External Action of the European Union

MUSEUR Janvier -Juin 2011ClémentSPOL21MS/CP

External action of the European Union

1. Introduction to the external action of the EU

1.1. Relevance and points of departure

The starting point in that the departure is the EU and the worldHow does the EU behave in a global context, how does the EU form its action towards the

world?

- Empirical: the EU is a big player in the world: important actor in some areas. Big player for economic power and ambitions as political/diplomatic power.

- Analytical: the EU as such is a political project which exists thanks to states that cooperate. It is the result of the external actions of the member states. The external action of the EU is not an exclusive task. The member states have also

relations with the world and there is then a multilevel system of external relations of the EU.

- 3 assumptions:1 The EU matters in the world and the world matters to understand the EU.

The EU can be a player in international relations in the world.We will not only focus on the dynamics of the EU but also on the dynamics of the world.

2 The EU’s positions, decisions and actions are the result of often complex interactions in a multi-level system.

The EU as such is not one level that takes place at a global level. There is the supranational level but also the different states. The domestic level is also very important the EU is not a unitary system.

3 The process of the EU’s external action is dynamic, if not always progressive or cumulative. External action is a part of European integration. The deepening process has an impact on the external action of the EU The strengthening of EU’s external action is due to the integration process.

1.2. Fields of tension in the EU’s external action

There are 4 tensions in the EU’s external action:

European integration Transatlantic solidarity

Civilian power Military power

Intergovernmental approach Supranational approach

External objectives Internal objectives

External action of European Union – Tom Delreux 1

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1) This tension has been present from the moment of the capitulation of Germany after WWII. There are 3 reasons why Europeans look to the other side of the Atlantic:- The Soviet threat. - The relative military weakness of Western Europe - The military superiority of the US.

Those transatlantic relations are characterised by NATO:- The European states are members of NATO, which is the corner stone of the EU’s external

action. - NATO is a regional organization but there is a constant tension between the European

integration and this transatlantic solidarity. It was particularly the case for the European Defence Community (cf. Class 2).

Nowadays, this tension often pops up: - “what do the Americans think?”-test.- EU’s external action not only impact on the issue but also on transatlantic relations/NATO.

If European member states want to decide something on a specific dossier, their position is not only influenced by the external issues but also by the expected reaction of the USA and the consequences on the functioning of NATO.

2) The term “Civilian power” has been frequently used in literature since the 70s. The first use of this concept was made by Duchene in 1972.3 hypotheses: - Refers to the post-WWII period.

The EU made interstate relations in Europe civilised after WWII: peace project. War civilized politics.

- The EU as a power. The EU can matter in the world even without military means.

- The EU’s ability to contribute in a positive/constructive way to international politics.The EU can do internationally nowadays what it has done after WWII. The ambition of the EU is to civilize the relations in the world.

This is connected to the first field of tension: - The American military was so important, it was impossible for the EU to compete with it.

The only possible way was to become a civilian power.

3) In order to have an international action, the EU can use different ways to reach a position: what happens inside the EU (which is a multi-layered polity) when wanting to produce external action? There are member states that are sovereign. If we talk about this tension, it is quiet easy to explain the situation of the Lisbon treaty.

The treaty of Maastricht introduced a 3-pillar structure:- The European Communities (EC) supranational approach. - The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) intergovernmental approach.- Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) intergovernmental approach.



But with the Lisbon treaty: formal abolition of the pillars. However, the political dynamics have not radically changed. There is on the one hand an intergovernmental conference and on the other hand a

supranational level. - The CFSP is an ideal kind of intergovernmental approach of the member states. - The external dimensions of internal policies are more characterized by a supranational

approach.E.g.: the UK feels much more that tension than Belgium.

It is the heart of the debate: what is EU and what EU could be?

4) The external action is not always driven by the problems outside the EU but also by internal objectives.

- Interrelational objectives: Often related to the WW II. Some external action is chosen because it is good for the relation between the member

states and not because of external goals.

Interrelational objectives

EU externalaction

No EU externalaction

External objectives

- Integration objectives: If we have to conduct a policy, how can it contribute to integration? Strengthening and weakening.

- Identity objectives: Build an identity for the EU. The EU will be a leader; will construct an image of leader in some areas (climate change for example).



1.3. Context of the EU’s external action

A post-cold war context

In the cold-war context, the world was easy to understand: - 2 big camps (the Western-capitalist and the Soviet-communist) = bipolar world.In 1989, the stability was no more present: The power dimension became challenged: can the EU be a power? There was a civilian dimension too during the 90s (civil war in former-Yugoslavia).

- Need to stabilise the other regions in the world: - Central and Eastern Europe (backyard of Europe) but couldn’t be resolved by the EU, which

was a breach in its external action.- Conditionality: access to the economic market based on political factors.- Post-war structures: the big challenge for post-war situations is to build a structure.

In the years 2000, there were terrorist attacks in Madrid and London:- Underlining the fact that civilian power is not sufficient anymore in the new context.- The EU has to develop new types of military and non-military instruments and action (refers

to civilian power): counter-terrorism strategy...

A globalizing world

‘The worst of them all is “Globalization” – a term which can refer to anything from the internet to a hamburger’

(Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State, 1996: xiii)

International politics have become more and more linked.- Between states- Betweens (groups of) individuals- Between states and (groups of) individuals.

Globalization has 2 consequences: - Integration: interdependence: the actors have become more and more connected:

- Technology: internet. - Economic liberalization: trade barriers down, for example. - Political democratisation: openness positive movement

- Disintegration: competition: - No adaptation to technology,- Economic competition, - Decreasing control of state: alienation because people are no longer familiar

with their political structures) negative side of globalization



EU has a double relation with globalization.

- EU acts as a shield against globalization: protects the citizens from the negative effects of globalization.

- EU contributes to globalisation. EU participates in a globalized world with its external action, which is a contribution to managing/ordering globalization as a norm exporter (world Europeanization).

1.4. Structure of the course

1) The EU’s external action in perspective2) What kind of power is the EU in international affairs? (group work)3) The EU’s external action in various policy areas.4) The EU and its global partners.

2. Historical overview

The EU can’t really play its role as a global actor because we need to take into account the process of integration (but this critique is not totally founded).

The more the process of integration goes ahead, the more the states’ sovereignty is attacked.


Shield against globalization

Agent of globalization


1952 – 1957

- Post-WW II: - Demilitarization of West Germany power vacuum in Europe. France presented an idea to solve the problem: The Pleven Plan.

- Pleven Plan: - Pleven: French external affairs minister. - create a European army. - But: Discrimination for West Germany: It would have to send all its soldiers when the other EU countries could

send only a part of their army.

- The European Defence Community Treaty: a step further that the Pleven plan.- Created more in the supranational logic (Monnet/ECSC logic) than the Pleven plan. So the member states had to ratify the treaty.

- Italy: no plain vote (they were waiting for the French vote). - France: voted against the project was cancelled.

- Reasons of the ‘No’ in France:- New government: Robert Schumann (pro-EU) was replaced by Gaullists (anti-EU).- 2 main elements: - Stalin’s death.

- End of the Korean War. The international threats were less urgent.

- The problem was solved by NATO.

1957 - 1967

- First event: Treaty of Rome

1 No references to defence:- That would be solved by another treaty under negotiation.

2 Common commercial policy:- Common tariff towards third countries (first reference to world trade).- Art. 110 TEEC: ‘harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of

restrictions on international trade, and the lowering of customs barriers.’ - Commission as external negotiator.

3 Association agreements4 Enlargement5 International legal personality for EEC:

- Legal agent in external relations (common negotiator).

- Second event: Charles De Gaulle

1 ‘European Europe’:- Create a ‘European Europe’ neither with the US nor with the URSS.

Counterbalance their power (no foreign domination). 2 ‘Europe of states’:

- 2 parallel dynamics: European character & Intergovernmental character. Is there a contradiction?



- Third event: Yaoundé convention 18 former French colonies concluded a treaty with the Commission.

- Fourth event: conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). First multilateral trade agreement post-WW II Organization of WTO (?) Kennedy round: First time that the EEC spoke with a single voice at the global level.

round period issuesGenève 1947 Tariffs Annecy 1949 TariffsTorquay 1950-1951 TariffsGenève II 1956 Tariffs Dillion Round 1960-1962 TariffsKennedy Round 1964-1967 Tariffs, antidumpingTokyo Round 1973-1979 Tariffs, non-tariff measures, framework

agreementsUruguay Round 1986-1994 Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services,

intellectual property rights, dispute settlement, textile, agriculture, establishment WTO

Doha Development Round 2001-now Tariffs, non-tariff measures, agriculture, labour standards, environment, competition, investment, transparency, patents…

1970 – 1974

1. 1970: Luxemburg/Davignon Report, written by Etienne Davignon.

- How can the EU become a stronger political power in the world? ‘The EEC needs to concentrate on the coordination of foreign policies in order to show the

whole world that Europe has a political mission.’

- No binding power but it was the first step to the European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC: member states cooperate about their external action. Just coordination: a low level.

Davignon Report (1970)

European Political Cooperation (EPC)- Meetings of heads of states and governments - Meetings of foreign affaires ministers - Meetings of Directors of MFA = Political committees: It can be seen as the predecessor of the ECSC.



Copenhagen Report - Ratified report formalizing the ideas of the Davignon report. - Formalization of meetings - ‘each state undertakes as a general rule not to take final positions without prior

consultation with its partners.’: Key idea: consultation and coordination.

EPC in SEA (1986) - Incorporated in the treaty of the Single European Act

The dynamic is an incremental development: step by step. Confirmations of existing habits.

European Political Cooperation (EPC)1 Intergovernmental dynamic

- De Gaulle’s vision: ‘Europe of States’- No transfer of competences, consensus requirement, no role for the European

institutions.- Avoidance of contamination of Community processes by the EPC.

2 Coordination & consultation- No common foreign policy- Not all aspects of external action

3 Separation with EC unsustainable- Clear distinction between EC and EPC became unsustainable because you need

instruments to sanction.Those 2 (EC & EPC) were condemned to get closer to each other

2. 1973: Accession of the UK.

- Big event for the external relations of the EU. Not easy to take an agreement with the UK about the development of a foreign policy.

3. European Council.

- Informal establishment by Valery Giscard d’Estaing, former president. He establishes regular meetings of head of states: the European Counci.

