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D

IISR

EPORT

DIIS .DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

DIIS REPORT

Louise Riis Andersen and

Peter Emil Engedal

Blue Helmets and Grey Zones:Do UN Multidimensional PeaceOperations Work?

DIIS Report 2013:29

A DIIS ReCom publication

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Louise Riis Andersen, PhD,Senior Analyst, DIISlan@diis.dk

Peter Emil Engedal, Research Assistant, DIIS

peem@diis.dk

Copenhagen 2013, the authors and DIIS

Danish Institute or International Studies, DIIS

stbanegade 117, DK 2100 Copenhagen

Ph: +45 32 69 87 87

Fax: +45 32 69 87 00E-mail: diis@diis.dk

Web: www.diis.dk

Layout: Allan Lind Jrgensen

Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS

ISBN 978-87-7605-615-5 (print)

ISBN 978-87-7605-616-2 (pd )

Price: DKK 50.00 (VA included)

DIIS publications can be downloaded

ree o charge rom www.diis.dkHardcopies can be ordered at www.diis.dk

Tis report is part o the Research and Communication

Programme (ReCom) on international development

cooperation, unded by Danida (Danish Development

Agency) and Sida (Swedish Development Agency),

and undertaken by a number o institutions including

UNU-WIDER and DIIS. For more inormation on the

programme, please see http://recom.wider.unu.edu/ andhttp://www.diis.dk/recom.

Te analysis and conclusions in the report do not necessarily

reflect the views o any o these institutions and are the sole

responsibility o the author(s).

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Contents

List o Abbreviations Used 5Abstract 7

Resum 8

Introduction 9

Part I. Te concepts and architecture o multidimensional UN peace

operations 13

Chapter 1. What is a multidimensional peace operation? 14From traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping 15

Multidimensional peace operations today 20

Chapter 2. Learning to build peace? 22

Te elaborate, yet ragmented system or UN multidimensional

peace operations 23

Learning to work together 27

Learning to protect 29

Part II. Assessing results on the ground 33

Chapter 3. Standards or success 34

Methodological challenges 34

Te peace continuum 35

Chapter 4. Peacekeeping works 39

UN peacekeeping reduces the risk o relapsing into conflict 40

Te UNs comparative advantage in building effective and

legitimate states 43

Chapter 5. But statebuilding ails.... 46

Evidence rom the field 48

Te modalities o intervention: statebuilding models 50

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You, the people: Te dilemmas o internationally assisted

statebuilding 52

Part III. Looking to the uture 57

Chapter 6. rends and perspectives 58

rends in the Security Council 58

Te changing global landscape 62

Te changing nature o violence 64

Chapter 7. Conclusion 67

Reerences 71

Annex 1. UN-led Peace Operations 1988-2013 78

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List of Abbreviations Used

AFISMA Arican-led International Support Mission to MaliAMISOM Arican Union Mission in Somalia

AU Arican Union

CIC Center on International Cooperation

Civcap Civilian Capacity

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DFID Department or International Development

DFS Department o Field SupportDPA Department o Political Affairs

DPKO Department o Peacekeeping Operations

DRC Democratic Republic o the Congo

DSS Department o Saety and Security

ECOWAS Economic Community o West Arican States

ICG International Crisis Group

IPI International Peace InstituteM23 23 March Movement

MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization

Mission in Mali

MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic o Congo

MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the

Democratic Republic o the Congo

NAO North Atlantic reaty OrganizationNPV Net Present Value

OCHA Office or Coordination o Humanitarian affairs

OECD Organization or Economic Cooperation and Development

OHCHR Office o the United Nations High Commissioner or Human

Rights

OROLSI Office o Rule o Law and Security Institutions

PBC Peacebuilding Commission

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PBF Peacebuilding Fund

PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office

SADC Southern Arican Development Community

SCR Security Council Report (Organization)

SRSG Special Representative o the Secretary-General

UN United Nations

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Aghanistan

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund

UNISFA United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic o South Sudan

UNMI United Nations Integrated Mission in East imor

UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNSG United Nations Secretary-General

UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya

UNSMIS United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria

UNAE United Nations ransitional Administration in East imor

UNSO United Nations ruce Supervision Organization

USAID United States Agency or International Development

WDR World Development Report

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Abstract

Multidimensional peace operations have emerged as one o the key instrumentsor addressing and managing the complex challenges related to violent conflict andstate ragility in the Global South. Based on a reading o existing literature, thisstudy provides an overview o what we know about the UNs ability to assist war-torn societies in laying the oundations or lasting peace. Te basic message is that

peacekeeping works, but statebuilding ails. In general, multidimensional UN-ledpeace operations have been successul at preventing the resumption o war, yet theyhave not succeeded in establishing effective and legitimate institutions o gover-nance. Te report also concludes that, while the system is ar rom perect, the UN

peacekeeping apparatus has been reormed and strengthen considerably in recentdecades. Outstanding challenges relate to contextualising interventions and ensur-ing local ownership, as well as to maintaining the normative consensus on the roleo UN peace operations.

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Resum

Multidimensionelle redsoperationer er et a de vsentligste instrumenter, det in-ternationale samund rder over i orhold til hndteringen a de mangeartede ud-ordringer og trusler, der orbindes med voldelige konflikter og skrbelige stater.Rapporten giver p baggrund a eksisterende litteratur en oversigt over hvad vi

ved om FNs evne til at bist krigshrgede lande med at bygge en varig red. Rap-porten konkluderer, atedbevarelse virker, men statsopbygning slr ejl. FN-ledederedsoperationer har generelt vist sig i stand til at orebygge, at krige bryder ud igen,men det er ikke lykkedes at etablere effektive og legitime statsstrukturer. Rapportenkonkluderer videre, at selvom FNs system langt ra er perekt, er organisationen

blevet reormeret og styrket betydeligt p det redsbevarende omrde i lbet a detseneste rti. Udestende udordringer handler isr om at sikre, at indsatserne til-

passes lokale politiske dynamikker, samt om at bevare den normative enighed omFNs redsoperationers rolle i remtiden.

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Introduction

For the past twenty years, shifing UN Secretaries-General have been singing thepraises o UN peacekeeping as an indispensable tool or maintaining internation-al peace and security, securing justice and human rights and promoting sustainabledevelopment. Tis report provides an overview o how well ounded such praise is.Drawing on the growing body o literature on the impact o UN-led peace operations,it seeks to establish whether UN-led peace operations have indeed been able to assist

war-torn societies in laying the oundations or lasting peace as promised in the sem-inal Agenda or Peace outlined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 (UNSG 1992).

While the purpose is straightorward, it is in act quite difficult to ascertain theextent to which multidimensional peace operations work. Te difficulties reflectthe nature o the beast: successul peacebuilding (however defined) is basically anon-scientific enterprise. In the words o William J. Durch, it is perhaps best un-derstood as a matter o art: the art o diplomacy, the art o (selective) war, the arto reconciliation and the art o law and politics (Durch et al. 2012: 97). Ideally, amultidimensional peace operation is supposed to bring all o these arts together ina way that provides or the establishment o sustainable peace. In reality, however,

most multidimensional peace operations are struggling to overcome and balancethe mismatch between mandates and resources, the plethora o competing or down-right contradictory policy objectives, and the troubled divide between the universalconcepts o peacebuilding and the particular contexts in which UN peacekeepersare deployed. In light o this, it is unsurprising that the outcomes o multidimen-sional peace operations are commonly described as mixed, with progress in someareas, while other areas remain woeully wanting.

Te title Blue Helmets and Grey Zones hints directly at the blurred results o mul-

tidimensional peace operations. Te analysis and discussion that ollow are basedon the pragmatic observation that most i not all multidimensional peace opera-tions are neither entirely successul, nor complete ailures. Tey tend to all into agrey zone where assessments o outcome and impact are as much a reflection o the

particular standards o success against which a given operation is measured as theyare reflections o objective empirical acts on the ground. In the context o multidi-mensional peace operations that engage virtually every aspect o social and humanlie, the choice o appropriate or relevant standards o success is ar rom being a

given. It is essentially a value choice that inorms us whether, or example, order and

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stability are privileged over equality, justice, and/or welare (Call 2008, 2012).

In keeping with the trend that has dominated academic and policy-related discus-

sions over multidimensional peace operations in the past decade, this report ocuseson two distinct, yet related criteria that are deemed important or the establishmento lasting peace. First, is the war over has the violence actually ended? Secondly,have effective and legitimate institutions o governance been established? Te lat-ter criterion in particular illustrates that it is not merely the outcomes o multidi-mensional peace operations but also their everyday practices that belong to the greyzones alluded to in the title o the report.

