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U N I T E D N AT I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T

UNCTAD financial condiittiioonnss indicators and financiaal vulnerraabbiiliittiieess

in emergingg mmaarkets

1

U N I T E D N AT I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T

UNCTAD financial condiittiioonnss indicators and financiaal vulnerraabbiiliittiieess

in emergingg mmaarkets

Geneva, 2019

This work is available open access by complying with the Creative Commons licence created for intergovernmental organizations, available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/.

UNCTAD/GDS/2018/1

© 2019, United Nations

TablesTable 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Table 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Table 3

and computed spreads between sovereign 10-year government bonds and United States 10-year treasury notes . 12

Table 1 Heat map: Emerging economies, 2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29





ContentIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The driving force of external factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Fed taper tantrum (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

The renminbi shock (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Annex 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

FiguresFigure 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Figure 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Figure 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Figure 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Figure 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Figure 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Figure 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Figure 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Figure 1 FCI for Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Figure 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Figure 3 FCI for India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Figure 4 FCI for Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Figure 5 FCI for South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Figure 6 FCI for Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

4

Acknowledgements

1

Introduction

Board, 2018), twice the size of the global economy.

E

domestic economies have been critically affected by imbalances and instabilities

1

makes fears of contagion and concerns of whether any one of these economies

Emerging markets

economies are

to the hazards of the unfettered and unstable growth of

1.

2

hyperglobalization.

The anxiety over these emerging

economies is further heightened by

the fact that they were thought to be adequately shielded against exogenous

3

The need for new tools to

as foreign investors have taken larger positions in domestically dominated asset

still depend.

Financial systems

economies, too, have become more

challenges well beyond standard

concerns with sovereign debt sustainability, customarily

associated with

5

conditions indicators

sovereign debt spreads. The emerging market macrorisk score is described in

macroeconomic considerations, they share a common methodology that limits their

overlapping in the information disclosed by each of the variables in the selected

WWhile UNCTAD

indicators are also

combining a large set

they differ from other indices in their choice

of methodology by building on a dynamic

6

1). The indicators are delivered on a monthly basis. In this paper, they are shown

November 2018

FIGURE 1

Coverage of UNCTAD financial conditions indicators, 2018

Coverage of indicators

Source:

7

The rising frequency of

assist policymakers and investors in determining whether an economy is going

conditions indicator as a local peak. This approach has the advantage of being less affected than the standard deviation method by the addition of new observations. While this way of reading the indicator makes sense if the analysis is to be carried

A major objective of

indicator is to

and investors in determining whether an economy is going through a round of

whether it may have hit some kind of

8

TABLE 1

Percentage of months spent in moderate or high financial stress

Source:

with 30 per cent, or three years and three months, in the period 2008–2018.2 The

TABLE 2Percentage of months spent in high financial stress

Source:

between the two time periods from an average of 6 per cent – half a year – to 13

Time period Arg

enti

na

Bra

zil

Ind

ia

Ind

one

sia

So

uth

Afr

ica

Turk

ey

Ave

rag

e

2000–2007 17 23 17 20 17 18 18

2008–2018 31 27 31 29 31 31 30

17 8 18 2 15 0 10

2013–2018 31 32 25 35 32 42 33

2. Until November 2018.

Time period Arg

enti

na

Bra

zil

Ind

ia

Ind

one

sia

So

uth

Afr

ica

Turk

ey

Ave

rag

e

2000–2007 7 6 1 7 5 8 6

2008–2018 12 13 17 12 14 11 13

0 2 12 0 3 0 3

2013–2018 11 14 7 10 13 13 11

9

emerging economies.

Leaving aside the

2009 that marks the actual global

data show that most

between 2008 and

10

A greater synchronization

emerging countries

FIGURE 2Synchronization of financial stress episodes by time period

Source:

64

38

22

11

0

65

46

28

16

6

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

At least two countries Three countries or more Four countries or more Five countries or more All six countries

2000–2007

2009–2018

11

and prompted by falling commodity prices that mainly affected the three leading

FIGURE 3Evolution of net portfolio flows and number of countries in financial stress, 2000–2018

Source:

