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Journal of Moral Philosophy 2006 SAGE Publications London, ^ ^ T B | JOURNAL

Thousand Oaks, CA ^^^^^9 OFand New Delhi ^ j ^ ^ H MORAL

http://MPJ.sagepub.com ^ 1 ^ ^ PHILO.SOPHY

Vol 3(2): 215-230DOI: 10.1177/1740468106065493

The Power Not to Be (Wh at W e Are):The Politics and Ethics of Self-creation in Foucault

B E N D A H O P M E Y R *

Radboud University NijmegenJan van Eyck Academy, M aastrichtThe [email protected]

To some extent, Foucault's later works on eth ics provides an opportunity togo beyond some of the controversies generated by his work of the 1970 s. Itwas thought, for example, that Foucault had overstated the extent to whichindividuals could be 'subjected' to the influence of power, leaving themlittle room to resist. This paper will consider the 'politics' of self-creation.W e shall attemp t to establish to wha t extent Foucault's later notion of self-formation does in fact succeed in countering an overdetermination bypower. In the end, thou gh, it would appear as if Foucault's turn to ethicsam oun ts to a sub stitution of ethics, understood as an individualized task,for the political task of collective social transformation. What is at stakeis whether or not Foucault's insistence on individual acts of resistanceam ounts to m ore than an em pty claim that ethics still som ehow has politi-cal imp lications whilst having in fact effectively given up on politics. It willbe argued that the subject of the later Foucault's ethics, the individu al, canonly be understood as political subjectivity, i.e. that the political potentialof individual action is not only 'added on' as an adjunct, but that indi-vidual action is intrinsically invested with political purport.

Keywords: care of the self; ethics; politics; power; power/knowJedge

Self-creation as the Way Out

T owards the end of his life, Foucault made a decisive ethical turna turntowards the self and seemingly away from his previous preoccupationswhich were considered more politically engaged. It appeared as if Foucaulthad trapped himself in power' and now chose to withdraw into the self.

Foucault even insisted that it was not power but the subject that formed the

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general theme of his research.^ And yet, his peculiar conception of power notonly paved the way for bu t also appeared to neeessitate a (re)turn to the self inhis later works. A reconceptualized self appeared on the scene: exit self, theproduct; enter self, the creator. The self is now no longer considered as thepassive product of an external system of constraint and prescriptions, but asthe active agent of its own formation. Foucault unlocks the self s potential forliberty by returning to ancient Greek and Greco-Roman culture where th ehermeneutics of the self was constituted by the practice of'care of the self.There he discovers an aesthetics of existence that is also ethical to the extentto which it maintains the freedom of the subject.'' In short, the later Foucaultappears to be saying that we can be freer by creating ourselves anew.

Accordingly, 'care of the self is presented as a 'struggle against the forms ofsubjectionagainst the submission of subjectivity'.^ More precisely, propercare of the self takes the form of a 'refusal' of the self, because what we areis the result of the political 'double bind' of modern power structures.'^ Thisform of power 'individualizes' the subject, but it also simultaneously 'totalizes'the subject; it does not empower the subject without also overpowering it. Thequestion then is: 'How can th e growth of capabilities be disconnected fromthe intensification of power relations?'^

The self, in Greek guise, i.e. as individual agency characterized by autarkyand auto-affection, seems to provide the answer to this dilemma. It is set inopposition to the material, historical, economic, discursive and linguistic struc-tures, practices and drives that constitute subjectivity and of which the subjectis an effect.' In short, it is opposed to the subject as subject. For, as Greenblatt

3 . M. Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', in H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, MiehelFoucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (London: The Harvester Press, 1986), pp.208-226.

4. M. Foucault, 'The Ethic of Care forthe Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interviewwith Michel Foucault on January, 20, 1984', (trans. J.D. Gauthier), in J.W. Bernauer andD.M. Rasmussen (eds.). The Final Foucault (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 1-20.

5. Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', p. 213.6. The self obviously cannot'refuse' itself completely without negatingitself. What the

self has to refusein the name of freedomare those aspectsof its identity which are coupledto established codes of identity (and moral codes), imposed from the outside and whichdiminish the subject's freedom. In other words, the limits that define us as agentsand whichsupposedly safeguard our freedom (Kant), also constrain us and limit our capacity for pos-sible action. We shall return to this later. In this regard, also see W.E. Connolly, 'Beyond

Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault', in J. Moss (ed.), 'Flie LaterFoucault (London: Sage Publications, 1998), pp. 108-128.7 Foucault 'The Subject and Power' p 216

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argues, the freedom of the arts of the self does not consist in self-creationitself, but in the experience of self-formation in the face of all the other forces

that fashion us.'*'Fouc ault defines ethicsas 'the practice of liberty, the deliberate practiceof

libe rty' ." If we take thisto mean that the essence of Foucault's ethical projectis cons tituted by the struggle for and the practice of freedom, his later worksalso imm ediately assum e political significance.In other words,if 'ethics is thedeliberate form assumedby liberty', his later works are essentially dedicatedto the political task of reinvesting the individual w iththe capacity for actionto chang e itself an dthe world in which it lives. And this ability to change one-self, and by extension the society in which you live, is rooted in the ability 'to

know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently'.'^Fou cault's genealogiesof the subject show how the individual has always

been constituted in ways tha t correlate with social norm s, whichare in turnengineered by the powers tha t be. This implies th at attem ptsto resist existingways of subjectification [assujettissement] ^which correspond to certain formsof subjection entail opposition to networks of power and governmental ration-alities. In other words, the later Foucault shifted emphasis fromthe prob-lematics of subjectivizing subjection [assujetissement] to tha t of subjectiviza-tion [subjectivation].'^ He now conceives of subjectivity not as a product ofpower, but as a result of the techniques of subjectivization thatmay indeedhave connections with techniquesof power but are essentially distinct fromthem. ' ' ' And since the promotion of new subjectivities or subjectivizationprovides the means to counter subjection, it is not only a matter of ethics,but also at once social, philosophical,and most importantly, political.

Foucault proposes three axesof subjectification: '^(1) the self s relation toknowledge/truth; (2) the self's relation to power; and (3) the self s relation toitself (ethics).'*In light of this tripartite, freedom would meanthe freedom

M. Foucault , 'Power and Strategies ' , in C. Gordon (ed. ) , Michel Foucault: Poiver/Knotvledge.Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall , JohnMepham and ICate Soper; Brighton, Sussex:The Harvester Press, 1980),pp. 134-45.

10. Foucault cites Greenhlatt asone of the few studies of aesthetics of existence donesince Burckhardt. See M. Foucault , Tlie History of Sexuality. II: The Use of Pleasure (trans.Robert Hurley; London: Penguin, 1992),p. 11; S. Greenblat t , Renaissance Self-fashioning:From More to Shakespeare (Ghicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980);J. Burckhardt , TlieCivilization of the Renaissance in Italy (trans. S.G.C. Middlemore; New York: Albert andCharles Boni, 1935).

11 . Foucault , T h e Ethic of Care for the Self, p. 4.12. Foucault , Tlie History of Sexuality,II, p. 9.13 . W h a t is relevant to Foucaultian aesthetics of the self, then , is not any particular

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of the subject to relate to itself without that relationship being pre-/over-determined by power and knowledge. In other words, ethics or 'the deliberate

practices of liberty' would depend upon the possibility of loosening theconnections between the three axes.''' This is in fact precisely what Foucaultproposes: the possibility of an ethical relation to the self that has recourseneither to power nor to knowledge. '^ This brings us to the main question atissue in this paper: to what extent is it possible to conceive of the self inde-pendently of knowledge and power? It will consider the way in which thesuccess or failure of this 'loosening' affects the political status of Foucault'sethics. If we do not succeed in securing our freedom, does this mean thatFoucault's ethics is politically inconsequential? Foucault's conception of

power will provide us with the key to answering these questions.

Power: The Twin Root of Good and Evil

For Foucault, power is not a theoretical question. Every aspect of our experi-ence is insidiously steeped in and consequently determined by power."Because power is deeply rooted in the social nexus,20 it is capable of institu-ting relations between individuals (or between groups).^' '[T]o live in society',writes Foucault, 'is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is pos-

sibleand in fact going on. A society without power relations can only be anabstraction'. However, Foucault stresses that although there cannot be asociety without power relations, it does not mean that all established powerrelations are necessary. That is why the critical analysis of existing powerrelationstheir historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility,the conditions that are necessary to transform some or to abolish othersis apolitical necessity.^^

We should nevertheless not deduce from this that Foucault considers powerto be the bane of our existence. To be sure, power can assume terminal forms.It can crystallize in institutions and mechanisms that ensure subservience, orin the form of a law that subjugates, or simply in a general system of domina-tion exerted by one group over another. However, when Foucault refers topower he is not talking about the sovereignty of the state, the form of thelaw or a general system of domination exerted by one group over another.