Te logic o trying to build peace by building states (Call and Wyeth 2008) pro-

vides multidimensional peace operations with an inherent paradox in using outsideintervention to establish sel-governance (Chesterman 2004; Paris and Sisk 2010).In the daily workings o multidimensional peace operations, it is ofen difficult toascertain where international imposition ends and national ownership begins. Tisonly adds to the predicament o determining the extent to which UN-led peace-keeping works: who is to blame when things go wrong: the national actors whodid not buy whole-heartedly into the peace process, or the international actors whoailed to provide their assistance in a relevant and timely manner?

Te importance o knowing and understanding the particular dynamics on theground is increasingly acknowledged in both the literature and among practitioners.Most i not all experiences and lessons learned rom different missions are unique,and one must be careul not to overgeneralise on the basis o distinct cases. At thesame time, there is something unreasonable, i not perverse in concluding that eacho these experiences is so particular that they cannot shed any light on the challeng-es that are likely to conront multidimensional peace operations elsewhere (Caplan2012: 311). Te report is thus situated in the troubled position o trying to identiy

the overall track record o multidimensional peacekeeping while acknowledgingthat each mission despite any similarities in mandates has worked under suchdiverse conditions and in such distinct local contexts that comparisons are likely todisguise as much they reveal. Tis tension is not unique to this specific report butrather emblematic o the entire field. Instead o providing clear answers to the sim-

ple question o what works and what does not work, the collective insights romscholarly studies may at best provide policymakers and practitioners with a deeperunderstanding o the dilemmas, paradoxes and contradictions that most o them

already know rom their daily work.

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Te most basic message o the report is that in general multidimensional UN peaceoperations have been successul at preventing the resumption o war, yet they have

not succeeded in establishing effective and legitimate institutions o governance:peacekeeping works, but statebuilding ails. Tis conclusion is based on a reading othe vast body o literature that explores and compares UN peace operations: theirdifferent orms, their various types o effects, and the shifing global and local con-ditions that have shaped UN-led peacekeeping in the past twenty years.

Underpinning the report is the suggestion that the orm and unctions o UNpeacekeeping are as much a reflection o the Zeitgeist as they are responses to thespecific crisis situations that a given operation is seeking to address. Tis suggests

that the ongoing diffusions o global power are likely to lead to changes in UNpeacekeeping in the same manner that the end o the Cold War enabled the ascend-ency o liberal peacebuilding in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Both in policy andacademic debates, the ocus is shifing towards more pragmatic or realistic modelso intervention that are more concerned with stabilising conflict areas than with

promoting democratic governance and inclusive politics. In light o this, the reportprovides an overview o the evidence-based track record o the past twenty years,ocusing on what we have learned afer two decades o multidimensional peace op-

erations, as well as a more open-ended discussion o where UN peacekeeping maygo rom here. Te report thus alls into three parts.

Part 1 outlines the evolving concepts and architecture o multidimensional peaceoperations. It does so by first discussing what a multidimensional peace operationis and how it can be distinguished rom other orms o military operations. Subse-quently, it explores the ragmented, yet elaborate system that has evolved within theUN to implement multidimensional peace operations, and it discusses in what waysthis system has managed to become a learning organisation. Part 2 turns towards

the question o impact and discusses the different standards o success, includingthe difficulties o measuring how the UN has contributed to achieving (or not) a

particular objective. Te third and final part discusses the uture direction o UNpeacekeeping and identifies what the UN has learned so ar, and what the worldorganisation and its member states are still struggling to learn regarding thecomplex challenges o building lasting peace afer lengthy conflicts.

Te report is a desk study that seeks to capture and draw out a ew o the many

aspects that relate to the grand question o how to build sustainable peace in the

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afermath o violent conflict. Considering the empirical and theoretical size o thatquestion, it is clear that the report provides only a selective glimpse o the manyissues and topics that are relevant to understanding the impact and dynamics o

multidimensional peace operations. Readers who are interested in a more compre-hensive and wide-ranging overview are advised to consult the ollowing books:

Understanding Peacekeepingby Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (PolityPress, 2010)

Providing Peacekeepers: Te Politics, Challenges, and Future o United NationsPeacekeeping Contributionsby Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (OxordUniversity Press, 2013)

Te New World o UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace?By Torsten

Benner, Stephen Mergenthaler, and Phillipp Rotmann (Oxord UniversityPress, 2011)

Political Economy o Statebuilding: Power afer Peace by Mats Berdal andDominik Zaum (Routledge 2013)

Why Peace Fails: Te Causes and Prevention o Civil War Recurrence by CharlesCall (Georgetown University Press 2012)

Exit Strategies and State Building, edited by Richard Caplan(Oxord UniversityPress, 2012)

Te Peace in Between: Post-war Violence and Peacebuilding, edited by AstriSuhrke and Mats Berdal (Routledge 2012)

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Part I.

The concepts and architectureof multidimensional UN peaceoperations

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Chapter 1. What is a multidimensional peace operation?

Striving or peace is and has always been considered an honourable endeavour.Over the course o history, countless aggressors have sought to derive legitimacyrom labelling their endeavours with terms such as peacekeeping, peace oper-ation, peace mission or peace orce. Te concept o a peace operation is, ac-cordingly, highly contested and quite difficult to set apart rom other orms ohuman activity that involve the use o armed personnel, including war (Bellamyand Williams 2010: 1418). Tis study ocuses on interventions that: 1) are con-ducted under United Nations command, and 2) have a mandate to assist in layingthe oundations or a sustainable peace. Such operations are widely reerred to

as multidimensional because they draw upon a mixture o civilian and militaryinstruments and work at the interace between security and development in orderto ulfil their mandates.

Te UN does not hold a monopoly on multidimensional peace operations. Awide and growing range o actors is actively engaged in multidimensional peaceoperations, and many o them are deliberately working to strengthen their capac-ity to conduct such missions in the uture. Tis includes in particular regional

and sub-regional organisations such as NAO, the Arican Union, the EuropeanUnion and ECOWAS and SADC. It also includes individual member states othe United Nations such as the USA, France and Australia, who have all, at one

point, been authorised by the Security Council to lead a military interventionin a oreign country. Historically, the Security Council has turned to such dele-

gatedmissions in situations that demanded peace enorcement, whereas UN-ledmissions have been mandated only to work on the challenges o post-conflicttransition (sometimes in the wake o a delegated mission). Tis division o la-bour between UN-led and delegated missions reflects the basic proposition that

the UN does not wage war but merely keeps the peace and/or lays the ounda-tion or building the peace. Recent years, however have seen a tendency towards

what or lack o a better word are called hybrid missions, where UN troopsare deployed alongside regional or bilateral troops operating under differentcommand structures and with different mandates. Tis clearly blurs the distinc-tion between delegated and UN-led missions, the most recent intervention inMali being a clear example that involves an offensive French-led operation (Ser-

val) alongside a UN-led operation (MINUSMA) that has taken over rom an

ECOWAS-led operation (AFISMA).

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Te move towards hybrid missions or peacekeeping partnerships, as the UNpreers to call them is quite strong and has been with us or a while (Andersen2007). We do not, however, have any systematic knowledge o the possible im-

pacts o the simultaneous deployment o UN and non-UN troops on the effec-tiveness o a multidimensional peace operation. For this reason, and or reasonso brevity, this study ocuses only on the UN contribution to multidimensional

peace operations.

From traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping

o situate UN-led multidimensional peace operations within the Security Coun-cils repertoire o peace and security activities, it is helpul to begin by outlining

the key concepts o peace-making, peacekeeping, peace enorcement and peace-building. Initially these concepts were understood as clearly distinct rom eachother:

Peace-makingincluded mediation and other diplomatic efforts aimed at bring-ing hostile parties to agreement.

Peacekeeping included the deployment o military and/or police personnelto oversee the implementation o a peace agreement or truce (ofen reached

through peace-making efforts). Peacebuildingwas defined as action on the ar side o conflict aimed at identi-ying and supporting structures that could prevent the recurrence o violence.

Finally,peace enorcementwas understood as involving a range o coercive meas-ures, including the use o military orce, to restore peace and security.

