centres. 265 Also, poppy is cultivated mainly in Shan, Chin and Kaching

areas of Myanmar. Intelligence sources said that heroin from Shan area is smuggled

into Assam through Ledo, Layshi and Homalin areas. 266 Much of the border

between Myanmar and four north-east Indian states of Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland,

and Arunachal Pradesh pass through deep jungle and hilly terrain which makes

patrolling extremely difficult. "The couriers operate in pairs and cycle down to

Tahang and Kalemyo and bring half kilogram packets of good quality heroin with

brand names like 'Dangerous' and 'Tiger' which are actually imitations of the heroin

produced in the 'Golden Triangle'" .267 The couriers are mostly Mizos of Myanmar

origin and hence can freely enter India and cla,im to be inhabitants of Mizoram. 268

The Narcotics Control Bureau identified five routes of transborder smuggling of

heroin from opium distillation plants in Myammar: Kalamew - Tamu - Moreh .. (Manipur); Kalamew - Tiddim - Chikha - Behlang (Manipur); Kalamew - Tiddim

Champhai (Mizoram); Kalamew -Falam - Farkawn (Mizoram) and; Kalamew - Somra

- Tusom Khullen (Manipur).269 From these town Burmese heroin is couriered to

264

265

266

267

268

269

Myanmar is the new ilame of Bumlli but at some places of this study the old name is also mentioned.

Economic Times, 19 July 1993.

Times of India, 6 April 1994.

Economic Times, 19 July 1993.

ibid.

Narcotic Control Bureau Report, reproduced in The Telegraph, 26 January 1997.

135

Calcutta, New Delhi, Bombay and Siliguri. "A major chunk of Burmese white sugar

passes via Siliguri to a town called Darrang in Nepal and from there to Kathmandu

and foreign destinations" .270

South East Asian heroin is being smuggled in through Thailand and the open

Indo-Nepal border to Mumbai. Some of the seizures in Nepal indicate that people

from Mizoram and Myanmar smuggle drugs into Nepal through the land route

following the 'golden triangle' - Nagaland - West Bengal Kakarvitta (Nepalese entry

point) to Kathmandu. 271 From here, instead of being transhipped directly to its

destination - Europe and US - it is being routed through African countries. 272

Further, Myanmar heroin is now smuggled out of north-east through two routes - one

is through Siliguri in north Bengal to Kathamandu from where American and

European smugglers pick up their consignment and fly to Hong Kong and enter the

US through the West Coast and other is to smuggle it to Bangladesh from where it

goes to the Middle East and then to Europe. 273

Of late, Manipur has developed into a nerve centre for smuggling, a conduit

for the movement of drugs and contraband across the border. The enforcement

agencies point out four major routes through which heroin pours into Manipur from

Myanmar. 274 The oldest and most commonly used route is National Highway

No.39 which passes through Imphal - Pallel - Tengnoupal and stops at Moreh, the

270

271

272

273

274

Indranil Banerjie, "Target: Narco-Terrorism", Sunday, vol.l5, no.23, 1-7 May 1988, p.75.

Narcotics Drug Control and Law Enforcement Unit (NDCLEU), Ministry of Home Affairs, His Maj~sty's Government of ~epal, 1996.

Economic Times, 9 May 1993.

ibid, 19 July 1993.

Arun Irengbanl, "Manipur: Outpost of Drug Corruption", Link, vo1.32, 110.43,3 June 1990, p.5.

136

infamous town of Manipur. The couriers here cross the Lokchao river on the border.

The second route is Tiddim road which enters south Manipur through Behang village

near Boundary Pillar No.64 and comes to Imphal via Churachandpur. The third route

is along the banks of Manipur river through Chingnunghoot and comes to Imphal via

Seron-Sugnu and Mayang Imphal. The fourth route is through the new Somdal village

and comes upto Imphal via Zoupi - Mombi - Chakpikarong - Seron - Churachandpur.

Traffickers are now using new routes since Moreh has attracted much attention world

wide. The latest route is through New Somdal in Ukhrul district in Manipur and Sita,

few kilometres away from Moreh. Drugs are also brought in through Champhai and

Aizawl in Mizoram. Another route recently developed runs via Kalemyo, Thaiwing,

Tiddim Lai, Lintan and Haimul and then passes Rih lake near the international border

before reaching Imphal from where it is distributed to other centres for further journey

to the US and Western Europe. 275 Further, Nagaland has an entrypoint at Noklak

in Mokakchung district. Mor and Sonari c:'_'Nagaland are transit points of Myanmar

heroin. 276 In Arunachal Pradesh, heroin originating in the Myanmar city of

Naryoon comes via Pangsoma pass to India and Ledo is another trading centre for

Myanmar heroin.277 Also, Assam, West Bengal and Mandasaur of Madhya Pradesh

see a marginal increase in trafficking. The drug mafia of India-Myanmar border area

take the advantage of an international law which allows tribals living within the 20km

belt on both sides to travel freely without permits. In addition, the Cox bazaar of

Bangladesh and North Cachar (a corridor which stretches from the Barail Ranges

through the trijunction of Nagaland, Manipur a!ld Assam, and passes through the

275 Dikshit and Shall, 11.214, p.83.

276 ibid.

277 ibid.

137

southern stretches of Meghalaya and into Bangladesh's Sylhet division) have emerged

as the drug markets in recent years.278 These markets are being seen as the major

corridor points for drug carriers. India's north-eastern region, fall prey to this

increasing drug trafficking.

Hence the conduit for drug supply to India continuous unabated (See Appendix

IX) and attempts to plug the 'inflow are conspicuous failures. Also, there are

increasing linkages between drug mafia and various rebel groups. The drug production

and drug trafficking are so rampant that the huge quantities of drugs passing through

South Asian region have had a spill over effect. The drug mafia represent a strong

organisation which has the money and arms to strike whenever and wherever it wants

to. Thus develops 'narco-terrorism' which is very much prevalent in South Asian

region and giving rise to political violence.

Drug Mafia and Dispersal of Small Anns

A spill over effect of such drug trafficking has been the dispersal of small arms

in the South Asian region. There are nexus between drug mafia and violent groups.

