Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies

Spring 2014

Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Supervisor: Håvard Hegre

UPPSALA UNIVERSITY

COALITION SIZE MATTERS

Explaining Variations in Severity of State Repression in Tunisia

and Syria during the Arab Spring  

 

Natalie Verständig

 

   

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ABSTRACT

The variation in state responses to popular uprisings begs the question of why some

authoritarian states are more repressive than others? Assuming that no ruler stands alone,

this question is approached by studying factors that influence elites’ decisions to

participate in repression, or rather support the protest movement. Previous works have

argued that minority rule is associated with a higher likelihood of different types of

violent outcomes. While a similar relationship could be expected for the outcome of state

repression as a response to popular uprisings, there is a lack of studies delving deeper into

the mechanisms behind this. This study will adopt Bueno de Mesquita’s Minimum

Winning Coalition (MWC) concept, hypothesizing that the size of the MWC is

negatively correlated to the severity of state repression as a response to uprisings. The

hypothesis will be tested on two recent cases of uprisings from the Arab Spring; Tunisia

and Syria. The regimes of these countries both experienced uprisings in 2010-2011, but

responded differently. This study will show that the size of the MWC helps account for

this difference. In small MWCs, the higher level of higher level of private benefits for

each coalition member, fear of permanent exclusion in the future, and increased loyalty to

the regime, are the explanations for the increase in severity of state repression.

 

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1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 4 

2. Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................ 6 2.1 Previous Research: Identifying the Gap ..................................................................................... 6 2.2 The Minimum Winning Coalition .............................................................................................. 8 2.3 State Repression ....................................................................................................................... 11 2.4 The Argument and the Causal Chain ........................................................................................ 13

3. Research Design ..................................................................................................... 16 3.1 Method ...................................................................................................................................... 16 3.2 Case Selection .......................................................................................................................... 17 3.3 Operational Definitions ............................................................................................................ 20 3.4 Loyalty and Defections – Tracing the Mechanism ................................................................... 25 3.5 Sources and Time Frame .......................................................................................................... 26

4. Case Studies ........................................................................................................... 28 4.1 Tunisia: Background ................................................................................................................ 28 4.2 Syria: Background .................................................................................................................... 31 4.3 Tunisia’s Minimum Winning Coalition under Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali 1987–2010 .............. 32 4.4 Syria’s Minimum Winning Coalition under Bashar al-Asad 2000-2011 ................................. 39 4.5 The Tunisian Uprising and State Repression ........................................................................... 46 4.6 The Syrian Uprising and State Repression ............................................................................... 48 4.7 Loyalty and Defections in Tunisia ........................................................................................... 49 4.8 Loyalty and Defections in Syria ............................................................................................... 52 

5. Analysis .................................................................................................................. 54 5.1 Between-Case Comparison of Minimum Winning Coalition .................................................. 54 5.2 Between-Case Comparison of State Repression ...................................................................... 56 5.3 Summary of findings ................................................................................................................ 57 5.4 The Causal Chain ..................................................................................................................... 57 5.5 Additional Observations and Alternative Explanations ........................................................... 60 5.6 Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 63

6. Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 64 6.1 Directions for Future Research ................................................................................................. 65 6.2 Implications for Policy ............................................................................................................. 66

7. Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 67 

 

 

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1. Introduction 

Recent years have seen a wave of popular uprisings against autocratic regimes. Across

different regions of the world, dissenting groups have gathered on streets and in squares

to express their demands for reform, change, and even revolution. Sadly, many peaceful

protest movements have been met with brutal repression; in some cases leading to

prolonged armed conflict between regime forces and opposition groups. At the same

time, some regimes gave in to protesters’ demands by either conceding through reforms,

or by resigning. The purpose of this study is to investigate the mechanisms behind state

responses to popular dissent, explaining why these may differ in terms of repression

intensity.

Several studies have previously suggested a relationship between different types

of minority rule, and violent outcomes. Heger and Salehyan (2007) studied the relation

between Minimum Winning Coalition (MWC) size and conflict intensity, demonstrating

a negative correlation between these variables. While a similar relationship would be

expected between coalition size and severity of state repression, there is a lack of studies

delving deeper into the mechanisms behind this correlation. By looking at state

repression instead of conflict intensity, cases where armed conflict according to the

conventional definition did not erupt, can also be included.

This study seeks to explore the effect of MWC size1 on state repression as a

response to popular dissent,2 and answer the following research question; Why do some

authoritarian states respond to popular dissent with more severe repression than others?

In order to do this, two cases from the recent wave of uprisings in the Middle East

and North Africa will be examined and compared, by means of a structured, focused

comparison. The Arab Spring provides us with several cases of popular dissent against

long-standing autocratic regimes. At the same time, regime responses to initially mainly

peaceful popular protests varied significantly across the region. While some leaders fled

or provided concessions and initiated reforms, others attempted to quell the challengers

with various repressive means, resulting in some instances in prolonged armed conflict.

The regimes in Syria and Tunisia both saw the rise of initially peaceful dissent

1 When referring to MWC size, the distinctions small/large, and narrow/broad will be used

interchangeably. 2 The terms popular dissent, popular uprising, and protest movement, will be used interchangeably.

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movements, but responded in vastly different ways. Given their commonalities in terms

of politics, history, culture, and geography, the two cases provide an interesting

opportunity for comparison of the effect of the size of the MWC on levels of state

repression.

Assuming that the ultimate objective of all incumbents is political survival, the

severity of state repression as a response to uprisings, is likely strongly influenced by the

leader’s ability to recruit members of their MWC in the fight against the opposition. This

in turn will be a function of the level of loyalty among MWC members, and their

expectations of what will happen in case of regime change. The smaller the MWC, I will

argue, the higher the loyalty among MWC members, and greater their fear of permanent

exclusion in case of regime change, leading to increased severity of repression in

response to popular dissent. The hypothesis is formulated as follows; The size of the

minimum winning coalition is negatively correlated with the severity of state repression

as a response to popular uprisings.

The findings of this study support the hypothesis. In the two cases investigated, a

narrow minimum winning coalition correlated with an increasing severity of state

repression in response to the uprisings explored, and vice versa. Several indicators also

point to the existence of a causal link between these variables.

In the following section, a theoretical framework will be provided for my

argument, beginning with a review of previous research aimed at identifying the research

gap this study will fill. The main concepts of this study will then be explained and

defined, followed by a clarification of the main argument and causal chain. In the third

section, the research design will be introduced including operational definitions for the

variables of interest. The fourth chapter contains the empirical findings from the case

studies. After a short introduction to each case, the explanatory variable is explored for

the respective countries. The outcome variable is then assessed for each case, followed by

indicators for the mechanism. In the fifth section, the analysis will be presented including

between-case comparisons and alternative explanations. Finally, the sixth chapter will

conclude and suggest directions for future research.

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2. Theoretical Framework 

This section will begin by reviewing the literature on the connection between minority

rule and violent outcomes, with the purpose of identifying the gap which this thesis will

contribute to fill. Subsequently, theory on the two main concepts of this study will be

presented and the variables will be conceptualized. Finally, the main argument and the

causal chain will be developed.

2.1 Previous Research: Identifying the Gap 

Scholars have for decades sought to account for variations in violent outcomes. Different

outcome variables have been in focus, including the likelihood or intensity of civil

conflict, the likelihood of genocide and politicide, or violent state repression. One strand

within this research explains conflict likelihood or severity using factors relating to

characteristics of the political elite, suggesting that countries where the elite is dominated

by representatives of a minority group are more likely to see violent outcomes.

A common tendency within this field of research is to focus on ethnicity as the

main explanatory factor. Barbara Harff (2003) attempts to explain the outcome of

genocide and politicide, and finds that ethnic conflict often precedes these outcomes. One

of the links between ethnicity and genocide and politicide, Harff argues, is the size of the

ethnic base of the regime. When the ethnic base of the regime is narrow, there is a high

risk that underrepresented groups will challenge the regime. As a response, the elite may

out of fear for this challenge, adopt ideologies that systematically exclude certain groups.

This can be seen for instance in the Apartheid ideology of South Africa, or the extreme

nationalisms of former Yugoslavia. Harff finds that the risk of genocide and politicide

was significantly more likely in countries where “the political elite was based mainly or

entirely on an ethnic minority” (Harff, 2003, p. 67).

Whether ethnic minority rule also leads to a heightened risk of civil war has been

questioned (Cederman & Girardin, 2007). James Fearon et al. (2007) attempt to answer

this question using data on the ethnicity of the top political leader for 161 countries since

1945. They find that while there is a tendency for countries where the leader belongs to

an ethnic minority group to have a heightened likelihood of civil war, the relationship is

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weak and not statistically significant. The mechanism suggested by Fearon et al. is

similar to the one Harff argues for; the perception among plurality groups of being

underrepresented causes antagonism and perceived opportunities to take over power

(Fearon et al., 2007, p. 192).

Heger and Salehyan (2007) also investigate the effects of minority rule, arguing

that such systems are more likely to experience higher conflict intensity. The mechanism

argued for is in fact not related to ethnicity, but in absence of a better indicator, the

authors use the size of the ethnic group of the leader as a proxy for winning coalition size.

Instead, the mechanism has to do with the private benefits doled out to supporters of the

regime. In countries where the leader relies on a narrow winning coalition, private

benefits are more substantial, resulting in strong bonds of loyalty towards the regime. As

a result, supporters are more likely to strongly oppose any challenges to the leadership,

leading to more violent outcomes. This mechanism, and especially the winning coalition

concept, is adopted from Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003). The

indicator used, however, seems unrelated to the mechanism and the findings can therefore

be questioned.

Hanne Fjelde (2010) argues that regime type influences the likelihood of civil

conflict, and looks beyond ethnicity in accounting for this link. Research has previously

tried to explain how political institutions affect the risk of civil war in a country. Fjelde

distinguishes between different types of authoritarian regimes. She finds that countries

ruled by more narrow coalitions, such as military regimes or monarchies, face a higher

risk of civil war, while states where the leader relies on political parties avoid violent

conflict to a greater extent. The idea is that leaders who exercise power through party

structures possess the means to both coerce and co-opt potential challengers, thus

avoiding the high costs of using violence. Davenport (2007) titles this phenomenon the

“tyrannical peace”. He finds that single party regimes possess some characteristics of

democracies which allow them to incorporate a greater proportion of the population into

the political process, thus reducing the risk of state repression.

What all these studies have in common is the difficulty in finding a good indicator

for minority rule, that is practical for use in large-n studies. The first group of studies

mentioned here use the size of the ethnic group of the leader as an indicator. However, it

is not entirely convincing why ethnicity is a more salient issue than any other basis for

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creating a sense of community or belonging. Nor does looking at ethnicity only account

for shifts and changes in how societies, sometimes quite suddenly, mobilize along

identity lines. The other group of studies has used regime type as an explanatory factor

for why more narrow coalitions tend to be more violent. Focusing only on regime type

does not take into account social structures within the population which may affect

violent outcomes.

In this thesis, I will investigate the causal mechanism suggested by Heger and

Salehyan (2007), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) through a qualitative study. This

approach will allow me to probe the mechanism in depth, and to observe it in action.

Furthermore, my contribution is also that I will investigate the relationship between

minimum winning coalition size and severity of state repression. Instead of looking at

likelihood of civil war, or conflict intensity as the outcome variable, my study will focus

on regime responses to challenges against the political survival of leaders. This focus

better corresponds with the causal mechanism hypothesized, which suggests that

supporters of the regime who benefit from its rule are more likely to strongly oppose

challenges to the leader’s dominance (Heger & Salehyan, 2007). As mentioned, it also

allows for including cases that do not qualify as ‘armed conflicts’.

2.2 The Minimum Winning Coalition  

Many theories tasked with explaining political violence tend to view the state as a unitary

actor, and to use structural factors to account for variations across countries. However,

the decision of leaders to use violence is ultimately a product of a cost-benefit calculation

on behalf of those individuals who are needed by the leadership to commit violent crimes

against citizens. Conceptualizing and understanding the MWC provides a useful

framework for explaining variations in state repression, where the size of the coalition

determines the outcome.

The MWC is defined as the subset of the population whose support is necessary

for the political survival of the regime. This subset can be identified as the group of

people within a state, which support the leadership politically in return for substantial

private benefits, and whose support is necessary for the political survival of the leader

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Heger & Salehyan, 2007, p. 387).

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The MWC concept might at the same time seem obvious and abstract. The fact

that no leader can rule alone, and that even the most autocratic of dictators need a support

base, no matter how limited, seems intuitive. At the same time, asked to identify the exact

MWC for any given country proves impossible. One way to approach the MWC is by

understanding the notion of the selectorate.