All six countries

major occurrences

reversals since their recovery from the

1

3

2

4 4

5 5

2 2 2

1

2

1

3

2 2

5

6 6

3

1 1

4 4

1

3 3

1

4

2

1

3 3

5

6 6

5

2

1

2

1 1 1 1

2

5

6

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Q1

2000

Q2

2000

Q3

2000

Q4

2000

Q1

2001

Q2

2001

Q3

2001

Q4

2001

Q1

2002

Q2

2002

Q3

2002

Q4

2002

Q1

2003

Q2

2003

Q3

2003

Q4

2003

Q1

2004

Q2

2004

Q3

2004

Q4

2004

Q1

2005

Q2

2005

Q3

2005

Q4

2005

Q1

2006

Q2

2006

Q3

2006

Q4

2006

Q1

2007

Q2

2007

Q3

2007

Q4

2007

Q1

2008

Q2

2008

Q3

2008

Q4

2008

Q1

2009

Q2

2009

Q3

2009

Q4

2009

Q1

2010

Q2

2010

Q3

2010

Q4

2010

Q1

2011

Q2

2011

Q3

2011

Q4

2011

Q1

2012

Q2

2012

Q3

2012

Q4

2012

Q1

2013

Q2

2013

Q3

2013

Q4

2013

Q1

2014

Q2

2014

Q3

2014

Q4

2014

Q1

2015

Q2

2015

Q3

2015

Q4

2015

Q1

2016

Q2

2016

Q3

2016

Q4

2016

Q1

2017

Q2

2017

Q3

2017

Q4

2017

Q1

2018

Q2

2018

Q3

2018

Bill

ions

of

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

dolla

rs

Contagion of Greek economic crisis

Chinajitters

United Statesdollar

appreciation and trade tensions

Commodityslump

Fedtaper tantrum

12

The driving force of external factors

Table 3 shows a relative deterioration of all three factors in 2013–2018, compared

is more modest, with an average gain of 0.5 points of yield difference.

TABLE 3Changes in average real effective exchange rates, Standard and Poor’s Goldman Sachs commodities index and computed spreads between sovereign 10-year government bonds and United States 10-year treasury notes

Source:a

b

indicators include three other external elements that are

key to the emergence

countries – exchange rates, commodity

between countries’ sovereign and United

Average real effec-tive exchange ratea

Average Standard and Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commodity Index

Average spread of 10-year govern-ment bonds and United States 10-year treasury notesb

95.4 4711.2 6.3

84.1 3269.7 6.8

13

emerging markets and advanced economies narrowed: from a peak of 6.1

debt levels.

Fed taper tantrum (2013)

T

by 287 basis points.

shock that affected all six emerging

on 23 May 2013, when the Federal

Reserve hinted at a

14

FIGURE 4Cumulative evolution of the financial conditions indicators: Fed taper tantrum

Source:

The collapse of commodity prices (2014)

Argentina

Brazil

India

Indonesia

South Africa

Turkey

Febr

uary

201

3

Mar

ch 2

013

Apr

il 20

13

May

201

3

June

201

3

July

201

3

Aug

ust 2

013

Sep

tem

ber

2013

Oct

ober

201

3

Nov

embe

r 20

13

t - 3 t - 2 t - 1 Shock t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6

Fina

ncia

l con

ditio

ns in

dica

tors

-7-6-5-4-3-2-1012

15

11.5 per cent, and borrowing costs decreased on average by 129 basis points.

inancial conditions indicators for the entire sample

FIGURE 5 Cumulative evolution of the financial conditions indicators: Commodity shock

Source:

conditions indicators

of countries declined after commodity

Apr

il 20

14

May

201

4

June

201

4

July

201

4

Aug

ust 2

014

Sep

tem

ber

2014

Oct

ober

201

4

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Dec

embe

r 20

14

Janu

ary

2015

t - 3 t - 2 t - 1 Shock t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6

Financial conditions indicators

Argentina

Brazil

India

Indonesia

South Africa

Turkey

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

16

The renminbi shock (2015)

be traced back to a combination of economic and political developments in the

The renminbi shock

volatility in the

emerging markets,

All six emerging

17

FIGURE 6Cumulative evolution of the financial conditions indicators: The renminbi shock

Source:

Political uncertainty in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States (2016)

May

201

5

June

201

5

July

201

5

Aug

ust 2

015

Sep

tem

ber

2015

Oct

ober

201

5

Nov

embe

r 20

15

Dec

embe

r 20

15

Janu

ary

2016

Febr

uary

201

6

t - 3 t - 2 t - 1 Shock t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6

Financial conditions indicators

Argentina

Brazil

India

Indonesia

South Africa

Turkey

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Global markets

of growing uncertainty

United Kingdom from

and the outcome of the United States

elections in November

18

2016.