Drugs have become an accepted international currency for the financing of unofficial

arms deals throughout the region. The development of the arms trafficker and drug

peddler nexus is further strengthened by the political linkages. South Asia's problem

of narco-terrorism is directly linked to the Afghan war. There are allegations that the

KGB recruited intelligence agents amongst the Afghan drug - traffickers, inducing

them to try to extract weapons from the Mujahideen - especially US Redeye and

Stinger surface-to-air missiles - in exchange for drugs; and that they used parallel

278 Kartha, 0.222, pp.66-67.

138

methods to try to destabilise Pakistan. 279

The violence in Pakistan are mainly the product" of the gun-runners and drug

mafia nexus. The drug culture in Pakistan could not have flourished had it not been

in league with the arms trade that got a tremendous spurt during the Afghan war. The

easy availability of weapons and small arms to the drug mafia has made the culture

of Kalashnikovs take firm root in Pakistan. An illicit drug trafficking also requires

illegal arms protection. This provided incentive to increase illegal arms production in

NWFP and Baluchistan areas of Pakistan. In the market of Peshawar and Landi Kotal,

drug is being openly bartered for ultra modern weapons. 280 The Frontier Province

alone has more than half a million Kalashnikovs, which enables the drug mafia to

maintain entire armies. 281 Dir, a mountain district of NWFP is not only an

'important poppy producer but the district has over "two million guns and other

automatic weapons. 282 In case of Baluchistan it is reported that, the drug barons

there develop nexus with bandits and dacoits in Sindh, who act as middlemen for the

drug lords. Further, the profits from narcotics business funnel into the modern

weaponry business.

Sohrab Goth, a suburb in Karachi, has become an Afghan smugglers' bazaar,

notorious for gun-running and dope peddling. Sohrab Goth is a strategic staging post

on the road that brings both arms and drugs to Karachi - the mafia that controls the

arms bazaar and the drug trade that controls the transporters, land grabbers, the slum

dwellers as well as the gargantuan job market in Karachi. Infact, many small markets

279

280

281

282

Maj. General Uberoy, D.2, p.102.

Radbakrishna Rao, 0.239, p.2.

Patriot, 21 January 1987.

Jasjit Singh, "India's Strategic Environment in Southern Asia", Journal of Strategic Studies (London), vol. 7, 1994, p.ll.

139

sprung up in the tribal areas, where the writ of the Pakistan government law did not

extenrl. 283 Path an tribesmen openly sold drugs side by side with AK-47 and other

weapons. Proliferation of drug laboratories in Pakistan also marked the proliferation

of trade in clandestine arms in the country. The clandestine arms bazaar and drug

mafia is no longer confined to Pakistan. It has also spread to other parts of South

Asia.

India is directly affected by the situation in Afghanistan that has led to

increased drug production coupled with the flow of sophisticated small arms, missiles

and explosives into the hands of terrorists and rebel groups. The lSI uses the huge

profits from drug trafficking to buy weapons for fuelling separatism in India. It is

believed that the lSI is deeply involved with Sikh militants who use Pakistan for

sanctuary and who do use heroin to fund their arms purchases. Drugs and arms link

the Punjab terrorists to the Mujahideen of Afghanistan and their link-men in

Afghanistan. The CIA report has authenticated by stating that the lSI is "deeply

involved with Sikh militants, who use Pakistan for sanctuary and who use heroin to

fund their arms purchases. "284 Pakistani involvement is further corroborated by the

fact that Haji Iqbal Beg, a well known Pakistani drug baron "cooperated with the lSI

in its programme to assist anti-India Sikh insurgents in their violent rebellion against

New Delhi. "285 Moreover, it has been reported that Chaudhry Shaukat Ali Bhatti

who was elected to the Punjab Assembly on the IJI ticket in 1990, and an important

member of the Arian mafia brokered an arms deal for Rs 9 million between Darra

283

284

285

Rashid, n.191, p.68.

US CIA Report. n.19O.

ibid.

140

Adam Khel arms merchants and Sikh militants. 286 Drug peddlers also provide

funds and arms to various violent groups in Jammu and Kashmir and North-east part

of India.

The most disturbing feature of the drug business in Tamil Nadu and Kerala is

the involvement of the LTTE of Sri Lanka. The LTIE is interested in the drug

business in Kerala for two reasons: firstly, for illegal pipe money i.e. the local

expression for foreign exchange smuggled into the State by the Gulf Malayalees and

secondly, for the availability of large areas for opium cultivation.287 The L TIE

militants buy the Gulf currencies from the Malayalees working in the Arab countries

in exchange of Indian currency to finance their arms purchased abroad. As the LTIE

. and other Sri Lankan Tamil militants need a lot of money to buy arms they find drug

smuggl ing the best way to make money. The L TIE is involved in a large way in

trafficking heroin through Bombay, Turkey, the UK, France, West Germany,

Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Canada and the USA. 288 In 1985, sixty Tamils were

arrested in Rome, Barcelona, Tunis and Paris, accused of smuggling heroin to raise

money for their secessionist guerrillas in Sri Lanka. "289 Sri Lankan Tamils were

responsible for the rise in the illegal business of drug peddling.

Thus the production and processing of narcotic drugs, rampant drug trafficking

and the dispersal of small arms by drug mafia pose a formidable challenge to the

South Asian security. The cultivation and refinement of drugs, enmeshed as it is with

. the ever strengthening linkage with the illegal arms dispersal to various militant

286

287

288

289

ibid.

India Speaks, voI.3, 00.38, 18 September 1990, p.22.

Rohan Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka, 1987), p.5l.

Whitaker, 0.223, p.325.

141

groups, has profoundly affected the basic structure of South Asian countries. The arms

dispersal by transnational drug 'cartels' have become such a powerful force in South

Asian politics that it has been primarily responsible for the development of the virus

of political violence into a full blown epidemic.

OVERSEAS REMITTANCES

Overseas remittances to various rebel groups within South Asian countries are

major threats to the social and political order of the region. The violent groups require

external resources to carryon their nefarious activities. External support has

frequently been demonstrated as a crucial factor for the survival .of the terrorist

groups. Modern weapons are expensive so the rebel organisations need f~iendly

outside help. The outside country provides financial help, often through voluntary

organisations or emigrants, weapons, trainings, safe sanctuaries and other facilities.

