1

Socrates, Ma. Celine Anastasia P. Political Science 313 MA Political Science Professor Francisco Nemenzo, Jr.

Guns N’ Carnations: Exploring the Role of the MFA in Portugal’s 1974 Revolution

Introduction

The “Revolution of Carnations” in Portugal on April 25, 1974 marked the fall of

the last right-wing authoritarian regime in Western Europe. This was also the first of the

so-called “third wave” democratic transitions that occurred in the 1970s1. The

revolution was led by junior officers of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) or the

Armed Forces Movement. It began during the wee hours of the morning and by the end

of the day, Marcello Caetano, the successor of the dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,

surrendered his power to what was later called the Junta de Salvaçao Nacional (JSN) or

the Junta of National Salvation under General Antonio Spínola. The seizure of power

was striking for its non-violence. On the morning of the 25th, when key establishments

had been occupied by the military, crowds of Portuguese citizens poured into the

streets of Lisbon to express their support for the new regime. A popular image which

articulates the sentiments of the period is that of civilians placing carnations inside the

gun barrels of military men. Various accounts of the event attest to the festive character

1 This is based on Huntington’s framework for understanding the democratization process in his work on the “three waves of democracy”. See: Samuel Huntington. The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Oklahoma University Press 1991).

2

of the revolution, including stories of how, due to the large demand for carnations, the

Portuguese supply ran out and more had to be imported from Holland2.

The April Revolution was followed by a period dubbed as the Processo

Revolucionario em Curso (PREC or, when roughly translated to English, “the course of the

revolutionary process”)—a turbulent period of transition in which various political

forces competed for the dominant hand in the government. Among the political parties,

the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS), the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the

Center Democrats (PCD) played vital roles. The period from 1974 to 1976 saw six

transitional governments succeeding one after the other before finally consolidating

into a constitutional democracy in 1976.

Beneath the power shifts that occurred on the surface of this transition process,

one entity remained to be the stable and enduring force, and this was the Armed Forces

Movement (MFA). Scholars3 would argue that the actual power throughout the

revolutionary process resided in the hands of the military. In fact, one explanation that

has been raised to justify the continuing presence of military forces in a democratizing

government is that the MFA members were meant to play the role of the “guardians” of

the Revolution. This was in order to ensure the fidelity of the transition process to the

spirit of the revolution, whose original plan of action was, in the words of one MFA

leader Melo Antunes, “decolonization, democratization and development”. Even after

2 Andrew J. Waskey. “Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974”. The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest. Edited by Immanuel Ness. Blackwell Reference (2009). 3 Cf. Maria Inacia Rezola. “The military, 25 April and the Portuguese transition to democracy”. Portuguese Journal of Social Science. Volume 7 Number 1 (2008): 3-16. Accessed September 26, 2012. DOI: 10.1386/pjss.7.1.3/1.

3

the establishment of a constitutional democracy, the MFA continued to exert a

considerable influence in politics through the Council of Revolution which played a

tutelary role in the selection of the President and the Prime Minister. This entity,

however, was abolished in the 1980s, with the emergence of the moderate center-right

as the dominant party in government.

This paper is an attempt to describe and explain the unique turn of events in the

Carnation Revolution using a historical approach. This historical approach to political

analysis sees political phenomena not as isolated events, but rather as a contingent part

in a historical tapestry of a plethora of happenings. In particular, this paper explores the

significant role played the MFA in the process of transition and consolidation, as well as

in bringing about fundamental changes in the political system.

Breakdown of the Salazar Dictatorship

In order to understand the emergence of the revolution and the rise of a new

political regime, it is necessary to have a basic knowledge of the old regime that

preceded it. As established by scholars4, the nature of the old regime is a key

component in explaining the foundations of the revolutionary process. In the case of

Portugal, the Carnation Revolution was preceded by forty-two years of fascist

dictatorship under Antonio Oliveira de Salazar. His regime, dubbed as the Novo Estado

or the “New State”, functioned in a system of corporatism.

4 This idea is well-articulated by Theda Skocpol in her work, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Study of France, Russia and China. (1979).

4

The foundation of corporatism is the philosophical notion of society as an

organic entity in which each member exists as a part of the whole body. In this context,

no member can be understood as singular, or isolated from the body and its head. This

philosophy enabled the government to device a system in which all organizations and

businesses are subsumed within the organs of the state. It is almost reminiscent of the

GOSPLAN implemented by the Soviet Union under Stalin which penetrated all social

institutions at the lowest level. The obvious difference, of course, is that in the

Portuguese case, there was no element of direct control through micromanagement,

unlike in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this corporatist system allowed the state to

have an incisive access within each entity in society. This was a convenient strategy to

prevent the rise of dissent or opposition. This is also one way of explaining why the

Novo Estado was able to survive the forty-two years of its existence.