(trans. William Smock), in P. Rabinow (ed.), TIte Foucault Reader (New York: PantheonBooks, 1984),pp. 333-39.

17. Foucault, 'The Ethic of

Carefor the Self, p. 5.

18. Cf M. Foucault, 'On the Genealogyof Ethics: An Overview of W ork inProgress', inP. Rabinow (ed.). The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp. 340-72;

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These forms of power are not given at the outset as if they constitute poweras such, but merely represent the ends or extremities of power,^^

Power should rather be understood as a 'multiplicity of force relationsimmanent in the sphere in which the y opera te and which con stitute their ownorganization',^' ' Power relations d o not o perate separate and ap art from othertypes of relationships, such as econo mic processes or knowledge relationships.N or do they assu me a superstruc tural position w ith merely a role of prohibi-tion o r accomp animent,^^ Power relations exist or operatewithin other rela-tionships and co nstitute bo th the imm ediate effects a nd internal c onditionsof differentiations occurring within them.

The Foucaultian conception of power implies aprocess a process that,

through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens orreverses force relations. These force relations can either mutually supporteach other like links in a chain, or be isolated from one another due to dis-junctions and contradictions. In other words, power^which is 'permanent,repe titious, inert, and self-producing'takes effect instrategies?'' These strate-gies migh t be em bod ied in the state ap pa ratu s, in the formulation of the law,and in the various social hegem onies, but are not reducible to them . In oth erwords, these strategies do not emanate from a central point, like an institu-tion or sovereign. They are diffuse, local and unstable. They operate from

the bottom up instead of the top down, form one moment to the next, atevery point. Power is everywhere because it comes from everywhere. It is nota certain strength we are endowed with, but quite simply acomplex strategicalsituation in a particular society the result of the interplay of nonegalitarianand mobile relations that are exercised from innumerable points,^^

Most importantly, power relations have a directlyproductive role. It doesnot merely suppress and subjugate, but is enabling and facilitates change. Itis always exercised w ith a series of aims an d objectives. However, altho ugh itis always purposeful or inten tion al, it isnever subjective. The interplay of powercannot be reduced to a decision made by an individual subject,^^

Also understood in terms of 'government'in the broadest sense of thetermpower aims to direct the conduct of individuals/groups while theyretain the possibility to direct their own behaviour. As such, power presup-postsfreedom. 'Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar asthey are free',^' For if we did not have the freedom to act and to react, theinterplay betw een relations of force would congeal into do m inatio n. Slavery,for example, is not a power relation but a physical relation of constraint,

2 3 , M. Foucault , Tlie History of Sexuality. I: Introduction(trans, Robert Hurley; London:Penguin, 1990), p. 92.

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Freedom is therefore both the precondition for the exercise of power and alsoits permanent support, since without the ability or the freedom to resist

relations of power, the interplay of mobile relations would congeal into aphysical determination.^*^ If power relations have a strictly relational char-acter, as Foucault maintains,^' then one has to accept the fact that wherethere is power, there is resistance (counter-power).

One can only resist power from within. We are in fact always 'inside'power. There is no 'escaping' it, for there is no absolute outside where poweris concerned. It is what radically defines us. 'Between techniques of knowl-edge and strategies of power', writes Foucault, 'there is no exteriority'.^''^ Thetruth about the self is generated by the self, deciphered and validated by

experts, and consequently manufactured in what Foucault calls '"local centers"of power/knowledge'. Different forms of discourseself-examination, ques-tionings, interpretations, interviewsact as the vehicle for a kind of incessantback-and-forth movement of forms of subjugation and schemas of knowledge.These relations of power/l

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necessary. However, according to Foucault,the 'liberation of liberty' inevitablyopens up new relations of power, which in tum bear the inherent dangerofdom ination. Liberationhas to be maintained, that is,the reinstated mobilityof power relations has to be controlled by practices of liberty.-^^