In this respect, the situation in South Asia is relevant where the terrorist groups have

a close relationship with foreign countries and the overseas remittance plays a·

significant role in escalating poi itical violence in the region. Moreover, there has been

a rapid spread and growth of criminal gangs, armed senas, drug mafia, smuggling

gangs, drug peddlers and economic lobbies in the region which have, over the years,

developed an extensive networks of contacts with the bureaucr~ts, government

functionaries at the local levels, politicians and strategically located individuals in the

non-s~te sector. They have international linkages including the foreign intelligence

agencies. 290

290 India, Ministry of Home Affairs. Vohra Committee Report. August 1995. p.4.

142

Overseas Remittance and Arms Dispersal

In India, the violent organisations have developed an excellent rapport with

foreign-based organisations and government. The core of the situation in India is that

the foreign countries are providing funds, sophisticated weapons, safe sanctuaries to

the militants without any hesitation. The violent groups functioning inside India are

"homo-fighters "291 of a kind who have been motivated and sponsored for an armed

struggle from outside. Pakistan is getting more deeply involved in the Punjab and

Kashmir region of India.

The Punjab rebel ~roups of India get substantial support from the foreign-based

organisations. The bulk of weapons with the Punjab militants in mid-1980s were of

much lower quality and lethality as compared to what they were to use since the

Afghan war. Sophisticated weapons are channellised from across the Pakistan border.

Since 1970s Islamabad has been training the Sikh militants as a part of Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto's strategy of "forward strategic depth" and also as a part of his effort to gain

revenge for India's support of an independent Bangladesh. 292 "About Rs 1 crore

had been collected by the militants and their ideologues abroad which had been

channellised for weapons procurement from Pakistan. Of this amount Rs 80 lakhs

worth of weapons had already found" its way from Pakistan via the Gujarat and

Rajasthan sectors. "293 The militants have been independently arranging for their

supplies from Darra-based smugglers. A deal worth Rs 1 crore, struck with Hazi

291

292

293

IlLustrated Weekly of India (Bombay), 3-9 AUgllSt 1991, p.7.

House Republican Research Committee Repon on flPalcistan. Afghanistan and the Export of Terrorism", Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, The New Islamist International, p.6.

Times of India, 24 November 1992.

143

Fazal, a Pakistani smuggler in Darra, was a clear evidence to it. 294 Militants were

given proper and advanced training in preparing and handling of sophisticated arms

and explosives. "There are two Sikh Organisations which are now in operation in

Pakistan: The Watan Dead Company and the Punjab Company .... It is also known

that along with Field Intelligence Unit (FlU), the apex Pakistani intelligence body, the

Inter Services Intelligence (lSI), is also being utilised for the arms training and control

these two companies". 295 Also, training camps are operated in Layalpur, Multan,

Sialkot, Lahore, Kasur and Faisalabad. Narowal Rangers Headquarters; Inspection

Bunglow on the outskirts of Sialkot cantonment; Changamanga Rest House; big house

at Suleiman Headworks near Fortabas Mandi opposite Sri Ganganagar sector of India;

Safe House near Lahore and barracks in Lahore are some of the locations.296 (See

Appendix VII). Duration of training ranged from 2 days to 3 months depending on the

quality of the training to be imparted.

The problem in the state of Punjab has gone much beyond Pakistani

involvement. Sikh communities of the UK, USA, Canada, Germany, New Zealand,

South-East Asia and some other countries are on a regular contact with the ultras of

Punjab and are engaged in providing support to the Punjab violent groups. Sikh

expatriates have formed a variety of international organisations that lobby for the Sikh

cause overseas. Branches of organisations like Babbar Khalsa, Oal Khalsa, National

Council of Khalistan, Sikh Students Federation, Sikh Youth Movement and Oeshmesh

Regiment have been set up. But "most prominent are the World Sikh Organization and

294

295

296

ibid.

Ritu Sarin, "The Pakistan COImectiol1", Sunday, vo1.l5, 110.19, 3-9 April 1988, p.60.

D.P. Shanna, The Punjab Story (Decade of Turmoil) (New Delhi, 1996), pp.271-72.

144

the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)." 297Allegedly, the militants, were

being trained by 'Kennie Mennie Services,' a London-based private mercenary

company.298 Sophisticated bomb making techniques and better training for Sikh

terrorists of the Dal Khalsa separatist movement were imparted in the Afghan

Mujahideen camps.299 The Sikh communities abroad provide expertise in weaponry

gained through training in mercenary schools in the US or in the use of electronic

equipment like wireless sets and remote switching for explosives. They also supply

. equipment such as specialised radio-sets, rubber dinghies and heavy-duty bolt cutters

to the militants in Pakistan for use in India. 3OO Over 400 AK-47s were smuggled

from across the border since April 1992. In May 1992 alone Punjab militants managed

to smuggle in 150 AK-47s, 60 revolvers and pistols and eight quantities of explosives.

There are reports about the Babbar Khalsa trying to procure the heat seeking Stinger

missiles which could endanger aircraft movement in the state.301

Pakistan lSI have close ties with Punjab militant groups. The lSI of Pakistan

plays an active role in distributing funds to the violent groups. Surinder Singh

Bhinder, an extremist, frequently visited Pakistan for handing ove~ to the Sikh

extremists, based in Pakistan, the funds collected by Sikh organisations based in West

Europe for the purchase of arms and ammunition.302 The most revealing testimony

297

298

299

300

301

302

US Deparnnent of State, Pattern of GLobaL Terrorism. 1994, Published in April 1995. p.61.

Times of India. 21 March 1993.

House Republican Research Committee Report. n.292. p.6.

Manoj Joshi. "Combating Terrorism in Punjab". Conflict StuLlies (London). no.261. May 1993, p.25.

Times of India. 24 November 1992.

ibid, 16 October 1991.

145

is that of Mohan Inder Singh Sachdev alias Pushpinder Singh, who was affiliated to

ISYF, Canada. 303 The youngman travelled to Nepal, Thailand, the USA, Canada

and Pakistan to scheme and plot against India, collect funds and arrange arms

supplies. Under interrogation he disclosed that a consignment of arms worth US $ 2.5

lakhs was sent to Pakistan by ISYF for onward transhipment to Punjab. He also gave

the details of a quarter million dollars collected in the USA to purchase the most

sophisticated weapoQs from the U.K. Another militant Daljit Shekhon on his arrest

revealed that the ISYF was sending Rs 20,000 to Rs 30,000 Pak currency every

month in the name of Satinder Pal Singh Gill to finance militant activities.304 In

sum total, overseas remittances to Punjab terrorists helped in escalating political

violence.