Aside from this system, another mechanism utilized by Salazar to ensure the

stability of his regime was the secret police known as the Policia Internacional e de Defesa

do Estado (PIDE, or the International Police of State Defense). In fact, the PIDE may be

argued to be the “main repressive agency”5 of the Salazar regime. Following

Gallagher’s account on the internal workings of the secret police, the PIDE harbored a

nationwide network of spies and eavesdroppers who were able to penetrate the most

mundane venues of every day living. Thus, as Gallagher puts it, the citizens “for nearly

half a century never dared to discuss politics in the open”6.

5 Tom Gallagher. “Controlled Repression in Salazar’s Portugal”. Journal of Contemporary History Volume 14, Number 3 (July 1979): 385-402. 6 Ibid. p. 387

5

Despite this seemingly effective strategy for repressing the opposition, a

significant event which precipitated the breakdown of the old regime is the beginning

of the colonial wars in Portugal’s African colonies. By 1960, Portugal was the only

country in Western Europe which had refused to grant independence to its colonies.

However, with the rise of independence movements in Angola, Mozambique and

Guinea-Bissau during the 1960s, the Portuguese government refused to yield, and opted

instead to fight the colonial wars. This entailed channeling a fair portion of the budget

and the human resources in order to win these colonial wars. By 1975, the Portuguese

government was allotting 44% of the country’s budget for the war alone, and 150,000

soldiers were also being mobilized to fight the wars in Africa7. This need for military

manpower, as well as the widespread emigration (a total of 1.3 million) of Portugal’s

peasant population caused a significant labor shortage in the domestic economy8.

To worsen the domestic conditions, Salazar suffered from a stroke in 1968. His

poor health condition necessitated then President Americo Tomas to appoint Marcello

Caetano as the Prime Minister to replace Salazar. Caetano was a lawyer and formerly a

Professor at the University of Lisbon before he became a Minister in the Estado Novo.

When he was appointed as Prime Minister, he instituted minor liberal reforms to curb

the negative effects of the repression. In 1969, the opposition was able to compete for

seats in the elections, although none of them actually won. Caetano also dissembled the

7 Thomas C. Bruneau. “The Portuguese Coup: Causes and Probable Consequences”. The World Today. Volume 30, No. 7 (July 1974): 277-288. Accessed August 23, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40394793. 8 Steward Lloyd-Jones. “Portugal since 1974”. CPHR Working Papers Series 2 Number 1 (November 2001): 1-15.

6

PIDE secret police, although this was replaced by the Direcção General de Segurança, or

General-Directorate of Security (DGS). In reality, what actually took place was a mere

change of names for the same repressive institution. In fact, it may be argued that these

attempts towards liberalization were merely a front to appease the demands for reform,

while consequently legitimizing the continuity of the Estado Novo. Among the elements

that stood firm with this change of leadership—still adhering to Salazar’s vision of the

Novo Estado—was the refusal to withdraw from the colonial wars in Africa. This proved

crucial in the events that followed on April 25, 1975.

The emergence of the MFA

Needless to say, the role of the military was the most crucial not only in the

actual seizure of power on April 25, but also in the turbulent period of transition in

which the new regime was being consolidated. This section attempts to trace the roots

of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) and its development as a major political

force for revolutionary change. A key question in this regard is: how was the military

able to form a revolutionary organization in the face of a repressive state?

In retrospect, it must be understood that the Carnation Revolution was not the

first time that the military intervened in Portuguese politics. In the past, the military

had already played a major role in bringing about revolutionary change in Portuguese

society. In fact, the military itself was a key in installing Salazar as Prime Minister. In

1926—after less than two decades of Portugal’s first republic, amid social and economic

7

instability—the military staged a coup which installed General Antonio de Fragoso

Carmona as President of the Republic. During this period, the revolutionary regime

appointed Salazar—then a Professor of Economics at the University of Coímbra—to be

the Minister of Finance. In 1932, after six years of governing the country, the military

appointed Salazar as the head of the Republic. The Novo Estado was established, and

the military withdrew to the sidelines. From a dialectical perspective, this paradox may

be understood as a component of the process in which the 1926 coup itself gave birth to

its own antithesis; thus, forty-two years later, a new revolution was staged.

What is interesting with the Portuguese military is not so much the act of

intervention itself—since military intervention in politics is also something we can find

in various other cases, such as in Latin American countries—but the deliberate act of

withdrawal and leaving the government in the hands of civilians once the aims of the

revolution had been met. The tendency by the military towards government

intervention is, as suggested by Harvey9, a result of Portugal’s feudal structure and the

absence of a developed middle-class. Taking this into account and borrowing from the

ideas of Rezola10, this also explains the minor role played by elites in the revolutionary

process itself. This is different from the experience of other countries such as Spain’s

9 Robert Harvey. “Portugal: Democracy’s Balance-Sheet”. The World Today, Volume 35 No. 1 (January 1979): 24-30. Accessed August 13, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395076 10 Maria Inacia Rezola. “The military, 25 April and the Portuguese transition to democracy”. Portuguese Journal of Social Science. Volume 7 Number 1 (2008): 3-16. Accessed September 26, 2012. DOI: 10.1386/pjss.7.1.3/1.

8

ruptura pactada11, in which the transition to a new regime was heavily influenced

primarily by the negotiations among the elite.