The moral of Foucault's story is th atour immersion in and the all-pervasive-ness of power do not give cause for fatalism,-^' Because power relationsareunstable, they are subjectto change; and because there is power everywhere,there is also freedom and the possibility of resistance everywhere.To be sure,power is dangerous and that is why 'the perm ane nt political task inherentinall social existence'is the analysis, elaborationand questioningof power rela-tions and the struggle ('agonism') between power relationsand non-negotiablefreedom,'"'

Caught in an Infinite Regress

We have seen that this political task, this strugglefor freedom, culminatesintbe ethical subject's 'practicesof liberty', Tbe later Foucault imagines 'politicsas an ethics', '" However, tbe political efficacy of an aesthetics of existence isthreatened by a dilemma tbat Balibar framesin the following terms:'the con-ditions of existence wbicb are to be transformed are woven from tbe samecloth as tbe practice of transformation itself; , , , tbey are [botb] of tbe orderof an "action upon an action" '.'^'^ The power relation is indeed constituent,wbereas tbe more or less stabilized social norms,the norms of behaviour, areconstituted.

Tbe implication is tbat liberty might justbe witbin our reach, but neverquite attainable,' '^ Powerin Foucault is tbe twin root of botb good and evil,

38, Foucault, The Ethic of Care for the Self, pp, 3-4,39, Foucault maintains that although poweris '"always already there", that one is never

"outside" it,,, does not entail the necessity of accepting an inescapable form of domination'.In other words, it 'does not mean that one is trapped and condemned to defeat no matterwhat' (Foucault, 'Powerand Strategies', pp, 141-42),

40. Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', p, 22 3. Also see p. 225 :'For, if it is true tha t atthe heart of power relations and as a permanent condition of their existence there is aninsubordination and a certain essential obstinacyon the part of the principles of freedom,then there is no relationship of power without the meansof escape or possible flight. Everypower relationship implies,at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle, in which the two forcesare not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature,or do not finally become confused.Each constitutes for the other a kind of permanent limit,a point of possible reversal'.

41, Foucault, 'Politicsand Ethics', p, 375.42. E. Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene (trans, C hristine Jones, James Swensonand

Chris Turner; London: Verso 2002) p 15

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The self can resist power because it is enmeshed in power, in the very thingthat makes resistance necessary. Every act of resistance instates new relation-

ships of power that have to be resisted in turn,'*'' As a result, the self faces thedanger of being caught in an infinite regress '' or return of liberation anddomination, of self-invention and self-refusal. The trajectory leading fromresistance to liberation and from liberation to domination and back again(via resistance) has come to be inscribed in the very texture ofthe individual.Moreover, the constant necessity to resist power complicates the self s rela-tionship to itself. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, for the self to convertto itself,''* if the self's relation to itself is entirely defined by its outwardlydirected struggles against power relations.

So where does power leave the subject? In light of the fact that 'power is"always already there", that one is never "outside" it','*'' it seems highly im-probable that the subject will succeed in loosening the three axes of subjecti-ficationpower, tru th and ethics. If the self s relationship to itself cannot befree from power and knowledge, the very notion of self-creation itself becomesrather incoherent. Let us reassess the terms of our dilemma.

Self-creation Reassessed

Foucault did indeed stress the fact that the subject's practices of ^e/f-constitu-tion are 'not something that the individual invents by himself. They are pat-t e r n s , , ,which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his eulture, his soeietyand his soeialgroup'.'^^ Seen from this perspective, self-constitution appears asless of an autonomous process in which the subject is independent fromexternal determinants, than a reactionary and thus heteronomous project,''^ Ifthe subject merely reacts to imposed identities, he or she inevitably remains

a sceptical recognitionofthe imbricationof authority and desire' (p, 387),Also see C,Taylor,'Foucaulton Freedom and Truth', in D,E, Hoy (ed.),Fouca ult: A Critical Reader (Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1986), pp, 69-102. Charles Taylor points out that although Foucault wishes todiscredit the very notion of a liberation from power, his own concept of power does not infact make sense without the idea of such liberation.