Next, militancy in Kashmir has been sustained through systematic and

continuous support from abroad. Since the conflict erupted in early 1990, it has

escalated alarmingly. Armed insurgents, who in late 1989 numbered only a few

hundred, are today officially estimated at some 10,000, they are grouped - around an

active hard core of 3500 to 4000.305 Further, since the spring of 1988 when the

first weapons began to cross the Line of Control (LOC), the insurgent arsenals has

progressed through many stages. The years 1989 and 1990 marked broadly the period

of the Kalashnikov and pistol. The weapons were mostly of Chinese origin, in

particular type 56-1 folding stock assault rifles and Chinese copies of the Soviet

Tokarev pistol. 306 Since the spring of 1990, rocket-propelled grenade launchers

303

304

305

306

Mainstream, vo1.26, 00.39, 9 July 1988, p.25.

D.P; Shanna, 0.296, p.273.

Anthooy Davis, "The Conflict io Kaslmlir". Jane's Intelligence Review. vol. 7, 00.1, January 1995, p.4D.

ibid, p.43.

146

were transported into the valley in growing numbers, along with ever greater number

of Type 56 assault rifles. Also, Chinese type 69 (RPG-7 equivalent) and Chinese stick

grenades began to cross the LOC in 1990-91. "The period of 1992-93 was marked by

an influx of weapons, notably Soviet RPD 7.62mm lightmachine guns, and later the

RPK and the PK heavier machine guns. These served to provide with greater

firepower over extended ranges, particularly in ambushes situations. Similarly mines

and improvised explosive devices (lEDs) were being more commonly deployed by

1993 .... Over the last two years, there has been a greater availability of more

sophisticated weapons in the Afghan small arms market. To be seen in Kashmir today.

are the Soviet Dragunov SVD snipers rifle, the 5.54mm AK-74 Kalakov rifle and

AKR Krinkov submachine gun, as well as the rifle mounted BGS-15 40mm grenade

launcher. "307 Insurgent communications have also been upgraded. The introduction

of a range of commercially available walkie-talkies, as well as more sophisticated

frequency-hopping/burst transmission radios, has enabled larger militant factions to

coordinate operations within the valley as well as with other areas. 308

A large number of Kashmiri non-governmental organisations are floated in

Pakistan, the UK, the USA and many other countries. It was reported that Pakistan

had suspended active support for the insurgency -in 1993 when the-US threatened to

add it to the list of countries sponsoring terrorism. But Pakistan then privatised its

Kashmir operations, funneling support to militants through non-governmental

organisations often run by retired army and lSI officials.309 This arrangement

continued for a short period till everything was set right and Pakistan, again, have

307 ibid.

308 ibid.

309 The GUllrdian (London). 17 May 1994.

147

been involved directly in sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir valley.

Non-governmental organisations operated overseas are the Kashmir Human

Rights Forum led by Major retired Umar Hayat; the Jammu and Kashmir Human

Rights Movement, Muzaffarbad, World Kashmir Freedom Movement, UK, the

Kashmir American Council, Washington, and the Kashmir Association of North

America. Apart from campaigning on the issue of human rights, these organisations

indulged in misinformation campaigns. The three extremist organisations assisting

Kashmiri militants have been identified as Jamaat-e-Islami, the Markaz Dawa-AI­

Irshad and Harkul-ul-Ansar which during the Afghan war was known as

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. These alI organisations place resources at the dispOSfll of the

. militants. These resources range from weapons to intelligence to money.

It is reported that" some $300 m ill ion worth of foreign currency is brought into

Pak-occupied Kashmir (POK) from West Asia every year. Most of which is used by

Pakistanis in financing the militants .... It is understood that three-fourth of the lSI

budget has been diverted to the cause of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir" .310

Pakistan has been supplying all manner of lethal and sophisticated arms to the militant

groups operating in the Kashmir valley. AK rifles, machine guns, anti-tank and

anti-personnel mines, rocket launchers, grenades and explosives of all kinds of pistols

and most sophisticated 10 SVD Dragunov telescopic s~iper rifles with large amounts

of ammunition and explosives.

Pakistan has offered open sanctuaries to Kashmir terrorists. The members of

terrorist organisations like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, AI-Umer Mujahideen, Muslim Janbaz

Force and Allah Tigers move about freely in Pakistan. It ~s reported that the Kashmir

Freedom Front (Rawalpindi) has opened an account, Account No.14241, with the

310 Chandra B. Khallduri, "Analysis of the Kashmir Problem and An Approach to Solution", Strategic Analysis, vol.l3, 1l0.6, September 1990, p.64l.

148

Habib Bank, Rawalpindi, to provide financial support to terrorists operating in the

Kashm ir valley. 311

The Pakistani military and lSI have been indulged in training Kashmiri

militants. Among the most crucial activities of the lSI have been to train and

indoctrinate selected leaders from the Kashmir valley. "A large number of youths

from the Kashmir valley and Poonch Sector were given extensive training in the use

of automatic weapons, sabotage and attacks on security forces. "312 Pakistan has set

up about 105 training camps - 48 in Pakistan, 49 in POK and eight on the Pak-Afghan

border - to train militants in the art of subversion as also to indoctrinate them.313

Training is handled entirely by the Pakistan army and the lSI. "At first, the main lSI

camp sites were: an abandoned factory in <;:hattar Ambore near Muzaffarabad; Garhi

Dupatta, 25 kms from Muzaffarabad, nearJhe\um river and; Kucha, some 9 kms from

Chinari and 20 kms from Chakothi area. Nearly, 4,000 Kashmiris were trained in

these facilities in 1991 alone. "314 The main training camps are in Gohat, Larkana,

311

312

313

314

The finances for promoting and sustaining militancy in Kaslmlir come fro~ various bank accounts which have been set up to facilitate deposit of donatiotlS. The sympathisers, thereby, deposit money in such accounts without disclosing dleir identity. Kashmir Fund Account bas been opened it Mausura, Lahore. The JKLF in the UK opened Account No. 192263 in the name of the Kashmir Relief Fund (KRF) at dle Yorkshire Bank, Drake Street, Rocbadaie, UK. The account is being operated by one Qurban Hussain, Chief of KRF. Radio Pakistan appealed to the people of Skardu in POK to deposit money in dle Bank of Pakistan under the name of KRF to help dle families of dle militants killed in the Kashmir valley. Further, at the official level, Pakistan Prime Minis~er's Fund and Punjab Chief Minister's Fund have been set up to assist the militants. The Government of 'Azad kashmir' bas also set up a Kashmir Liberation (:ell to provide monetary support to the liberation of Kas~r. (Source: Ghazanfar Butt, "Pakistan's Money StlStaitlS Militancy in Kashmir", Link, vo1.36, no.2, 22 AugtlSt 1993, p.8).