- Development of the ‘Gymnich’ (German city where the first meeting took place) meetings. Informal council meetings between foreign affairs ministers.



1976 – 1986

1. Tensions between the USA (Kissinger) and the EEC.

- For the first time. - Transatlantic relations are not easy.

2. Second enlargement to Greece, Portugal and Spain.

- Enlargement = act of foreign policy, of external action. Enlargement made to stabilize the young democracies that were just established.

- Today’s enlargements follow the same logic.- It is a way to conduct external action and policies. - Idea of conditionality: the states can join the EU only under 3 conditions: Copenhagen criteria: - political (human rights and democracy),

- economical (market-based economy), - ‘acquis communautaire’ (implementation of European

policies).3. 1986: Single European Act.

- Codification of existing EPC practices. - Legal confirmation of those existing practices.

1989 – 1991

1. The end of the east block.

- ‘Solidarnosc’ won the Polish elections.- In 1989 the Berlin wall fell. Eastern Europe became free = Possibility to reunify Europe.

- First question: Is the reunification of Germany possible? Mitterrand and Kohl (West Germany chancellor) were in favor of that reunification. For the others: reunification of Germany possible if we have a stronger political

integration in Europe.

- Solution: - IGC on political union.- IGC on monetary union.

But no immediate consequences for the external relations of Europe.

1991 – 1995

1. Result of the IGC started by Kohl and Mitterrand: treaty of Maastricht.

- More integrated Europe for the first time.- Creation of the 3 pillars structure:

- The European Community (EC), - The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) - The Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal affairs (PJCC) 3 pillars with a roof called EU.



Supranational Intergovernmental institutions: governance- Parliament- Commission- Council

- The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP):1 Part of a bigger plan to strengthen the EU:

- CFSP is a corner stone for the EU. - Role for a reunited Germany.

2 Separate pillar than the EC: - Under member state’s control. Fear that the Commission would take over the foreign policies.

Cf. Delors’ voluntaristic Commission3 Identity objectives:

- Role in the CFSP: stronger identity (in addition to the external objectives).- Art 2 TEU: ‘(…) to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the

implementation of a CFSP’.4 Debate on the status of the CFSP?

- Pro-EU member states: - effective and credible: Having a CFSP strengthening the identity of the EU is a big step forward for the

development of the EU as an external actor.- Eusosceptic member states: - need of an intergovernmental nature of the CFSP: Can’t be contaminated by the first pillar. They want to keep control.

2. Enlargement to Austria, Sweden and Finland (third wave).- They were neutral during the Cold War so they were able to join the EU only afterwards.

3. Confrontation to the former communist countries which weren’t enemies anymore.- What strategy should they adopt? 2 dynamics:

- Discourse of reunification (pan-European community)- Very soon after the 89 – 91 period: Europe agreements (trade agreements) with a lot of those eastern countries: Preferential access to the European market and establishment of a kind of political

dialogue (human rights, democracy, etc). Application of the conditionality.

Combination of the dynamics that assure the future accession of those countries to the EU.



4. Failure for EU in its backyard:- Former Yugoslavia: failure in its external action. - NATO, so the US, could solve the problem. Lessons for the future: - Stabilization Association agreements with new states

- Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE) Trade agreement with big political elements (conditionality)

= First step for a possible further accession.

1997 – 2000

1. Treaty of Amsterdam: - Not a big step compared to Maastricht. - BUT 3 innovations:

- High representative for the CFSP: Kind of “minister of foreign affairs”: Javier Solana: choice to maximize the function.

- Establishment of common strategies vis-à-vis key actors in the world.- Trade in services & intellectual property rights:

2000 – 2003

1. Treaty of Nice.- Enhanced cooperation for the CFSP: Cooperation allowed even if some member states do not participate in that project. Not everyone had to be on board and not for defense politics.

2. New tandem between France (Chirac) and the UK (Blair, which was more pro-Europe).- Saint-Malo declaration: Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair discuss external action and European defense

= Starting point for the ESDP. First thing that happened on the field

- ‘(…) to play its full role at the international stage (…)’ - ‘(…) needed the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the

means to use them, and a readiness to do it, in order to respond to international crises.’

Saint – Malo declaration

1999: Cologne European Council

1999: Helsinki European Council

Helsinki Headline Goal Political & Security committeeMilitary committee

Concordia (FYROM, 2003)



- Consequences:1 - The taboo on European defense policy was broken.

2 - BUT: the issue of European foreign policy was very sensitive for the US and NATO. Tension between European integration and transatlantic solidarity:


3 - Summarized by the 3 Ds (asked by NATO towards the ESDP):

D D DNo decoupling No duplication No discrimination

- ESDP couldn’t become something different than what was already existing in NATO.

- ESDP couldn’t become a new kind of NATO.

- ESDP couldn’t discriminate between NATO and non NATO member states.

Berlin Plus arrangements.

3. The EU, for the first time, developed its own European defense strategy.- Corner stone of the ESDP: make a European strategy.- Main observation:

- ‘(…) the world is full of new dangers and opportunities (…)’- ‘(…) no single nation is able to tackle today’s complex challenges (…)’ Things are happening outside and no single nation can apprehend those things alone.

2005 – 2008

1. Enlargement to central and eastern Europe countries.- New dimensions because of new external borders: questions of immigration, etc. Establishment of agencies like Frontex.

2. In the aftermath of 2001: London and Madrid terrorist attacks.Creation of an anti-terrorist strategy.

2009 – 20111. Lisbon treaty: convention on the future of Europe.

- The main ideas had already been written in the draft Constitution treaty.- Consequences of the Lisbon treaty on policy making in external relations:

1 Formal abolition of the pillar structure & International legal personality for the EU:In term of policy-making there was no change in the intergovernmental way.

2 High representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy.Institutionally embedded in the European Commission: HR/Vice President.Chairwoman of the foreign affairs council: This is the only position that isn’t taken by the rotating presidency in the CouncilDouble handed: vice-president of the Commission and representative of the Council.

3 Creation of a permanent president of the European Council: - Level of the chiefs of states: European representation done by Herman van Rompuy. Not by the President (of the Prime Minister) of the rotating presidency anymore.

- The rotating presidency is still representing EU for some external representations.


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4 Creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS): - Center of the European diplomacy.- Creation by the normal legal process: with a co-decision of the Parliament and the

Council (as was said in the Lisbon treaty).- Service on its own: EEAS is not dependent upon the institutions (the EU Council, the

Council, the Commission…) = something new

- Need of regulations: staff regulation (diplomatic status?) and financial regulation, which were negotiated by the Belgian presidency.

- The EEAS is formally functional but won’t be really functional before one year or so.- Top of the structure: cockpit by 4 people and Ashton close control of the Parliament on the financial issues of the EEAS

- Horizontal issues: Director Generals, who have geographical and thematic topics (human rights for example)

- Who will be in the EEAS? Transfer from the Commission to the EEAS. Officials and diplomats of the Council working for foreign affairs: transfer from the

Council to the EEAS. People coming directly from the member states.= Mix of people with European and national backgrounds

3. Legal framework, institutional structure and policy-making processes

3.1. The legal framework for the external dimension of the internal policies: The EU and international agreements

International legal personality of the EU

- Ability of actors in the international system to become a subject of international law. = Ability to become: a party to international agreements

a member of international organizations.

- Traditionally: - states = international legal personality. - international organisations = intergovernmental. EU ?

- Treaty of Maastricht: international legal personality only to the first pillar of the EU (the EC).

International legal personality.External action of European Union – Tom Delreux 13


- Treaty of Lisbon (1st December 2009): End of the pillars. The EU became a legal entity and a subject of international law.

- EU = Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO). Treaties can be concluded by states and REIOs. For the moment, only used by the EU but it is open to be used by other organizations.

External competences of the EU

- Main logic: principle of attribution.

Memberstates Attribution principle EU

The member states give a competence to the EU. The EU cannot attribute competences to itself.

- 2 ways to establish external competences for the EU:

1 - Express powers:

- Attribution in the Treaty, written in the treaties.- Examples:

Trade policy Present in the treaty of RomeAssociation agreements

Environmental policyMonetary policyResearch policy

Development cooperationHumanitarian aid Present in the treaty of Lisbon (last treaty)

Neighbourhood policy

2- Implied powers:

- Attributed through rulings of the European Court of Justice. ‘The competence of the Community to conclude international agreements may arise not

only from express conformant by the Treaty but may equally flow from other provisions in the Treaty and from measures adopted (...) by Community institutions.’

- Example: AETR (Accords européens de transport routier): - Not in the list of express powers but the Commission wanted to conclude the agreement

with Switzerland. The Council said it hadn’t the competences they went to the ECJ.- Parallelism doctrine: ‘In foro interno, in foro externo’ Competences at the internal level = competence for the external level.

= Same principle used for the Regions and Communities in Belgium



- But are these competences exclusively attributed to the EU?

Exclusive competencesArt. 3 TFEU

= No competence for the member states at all. ‘The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas:

(a) customs union;(b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the

internal market;(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro;(d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries

policies;(e) common commercial policy.’

Shared competencesArt. 4 TFEU

= Not all competences are transferred to the EU. = Member states and the EU can act internationally.’Shared competence between the EU and the Member States applies in the following

principal areas:(a) Internal market;(b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this treaty;(c) economic, social and territorial cohesion(d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological

resources;(e) environment;(f) consumer protection;(g) transport;(h) trans-European networks;(i) energy;(j) area of freedom, security and justice;(k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this

treaty.’

Supporting competencesArt. 6 TFEU

= Member states have the right to conclude international agreements but the EU supports them.

’The Union shall have competence to carry actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. The areas of such action shall, at European level, be:

(a) protection and improvement of human health;(b) industry; (c) culture;(d) tourism;(e) Education, vocational training, youth and sport;(f) civil protection;(g) administrative cooperation.’



The conclusion of international agreements

Agreements on exclusive EU competences

- 2 step logic: 1) Negotiation stage: 2) Ratification stage: also called ‘conclusion’ of international treaties.

- ‘Consent to be bound to the international treaty’ (legally binding).- ‘Take it or leave it’ logic: no amendment possible: only acceptation or rejection.

- ‘The Council shall (…) authorize the signing of agreements and conclude them.Art. 218 §2 TFEU

BUT: - only on the basis of recommendation by the commission.- the negotiation stage is done by the Commission.