Going back to the question that was originally posed, the key to understanding

the formation of the MFA is the colonial wars. After more than a decade of fighting in

the war, the military was beleaguered by a deep sense of discontent12. By 1974, the war

in the African colonies had already been dragging on for thirteen years, with a very

bleak hope of victory.

As an aside, one may recall a similar situation which happened in Russia in 1917.

Among the factors which caused a widespread discontent among the Russian citizens

during this time was Russia’s involvement in World War I, which consumed the

country’s human and financial resources. Even peasants were being conscripted during

this period. Consequently, there was a shortage of agricultural produce and the cities

were beset with famine. These conditions were maximized by the Bolsheviks to gain

public support, with their campaigns for “Bread, Peace and Land”. The second element,

“Peace”, became quite crucial because it struck a contrast with the Provisional

Government’s ambiguous stand with regard to the war. These three concerns mirrored

the dominant sentiment among the public and proved to be very effective.

Going back to the MFA, accounts regarding its nature and origin have conflicting

aspects. A point of consensus, however, is that the MFA finds its origin in the Captains’

11

Marina Costa Lobo, Antonio Costa Pinto and Pedro Magalhaes. “The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy” in Portugal in the Twenty-First Century: Politics, Society and Economics, ed. Sebastian Royo. (Lexington Books 2012). 12 Thomas C. Bruneau. “The Portuguese Coup: Causes and Probable Consequences”. The World Today. Volume 30, No. 7 (July 1974): 277-288. Accessed August 23, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40394793.

9

Movement which was established in September 9, 1973 in a meeting of among captains

who were involved in the colonial wars. Some scholars hold that the movement was

established in a meeting was held at Monte Do Sobral, in the Portuguese town of

Alcaçovas13. Others, however, claim that the Movement was created in the colonies14.

Initially, the movement did not harbor explicitly revolutionary objectives; rather,

it was formed in order to safeguard the professional interests of the officers such as the

issues of promotion and salary15. In particular, the captains were opposing a decree of

the Caetano government allowing promotions for non-military officers who were

conscripted and who fought in the colonial wars. This sparked the ire of “professional”

military officers. Before long, however, the concerns of the Captains’ Movement became

increasingly centered on the issue of withdrawing from the wars in the colonies. On

December 1973, the Movement gathered together in Obidos with 86 delegates. Their

agenda was even more specific: overthrowing the authoritarian regime. This is reflected

in the program that they proposed after their seizure of power, which was,

“decolonisation, democratization and development”16. The Caetano government

learned about this plan, but mysteriously did nothing about it17.

13 Maria Inacia Rezola. “The military, 25 April and the Portuguese transition to democracy”. Portuguese Journal of Social Science. Volume 7 Number 1 (2008): 3-16. Accessed September 26, 2012. DOI: 10.1386/pjss.7.1.3/1. 14 Joanna Rollo. “Portugal: Role and Nature of the Army”. Notes of the Month, International Socialism, Number 73 (December 1974): 6-7. Accessed September 26, 2012. URL: http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj/1974/no073/rollo.htm. 15 Cf. Steward Lloyd Jones. “An End or Beginning for Portugal? Some Notes on the Legacy of 25 April 1974”. Lustopie 2 (2002): 141-147. 16 Rezola, 2008. This was based on the MFA revolutionary program crafted by Melo Antunes. 17 Andrew J. Waskey. “Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974”. The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest. Edited by Immanuel Ness. Blackwell Reference (2009).

10

As regards the actual membership of the MFA, no accessible material yields a

complete and detailed amount of data. The Movement was a clandestine organization.

However, there are estimates that the movement’s membership reached up to 40018,

most of which were captains who were assigned to fight the war in the Portuguese

colonies. Some of them, according to Rollo, were peasants. Others were left-wing

university students who had been conscripted in the army. Many of them were

mandatorily enlisted for the four-year national service. These officers had a direct

experience of combat in the war and were convinced that it could not be won.

According to Thomas Bruneau19, it is possible that the left-leaning members of the army

were beforehand already members of the Left movements in Portugal, since political

activists during this period were given a choice of whether to be conscripted for the

colonial wars or to be imprisoned. Naturally, a portion of the Left chose to be

conscripted. More interestingly, Bruneau points out the high likelihood (though

unvalidated) that it had been a deliberate policy of the Socialist and Communist

movements to encourage their members to penetrate the ranks of the military in order

to “radicalize” them.

What is of greater interest, however, is the leadership within the Movement.

Three key persons are understood to be the ones leading the MFA20: Vasco Gonçalves,

18 Joanna Rollo. “Portugal: Role and Nature of the Army”. 19 Thomas C. Bruneau. “The Portuguese Coup: Causes and Probable Consequences”. The World Today.