House Republican Research Committee Report, n.292, p.8.

High Commission of India, London, A Press Release on the "Terrorist Activity: The Kashmir Issue", 10 May 1993, p.66.

House Republican Research Committee Report, n.292, p.12.

149

Sargodha, Auttock, Murree, Sialkot and Lahore. 315 With the passage of time lSI

training camps have been established in Sukur, Tamu, Alahazar, New Saibabad,

Kundri, Digri and Thana Bullakhan area, opposite Barmer and Gujarat area; Aliabad,

Kalamulla, Nakyal, Gulpur, Khuratta and Muzaffarabad in POK. (See Appendix VII).

The New Islamist International estimates that some 20,000 young Kashmiris are

trained and armed by and/or in Pakistan in recent years and virtually all of the

activities of the Islamist groups, short of recruitment are carried out in Pakistani

Kashmiri.316

The patterns of the arms training have been changing. Earlier, the elementary

training for seven to ten days included introduction to AK-47 rifles, Chinese pistols,

rocket launchers, use of Light Machine Guns (LMG) and explosives. Later on,

multiple training programmes dovetailing basic arms training with long duration

specialised schedules have been organised. "There are extended training courses of

two to twelve weeks, incorporating the use of sophisticated heavy weapons, including

rocket launchers, MMG/LMG, AK-47/56174, sniper rifles, mortars, remote control

devices, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. The operation and control of high

explosives, anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns are also included in the schedule,

which has been extended by six months". 317 Further, selected trainees, put through

advanced courses to enable them to use SVD Dragunov Sniper rifles, were sent to the

Afghan border in the Khost area to fight along with the Afghan Mujahideen.318

315

316

317

318

ibid.

ibid, p.ll.

S. Das Gupta, "Gameplan by Pakistan in Kashmir Changing", Prout, vol.4, no.49, 27 February - 5 March 1993. p.36.

Prout, vol.4, no.3l, 17-31 October 1992. pp.18-19.

150

Besides, the Kashmir militant groups developed contacts with overseas militant

groups. The Kashmiri group has naxus with the Tamil militant group, LTTE. The

Kashmiri terrorists travel to Sri Lanka to get the training with LTTE.319

Since the end of the Afghan war, Kashmir has been witnessing the influx of

foreign mercenaries. A large number of foreign mercenaries, being specially trained

in guerrilla warfare armed with sophisticated weapons have been inducted into the

valley to join hands with the local violent groups and step up secessionist activity.

"Foreign guerrillas first joined the Kashmiri conflict in mid-late 1991, and are

believed to have been Afghans loyal to the Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar .... The first Afghans to arrive appear to have been operating essentially

in an advisory capacity .... Numbers increased markedly in 1992 following the fall of

Nazibullah regime in Kabul. "320 "Afghan terrorists trained by '" CIA instructors

had been smuggled into India with the purpose of organising acts of terrorism

against... members of the Indian Government and foreign diplomatic

representatives. "321 The late summer of 1992 also saw non-Afghan foreigners

moving into Kashmir. It was reported that the town of Sopore" in K~hmir has 500

battle-hardened Afghans and a few Sudanese who are boosting the already high morale

of at least 1500 to 2000 armed militants who walk the streets openly brandishing their

AK-47 Chinese rifles, wireless sets in hands. 322

319

320

321

322

Interview with Dr. Chris Smith in London, 23 July 1996.

Davis, n.305, p.45.

House Republican Research Conllilittee Repon, n.292, p.6.

M.A. Hussain MulIick, "Kashmir Conflict: TIle Cause of Frustrated Economic Take-off in India and Pakistan, a Politico-Economic Assessment", Pakistan Defence Review (Islanlabad), June 1993.

151

Arab volunteers from Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Algeria

and Kuwait continue to arrive in Peshawar regularly. A special department is run by

Major Amir of the lSI for ensuring their proper entry into Pakistan and prompt

despatches to the right destinations.323 The Service Office, called as Maktaba-i­

Khidmat, receives the volunteers and despatches them to various training camps run

by Arab-Afghan militants inside Afghanistan.324 A large number of foreign

mercenaries assemble at Markaz-Dawar, a centre for world wide Islamic

activity.325 The Pakistani lSI is also "channeling these militants through a front

organisation, Markaz Dawat-ul Arshad (MDA), into Kashmir. The MDA has its own

trained cadres operating under the banner of the Lakshar-e-Taiba. 326 In Kashmir

these 'guest militants' attached themselves to various local militant outfits like the AI

Burq, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Muslimeen Mujahideen".

The following table delineates the presence of mercenaries from various parts

of the world in the Kashmir valley.

323

324

325

326

B.P. Saba, Trans-Border Terrorism: Intemarionalisarion of Kashmir Tangle (New Delhi, 1996), p.142.

ibid.

ibid, p.71.

Times of India, 27 September 1994.

Source:

Table 3.4

Toll of Foreign Mercenaries (January 1991-June 1997)

Country of Origin Arrested Killed

Pakistan/POK 151 219

Afghanistan 12 178

Egypt - 1

Sudan - 5

Yemen - 1

Chechllya - 1

Lebanon 1 -

Bahrain 2 2

Bosq,ia - 1

Saudi Arabia - 3

Algeria - 1

Iran - 1

Turkey - 2

Others 43 149

Total 209 564

152

Times of India, 27 September 1994; Asian Age (Calcutta), 9 September, 1996; Times of India, 3 July 1997.

The above table indicated the arrests of foreign mercenaries and their-killings

in the encounters and the involvement of external actors in the escalation of political

violence in the Kashmir valley. "Interrogation of the captured foreign militants reveals

that they were given and lumpsum payment of Rs 15,000 each when they infiltrated

153

into the valley and they were promised a monthly retainer of Rs 3,000".327 The

former Governor of Kashmir said that the Pakistan's lSI is the Third World's most

powerful terrorist and int~lIigence organisation with 10,000 to 15,000 foreign

mercenaries on its payroll to export terrorism to Kashmir, Central Asian Republics

and Middle East countries.328

Further, the drugs and arms mafia, with active support from Pakistan's lSI,

were involved in Bombay blasts. The lSI which helped arm and organise

Afghanistan's Mujahideen rebels, supplied the eStimated 240 kg of RDX and Semtex

plastic explosives used in the Bombay bomb blasts.329 On the basis of the initial

findings the police officials reported that the new materials used in the blasts were

RDX or MDX and Semtex, a high-intensity explosives manufactured in

Czechoslovakia. 330

The Bombay blast case strongly identified the nexus between the criminals and

anti-national elements on the one hand and bureaucrats, politicians and other

sensitively located individuals on the other. The case of Bombay demonstrated how

the Indian underworld are exploited by the Pakistan lSI and the latter's network in

United Arab Emirates to cause sabotage, subversion and communal tension in various

parts of the country. The investigations have revealed extensive linkages of the

underworld in the various governmental agencies, political circle, business sector and

the film world. The Vohra Committee report on crime-politics nexus identified that

327

328

329

330

ibid.