In multidimensional peace operations, the boundaries between these our tools aretranscended. Tis is particularly maniest in the gradual erosion o the boundariesbetween military and civilian tools. Te most pronounced symptom o this tran-

scendence is maniested in the preerence o the Security Council to call or peace-buildingefforts (reduce the risk o relapses into conflict by strengthening local ca-

pacities) when mandating missions o peacekeeping(originally techniques designedto preserve and enorce existing peace; DPKO 2008: 18). Figure 1 below providesan overview o how the UN Department o Peacekeeping Operations currently seesthe relationship between the Security Councils our peace tools.

When describing the gradual merger o peacekeeping and peacebuilding, both

scholars and practitioners present the history o UN peace operations in evolution-

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ary terms: as somehow moving towards higher levels o complexity and sophistica-

tion. Such a chronological ramework is overly simplistic, as it ignores the great vari-ety that has always existed between individual UN missions (Bellamy and Williams2010: 17). Distinguishing between different generations o UN peace operationsis, however, a useul heuristic tool or understanding howmultidimensional peaceoperations came to be the Security Councils preerred tool or engaging in com-

plex political emergencies, as well as or identiying whythe use o the instrumentremains troubled by tensions between the traditional peacekeeping principles upon

which it is built and the complex, intra-state type o conflict it is meant to solve. Inorder to set the scene or the subsequent analysis o whether and how well UN-led

multidimensional peace operations work, thereore, the section below briefly out-lines the three generations o peace operations that have dominated UN peacekeep-ing rom 1948 till today.

Three generations of UN peacekeeping

Te UN Charter does not provide explicitly or the deployment o military troopsunder UN command. Tere is no reerence to the concept o peacekeeping in theCharter. Tis has not inhibited its development, as is evident rom the current posi-

tion o peacekeeping as the flagship activity o the UN. It may even be argued that

Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and

Preventing Relapse to Conflict

Peacekeeping

Conflict Prevention

Peacemaking Peace Enforcement

Political

Process

Conflict

Cease-fire

Figure 1. Spectrum of peace and security activities

From DPKO 2008: 19.

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the lack o an express mention in the Charter has in act helped establish peacekeep-ing as a flexible response to international crises (Murphy 2007: 5).

Tefirst generationo UN peacekeeping dates back to the late 1940s and the de-ployment o military observers mandated to monitor the truce in Palestine1and tooversee the ceasefire between Pakistan and India in Kashmir.2Both missions remainongoing. Over the ollowing our decades, the Security Council launched a num-ber o similar missions that were characterised by two things relative to the currentstate o play: the missions were deployed to conflicts between states, not to con-flicts within states; and they were given limited mandates that primarily consistedin monitoring and observing that a given peace agreement, ceasefire or truce wasbeing respected (Dobbins et al. 2005: xvi). Te most notable exception to this rule

was the mission in Congo rom 1960 to 1964, which in act bore quite a number oresemblances to the multidimensional peacekeeping operations we see today (Ches-terman 2004).

During the Cold War, the larger purpose o peacekeeping was to create the politicalspace that was necessary or the warring states to negotiate a political solution, and equally importantly to contain local conflicts and prevent them rom escalatinginto global crises, or worse, nuclear war (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 8; Annan

2012: 32). Tis illustrates that the design o peacekeeping operations has alwaysbeen a product o its time: the Cold War political dynamics rarely allowed the Se-curity Council to reach agreement, and when it did, it was primarily in the MiddleEast, where both superpowers recognised the potential or escalation, but neither

was prepared to wage war in order to deend its claims and allies in the region (Bel-lamy and Williams 2010: 85). Te UN accordingly conducted no more than fifeen

peace operations between 1945 and 1987.

o guide the first generation o UN peacekeeping, a set o principles gradually

emerged which in 1973 were ormally codified. According to these, UN peacekeep-ers should:

only be deployed with the consent o the parties to the dispute be strictly impartial in their deployment and activities

1UNSO, the United Nations ruce Supervision Organization, see www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/2 UNMOGIP, the United Nations United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, see: http://

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/

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only use orce in sel-deence be mandated and supported by the Security Council in their activities rely on the voluntary contribution o member states or military personnel,

equipment and logistics (Annan 2012: 33).

Te move towards the second and third generations o UN peacekeeping has in-volved a reinterpretation, rather than a replacement, o these basic principles. Aswill be outlined in subsequent chapters, this has in many cases added to the predica-ment in which UN peacekeepers have ound themselves when trying to implementambitious multidimensional mandates.

With the end o the Cold War, political realities and the normative environment

changed; a new optimism surrounded the UNs role as international societys maintool to promote peace and security in a rapidly globalising world. Partly owing tothe act that these developments coincided with a peak in the number o intra-state

violent conflicts (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 2), UN-led peacekeeping moved intoits second generation. Te Security Council now began to intervene in civil warsand humanitarian disasters and provided peacekeeping missions with wider rangingmandates that aimed not merely at keeping the peace, but rather at building or lay-ing the oundations or lasting peace. Tis radically new role or UN peacekeeping

was captured in the seminal report An Agenda or Peace that was issued in 1992 bythe then- Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Underpinning the new agen-da was the idea that, in order to establish lasting peace in war-torn societies, outsideintervention was needed to support the transormation o deficient national struc-tures and strengthening new democratic institutions (UNSG 1992: paragraph 59).

ypical examples o second-generation missions are the interventions in Cambodia,El Salvador, Mozambique and Namibia launched between 1989 and 1992, which allcontained mandates and resources to organise elections, oster processes o the dis-

armament, demobilisation and reintegration o ormer combatants, and encouragepolitical reconciliation (Dobbins et al. 2005: xvi-xvii). Te number o missions alsogrew drastically. Between 1988 and 1993 alone, the UN launched a total o twentynew peace operations, five more than during the preceding orty years (Bellamy and

Williams 2010: 98). O these, at least eight were o the multidimensional type thatcontained both peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks (Paris and Sisk 2009a: 5).

As a result o these qualitative and quantitative changes in the mandating practice o

the Security Council, the number o UN peacekeepers grew rapidly rom 11,000 in

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1989 to 75,000 in 1994.3Ofen, however, the UN ailed to respond properly to theoverwhelming increase in demand and responsibilities. In too many cases, the UN

was not institutionally, militarily, logistically or managerially capable o ulfilling

the ambitious mandates set out by the Security Council. Tese shortcomings cameto have a significant impact on the reputation o UN peacekeeping, as they led toseveral high-profile ailures, most notably the operations in Somalia, Bosnia andRwanda. As a direct result o these ailures, the Security Council lost its appetite orUN-led peace operations and turned increasingly instead to regional organisationsand delegated missions. Te latter hal o the 1990s saw a historic low o peacekeep-ing missions, very much in contrast to what had looked like a golden age o peace-keeping just a ew years earlier (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 93120; Dobbins etal. 2005: xvixviii).

In response to this existential crisis, the new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,asked experienced Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi (now Special Envoy toSyria) to head a high-level panel tasked with developing recommendations orthe uture o UN peacekeeping. Te panels report, known as the Brahimi Re-

port, coincided with a newly ound interest in the Security Council or usingUN interventions as a tool to assist in rebuilding ragile and conflict-affectedstates. Tis paved the way or the rise o a third generationo UN peace opera-

tions: missions were provided with more robust mandates that allowed them touse orce, not just in sel-deence but also in deence o the mission. Missionswere requested to apply more integrated working methods to ensure coherencebetween the military and civilian aspects o the engagement. And missions weredeployed to countries or considerably longer periods than during the 1990s.

While the overall objective remained the same to assist in laying the oun-dations or lasting peace third-generation missions are thus more intrusivethan second-generation missions in providing or the greater, deeper and longerinvolvement o international actors in transorming domestic arrangements in

war-torn societies.

As was the case in the early 1990s, the qualitative changes were ollowed by a quan-titative upsurge in UN-led peace operations. Between 1999 and 2010 UN peaceoperations as a whole grew by a actor o eight in terms in personnel and by a actoro ten in terms o budget (Benner et al. 2011: 3). Tese figures reflect not only an in-creased number o missions, but also an increased number o operational elements.

3

DPKO homepage, 2013, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml

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Tis once again challenged the UN peacekeeping apparatus to its absolute limitsand led the Under-Secretary-General or Peacekeeping to warn publicly o the dan-gers o overloading the UN peacekeeping system.

Figure 2 below provides a graphic illustration o the drastic ups and downs o the1990s and the long period o growth and consolidation that the UN peacekeepingsystem has experienced in the first decade o the 21 stcentury.