44, Foucault, The Ethic of Care for the Self, p. 4.45, Balibar,Politics and the O ther Scene, p. 19. 'Regress'is here used in the philosophical

sense of the term, referring to a series of actions (practices or technologies of the self) inwhich resistance is continually reapplied to its own result without approaching a usefulconclusion,

46, M, Foucault, The History o f Sexuality.Ill: The Care ofthe Self(trans. Robert Hurley;

London: Penguin, 1990), p, 64,47, Foucault,'Powerand Strategies', p. 141,48 Foucault 'The Ethic of Care for the Self p 1 1 my emphasis

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tied to the latter. And although the individual is then supposedly free tochoose his or her own nor m s, these norm s are not of his or her own m aking,

Foucault nevertheless insists that the self's creative practices are ways inwhich we can m aintain our freedom against coercive powers. Yet, to be ableto indulge in these practices we already have to be free, 'Liberty', writesFouc ault, 'is the on tological condition of ethics. But ethics is the deliberateform assum ed by liberty',^ In cases of dom inatio n, th en ,liberation forms thepolitical or historical con dition for practices of liberty. How ever, liberation inturn installs new relations of power, which have to be controlled by practicesof liberty.^' The practices of liberty then appear as anecessity emerging afterliberationto maintain freedom.

From this it is clear that the ethicality of an 'aesthetics of existence' con-sists in its ability to ma intain freedom. T he as sum ption seems to be th at o urimmersion in power and knowledge undermines our freedom and that wecan detach or at least distance ourselves from it in part to create ourselvesanew. Three interrelated difficulties arise:

a. To w ha t ex ten t is it possible to sepa rate the self from pow er andknowledge, thatis, to liberate the subject so that it canpractice liberty?

b. If this is feasible, the liberated subject has to maintain his or her

liberty by con structing a new subject identity. Ho w is this possiblewithout the aid of power and knowledge? In wanting to separatethe thre e axes of subjectification, does Fou cault no t risk throw ingout the baby with the bathwater?

c. An d, thirdly, if every liberation instigates new power relations, dowe dare hope for a better future, for better socio-political condi-tions? And if not, does this no t m ake th e self s ethical p racticespolitically inconsequential?

The Possibility of Liberation from Pow er and K nowledgeLet us first consider the possibility of liberation from power and knowledge,Deleuze argues that the Greeks have cleared the way for a 'double unhook-ing or "differentiation" [decrochage]: when the "exercises that enable one togovern o nes elf become detached both from power as a relation between forces,and from knowledge as a stratified form, or "co de" of virtu e', D eleuze con-tinues that the relation to oneself assumes anindependent statu s as a result ofthis differentiation. Th e parad ox is th at this indep end enc e does no t signal a

detachment from power and loiowledgein general, but from lcnowledge asimposed codes of prescriptive rules and power as a relation between forces,^^

h h lf l k l d

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According to Foucault, '[fjrom Antiquity to Christianity one passes from amorality that was essentially a search for a personal ethics, to a morality as

obedience to a system of rules',^^ And since the latter is 'now disappearing,has already disappeared', the self has to create itself by once again choosingits own criteria for ethical conduct. However, despite its supposed freedomfrom imposed rules, the self remains dependent upon culturally derived norms,Foucault furthermore stresses tha t the assimilation of knowledge of the selfthat is the Socratic-Platonic aspectis a necessary condition of care of theself, '' However, to know oneself is not an autonomous process. It is theresult of knowledge about the self produced by society, generated by expertsand internalized by the self. For Foucault, knowledge and truth do no t set us

free as is often assumed, but are accessory to normalizing power that cate-gorizes individuals and marks them by their own individuality,^^ In short,the self is inextricably bound to knowledge.

As for the self s relation to power, Foucault's text reads as follows: 'therewas to be a differentiation between the exercises that enabled one to governoneself and the learning of what was necessary to govern others',5' ' Accord-ingly, Deleuze's interpretation ofthe self's detachment from power amountsto a conflation. He conflates 'power as a relation between forces' and thegovernment of others. Power relations are constituent. In other words, the selfis a product of power but it also derives its agency from it. Power is a diffusenetwork and not reducible to the government of others,^'' To be sure, powerdoes 'bring into play relations between individuals (or between groups)', butit 'is not simply a relationship between partners ,,, it is a way in whichcertain actions modify others',^^ The term 'conduct' [conduire] explains the

5 3 , S. Lotringer (ed,), Foucault Live: Interviews 1961-1984 (trans. Lysa Hochroth and

John Johnston; New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), p, 45 1.54. Foucault, The Ethic of Care for the Self, p. 5,5 5 . Cf, M, Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison (trans, Alan Sheridan;

London: Penguin, 1992 [1975]), In this work, Foucault joins power and knowledge as'power-knowledge' (p, 27), This juxtaposition opposes the traditional notion that knowledgecan exist only where the effects of power are suspended. According to Foucault, power andknowledge are in fact co-constitutingthey directly imply one another. In other words,knowledge cannot exist except through relations of power, and power makes possible andproduces 'regimes of truth' , Cf, Hiley, 'Foucault and the Analysis of Power', p, 200, Thiswould imply that if the subject remains dependent upon knowledge, it is also per definitiontied to power.