Times of Inaia, 14 July 1993.

Jefferson Penberthy, "India: Mob Mayhem", Time (London), vo1.l41, no.13, 29 March 1993, p.29.

S. Da~gupta, "Demand for Declaration of Pakistan as Terrorist State", Prout, vol.5, no.4, 17-23 April 1993, pp.34-35.

154

the activities of Dawood Ibrahim and Memon brothers had been growing for many

years before these culminated in the formation of a powerful network; this could not

have happened without the solid backing of government officials.331

In the north-eastern parts of India, money and arms began to flow to the

insurgent groups. The borders with Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal are earmarked

with free flow of small arms to the north-easter region. Light weapons are mainly

coming from Myanmar and Bangladesh to the north-eastern part.332 China also

remits funds and supply weapons to the north-east insurgents. 333 Moreover,

Pakistan's lSI has established its bases in many places, particularly in Nepal, to

provide money and material to the insurgent groups. The activities of Muslims are

steadily intensifying 111 Pokhara, Biratnagar, Birtamod, Bhadrapur and

Kakarbhitta. 334 At all these places the lSI has set up various organisations such as

Muslim Volunteer Force, Muslim Liberation Front, Islamic United Liberation Army,

Islamic Movement of India, Islamic Revolutionary Force and Saddam Bahini, to

operate its subversive activities.335 Acting as a linkage among the terrorist

organisations the lSI directs members of all the Muslim terrorist organisations of the

region to supply weapons to these organisations and threatens to stop all assistance to

them if they do not help the Muslim terrorist organisations. The lSI's sphere of

influence stretched across India into Bangladesh as well where several north-east

331

332

333

334

335

India, Ministry of Home Affairs. Vohra COf1ulIittee Report, August 1995, pp.I-5. -

Interview with Dr. Chris Smith in London. 23 July 1996.

Ved Marwah. Presented a Seminar on Terrorism: India's Internal Security. organised by the South Asian Division. School of Intemational Studies. Jawaharlal Nehru University. 8 October 1996. .

Nepal Press Report (Kathmandu, Regmi Researl:h Pvt. Ltd.), no.52/95, 22 March 1995, p.89.

ibid. pp.89-90.

155

insurgent groups like the ULFA, NSCN, ALL Tripura Tiger's Force, Manipur

People's Liberation Army (PLA) were being provided logistic support and even being

trained in camps in the NWFP run by Afghan war veterans. "336

In a ten-page press note, the Border Security Force disclosed that most militant

outfits in the north-east were acquiring sophisticated weapons from Thailand with the

active connivance of Bangladeshi intelligence agencies.337 Further, the lSI of

Pakistan in cooperation with Bangladeshi intelligence transfer large consignment of

weapons from Bangladesh soil into the norht-eastern states.338 Also, Kashmir

youths were being brought to Bangladesh to motivate youth from that country to join

the militant movement in the valley.339

The Naga rebels have their bases in northern and western part of Myanmar.

They procure funds and arms from abroad through Bangladesh. They have established

a permanent liaison post in Bangladesh from where they receive arms consignments

procured from various Kampuchean outfits and shipped in from Thailand.340

Further, according to the sources, the 0.45 gun, an American weapon, had probably

found its way tothe outfit from Thailand through a clandestine arms conduit. Some

of the AK-47 rifles in the armoury of the organisation are believed to have been

obtained from the outlawed National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN).341

Also, the NSCN developed links with the lSI of Pakistan in getting material and

336

337

338

339

340

341

High Commission of India. London, tl.313, p.64.

Times of India, 19 December 1996.

ibid.

ibid.

Times of India, 7 July 1991.

ibid, 23 July 1992.

156

financial support. The Pakistani connection was apparent when a captured militant

(NSCN - Khayo Hurrey) revealed that a Pakistani diplomat had given him $1,700,000

in three instalments as part of a deal to arm the Nagas.342

Pakistan's involvement in arming and funding the PLA of Manipur is also

noticed. "Captured PLA documents state that Pakistan agreed to extend all possible

help which would be channeled via Burma. The Burmese government has agreed to

patronise the Revolutionary Front with all the force under their command to revolt

against the Indian government" .343 Indeed the financial assistance provided by

Pakistan via Dhaka enabled the Manipur insurgents to acquire such weapons as AK-

47s, rocket launchers and RPGs.344

A foreign hand in United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) activities is also

evident. In Bangladesh, a chain of camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts area

guaranteed entry into Assam through the Cachar and Barrack valley corridors.345

Using Bangladesh as an exit point the ULFA cadres make contacts with arms dealers

of Thailand and as far off as Romania.346 At Cox's Bazaar of Bangladesh, they

happen to meet with various militant outfits. Bangladesh also served as a place of

currency conversion and moving finances out of the country.347 Pakistan's embassy

in Dhaka has apparently been providing arms and funds to the Front. ULFA's links

with Pakistani lSI appear to have been forged almost immediately after securing

342

343

344

345

346

347

Kartha, 11.46, p.15.

House Republican Research Committee Report, 11.286, p.IS.

ibid.

Kartha, n.46, p.14.

ibid.

ibid.