- In the field of the CFSP: signing of the treaty is made by the HR/VP, since the Lisbon treaty.

- Role of the Parliament in the ratification stage? Art. 218 & 300 TEC:- consultation procedure: non-binding opinion.- but assent procedure (veto power) for:

(a) Association agreements;(b) Agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing cooperation

procedures;(c) Agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union.(d) Agreements on Union accession to the European convention for the protection of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom.(e) Agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or

the special legislative procedure where consent by the EP is required. For those areas: the EP has the right to ratify international agreements.

Agreement on shared competences = Mixed agreements: International agreements to which both the EU and the Member States

both are a party = Mostly related to shared competences:(a) Internal market;(b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this treaty;(c) economic, social and territorial cohesion(d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological

resources;(e) environment;(f) consumer protection;(g) transport;(h) trans-European networks;(i) energy;(j) area of freedom, security and justice;(k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this

treaty.’ Many shared competences fall under the legislative procedure but mixed

agreements have to be ratified by each of the member states separately.



3.2. The intergovernmental policy-making approach in the EU’s external action

European Council= Meeting of the head of states and governments.

- Important role in the external action: - determines the strategic directions; - gives the impulses.

- No concrete decisions: they have to be implemented: By which other actor?

Council of ministers- Place of the real decisions.- Formally: there is only 1 council.

BUT in the facts: 10 specialised councils:1 General affairs2 Foreign affairs presided by the HR/VP = exception3 ECOFIN4 Justice and home affairs5 Employment, social policy and consumer policy6 Competitiveness (internal market, industry, research, space)7 Transport, telecommunication and energy8 Agriculture and fisheries9 Environment10 Education, youth and sport

- Foreign affairs: only external relations and foreign affairs.- External dimension of internal policies: in the appropriate council.

- Meetings: - Foreign affairs Council: 2x/month+ Gymnichs: one per semester Paradox: - Foreign affairs council = strong institution, big role in foreign affairs.

- But: meeting of foreign ministers: relatively weak. - Relatively weak: 2 reasons:

1 Overloaded agenda: - There are a lot of subjects in a few hours. - There are many people: member states representatives, diplomats,

experts...

Importance of the lunch before the reunion:- Only the ministers (eventually with someone else) attend that lunch.- They start the discussions there.

Decreasing of the interest of the formal Council Mutually reinforcing dynamic.

2 Substructure of the Council- COREPER II: Diplomats and ambassadors meet each other (≠ COREPER I).

= Main preparatory body for those councils- PSC (CoPS): Political and Security Committee: exclusively decisions related to the

foreign and security policies:- Monitoring of international situation in CFSP and ESDP areas.- Day-to-day running of CFSP and ESDP- Preparation of CFSP/ESDP aspects of FAC



- Monitoring of implementation- Political control and strategic direction of military and civilian management

operations.

- 2 committees below:-EUMC: preparing strategic military actions: European Union Military Committee-CIVCOM: Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

- Below there are working groups (two kinds):- Geographical working groups- Thematic working groups These working groups prepare the work of the diplomats.

Geographical working groups Thematic working groups (only for PSC)Focused on one region human rights, nuclear

or one country (Middle East, non proliferation, China, etc.). democratization

Commission- Not a big role but there is a role.- Main person: Vice-president of the Commission, the High Representative.

Responsible for the Foreign Affairs. - In the Commission as such, the Director General responsible for foreign affairs has moved to

the External Affairs Action Service because of the arrival of the High Representative. The new European external action service is now in place.

- What will be the role of the Commission? Supranational approach.


COUNCIL

COREPER II PSC

EUMC CIVCOM

CWG CWG CWG CWG CWG CWG


Traditional CFSP: the Commission is still playing a role. Example: trade politics.

Policy-making process- Quite intergovernmental: so there is a possibility to attain deadlocks.

Underlying political dynamics are necessary to push the EU’s external action forward.

- There are 3 political dynamics:

1 EU= multi-level polity: - Composed of a supra-national level and a member state level. EU level, intergovernmental level and domestic level.

- The Member States can support the action or take complementary actions.- The support of the Member States is an essential condition for success.

2 Increasing involvement of the Commission: - The supranational dynamics is coming up. - 2 reasons:

1) Problems with the intergovernmental nature of CFSP Majority, consensus... Can be solved by introducing supranational dynamics.

2) Issues under EU competences are more and more used as foreign policy instruments. If you want to conduct an effective foreign policy, you need the instruments

of supranational level (competences like human rights, developing aid, agriculture...) and there are areas in which the Commission plays a role.

To apply the CFSP, you need competences that are not directly related. There are interlinks between the two domains.

3 Establishment and development of core groups: - Informal ‘self-selection process’: that is the member states’ decision of

selecting themselves (not established). States have to contribute to their group. They are groups of mainly member states that take the lead in a particular

dossier (sometimes the Commission can participate too).

- Interests-based or expertise-based participation: Participating because they have lot of know-how or because of their interests.

- Large degree of variation is time, size...

Example (2007): Afghanistan: UK, Germany, Netherland, France, Italy, Spain, Commission.

DRC: France, UK, Belgium. Somalia: UK, Italy, Sweden, Commission.

3.3. And then... consistency? Is the EU able to conduct a consistent and coherent external action?

1) Division of competences

Exclusive competences Shared competences Supporting competences



Art. 3 TFEU Art. 4 TFEU Art. 6 TFEU2) Complexity of the institution framework: COREPER...

3) Split up of CFSP and external dimension of internal policies

4) The 3 elements: political dynamics.1 EU= multi-level polity2 Increasing involvement of the Commission3 Establishment and development of core groups

The question of the coherence has 4 dimensions:

1 Horizontal consistency: - Consistency between its different policy areas. Does the EU’s developing policy contribute to promoting human rights?

2 Institutional consistency: - Between institutions. Does the Commission act consistently with what the Council does? Aren’t their decisions contradictory?

- Inside institutions. Are all the Council configurations acting in a consistent manner?

- Cf.: creation of the HR/VP can be considered as an answer to the challenge of consistency thanks to the merging of the Commissioner and the HR.

3 Vertical consistency: refers to the multi-level nature of the EU’s polity. - Between the EU and the domestic levels.


COUNCIL

COREPER II PSC

EUMC CIVCOM

CWG CWG CWG CWG CWG CWG


- The member states sometimes act in a contradictory way with the Commission.

- The involvement of the member states is an essential condition for the success of the EU’s external action.

4 Interstate consistency: - Among all the actors at the national level.- There is heterogeneity among the member states. Are they doing the same? Is the Council divided or not? This point is still a challenge because it can have an impact on the other levels.

4. EU trade politics

- Trade politics = the area of external action in which the EU is really a global power. - 3 reasons:

1) Treaty of Rome - Aim: to create an economic community. The economic interdependence would achieve the states’ peace project.

- Creation of a customs union: 2 main characteristics:1 Elimination of trade tariffs among members:

- Regional organization where countries eliminate trade tariffs among them.

2 Common tariffs vis-à-vis third countries: - ≠ from a free trade area:

No trade tariffs among the members & no common tariffs vis-à-vis external partners (not the case here).

This implies joints negotiations to negotiate with third countries in a common way. Common external commercial policy.

- Today: the EU has an Internal Market (= Single Market, formerly the Common Market). Definitions: - Free trade area: elimination o strafe tariffs within the organization.

- Customs union: FTA + common external tariff - Common market: CU + 4 freedoms: - Free movement of goods,

- Free movement of capital, - Free movement of services, - Free movement of people.

2) Single voice- The EU has to speak with a single voice. The Commission has an important role of negotiation.

3) Export- The EU = biggest exporter of goods and services in the world.

= second importer of goods and biggest importer of services. The EU has thus an enormous market power.



4.1. EU trade policy competences

- Trade is an area of external action among the most supranational.BUT: full of controversy since the 90s.

Common commercial policy in the treaty of Rome

- = Express power given by the treaty to the EU.- In the treaty, a customs union was created:

Customs union

Common Commercial Policy- Common external tariff- Common trade agreements- Commission as negotiator- Uniform application of trade instruments

Competence dispute during the 90s

- 2 reasons why the competences of the EU on trade policy were disputed:1 New trade issues:

- Before: trade was mainly trade of goods, so that was quite basic and clear.- But now there are new issues: E.g.: trade services.

- 4 kinds: - Service developed in country A and traded to country B (e. g. license or

software)- Service established in country B, which is made use of someone of country A

(e. g. telecommunications)- Financial services (e. g. bank of country B has offices in country A) - Service provided by A individuals in country B (e. g. consultation tasks)

- Another issues:- Property rights (about medicines, etc.) how to export and import them?- Air services: were close to national sovereignty and prestige so the member states

wanted to negotiate on trade liberalization with third countries on a bilateral basis The Commission refused because of the need to negotiate on a common basis.

2 1994: creation of the WTO: There was no organization before but GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). In the EU, we moved to a multilateral system governed by a supranational organization. The EU has explicit trade powers, should it have the membership at the WTO then?To resolve their disputes, member states can go to the European Court of Justice or can change the EU treaties. In this case, the member states asked to the court “who can have the right to represent the new trade issues?”. Opinion 1/94: the EU has an



exclusive competence on trade in goods, but not in the other trade dimensions. So the Council decided to change the treaty.

From Amsterdam to Nice: a political solution to the competence dispute

Amsterdam IGC: no agreement- Nothing changed.

Case by case solutions

Nice IGC: agreement- Agreement found.

Also exclusive competences for services- EU: exclusive competences for services. - Exceptions: Cultural exception clause (most important exception). For all cultural services, the community has no competences (E.g.: rights on movies).

= Too politically sensitive for the member states.

Trade policy after the Lisbon treaty

- Extension of the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV).BUT with exceptions: - Air services

- Cultural exception - Social services - Educational services - Health services

= Sensitive issues unanimity is still needed.

- Increased role of the EP (art. 218): 1. Ordinary legislative procedure: co-decision procedure

The EP has a first veto power about trade issues2. Right to BE INFORMED: the Commission has to inform the EP.

Information on the progress of international trade negotiations during the course. 3. Ratification veto player: The EP has to ratify the trade agreements.

Second veto power during the ratification stage.

4.2. EU trade policy-making process

- The EU is represented by a single negotiator at the WTO. This representation is done by a member of the Commission.



- There is a relation between the Member States and the Commission negotiator.= Principal-Agent relationship.