Volume 30, No. 7 (July 1974): 277-288. 20 Fallaci, Oriana. “Disintegrating Portugal: An Interview with Mario Soares”. The New York Review of Books Volume 22, Number 18 (November 13, 1975). Accessed October 1, 2012. URL: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1975/nov/13/disintegrating-portugal-an-interview-with-mario-so/?pagination=false

11

Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and Ernesto Melo Antunes. While some refer to Gonçalves as

“the ideological brains behind the Portuguese ‘Carnations Revolution’ of 1974”21, it is

more commonly held that22 Otelo Saraiva de Cravalho—then ranked as a “Major”—was

the original leader of the MFA, and the “chief architect of the meticulously planned

coup”23. In any case, it is worth inquiring into the background of these three persons

before the 1974 revolution.

A brief obituary on Gonçalves from The Telegraph reveals much interesting

information about this man’s background. He was a military engineer. Although “born

into Portugal’s prosperous middles classes”, it is evident that the man had radical

tendencies (despite popular perceptions that persons from the middle classes are

generally conservative). As explained in the said obituary, Gonçalves was part of a 1959

coup attempt which is believed to be linked with the Communist Party, of which

Gonçalves himself was believed to have been a member24. When the independence

movements erupted in the colonies, he was assigned to fight in Angola and

Mozambique. Furthermore, as explained in The Telegraph, he was the only colonel in the

MFA, and was invited to join the Movement precisely because of his radical tendencies.

His radicalism was later on manifested through his support of Communist policies

21 “General Vasco Gonçalves”. Obituaries. The Telegraph. June 23, 2005. Accessed October 1, 2012. URL: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1492590/General-Vasco-Goncalves.html. 22 See, for instance, Michael J. Faber. “Portugal: The Party Systems from 1963 to 2000”. International Comparative Political Parties Index. (2000). Accessed October 1, 2012. URL: http://www.janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/1-WestCentralEurope/17-Portugal/Portugal63-00.htm. 23 “Portugal: The Military Takeover of 1974”. Country Data Website. Accessed October 1, 2012. URL: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-10993.html 24 Michael J. Faber. “Portugal: The Party Systems from 1963 to 2000”.

12

when he became the head of the Second Provisional Government. This will be discussed

in the next part of this term paper.

What is even more interesting, however, is the background of Otelo Saraiva de

Carvalho. At the time of the Carnation Revolution, he was a 38-year-old captain.

Although he was educated in the military academy in Lisbon, he spent his formative

years in Mozambique, where he was born in 1936. During the colonial wars, he was

assigned as to the Guinea-Bissau as the head of propaganda department. It was during

this period that he worked under the leadership of General Spínola, eventually became

a key figure later on in the Carnation Revolution and as the leader of the First

Provisional Government.

Similar to Carvalho, Melo Antunes had the experience of living in one of the

Portuguese colonies during his formative years, albeit only during a brief period of four

years. His father was a military officer who was assigned in Angola. Antunes

completed his education and military training in Portugal. During the colonial wars, he

was sent to fight in Angola. His main contribution to the movement is in the crafting of

the MFA revolutionary program of “decolonization, democratization and

development”. Unlike Gonçalves and Carvalho, who had more radical leanings,

Antunes was associated with the moderate Socialists led by Mario Soares25.

None of these three persons deemed to be the leaders of the Movement headed

the First Provisional Government. Instead, the one who emerged as the leader

immediately after the revolution was General Antonio de Spínola. Ironically, in fact,

25 “Revolution in Portugal”. Socialism Today. Issue 82 (April 2004).

13

Spínola’s background is deemed to have “impeccably fascist credentials”26. His close

relations with the Novo Estado may be deduced from the fact that his father was the

Finance Minister of Salazar. Another author describes General de Spínola as a

“consummate representative of the Portuguese ruling class, right down to the toe of his

jackboot”27. Despite this background, Spínola’s emergence as a leader of the revolution

has much to do with his role as a catalyst which instigated a further politicization of the

MFA.

The April Revolution

Given the climate of dissatisfaction in the military and the already-existing MFA,

what pulled the trigger to stage a revolution was General Spínola’s book, Portugal and

Its Future. The book was published in February 1974, two months before the revolution.

A central argument from this book was the impossibility of winning the colonial wars

in Africa. He argued for a gradual withdrawal of direct control over the colonies, but

maintaining indirect Portuguese power. These ideas were supported by another

military officer General Francisco da Costa Gomes. By this time, Costa Gomes was the

Lisbon military’s chief of staff. Although supposedly at the side of the government,

Costa Gomes also had associations with Humberto Delgado, a military general who, in

26 Manny Thain. “1974, revolution in Portugal”. Website, Committee for a World’s International. Accessed July 16, 2012. URL: http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/1187 27 Phil Michinson. “Worker’s History: Portuguese Revolution 1974”. Website. International Marxist Tendency. October 7, 2002. Accessed July 17, 2012. URL: http://www.marxist.com/workers-history-portuguese-revolution1974.htm

14

1958, attempted to stage a coup against Salazar. Upon the publication of the book, due

to their resistance to the colonial policies of the Caetano administration, both Spínola

and Costa Gomes were removed from their posts.