FIGURE 7

Cumulative evolution of financial conditions indicators: 2016 shock

Source:

the deterioration of the indicator in the three months following the adoption of demonetization.

Apr

il 20

16

May

201

6

June

201

6

July

201

6

Aug

ust 2

016

Sep

tem

ber

2016

Oct

ober

201

6

Nov

embe

r 20

16

Dec

embe

r 20

16

Janu

ary

2017

t - 3 t - 2 t - 1 Shock t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6

Fina

ncia

l con

ditio

ns in

dica

tors

Argentina

Brazil

India

Indonesia

South Africa

Turkey

-4-3,5

-3-2,5

-2-1,5

-1-0,5

00,5

1

19

commodity prices stabilized and improved in the second half of 2017.

Appreciation of the United States dollar and escalation of trade tensions (2018)

domestic banks while avoided the imposition of capital controls.

depreciated by 21.4 per cent against the dollar, and sovereign yields increased 3

With uncertainty about the direction and decisiveness of United States

and concerns about a stronger dollar,

measures lingering in the background,

investors focused on two local shocks: the

crises in Argentina

3.

20

FIGURE 8Cumulative evolution of the financial conditions indicators: Market sell-offs in emerging markets

Source:

and of commodity prices over the entire period, while broadly stable bank interest rates for the best part of this period mean that this variable has not yet been

Nov

embe

r 20

17

Dec

embe

r 20

17

Janu

ary

2018

Febr

uary

201

8

Mar

ch 2

018

Apr

il 20

18

May

201

8

June

201

8

July

201

8

Aug

ust 2

018

t - 3 t - 2 t - 1 Shock t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6

Fina

ncia

l con

ditio

ns in

dica

tors

Argentina

Brazil

India

Indonesia

South Africa

Turkey

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

21

Conclusion

term bonds.

arising from appreciations of the dollar and global trade tensions, the indicators

and debt levels help to retain a degree of domestic policy space to respond to

With little reason to assume that any of the external factors will stabilize soon

become steady,

such as those affecting Argentina

and Turkey most recently, are likely to

22

scope of this paper.

Annex

23

Annex 1FIGURE 1

UNCTAD FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDICATOR FOR ARGENTINA

ARGENTINA-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4

GLOBALFINANCIAL

CRISIS

APPRECIATION OFUNITED STATES DOLLAR

AND ESCALATIONOF TRADE TENSIONS

CONTAGION OFGREEK ECONOMIC

CRISIS

COMMODITYSHOCK

FED TAPERTANTRUM

RENMINBISHOCK

POLITICAL UNCERTAINTYIN UNITED KINGDOMAND UNITED STATES

1/07

4/07

7/07

10/07

1/08

4/08

7/08

10/08

1/09

4/09

7/09

10/09

1/10

4/10

7/10

10/10

1/11

4/11

7/11

10/11

1/12

4/12

7/12

10/12

1/13

4/13

7/13

10/13

1/14

4/14

7/14

10/14

1/15

4/15

7/15

10/15

1/16

4/16

7/16

10/16

1/17

4/17

7/17

10/17

1/18

4/18

7/18

10/18

24

FIGURE 2

UNCTAD FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDICATOR FOR BRAZIL

BRAZIL-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

GLOBALFINANCIAL

CRISIS




CRISIS

COMMODITYSHOCK

FED TAPERTANTRUM

RENMINBISHOCK


1/07

4/07

7/07

10/07

1/08

4/08

7/08

10/08

1/09

4/09

7/09

10/09

1/10

4/10

7/10

10/10

1/11

4/11

7/11

10/11

1/12

4/12

7/12

10/12

1/13

4/13

7/13

10/13

1/14

4/14

7/14

10/14

1/15

4/15

7/15

10/15

1/16

4/16

7/16

10/16

1/17

4/17

7/17

10/17

1/18

4/18

7/18

10/18

Annex

25

FIGURE 3

UNCTAD FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDICATOR FOR INDIA

INDIA-14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8

GLOBALFINANCIAL

CRISIS




CRISIS

COMMODITYSHOCK

FED TAPERTANTRUM

RENMINBISHOCK


1/07

4/07

7/07

10/07

1/08

4/08

7/08

10/08

1/09

4/09

7/09

10/09

1/10

4/10

7/10

10/10

1/11

4/11

7/11

10/11

1/12

4/12

7/12

10/12

1/13

4/13

7/13

10/13

1/14

4/14

7/14

10/14

1/15

4/15

7/15

10/15

1/16

4/16

7/16

10/16

1/17

4/17

7/17

10/17

1/18

4/18

7/18

10/18

26

FIGURE 4

UNCTAD FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDICATOR FOR INDONESIA