The selectorate refers to the set of individuals who are qualified, by possessing

some combination of characteristics, to select the leadership, and to gain access to private

benefits from the government. Membership of the selectorate differs depending on the

type of regime, where different polities have different criteria for inclusion into the

selectorate. In hereditary monarchies, for instance, selectorate membership is determined

by lineage; being born into the aristocracy or nobility is a requirement for becoming the

monarch, but not always sufficient. Military regimes, by contrast, are an example of

polities where possession of a special proficiency determines selectorate membership.

Monarchies and military regimes are both examples of polities with small selectorates,

while democracies typically have large selectorates, including those eligible to vote; in

most cases all adult citizens (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

Another important characteristic of the selectorate is that its members serve as a

base of recruitment for the MWC. In other words, selectorate members not only possess

qualities and characteristics required to select the leadership, they also have the

possibility of qualifying to become part of the winning coalition. The winning coalition is

defined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) as a “subset of the selectorate of sufficient

size such that the subset’s support endows the leadership with political power over the

remainder of the selectorate as well as over disenfranchised members of the society.” (p.

51). The prefix minimum is added to winning coalition, in order to emphasize that it will

always be the smallest possible coalition needed to ensure the political survival of the

leader. The MWC tends in general to be smaller in autocratic systems than in

democracies, but the variation among authoritarian states is nonetheless significant

(Heger & Salehyan, 2007).

Both the leader and the members of the MWC have an interest in keeping the

coalition to a minimum; the members in order to maximize their individual share of

private benefits, and the leader in order to minimize the total amount of private benefits

paid out to supporters. This also demonstrates the mutual nature of the relationship

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between MWC members and the leadership; the members of the MWC provide political

support in return for private benefits (Heger & Salehyan, 2007).

While the size of the winning coalition is a function of the size of the selectorate,

it also varies with other, societal factors. For instance, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)

argue that in heterogeneous societies, where “affinity is likely to be lumpy in its

distribution” (p. 63), bloc identities are more likely to form. Leaders in heterogeneous

societies tend to use bloc identities, such as religion, ethnicity or union membership, to

create groups of voting whereby a few key individuals, bloc leaders, can deliver bloc

votes, essentially representing a larger group of selectorate members with similar affinity.

Bloc identity voting will tend to create smaller winning coalitions, since a small number

of individuals in the winning coalition can represent a larger group in the selectorate.

I will argue that MWC size has crucial importance for the political survival of

leaders, and also helps explain states’ use of violence. The smaller the size of the MWC,

the more loyal its members will be. The implication is a negative relationship between

MWC size and severity of repression as a response to dissent.

Below is a table outlining the criteria, which can be used to conceptualize the

MWC, and help identify groups in society who can be considered to be included in the

MWC. The criteria are all necessary, but none is sufficient by itself.

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MINIMUM WINNING COALITION

Criteria Explanation

Qualified to select leadership Members of the selectorate have the necessary

qualifications needed to endow the regime

with the mandate to rule, and have the

possibility of qualifying to become part of the

winning coalition.

Support the leadership

politically

Members of the MWC support the leadership

politically, either by virtue of their

membership of a political party, union, ethnic

group, class, or other collective which

evidently supports the leadership, or by virtue

of their direct relation to the leader.

Mutual relationship Members of the MWC are the receptors of

benefits from the regime, which sets them

apart from the majority. Can be for instance

favorable business deals, targeted subsidies,

policies, tax benefits, or protection etc.

Adapted from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)

Table 1. Conceptualization of minimum winning coalition

2.3 State Repression 

Research on state repression has made significant strides in the past two decades.

Conceptualizations have been many, but most tend to emphasize similar aspects.

Davenport and Inman (2012) use the following conceptual definition, which will also be

applied in this research;

…actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization,

within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the

target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to

government personnel, practices or institutions. (Davenport & Inman, 2012, p. 620).

Much of the literature on state repression is concerned with increasing our

understanding of what influences repression. A common argument among state

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repression scholars is the interdependence between dissent and repression. Most

researchers within this field seem to agree that challenges to the regime through some

form of popular dissent leads to repression. This finding is very robust, proving to be

consistent across space, time, context, and type of challenge (both violent and non-

violent). However, most scholars will agree that this is not a unidirectional relationship;

rather, the finding is more commonly referred to as the conflict/dissent-repression nexus,

indicating an interdependent, or circular, relationship between challenges to the

government and its response in form of repression (Christian Davenport & Inman, 2012).

Within the literature on the dissent-repression nexus, one can find both studies

seeking to explain dissidents’ behavior as a response to state repression, as well as the

impact of dissent on leaders’ decision to repress (Carey, 2006; Christian Davenport &

Inman, 2012; Lichbach, 1987). Dissent is defined by Ritter (2013) as a “coordinated

attempt by non-state actors within the territorial jurisdiction of the state to influence

political outcomes that is not organized by the state.” (p. 145). In other words, methods of

political participation such as voting or running for office are excluded, while both legal

and illegal forms of dissent are included. This ranges from non-violent methods such as

sit-ins or peaceful protests, to violent methods such as riots and violent attacks on person

and/or property (Ritter, 2013).

While research has shown a strong connection between dissent and repression,

repression is not always a response to dissent, protests, or revolutions. Many authoritarian

regimes maintain some sort of constant level of repression as a standard tactic aimed at

either imposing fear on citizens with the purpose of deterring potential challenges, or

restricting individuals from organizing against the government. Indeed, for many of the

Arab Spring states, repression was part of the daily routine. However, simply being

authoritarian does not explain variations in repression over time within the same state.

Similarly, the incidence of dissent cannot alone account for the variation in regimes’

responses to these occurrences.

The literature on dissent and repression suggests a highly interdependent

relationship between the two phenomena. However, the relation between dissent and

repression is not the main focus of this study. Neither is the purpose of the study is to

explain what caused the onset of the popular uprisings and expressions of dissent of the

Arab Spring. Rather, the aim is to investigate under what conditions state repression as a

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response to popular dissent is likely to be more severe. In other words, the causality

between dissent and repression is already assumed to be present, building on the above

reviewed literature.

2.4 The Argument and the Causal Chain 

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) show that large coalition size is correlated with a

significantly lower probability of war. Heger and Salehyan (2007) argue that the size of

the winning coalition is negatively correlated with severity of conflict. In brief, the link

between MWC size and violence is loyalty; the smaller the MWC, the higher the loyalty

of individual members towards the leader, and thus the more likely are members to

engage in more severe acts of repression against dissenters. The creation of loyalty within

small coalitions can be explained by two mechanisms.

Figure 1. Causal chain

The first mechanism is the private benefits provided by the leadership to its

supporters. The smaller the winning coalition, the larger the individual share of private

benefits. Leaders, and coalition members, tend to prefer to keep the coalition size to a

minimum. This is done to maximize the individual share of benefits to each member,

while minimizing the total amount of benefits paid by the leadership. However, a range

of factors, such as the political institutions of the country, present limits to how narrow

the winning coalition can be for the leader to be able to sustain her rule. In democracies

Small Minimum Winning Coalition 

(X) 

Higher level of per‐person bene<its 

Increased fear of future 

exclusion 

Increased loyalty 

Increased severity of state 

repression (Y) 

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for instance, where the MWC is very broad, public goods are often provided instead of

private, since this becomes cheaper and more efficient. But even in autocracies and semi-

autocracies with relatively broad MWCs, the provision of private goods is more difficult

and more expensive, leading to a smaller per-member share of benefits. The higher level

of per-person private benefits paid to members of small MWCs, implies that these will

have a stronger interest in maintaining the current regime, leading to increased loyalty

towards the regime and greater willingness to use violence to curb uprisings threatening

the current order (Heger & Salehyan, 2007, pp. 387–388).

The second mechanism has to do with MWC members’ fear of permanent

exclusion in case of a regime change. In countries with a relatively small MWC,

supporters of the regime will be easier to identify and exclude in case of regime change.

As such, members of narrow coalitions are more likely to fear permanent exclusion as a

result of shift in power, making them more desperate to defend the current leadership

(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Heger & Salehyan, 2007).

Both of these mechanisms hinge on the fact that there can be no guarantee for

individual members of the MWC to become part of the new coalition in case of regime

change. The commitment problem implies that leaders cannot credibly commit to include

a minority in a future MWC, due to the shift of bargaining power associated with regime

change (Fearon, 1998). While the commitment problem is relevant for members of both

broad and narrow MWCs, the problem will be more accentuated the smaller the coalition,

due to the mechanisms explained above.

The causal mechanisms can be better understood with help of the principal-agent

logic. If members of a narrow MWC are more likely to commit more (severe) acts of

repression, agents’ personal motives can be a useful way of framing this theoretically.

The principal-agent approach stands in contrast to the more structural approaches where

the state is seen as a unitary actor with a single interest. Such studies may for instance

conflate the regime with the security forces, while these two actors are in fact different

with regards to interests and capabilities. Distinguishing between principals and agents,

and between different agents, allows for understanding the goals of agents as independent

of those of other agents and of the principal. Motives for exercising repression may

indeed be more or less selfish, generating private benefits for agents such as loot, revenge

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or other types of satisfaction, while lacking more obvious strategic benefits (Butler,

Gluch, & Mitchell, 2007).

Heger and Salehyan (2007), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) use ‘level of

violence’, and ‘conflict severity’ as their outcome variables, both measured as the number

of deaths on both sides during a conflict. Using ‘state repression as a response to dissent’

as the dependent variable offers a more conceptually clear argument, where the actions of

the state are isolated as the outcome, and both violent and non-violent acts are included.

It also allows for including cases where ‘armed conflict’ did not take place according to

the conventional definition.

As such, the hypothesis to be tested is formulated as follows; As the size of the

minimum winning coalition decreases, the severity of state repression in response to

popular dissent will increase.

   

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3. Research Design  

This chapter will present and motivate the choice of methodology, and critically discuss

the case selection process. Following, the independent and dependent variables will be

operationalized and the sources and time frame of the study will be discussed.

3.1 Method 

For this study, a comparative case study approach is chosen. As the main goal of this

study is to elaborate causal mechanisms, a small-n case study may prove more revealing

than a quantitative approach. Studying a small number of cases closely allows for

observing the interaction of the independent and dependent variables, and as such

provides the possibility to see the causal mechanism in action (Gerring, 2007).

In this study, the main purpose is to investigate the causal mechanism that

explains the effect between the size of the MWC and the severity of state repression as a

response to popular dissent. The causal effect between MWC and conflict severity (which

is conceptually close to the dependent variable of this study) has previously been

established in a large-n study by Heger and Salehyan (2007). In order to more closely

investigate the causal mechanism suggested by Heger and Salehyan, a case study

approach is chosen.

The case study approach can also be advantageous in the sense that it allows for a

more flexible operationalization whereas large-n studies often force researchers to make

unsubstantiated assumptions in order to score their variables (Gerring, 2007). The

operationalization of MWC size in the study by Heger and Salehyan (2007) can be

questioned, and is discussed further below. The difficulties concerned with that task led

to the utilization of indicators that are more or less detached from the actual concept.

Indeed, MWC is by definition a concept, which cannot be precisely determined when it

comes to size or composition. As such, this approach allows for developing an

operationalization that is more flexible than what a large-n study allows for.

Further, the conditions influencing the size of the MWC is thought to vary from

state to state, and over time, making it difficult to find any universal indicators. A

comparative case study is expected to allow for more flexibility in terms of analyzing the

size and composition of the MWC in the countries studied.

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More specifically, with regards to the research design, the hypothesis will be

tested through a so-called structured, focused comparison. The comparison will be

structured in the sense that a set of questions is developed to reflect the theoretical focus

and research objective of the study. This set of questions is posed to each of the cases in

the comparison, ensuring that the investigation does not simply handle the issues of

interest to the researcher, or those issues where information is readily available. Also,

formulating a standardized set of questions allows for replication in future research.

Further, the study will be focused in the sense that it will maintain focus on one single

research objective rather than aiming to study all interesting aspects of the events

(George & Bennet, 2005). The questions will be formulated to measure the independent

and dependent variables in each case.

In order to observe the causal mechanism “in action”, I will also briefly trace the

process of how MWC members reacted to the popular dissent in the two cases. Process-

tracing can be described in its simplest form as “a detailed narrative or story presented in

a form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about” (George

& Bennet, 2005, p. 182). In other words, the idea is that the researcher simply describes

the chain of events, linking the explanatory variable to the outcome. Process-tracing is

believed to make up for some of the limitations of Mill’s method of difference (explained

below). As most case studies are flawed in the sense that the cases chosen are not exactly

similar, implying a risk that alternative explanations or confounders may play a role,

process-tracing allows for proving that the causal relationship suggested in fact exists.

3.2 Case Selection 

In this study, the cases will be chosen according to the most-similar case design,

also referred to as Mill’s method of difference, where two cases are chosen which are

similar in all important respects except the outcome variable. This method is commonly

used in the exploratory stages of research, in order to generate hypotheses, but may

transform over the duration of the research to become more confirmatory in nature.