56, F o u c a u l t , TTie History of Sexuality,II , p . 77 .

37. Cf, M. Foucault, 'Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault

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two-sidedness of power best: to ' lead' others [se conduire] and to behave orconduct oneself [la conduire].^'^

To 'govern' others thus makesup one side of the power coin. The otherside of power consists in exercising power overoneself. It also belongs to theorder of 'an action upon other actions'. Shouldwe then consider powerexerted over oneselfas 'subjective'contrary to Foucau lt's ow n d efinitionofpower?^ Or is it also only one force acting and reacting to other forces in anetwork of relations that dissolvesthe autonomy of the subject instead ofderiving from it? If power acts as the self's driving force,it would be impos-sible for the self to be t ruly independentof power. It could be that Foucaultimagined us being indep enden tof that specific form of power tha t proh ibitsand subjugates while leaving intactthe 'affirmative power' that infusesthe'practices oflibe rty'.The question is w heth erwe can clearly sep arate the two.The power that subjects us is the very power th at 'subjectivizes' us. This was,after all, Fouca ult's very po intof departure and also that which trapshim inpower in the end.

The Possibility of Self-Crea tionW e are consequently left with a dimension of subjectivity derived frompower and knowledge that cannot relinquishits dependence upon them.*'The upside of remaining tied to power and knowledge is tha t the self retainsthe resources needed for 'self-creation', a lthoug hthe latter can no longer beconsidered an auton om ous process. Unless power am oun tsto domination, itfurnishes the self with the ability and the freedom it needs for resistance.Butif every act of resistance unleashes new power relations, no alternativesubject identity can signal a final liberation. It amounts to 'an ethic forwhich freedom lies...ina constant a t tempt at self-disengagement and self-invention'.^^

Besides freedom, resistance also implies thatone laiows what to resist.Foucault, the sceptic, wou ld say we haveto resist everything, tha t everythingis dang erous. At other times, he seems to distinguish the empowering formsof power from those forms that disempowerus. He even believes tha t wecantell them apart, desp iteour immersion in power. After the events of May '68,for example, Foucault believed thatthe masses no longer needed the intel-lectual to gain insight, that 'theyknow perfectly well, without illusion...andare certainly capableof expressing themselves'. However,he continues, 'thereexists a system of power which blocks,...and invalidates...this lcnowledge,apower not only found in the manifest authority of censorship, but one tha t

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profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire societal network'.^^ So even if wecan tell the good power from the bad power, this insight is ultimately under-

cut by power itself.Foucault's point is that the 'bad' form of power is insidious, invisible and

extremely dangerous. It is dangerous because it is totalizing, and because it istotalizing, reform is useless. Reform is imposed from the outside in an effortto rectify a situation already entirely enmeshed in totalizing power.'^'' Revolu-tionary action, on the other hand, is initiated by those concerned. It occurswhen individuals engage 'in a struggle that concerns their own interests, whoseobjectives they clearly understand and whose methods only they can under-mine'. When we denounce a particular source of power, we also question thetotality of power and the hierarchy that maintains it. It is always a 'specificstruggle against the particularized power' exerted over individuals.^ But thesystem cannot be defeated through isolated actions. It is a long struggle; it isrepetitive and seemingly incoherent. 'But the system it opposes, as well asthe power exercised through the system, supplies its unity'.^^ And as forwhat replaces the system, Foucault is quite clear: 'to imagine another systemis to extend our participation in the present system'.^^

The Possibility of Politically Engag ed Practices ofthe SelfWe are thus left with the individual and with what appears to be his or hersingular and repeated acts of resistance with no prospect of ever seeing thepromised land. But if we just fight against something instead of fighting^rsomething, does that not make Foucault's ethics politically inconsequential?