- Agent: Actor who acts on behalf of principals (Member States) who delegate their power.

Principal-agent theory:- Market power (bargaining power) the agent is more than the sum of his parts.- 2 risks: - The Commission can realize its own preferences: preference heterogeneity.

- Information asymmetry

- The EU’s participation in the WTO can be decoupled in 3 stages:

Authorization stage Negotiation stage Ratification stage

MandateNegotiating directives

= Control Mechanism 1

1) Authorization stage

- The impulsion is made by the Commission:- The Commission proposes a mandate to the Council.- The Council gives the mandate to the Commission. Interdependence: - The Commission needs a mandate: dependency vis-à-vis the Council.

- The Member States need a proposal of the Commission.

- The Commission always need a mandate by the member states in order to negotiate. There is no automaticity.

- 2 control mechanisms:

1) The Council gives some instructions: negotiating directives That can be considered as a first control mechanism


Market power (bargaining power)

Preference heterogeneity

Information asymmetry

= CONTROLMECHANISM 1


2) Trade Policy Committee= Group preparing the discussion in the Council. Between the levels of the ministers and the civil servants: level of diplomats. It is organised by diplomats = same status than the COREPER.

- The TPC is the main contact point of the Council during the negotiation.- Below the committee: smaller services in specific domains: 133 textiles, 133 services... Those services are composed of experts (not diplomats), focused on specific issues.

NB: the number 133 refers to the article of trade policies in the treaty of Nice. = New article of the treaty of Lisbon: art. 207.

- Trade politics = important thingBUT: no specified Council for trade. The discussions are made in the Foreign Policy Council.

If trade issues are discussed: different composition: - The trade ministers of the member states come to the Foreign Affairs Council.- The presidency is assured by the rotating presidency (and not by the HR/VP).

- Important thing: - The negotiating directives (mandate) are not biding for the Commission.

= Only a political guidance about the preferences of the member states. There is a ratification stage (as for all international agreements)

= 3rd control mechanism.

= Anticipation way: the Commission can anticipate because of the negotiating directives, knowing that, at the ratification stage, there is a “take it or leave it” rationale for the member states.


COUNCIL

Trade Policy Committee

Brusselson the spot


133 textiles 133 services 133 steel 133 ...



2) Negotiation stage

- The negotiator is a commissioner for external trade (Karel de Gucht). - It can be the DG trade at the highest level, but lower levels of commissioners are possible

too.

- Negotiation is an exclusive competence of the Commission.BUT the member states are still members of the WTO They can attend the negotiations without speaking: 4th control mechanism. There are frequent relations: Brussels on the spot.

- Relations during the negotiation: - How strong is the Commission vis-à-vis the member states?- Can the EU use the argument of tight hands?

‘(...) the power of a negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions and to meet demands’

(Schelling, 1960: 19).

- Sophie Meunier: 2 different categories of international negotiation:

1) The Commission has a more conservative position than the USA. = Conservative model. I prefer to change nothing. (E.g.: Agriculture)The Schelling conjecture has an impact in this model.

2) The Commission has a more reformist position than the USA. = Reformist model. I prefer more liberalisation. (E.g.: Financial services, opening of markets)Here, the Schelling conjecture doesn’t work.

NB: The effect of the Schelling conjecture is strengthened when the majority requirement is larger (unanimity>QMV)

3) Ratification stage

- The European Parliament has a veto power in the ratification since the treaty of Lisbon. There are thus 2 steps for the ratification: Council + EP.

4.3. Trade instruments

What kind of policy instruments does the Commission have?

Tariffs= The most classical form of conducting trade policies.

Common commercial policy (CCP)1 Common external tariff

- Percentage that the EU amounts on the import of a particular product (good).= Instrument to protect its own market.

- BUT: the importance of tariffs in international trade politics decrease because of




trade liberalization. Import tariffs have become irrelevant.2 Common trade agreements3 Commission as negotiator4 Uniform application


agreementsUruguay Round 1986-1994 Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services,

intellectual property rights, dispute settlement, textile, agriculture, establishment WTO


Non-tariff barriers

- Become more and more important. - There are more than 3 but those are the most important:

1 Quotas: - Quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product

= not a percentage but definite number/quantity. But the WTO prohibits more and more quotas.

2 Anti-dumping measures: - Dumping is prohibited by the WTO.

Dumping = A country sells a product in a cheaper way than what is generally accepted Production costs + reasonable benefits = minimum price of a product.

- There are 3 conditions for the EU to take anti-dumping measures:1. Dumping practices: dumping has to be shown, to be proved.2. Damage: the EU has to show some damage at the EU market3. Causal link: the damage must be caused by the dumping.

- Anti-dumping measures can be taken only if:1. They are lower than the dumping margin (difference between the dumping price

and the general price).2. Dumping margin > 2% of the price

2 forms: - Charge: the company pays the difference to the public authorities - Undertaking: paid to the company that has damage.

3 Technical (regulatory) barriers:= Most important instrument (and increasing)



- Due to the internal legislation of the EU = respect of the European standards. E.g.: Emission of CO2 for cars & use of chemicals products.- BUT regulated by the WTO in 2 separate agreements:- Technical Barriers on Trade agreement: describes the technical measures that can be used to protect a market.- Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement: sanitary measures.

4.4. Trade agreements

The system of EU trade preferences

- Most Favorite Nation (MFN) :‘(…) any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any

product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorder immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all another

contracting parties’. (Article 1.1 GATT)- The Most Favorite Nation (MFN) = the first corner stone of the WTO.

Any trade preference to a country (any country, not especially a member of the WTO) should be given to all WTO countries

All WTO member states have the same status as your MFN.- Exceptions to the MFN: - Free Trade Areas (e. g. NAFTA USA, Canada and Mexico),

- Customs union, - Internal market.

Those exceptions are essential for the EU to exist.

Pyramid of the EU’s trade preferences most integrated trade preference: 27

= European Economic Area: Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein

Turkey, San Marino, Andorra

= Free trade areas + common rules on non-trade issues (political dimension).

North-Africa. Serbia and FYRM: Stabilization and

Association Agreements (SAAs), which are part of the Stabilization and Association Process. = First step to a future EU membership.

Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, negotiations with Mercosur and the Gulf Cooperation Council, EPAs…


Internal marketwith EU membership

Internal marketwithout EU membership

Customs union

Association agreements

Free trade agreements

Web

of p

refe

renti

al tr

ade

agre

emen

ts


= Normally not allowed by the WTO: 2nd corner stone of the WTO: reciprocity.

- Exception: ‘enabling clause’: a GSP (Generalized System of Preferences): unilateral trade preferences)

- Possible if: - developing countries. - no discrimination.

- can import everything but arms from the EU without tariffs 8 countries still follow the general rule:

Australia, Canada, Japan, Taiwan, US...But = 1/3 of the EU’s imports.

Multilateral trade policy: the EU and the WTO

- Limitation of its implication- Doesn’t push liberalization forward, nor include new issues (contrarily to

the US)

- New issues on the agenda: - environmental norms: regulatory measures - social norms: labor standards in particular - Singapore issues: transparency, trade facilitation, investment,

competition, financial policies, etc. The EU wanted to discuss those issues at the WTO level for a political reason (negotiation logic): in order to sell the agreement to the member states, the Commission broadens a big package deal to maximize the compensation possibilities (a. o. with agriculture concessions)

- EU tries to overcome its image of a ‘fortress Europe’ (protectionist image): Agriculture: CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) reform:

- Before: production-based subsidies (led to overproduction) and export subsidies - After: income-based subsidies (regardless of the production) and introduction of

the concept of ‘multifunctionality’ of the CAP (not only food production but also environment, eco-tourism, etc.)

Doha Development Agenda: 2001 - ???


agreements


Non reciprocal preferences

MFN

90s

Defensive trade policy

Offensive trade policy


Uruguay Round 1986-1994 Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property rights, dispute settlement, textile, agriculture, establishment WTO


- July 2004, meeting of trade ministers in Geneva: ‘July Package’ (framework of the future multilateral trade agreement): big EU concessions:

- promised to abolish its agricultural export subsidies. - removal of Singapore issues from the July package. July package failed, so concessions not close to being implemented Web of preferential trade agreements as second best option if the multilateral trade agreement fails.

The EU and regionalism

- Debate: Bilateral preferential trade agreements = stumbling blocks or building blocks towards trade multilateralization?

- More and more reciprocal trade agreements (non-reciprocal forbidden by the WTO): E.g.: EPAs (economic and partnership agreements) with ACP countries

- They include more and more trade-related issues environmental and social norms. Metaphor of the reef: the sea level (tariffs) lowers, so other issues are popping up at the surface (tariffs are not relevant anymore)

5. EU development politics

Clearly linked with trade politicsHistorical evolution:- From a relation between donors (EU member states) and a group of recipients (former colonies)…- … to amore comprehensive approach of development But there is an evolution only as far as the discourse of the EU is concerned (reality?...)

5.1. 50s-90s: Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions A (post-)colonial development policy

First development policy: the European Development Fund:- Still exists, - Funded by voluntary contribution of the member states. Outside the EU budget Not controlled by the European Parliament.

- The EU’s policy development started with an exclusive focus on former colonies Mostly French former colonies: African sub-Saharan countries.

- There was an opposition between two groups of member states:Regionalists Globalists

- focus on former colonies - focus on countries that need more External action of European Union – Tom Delreux 30


- E.g.: France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal.

help - the poverty level is higher - E.g.: UK, Germany, the Netherlands,

Austria, Sweden.

- BUT: ‘FORMER’ colonies : newly independent states. The EU needed international agreements in order to help them.

1. Yaoundé agreements - 1st in 1964, renegotiated in 1969.

- 18 and then 27 former French colonies.

2. Lomé conventions - 1st in 1975, 2nd in 1979, 3rd in 1984, 4th in 1989 and 4th bis in 1995.

- 46 developing countries: ACP countries Introduction of the concept of ACP countries: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Today: the main goal of the EU’s development policy is still the ACP countries.

- Replacement of Yaoundé agreements: ‘real’ negotiation process with the countries.

- Based on non-reciprocity. The EU opened its market, and lowered its import tariffs, but the ACP countries didn’t

lower theirs.

- To what extent did the Lomé convention contribute to development? - 70s: meeting of the G77 of the UN. Creation of the concept of New International Economic Order (NIEO) to promote the

interests of the developing countries. The EU reacted as a response to this NIEO.