The government’s treatment of Spínola and Costa Gomes sparked resistance

among the military. Even before the successful revolution in April 1974, this was

preceded by a revolt in March 1974 in Caldas de Rainha. This was composed of an

estimate of 200 junior officers from the 5th Infantry Regiment28. However, they were

immediately arrested “without a shot being fired”29.

30With this sequence of events and the failed revolt, the MFA finally took action

to stage a coup d’état on April 25. The Command Post of the MFA was stationed at

Pontinha, which was at the outskirts of Lisbon. However, to communicate with those

who would be taking part in the coup, the Movement used the music played in the

Lisbon radio station to send signals to one another. The first signal, which was played

late at night on the 24th, the eve of the coup, marked the beginning of the coup. It was a

song by Paulo de Carvalho, entitled, “E Depois de Adeus”. The second song was played

on the 25th of April a few minutes past midnight. The song was Zeca Afonso’s “Gradola,

Vila Morena”. This song alerted the MFA soldiers to begin capturing key

establishments. By four in the morning, the MFA had occupied the Lisbon Military

28 “Revolution in Portugal”. Socialism Today. Issue 82 (April 2004). 29 Andrew J. Waskey. “Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974”. The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest. Edited by Immanuel Ness. Blackwell Reference (2009). 30 The events narrated in this section is reconstructed from the data available from various sources, namely: documents from Contemporary Portuguese History Online (URL: www.cphr.org), data from www.25abril.org, and chronological data from the Instituto Camoes (URL: http://www.instituto-camoes.pt/).

15

headquarters and three media stations (the Rádio Clube Português, the Rádio Televisão

Portuguesa, the Emissora Nacional and the Rádio Clube Português). In the next few

hours they occupied banks and offices, including the headquarters of the DGS. They

had also occupied the Lisbon airport as well as the entire area of Terreiro do Paço,

where the ministries were located. Capturing the radio stations enabled the MFA to

make various announcements to facilitate communication. The content of most of the

announcements were warnings to the government troops, as well as to the people, to

maintain caution. The MFA also appealed to the public to remain calm and to stay on

their homes in order to avoid bloodshed. Of course, the plea for civilians to stay at

home was completely useless. In the morning of the 25th, crowds of Portuguese citizens

flooded the streets of Lisbon expressing support for the revolutionaries.

Forces loyal to the government were being sent to the areas already occupied by

MFA forces. However, actual firing was minimal31. In fact, some of the forces that were

loyal to the government began to join the forces of the MFA. Before noon of April 25,

the MFA forces announced in the radio stations that it had a complete control of the

situation. The only thing that they were waiting for was the surrender of the Prime

Minister. By this time, Prime Minister Marcello Caetano was known to be hiding at a

military headquarters in Carmo. A group of the MFA forces under Salguiero Maia

surrounded the area. For several hours, however, there was no progress in the

negotiations with Caetano. Maia even threatened to open fire. Caetano insisted that he

31 Only four people died in the course of the revolutionary seizure of power, and the shots actually came from government forces.

16

would only surrender to a General, for fear that the government would “fall into the

hands of the mob”32. Before long, however, communication was opened between

Caetano and General Spínola through the MFA Command Post. Spínola went to the

Carmo headquarters to receive the surrender of Caetano. The revolution had succeeded

in overthrowing the Novo Estado, but it was not yet finished.

Rebuilding government: the Processo Revolucionario em Curso

With the surrender of Caetano, and the rise of Spínola as the President, this

paved the way for the establishment of the Junta da Salvação Nacional (JSN or Junta for

National Salvation). Among the first policies of the JSN was the elimination of fascist

institutions such as the DGS secret police and the government political party, Acção

Nacional Popular (National Popular Action). Most of the officials of the Novo Estado

were allowed to leave the country. Many of them fled to Brazil.

As indicated in the introduction, the Carnation Revolution was followed by a

turbulent period of transition dubbed as the Processo Revolucionario em Curso (PREC),

which lasted from 1974 until the establishment of a constitutional democracy in 1976.

This period saw six transitional governments replacing one after the other. This section

of the paper will attempt to discuss the highlights of this transition period, and the steps

taken in order to consolidate the new regime.

32 Steward Lloyd-Jones. “Portugal Since 194”. CPHRC Working Papers Series 2 Number 1 (November 2001): 1-15.

17

The MFA was not the sole actor in the PREC. The first provisional government,

in fact, was at the onset a coalition government. The government was headed by

General Spínola and peopled by ministers from different political parties. As mentioned

in an earlier part of this paper, various political parties were involved in the process of

the transition. Below is a table showing the composition of the First Provisional

Government. It can be observed that the military presence in the government is actually

very minimal. However, this changed after a conflict between Spínola and the leaders of

the MFA.