(Gerring, 2007). In other words, the research process started out by identifying a relevant

puzzle; in this case I sought to explain why some regimes affected by the Arab Spring

responded to the popular dissent with more repression than others. The aim was then to

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find two cases, which differed in outcome, i.e. severity of repression, but were similar in

most other important respects. Simultaneously, I searched for theories explaining

variation in repression, and developed a hypothesis, which I believed would be able to

explain a significant amount of the variation in the outcome of my two cases.

Based on these considerations, I chose two cases which displayed variation on the

outcome variable, and were “most similar” on other potential causal factors. The cases

chosen are Tunisia and Syria, which display different levels of state repression as a

response to the popular dissent that erupted in 2010 and 2011, but where a number of

other factors can be held constant. Before going into which these factors are, and why

they are considered important, it should be recognized that while the aim is to compare

two “most similar” cases, they inevitably differ on several points. Indeed, no two

countries are fully comparable. Nevertheless, the ambition is to compare two cases where

most of the factors, which can be considered alternative explanations to the outcome, are

held constant. Furthermore, the cases are also chosen to avoid any potential confounding

factors, that is, factors that could potentially explain the variation in both the independent

and dependent variables.

In both Tunisia and Syria, groups of dissenters came together to demand regime

change; starting in Tunisia on December 18, 2010, and in Syria on March 16, 2011. The

outcome, as is well known, is vastly different. In Tunisia, while security forces initially

made some attempts to quell protests using repression tactics, within a month, the

President had left the country. In Syria, however, large-scale military operations were

deployed against demonstrators resulting in a protracted, still ongoing, civil war between

regime forces and opposition groups.

Furthermore, the hypothesis was formulated expecting that a small MWC had

caused the high levels of repression in Syria, while a relatively broad MWC in Tunisia

meant that repression was constrained and violent conflict thus contained. This

assumption was inspired by several empirical studies and the author’s own knowledge of

these countries. For instance, Heger and Salehyan (2007) suggest that a narrow MWC in

Syria explained the brutal repression of a Muslim Brotherhood revolt in 1982.

Assumed to be different in terms of MWC size, Tunisia and Syria are similar

when it comes to a number of other factors including colonial history, geographical

region, culture, and religion. Both countries have a background within the Ottoman

19

Empire, and were released from several decades of French administration in 1956 and

1946, respectively. Tunisia and Syria are both Arab countries, members of the Arab

League, and are populated by a majority of Sunni Muslims.

In the last three decades, both countries had been relatively stable, seeing only

one succession of power in each country, both non-violent, where executive recruitment

occurred through designation.3 No armed conflicts occurred in either country during this

time (UCDP).

Perhaps the most important factor held constant is the incidence of popular

dissent. In both Syria and Tunisia, organized dissent movements came together to

demand regime change. Assuming that demands for regime change would be considered

the most threatening to leaders, compared to demands for economic and political reforms,

the level of threat posed is held constant. Additionally, in neither case did the protesters

start out with violent protests; they only turned violent after the regime had started with

violent repression.

One of the most robust relationships found within the repression literature, is what

is sometimes referred to as the domestic democratic peace; the negative impact of

democracy on repression. According to Davenport and Inman (2012), the level of

democracy has no effect on repression below a certain threshold; 0.8 on the Polity

measure. As of 2010, both Tunisia and Syria measured well below this threshold on the

Polity measure, with scores of -4 and -7, respectively. Thus, the level of democracy is

held constant, to the extent that it is not believed to have caused the variation in

repression.

Economic development has also been found to have an effect on state repression

(Davenport & Inman, 2012). In 2011, GDP per capita in Syria was USD 5,100, and USD

9,500 in Tunisia. While it is obviously difficult to determine whether two countries are

similar enough in terms of economic development to ensure that this is not an alternative

explanation, it is also difficult to find two countries for comparison that are more similar

than Tunisia in Syria. Among the 22 Arab League countries, Tunisia ranks tenth and

3 In Syria, Bashar al-Asad took over from his father, Hafiz al-Asad in 2000, which may indicate some sort

of hereditary system, this is in many ways a flawed picture of Syrian politics, given the crucial role of the

Ba’ath party in selecting Bashar al-Asad for leader (Polity IV Country Report 2010: Syria).

20

Syria sixteenth on GDP per capita. Nevertheless, the link between democracy, economic

development, will be further elaborated on in the discussion.

It is worth to make a note of the population size in the respective countries. While

Tunisia is home to around 10 million people, Syria has approximately 17 million

inhabitants (The World Factbook, 2014). One could argue that a country with a larger

population would be more likely to have a larger MWC. Since this argument runs counter

to the findings of this thesis, it is not considered to be a problem. Furthermore,

population size is not generally considered to have an effect on state repression. A

potential argument could be that it is more difficult to repress an uprising in a state with a

large population. This also runs counter to the findings of this research and is therefore

not assumed to be an issue.

In sum, Tunisia and Syria pose an interesting case for comparison, since they are

both cases of authoritarian regimes, similar on a number of important points, that faced

popular dissent in 2010-2011, but where the outcome in terms of state repression

differed.

3.3 Operational Definitions 

3.3.1 Minimum Winning Coalition Size 

The operationalization of MWC size in this study will build on the theory constructed by

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). Elements are identified which are measurable and can

function as operational indicators for the size of the MWC. This operational definition is

constructed with the ambition of providing a replicable and practical framework for

estimating MWC size across cases.

First of all, MWC members need to be part of the selectorate, that is, have the

necessary qualifications needed to endow the regime with the mandate to rule. Depending

on the country, this could for instance be citizenship, or membership in the ruling party or

union. The minimum criteria for selecting the leadership, and joining the MWC will be

identified. A country with strict criteria for selectorate membership is assumed to be more

likely to have a narrow MWC. In the operationalization used by Bueno de Mesquita et al.

(2003), selectorate size is assumed to depend on the breadth of the selectiveness of

21

members of a country’s legislature. In other words, a legislature which is directly elected

in popular elections is assumed to be an indicator of a broad selectorate, while a

legislature chosen by heredity is though to indicate a smaller selectorate. I will also look

at the election of the executive as an indicator of selectorate size.

Second, what essentially defines MWC members is their support for the regime,

and that they are considered by the regime to be vital supporters in the sense that regime

survival would be seriously threatened without their support. Support can be manifested

either at the individual level, for instance close associates of the leader such as members

of the cabinet, or at the group level where the leadership relies on an entire group or

social segment for support. As it is oftentimes difficult to identify the support base of a

regime, I will also identify those excluded by the regime. A country with a broad MWC is

assumed to include larger and more groups into its support base, while a regime resting

on a narrow MWC is expected to rely on the support of relatively few individuals and/or

groups.

Third, the level of private benefits paid to each member of the MWC is expected

to be higher the smaller the MWC is. Private benefits may include favorable business

deals, targeted subsidies, policies, tax benefits, or protection etc. With fewer members,

the leader can afford to provide each member with a larger share of benefits. The nature

of the benefits received by members of the MWC can vary greatly, and therefore it is

difficult to measure this indicator in quantitative terms.

A final indication of the size of the MWC will be the extent to which there are

stable and enduring oppositional groups. The assumption here is that oppositional groups

would not persist if they did not believe they had an opportunity to influence politics and

becoming part of the MWC in the future (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). As such, a

country with many stable and enduring oppositional groups will indicate broader criteria

for inclusion into the MWC.

22

MINIMUM WINNING COALITION SIZE

Selectorate size Political support

for the leadership

Per-member level

of private benefits

Opposition groups

The degree to

which the

legislature and the

executive is

selected in direct,

popular elections.

Direct election

indicates broad

selectorate, which

indicates broader

MWC.

The groups and

individuals whose

support is

considered by the

regime to be crucial

to its survival.

Support from more

and larger groups

and individuals

indicates broader

MWC.

The private

benefits afforded

supporters in return

for their backing of

the regime. A

lower level of per-

member benefits

indicates broader

MWC.

Many and enduring

political opposition

groups indicates

broader MWC.

Adapted from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)

Table 3. Operationalization of minimum winning coalition size

Based on these indicators, the following questions will be posed to each case:

1. How are members of the legislature and the executive selected?

2. What groups can be identified as the support base for the regime?

a. What groups in society can be characterized as excluded from the

support base of the regime?

3. To what extent do supporters of the regime benefit from private benefits

which sets them apart from the rest of the population?

4. Are there any stable and enduring oppositional groups? Which are these?

Since the exact size of the MWC in a given country cannot be determined, I will

use the following categorization to operationalize the independent variable:

1. Broad/inclusive MWC – democracies (while there are segments of the

population who are not supportive of the regime, there are institutions guaranteeing a

more or less equal distribution of goods), or authoritarian states where the entire (native)

population is patronized by the regime.

23

2. Relatively broad/one-party state MWC – authoritarian states where the MWC

constitutes a simple majority of the population, while there are substantial segments of

the population, which are disenfranchised or excluded from private benefits.

3. Narrow MWC – states where the leadership depends on a MWC, which

constitutes a small minority of the population, and where most members of the MWC

have direct relation to the leadership.

3.3.2 State Repression as a Response to Popular Dissent   

In order to assess whether protests in Syria and Tunisia during the Arab Spring qualify as

popular dissent according to the conceptualization of the term, I will use the

operationalization of campaigns in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. This operationalization is

corresponds sufficiently to what is referred to here as popular dissent. The definition

takes into account both participation and goals. First of all, campaign onset occurs when

at least 1,000 observed participants gather in a coordinated, contentious, collective action.

Second, the campaign must have ‘maximalist’ goals in order to ensure the existence of

conflict conditions. This includes goals of regime change, secession, or the removal of a

foreign occupier (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Popular dissent will not be measured in

terms of intensity, but rather as a dichotomous variable (existence or not existence of

popular dissent).

Repression tactics and repression outcomes will be used to determine repression

severity in this study. While state repression can be both physical and non-physical, this

study will focus on physical sanctions. The reasoning behind this is that non-physical

sanctions, for instance, domestic spying or restrictions of speech and assembly, is

difficult to measure in the short term. Since this study is concerned with the first month

since the start of the uprising, physical sanctions are both more likely to be observed as a

direct consequence of the protests, and easier to measure.

Regarding the tactics, Hendrix and Salehyan (2013) separate between lethal

repression (i.e. resulting in deaths) and non-lethal repression. Since the dependent

variable in this study is the severity of state repression, non-lethal repression will be

classified as less severe. Further, the degree to which the use of lethal tactics was

systematic and deliberated will be assessed. The more systematic and deliberated the use

of lethal tactics against protesters, the higher the severity of repression. Repression tactics

24

will be measured using qualitative sources, including International Crisis Group reports

on the uprisings, and scholarly articles and books.

Repression outcomes will be measured in terms of number of deaths, and number

of illegally detained journalists, in the first month from the start of the uprising. Number

of deaths will be measured using an indicator of the level of violence from the SIPRI

Yearbook of 2012 (Allansson, Baumann, Taub, Themnér, & Wallensteen, 2012), namely

the number of people killed in Arab Spring-related violence in each country4. There are

some problems with this measurement. First of all, it measures the total level of violence

in 2011 which does not allow for the isolation of the first month of protests. Second, it

does not only include violence directed at protestors, but also any violence directed at

government forces. Still, it is considered to be a good complement to the other indicators

used in this study. The number of illegally detained journalists will be measured using

data from Reporters Without Borders. The level of violence, and the number of

journalists arrested, helps refine the distinction between lethal and non-lethal, providing a

continuous measurement of severity within these categories. The choice to look at the

treatment of journalists by the regime forces was made deliberately. Crackdowns on the

media are a frequent tactic used by governments to quell dissenters and therefore a good

indicator of state repression as a response to popular dissent (Reporters Without Borders,

2011, 2013).

Since this study is concerned with measuring ‘state’ repression, only repressive

acts perpetrated by state actors will be considered. State actors foremost includes the

military, security forces and police forces, but can also include any individuals which

were demonstrably recruited by the regime.

4 Low level of violence will indicate 1-24 deaths, Intermediate 25-999 deaths, and High 1000 or more

deaths.

25

POPULAR DISSENT

Participation Goals

The gathering of at

least 1,000 participants

in coordinated,

contentious, collective

action.

Maximalist goals, i.e.

regime change,

secession, or the

removal of a foreign

occupier.

Adapted from Chenoweth and Lewis (2013).

Table 4. Operationalization of popular dissent

SEVERITY OF STATE REPRESSION

Repression tactics Repression outcomes

• Lethal vs. non-lethal

tactics

• Degree to which tactics

are deliberate and

systematic

Lethal tactics (resulting in deaths),

and tactics that are systematic and

deliberate, will be considered to

indicate higher severity of

repression.