- Lomé convention = contribution to the NIEO?

o YES:1 No interference in the internal affairs of the recipients2 Non-reciprocity3 Compensations for the price fluctuations

o NO:1 ‘New colonialism’: access to raw materials and certified export markets

ACP countries under the control of the EU.2 Decrease of EDF/capita

- European Development Fund.- High increase of the population in ACP countries & lower increase of money.The amount of money given to the EDF is proportionally decreasing.

3 Low degree of effectiveness4 Macro-economic conditionality

= most important criticism now.External action of European Union – Tom Delreux 31


5 Economic performance- The performance of the ACP countries isn’t better than it was before. ACP imports in the EU decreased from 8% in 1980 to 3% in 2000.

5.2. European development policy in the 90s: Trying to change, but not achieving in doing so

- The Lomé conventions ended in 1995, The Commission was not thinking of a Lomé V or VI. The EU wanted to change its (postcolonial) approach.

‘ACP-EU relations are still a key part of the Union’s identity. The postcolonial era is coming to end but our responsibility towards the ACP countries continue’

European Commission, Green Paper, 1996.- 3 reasons:

1. Criticisms on Lomé era:1 Disappointing economic performance of the ACP countries2 Incompatibility of non-reciprocity with the WTO:

- 1994: establishment of the WTO rule of reciprocity.- Lomé IVbis was based on a non-reciprocity rule, so the EU was forced to change.

3 Bureaucratic nature of EU foreign aid practice

2. The current regime is bad for the EU’s international image: the EU needs a new approach.3. Tension between supranational development policy and the member states’ development

policy: considered as a matter of national sovereignty.

- 1992: Treaty of Maastricht (+ 97 Amsterdam). Introduction of the CCC approach for the EU’s development policy.

C C CCoordination Complementarity Coherence

= Between the EU and the member states

- Consultation to coordinate aid programmes

- Including in international conferences

- Promoted by the Commission

o Shared development competences

o The EU aid programs should complement the national programs.

= Between different policy areas that can have an impact and relate to the EU’s development policy area

oAll policies should take into account poorest countries.

In practice: not much change: tension with the member states.

o Reasons why they keep development policies:



1 Impact of historical relations:Relations of the member states with their former colonies hindering of the transfer of competences

2 Fear of a dominance from France and the United Kingdom:Typical approach: regionalist camp (FR), globalist camp (UK)

3 Bureaucratic self-preservation:National bureaucracies that are responsible for development have a reflex of self-preservation (can do better than the EU, want to keep their jobs, etc.)

5.3. European development policy since 2000 Cotonou Agreement & ECD

o 2 important context factors that shaped the EU’s policy:1) Millennium Development Goals

Conference at the level of United Nations: heads of governments. Decision on MDGs: decreasing the degree poverty of 50% by 2050.

2) ‘Security-development nexus’ 9/11/2001: attacks on the WTC Poverty = root cause of terrorism: need of development aid.

Cotonou agreemento 2003-2023, revisionso Officially: ‘ACP-EU partnership agreement’

77 ACP countries were part of this agreement.o Comparison with the Lomé convention:

Cotonou Agreement Lomé convention1 Allocation of aid = performance

performance of the ACP countriesAid based on objective criteria

EU’s assessment

2 Trade liberalization Reduction of trade barriers ReciprocityBUT differentiation among ACP countries Possible with the generalized system of

preferences : ‘Enabling Clause’*1

You can discriminate, but only if it’s for the least developed countries

Non-reciprocity

3 Diminishing poverty as an explicit objective 1st article of the agreement *2

4 Participation of non-state actors ACP countries have to consult NGOs, trade unions, etc. on how to implement the aid + implementation conditionality: internal reforms needed to receive help

5 Political conditionality: ‘good governance’ Need to organize the internal system (transparency, no corruption, clear budgets, etc.)


WTO rules


Increasing importance Development-security nexus too makes development more and more politicized and sensitive Development policy much more politicized than before, when it was only about economics

*1 Unilateral trade preference to developing countries, no discrimination among developing countries except for the least developed countries (LDCs)

*2 ‘Reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.’

The objectives of the EU as a donor merge with its objectives as a global actor.

Political conditionality Increased level of politicization

‘[this development] has generated an international actor whose development policy remains separate from its explicit foreign policy parameter but yet visibly obtains a foreign policy platform.’

(Hadfield, 2007: 44)

o Negotiations of the EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements) in the framework of the Cotonou agreement. The Commission came with the proposition to negotiate an economic agreement under

the umbrella of the Cotonou agreement. EPAs = trade liberalization agreements with reciprocity.

(Mentioned during the class on trade politics: “free trade agreements”)

The Commission was in charge of this because of the large trade component. The approach became more and more opposed in the EU but also outside:

1 Least Developed Countries: status-quo is a good alternative (EBA)- Status-quo: Everything but arms and munitions (EBA) No trade barriers to exportation and normal barriers to import (tariffs).

- With the EBA, they would have to reduce their tariffs not interesting2 EU: internal opposition

Opposition of the member states, especially the UK and Denmark: fear that the development/social approach was getting too importantThe EU negotiates but member states still play a role with ratification.

3 ACP countries: partnership principle?We understand but don’t agree: we have agreed that in our mutual relations the partnership is principal. The Cotonou agreement says that: ACP-EU partnership.You are imposing your approach (EPA)... it’s not correct.

4 NGOs: ‘stop EPAs’ (large campaigns in 2005-2007)Too much focused on trade liberalization forgets about the social consequences on the ACP countries.

o These negotiations (started in 2004) were negotiated with a deadline: reached before 21 December 2007: but only full EPAs with Caribbean region were reached.

o With African and Pacific countries, it was much more difficult. 20 ‘interim agreements’: kind of fix time period. With other 43 ACP countries: no EPAs.



The European consensus on development= New concept: exists on paper, on discourses but has to be implemented in practice.

Quantity

o 2002: UN’s conference of Monterey (California): financing of development The EU played a leading role.

o Pledge (by the EU and its members states) to increase its aid from 0.33% of the GDP in 2002 to 0.39% of the GDP in 2006. More financial assistance.

o 3 implications to this pledge:1. Reversed declining trend: the decreasing of the European aid was broken.2. Aid of the EU > aid of all the member states separately: for the first time.3. The image of the EU’s leadership in development was strengthened. 2010: 0.56% of the GDP

o The basic approach by doing those pledges had to do with an approach of peer pressure: ‘name and shame’. Joint declaration all member states have to follow it.

Quality

1. More transparency in the way of developing aid (member states’ development policy).2. ‘Policy Coherence for Development’ program: program in the Council where 12 axes were

agreed. More intra-EU than the Monterey conference

= EUROPEAN CONSENSUS FOR DEVELOPMENT

o Those 2 discussions (quantity + quality) are a kind of building blocks for the European Consensus for Development.o Meant to be all-encompassing in the EU development policy approach.

o Leading role of the Commission: Plaid for more cooperation and coordination between the member states, under its

umbrella. 3 groups of countries:

Opposed Other SupportingUK, Denmark and SwedenoFear that the Commission

would become a bureaucratic filter for development aid = additional level between the UN and the domestic level.

Germany, the Netherlands and Finland - agreed BUT o wanted a

coordination by themselves and not by the Commission

Belgium and France o more coherent, o more coordinated o we give the lead to

the Commission.

o Interpretation of the ECD:1 ‘Normative power’ Europe

- It stresses the power of the EU to eliminate poverty and stimulate human dignity,



democracy…2 Multidimensional nature of the fight against poverty (diverse policy areas)

- Link between development and security: development-security nexus.- Refers to the European Security Strategy: the ECD complements the ESS (which puts

the emphasis on security) the two documents have to be read together)3 Identity politics

The EU wanted to build/reinforce its own identity distinguished from the one of the other parts of the world.We are conducting a development policy which is different of other countries: it’s our identity.

internal objectives: - Interrelational objective

- Integration objective- Identity objective: Different from the IMF which is a personification of the US way of developing aid (neoliberal approach). The EU wanted to be distinguished: dialogue, social dimension, development dimension.

o Implementation of the ECD:1 Code of conduct on complementarity and division of labor:

- Priority countries and other countries (‘aid darlings’ vs. ‘aid orphans’) need of more equilibrium- 3 priority areas per member state. Specialization: need of a clear division of labor between the member states.- Not only external dialogue, also internal dialogue: engagement to more dialogue among the member states about the complementarity and the division of labor.

2 Africa-EU Strategy (2007):- Large strategy negotiated: employment, energy, climate change, human rights, etc.).- Partnerships

3 Effectiveness?- Millennium Development Goals: according to official reports the EU is behind the schedule of lowering poverty by 50% by 2050 credibility as a leader?- Internal objectives: reluctance of the member states to implement the Code of conduct because they fear they will lose their autonomy, their prestige, their visibility and their preferential historic relations.- ‘Coordination fatigue’: they don’t want to coordinate anymore. Not much effectiveness

Treaty of Lisbon

‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable

development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well

as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’

Art 3§5 TEU

- For the first time, the fight against poverty is a clear external objective of the EU: written in the treaty.



o Role of the new EU delegations: - How will they work for development policies? - New term for European mission in third countries? - Will they make the EU development policy more effective?

o Relation with general foreign policy objectives:- Will the general foreign policy objectives undermine the specific objective of development? - Will it be enough place for developing in the whole list of (many) objectives?

o Role of the development Commissioner:- He has to engage his role with the HR/VP: strength vis-à-vis the big role of the Foreign

Service. - Will he be able to defend his policies to Ashton?

5.4. Development policy and the EU as a global actor

How does the internal decision-making affect the EU’s global role in development politics?

Does the internal decision have an impact on external performance?

Exclusive competencesArt. 3 TFEU

Shared competencesArt. 4 TFEU

Supporting competencesArt. 6 TFEU

- 27 + 1 development policies: 27 member states + supranational part of the EU competences.

- UK + France: o Development policies were dominated by the clash between those 2 former colonial

powers. o Big member states with a lot of power in the Council, heterogeneous preferences. These big tensions have gone today.

- It is more 2 groups: The UK, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden,

Ireland and the NetherlandsItaly, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain

& Greece- Aid to poor and democratic countries. - Not in favour of the EU approach (prefer a

member states’ approach).