Source:Simplified rom Surge in Uniormed UN Peacekeeping Personnel rom 1991 Present, asprepared by the Peace and Security Section o DPI in consultation with the Office o Military Affairso DPKO - DPI/2444/Rev.30 August 2013. Available through DPKO website.

Figure 2. Number of uniformed UN peacekeeping personnel 1991-present

Multidimensional peace operations today

In January 2013 the Security Council, or the first time in ten years, adopted a res-

olution on peacekeeping. Resolution 2086 is an explicit attempt to outline howthe Council understands multidimensional peacekeeping (UNSC 2013a), and it

provides a long, but non-exhaustive, enumeration o elements that can be includ-ed in multidimensional peacekeeping mandates. o those amiliar with debates on

peacebuilding, the resolution contains little news. It outlines a wide range o issuesthat multidimensional peacekeeping operations may be mandated to address, in-cluding basic saety and security, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration,security sector reorm, demining, peace consolidation and inclusive political pro-

cesses, humanitarian assistance, human rights and protection o civilians (UNSC

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2013a: paragraph 8). And it underlines the importance o national ownership ando ensuring that the mandate o each mission is specific to the needs and situation othe country concerned (UNSC 2013a: preamble and paragraph 7) As such, there

are no surprises in the resolution. o the extent that it does anything, it captureswhat has transpired as conventional wisdom on the role o UN peace operations,including in particular the importance o grasping the challenges o peacebuildingrom the inception o a peacekeeping mission (UNSC 2013a: paragraph 4).

As always with political texts, however, it is not only what is in the text that is im-portant, but also what has been excluded rom it. Compared to the 1992 Agendaor Peace, the 2013 resolution is remarkably silent on the relationship between dem-ocratic governance and lasting peace, apart rom the broad reerence to inclusive

political processes. Whether or not this indicates a move towards aourth generationo peace operations, possibly aimed at stabilisation rather than transormation, isbeyond the remit o the present report. However, we return to this question in thefinal part o the report which explores the most recent mandating practice o theSecurity Council and the role o emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil inshaping the uture outlook o UN peace operations. For now, though, and through-out most o the report, the ocus remains on the experiences o the past, rather thanthe outlook or the uture.

Te next chapter provides an overview o how the UN as an organisation has orthe past twenty years been trying to adapt its institutional structures and workingmethods to enable it to implement better the ambitious and complex tasks that it isentrusted with when leading multidimensional peace operations.

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Chapter 2. Learning to build peace?

In any analysis o the UN, it is vital to distinguish between the First UN, whichconsists o the member states and the key organs in which they meet (the SecurityCouncil, the General Assembly etc.) and the Second UN, which comprises theSecretariat and the multiple departments, agencies, programmes and commissionsmandated to work on specific issues. Te activities o the Second UN are highlydependent on the political will and financial resources o member states, especiallyin the realm o peace and security. Nevertheless, the Second UN, headed by theSecretary-General, does possess some degree o moral authority, political autonomyand bureaucratic culture that sets the UN as an administrative apparatus apart rom

the UN as an intergovernmental club o member states. It is the UN peacekeepingbureaucracy that makes multidimensional operations work in the field. Tis chapterocuses on how this administrative apparatus and its bureaucracy have evolved overtime in response to and in tandem with the growing complexity o peacekeepingmandates.

In recent years, the scholarly literature has paid increasing attention to the role othe UN bureaucracy (see, e.g., Benner et al. 2011; Bellamy and Williams 2010;

Winckler 2012; Dijkstra 2012: Junk 2012; Lipson 2012). One o the key messageso these studies is the importance o inormation and knowledge (Winckler 2012:88). Te claim o knowing what it takes to build lasting peace constitutes a majorsource o authority or the civilian and military personnel who are deployed to mul-tidimensional peacekeeping operations. In the words o a recently retired UN civilservant:

essentially, UN Agencies dont have a lot o money. Instead, an importantrole o the UN Agencies [engaged in development work] lies in the knowledge

they can bring to bear on a situation. (Glovinsky 2012: 189)

Especially in the early years o multidimensional peace operations, there were ew iany efforts at organization-wide learning. Experience travelled between missions inan unsystematic and dangerous way, as peacekeepers took their template rom thelast mission they had served in and used it in their next assignment: Unsurprisinglyreality ofen proved this copy & paste logic wrong (Benner et al. 2011: 2). In the

past decade, however, the UN bureaucracy has been struggling to become a learn-

ing organisation (Benner et al. 2011). Tis move was prompted by the operational

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ailures o the 1990s and the general peacekeeping crises o the late 1990s. Somalia,Bosnia and Rwanda in particular initiated a hitherto unoreseen process o criticalsel-reflection that culminated in the Brahimi Report and the initiation o a still

ongoing process o reorms and organisational restructuring. Te process includessignificant, yet mundane efforts to proessionalise the UN peacekeeping system in ar-eas such as command and control arrangements, personnel management (includingrecruitment and training), financial management, orce generation and reimburse-ment procedures (see Frchette 2012; Bellamy and Williams 2013; IPI 2013a), as

well as a doctrinal rethinking o questions concerning the role and identity o UN-led multidimensional peace operations.

Continuing the process that began with the Brahimi Report, the UN system has

most recently explored that question through the elaboration o three key docu-ments: Te Capstone Doctrine o 2008 that paved the way or a reinterpretation othe principles o peacekeeping (DPKO 2008); the New Horizon process, resultingin a report released in 2009 by the UN Secretariat that shed light on the dilemmaso peacekeeping and outlined a strategic direction or stronger partnerships withactors outside the UN system (DPKO 2009); and finally, in 2011, an extensive in-

vestigation o how to improve the use o civilian capacities in the afermath o con-flict, the so-called CivCap report (UN 2011). aken together, these UN initiatives

have helped to move both the practice and the concept o peacekeeping at leastsome o the way rom a mindset o quick fixes to involving a comprehensive strategy(Paris and Sisk 2009a; 2009b), and rom having an ad hoc-based planning cultureto being a learning organisation (Benner et al. 2011). Te next sections explore this

process through two steps: first, by outlining the elaborate yet ragmented architec-ture or multidimensional peacekeeping that has evolved within the UN in the pasttwo decades; and secondly, by discussing two key topics that have shaped the UNslearning processes since the Brahimi Report (integration and the use o orce).

The elaborate, yet fragmented system for UN multidimensional

peace operations

As noted, peacekeeping was not invented when the UN was established in 1945.Te UN bureaucracy was thus born without a specific organisational home or

peacekeeping operations. Te missions that were mandated between 1948 and1992 were all effectively assembled and managed on an ad hoc basis, albeit since1962 under the auspices o a small section in the Secretary-Generals Office

or Special Political Affairs (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 52). In 1992, Secre-

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tary-General Boutros-Ghali transormed this small section into a new Depart-ment o Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and regrouped the other politicalunctions into a new Department o Political Affairs (DPA) (Frchette 2012: 8).

Tis was a first example o organisational learning a bureaucratic response tothe increasing demands and changing nature o UN peacekeeping. Another andmore recent example is the identification o a key institutional gap in the UN

peace architecture, namely the lack o a place in the United Nations system ex-plicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countriesin their transition rom war to peace (UN 2004: paragraph 261). o fill this gap,in 2005 the World Summit established the so-called UN peacebuilding archi-tecture, consisting o the inter-governmental Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),the Secretariat entity the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and a multi-do-

nor trust und, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Te intention o the architecturewas 1) to bring together all o the relevant actors, including international donors,the international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributingcountries; (2) to marshal resources; and (3) to advise on and propose integratedstrategies or post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and, where appropriate,highlight any gaps that threaten to undermine peace.

So ar, however, these aspirations have not been met (SCR 2013). Te PBC and

the PBSO play only minor roles in relation to multidimensional peace operations,either practically or strategically. Te stovepipes that have characterized the UNswork on security and development since its ounding have not been overcome, andthe UN system or conducting multidimensional peace operations remains elabo-rate yet ragmented. Te system is centred around, albeit not directed by, the De-

partment o Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO.