• Number of deaths

• Number of

illegally detained

journalists

Higher numbers of deaths

and detainees indicate

increased severity of

repression.

Table 5. Operationalization of state repression severity as a response to popular dissent

Based on these indicators, the following questions will be posed to each case:

1. Did popular dissent occur?

2. What types of repression tactics were used by state actors against dissenters in

the first month after popular dissent started?

3. What were the outcomes of the state repression in terms of number of deaths

and detainees?

3.4 Loyalty and Defections – Tracing the Mechanism 

Observing and estimating the outcome and the explanatory factors in both cases can give

an indication of the existence of a relationship between these two variables. In order to

26

demonstrate a causal relationship, it is necessary to also observe indicators of the causal

mechanism. The hypothesis states that in countries with narrow MWCs, the response to

popular uprisings is likely to be more repressive. This is explained by the high degree of

loyalty among members of the MWC towards the regime, caused by a higher per-person

level of benefits, and their fear of exclusion in the future.

As such, in a country with a narrow MWC, I will expect that members of the

MWC remain loyal to the regime in the face of a challenge from a popular uprising. The

degree of loyalty among MWC members can be indicated by the participants of the

uprising. In a country with a narrow MWC, I expect that those participating in the

protests are chiefly from sectors of society which are not included in the MWC. The

leadership will thus be able to recruit its coalition members to participate in repression of

the uprising. Another indicator of loyalty among MWC members is the level of

defections, expecting few defections from within the MWC when the coalition is narrow.

Contrarily, in a country with a broad MWC, I expect that members of the MWC

will defect to a higher extent and also join the protest movement against the regime rather

than help to repress it. The leadership will therefore face difficulties in recruiting

members from its support base to repress the uprising.

To test for this, the following questions will be posed to each case:

1. Who participated in the protests?

2. Who participated in the repression of the protests?

3. To what extent did defections occur from within the MWC during the first

month of the uprising?

3.5 Sources and Time Frame 

The independent variable, MWC size, is believed to be relatively constant over time,

given that there are no radical changes such as civil war, or coups. At the same time, it

would be impossible to determine the size of the MWC at one specific point in time, due

to the nature of the concept and the availability of source material. Since autocratic

regimes tend to be shaped by the leader in power, I will look at the MWC in the course of

the regime which was in power at the time of the uprisings, but maintain a specific focus

on developments in the years leading up to the uprising.

27

For this, a range of secondary sources will be consulted, mainly scholarly

literature on the internal politics of the countries, country reports, and news reports,

combined with relevant data on ethnicity, political party affiliation, legislation etc.

The dependent variable, state repression, will be measured starting from the first

identified act of popular dissent in the respective countries according to the SIPRI

Yearbook. In Tunisia, this is December 18, 2010, and March 16, 2011 in Syria. I will

look at state repression in the first month from the start of the uprising. This is considered

to be sufficient time for the state to react to the uprising but too short for external actors

to get heavily involved, which could alter the dynamics of the conflict.

Also, since the Tunisian uprising only went on for about one month before

President Ben Ali fled the country, it would not be possible to measure state repression

after the first month in Tunisia. Since it is the size of Ben Ali’s MWC which is expected

to have an effect on his regime’s use of state repression, it would make little sense to

measure repression after he was no longer the incumbent. Using the same time frame for

Syria allows for a high level of comparability between the two countries.

The incidence of dissent, and the first act of state repression will be identified

using news sources and data from UCDP and SIPRI, as well as country reports from

various NGOs. For repression tactics and outcomes, data from UCDP and SIPRI as well

as from Reporters Without Borders will be used together with some secondary material.

 

28

4. Case Studies 

After a short background on each case, the empirics from the case studies will be

presented separately for each variable. The MWC of each case will be discussed,

followed by state repression as a response to the uprisings. Lastly, the indicators for the

mechanism will be assessed.

4.1 Tunisia: Background 

Tunisia is often characterized as a fairly homogeneous society in terms of demography.

The majority, around 98 percent, are Sunni Muslims, and minority groups are relatively

few and small. The Tunisian Berber minority is smaller than in neighboring countries,

and they live mainly in isolated communities in the south of the country. While official

numbers for the indigenous Berber group are hard to come by, estimates range between

one and two percent (Minority Rights Group International, 2011). Observers have

described Tunisia before the revolution as a socially cohesive state, much owing to its

ethnic homogeneity, but also to a high degree of political legitimacy. However, the notion

of homogeneity can be questioned. Religious-secular cleavages have been significant in

Tunisia’s social and political arena since independence. Regional differences have also

divided the nation, between the developed coastal towns (from where most of the

political and industrial leadership were drawn), and the less privileged rural areas in the

middle of the country (Alexander, 2010; Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). Another criticism of

the idea of Tunisia as homogeneous consists of the fact that, traditionally, the country has

been characterized by tribal loyalties. However, these assumed lesser significance in the

period of independence in part due to the unification policies of the state (al-Qassemi,

2012; Boutaleb, 2012).

In order to understand the MWC which worked to sustain, and benefited from, the

rule of Ben Ali, one must start with the basis of the rule of Habib Bourguiba, who led the

country from independence in 1956 until 1987. The institutions Bourguiba used to build

support for his government transformed, but to some extent remained the basis and origin

of political power even under Ben Ali.

Habib Bourguiba originated in the new, Western influenced elite which had

broken with the old traditional ruling class. (King, 1998). Bourguiba ruled Tunisia for

29

three decades through the New Constitutional (Neo-Destour) Party, later renamed the

Socialist Constitutional (Destour) Party (PSD). Bourguiba had during the period of

nationalist struggle prior to independence established a support base which followed him

into the period of sovereignty. He came to base his rule on a broad coalition of organized

labor and other left-leaning interests. Two institutions were crucial in the formation of

this coalition. First of all, the Neo-Destour Party was the basis of support and legitimacy

for Bourguiba throughout his years in office. It started out as a mass party uniting

Tunisians in the struggle for independence, and transitioned over time into the institution

through which Bourguiba exercised his increasingly authoritarian rule (Alexander, 2010;

Moore, 1962). The Neo-Destour had a broad base and included intellectuals in the cities

as well as rural tribal communities. According to an estimation, by 1955, one third of all

male adults in Tunisia were members of the party (Charrad, 2001).5

Bourguiba is often described as Tunisia’s founding father; he embarked the

country on a wide-reaching nation-building project, including all sectors of society. Still,

Bourguiba maintained an authoritarian rule throughout his decades in office. (Alexander,

2010). Once the state was established, top party officials were assigned leading positions

within the newly formed government. Over time, all significant opposition parties were

banned or rendered harmless and Tunisia morphed into an increasingly authoritarian one-

party state. In 1963, the Neo-Destour national council declared its official support for a

single-party regime and subsequently the party and the state became indistinguishable

from one another; “the ruling party had become little more than a transmission belt for

the government” (Alexander, 2010, p. 41).

The other institution which served as a fundament for Bourguiba’s rule, and

indeed played an important role in the formation of the modern Tunisian state, was the

Tunisian General Labor Union, the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail). The

UGTT was established in 1946 from sectors of society which had been vital in the

nationalist movement led by Bourguiba prior to independence. Through the UGTT,

Bourguiba co-opted the Tunisian workers’ movement and gained their support for the

independence movement in return for salary increases and improvements in working

5 This estimation corresponds roughly to the figures available; in 1957, the party supposedly had 600,000

members. With a population of around 4 million this translates into approximately one-third of the male

population at the time (Moore, 1962).

30

conditions. More than that, the UGTT gained wide-reaching influence over policy in

return for their support for the president. In addition to allocating nearly one-fourth of the

seats in the National Assembly to the UGTT, Bourguiba also adopted large parts of the

union’s economic program. This included centralization of economic planning,

nationalization of major industries, and land reform aimed at creating cooperatives

(Alexander, 2010; Moore, 1962). The latter policy was especially targeted to gain the

support of rural-based peasants. Peasants were indeed an important interest group for

Bourguiba and their support was, in addition to land, traded for credit, technical, and

marketing assistance. Co-opting the peasants was particularly important for the regime in

its attempt to diminish the influence of urban elites (King, 1998).

A combination of circumstances had by the 1980s accumulated to pose mounting

challenges to the Bourguiba regime. First of all, economic conditions were deteriorating

with soaring unemployment and inflation rates. An attempt by Bourguiba to use the

UGTT in order to constrain the rising tensions among workers backfired, causing a split

within the union. This period also saw a rising popularity for the Islamist movement in

Tunisia, leading to escalating conflict with the incumbent regime (Alexander, 2010;

King, 2003).

Coupled with Bourguiba’s poor health and alleged senility, these conditions

eventually led to the overtake by Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in a bloodless coup in 1987

(Alexander, 2010; King, 2003). The former general changed the name of the PSD to the

Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), to emphasize his commitment to democratic

reform. Ben Ali’s rule was indeed characterized by political and economic reform and

Tunisia has been lauded for its progress in terms of economic liberalization. The political

arena opened up to allow for new parties to form and run in elections, and for other

candidates to run for the presidency. The reforms were also a way to deescalate the

conflict with the Islamists. However, Ben Ali’s continued strong grip on power raises the

question whether or not these reforms were simply a façade (Alexander, 2010; King,

2009).

31

4.2 Syria: Background 

In Syria, groups are defined by different combinations of religious or ethnic belongings.

Around two-thirds of Syria’s population is Sunni Muslim, although not all of these are

Arab. The largest minority groups, representing around ten percent each, are Alawis,

Christians of various denominations, Iraqi refugees,6 and Kurds. The presence of around

two million Alawis is worth noting, not least due to the group’s political significance.

Historically, the Alawi minority has suffered from persecution and conflict with the

dominant Sunni culture. Under the French rule in Syria, Alawis were in many ways

privileged, which both set them apart from the rest of society, and allowed for the

creation of an Alawi middle class; well educated and economically powerful. However,

the group faced discrimination as heretics by the Sunni majority during the early years of

Syrian independence. With the rise to power of Hafiz al-Asad in 1970, many Alawis

regained their privileged positions (Minority Rights Group International, 2011).

Following a period of instability and a series of coups after independence in 1946,

representatives of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party assumed power in 1963. The Ba’ath

Party has since been the formal source of political power in Syria for half a century. This

seeming continuity does not imply political stability; rather, the institutions of the Ba’ath

Party have been used for different political means by those in power at the time. After the

coup, it replaced the urban-Sunni political dominance with a radicalized rural-

minoritarian rule. After decades of antagonism and conflict between urban and rural

groups, this shift marked the first challenge to the Sunni dominance in Syrian politics

since independence (Haddad, 2011).

When Hafiz al-Asad came to power in 1970, it signified both the gain of privilege

and status for many Alawis, but also the rise of more pragmatic elements within the

Ba’ath Party. The party preceded Hafiz al-Asad’s presidency and has as mentioned been

used for different political purposes depending on the ruler and the hegemonic ideology

at the time. During Hafiz al-Asad’s presidency, the Ba’ath transformed from a vehicle of

rural mobilization against the urban elites into a central pillar which the state rested on.

The broadening of the party’s support base was accomplished through an increased

6 While Syria started accepting Iraqi refugees already in the 1940s, a majority of the current refugee

population arrived to Syria after the 2003 U.S. invasion.

32

emphasis on pan-Arabism. Arab nationalism seemed to be the only ideology able to unite

a majority of Syrians in an attempt to produce a politically stable future without further

coups. But the politicization of the party implied that the elites maintained some

autonomy vis-à-vis the presidency. The Ba’ath became an indispensible, unifying

political tool for Asad, while it at the same time meant that he had to deal with a strong,

in some areas independent, political institution (Haddad, 2011; Stacher, 2012).

In the later years of Hafiz al-Asad’s presidency, the Ba’ath Party became

increasingly irrelevant, as the president solidified his rule, and indeed became the symbol

of the nation. But as succession neared leading up to Hafiz al-Asad’s death in 2000, the

party experienced a revival. The task to select a successor fell on the top leadership

within the party. Bashar al-Asad was chosen to succeed his father not because he was a

strong leader with roots in the party; rather the opposite. The choice to promote Bashar to

the presidency was a way for the old elites to avoid fragmentation within the coalition.

Bashar al-Asad was considered a weak and malleable leader, and his appointment was a

consensus decision thought to ensure regime survival after Hafiz al-Asad’s death. In

other words, Bashar al-Asad stepped in as the president within a regime of strong,

politicized institutions and elites; the Ba’ath, the military, and the security services

(Stacher, 2012).

4.3 Tunisia’s Minimum Winning Coalition under Zine el‐Abidine Ben Ali 1987–

2010 

4.3.1 Selectorate Membership 

While popular elections prior to the revolution were held in Tunisia every five years,

restrictions on oppositional candidates and parties, together with election fraud, implies

that the power to select the leadership is not entirely with the people. Other

characteristics seem to be of importance, rendering certain individuals more qualified and

able to select the leadership and more likely to become part of a future ruling coalition.