- Less intensively cooperating. - Aid to former colonies and more - In favour of the EU approach

- No new member state in those groups. New member states have a secondary role in development aid. Particularly clear in the EDF: their contribution is very low. The EU’s development policy is still driven by the old member states (EU15).

Which role does the EU play in determining the global agenda on development?

Some evolutions: - From ‘non-interference’, ‘partnership’: basically in the Lomé Convention (+ Yaoundé);



- To more conditionality and liberalization ‘Partnership’ discourse? Evolution was in practice, not in the discourses.

The EU is struggling between these 2 poles (what it says and what it does).

How is the EU as a development actor perceived by other actors in the international system?

- At the beginning (Lomé era): the EU = ‘aid superpower’ Biggest donor in the world, but was blamed for its neo-colonial relations. Benevolent power: giving a lot of money to decrease the level of poverty.

- Now : normative power (wants to export its values). Most frequently used images: solidarity, good governance, democracy.

- BUT empirically: the image seems to be more mixed:

o The effectiveness is not that good. o Tensions between conditionality and the rhetoric on dialogue and partnership (the EU

doesn’t impose anything).o Asymmetrical bargaining relation: the EU has the market power and the bargaining

strategies and tools at its disposal to impose conditions. The symmetry is not there: EU is much stronger and developing countries are dependent, even if the general framework is presented as a partnership.

5.5. Challenges for the EU development cooperation

- Tension inside the EU: different approaches EU - not EU Democratic countries - former colonies.

- Also 27+1 idea.

- Some prospects to change this: Some potentials are present and are related to trade politics. Development policy is linked to trade policy.

- Can only be realised if challenges are overcome:

1 EU’s institutional structure- Vertical dimension: supranational and domestic levels (27+1)

More coherence without coordination fatigue?- Horizontal dimension: institutional fragmentation in the EU: Commission & Council,

trade Commissioner, development Commissioner, General foreign policy objectives, agriculture Commissioner, fisheries Commissioner… Cross-policy coherence: the different actors have to come with a coherent

development approach.- + instruments fragmentation in the EU: the Commissioners have to bring their

different instruments together. 2 Effectiveness

- Link with vertical dimension: coordination and fine-tuning- Link with horizontal dimension: coherence.- Examples:



o Agriculture: important for development: is the EU still promoting export subsidies? Export subsidies hinder fair competition with the South, and disturb the local markets in which the EU can enter.

o Fisheries: coherence between development policy, fisheries policy etc.Agreement with African countries to fish in their seas, with some consequences (environment, unemployment, etc.) Need to ensure, by means of any appropriate Community agreements, that the Community fishermen obtain fishing rights in the waters of third countries and that the existing rights are retained: 1976 20 agreements with African countries.

Economic effects contradictory with the development objectives.3 Traditional focus on ACP countries

Clear example of path dependency: Yaoundé – Lomé – Cotonou. The political cost is too high to deviate from that pathRecently: non-ACP countries are targeted: (e.g. Mercosur)

4 ConditionalityMulti-faceted nature: proliferations of conditions under the umbrella of good governance. Tension between what the EU says (partnership) and what it does (conditionality) Dilemma

6. EU environmental and climate change politics

Dominates a lot of other policy areas (transport, energy, agriculture, etc.)Many tensions but the EU is able to overcome them thanks to informal dynamics.

6.1. The EU as an actor in Global Environmental Politics

Time line: From 1970 to 2010.The question is really different today than it was before.

First steps: negotiation at the international level- Struggle of the EU to be recognized as a negotiation partner because of its competences and

the member states’ competences. This generates uncertainty vis-à-vis third countries: who is negotiating? The EU or the

member states?- No precedents: there was nothing like the EU in the negotiations before (a supranational

organization wanting to involve itself in global environmental politics). Perceived uncertainty.

Nowadays: the EU is fully recognized and the member states accept the EU representative. The EU is de facto an actor.

Nowadays: fully recognized, but legal recognition?

As a party to Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)

As a partner in the negotiation process

MEAs: Kyoto Protocol, Cartagena Protocol, etc. Negotiation process leading to MEAs.


MUSEUR Janvier -Juin 2011ClémentSPOL21MS/CP- International legal personality for the EU- EU as a REIO: before 2009, it was the European Community that negotiated now it is the EU

The EU’s status is recognized:1) as an super-observer: in the United

Nations Environmental Program2) as a member: of the Food & Agriculture

Organization full member, just like states3) as a party: to the negotiations under

existing MEAs (rare that new ones are negotiated)

- Conferences Of the Parties (COPs) - Meetings Of the Parties (MOPs):

organized for protocols (sub-agreements to existing treaties) or amendments

The EU is de jure an actor

6.2. Who represents the EU?

Who represents the EU ?

In negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement (MEA)

In negotiations not leading to a legally binding agreement

1) To a legally binding agreement= dual representation.= consequence of “Shared competences” (art. 4 TFEU): environment.

Shared competences Mixed agreements dual representation.

The agreement negotiated will be a mixed agreement: and the member states and the EU will be part of the agreement.

Shared nature of competencesShared competences

EU Member statesCommission

Council

By our own Presidency of the Council

Member states in the CouncilArt. 218:Art. 17:

- EU: The Council has to delegate its authority to the Commission, after the Commission has asked the Council to authorize its negotiation (// trade politics).- Member states: The member states in the Council have two possibilities:

- No delegation: they will go separately to the negotiations- Optional choice: political reasoning they pool their bargaining power behind one of them: the rotating Presidency (for now, Hungary)


Art. 218 TFEUArt. 17§1 TEU

Obligatory delegation

No delegation

Optionaldelegation


Usually, the benefits of doing the negotiations together are higher than the costs That is the dual representation: The Commission negotiating for the EU, and the rotating Presidency negotiating for the member states.

BUT this whole system is seldom used in real negotiations. In practice: ad hoc EU negotiation arrangements: often based on pragmatic

considerations (more effective).

Ad hoc EU negotiation arrangementUNCCD (1993-1994)

UN Convention to Combat

Desertification

Presidency Because the Commission wasn’t really strong

AEWA (1993-1994)African-Eurasian

Waterbird Agreement

Commission No role for the Member States but the Commission negotiated

Kyoto Protocol (1997)

1. Presidency At first, the negotiations were made by the Dutch Presidency, but it rotated to Luxemburg, which wasn’t strong enough to handle the negotiations by its own 2. Troika (PRES; PRES-1; PRES+1) The troika (Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the UK) took the lead because the two non-President countries had more bargaining power

Nowadays the composition of Troika changed: PRES; PRES+1; Commission.

Arhus Convention (1996 – 1998)

1. None No mandate given to the Commission (although there were EU competences)2. Commission

1. From the 7th negotiating session onwardsRotterdam PIC

Convention (1996 – 1998)

Rotterdam Prior Informed Consent

Convention

Commission Exception in environmental negotiations: the Commission negotiated

everything (just as it does in trade)

Cartagena Protocol(1996-2000)

1. Commission + Presidency Clearest example of dual representation Division of subjects based on European and national competences (All topics were listed with the Presidency).

2. Commission The Commission took the competences over because of the German elections (Germany was President and the member states were divided).

Stockholm POPs Convention (1988-2001)Stockholm

Convention on

1. Commission + Presidency (Portuguese) With the Portuguese Presidency, the EU was losing ground vis-à-vis the US2. Commission + Presidency + lead countries Addition of lead countries in the negotiation (informal division of



Persistent Organic Pollutants

labour = issues discussed were divided between member states who can take the lead to represent the EU at negotiations): Presidency was only a formal role.

SEA Protocol (2001-2003)

Protocol on Strategic Environmental

Assessment

1. Commission2. Commission + Presidency

Only 3 examples with dual representation.

2) Non binding agreement

- COPs and MOPs: majority of the negotiations going on today- Not in the Treaty: no strict legal framework.

Art. 218§1 TFEUInterpretation of the article 2 of the Vienna Convention (which explains how the treaties have to be made) only for legally binding agreements. No legal role for the EU representation

The rotating Presidency represents the EU member states at the international level for non-binding agreements. It is a political agreement between the Presidency and the member states, who can still legally take the lead.

1. Do the member states achieve a common position: homogeneous position.2. Do they trust the Presidency?

Legally, no formal role for the Commission but de facto: like a 28th member state.

Pragmatic considerationsPlay an important role

E.g. lead country/lead negotiator approach. No matter which member state or the Commission represents the EU, because the

legal basis of shared competences is not relevant anymore. Clear example of informal dynamics Dutch negotiator representing EU with a French “denomination” (changes inside

the EU but formal representation outside).

1 Informal system under the umbrella of the PresidencyNo formal arrangements, and the Presidency is still on the lead, so the representation is still under their responsibility. The Presidency can stop it whenever they want. But until now: never happened (the system seems to be working).

2 Particular skill/expertiseYou need people who know what they are talking about. Best experts all over the EU

3 Initially: because of pressing problemThe EU is losing ground in the negotiation introduction of an ad hoc systemNow: uncontested and informally institutionalized



In practice, there is no way back anymore

The question is why do the EU and the member states act so?1) Burden-sharing: Complexity: many international environmental negotiations are complex

and very broad, with lot of technical issues. Not all member states have capabilities to negotiate such issues (and they can’t invest in those capabilities for the time of their presidency).

2) Expertise pooling: use the expertise of states at the international level (put the right people in the right place, make use of their knowledge).

3) Involving member states: it is easier to make the member states accept the agreement at the European level after they experienced the pressure and the atmosphere of international negotiations.

4) Guaranteeing continuity: problem of the rotating Presidency each 6 months: new faces, lack of trust, lack of confidence, new networks of people to build. The system of continuity on behalf of the Presidency introduces stability (the main criticism to the rotating Presidency system is precisely the lack of continuity).

Ad hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWGLCA)

Ad hoc working group on the Kyoto Protocol

UN framework convention all UN countries Only industrialized countries

Lead negotiatorUK + issue leaders

German, Poland, France, Belgium, Commission, Sweden.

Lead negotiatorCommission (no difference with the member

states) + issue leaders

Issue leaders: support and assist their respective lead negotiator (informal division of labour). They often change.