First Provisional Government33

Ministers % Military 1 7

PS (Socialist Party) 3 20 PCP (Portuguese Communist Party 2 13 PDP (Popular Democratic Party) 2 13

Independent 6 40 MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Elections Committee)

1 7

The main challenge with the First Provisional Government, however, was

Spínola’s refusal to carry out the original program laid down by the MFA, which

emphasized the decolonization of Portugal’s colonies. Although Spínola himself was

supportive of withdrawing from the colonial war, his solution to the problem with the

colonies was the gradual establishment of federal relations with these colonies. At heart,

33 From Maria Inacia Rezola. “The Portuguese Transition to Democracy”. Institute of Contemporary History. (March 2010).

18

Spínola still “dreamt of fulfilling Salazar’s vision of a Lusitanian Community embracing

Brazil, Portugal and autonomous African states with their own institutions consecrated

with a referendum”34. This became a major source of conflict, and paved the way for the

second provisional government in July, three months after the revolution.

The second provisional government marked a power struggle between General

Spínola and the MFA. Although it still had Spínola as the President, there was a

massive reconfiguration of the Cabinet. The MFA leader Vasco Gonçalves became the

Premier (a position that was formally held by Palma Carlos). Moreover, there was a

drastic change in the composition of the Cabinet, infusing it with a greater degree of

military involvement. Below is a table showing the composition of the Second

Provisional Government.

Second Provisional Government35

Ministers % Military 8 47 PS (Socialist Party) 3 18 PCP (Portuguese Communist Party 1 6 PDP (Popular Democratic Party) 1 6

Independent 4 24 MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Elections Committee)

-- --

34 Jonathan Story. “Portugal’s Revolution of Carnations: Patterns of Change and Continuity”. International Affairs Volume 52, Number 3 (July 1975): 417-433. Accessed June 26, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2616554 35 From Maria Inacia Rezola. “The Portuguese Transition to Democracy”. Institute of Contemporary History. (March 2010).

19

In September, Spínola resigned and was replaced by General Francisco da Costa

Gomes. The latter supported the MFA proposal for rapid decolonization. Initially,

Spínola attempted to seek the support of the Portuguese citizens. He called for a “march

of the silent majority”, which was unsuccessful because the MFA secured Lisbon with a

barricade and forced Spínola into exile in neighboring Spain. This event marked the

transition to the third provisional government. With Spínola out of the picture, the

rapid process of decolonization began, ending in 1975 with the withdrawal from East

Timor.

While the colonies were being liberated, however, the domestic economy of

Portugal was undergoing a crisis. There was a shortage of skilled labor, since those who

were supportive of the Novo Estado emigrated to Brazil for fear of the purges, which

indeed happened. Moreover, Portuguese living in the colonies were returning to

Portugal throughout the process of decolonization. These so-called retornados numbered

around 75,00036.

On March 1975, Conservative forces who were loyal Spínola attempted to stage a

counter-coup by occupying the Lisbon airport in Portela. This was a failure, but it

instigated a further radicalization of the MFA. A Revolutionary Council consisting of

leaders of the MFA was established, as well as a 200-member MFA Assembly. These

institutions were, to use the words of Steward Lloyd-Jones37, like a “hidden

36 Trevor Grundy. “Portugal-Africa: 30 Years After the Carnation Revolution”. New African (March 2004): 54-57. 37 Steward Lloyd-Jones. “Portugal since 1974”. CPHR Working Papers Series 2 Number 1 (November 2001): 1-15.

20

government” acting as the real power behind the Provisional Government. Below are

the names of the members who formed part of the Revolutionary Council.

Members of the Council of the Revolution38

1. General Francisco da Costa Gomes, President and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces 2. Brig. General Vasco dos Santos Goncalves, Prime Minister 3. Vice-Almirante Jose Pinheiro de Azeveda, Chief of Staff of the Army 4. General Carlos Alberto Idaes Soares Fabiao, Chief of Staff for Training 5. General Narciso Mendes Dias, Chief of Staff for the Air Force 6. Vice-Almirante Antonio Alva Rosa Coutindo, Member of Former JSN 7. General Anibal Jose Coentro de Pinho Freire, Member of Former JSN 8. General Nuno Manuel Guimaraes Fischer Lopes Pires, Member of Former JSN 9. Brig. General Otelo Nuno Romao Saraiva de Carvalhi 10. Lt. Colonel Manual Riberio Franco Charais, Coordinating Commission of MFA 11. Lt. Commander Carolos de Almada Contreiras, Coordinating Commission of MFA 12. Major Pilot Jose Bernardo do Canto e Castro, Coordinating Commission of MFA 13. Major Air Force Engineer Jose Gabriel Coutinho Pereira Pinto, Coordinating Commission of MFA 14. Captain Vasco Correlia Lourenco, Coordinating Commission of the MFA 15. Captain Engineer Duarte Nuno de Ataide Saraiva Marques Pinto Soares,

Coordinating Commission of the MFA 16. 1st Lt. Jose Manuel Miguel Judas, Coordinating Commission of the MFA 17. Naval Captain, Construction Engineer Manuel Beirao Martins Guerreiro,

Representative of the MFA 18. Major of Infantry Pedro Julio Pazarat Correia, Delegate of the MFA 19. Major Aeronautical Engineer Jose Manuel da Costa Neves, Delegate of the MFA 20. Captain of Artillery Rodrigo Manuel Lopes de Sousa e Castro, Delegate of the MFA 21. 1st Lt. Naval Medical Corp Ramiro Pedroso Correia, Delegate of the MFA 22. Captain of Aeronautical Engineering Vitor Manuel Graca Cunha, Delegate of the MFA

The fourth provisional government led by Vasco Gonçalves, as a reaction to the

militancy of the Right, began to side with the forces of the Left, particularly the

Communist Party led by Alvaro Cunhal. This was no abrupt shift, however. It must be

remembered that Gonçalves himself already had links with the Communist Party even

before he became part of the MFA. This period saw more radical reforms in Portugal.