One such characteristic has been membership in the RCD, the ruling party. In

fact, the system of executive recruitment was designed in such a way that non-RCD

candidates were practically excluded from winning in presidential elections, and from

selecting the leadership. The Constitution required presidential candidates to secure

support from at least 30 legislators or mayors, which all belong to the RCD. As a result of

33

this system, since his first election in 1989, Ben Ali was reelected every five years, never

gaining less than 89 percent of the vote (Polity IV, 2010b).

RCD membership was a crucial factor also in legislative selection. The electoral

system in Tunisia was a mix between majority list and proportional representation. The

majority list system entailed that a party had to present a list of candidates and obtain the

exclusive support of 75 voters in that district. This was difficult for the opposition parties

since they lacked national organizations and constituencies, but was no match for the

RCD. The share of the seats distributed proportionally among the opposition parties was

successively increased since 1994. Prior to the 2009 elections, the government approved

yet another amendment increasing the opposition’s share to 25 percent; a share which

they could probably not have received by competing in free elections. As such, this was a

way for Ben Ali to maintain RCD hegemony while ensuring that the opposition parties

were content and non-disruptive (Alexander, 2010, pp. 56–62).

In 2002, a second chamber was created. The Chamber of Advisors had 126

members elected by professional organizations, municipal councilors, members of the

first chamber, or appointed by the president. In 2004, over 90 percent of those selecting

the members for the Chamber of Advisors were RCD members (Alexander, 2010, p. 62).

As such, the system for legislative selection was neither hereditary nor one of direct

popular election. Tunisia’s legislature and presidency are de jure selected by the all

Tunisian adult citizens, but the de facto selectorate was smaller than that. The dominance

of the RCD in Tunisian politics and the institutionalized exclusion of non-RCD members

implies that the minimum criteria for selectorate membership in Tunisia was RCD

membership.

Before the 2011 uprising, the RCD had around two million members, which is a

fifth of the population. This meant that each Tunisian family had at least two RCD

members on average (Sadiki, 2002, p. 66). The party has been largely synonymous with

the state for a long time, with strong grass root and student movements. Even if the mass,

populist character of the party has somewhat faded in recent years, the strong social base

and popular anchoring meant that the RCD has been available as a means for political

participation to most Tunisians.

Tunisia under Ben Ali cannot be said to have ruled on the exclusion of any

particular group or segment of the population. Political opposition parties (except the

34

Islamists) were offered a political opening under Ben Ali. While privatization policies in

recent decades to some extent have favored urban elites, the considerations of the rural

population have constantly been incorporated. The one exception would be the Islamists,

whose political participation Ben Ali restricted by law. Still, Ben Ali occasionally let

even the Islamists into the political arena, mainly at the beginning of his rule (Alexander,

2010; King, 2003).

4.3.2 The Support Base of Zine el‐Abidine Ben Ali 

In contrast to Habib Bourguiba, Ben Ali did not have a strong popular base of support

when he entered office. In spite of his political career as interior and prime ministers, as

well as a general in the army, he was not part of the old ruling party elites, and did not

have any strong alliances to base his rule on. Ben Ali used different strategies to

consolidate and legitimize his rule. The fact that he opted to move away from the

patrimonial one-party state of Bourguiba and ground his legitimacy in the ideas of liberal

democracy, can be seen as a strategy to compensate for the lack of a strong constituency.

And while Tunisia indeed did become increasingly authoritarian after the new

millennium, Ben Ali played a constant game of maintaining his and the RCD’s hegemony

while co-opting the opposition. This strategy was most obvious in the early years of his

presidency (Alexander, 2010).

The RCD continued to be an important support base for Ben Ali during his

decades in power, and indeed the source of political power in the country. But its social

base shifted as Ben Ali worked to co-opt certain segments of society. Over the course of

his rule, the rural bourgeoisie assumed a central role in the Tunisian political arena. The

rural bourgeoisie, or notables, included the large landowners of the countryside, which

had been instrumental for the French during the protectorate. The socialist-leaning elites

of the Neo-Destour under Bourguiba believed the rural bourgeoisie to have been “the

allies, if not the basis of colonization”, and opted instead to garner support from the rural

masses (King, 1998, p. 59). During the 1980s and 1990s, the rural bourgeoisie had grown

increasingly discontent with the government’s socialist policies, in particular the land

reforms which implied the transformation into cooperatives of large landholdings.

35

In other words, as it became more difficult to uphold the catch-all character of the

RCD, Ben Ali’s tactic not only involved instrumentalization of the language of liberal

democracy, but also the co-option of influential social groups such as the rural

bourgeoisie. This group of rural elites, as well as their urban offshoots, served as an

important support base during the privatization of the 1990s. The privatization and

market-oriented policies of the government were mutually beneficial for the regime and

the new capitalist elites. In essence, Ben Ali used mix of neo-liberal reforms and state

corporatism to redistribute wealth to, and buy the support of, urban and rural economic

elites (Alexander, 2010; King, 1998, 2003). This process involved a transformation

whereby the RCD turned in to “largely a party of rural notables and well-connected

capitalists” (King, 2009, p. 170).

But while the social base of the RCD shifted under Ben Ali in the years of

economic liberalization, the Tunisian President also continued to value the constituents of

the countryside. Ben Ali turned to the UGTT to ensure their support from peasants and

workers for his regime in spite of privatization efforts which tended to disadvantage this

group. In this sense, the trade union was an important component in the consolidation of

his economic and political project. Ben Ali instituted close ties between the unionists and

the state authorities, and the former signed on to his economic reform policies as well as

his political project. In presidential elections, the UGTT leadership appealed to its

members and to Tunisian workers at large to vote for Ben Ali (King, 2009).

It is also worth to make a note of the relationship between the regime and the

military and security forces. Tunisia was unique among Arab states in the sense that the

armed forces were highly independent from the ruling regime. Even though Ben Ali was

a general, he came from the intelligence services rather than the regular army.

Furthermore, he constantly tried to limit the army’s influence in political matters, creating

a depoliticized military with limited resources. The Tunisian military also stands out in

the region by its lack of corruption and cronyism. Instead of relying on the armed forces,

Ben Ali used the internal security and intelligence agencies as his power base, which

were significantly larger, and given more resources, than the regular military (Lutterbeck,

2013, pp. 21–22).

36

4.3.3 Private Benefits under Zine el‐Abidine Ben Ali 

The most obvious beneficiaries of the Tunisian regime prior to the revolution were the

Ben Ali and Trabelsi families. It is estimated that their families together controlled nearly

50 percent of the Tunisian business sector. The President’s second wife, Leila Ben Ali

(formerly Trabelsi) was particularly infamous for her extravagant lifestyle supported with

public funds. In addition to this inner-most circle of beneficiaries, a number of top

officials in the party and government were paid off to ensure their continued support for

the incumbent (Murphy, 2011). In the course of privatization of the economy, which had

been underway since the 1980s, these close associates of the government had been able to

benefit from the growing private sector (Murphy, 2011). At the same time, the Tunisian

private sector continued to be dominated by small firms, struggling to survive rather than

grow, unable to respond to the growing unemployment and poverty rates (Alexander,

2010).

As mentioned above, the social base of the RCD shifted during Ben Ali’s rule as

privatization efforts accelerated. The alliance between this new base, the rural and urban

economic elites, and the regime, was mutually beneficial. In the words of Payne, “the

new ruling elite was united not so much by its institutional basis as by a common

allegiance to the (economic) reform policies” (Payne, 1991, 144-45, in King, 2003, 137).

And while the economic reforms undertaken in this period were to some extent aimed to

address real needs, they were also designed to redistribute income and access to land to

these notables. In other words, the large landowners who had been privileged during the

French protectorate but neglected under Bourguiba, were now enriched and empowered

by the Ben Ali regime. This was perhaps most obvious through the distribution of

300,000 hectares of cooperatively held agricultural land exclusively to large landowners

in the 1980s and 1990s. The rural elites not only gained access to more agricultural land,

they were also enabled to diversify their investments to other sectors than the

agricultural; access to the transport, construction, and hotel management sectors was

aided by preferential access to government and private credit (King, 1998, 2003).

As privatization policies in many ways naturally disadvantaged the rural masses,

the workers and the peasants, Ben Ali had to find other ways to co-opt these important

constituents. Indeed, party membership in poor and underdeveloped areas remained high.

Joining the RCD was considered an investment by many hoping for material benefits

37

such as employment for family members. But under Ben Ali, such benefits gradually

diminished, disappointing many of the party members (International Crisis Group, 2011,

p. 9).

In an attempt to gain the support from the less wealthy segments of the

population, Ben Ali offered the leadership of the UGTT, which represented the workers’

interests, access to policymaking as well as closer ties to the leadership and a hegemonic

position in the political arena, shared with the RCD. In return, the union provided its

support for the President and backed him in elections. Having the backing of the UGTT

was crucial for Ben Ali. The trade union had demonstrated its independence and ability to

disrupt the order through the national strike in 1978 and in other open conflicts with the

government , which had shaken the regime fundamentally (King, 2009).

4.3.4 Political Opposition to the Ben Ali Regime 

Under Ben Ali, the political space was opened up to oppositional groups albeit in a

limited manner. While liberal democracy never fully materialized, the country did

transform into some form of an ‘electoral’ democracy, through the introduction of a

certain degree of political pluralism and multiparty competition. Democracy came to gain

new meaning in the Tunisian context. Ben Ali started using language inspired by Western

ideas of liberal democracy, talking about notions such as the rule of law, and individual

rights and liberties. Furthermore, under Ben Ali, the state party to a lesser extent sought

to be the inclusive, catch-all party of the Neo-Destour era. The RCD still aimed to catch a

majority of Tunisians, but the political space was simultaneously opened up, albeit slowly

and not fully, to opposition groups. Manifesting this change, by the end of his first year in

power, Ben Ali, together with sixteen political parties and organizations, signed the

National Pact. The document opened for the inclusion of oppositional elements within

certain boundaries (Alexander, 2010; King, 2003).

The most serious political challenge for Ben Ali at the beginning of his

presidency, in terms of how obviously it contested the status quo, was the Islamic

Movement, the MTI, which later formed a political party, al-Nahda (sometimes referred

to as Ennahda). The MTI was legalized by Ben Ali on the condition that they renounced

violence and accepted the ‘democratic’ rules of engagement (Alexander, 2010; King,

38

1998).7 Both the MTI and the party were led by Rashid Ghannushi until his exile in 1989.

Bourguiba had heavily repressed the MTI and restricted its ability to organize. Ghannushi

was imprisoned until Ben Ali released him, and several other prominent members of the

movement, in 1988. Al-Nahda was banned from participating as a party in the 1989

elections, but were allowed to run as independents, gaining around 15 percent of the

vote. In some of the Tunis suburbs, al-Nahda candidates gained as much as 30 percent of

the vote. Had the al-Nahda candidates been allowed to run as a party, it would have been

the second largest party after the RCD. Even if the 1989 elections did not give the

Islamists any real power, the results did establish them as a political factor for the

government to consider (Perkins, 2014).

During the 1990s and early 2000s, al-Nahda displayed little political activism.

Restrained by the imprisonment or exile of thousands of its members and activists, al-

Nahda virtually disappeared from political life in these years. But the Islamists were not

the only oppositional players in Ben Ali’s Tunisia. In 2010, there were eight legal

opposition parties in addition to the RCD. In spite of the restrictions that did exist on

freedom of expression, the reforms instituted by Ben Ali enabled these parties to make

their voices heard; “[Ben Ali’s] reforms have created formal space for public discourse

and engagement that did not exist under Bourguiba.” (Alexander, 2010, p. 115). The

three main oppositional parties, the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), the Tajdid

Movement, and the Democratic Front for Labor and Freedom (FDTL), were given a

space to participate in the day-to-day political life, even if they faced some restrictions

(International Crisis Group, 2011).

A sign of the pragmatism on behalf of both the Islamist and the secular-left

opposition, in 2005 these seemingly disparate groupings came together to form the 18th

of

October Front. The Front was a coalition between the moderate Islamists of al-Nahda

and other oppositional elements including liberals, leftists, centrists and nationalists. The

Front united under three principles; “opposing authoritarianism, ending corruption, and

restoring civil liberties” (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012, p. 199). This Left-Islamist alliance

was central in the 2011 uprisings and came together after the elections to form a broad

interim government (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012).

7 The MTI later formed a political party, al-Nahda, which won nearly 14 percent of the vote in the 1989

elections, offering the only challenge to RCD hegemony (King, 1998).