Whole system of lead negotiator and issue leaders developed institutionally:The key institution is the Council:- European Council heads of states (not always present, but sometimes)- Environment Council ministers- Coreper I ambassadors- Working Party on International Environmental Issue (Climate Change) officials

Below:- Expert Group on Future Action (EGFA): the issue leaders come from EGFA. Role:

- coordinates the different expert groups, from where comes the specialization- makes sure that what is negotiated is developed in the expert groups

- 10 Expert groups:- Discussion on numbers, contributions country by country, mechanisms, etc.

How can we explain the evolution from an informal effective system (lead negotiator + issue leaders) to a non-effective heads of states system (x leaders fragmented with Obama in Copenhagen)?External action of European Union – Tom Delreux 43


The more the negotiations are politically sensitive and covered by the media, the more the heads of states take the lead

At a certain level of politicization, the heads of states take the lead, even if the EU would beneficiate from more informal mechanisms. How to explain that shift?

We are still in a situation of shared competences: and there is a possibility: no delegation. Politicization = the member states count on their formal rights because the issue is important

and sensitive. The legal framework authorizes the member states not to delegate.

E. g. third conference of the Stockholm POPs Convention, that lasted 6 days (from 8AM to 4PM):- Formal international negotiations (COPs): not much, only at the beginning and the end of the

conference (dark red lines)- Informal negotiations (CoWs): general structure (light red lines)- Contact groups: where the most environmental negotiations take place. Not necessarily

plenary, deal with one specific topic ad hoc working groups with effective bargaining, issue by issue (pink lines)

- ‘Friends of the Chair’: only key players are invited (light pink lines)- EU coordination meetings: inside the EU, before the international meetings (yellow lines)- ‘Breakout’ EU coordination: specialized coordination meetings (orange lines)- Outreach: the EU organizes a bilateral meeting with a country or with a group of countries and

listens to the concerns of the other parties usually done by the troika (Commission, pres & pres+1)

Not as politicized and sensitive as climate change

6.3. A single voice?

Main criticism to the EU: is there a single voice?

‘A single voice’ can mean 2 things:= ability to reach a common position: no divergence in the EU (most often used meaning).Or= ability to defend that position in a unified way: refers to the spokesperson of the EU.

1) Common position

Depends from case to case: the main place where the EU position is made is at the Council.The central actor is the WPIEI: higher political body on place with the negotiation.COREPER I and ministers meet less frequently, so they are less central.


Pol

itici

zatio

n

Formalized system


The WPIEI convenes before in Brussels, and then on the spot of the negotiations, at the EU coordination meetings gives instruction to the EU negotiators (delegation)?

NO: The direction is given from the EU negotiators to the WPIEI: the negotiators have the best information about what is going on at the international level and the best assessment of feasibility. The red line of member states is what already exists in the European legislation: they want to avoid an agreement that is incompatible at the EU level, because that would need a renegotiation with the European Parliament (internal negotiation). That is not a problem because there are much more rules in the EU than in the international agreements.

EU legislation leads to cohesion: the more the EU legislation is clear, the more coherent its position will be.

Degree of politicization: the less politicized issues are, the more coherent they will be.

2) Unified way

Single voice = coherent EU position?Single mouth = who represents the EU?

PositionSingle voice Multiple voices

Repr

esen

tatio

n

Single mouth

Advantages:- Highest degree of consistency- No perceived ambiguities at the internal level

Disadvantage:- Only one negotiator: maybe not clear for third parties that he is backed by the 27 member states and the Commission

x

Multiple mouths

Clearly defined set of EU negotiators

Clearly defined set of EU negotiators+ member states

Big advantage:- Increased bargaining power (additional arguments and many people repeating the same message) Often used at the G77

When internally divided EUCounterintuitively: Can sometimes be desirable and instrumental if the EU is negotiating with a small group of states one big EU seems to dictate its opinion, when a block with internal divisions is not a giant block but comes with compromises

UNIFIED EU DIVIDED EU

Single voice +Single mouth

Single voice +Multiple mouths (negotiators)

Single voice +Multiple mouths (negotiators + member states)

Multiple voices +Multiple mouths



6.4. Internal and external climate change policy

Internal (EU) climate change policyExternal (international) climate change policy Those two dimensions are going together.

Start: 1992: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Summit: 3 treaties:- desertification- biological diversity- Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): general framework to combat climate

change (no targets to fulfil)

95: COP: parties decided that they had to negotiate a protocol to reduce gas emissions: 97: Kyoto Protocol: - Quantitative reduction of CO2 emissions target: Only applicable to industrialized countries (annex 1 countries) because developing countries don’t have a strong enough economy yet The EU as a group is considered as a bubble: joint target. The states have no binding target separately, so there need to be a joint commitment. Internal negotiation about the division of the 8% reduction goal: Burden Sharing Agreement.

- Flexible mechanisms:Economic mechanisms that allow the parties to realize their reduction outside their territory:1. Joint implementation: industrialize countries can contribute to reduce emission in other

industrialized countries by investing in certain projects2. Clean development mechanism: idem, but only for investment in a developing country.3. Emissions trading: cap and trade

Kyoto Protocol signed in December 97 but ratification required. Requirements for ratification:- 55% of the signatories- 55% of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions Conditions to enter into force.

Robert Byrd (US senator) posed a lot of problems: ‘Byrd-Hagel resolution’ The Senate will never ratify an international climate change agreement if there is no emission

reduction target for economically competing developing countries (China and India).The EU had to show its leadership:

- Implementation agreements: made after Kyoto (COP 7 & 8) had to be strong- Russian ratification: key player to get the protocol ratified (55% of GHG condition):

without them nor the US, the ratification stage couldn’t be achieved= Big success of the European diplomacy. Package deal: Kyoto protocol ratification vs. EU support to their WTO membership.

2005: the Protocol of Kyoto came into force (legally binding).

E. g. EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) = trading carbon units Cap and tradeCap = Determining the emissions of the industries (how much emission a company can make) Trade = sell carbon units to companies that emit more than it is permitted



First stage of the ETS: initially, emission trading limited to some sectors: iron & steel, glass, cement... (40% of the EU’s CO2 emission) Second stage: 2008: more stringent allocation mechanisms for 2008-2012. Third stage: ETS reform (2013):

- More sectors: petrochemistry, aluminium... - Centralized allocation of caps at the supranational level (no national allocation plans

anymore)

E. g. The EU Climate and energy package First part of the package (2007): the ‘20-20-20’ targets:

- 20% reduction of CO2 emissions (30% if it is within the framework of a global agreement on climate change, and if other major parties like China and the US go along with the EU and make significant efforts)- 20% of the energy mix should be renewable- 20% improve in energy efficiency (consumption e. g. transports) These targets have to be achieved by 2020

Second part of the package (2008-2009: fast for the EU)): the legislative instruments: 4 pieces

1 Directive 2009/29/EC: revision ETS- Will start in 2013- No national allocation plans anymore but a system at the European level.- Auctioning the rule, free allocation the exception. No free allocation anymore: the companies will have to buy the right to emit carbon units.- New sectors Stronger and broader than before.

2 Decision 406/2009/EC: effort sharing- New terminology in place of the ‘burden-sharing’ concept of the Kyoto system.- Also in non-ETS sectors, member states have to reduce their emissions.- This is linked to the objective of reducing of 20% of emissions. We cannot do it without other sectors: households, buildings, transport, agriculture.Cf. 20%emission reduction targets.

3 Directive 2009/28/EC: renewable energy- Mandatory national targets for use of renewable.- Linked with the second target of 20% renewable energy.- Every member state has to increase its target by 5,5% + an additional goal linked to its GDP

4 Directive 2009/31/EC: carbon capture and storage (CCS)- New technology that captures the carbon dioxide emitted by industrial processes and stores it in underground geological formations where it cannot contribute to global warming (part of the solution to fight climate change)- Legal framework for CCS: there wasn’t any before that- Linked to international negotiation

It was seen as an important contribution of the EU as a leader to fight climate change The EU wanted to show leadership as an important step towards Copenhagen

But the Copenhagen aspirations were broken by the US Senate, where the human contribution to climate change was questioned.



We also had the financial crisis: on one hand, good for the climate because of the reduction of emissions due to the inactivity of companies. But big disadvantage: the market of CO2 also crashed. Companies were emitting less CO2 and the prices of carbon units were going down.

Copenhagen 2009

The EU came with 2 big positions:- Mitigation (= fighting the causes of climate change): Pledge to reduce their emissions of CO2

by 20% = 1st objective of the energy package.- Adaptation (= helping countries to adapt themselves to climate change): Fast start financing:

green climate fund to help developing countries to adapt themselves by 2010.

Struggle about the second commitment period refers to “do we need a second Kyoto Protocol?”: political question. End of Kyoto in 2012 (flexible mechanisms and carbon trading will stop) but do we need a new protocol or do we need another agreement with all countries together? That refers to the fact that industrialized and developing countries have been treated separately in the Kyoto Protocol the developing countries want to benefit from the mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. What would be the legal form of the new agreement? - Legally binding? Preference of the EU but then no participation of the US, China, India…- Pledges? More comprehensive (all parties involved) but not legally binding… Difficult question for the EU.

The prime minister of Sweden in 2009 was the president of the rotating presidency (Herman Van Rompuy took siege a month later) represented the EU in Copenhagen.‘A disaster for the EU’ on 2 fronts: - No consensus with the COPs: the decisions were agreed without any consensus,

diametrically against the position of the EU- Process: the EU was not involved in the final negotiation (crucial one): the political package

deal was made by the BRICs with the US president and without the EU. The ambition to show leadership was diminished.

In Mexico (Cancun 2010), the EU tried to rebuild its leadership role in climate: - EU environmental integrity: the agreement had to contribute to the fight against climate

change.- Multilateral framework: the EU wanted to use the UN (UNCCC) but there were oppositions

in the G8 not clubs, but a big organization.- International law: format of the outcome of the negotiation: preference for legally binding

agreements (although now there are mainly politically binding agreements). Leadership by example: showing the world that the EU can tackle climate change, and trying to export its own climate change system.

Challenges for the EU’s leadership:- Institutions:

- Process of the negotiations: institutions battle about the ‘Lisbon grey zones’ (e.g. the EU’s external representation).- ‘Club governance’: EU climate diplomacy for all international fora.



G20: climate change is discussed there too, and the EU is present but not the whole EU environment configuration, like in the UNFCCC (environment Council WPIEI)

- Policy:- The EU needs a strategy: there is a very elaborate position on paper but no strategy to impose it in political bargaining.