Initially established as a small department with only fify staffers in New York di-recting and supporting 80,000 blue helmets across the globe (Benner et al. 2011:

30), the size o DPKO has increased somewhat. oday, approximately 430 peoplework or the DPKO in New York. Te figure below illustrates how these are allocat-ed between the our different offices that have existed within the DPKO since 2007.It ollows rom the distribution o staff that questions related to organizationallearning (policy, evaluation and training) are now prioritized on a par with oper-ational questions. DPKOs first lessons learned unit consisted o two staffers, onehead o section and one research assistant (Annan 2012). Similarly, the establish-ment o a dedicated office or rule o law and security institutions (OROSLI) sig-

nals the emphasis and priority given to this area. Security-sector reorm and the

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Office of the Under-Secretary General

74 posts (temporary)

Office of Operations

73 posts

(0 temporary)

Office of Military Affairs

28 posts

(2 temporary)

Office of Rule of Law and

Security Institutions

94 posts

(3 temporary)

Policy, Evaluation and

Training Division

62 posts

(1 temporary)

Total: 431 posts (14 temporary)

Figure 3. Proposed staffing of DPKO 1 July 201330 June 20144

Source: UN (2013): Report o the Secretary-General: Budget or the support account or peacekeepingoperations or the period om 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 and financing or the period om 1 July 2012to 30 June 2013. General Assembly-document A/67756. United Nations, New York

rebuilding o national security institutions has increasingly come to be understoodas the main exit strategy or UN peacekeeping operations (see DPKO 2008).

OROLSI is also interesting because it illustrates the blurring o conventional dis-

tinctions between civilian and military instruments in multidimensional peaceoperations. In addition to engaging in questions regarding legitimate and effectivesecurity governance, the military branch o the UN has also taken on a widerrange o civilian tasks, including delivering medical services and rebuilding phys-ical inrastructure. At the same time, the civilian side o the UN (the specialisedUN agencies, bureaus and programmes that are mandated to work on develop-ment and humanitarian issues) have increasingly been enlisted in or joined the implementation o multidimensional peacekeeping mandates. In the early,second-generation years o multidimensional peacekeeping, there were ew i any

attempts at linking the UNs development efforts directly with its role in main-taining international peace and security. Tis has since changed radically. An in-

ventory rom 2006 identified no less than 31 distinct UN entities with an interestin and capacity or post-conflict peacebuilding (UNSG 2006). Tese include in

particular the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Unit-ed Nations Office or Coordination o Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Otherspecialised agencies worth highlighting are UN Women, mandated to work on

4

Excluding the Office to the Arican Union (54 posts).

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gender issues, UNICEF, mandated to work or childrens rights, and OHCHR,mandated to work on human rights. Furthermore, the World Bank which isormally part o the UN amily, despite maintaining a much more independent

role than other agencies has become a key partner o the peacekeeping system.oday, a large part o UN knowledge production on how to assist ragile andconflict-affected states in reconstruction and peacebuilding is conducted in closecooperation with the World Bank.

Figure 4 below provides a schematic overview o the main UN agencies that play arole in the implementation o multidimensional mandates:

PBSO

UNDP

DFS

DPA

OCHA

OCHAUN

women

UNICEF

World

Bank

DPKO

Figure 4. The UN peacekeeping system

No agency left behind?It ollows rom the presentation above that it is difficult, i not outright impossible,to identiy the exact contours o the UN bureaucracy or multidimensional peaceoperations. In principle, there are no limits to the number o agencies and entitiesthat can be seen as somehow contributing to the ulfilment o multidimensionalmandates. Tis has led some observers to suggest that the UN has ollowed a noagency lef behind approach to post-conflict peacebuilding (Call and Cousens2008), essentially throwing in everything but the kitchen sink when outlining what

it would take to build lasting peace afer civil war.

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However, the expansion o the peacebuilding agenda in the 1990s and the accompa-nying growth in the number o agencies involved can also be seen as the result o alearning process. As experiences were gained rom early multidimensional peacekeep-

ing operations in Mozambique, Namibia and Cambodia, practitioners and scholarsalike became increasingly aware o the complexity o post-conflict transitions andthe multiple, simultaneous needs o post-conflict societies (Call and Cousens 2008:3). Everything seemed to matter in terms o laying the oundations or lasting peace:rom building schools and health clinics and securing livelihoods to improving the par-ticipation o marginalised groups, including women and children, disarming ormercombatants and revitalising the economy while reorming the constitution, holdingree and air elections and promoting transitional justice and national reconciliation.Increasingly, such a broad understanding o peacebuilding and the type o laundry list

or Christmas tree mandates5it has inspired have come to be seen as problematic, notjust by scholars and observers outside the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, but also byleading figures within it. In combination with the ragmented nature o the UN peace-keeping system, it is seen as having given rise to two distinct, yet related, problems.

First, there is the inability to deliver as onebecause the system is not a unitary actorbut is made up o a wide range o bureaucratic entities with different mandates,interests and understandings o what it takes to build lasting peace (Barnett et al.

2007). Te act that these entities are all subjected to distinct sets o rules, regula-tions and bureaucratic procedures adds urther to the predicament. Secondly, andin direct relation to this, there is an inability to prioritiseand ocus on those tasksthat matter most to the establishment o lasting peace in that particular context.Te next section will explore how the UN peacekeeping system has been trying tofind organisational solutions or ways o managing these two structural problemsthrough the use o integrated missions.

Learning to work togetherIn response to the need or coherence and shared strategies, the UN peacekeepingsystem has invented the concepts o integration and integrated missions.6It is an

5 Te term Christmas tree mandates is borrowed rom the ormer SRSG to Liberia, Ellen Margrethe Lj, who,on several occasions, has spoken publicly and to the Security Council on the difficulties o translating mandatescontaining long lists o cross-cutting and generic tasks into effective peacekeeping action in specific countries.6 Integration is the UN equivalent o member states ocus on Whole o Government and/or ComprehensiveApproaches. For an overview o this debate, see the DIIS report by Finn Stepputat published in the same ReCom

series as this report.

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organisational attempt to remedy some o the problems that relate to the ragment-ed nature o the UN peacekeeping system, including the detrimental effects o agen-cies working at cross purposes and/or duplicating one anothers work and thereby

wasting scarce resources. Te term integration was ormally introduced by the Sec-retary-General in 1997 (Metcale et al. 2011: 1), but the concept was only properlydefined in the Brahimi Report (UN 2000: paragraphs 198217). Since then, inte-gration has become the guiding policy or the UNs engagement in all conflict and

post-conflict settings where the UN has a Country eam and a multidimensionalpeacekeeping operation (or a country-specific political mission).

An integrated mission is headed by the Secretary-Generals Special Representative(SRSG), who holds overall responsibility not only or the peacekeeping mission,

but also or the wider UN and international effort, and or bringing together thevarious stakeholders and coordinating the overall peacebuilding process (de Coning2010: 2). Te SRSG is supported by a triple-hatted deputy who leads the coordina-tion efforts or humanitarian, development and recovery activities, and serves as the

principal interace between the (civilian) country team and the military componento the peacekeeping mission, normally led by a Force Commander (UNDP 2013:9). Te concept is widely regarded as having acilitated some progress, in particularthrough the integrated mission planning processes. Practitioners, however, suggest

that integration efforts in the field would be ar more successul i integration werealso introduced at headquarters. Te diverse sets o rules, regulations and bureau-cratic procedures that the distinct UN entities are subject to and which are man-aged rom their headquarters continue to make it difficult or the UN to deliver asone in the field.

Recent studies urthermore suggest that the concept o UN integration remainspoorly understood and contested in the field, especially among humanitarian anddevelopment agencies (Metcale et al. 2011; UNDP 2013). On the humanitarian

side, the ear is that integration arrangements endanger the neutrality o humani-tarian space and actors (Metcale et al. 2011). On the development side, resistanceto integration relates to the inherent tension between the time-bound nature andapproach o DPKO as opposed to the longer-term development agenda pursuedby agencies such as UNDP (UNDP 2013: xvii). Tis serves to illustrate that inte-gration is only a matter o organisational arrangements on the surace; at its core,it is a matter o politics in the sense that it requires managing, negotiating and ul-timately choosing between competing priorities. Given the absence o clear man-

dates in particular, and o unified directions rom New York, this also underlines

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the importance o competent leadership in the field. In practice, it is ofen up tothe SRSG to balance and prioritise the many tasks that the mission is charged with.Tis includes figuring out how to ensure that generic tasks related to, or example,

capacity-building and the reconciliation and protection o civilians are operational-ised so that they work together in a manner that is appropriate to the local contextand the resources available to the mission. While one should obviously be careulnot to overstate the importance o one individual, in this instance the SRSG, it is

worthwhile noting that the UN system has, in recent years, been paying more atten-tion to the appointment and training o competent leadership (de Coning 2010).