39

The persistence on part of the Islamists in spite of the government bans and

imprisonments implies not only widespread grass root support of the movement, but also

that its leaders believed there to be an opportunity in the future to compete for power and

become part of the ruling coalition. Similarly, the organization of the secular-left

opposition and its alliance with the Islamists indicates a pragmatic approach hinged on

the assumption that political compromise between ideological enemies had the potential

of breaking Ben Ali’s long-standing autocracy.

4.3.5 Conclusion Tunisian MWC 

The answer to who belonged to Tunisia’s MWC under Ben Ali is complex; on the

one hand it seems that the regime benefited a relatively small segment of society; the

families of the President and his wife, as well as the wealthy party elites of the

countryside and their urban offshoots. On the other hand, Ben Ali did not seem to be

content with this core support base as he worked hard to gain the support also of the

workers and peasants through co-opting the UGTT, and the land redistribution efforts.

This desire to appease and co-opt different societal interests left Ben Ali with a relatively

broad MWC. Opposition groups, although facing severe restrictions in the political arena,

persisted as a result of their belief that they could influence politics.

4.4 Syria’s Minimum Winning Coalition under Bashar al‐Asad 2000‐2011 

4.4.1 Selectorate Membership 

Parliamentary elections in Syria have been held approximately every four years since the

1970s. But whether the right to select the parliament equals any real influence over

political outcomes in the country is highly questionable. The Syrian legislature is neither

independent nor particularly active; all laws passed by the parliament have been

introduced by the government. Furthermore, independents and legal opposition parties

are allocated a predetermined share, around 30 percent, of the total 250 parliamentary

seats prior to elections, implying that the competition for power is staged rather than real

(Stacher, 2012).

While Syria under Bashar al-Asad could formally be considered a one-party state,

and the Ba’ath Party indeed was one of the most influential political institutions, the state

40

also bore close resemblance to a more narrow, personalistic dictatorship. One way in

which this was manifested was the fact that party membership was not a sufficient

condition for selecting, and being elected to, the parliament.

Judging from the 2003 parliamentary elections, the first held under Bashar al-

Asad’s rule, money and connections seemed to be important qualifications. According to

one estimation, more than one million dollars was spent by potential candidates in the

election campaign; a figure which is immense in the Syrian context. Moreover, the

independent candidates that won seats were mainly businessmen with connections to the

ruling elites (Stacher, 2012, p. 142).

The President is elected for seven-year terms, although clearly not in free and

open elections. However, while it may seem like Syria has a hereditary system of

executive recruitment, given that Hafiz al-Asad was succeeded by his son, the influence

of the top leadership and the Ba’ath Party executives in this decision rather implies a

system of designation. Since the coming to power of Bashar al-Asad, who was chosen

through a consensus among the ruling elites, he has been backed by the same. The

president in turn has the power to appoint the ministers in the cabinet (Polity IV, 2010a).

In other words, the system of legislative and executive selection in Syria was far

from direct popular election, but neither was it strictly hereditary even if it bore close

resemblance to such a system. Rather, the system was one where a very narrow segment

of the population in practice selected the rulers, and had the opportunity to be selected

themselves.

Several factors indicate that selectorate membership in Syria was quite rigid and

closed, excluding large segments of the population. Haddad argues that a majority of

Syrians are excluded from politics as a result of informal structures which comes “at the

expense of the largest segments of Syrian society, which continue to be disenfranchised

both politically and economically” (Haddad, 2011, p. xii).

The rule of Hafiz al-Asad was based on the deliberate exclusion of some groups;

the Kurds, who made up around twelve percent of the population, as well as landowners

and merchants who were part of the former ruling elite. While the former group felt

excluded on grounds of ethnicity (Hafiz grounded his legitimacy in an Arab nationalist

identity), the latter group were disenfranchised by the government’s socialist policies

(Phillips, 2012, pp. 68–69). As Bashar al-Asad came to power, his economic reforms

41

served to further narrow the social base upon which he relied. Privatization and

liberalization reforms alienated the Sunni Arab workers and peasants, who had previously

been supporters of Hafiz al-Asad’s regime. The poorer segments of Syrian society in

general were excluded by Bashar’s economic policies and his concentration of capital in

the urban centers. As a part of the privatization effort, public sector employment

decreased and many of those who remained saw their salaries cut, forcing them to take on

second jobs. The poor Sunni Arab classes now started to show resentment towards the

enrichment of the mainly Alawi elites (Phillips, 2012, p. 69).

4.4.2 The Support Base of Bashar al‐Asad 

In 2000, Bashar al-Asad inherited a strong centralized state with a narrow but loyal

support base from his father. While power was concentrated in the office of the president,

the regime was vulnerable. The domination of rural Alawi officers provoked resentment

among the Sunni urban community and the Muslim Brotherhood. Hafiz al-Asad had dealt

with these challenges by means of repression, and concentration of power, as well as

enriching his core supporters. To a great extent Bashar al-Asad inherited his father’s loyal

supporters but he ruled the country differently. Since his installment, power has been

more decentralized and the presidency is only one of several power centers (Haddad,

2011; Hinnebusch, 2012).

Syria’s ruling class8, also referred to as the state bourgeoisie, consists of

individuals who hold either official or para-official positions in the state bureaucracy,

ruling party, military forces or public economic sector. Their interest is mainly economic,

providing the imperative to support a certain course of politics (Haddad, 2012). The

ruling class may be described as decentralized in the sense that the ruling elites often

contest and sometimes overrule Bashar al-Asad’s policies. However, when it comes to

regime survival, cohesion and loyalty is strong within this group. The different power

centers are strongly united to protect the president and the regime at any rate. As Stacher

puts it, “because the Syrian system lacks the ability to change the coalition without

8 Whether or not the state bourgeoisie should be referred to as a class, or simply social stratum, can be

discussed. See Haddad (2012) for a discussion on this.

42

inviting the collapse of the regime, the senior elites have to unify behind force to save the

regime” (Stacher, 2012, p. 112).

For the last three decades, as privatization efforts intensified, members of the state

bourgeoisie have been approaching business leaders in order to form informal business

networks to promote mutually favorable deals, with the effect of creating a new economic

elite. Given the rural-urban tensions and the lack of trust, at the group level, between the

Alawi rulers and the Sunni business community, the process of building alliances and

cooperation between the state and the business elites was slow and careful. Eventually,

Hafiz al-Asad consolidated the business networks that were to dominate Syrian politics

for decades to come. Together, the state bourgeoisie and the private business elites are

referred to as the “new economic elite”, or the “new bourgeoisie”. According to

estimations they make up around one percent of the Syrian population (Borshchevskaya,

2010; Haddad, 2011, 2012).

In 2005, Bashar al-Asad introduced what he called a ‘social market’ economy.

The initiative was an attempt to formalize the business networks and broaden the support

base of the regime. The success of this endeavor can be questioned; in his attempt to

broaden the coalition, Bashar al-Asad lost many of the old guard, especially from the

Ba’ath party and the unions, and as a result became even more dependent on the family

clan and the state bourgeoisie, ending up narrowing the coalition. Interestingly, it was the

bourgeoisie, and not the Ba’ath party, that funded Asad’s election campaign in 2007. The

‘social market’ initiative also resulted in a shrinking public sector, to the disadvantage of

the great majority of Syrians (Haddad, 2011, 2012; Hinnebusch, 2012).

The role of the military in Syrian politics is worth to note separately. As

mentioned, military officials are included into the state bourgeoisie. The Syrian armed

forces have especially strong ties to the regime. A sign of these close ties, as Bashar al-

Asad was selected to succeed his father, he received military training and promotion to

the highest rank in the army’s hierarchal structure. During the course of Bashar al-Asad’s

rule, the military has been politicized and instrumentalized to sustain his rule. The Syrian

president maintained these patrimonial relations with the military by appointing friends

and family members to the top ranks. In fact, Alawis account for 70 percent of career

soldiers in the Syrian army, compared to their twelve percent share in the general

population (Lutterbeck, 2013, pp. 47–48).

43

While the ethnic factor should not be overstated, it is necessary to consider this

dimension when talking about the ruling coalition in Syria. As mentioned, Alawis had

traditionally been privileged and since the coming to power of Hafiz al-Asad, also given

disproportional influence. Hafiz did however make some efforts to balance the

concentration of Alawis in the ruling elite by promoting prominent Sunni Arab families,

an effort which his son did not undertake. The top leadership, the sector that wield the

most power, came to be dominated by Alawis under Bashar al-Asad. Other minorities,

especially Christians, were also overrepresented among government employees. Sunni

Muslims from the urban centers were included in the new economic elite, especially

within the private component (Haddad, 2011; Hinnebusch, 2012; Phillips, 2012).

4.4.3 Private Benefits under Bashar al‐Asad 

It clear that members of the new economic elite, both the state and private components,

benefited politically and economically from the Asad regime. The state bourgeoisie can

be divided into different tiers, starting with the top leadership. While these do not all have

official posts, they are directly connected to the Asad family. The family factor is not

irrelevant here; the Asad, the Shalish and the Makhlouf families9, as well as a few more,

dominate the top of the Syrian elites. Together, they control both public sectors, such as

oil, as well as private sector markets including communication and information

technology. The continuity and low turnover within this class has allowed them to

accumulate immense personal wealth over the past three decades (Borshchevskaya, 2010;

Haddad, 2012).

Second, military generals, heads of the security apparatuses and several other

loyal deputies, benefit from their support of the regime in terms of personal privileges as

well as from their partnerships with private businesses. This way, these individuals have

also been able to amass significant wealth (Haddad, 2012).

Third, several hundred civil servants, party functionaries, and heads of labor

unions, also exchange political loyalty for personal gain. The mutual nature of the

relation between these supporters and the regime is illustrated by Haddad; “Loyalty, often

9 The Shalish family is connected to the Asads through Hafiz al-Asads sister who married in to the Shalish

family. The Makhloufs are connected to the Asads through Hafiz al-Asads wife, Anisa, who was born

Makhlouf.

44

manifested by party membership and backing from a member of the regime elite, is

usually a prerequisite for such post holders to become far more powerful, and richer, than

their post may suggest.” (Haddad, 2012, p. 241).

Finally, salaried bureaucrats receive benefits on in the shape of subsidies on food,

education, and health in return for their support for the state (Borshchevskaya, 2010;

Haddad, 2011, 2012).

The private component of the new economic elite in Syria consists of business

actors connected to the state bourgeoisie through largely informal networks. Research

shows how these private actors have been allowed to wield significant influence over

policy. The highly entrenched networks between the state and private elites has had a

deteriorating effect on the Syrian economy. The business elites are through their

privileged positions, enabled to avoid regulation and manipulate the law in a way that has

been “ultimately detrimental to economic efficiency and productivity.” (Haddad, p. 84).

The interests of these elites have prevented new actors from entering and developing

various sectors of the Syrian economy. Successful new businesses are prevented must

struggle to maintain their independence; as soon as they become profitable, a share of the

profit must go to the government, or it will not be allowed to operate (Borshchevskaya,

2010).

4.4.4 Political Opposition to the Asad Regime 

Elections in Syria were far from competitive, and the right to political organization and

expression are severely limited. In spite of calling itself a multiparty state, Syria under the

Asads remained for all intents and purposes ruled by an autocratic regime (Polity IV,

2010a).

It is difficult to talk about any independent political groups or candidates in Syria.

In 1972, Hafiz al-Asad created the Progressive National Front (PNF), with seven political

groups in addition to his own Ba’ath party. However, rather than giving these parties a

platform, the PNF was designed to fragment the opposition and make them “subservient

to the ruling party in exchange for parliamentary and ministerial representation.”

(Stacher, 2012, p. 126). The same goes for the agricultural union; rather than representing

the interests of the rural population in opposition to the government, it operated to

45

support the regime and allowed it to reinforce the power and reach of the Ba’ath (Stacher,

2012). Since 1990, the government permitted independent candidates to run for a limited

number of seats in the People’s Council, but their autonomy is severely restricted.

Instead, the allocation of seats to the National Assembly is designed to ensure a

permanent absolute majority for the PNF; 167 of the 250 seats (Polity IV, 2010a).

Traditionally, the strongest opposition faction in Syria has been the Islamists,

organized as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB). Even though the SMB has not been

allowed to participate in political life within Syria, they have to some extent continued to

operate from outside. After the SMB insurrection in the early 1980s and Hafiz al-Asad’s

brutal repression of the Brotherhood in Hama, the former president sought to incorporate

elements of moderate Islam into his rule in an attempt to sideline the more radical

version. Bashar continued this effort and managed to limit Islamist influence to non-

political issues. The SMB subsequently operated mainly outside of the country, allying

with the Iraqi Ba’ath party among others. In 2002, after renouncing violence, they met

with other opposition groups in London and issued the National Pact in Syria. Another

program was published in 2004, also indicating a moderation of the Islamist group

(Hinnebusch, 2012; Talhamy, 2012).