Making package deals >< China, US: strategy but no position.- Fallback positions for endgame (Friends of the Chair): be able to go for a more political deal.

Common position on an overall political strategy

7. EU Foreign, security and defence politics

Trade was an external dimension of internal policies.CFSP and CSDP are intergovernmental issues: it is led by the member states.

7.1. Common Foreign and Security Policy

Nature of the CFSP

- In 1992: Maastricht treaty with a 3-pillar structure: EC, CFSP & PJCC.- Common: Not a common policy as the other common policies of the EU (agriculture,

fisheries, commercial policies...) No common actors, institutions, instruments, budgets.

However: recent developments No (quasi-)exclusive EU competences.

- Policy: difference with the European Political Cooperation (EPC) The intention of the Maastricht treaty was to transform cooperation into a real policy.

More than just coordination- Foreign and Security:

‘All areas of foreign policy and all questions related to the Union’s security’ (art. 24 TEU): in practice, neither all areas nor all questions

- Citizens had expectations about CFSP (name + rhetoric) = Capability-Expectations Gap the expectations were too high to meet the EU’s real capabilities.

- Non-binding nature of the CFSP decisions: The ECJ can only play a role for the 1st pillar: the supranational dynamic, not for the rest. Intergovernmental nature of CFSP. Big member states: international role expectations hide behind other international frameworks where they have responsibilities (UN Security Council, G8…).



CFSP instruments

The Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by:(a) defining the general guidelines;(b) adopting decisions defining:

(i) actions to be undertaken by the Union;(ii) positions to be taken by the Union;(iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii) and by

(c) Strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.Art. 25 TEU

(a) broad directions(b) decisions that can be adopted. Before the Lisbon treaty: joint actions (= actions),

common positions (= positions) and common strategies (not an instrument anymore)

(c) possibilities for member states to cooperate: the cooperation instrument of the CFSD is the EPC

+ Also more traditional foreign policy instruments (phone calls, international conferences, diplomatic representation…)

- Cooperation between the member states: the most important instrument is the strengthening of cooperation.- Often overlooked: cooperation is the most frequently applied tool, but also the least visible- ‘Strengthening’: not yet acquired. There is not yet big cooperation: the EU has to increase the effort of cooperation, making it more efficient.- Backbone of EPC remains: still cooperation, even if explicit instruments are added - Member States remain in the driving seat

This leads to Consultation reflex: if something happens, the member states consult themselves:

- Between Foreign affairs ministries in capitals.- Between permanent representations (EU ‘embassies’) in Brussels.- Between embassies in third countries (less strong). Not necessarily common or coordinated actions. But mostly based on similar information (importance of the consultation stage).

External objectives Internal objectives

An internal objective was: Interrelational the member states understand better what each member state means and wants

How to evaluate the consultation instrument?- Kind of a reflex: As an inherent part of national foreign policy making- Variations of that reflex: applied in Brussels and between the capitals, but less applied in

third countries (lack of coordination)- High politics vs. Low politics: consultation is more likely when low politics issues are at stake


4


Low politics doesn’t always mean high cooperation: the member states can have no interest in the issue or no capabilities…

Substance of the CFSP

o Quite broad scope:- Many areas are part of the CFSP (even the ‘domaines réservés’)

o Often vague principles and objectives, not concrete action consequence of the unanimity requirement (the position that is the closest to the status quo wins Schelling conjecture).- ‘peaceful resolution of conflicts’, ‘rejection of the use of violence’... CFSP = often ‘declaratory foreign policy’

o Priority areas of the CFSP (characterize its substance):- Human rights (Cf. Declaratory foreign policy what does it really change?). Criticisms:

Coherence between CFSP and external dimension of internal policies (e. g. trade and development)?

It’s easy to agree about human rights: aren’t they masking an inability of the member states to agree on more fundamental problems?

- Non-proliferation of WMDs. Nuclear powers (UK, France) vs. Non-nuclear powers: block their decisions about

WMDs Iraq, Iran, North Korea: 2003: EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction complement to the European Security Strategy (ESS). Still internal differences: EU credibility losses.

- Limiting arms export and combating the spread of small arms. 1998: Code of Conduct of Arms Exports: vague document, non-binding.Criticized because of transparency and minimum standards.2006: Strategy to Combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and the ammunition

Criticized because declaratory and contradictory with the reality (business, trade). - Conflict prevention, crisis management & peace building.

Lessons learned from the Yugoslav war and the Kosovo crisis (external events = triggers for those policies).

2001: EU Program for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (peace making, focusing on the ‘root causes’ of war)

Focus on Africa & ‘partnerships’ (// Cotonou Agreement) ESDP/CDSP contributes to the credibility of the EU.

- Fight against terrorism. 2005: EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy complement to the ESS.

- Support to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Horizontal priority

7.2. Common Security and Defence Policy

More concrete elements

First steps towards an European security and defence policy


MUSEUR Janvier -Juin 2011ClémentSPOL21MS/CP- European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

Now (after Lisbon): Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP)

One of the rare success stories of the European integration in the last decade.

End 90s: first ideas about creating a common defence policy (Saint Malo declaration)2003: first operation (Concordia, FYROM)2011: more than 20 operations on almost all continents Impressive, quantitatively and geographically

The failure of the EDCT in the 50s had made defence politics a taboo, but it’s broken now. What was the trigger? The crises in Yugoslavia and Kosovo (the ‘backyard of Europe’), where the EU needed NATO (and then the US) to deal with the crisis.

1999: 2 leaders: Chirac and Tony Blair: Saint-Malo declaration.

‘The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means o decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’

‘Contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members’

An EU defense is possible and necessary

1999: Cologne European Council: repeated exactly the same thing.

Next steps: implement the new commitment: taken quite rapidly European Council of Helsinki December 1999:

- Helsinki Headline Goal: civilian and military (troops for the CSDP) components Crisis management capabilities: 6 priorities:

Strong police forces, strengthening the rule of law (so justice can be done), civil administration, civil protection (for instance by police force), security sector reform, monitoring missions.

Military forces

The relationship with NATO and the US


D D DNo decoupling No duplication No discrimination

Berlin plus Arrangements (2002): implementation of the 3Ds approach:2 possibilities of EU military operations:- Autonomously : operational headquarters of a member state (or of its own)- Making use of NATO’s capabilities and command structures


1


The EU wants to have a defence policy but leaves the NATO window open (3Ds). Important for 2 reasons:- Pragmatism: the NATO structures are there, why not use them? Besides, a majority of NATO

members are also EU members.- Symbolism: refers to the second phrase of the Saint-Malo Declaration Allowing the EU to

make use of the NATO structures can be the expression of a modernized Atlantic Alliance.

ESDP/CSDP OPERATIONS

First operation in 2003: EUFOR CONCORDIA in FYROM2004: ALTHEA EUFOR: Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO based.ARTEMIS: first one not under Berlin Plus Arrangements.Green operations = military operationsBlue text = currently in force16 civilian missions7 military missions

Military crisis management

Helsinki Headline Goal: 1st objective for the military missions. cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy

and sustain a military operation UWEU = Western European Union: defence purpose O Petersberg tasks developed in the WEU: humanitarian and rescue activities,

peacekeeping, the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Have become irrelevant with the Helsinki Headline Goal (twice the same purpose) Will be abandoned in June/July 2011

Limitations of the CSDP:- Objectives of the CSDP: not EU territorial defence (still member states’ sovereignty) Focus on crisis management outside the EU- No large-scale military operations. Expectations can’t be too high.

Methods of the CSDP: no permanent European forces/ European army. voluntary and temporary contribution of the member states

2004: New Headline Goal 2010 (HG2010) New concept of ‘Battlegroups’: relative limited number of troops (1500-2000) deployable in

15 days for 30-120 days. Purpose: rapid reaction Spanish battlegroup, French battlegroup, British battlegroup, French-Belgian battlegroup, Italian-

Hungarian-Slovenian battlegroup, Balkan battlegroup…

Always 2 battlegroups are on standby (available) for 6 months (duration of a rotating Presidency) Weakness of the system



1-06/2011: battlegroup 107, Nordic battlegroup.

Other weakness: Different priorities and/or capabilities of the rotating battlegroups Voluntary character: depend on the political preferences of the member states.E. g. The events in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008: the EU couldn’t react because of

the unwillingness of the member statesUnwillingness to react when:

Risky situations Other multilateral frameworks outside the EU ‘Coalitions of the willing’ (ad hoc coalitions)

3 possibilities for the EU to react:- Through NATO: Berlin plus arrangement: EUFOR Althea.- By itself, but at the national level: Artemis, EU NAVFOR.- At the European level: nothing yet structure not sufficient.

Intergovernmental institutional framework: PSC divided in EU Military Committee and CIVCOM (civilian management of crises)

Civilian crisis management

- Most important civilian mission: Kosovo- Civilian Headline Goal 2008:

- 5000 police officers (1400 deployable in 30 days), 200 judges and prosecutors (deployable in 30 days), teams of 10 experts of civil administration (deployable in 7 hours).

- Problems of the civilian component of CSDP There is less staff for the civilian mission than for the military missions. Horizontal coordination challenge: between the institutions+ instruments (compatibility with trade, development, conditionality) Vertical coordination challenge: between the EU and the member states (involvement of national actors)

Evaluation

- Historical perspective: clear and impressive growth: quantitatively, geographically, and at the level of the objectives. We come from a taboo subject to the Saint Malo declaration, then to concrete operations.

- Paradox: the CSDP has upgraded the quality of the CFSP: from a declaratory foreign policy to an action-based foreign policy. Strengthens the credibility of the EU BUT: Risk of an enhanced CSDP without a sufficiently developed CFSP (the political foundations): - Misleading image of a clear and coherent foreign policy with the CSDP, but not in reality.- No clear foreign policy strategy.

- But also challenges:- Lack of staff- Horizontal & vertical coordination issues: coherence?- Quality of the operations: low-risk operations, in low-politics domains But does the EU want to engage? Would it improve the quality of the operations?


MUSEUR Janvier -Juin 2011ClémentSPOL21MS/CP- Effectiveness and efficiency perspective: nuanced assessment: The EU wants to achieve

external action to fulfil internal objectives:- Balkans: focus on the region quite successful, but is that really due to the EU? (close link with NATO)- Generally: scope too limited, in terms of quantity and geography, to make a difference.


Documents

External Action of the European Union