There year was marked by a series of purges among right-wing sympathizers in

38 Rona M. Fields. The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement. Praeger. (New York 1975).

21

government and in civil society. Generals who were supportive of Spínola were also

imprisoned. There was also government intervention in key sectors of the economy, but

free enterprise was still allowed to flourish and foreign investors were exempt from

government takeovers. There was a nationalization of banks, insurance companies, the

petroleum and electric companies, as well as the airline and railway. By 1975, 50% of

businesses were state-owned. Minimum wages for workers was established. The taxing

system was rationalized. Policies on income redistribution were created to favor

industrial and agricultural workers.

Democratic elections for a Constituent Assembly were scheduled on April 25,

1975. The Socialist Party (PS) led by Mario Soares garnered the most support from the

people, with 37.9% of the votes. This was followed by the Social Democratic Party led

by Francisco Sa Carneiro with 26.4% of the votes. The Communist Party under Alvaro

Cunhal—which was supported by Goncalves—only had 12.5% of the votes. However,

the Revolutionary Council continued to dominate the Fifth Provisional Government,

with the creation of the “Directorate” of three persons: Vasco Gonçalves, Francisco do

Costa Gomes and Otelo Saraiva do Carvalho . This was a consequence of a pact39

between the MFA and the political parties giving the former a veto power as regards

the outcome of the constitutional assembly and a supervising role over government. By

this time, the Communist Party continued to exert the most influence in the government

39 Marina Costa Lobo, Antonio Costa Pinto and Pedro Magalhaes. “The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy” in Portugal in the Twenty-First Century: Politics, Society and Economics, ed. Sebastian Royo. (Lexington Books 2012).

22

as it continued to enjoy the support of Vasco Gonçalves. This contributed to a rise of

anti-Communist sentiment and the Socialists resigned from government.

Incidentally, a rift had been formed within the MFA. Some members of the MFA

were more supportive of the moderates and the Socialist Party. They supported a

pluralist democracy. This group, headed by Melo Antunes, came to be called the

“Group of Nine”. The other members were Captain Vasco Lourenço, Brigadier Pedro

Pezerat Correia, Brigadier Franco Charais, air force Major Canto e Castro, air force

Major Costa Neves, Captain Rodrigo de Sousa e Castro, Major Vítor Alves and

Commander Vítor Crespo. Aside from this group, another group of MFA was

advocating for a popular democracy based on support from the grassroots. They

formed the group Comando Operacional do Continent (COPCON or Continental

Operations Command) under the leadership of Otelo Saraiva do Carvalho.

On September 1975, Gonçalves was ousted as Prime Minister and replaced by the

Socialist Party’s Jose Azevedo, with the support of the Group of Nine. There began a

process of restructuring within the Provisional Government. In response to this, radical

left-wing factions supporting Gonçalves are believed to have been responsible for the

riots and protests during this period40. On November 25, 1975, left-wing members of the

MFA attempted to stage a coup, but it was not successful. In a final confrontation

among the political parties and the various MFA factions, negotiations resulted in the

40 From Maria Inacia Rezola. “The Portuguese Transition to Democracy”. Institute of Contemporary History. (March 2010).

23

purging of radical left-wing elements in the government. The moderate and socialist

parties were placed in power.

November 25, 1975 marked the end of the PREC and secured the hold on power

of moderate political groups41. In April 1976, the new democratic constitution was

approved and a new legislature elected, with the Socialist and the Social Democratic

parties winning most of the seats. The leader of the Socialist Party (PS), Mario Soares,

became the Prime Minister. This was followed shortly by presidential elections in July

1976, where an MFA member with moderate leanings, General Eanes, won 61.5% of the

votes. His opponent was Otelo Carvalho.

Under the leadership of Soares, Portugal accepted the IMF stabilization program

in 1976 in exchange for $750 million loan from various industrial countries. There was a

reorientation in economic development that focused on attracting foreign investments.

Gallagher42 describes the Socialist Democratic Party to have “drifted steadily

rightwards”, especially after it was rejected from the Socialist International. With regard

to the Socialist party, Gallagher quotes Soares to have said that Portugal must “leave

Socialism at the drawer”. However, the Revolutionary Council continued to govern

from the background. Soares also had frequent clashes with President Eanes, who

wanted to create a Presidential type of government. This and various other factors

contributed to the rise of the center-right coalition as the main force in the 1979

41 Ibid. 42 Tom Gallagher. “Portugal’s Second Decade of Democracy”. The World Today Volume 42, Number 4 (April 1986): 67-69. Accessed August 13, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395916

24

elections. They revised the 1986 Constitution. In 1982, the Revolutionary Council was

abolished, thus marking the final withdrawal of the military from politics.