Learning to Protect

From the outset in 1948, UN peacekeeping missions have been bound by the prin-ciple o the non-use o orce. Maintaining this principle was thought o as a wayo protecting the blue helmets by allowing them to remain neutral. When engag-ing in modern civil wars, however, the principle turned out to be a dangerous trap(Benner et al. 2011: 17). Te ailures to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda andthe 1995 massacre in Srebrenica had lef UN peacekeeping and the principle othe non-use o orce severely discredited. Te principle was urther challenged byevents unolding in Sierra Leone in May 2000, when rebels detained more than 400

UN peacekeepers and stripped them o their weapons and equipment, including ahelicopter (Benner et al. 2011: 17). Te Brahimi Report that was being worked onat the time took this into account and argued that United Nations military unitsmust be capable o deending themselves, other mission components and the mis-sions mandate. Rules o engagement should be sufficiently robust and not orce UNcontingents to cede the initiative to their attackers (UN 2000: x).

Te concept o robust peacekeeping has led to heated debates within the UNpeacekeeping system and among member states. Te debate has been defined by

a undamental rif between those who advocated humanitarian intervention andthe emerging concept o Responsibility to Protect and who pushed or a more

proactive doctrine on the use o orce as a progressive, morally enlightened pol-icy, and those who saw it as a rontal assault on the undamental norms o statesovereignty and the right to non-interventionnorms that were understood as alast line o deence or many post-colonial states who remained distrustul o thebenign intentions behind the interventionist policies o Western powers (Benneret al. 2011: 18). Neither the debate nor the rif has been resolved, yet over the years

the de acto point o reerence or the use o orce in peace operations has effectively

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been changed on a pragmatic mission-by-mission basis (Benner et al. 2011: 1921).oday, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are routinely provided with ro-bust mandates and rules o engagement that allow them to use all means necessary,

including conducting offensive operations or the protection o civilians.7

Te new standard is captured in the Capstone Doctrine, which reinterpreted ratherthan replaced the traditional principles o peacekeeping consent, impartiality andnon-use o orce (DPKO 2008). Te doctrine provided some clarification o howthe UN bureaucracy sees the role o UN peacekeeping: what it can and especially

what it cannot do (including waging wars). It outlines a narrow, tactical approach torobust peacekeeping that aims at enabling peacekeepers to implement their man-date by relying on their robustness in posture, equipment and the ability to use orce

(ardy 2011: 154). Tis, however, has not solved the wider strategic and normativeissues raised by the concept o robust peacekeeping. wo aspects in particular have

proved difficult or the UN to tackle in the field: how to ensure the saety and secu-rity o peacekeepers, and how to translate civilian protection mandates into effec-tive action on the ground.

Te Brahimi Report envisioned robust peacekeeping as a way o ensuring thatpeacekeepers were able to protect themselves and their mandates. Tis notion is still

the most widely accepted. However, within both the peacekeeping bureaucracy andamong member states, especially the troop-contributing countries, voices o dissentdo argue that robust peacekeeping is, in effect, putting peacekeepers in harms way.

Violence targeting peacekeepers has indeed become a common theme in many mul-tidimensional missions. Violence and attacks are, however, not only or even primar-ily directed against UN peacekeepers. Civilian personnel, including developmentand humanitarian workers, are also increasingly being targeted.

Te saety and security o the people working or the UN clearly matters in its own

right, yet the move towards robust peacekeeping and towards providing the mis-sions with the necessary equipment and tools to sustain those mandates has pri-marily been justified by reerence to the need to protect civilians. Since 1999, twelveUN peacekeeping operations have been provided with mandates to protect civilians

7 Most recently, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic o Congo (MONUSCO) has been supplementedby a new and even more aggressive kind of force: the UN Intervention Brigade, mandated to neutralize anddisarm rebel groups in the country (IPI 2013b). Tis development is, however, so new that it is more appropriatelydealt with in the discussion on trends and perspectives, rather than as part o the lessons learned rom previous

experiences.

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under imminent threat o physical violence. Te UN peacekeeping system is acutelyaware that civilian protection mandates have become the yardstick by which the in-ternational community, and those whom we endeavour to protect, judge our worth

as peacekeepers.8

In recent years the Secretariat has thereore paid special atten-tion to developing operational policy and guidance material or missions. rainingcourses have been held, and a new position o Protection o Civilians CoordinationOfficer has been established within DPKO to strengthen the Secretariats capacityto provide support to missions with protection mandates (SCR 2012: 14). Under-

pinning these efforts is the suggestion that effective protection demands:

proactive, well-trained and appropriately resourced peacekeepers who canuse a ull spectrum o tools military, police, justice, corrections and human

rights in cohesive ashion. Additionally, peacekeeping missions and otherpartners must continue to strengthen national institutions so that they areable to discharge their primary responsibility or enhancing security and therule o law by the time the mission leaves. (UNSG 2011)

Tis quote illustrates two generic points that sum up the past two decades o organ-izational learning: first, that peacekeeping tasks are no longer primarily military innature; and secondly, that the building o national capacity is the key to a successul

exit or UN peacekeepers.

o provide or a discussion o whether the UN is indeed becoming better at im-plementing multidimensional mandates, the next part o the report moves awayrom the organisational UNs navel-gazing towards a concern with the impact onthe ground: to what extent have multidimensional peace efforts ulfilled their am-bitious and complex mandates?

8

DPKO webpage, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml

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Part II.

Assessing results on the ground

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Chapter 3. Standards for success

Te complexity o multidimensional peace operations and the inherent tensions be-tween their time-bound nature and the long-term agenda o social transormationthey engage in makes it very difficult to pinpoint exactly when a peace operation canbe understood as successul. Ofen the mere notion o success provides or whatcould be called a relativity problem: how can one even talk about success wheneven the best o missions still leave behind poverty, inequality, violence and livingconditions that rank among the worst in the world? Notwithstanding such ethicalquestions, this part o the report ocuses on the more practical difficulties o deter-mining the effectiveness o multidimensional peace operations.

Te combination o ambitious mandates containing a laundry list o broad missionobjectives and tasks with the lack o clear operational indicators gives rise to the pe-culiar situation that a peacekeeping mission can be regarded as a reasonable successeven when most o the tasks remain unulfilled or work in progress. Neither theSecurity Council nor the UN peacekeeping system has shown a significant appetiteor detailing general criteria or standards or success. However, i we are to assess thecrucial questions o whether multidimensional peace operations work and how

the instrument might be improved, it is imperative to have some sort o commonunderstanding o, first, what constitutes an effective peace operation, and secondly,how we can assess whether the criteria or standards or success have been met ina given situation: what are the ultimate goals, when is a mission a relative successand how do we know? Despite the complexities and difficulties, including their in-herently political nature, the literature on peacekeeping has sought to answer thesequestions with increasing intensity (Maley 2012: 199). Tis chapter provides a brieoverview o the discussion, ocusing on the main reasons why it is so difficult to pro-

vide hard acts in the orm o evidence-based, causal explanations concerning the

impact o multidimensional peace operations. Te subsequent two chapters providea more substantial discussion o impact in terms o 1) the missions ability to keepthe peace, and 2) the distinct quality o the peace that is kept.

Methodological challenges

Evaluating or assessing the outcome o peacekeeping entails a number o methodo-logical challenges that must be taken into account. Most o these challenges relate to

one o the most undamental insights in science: there can be no generalizablescien-

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tific finding without comparison and control (e.g. Sartori 1991). Without systemat-ic, scientific comparison between peacekeeping missions, including controlling orthe effect on other variables that affect the outcome, we can only make conclusions

about individual cases and must rerain rom conclusions about peacekeeping ingeneral. Tis logic constitutes a problem or peacekeeping scholarship because thefield suffers rom at least our (related) challenges when it comes to the exercise osystematic comparisons and control.

First, by statistical standards there is a very smalln, that is, a very ew cases o peace-keeping. Because statisticians operate with varying thresholds o n or statisticalanalysis to make sense, some scholars have questioned whether there are enoughcases or quantitative studies o peacekeeping success to be valid (e.g. Carvalho and

Aune 2010). Secondly, there is a large degree o heterogeneity between the cases,meaning that peacekeeping missions are so different both in type and over timethat it can be questioned whether they are in act the same thing (e.g. Maley 2012:199200; see also Carvalho and Aune 2010). Tis, in turn, can lead to the method-ological problem o concept stretching (see Sartori 1991), which not only appliesto the peacekeeping missions themselves, but also to the different types o outcome,as there are enormous differences between the types o peace being established.Tirdly, it is very difficult to compare the success rate o cases withintervention to

cases onon-intervention. Tis is down to the extreme variety in context (type andstage o conflict, culture, parties, etc.), as well as the simple act, pointed out by sev-eral scholars, that peacekeeping missions tend to be deployed only in the hard cases(e.g. Fortna 2008). Fourthly, a crucial part o quantitative analysis is controlling orthe effect o contextual variables when determining ixdoes in act lead toy, thatis, i peacekeeping missions actually create peace. Because both multidimensional

peacekeeping in itsel and the context in which it takes place are such complex phe-nomena, it is also extremely difficult to isolate the effect o peacekeeping in itselrom contextual variables (Fortna 2008).