4.4.5 Conclusion Syrian MWC  

In sum, the core supporters of the Syrian regime, without which support the survival of

the regime would be seriously threatened, can be found within the so called new

economic elite, which contained both private and public components. A small portion of

society, comprised of individuals from influential backgrounds such as the political

leadership, the military, the bureaucracy, and the business world, not only wield political

power but also benefit in material terms from their positions. The criteria for membership

in this coalition seem to be rigid and difficult to attain. Becoming member of the ruling

party is not sufficient; networks and personal connections play an important role. As a

result of the strong concentration of power in this narrow coalition, stable and enduring

political groups are difficult to find. Opportunities to join or challenge the ruling coalition

through legal means were close to inexistent under the Asads, with the result that

independent opposition groups were close to nonexistent. The exception is the Syrian

46

Muslim Brotherhood. But while the SMB has persisted for decades, it has almost

exclusively operated from outside of Syria, and it is unclear how it would act in case of a

regime change in the future.

4.5 The Tunisian Uprising and State Repression 

4.5.1 Popular Dissent in Tunisia December 2010–January 2011  

The trigger for the uprising in Tunisia, and indeed the spark that lit the entire wave of

Arab uprisings, was the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi on

December 17, 2010 in the town of Sidi Bouzid. Subsequently, riots, mostly involving

local youth, broke out in Sidi Bouzid and lasted for several days. On December 27,

“thousands of people” gathered in Tunis to show their solidarity with the protesters in

Sidi Bouzid, and to show their discontent with the government (Honwana, 2013, p. 74).

The protests were also highly coordinated; exemplified by the organization of trade

unions, lawyers’ and doctors’ associations. The successful strike by “virtually all of the

country’s lawyers” especially required a high degree of coordination (Murphy, 2011;

Perkins, 2014, p. 223). As such, in terms of participation, the protests can be defined as

‘mass protests’ according to the NAVCO 2.0 definition (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013).

After a week of protests, the uprising spread to other parts of the country and

intensified, and also acquired a political character. While the demands of the

demonstrators had initially concerned mainly socio-economic issues, including

corruption and unemployment, calls for regime change and the ousting of Ben Ali were

now starting to be heard (Honwana, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2011; Murphy,

2011).

4.5.2 Repression Tactics and Outcomes 

According to the SIPRI Yearbook, the level of violence in Tunisia, referring to the

number of people killed in Arab Spring-related violence, was classified as intermediate.

This means that between 25-999 people were killed (Allansson et al., 2012). According to

a senior UN official, Juan Mendez, around 300 people were killed in the December-

January uprising in Tunisia (Mustapha Ajbaili, 2011). In addition, the regime did not

seem to deliberately target reporters. Between December 17, 2010, and January 14, 2011,

“only” six journalists were arrested in Tunisia (Reporters Without Borders, 2011).

47

Qualitative sources also contribute to the picture that the regime in Tunisia responded to

the uprising in a limited manner, mixing concession and repression. Furthermore, when

lethal tactics were deployed, this was mostly by the police forces and not the regular

army (Lutterbeck, 2013, pp. 22–23).

Responding to the initial protests in Sidi Bouzid, the Tunisian police used non-

lethal tactics such as tear gas and police brutality, arresting and injuring several. A week

or so into the protests, the police forces turned to using lethal repression tactics. In

Menzel Bouazaiane, on December 24, two people died after being shot by the police

during a demonstration (Honwana, 2013). In the first weeks of the uprising, Ben Ali’s

police forces continued to shoot at protesters. By January 13, nearly 70 protesters had

been killed according to official sources (Murphy, 2011).

The killings of protesters during the uprising in Tunisia seem to have been mostly

the results of confrontations between demonstrators and police (even though the police

most likely had weapons that outweighed those of the demonstrators), where police

officers started shooting at individuals which they reportedly perceived as a “threat to

their own safety” (Perkins, 2014, p. 226). While this in no way legitimize the killings, it

does indicate that the decision to employ lethal tactics against the protesters was not

highly systematic nor deliberated. It should also be mentioned that there are reports of

snipers shooting at protesters during the uprising, with lethal outcomes. However, the

identity and origins of these snipers remains uncertain (Ryan, 2013), for which reason

their actions cannot be clearly defined as ‘state repression’ in the framework of this

study.

Throughout the uprising, Ben Ali constantly mixed repression with concession,

making grand promises of reforms. And while civilians were being killed by his police

forces, he seemed to show some remorse at this, promising to launch an investigation into

the killing of civilians thus far in the uprising. Nevertheless, the use of lethal tactics

remained limited, and mainly perpetrated by members of the police corps. A full-blown

assault on the protesters was avoided as the army chief of staff, Rachid Ammar, refused

to order his troops to fire on protesters (Murphy, 2011).

The refusal of the army chief to fire on protesters is noteworthy. As Ben Ali

started to realize that his mix of repression and concession did not succeed to contain the

protest movement quickly enough, he ordered the army, which was already present on the

48

streets, to crack down on the demonstrators with force. Ammar ignored these orders, and

instead informed Ben Ali that the will of the people was for him to resign. As long as he

defied the people’s wishes, Ammar warned, no level of security could guarantee the

President’s safety (Murphy, 2011; Perkins, 2014).

4.6 The Syrian Uprising and State Repression 

4.6.1 Popular Dissent in Syria March – April 2011 

As the Arab Spring started to spread across the region in early 2011, the Syrian regime

believed itself to be different, and immune to the upheavals experienced by its neighbors.

This assumption would soon prove to be mistaken. In February of 2011, minor protests

started to break out in Syria, but were quickly contained by the regime. However, on

March 18, after Friday prayers, thousands of protesters gathered in the town of Daraa in

the southwest of the country. The trigger for this gathering was the arrest and torture of

some young boys who had sprayed anti-government graffiti on their school.

The protests were mostly peaceful for the first few months. However, there were

incidents where damage was inflicted on government offices such as the Ba’ath Party

headquarters, the governor’s office and the headquarters of the security forces. The

gatherings were coordinated via social media and cell phones, and usually took place

after Friday prayers or funerals of victims of the government crackdown.

The protesters soon started to demand the removal of Bashar al-Asad, as well as

free and fair elections, implying that the participants of the uprising expressed maximalist

goals (Allansson et al., 2012; Lesch, 2012).

4.6.2 Repression Tactics and Outcomes  

In Syria, the level of violence in 2011 was defined as high by the SIPRI Yearbook

(Allansson et al., 2012), meaning that more than one thousand deaths were recorded in

Arab Spring-related violence in that year. While this data does not allow for monthly

disaggregation, it serves as an indication. Furthermore, qualitative data tells us that

repression was high already from the outset of the protests with many civilians killed.

Moreover, not only did repression result in a high number of deaths; between March and

April 2011, 34 journalists were arrested by the regular army in Syria, indicating that the

49

assault on journalists was a deliberate strategy on behalf of the regime forces (Reporters

Without Borders, 2013).

The security services almost immediately started using lethal tactics in response

to the protests. On March 18 in Daraa, the government forces first tried to stop the

protests using tear gas and water ammunitions but subsequently used live ammunition to

kill four people. This date is recorded by SIPRI as the first death connected to Arab

Spring-related violence in the country. As protests continued, the security forces

combined non-lethal tactics such as mass arrests, systematic torture of detainees, deprival

of medical treatment to wounded persons, with the use of snipers to kill protesters

(Allansson et al., 2012).

Following protests on March 23, security agents raided the Omari mosque where

wounded protesters were being treated, killing at least fifteen civilians and wounding

hundreds. Government forces surrounded Daraa that evening, hoping to contain the

protests and prevent it from spreading to other cities (Lesch, 2012).

The uprising quickly spread to other locations, and within a month from the start

of the protests, the government then started to besiege and shell entire cities, using tanks

and snipers against the demonstrators (Allansson et al., 2012; Nepstad, 2011). Hard-liners

within the regime were empowered by the ongoing civil instability and triumphed over

those who were in favor of a negotiated solution. These hard-liners in the government

and security forces, led by Bashar’s younger brother Maher, supported the idea that

tolerance would lead to more unrest, and as such prompted the use of excessive violence

(Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 109; Phillips, 2012, p. 71).

Not only the use of lethal tactics, but the deployment of the security forces to use

such systematic violence against the protesters is telling. The siege and shelling of an

entire city indicates a certain level of planning and deliberation from the top ranks of the

political and military leadership.

4.7 Loyalty and Defections in Tunisia 

The Tunisian uprising started as a protest against deteriorating socio-economic

conditions. Unemployment rates had been high for years, especially for youth. As a result

poverty levels were high, especially in the rural and southern areas. At the same time, the

protests were not constricted to the poor and marginalized, but came to include people

50

from different areas and social classes (Honwana, 2013; Murphy, 2011). Honwana (2013,

p. 48) identifies four groups that played significant roles in the uprising; young cyber

activists, unemployed university graduates, civil society organizations, and political

opposition parties. The two first groups had a triggering role in the uprising; they were

the ones primarily marginalized by poverty and unemployment, and frustrated by the lack

of political rights and freedoms. The protest movement started in regions rid by poverty

and unemployment, but later spread to the wealthier coastal regions. The Arab Barometer

Study10

shows that participation in the uprising was not significantly related to

unemployment or poverty, implying that also the wealthier, more privileged classes

participated in the uprising. In fact, the middle class was overrepresented in the protests

compared to their size in the population. (Beissinger, 2012; Perkins, 2014, p. 223).

Civil society had an important role in taking the uprising to the next level and

spreading the movement beyond the youth. As mentioned, the lawyers’ association

staged a nationwide strike. The UGTT also assumed an important role in the uprising.

The actions of the national trade union is especially interesting as it had been such crucial

ally to the Tunisian regime both under Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Initially, the UGTT acted

as a mediator between the protesters and the government, but not long after protests

started spreading across Tunisia, local and regional UGTT unions joined the protest

movement. It did not take long for the union’s national leadership to follow their lead and

on January 11, 2011, they called for peaceful marches across the country. A few days

later, the UGTT organized the national strike which in retrospect is viewed as a turning

point for the uprising, bringing about the resignation and departure of President Ben Ali

(Honwana, 2013, pp. 66–67; International Crisis Group, 2011, pp. 5–6).

The legal opposition parties played a limited role in the uprising. As a result of

their limited independence, they took their time, but eventually they did act in support of

the protest movement. Illegal leftist parties supported the demonstrators early on. Al-

Nahda was absent in the beginning of the protests, as a result of the ban on their political

participation, but some activists from the Islamist movement did take part in the uprising

(Honwana, 2013, pp. 68–69). As such, political parties did not have a decisive role in the

10

The Arab Barometer study was conducted in Tunisia in October 2011. A number of questions in the

survey allows for identifying who participated in the revolution, and individual attitudes related to the

revolution. The sample size was 1,196 (Beissinger, 2012, p. 11).

51

uprising, but this is not to say that the protesters were apolitical. Rather, the protest

movement was one driven by a highly politicized youth, supported by influential civil

society organization that helped spread and extend the movement.

In addition, there is evidence that a significant amount of individuals closely

related to the regime and the RCD took part in the protests demanding the resignation of

Ben Ali. The Arab Barometer shows that government employees participated in the

uprising to a relatively high degree. According to the survey, twelve percent of Tunisian

protesters were employed by the government, compared to seven percent in the

population (Beissinger, 2012). Furthermore, many of the protesters were RCD members

who had been politically disillusioned. Interestingly, Sidi Bouzid, where the protests first

started, was an RCD stronghold but not a single loyalist protest was organized there

(International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 9). A quote from an RCD leader demonstrates how a

lack of loyalty among party officials made it difficult to recruit members of the party to

counter the anti-government protests:

When orders were given to mid-level party officials to mobilize their men, their

situation was difficult because much of their rank and file were sympathizing

with the demands of the protesters. Many members of the RCD were opposed to

power that was based on the party but was wielded by two families and the clans

that hovered around them (Crisis Group Interview with Mohammed Gheriani,

former RCD Secretary General, Tunis, 11 February 2011, in International Crisis

Group, 2011, p. 9).

There are reasons to believe that the unwillingness of RCD officials to mobilize

against the uprising was directly related to the low level of material benefits doled out by

the regime. A common reason for joining the RCD was the prospect of receiving material

advantages, for instance in terms of employment opportunities for family members.

When this was not provided to the extent that was expected, loyalty among party officials

seemed to suffer (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 9).