INDONESIA-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8

GLOBALFINANCIAL

CRISIS




CRISIS

COMMODITYSHOCK

FED TAPERTANTRUM

RENMINBISHOCK


1/07

4/07

7/07

10/07

1/08

4/08

7/08

10/08

1/09

4/09

7/09

10/09

1/10

4/10

7/10

10/10

1/11

4/11

7/11

10/11

1/12

4/12

7/12

10/12

1/13

4/13

7/13

10/13

1/14

4/14

7/14

10/14

1/15

4/15

7/15

10/15

1/16

4/16

7/16

10/16

1/17

4/17

7/17

10/17

1/18

4/18

7/18

10/18

Annex

27

FIGURE 5

UNCTAD FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDICATOR FOR SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4

GLOBALFINANCIAL

CRISIS




CRISIS

COMMODITYSHOCK

FED TAPERTANTRUM

RENMINBISHOCK


1/07

4/07

7/07

10/07

1/08

4/08

7/08

10/08

1/09

4/09

7/09

10/09

1/10

4/10

7/10

10/10

1/11

4/11

7/11

10/11

1/12

4/12

7/12

10/12

1/13

4/13

7/13

10/13

1/14

4/14

7/14

10/14

1/15

4/15

7/15

10/15

1/16

4/16

7/16

10/16

1/17

4/17

7/17

10/17

1/18

4/18

7/18

10/18

28

FIGURE 6

UNCTAD FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDICATOR FOR TURKEY

TURKEY



-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6

1/07

4/07

7/07

10/07

1/08

4/08

7/08

10/08

1/09

4/09

7/09

10/09

1/10

4/10

7/10

10/10

1/11

4/11

7/11

10/11

1/12

4/12

7/12

10/12

1/13

4/13

7/13

10/13

1/14

4/14

7/14

10/14

1/15

4/15

7/15

10/15

1/16

4/16

7/16

10/16

1/17

4/17

7/17

10/17

1/18

4/18

7/18

10/18

GLOBALFINANCIAL

CRISIS


CRISIS

COMMODITYSHOCK

FED TAPERTANTRUM

RENMINBISHOCK


Annex

29

Heat mapsTABLE 1

HEAT MAP: EMERGING ECONOMIES, 2013

External vulnerabilities

Crit

eria

Bra

zil

Indi

a

Indo

nesi

a

Ave

rag

e

-3.8

75.5 86.8 88.6 79.2 81.0 83.1 82.4

trailing) – in billion dollars)a 0.6 16.5 -5

25.6 12.6 22.7 31.0 39.0 40.5 28.6

23.6 10.4 21.7 16.1 19.5 33.9 20.9

Fiscal vulnerabilities

Primary balance 1.7 0.8 -0.8

41.7 60.2 68.5 24.8 44.1 31.4 45.1

25.4 15 6 58.8 35.2 42.2 30.4

559 353 65 332 140 276 287

Financial and monetary vulnerabilities

b 10.6 6.2 10.9 6.4 5.8 7.5 7.9

Policy rate10 7.75 7.5 5 4.5 7.0

c 1.9 1.4 9.5 -0.4

139.7 71.6 88.5 76.2 93.4 72.5 90.3

2.4 3.0 6.4 5.6 2.5 8.5 4.7

Sources:

a

b

c

Low

30

TABLE 2


External vulnerabilitiesC

riter

ia

Bra

zil

Indi

a

Indo

nesi

a

Ave

rag

e

-3,3

77.1 88.8 98.0 98.3 90.7 93 90,9

trailing) – in biillion dollars)a 9.1 30.9 2.6 7

27.0 14.9 22.3 33.3 40.7 41.2 29,9

17.8 16.3 18.7 15.4 19.8 33.3 20,2


Primary balance 0.0 0.5 -1.3

43.6 62.3 67.8 24.7 47.0 28.8 45.7

28.8 17 7 59.1 34.9 42.9 31.5

-129


b 6.3 6.7 6.4 6.1 8.9 6.9

Policy rate11.75 8 7.75 5.75 8.25 8.3

c 6.9 10.7 8.2 1.7

116.2 83.6 135 119.7 96.2 118,0 111.5

0.5 7.4 5.0 1.9 5.2 2.9

Sources:

a

b

c

Low

Annex

31

TABLE 3



riter

ia

Bra

zil

Indi

a

Indo

nesi

a

Ave

rag

e

-2.9

65.4 67.2 95.5 89.9 74.4 80.1 78.8

trailing) – in billion dollars)a 3 -17

25.7 20.7 22.7 36.4 47.2 45.0 33.0

35.5 15.3 17.0 12.5 21.1 26.3 21.3


Primary balance 0.6 -1.9

55.1 72.6 70.0 27.5 49.3 27.6 50.3

28.4 17 6 59.8 33.8 40.1 30.8

167 329 62 265 237 175


b 9.0 4.9 6.4 4.5 7.7 6.5

Policy rate14.25 6.75 7.5 6.25 7.5 8.5

c 5.5 0.6 -7.7

89.1 59.2 95.2 80.5 76.4 63.4 77.3

2.7 8.2 4.9 1.3 6.1 3.3

a

b

c

Low

32

TABLE 4



riter

ia

Bra

zil

Indi

a

Indo

nesi

a

Ave

rag

e

-2.2

81.9 121.9 97.5 102.3 113.5 83.0 100.0

trailing) – in billion dollars)a 35 6.1 22.0 1

31.3 16.5 20.0 33.2 45.6 44.9 31.9

26.1 17.3 18.4 12.7 20.4 24.8 19.9


Primary balance -2.1

55.0 78.4 69.5 28.3 51.6 28.3 51.9

37.8 13 6 59,1 35,8 41,5 32,2

0.0 64,0 -120


b 8.7 5.0 3.5 6.6 7.8 6.3

Policy rate24.75 13.75 6.25 4.75 7 8 10.8

c 8.4 18.4 1.4 10.1 19.0 9.4

134.1 180.2 103 119.0 116.5 89.9 123.8

7.1 5.0 0.6 3.2 1.8

a

b

c

Low

Annex

33

TABLE 5



riter

ia

Bra

zil

Indi

a

Indo

nesi

a

Ave

rag

e

-3.2

50.0 86.3 88.9 93.0 88.0 71.1 79.6

trailing) – in billion dollars)a 11.4 3.6 -4

64.8 16.4 20.5 34.7 53.9 60.3 41.8

19.1 15.6 18.8 14.0 20.5 24.9 18.8


Primary balance -1.7

62.7 88.4 69.6 29.8 55.7 32.3 56.4

47.7 12 6 62.3 41.1 42.2 35.2

161.5 35.6 173.2 635.0 164


b 3.3 5.3 3.7 4.7 13.0 6.0

Policy rate45.00 6.5 6.5 5.75 6.5 24 15.7

c 16.3 8.8 4.5 18.7 10.6 9.2

49.0 92.6 82.9 88.7 74.4 54.7 73.7

1.3 2.0 7.6 5.3 1.3 4.0 3.6

a

b

c

Low

34

ReferencesARSLANALP S AND TSUDA T (2014).

Tracking global demand for advanced economy sovereign debt.

BALAKRISHNAN R, DANNINGER S, ELEKDAG S AND TYTELL I (2011).

BICCHETTI D AND NETO D (2018).

CARDARELLI R, ELEKDAG S AND LALL S (2011).

DAVIS S AND PRESNO I (2014).

DOZ C, GIANNONE D AND REICHLIN L (2011).

DOZ C, GIANNONE D AND REICHLIN L (2012).

FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (2018).

GALLAGHER KP (2010).

MBAYE S, MORENO-BADIA M AND CHAE K (2018).

STANDARD AND POOR’S GLOBAL (2017).

STOCK JH AND WATSON MW (2011).

SZENTIVANYI N AND A WONG (2018)

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UNCTAD (2015).

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UNCTAD (2018).

Layout and Printing at United Nations, Geneva – 1902726 (E) – March 2019 – 399 – UNCTAD/GDS/2018/1

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