The peace continuum

Trough the years, peacekeeping scholars have come up with a plethora o standardsor success, some o them ocusing on sub-fields such as economic development, oreven narrower, context-specific fields such as protection o women and children in

post-conflict environments (e.g. Diehl and Druckman 2012a, 2012b). Others havetried to identiy a ew overarching, generic actors that can be used across missions

to determine whether they are successul or not (e.g. Call 2008). Although it is

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beyond the scope o this study to present a complete picture o this research and itsinherent debates, Figure 4 below provides an overview o some o the most impor-tant standards o success proposed,9 ocusing primarily on macro-level indicators

and oregoing some o the more detailed and very sector-specific standards.

Figure 5. Standards of success for peacekeeping

Prevent war recurrence

Protection of civiliansProtect and promote human rights

Create legitimate andeffective political institutions

Address social root causes of war

Mitigate systematic violence

Disarmament demobilizationand reintegration

Restore rule of law

Facilitate and organize democratic elections

Minimize military casualties

Foster return of refugees

Foster growth in per capita GDP

Reconstruct economic infrastructure

Fight corruption

Strengthen local governance

Redress past crimes

SECURITY

SOCIAL

POLITICALECONOMIC

HUMANITARIAN

Tere is an emerging consensus in the recent literature on two key standards o suc-cess. Te first and least controversial o these ocuses on whether or not the war is over:has violent conflict ended, and is the fighting unlikely to reignite? Tis is reerred toin the literature as prolonged absence o armed conflict, no war recurrence or simplysustained peace. We take this crucial aspect as the starting point or the discussion in

Chapter 4 that provides evidence or claiming that peacekeeping works. Te secondand infinitely more complex standard ocuses on whether or not the peace is sel-sus-tainable because structures have been established to ensure the peaceul resolution outure conflicts. We reer to this aspect here as effective and legitimate institutions o

goernance,and while it is touched upon briefly in Chapter 4, we will discuss it inmore detail in Chapter 5.

9 It is assumed here that factors discussed by scholars under other labels such as goals of peacekeeping, measuresof progress, measures of outcome or concept of success are all essentially (or can be translated into) standards

o success.

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Most scholars argue, either directly or indirectly, that the absence o war recurrenceis the most essential and important indicator o success or multidimensional peace-keeping (e.g. Call 2008; Fortna 2008: 102; Van der Lijn 2009 and others). Whether

expressed and operationalized as no war recurrence, no systematic armed violenceor no relapse into conflict within a given period, the end goal essentially involvesthe same thing.

It may seem sel-evident that the success o peaceoperations should be judged pri-marily by their ability to prevent armed conflict rom breaking out again. In tandem

with the move to second- and third-generation peace operations, however, the o-cus has been broadened to be concerned also with the kind o peace being estab-lished, ofen drawing explicitly or implicitly on Norwegian peace researcher Johan

Galtungs seminal distinction between positive and negative peace (1969). Figure6 below provides an overview o the peace continuum that shapes both the scholarlyand policy-related discussion.

Te methodological challenges o identiying where on the peace continuum a giv-en situation should be placed and the extent to which this position is related to the

presence or absence o a peace operation add a degree o uncertainty to all attemptsto evaluate the success or ailure o multidimensional peacekeeping, regardless othe appropriateness o the standards used. Tis does not mean that practitioners,

policymakers and scholars should rerain rom asking whether or how peacekeep-ing works. Tere are certainly ways to mitigate and conront these challenges, suchas being context-sensitive and allowing or nuanced conclusions. Methodological

problems should not prevent us rom asking questions, but only remind us to inter-

Absence of socialinjustice (indirectviolence), senseof confidenceamong people

Growing structuraland social conditionsfor consolidatedpeace and harmony

Absence ofwar (directviolence)

From Galtung, 1969; UN, 1992

Negativepeace Positivepeace

Figure 6. Peace continuum

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pret results with caution and nuanced curiosity rather than deterministic convic-tion. Any serious and well-researched analysis will help us to better understand thefield, its subjects, objects and contexts and complexities (Diehl and Druckman

2010, 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, the debate over standards is interesting in itselbecause it reflects value choices and tells us which actors or aims are considered themost important. I the absence o war is considered sufficient to classiy an inter-

vention as a success, it implies that order and stability are privileged over equality,or example, or justice, empowerment or welare (Call 2008: 189). Te remaindero the report draws on such studies to provide an overview o what we know so aro how and why multidimensional peace operations work in the sense that they

provide or establishing negative peace, yet too ofen ail to achieve the ambitiousgoals o ensuring a positive peace or all.

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Chapter 4. Peacekeeping works

he answer to the question o whether peacekeeping works is a clear andresounding yes (Fortna 2008: 173)

American scholar Virginia Page Fortnas quote launches this chapter because it e-ectively communicates the most important message there is to convey here: that

when measured against the most basic standard o success no war recurrence theclear conclusion is that peacekeeping works. As will be shown below, there is more

peace where peacekeepers are deployed. When taking into account the difficulty othe task in hand, the political and organisational challenges that the UN is acing,

and last but not least the act that UN peacekeepers tend to be deployed to the hardcases where no one else wishes to go (Fortna 2008: 172), one might be genuinelysurprised how effective peacekeeping actually can be. As one scholar notes, when itcomes to the question o whether the UN should engage in peacekeeping or not,it seems sae to say that the world is at least better with it than without it (Maley2012: 204).

Te statement that peacekeeping works is, however, not a universal truthit is con-

tingent on a number o actors, some related to the specific conflict, its history anddynamics, others more broadly related to external issues that shape the overall in-ternational engagement. Although the literature has not provided a consensus viewon what it takes to ensure success, the ollowing actors are ofen highlighted as

particularly crucial (van der Lijn 2009):

Consent, willingness and sincerity Impartiality and the non-use o orce Co-operation rom important outside actors

Clear, appropriate and achievable mandates Competent leadership and personnel Coordination and cooperation.

It ollows rom the list that it is not the technical design o specific programmes andprojects that determines whether a multidimensional mission is successul or not;what matters is the overall political climate and will o the actors involved on allsides actors that are inherently difficult to quantiy and measure. Te statistical

findings presented in this chapter, however, provide support to the macro-claim

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that UN peace operations work, albeit in general and not per se. Te chapter ocusesfirst, on the extent to which UN peacekeepers have indeed been able to keep the

peace provide negative peace; and secondly, on the claim that, despite its short-

comings, the UN has certain comparative advantages in addressing the diverse chal-lenges o multidimensional peace operations.

UN peacekeeping reduces the risk of relapsing into conflict

A substantial body o academic literature is tackling the question o whether peace-keeping works. Te field has grown in both quality and quantity over recent years.A stronger emphasis on the correlation between input and output (e.g. Dobbins etal. 2005; Adebajo 2011), a more nuanced perspective on the dilemmas, pitalls and

grey areas within both theory and practice (e.g. Paris and Sisk 2009b; Martin-Brl2012; Suhrke 2012), and the gradual emergence o more sophisticated and morefinely tuned rameworks or evaluation (e.g. Diehl and Druckman 2010; 2012b)have been particularly constructive trends. Tis has been coupled with a number oquantitative studies o hitherto unseen quality (e.g. Fortna 2008; Call 2008; 2012;Doyle and Sambanis 2010).

A ew years ago, one particular figure attracted quite a lot o attention, both among

scholars and policymakers: the claim that peacekeeping was only successul in keep-ing the peace 50% o the time (Suhrke and Samset 2007). Te debate has sincemoved on and been refined considerably. A recent study suggest that numbers de-tailing the success rate o UN peacekeeping can, o course, be sliced in a number o

ways to reveal different patterns. For instance, Call notes that success rates are high-er or conflicts that ended in outright victories rather than negotiated settlements(Call 2008: 187). It seems easier to keep the peace i there is a clear winner to theconflict a correlation that may indicate that the best way to achieve a lasting peaceis simply to give war a chance (Luttwak 1999).