157

access to Bangladesh. Hence "scores of ULFA militants from small towns or villages

in the Brahmaputra valley moved to the somewhat similar environment of camps in

rural Sylhet to, finally, a completely different world of the lSI in Pakistan and, in

some cases, also to Mujahideen camps in Peshawar and areas of Afghanistan under

Mujahideen control. 348 The ULF A cadres were given a complete course with

training manuals, and arms training on rocket launchers, explosives and assault

weapons. Importantly, the selected trainees were taught to be one man demolition

squads, using sabotage and frontal attacks to make full use of limited weaponry. 349

The first batch of about 10 ULFA militants was taken to Pakistan around mid-1991;

in all, about 70 ULFA militants are believed to make the trip to Pakistan in five or

six batches during 1991- 92.350 It is also reported that the Bodo militants, having

proclaimed as their objective the creation of an independent , Bodoland, and having

established contacts with other secessionist elements in the region, seek the help of the

lSI to pursue their objectives. Also, they had two rounds of talks with the ISI.351

Over the last few years, Tamil rebel groups have been a fearful proposition in

Sri Lanka. In order to achieve an independent Tamil Eelam, the LTTE has developed

a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, propaganda activities and

weapon procurement. The Tigers draw support-from an expatriate Sri Lankan Tamil

community larger than 4,50,000, having offices altogether in, thirty eight nations

348

349

350

351

M.S. Prabhakara, "The Foreign Hand: The lSI Nexus in the North-east", Frontline, 11 February 1994, p.27.

Kartha, n.46, p.15.

Prabhakara, Il.348, p.27.

Hilldustan Times, 16 May 1994.

158

drawing an estimated $2 million a month. 352

The Tamil businessmen in Singapore and those running tin business and rubber

plantations in Malayasia provide funds to the L TIE.353 Singapore, strategically

situated on key shipping lanes with a developed banking infrastructure, was a central

hub in the LTIE's weapon-purchasing network. 354 Tiger trading companies were

established in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Singapore became the favoured market

for the purchase of "dual use" technologies such as computers, electronics, outboard

motors and diving gear. 355 An important L TIE cell was established on th"e

Andaman coast in th Thai town of Trang before it was shifted north to a front

company in Phuket.356 To raise funds, "the LTIE vessels are believed to have

begun shipping timber from Myanmar to Thailand in the 1980s .... Some time after

mid-1990, the contacts resulted in the establishment of an L TIE base at the small

town of Twantay, in the Irrawaddy delta south of Yangoon.357 This base facilitated

the communication and transhipment operations.

The Tamils of the USA, particularly of Boston, funnel money to young Tamils

of Jaffna to demand a separate country.358 There are two main Eelam Associations

in the US: Ilankai Thamil Sangam 111c. (Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

Anthony Davis, "Tiger International: Howa Secret Global Network Keeps Sri Lanka's Tamil Guerrilla Organisation Up and Killing", Asia Week (Hong Kong), vo1.22, no.30, 26 July 1996, p.33.

Times of India. 9 June 1991.

Davis, 11.352, p.32.

ibid, p.33.

ibid.

ibid.

Sunday, vo1.l4, 110.24, 3-9 May 1987, p.15.

159

USA) and Eelam Tamil Association of America, who have been able to influence the

Members of State Legislatures in the US to raise voice in support of their cause.359

Further, the World Tamil Eelam Convention, held each year in July, in the USA,

brings together delegates from Canada, UK. Australia, Malayasia, USA, Sri Lanka

and India, particularly Tamil Nadu. 36O

Canada has some 1,40,000 Tamil population and over 85 % live in the Toronto

area. In Canada, officers of the Asian Crime Task Force have calculated the L TTE

pull in around $7,30,000 in a month.361 In Britain, the number of Sri Lankans is

believed to b~ over 50,000 and the majority of them are Tamils.362 Eelam

organisations, operating in the United Kingdom, are many, e.g. The Eelam Research

Organization, General Union of Tamil Students, Sri Lanka Human Rights Movement,

The London Tamil Sangam, The Tamil Co-ordinating Committee Tamil Rights Group,

General Union of Eelam Students (GUES), and Eelam Tamils Association.363 In

Britain, Tamils raise a monthly income of around $3,90,000.364 The LTTE's

international secretariat is in London.

The main pro-LTTE global group, World Tamil Movement, is based in

Paris. 365 Almost 40,000 Sri Lankan Tamils, mostly young people are in

359

360

361

362

363

364

365

Sinha Ratnatunga, Politics of Terrorism: The Sri Lanknn Experience (Australia, 1988), p.292.

ibid, p.279.

Davis, 0.346, p.35.

ibid.

Ratnatuoga, 0.359, p.291.

Davis, n.346, p.35.

ibid, p.33.

160

France. 366 "Those living in France are organised and assist Tamils coming to

France for asylum or employment. There is a Tamil radio programme sponsored by

the French Branch of the Tamil Co-ordinating Committee. It was reported to be

broadcasting once a week between 7 p. m. and 8 p.m. on Thursdays from a private

radio station in Paris". 367

There are some 23,000 Tamils live in Switzerland and extortion seems to have

played a part in LTTE fundraising there.368 According to LITE sources, Tamil

donors are coaxed to part with $40 to $80 each month, estimating a monthly revenues

of $6,60,000.369 Further, the Tamil cause in Australia was enhanced by the

expatriate Tamil Community and Tamil academics in that country. The Australian

Federation of Tamil Associations draws together member association from various

places within Australia and member groups from Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New

Guinea. The Association's main reason for existence is to promote the Tamil cause

and to attempt to get the Australian government to exert international pressure on the

Sri Lankan government. 370 In addition, there are very active Eelam groups in

Norway and Sweden. "Some Sri Lankan Tamils have virtually 'Tamilized' remote

villages of Scandinavia where they live in large families. They too actively ask

respective governments to cut aid to Sri Lanka. "371

366 Ratnatunga, n.359, p.274.

367 ibid, p.288.

368 Davis, n.346, p.35.

369 ibid.

370 Ratnatunga, n.359, p.284.

371 . ibid, p.291.

161

Furthermore, it is believed that India has been a big source of money for the

Tigers. The state of Tamil Nadu has been used by the L TIE to raise money through

a variety of means, especially, ransom, bank robberies and cultural programmes.

This extensive international network and overseas remittances have made

possible for the Tamil rebel groups to travel all over to procure weapons of various

qualities and to obtain militry training. In 1984, one of the LTIE's early weapons

purchases deal was made with an Australian arms dealer. 372 Deals with global arms

dealers were also put together in Hong Kong.373 Also, LTIE's arms network relied

on West Asian and European dealers who could extend their reach to cover South-east

Asia and Pakistan's booming Afghan arms bazaar.374

"Most of the weapons used by the militants were purchased from Singapore,

India, Afghanistan and the Middle East. Soviet made AK-47, T56 Chinese assault

rifles and the Indian-Belgian AK MS a'1d the M16 AI manufactured by the Colt

Company in the United States (believed to have been obtained from Vietnam) were

the commonest weapons used by the militants. Other weapons were G3's (A3 and A4)

British L.I.A.I. (S.L.R.) F.N.F.N.C. 5.56 ~eretta model 12 sub machine guns, A60

(US), Browning 30, Browning 50, H.K. 21, and the 7.62 mag, heavy machine

gun. "375

The arms, having North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Israeli

mark, were shipped to the L TIE via Singapore. "Arms are often bought in Europe,

through Taiwan or Hong Kong-based traders, then shipped to Singapore where bills

372

373

374

375

Davis, 0.346. p.32.

ibid, p.33.

ibid.