Foucault would never sacrifice the process for the purpose. Politics in itsteleological guise leaves a series of victims in its wake: (1) the present isdevaluated and ultimately sacrificed in the name of a better future. By beingsubordinated to some ideal moment in the future, it no longer exists as anautonomous entity; (2) Individual human actions face a similar fate. Theyare condoned only in as far as they contribute towards realizing the politicaltelos. The present political struggles that Foucault advocates, on the otherhand, turn on the question, 'What are we today?'^^ 'They are a refusal of theseabstractions, of economic and ideological state violence that ignores who weare individually, and also a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisitionwhich determines who one is'. If one side of this resistance is to 'refuse whatwe are', the other side is to invent, not discover, who we are by promoting

63. Foucault, 'Intellectuals and Power', p. 207, original emphasis.64. Foucault, 'Intellectuals and Power', p. 208.65 Foucault 'Intellectuals and Power' pp 214 216

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'new forms of subjectivity'.*' He uses genealogy as a diagnostic tool, a toolself-consciously situated in the present amidst the very web of power itanalyses. It therefore cannot provide an outside point of view and is notinterested in sacrificing the present to some future ideal.'' No promise of abetter future can do away with the necessity for resistance in the present.Besides, Foucault considers his ethics as 'anti-strategic', as irreducible to thequestion of political success.'' ' It is well known, for example, that Foucaultsupported the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79. Even though the revolutionresulted in new political repression, Foucault refused to dismiss the moralachievement of those responsible for the revolution.' '^

So yes, in the end, Foucault did get trapped in power, but he refused tobecome an instrument of power''^ by offering normative criteria for distin-guishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power.'^'^ He got trappedbecause he, like all of us, has always been trapped. The point is this is not abad thing. The pervasiveness of power might dispel the myth of autonomousself-creation but it does facilitate heteronomous practices of freedoma diffi-cult freedom which is not freedom^rom power, but freedomthrough power,despite power and because of power.

The Crux: Substituting Ethics for Politics?What can then be said about the relation between ethics and politics? Itwould seem that, despite numerous qualifications, the later Foucault's turnto ethics nevertheless amounts to a substitution of ethics for politics'^^itwould appear to leave no room for the possibility ofpolitical subjectivity.This is meant in two senses: the possibility for a subject to effectively actpolitically, but also, and more importantly, the possibility of a notion of

6 9 . Foucault , 'The Subject and Power' , pp. 212, 216.70 . Hiley, 'Foucault and the Analysis of Power', p. 196.71 . M. Foucault, 'Is it Useless to Revolt?' (trans. James Bernauer),Philosophy and Social

Criticism 8 (1981) , pp. 5-9 .72 . G. Gutting (ed.) .The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Gambridge: Gambridge Uni-

versity Press, 1996), p. 144.73 . Foucault , ' Intellectuals and Power' , p. 208.74. Gf. N. Fraser, 'Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative

Confusions', Praxis International 1.3 (1981), pp. 272-87. Fraser (p. 286) precisely argues thatFoucault cannot provide a polit ically engaged crit ique of modem forms of power when his

analysis has as on e of its con sequ ence s a suspension ofa normative framework for criticizingexercises of power.75 After all in an interview Foucault admits that 'what interests me is much more

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subjectivity which thinks the subject politically, that is, where politics is not'added on' to the subject as an adjunct.

Many critics consider Foucault's aestheticized ethics as individualistic.According to Hiley, for example, self-creation is a feat of individual heroismthat Foucault fails to reconcile with a notion of community or polity.^^ Andto add insult to injury. Best and Kellner claim that he construes the indivi-dual as 'a peculiarly inefficacious entity, reducing subjectivity from a multi-dimensional form of agency and practice.. .to a decentred desiring existence'.^Moreover, his extremely pessimistic realism allows Foucault to excuse himselffrom the obligation to work macro-politically.'^^ His turn to ethics thensubstitutes what can only be an individualized task of ethics for the politicaltask oi collective social transformationwhich he apparently sees little scopefor. But what prevents the individual as ethical subject from engaging incollective practices of mobilization for reasons other than self-realization?According to White, Foucault does not promote arts of the self that fashion'juridical' subjects who would be capable of cooperating politically in a polityor social movement.'^' These would be juridical subjects because they wouldaccept the validity of consensually and rationally chosen rules and norms.^"^Foucault's insistence on individual acts of resistance would appear to benothing more than an empty claim that ethics still somehow has politicalimplications whilst having in fact effectively given up on politics. For Foucaultexplicitly defines liberation as an ethical taska task for the individual ratherthan the collective. And if it is an expressly ethical task, its supposed politicalconsequences are thrown in doubt. Whatever political purport or potentialindividual action might have, would have to be 'added on' as an afterthoughtinstead of being an intrinsic feature.