Using a ar more conservative and staticmeasure that indicates success in binaryterms as either peace or war two years afer theend o civil war, a study by Doyle andSambanis compared multidimensional and traditional peace operations and oundthat the five multidimensional peacekeeping missions included in the study wereall successes, whereas the eight traditional peacekeeping missions were all ailures(Doyle and Sambanis 2010: 90). Furthermore, the authors ound that () or these

vital, messy jobs, no one does it better than the UN (Doyle and Sambanis 2010:

351). Tis last finding has been supported by another study comparing missions led

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by the UN and the US respectively. Te study examined sixteen cases using bothquantitative and qualitative methods, and ound that, whereas seven out o eightUN-led missions resulted in sustained peace, only our out o eight US-led mis-

sions achieved the same thing (Dobbins et al. 2005: xxv; 234). Hence, across thecases examined, the study accredits UN peacekeeping with a success rate o almost90%.

While the findings reported above support each other, they suffer rom at least twoo the previously mentioned methodological problems, namely how to comparecases with UN intervention systematically with cases o non-intervention, and howto control or the effect o contextual actors. Tereore, it is worth once again high-lighting the study by Fortna (2008) reerred to at the beginning o this chapter, as

these two problems are here mitigated very well.

Fortna controls or contextual actors and intervention/non-intervention acrossseveral statistical models, while juggling with different variables and operationali-zations o peace. For example, she finds that contextual actors such as contrabandfinancing or rebels (negative effect) as well as the length and cost o the preceding

war (short and costly wars make peacekeeping less successul) are powerul indica-tors o peacekeeping success. Such controls are critical in making statistical findings

as robust and valid as possible. It is thereore particularly reassuring that the resultsreported above are by and large confirmed by Fortna. Depending on the conserva-tism o the models used and reporting both time-varying and constant effects, Fort-na finds that a UN peacekeeping operation reduces the risk o relapse into conflictby 50-85% (Fortna 2008: 125). What is particularly interesting to note is that it isthe models that take into account the peace that holds afer the peacekeepers havebeen withdrawn that show the highest success rates. As Fortna rightly notes, thismust be the ultimate standard o success because a sel-sustaining peace is the endgoal o peacekeeping (Fortna 2008: 111113). It is also worth noting that Fortna

replicates the finding that multidimensional peacekeeping missions are the mosteffective o all. In act, using a less conservative, time-constant model correcting anegative bias rom the time-varying model, these are accredited with a striking suc-cess rate o 94% in creating sustained peace (Fortna 2008: 111113).

Te figure below provides an overview o some o the most important quantitativestudies o peacekeeping success when it comes to mitigating war recurrence. Notethat different results rom the same studies are included in order to emphasise the

effect o differences in the standards o success, cases and types o mission chosen.

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interpreted with much caution. Tey do not imply that peacekeeping will alwayswork everywhere, but they do add to the emerging consensus in the literature thatpeacekeeping in particular, o the multidimensional kind is able to reduce the

risk o relapse into conflict.

The UNs comparative advantage in building effective and legiti-

mate states

In January 2013, Ban Ki-Moon reerred to multidimensional peace operations asthe flagship activity o the United Nations, boldly claiming that no other inter-national tool is as effective in combining political, security, rule o law and humanrights efforts (UNSG 2013a). Notwithstanding the Secretary-Generals obvious

institutional interest in promoting his organisation, three key arguments supportthe claim that the United Nations is especially well-suited to assisting war-torncountries in healing the social wounds o extended violent conflict.

First and oremost are considerations o legitimacy. For the present purpose, theseconsiderations extend beyond questions o legality concerning the use o orce(DIIS 2005) and relate to more practical questions concerning local acceptance othe international engagement. Te active involvement o outsiders in domestic,

political and social processes is politically sensitive and bound to be contested. TeUN is not above being accused o imperialism and neo-colonialism in that regard,yet in general the organisation is less susceptible to allegations o pursuing narrowlydefined interests and more widely seen as working or the greater good than re-gional organisations, or example, or great powers. Ofen, but not always, the UNhas been more easily and widely acceptable to local, national and regional actors asa neutral acilitator or partner in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.

Secondly, in theory the UN is able to engage comprehensivelywith the challenges o

post-conflict reconstruction. In contrast to most other international organisationsand multilateral settings, the United Nations has a mandate and a range o special-ised agencies that allow it to work on both security and development issues and tocombine civilian and military instruments in so doing. As noted in the discussionabove on integrated missions, the UN has not been able to ully translate this intoconcerted action on the ground, yet the aim o bringing to bear the ull orce othe United Nations system in support o countries emerging rom conflict (UNSG2009: paragraph 24) has guided the past twenty years o organisational reorms and

doctrinal revisions.

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Tirdly, the UN is cost-effective. Te UN is ofen portrayed as an ineffective and expen-sive organ, but recent studies suggest that UN-led peace operations are in act quitecost-effective. It is telling that the yearly budget or UN peace operations amounts

to slightly less than what the US Department o Deence spent per monthin Iraq in2005, or in Aghanistan in 2011 (Dobbins et al. 2005; CRS 2011). Similarly, it isworth noting that, compared to NAO, the ratio between headquarters staff andtroop deployment remains very high or the UN. A study indicates that NAO hasa ratio o 1:18, while the UNs ratio is 1:100 (CIC 2009: 42), while other studiessuggest an even higher UN ratio (see e.g. Bellamy and Williams 2010: 53). NAO,the Pentagon and DPKO are clearly not immediately comparable, yet the figures dosuggest that the UN is able to conduct peace operations at quite a low cost.

Cost-effectiveness does not necessarily imply that the UN is a lean organisation,or even that it is leaner than NAO and the Pentagon: it may just as well indicatethat the UN is orced to operate on the cheap due to the widely acknowledged gapthat exists between ambitious mandates and inadequate resources, and that i only

peacekeeping missions were equipped with more resources they would be able toachieve better results. According to one of-cited study, there is a direct correlationbetween how much peace one wants and the number o troops needed or themission (Dobbins et al. 2007). Tis logic is, however, increasingly questioned, as

scholars are instead pointing to the context-sensitivity o mission requirements (e.g.Call 2008, 2012; Martin-Brl 2012; Diehl and Druckman 2010) and hence theneed to have the rightresources, rather than just more resources. Several case studieshave highlighted the detrimental effects o UN missions lacking troops that are welltrained or the job, or example, qualified mission leadership and/or appropriatematerial such as vehicles and helicopters that can allow the peacekeepers to leavethe barracks (e.g. Bellamy and Williams 2013; Adebajo 2011; Martin-Brl 2012).Others have pointed to the need or UN personnel to know and understand the

particular historical, political and cultural context o the conflict and country they

are working in (Sending 2010). Along the same lines, a very comprehensive, recentstudy looked into the process o orce and resource generation or UN peacekeep-ing missions and ound that the most pressing challenge was not to attract moreresources, but to attract the right resources, that is, orces with appropriate militarycapacities and key civilian specialists or multidimensional missions (Bellamy and

Williams 2013).

Tat the UN, despite its shortcomings, has some comparative advantages over

NAO and the Pentagon when it comes to conducting multidimensional peace op-

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erations unortunately does not say much. Even the most United Nations-riendlyobservers, including the UN peacekeeping system itsel, do not consider the UNstrack record to be any better than, at best, mixed. And harsher critics have no trou-

ble in suggesting that the UN has either ailed completely in delivering on its prom-ise o a liberal peace or all (Richmond 2009) or has allen short o the ambitiousgoal o creating the good society(Barnett and Zrcher 2009: 24). Some even go soar as to suggest that the impact o UN involvement in post-conflict statebuildinghas on the whole been negative and resulted in the production o phantom states,

whose governing institutions lack social and political legitimacy (Chandler 2006).o assess these claims, the next chapter turns to the critical question o the qualityo the peace that the UN has succeeded in keeping and building through its multi-dimensional peace operations.

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Chapter 5. But statebuilding fails

Te preceding chapter outlined the statistical evidence or claiming that UN peaceoperations work. Despite the different methodological caveats pointed out there,the basic conclusion is that, five years down the line, a war-torn country will in gen-eral be better off with a peacekeeping mission than without one (Call 2008). In thischapter, the ocus shifs towards the more difficult and arguably substantial discus-sion o how well multidimensional peacekeeping works: what are the wider effectso UN-led peace operations, including their possible unintended consequences?Tis is essentially a matter o exploring the quality o the peace that UN missionsmay be successul