Rohan Gunaratna. War and Peace in Sri Lanka, (Sri Lanka, 1987).p,46.

161a

of loading and containers are changed and are· then transferred to smaller boats on

high seas near Sri Lanka. "376 Traditionally fishermen formed an important group

of couriers. Now the L TIE uses the fast-moving boats that covers the distance

between point Calimere and Sri Lanka in less than 30 minutes. L TIE consolidated

itself militarily using Tamil Nadu as a conduit for smuggling arms obtained from

sources abroad.

I n August 1994, an L TIE vessel later identified as M. V. Swanee left the

Ukrainian Black Sea Port of Nikolayev. It carried 50 tons of TNT and 10 tons of

RDX explosives. The consignmeht was arranged by a Dhaka front company, Carlton

Trading. Protected by Sea Tiger speed boats,· its deadly cargo was off-loaded and

transferred to several jungle bases.377 Further, earlier in 1996, the freighter Comex

Joux with weapons, ammunition and explosives on board was intercepted by the

Indian Navy and Orissa-based spy planes of the Aviation Research Centre, a RAW

sister organisation. 378 The arms and a,nmunition were believed to have been

purchased from Cambodia and left the Phuket port for LTIE bases.379

Further, the recent use of surface-to-air missiles by the L TIE created concern

among the authorities of various countries. Indian defence and security agencies traced

the source and origin of such missile as Russian origin, probably procured from

Afghan Mujahideen groups.380 Some other soutces believed that such missiles were

sold by corrupt Cambodian general and transported across the Thai border in late

376 Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vo1.l4, 00.5, I July 1991, p.ll.

377 Davis, 0.346, p.34.

378 ibid, p.35.

379 ibid.

380 Times of India, 6 May 1995.

161b

1994.381 Another source revealed that the L TIE procured these missiles through

unofficial channels from Ukraine. 382 It is also believed that arms manufacturing

plants were set up in Jaffna peninsula.383 The L TIE factory produced 60mm

mortars that could reach a target of 1410 metres.384

For the self-taught in the use of sophisticated weapons, L TIE cadres were sent

abroad. They established linkages with militants as well as liberation movements

throughout the world. They developed contacts "with SWAPO, the Basques, the PLO,

PFLP etc. They also received considerable assistance from Iran and Libya, which

jointly fund over 40 terrorist groups.385 Abu Jihad, Arafat's military hand,

explained to a group of Sri Lankans at a Lebanese training camp that the PLO thought

that 'creating bubbles of anti-imperialism everywhere or wherever possible would

indirectly help their Palestinian's own struggle.386 Tigers carefully cultivated links

with Arab extremist groups in Lebanon and at least 200 Tigers were trained by

Palest.ne splinter groups.387 Norwegian mercenaries also "assisted in the training

of Tiger frogmen in underwater demolition techniques. The Tigers retuflled to Sri

Lanka to teach other fighters whose skills were later displayed in the sinking of a

381

382

383

384

385

386

387

Davis. n.344. p.34.

TitTles of India. 6 May 1995.

Davis. n.346. p.32.

G~naratna. n.375. p.47.

Rohan Gunaratna. Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India 's Intelligence Agencies -(Colombo. 1993). p.409.

M.R. Narayallswamy. Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (Delhi. 1994). p.98.

Times of India. 3 June 1991.

161c

string of Sri Lankan naval vessels". 388 Furthermore, it has been alleged that the

Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) involved itself in training Tamil militants

at various places inside India. It has also been reported that Tamil Nadu harbours

many rebel camps in which the Tamil militants are undergoing training.

Hence the L TIE exploits large Tamil diaspora in various countries besides

South Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka.

Of late, Pakistan has become a hospitab.Ie environment for political violence.

Overseas remittances intensify such violence. Afghan government and its intelligence

agency, KHAD, was sometimes involved. KHAD was involved in dispersing funds

and weapons to such groups only for the reason of Pakistan's involvement in

fomenting civil war in Afghanistan. A lot of weapons are a fall out of the Afghan

war. A large number of sophisticated weapons passed into the hands of the rebel

groups in Sindh and Karachi area. Iran supplies arms to Shias in Pakistan. Secret

camps are run by proclaimed offenders to train people in handling such sophisticated

arms. Sheikh Rashid, the then Information Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan,

attributed the spurt in violence to the Al Zulfiq~, purported a Pakistani- Afghanistan

based terrorist organisation and also to India's RAWand the Afghanistan's KHAD ...

the ItA Wand KHAD have been frequent whipping boys of Pakistan in relation to its

frequently erupting internal situations.389

tn addition to the above ways of overseas remittances to various militant

groups within South Asia, the advent of global communication facilities and the use

of airways significantly contribute to the easy transfer of weapons. The airdropping

388

389

Davis, n.346, pp.33-34.

Maj. Gen. M.L. P1opli. ·Will Siodh go the Bangladesh Ways·. Link (New Delhi). vo1.33, 00.49. 14 July 1991. p.5.

161d

of arms in Purulia, West Bengal, is a clear evi~ence to it. 390

Hence it is evident that the violent groups, basking under the patronage of

foreign countries, have converted their home countries into their fiefdom showing

scant regard for the rights of the local people or for the loss of the land. And,

eventually, they have become the main source of political violence and disorder in the

region.

Thus the above four factors of small arms proliferation stand out with

prominence. Arms bazaars are f10urshing with sophisticated small arms where the

militants frequently visit and buy against direct cash payment. The immediate fall-out

of the Afghanistan civil war was the widespread dispersal of small arl11s and which

makes en route to Pakistan's arms markets. Further; the drug production and

trafficking are linked closely to the diffusion of small arms and terrorism. The drug

bnmafia and militants sustain each other in terms of money an~ security. Moreover,

the factor of overseas remittance is crucial for a terrorist outfit to survive. The

overseas diaspora and organisations provide both financial and material help. These

are the factors which intensify the degree of political violence in the South Asian

region.

390 For Detail See Chapter v.