Conclusion

The Carnation Revolution provides a unique case of military intervention in the

process towards democratic transformation from a fascist regime. It cannot be denied

that there is a common perception which views the military as a fascist institution.

Perhaps this is because of the strictly regimented lifestyle often associated with the

military, not to mention the hierarchical relations that are embedded in the

organizational structure itself.

However, in the case of the April 1974 Revolution in Portugal led by military

captains who are part of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), the military was the

leading agent which overthrew the fascist system of the Novo Estado established by

Salazar. It became, in effect, an instrument for democratic change. The MFA, however,

had a different configuration. In the first place, it was non-hierarchical, since most of the

members were captains. Second, the context of the period was beset with external

conflicts (with Portugal’s colonial wars on three fronts—Mozambique, Angola and

Guinea-Bissau), thus providing unique circumstances for the radicalization of the army.

This paper was an attempt to reconstruct a narrative of the events that led to the

Carnation Revolution—highlighting the pivotal role of the MFA—and the process of

rebuilding and consolidating a new government.

25

Bibliography: “General Vasco Gonçalves”. Obituaries. The Telegraph. June 23, 2005. Accessed October 1, 2012. URL: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1492590/General-Vasco-Goncalves.html. “Portugal: The Military Takeover of 1974”. Country Data Website. Accessed October 1, 2012. URL: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-10993.html “Revolution in Portugal”. Socialism Today. Issue 82 (April 2004). Thomas C. Bruneau. “The Portuguese Coup: Causes and Probable Consequences”. The World Today. Volume 30, No. 7 (July 1974): 277-288. Accessed August 23, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40394793. Michael J. Faber. “Portugal: The Party Systems from 1963 to 2000”. International Comparative Political Parties Index. (2000). Accessed October 1, 2012. URL: http://www.janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/1-WestCentralEurope/17-Portugal/Portugal63-00.htm. Oriana Fallaci. “Disintegrating Portugal: An Interview with Mario Soares”. The New York Review of Books Volume 22, Number 18 (November 13, 1975). Accessed October 1, 2012. URL: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1975/nov/13/disintegrating-portugal-an-interview-with-mario-so/?pagination=false Rona M. Fields. The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement. Praeger. (New York 1975). Tom Gallagher. “Controlled Repression in Salazar’s Portugal”. Journal of Contemporary History Volume 14, Number 3 (July 1979): 385-402. _____________. “Portugal’s Second Decade of Democracy”. The World Today Volume 42, Number 4 (April 1986): 67-69. Accessed August 13, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395916 Trevor Grundy. “Portugal-Africa: 30 Years After the Carnation Revolution”. New African (March 2004): 54-57. Robert Harvey. “Portugal: Democracy’s Balance-Sheet”. The World Today, Volume 35 No. 1 (January 1979): 24-30. Accessed August 13, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395076

26

Samuel Huntington. The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Oklahoma University Press 1991). Steward Lloyd Jones. “An End or Beginning for Portugal? Some Notes on the Legacy of 25 April 1974”. Lustopie 2 (2002): 141-147. __________________. “Portugal since 1974”. CPHR Working Papers Series 2 Number 1 (November 2001): 1-15. Marina Costa Lobo, Antonio Costa Pinto and Pedro Magalhaes. “The Political Institutions of Portuguese Democracy” in Portugal in the Twenty-First Century: Politics, Society and Economics, ed. Sebastian Royo. (Lexington Books 2012). Phil Michinson. “Worker’s History: Portuguese Revolution 1974”. Website. International Marxist Tendency. October 7, 2002. Accessed July 17, 2012. URL: http://www.marxist.com/workers-history-portuguese-revolution1974.htm Maria Inacia Rezola. “The military, 25 April and the Portuguese transition to democracy”. Portuguese Journal of Social Science. Volume 7 Number 1 (2008): 3-16. Accessed September 26, 2012. DOI: 10.1386/pjss.7.1.3/1. _________________. “The Portuguese Transition to Democracy”. Institute of Contemporary History. (March 2010). Joanna Rollo. “Portugal: Role and Nature of the Army”. Notes of the Month, International Socialism, Number 73 (December 1974): 6-7. Accessed September 26, 2012. URL: http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj/1974/no073/rollo.htm. Theda Skocpol. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Study of France, Russia and China. (Cambridge University Press 1979). Jonathan Story. “Portugal’s Revolution of Carnations: Patterns of Change and Continuity”. International Affairs Volume 52, Number 3 (July 1975): 417-433. Accessed June 26, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2616554 Manny Thain. “1974, revolution in Portugal”. Website, Committee for a World’s International. Accessed July 16, 2012. URL: http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/1187 Andrew J. Waskey. “Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974”. The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest. Edited by Immanuel Ness. Blackwell Reference (2009).