76. D.R. Hiley, 'Foucault and the Question of Enlightenment', Philosophy and Social

Criticism 11(1985), pp. 63-84. Also see Hiley, 'Foucault and the Analysis of Power', p. 206,where he reiterates that Foucault's constant concern for the self induces a withdrawal frompolitics.

77. S. Best and D. Kellner, Postmodern Tlieory: Critical Interrogations (Hampshire: PalgraveMacmiUan, 1991), p. 290.

78. Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 387. According to Eagleton, Foucault's workconsequently 'represents a kind of negative or inverted ultra-leftism, in which a resoluterevolutionary negation is at once clung to and disowned. The dream of liberty must becherished, but this impulse has fallen, historically speaking, on hard times, and causticallyrefuses the possibility of its own realization'.

79. S. White , 'Foucault's Ghallenge to Gritical Theory', American Political Science Review80.2 (1986), pp. 419-32.

80 To be sure Foucault is wary of consensus politics but he never claims that a society

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To be sure, the subject of Foucault's ethicsis the individual, but this indivi-dual is no longer exclusively thesubject (in the sense of subordination) ofsubjectification [assujetissement] or what Judith Butler calls 'the body' whichemerged in Discipline and Punish 'as a way of taking over the the ory of agencypreviously ascribed to the subject.. .understo od in terms of appro priation andpossession'.^' The individual now appears as a node in a network of power/knowledge. Being cons tituted in and throu gh power, this 'individual' is some-thing other or something m ore than a distinct singularity. N ot th at Foucaultis herew ith personifying p ower and depersonifying or deh um anizing personsby making them into effects of power. The individual is still vulnerable tosubordinating forces but also invested with the possibility of resistancethrough subjectivizadon [subjectivation].^'^ For, as we have seen, the subject'sentrapment in power renders it far from inefficacious and the all-pervasivenessof power does not give cause for fatalism. 'Individual' action, understood asan acting or reacting relation of force, can no t simply remain localized (or beconceived as individualistic) for it has the potential of causing a chain reac-tion or ripple effect through the social fabric.^^ Foucault's insistence thatpower is never subjective, tha t is, th at it can no t be reduced to an individualsubject's decision or action, can also be understood in this light. Moreover,since it is neither localized nor isolated, the individual ethical subject's'practices of liberty' would then also have the potential of effecting larger-scale political changes from the bo ttom up , and liberation would n ot only bean ethical but also a political task.^"* In fact, if we are to accept Foucault'sclaim that power is all-pervasive, the individual's practices of liberty becomea necessary condition for political action. In the later Foucault, then, politicsonly becomes possible if ethics succeed.

This reading is furthermore supported by Foucault's preface to the Englishedition of Deleuze and Gusittans Anti-oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.Th erein Fou cault describes wh at he calls an 'Intro du ction to the N on-FascistLife', or an ethics based on inherently 'de-individualizing' principles: 'The

8 1 . ].Sutler,"BodiesandPower,Revisited',RadicalPhilosophy I 14(2002),pp. 13-19(18).8 2. As Butler points out, the 'effect' in Foucault 'is not the simple and unilateral con-

sequence ofa prior cause. "Effects" do not stop being affected: they are incessant ac tivities,in the Spinozistic sense. They do no t, in this sense, presuppose power as a "cause"; on thecontrary, they recast poweras an activity of effectuation with no origin and no end' ('Bodiesand Power, Revisited', p. 19).

83. To be sure, force relations can either mutually support each other like links in achain, or be isolated from one anotherdue to disjunctions and contradictions (Foucault,TlieHistory of Sexuality I p 92)

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individual is the product of power. What is needed is to "de-individualize"by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The

group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but aconstant generator of de-individualization', ^ The centrality of the ethical per-spective in Foucault's later work therefore does not signal an abdication ofpolitical engagement, but precisely a call for political struggle understood,first and foremost, as a 'politics of ourselves',''

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