52

4.8 Loyalty and Defections in Syria 

The Syrian uprising initially mobilized those who had been excluded under the Asad

regime. To start with, the protests were concentrated to areas which are considered to be

peripheral in relation to the power centers; villages and medium-sized cities. Protests

reflected a number of different grievances; unemployment, poverty, and corruption, as

well as bans on Islamic practices such as the niqab in schools. Deraa, where the protests

began, is a good example of these conditions. It is a medium-sized rural town in the

periphery, which has suffered not only from government neglect, but also from a long

drought in an already dry region. It is also a town where deteriorating economic

conditions had led to the spread of Islamism among the youth. Furthermore, most of the

early participants in the uprising were Sunni Muslims, many of whom identified as

Islamists (Hinnebusch, 2012, pp. 106–107; Lesch, 2012, pp. 55–57).

By contrast, those areas that remained least active the early stages of the uprising

were generally those where either Asad’s economic policies had been beneficial, such as

Damascus and Aleppo, or those where Alawis were dominant, such as Tartous and

Lattakia (Phillips, 2012, p. 70). Furthermore, when protests did occasionally take place in

areas with strong pro-Asad support bases, the regime was able to mobilize counter-

demonstrations in support of the government (Hinnebusch, 2012).

There has been a high level of cohesion among the segments which are

considered to be part of the MWC in Syria. The ruling coalition, and especially the state

bourgeoisie, but also the economic elite, remained remarkably intact during the first

month of the uprising. Surprisingly few defections occurred, and mainly at the lower and

lower-middle levels within the army. (Haddad, 2012, p. 231). Even a year into the

uprising, the Syrian military remained intact. No entire units had by that time defected,

and the military had avoided the move of heavy weapons from the hands of the state to

the rebels (Phillips, 2012, p. 73).

The regime was able to mobilize loyalists to repress the uprising. Mainly Alawis

were recruited into “thuggish militias”, so called Shabihas, and into the military reserves.

In the early stages of the uprising, these Shabiha militias were responsible for most of the

violence against the largely peaceful demonstrators. Phillips argues that the fear among

53

regime supporters was one factor motivating them to take part in the repression of the

uprising:

“The loyalists’ motives vary. Some genuinely support the regime… More likely is that

many fear for their fate if the regime collapses. Christians are wary of the terrible fate of

their Iraqi co-religionists after Saddam Hussein’s demise, with over a quarter fleeing

targeted sectarian killings… The Alawites … also fear for their future, concerned that

they will be blamed for Assad’s violence” (Phillips, 2012, p. 73)

Hinnebusch also relates the willingness of members of the Alawi sect to join the

regime in suppressing the uprising to their privileged position; “with much to lose if the

regime fell, they remained its most reliable shock troops.” (Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 108).

   

54

5. Analysis

The analysis will begin by a between-case comparison of each variable, followed by a

summation of these findings. I will then return to the causal chain and assess to what

extent I found evidence for it in the empirics. Subsequently, alternative explanations will

be presented followed by a brief discussion of the limitations of the study.

5.1 Between‐Case Comparison of Minimum Winning Coalition 

As the case studies have shown, both Tunisia and Syria were ruled with the support of a,

more or less clearly defined, set of supporters, which were considered by the leaders of

each country to be crucial to the regime’s survival. These supporters all received some

amount of private benefits in return for their political loyalty. While both countries were

indeed autocratic, and as such excluded segments of society, the empirical findings

indicate that Tunisia’s minimum winning coalition was broader than the Syrian.

To begin with, the selection of the Tunisian legislature and executive was mainly

based in the RCD. The RCD has a legacy as a broad, all-inclusive mass party that

attended to all segments of the population. While the state party in recent years moved

more towards land-owning influential elites, it maintained the ambition to represent the

interests of all segments of the Tunisian population. As such, it served as a vehicle for

political participation for most Tunisians, obviously with the exception of those

belonging to opposition parties. While opposition parties were granted a share of

parliamentary seats, the system was constructed in such a sense that they could never

gain majority. The Islamists were subject to harsher means of exclusion, but even this

group was allowed limited participation.

In Syria, the legislative and executive selection was more narrowly defined. To

select the members of the ruling coalition, and to be able to be selected, resources in

terms of financial means, and not least connections within the ruling elites, were crucial.

Even the so-called independent candidates in the legislative elections were well-

connected businessmen with clear ties to the regime. Furthermore, the regime based its

rule on the deliberate exclusion of certain segments of the population.

As regards the political support base of the regime, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali

stepped into office without any preexisting alliances or support base to draw from.

55

Instead, the Tunisian President worked hard to co-opt different sectors of society

throughout his decades in power, not least through the instrumentalization of democratic

reforms and ‘multiparty’ elections. Ben Ali incorporated different social groupings into

his MWC; the core made up of his and his wife’s families, while the broader coalition

included the RCD through which he enriched the rural elites, as well as the UGTT

representing the interests of workers and the rural masses. Distributing the state resource

pie between that many different actors left each of them with a relatively small share.

Trying to appease rich landowners while co-opting the national workers’ union and the

peasants of the countryside left no one happy. With the exception of the small circle of

family members, patronage was handed out mainly in terms of beneficial policies. As

such, trying to appease these fundamentally different social sectors meant that, inevitably,

patronage was only superficial. This is not to say that the Ben Ali had no loyal

supporters. His closest circles, mainly family members and some top officials, were

personally enriched by his rule to such an extent that they remained loyal. But Ben Ali’s

appeasement strategies directed at different segments of Tunisian society indicated that

this core was not a sufficient minimum winning coalition by itself.

By contrast, Bashar al-Asad inherited his father’s tight-knit, small, core of

supporters which support together with that of the powerful businessmen of the new

economic elite, was enough to uphold the survival of his regime. The inclusion of persons

and groups into the MWC from important political, economic, and military functions was

crucial to the political viability of this narrow coalition. Several of the top officials within

the armed forces and other institutions were personal friends or relatives of the president.

In this sense, the boundaries of the ruling coalition were quite rigid and inflexible.

Bashar’s attempts to exchange members of the old guard for his own personal appointees,

served to narrow the ruling coalition even further, increasing his dependence on a couple

of influential families, including his own. Furthermore, the members of the Syrian MWC

received benefits not only in terms of favorable policies, but personal enrichment and

control over entire business sectors. The loyalty instilled through personal ties and an

institutionalized system of patronage was infallible.

The strong distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in Syria, and the fact that

the insiders were clearly outnumbered by the outsiders, further served to amplify fears

among those belonging to the ruling coalition, of exclusion in the future. In Tunisia on

56

the other hand, those benefiting from the regime were not as clearly defined. As such, it

would be more difficult to exclude these in case of regime change.

In sum, both Tunisia and Syria were before the revolutions, on paper, one-party

states, but portrayed significant differences when it comes to the coalition of supporters

that upheld the regimes. Tunisia’s history of inclusion of different segments of society

and the tendency of Ben Ali to appease and co-opt a multitude of interests to uphold his

rule meant that the MWC was relatively broad, typical of the authoritarian one-party

state. In Syria under Bashar al-Asad, on the other hand, the legacy of ruling by exclusion

of certain clearly defined groups, and the strong patronage system, meant that Syria was

for all intents and purposes a narrow MWC state.

5.2 Between‐Case Comparison of State Repression 

Both Tunisia and Syria experienced popular uprisings in 2010–2011, and the regimes

responded with varying degrees of repression in the first month since the start of the

protests.

As protests erupted in Tunisia in late 2010, the state’s repression tactics in the

first month seemed to be of dual nature. While on the one hand Ben Ali ordered his

police forces to fire on protesters to contain the uprising, he also showed restraint in his

response, mixing repression with concessions. Additionally, in some instances where

violence got out of hand, it seems as if these initiatives were not planned nor deliberated

to any greater extent. Non-lethal tactics, such as arrests, were not employed to any greater

extent either. The outcomes demonstrate this fact; “only” six journalists were detained in

the first month. The refusal of the army chief to deploy his forces against the protesters is

a critical fact in the Tunisian case. Without the backing of the armed forces, coupled with

the diminishing overall support for his regime, Ben Ali could not fulfill his plan to

repress the uprising, and the number of deaths was limited. As such, the tactics and

outcomes of the state repression as a response to the Tunisian uprising can de defined as

intermediate in severity.

The regime response to the Syrian uprising in the spring of 2011 was not as

limited in nature. Both the tactics and outcomes of state repression in the first month

demonstrate a high level of deliberation behind the extremely violent response. Severe

57

repression tactics were used by the regime forces, on orders from the leadership. The

armed forces were deployed to surround and shell entire cities, and snipers fired at

demonstrators. These harsh, lethal tactics resulted in over one thousand deaths in the first

year of the uprising. Non-lethal tactics were used as well, resulting in the detainment of

34 journalists in the first month since the start of the uprising. As follows, it can be

concluded that state repression as a response to the popular dissent in Syria can be

classified as high in severity.

5.3 Summary of findings 

In sum, after analyzing the empirical findings of the explanatory and outcome variables

in both cases, it can be concluded that the hypothesis was supported, and a correlation

was found between the size of the minimum winning coalition, and the severity of state

repression as a response to popular dissent. Tunisia had a relatively broad winning

coalition under President Ben Ali, and in response to the 2010-2011 uprising, state

repression was intermediate. In Syria, the minimum winning coalition was narrow and

the severity of state repression as a response to the 2011 uprising was high. This is

demonstrated in the table below.

Case Minimum Winning

Coalition

State Repression as

a Response to

Popular Dissent

Support for

Hypothesis

Tunisia Relatively broad Intermediate Yes

Syria Narrow High Yes

Table 5. Illustration of empirical findings

5.4 The Causal Chain 

I will now return to the causal chain presented in the beginning of this thesis, presenting

how the empirical results corresponds with the hypothesized chain of events. To recap, I

theorized that if a relationship exists between MWC size and repression severity, I would

find that a popular uprising is more likely to include members of the MWC in a country

58

with a broad MWC. Also, where there is a broad MWC, I would expect members of the

MWC to defect from the regime to a higher extent, rather than participate in the

repression the uprising. The leadership will therefore face difficulties in recruiting

members from its support base to repress the uprising in countries with broad MWCs.

The contrary was expected for countries with a narrow MWC. As shown in the empirical

section, I found support for the existence of a causal link between the suggested

explanatory and outcome variables.

In Tunisia, the uprising mobilized members of the MWC. While the protests were

started in areas affected by high levels of poverty and unemployment, they soon came to

include participants from within the regime’s MWC. The high participation rate of

government employees in the protests is especially noteworthy as it is a clear example of

how members of the MWC defected from the side of the regime. The UGTT took an

important role in the uprising, in spite of the fact that its leadership had been closely tied

to, and co-opted by, the Tunisian regime. The trade union had been considered by Ben

Ali as a crucial component of his MWC. Yet, as the opportunity arose to join the protests

demanding the president’s resignation, the national leadership of the union chimed in.

Finally, it was the defection of the army chief, in combination with the lack of

loyalty within the support base of the regime, that prevented repression from taking on

larger proportions, and forced Ben Ali to depart. In his last days as president of Tunisia,

Ben Ali was ultimately alone, a fact that convinced him that departure was the only

option. Even his own army had turned its back on him, refusing his orders to use force

against the protesters demanding his resignation. As if this were not enough, the very

crew that had escorted Ben Ali into exile had ignored his orders to stand by and await

further instructions. The former president had intended to return to Tunisia once the

uprising had quieted down, but was unable to do so as the presidential aircraft left

without him (Perkins, 2014, p. 228). This final example is an illustration of how the lack

of a narrow, tight-knit coalition of supporters left Ben Ali without the option to stay and

fight, forcing him to step down and hand over power.

The fact that members of the MWC in Tunisia defected to join or support the

protest movement indicates that they did not experience any greater fear of permanent

exclusion in the case of regime change. Rather, they likely believed that they would

benefit more from a situation in which the current regime was replaced, in spite of the

59

fact that they were included in the MWC. The defections and lack of loyalty were also

demonstrably a result of the perceived shortcomings in private benefits from the regime.

The relatively low levels of loyalty among MWC members, demonstrated by defections,

prevented state repression of the uprising from increasing in severity, and ultimately

forced Ben Ali into exile.

Figure 2. Causal chain for Tunisia.

The Syrian uprising has turned out to be the longest lasting, and most deadly,

among the revolutions of the Arab Spring. The deliberate, large-scale use of lethal tactics

against civilians could not have been possible without the strong cohesion within the

regime’s support base in the early stages of the revolution. The low rate of defections

from within the MWC enabled the regime to violently repress the uprising. Loyalists

were recruited to take part in the repression against the dissenters, and organized

counterdemonstrations in favor of the regime. Furthermore, those participating in the

uprising were mainly individuals from sectors not included in the regime’s MWC. The

initial protests were mainly concentrated to areas in the periphery, where regime support

had traditionally been low as a result of disenfranchisement and government neglect.

The low degree of defections from the MWC in Syria during the uprising was a

result of the high level of private benefits paid by the leadership to the members of the

coalition, as well as their fear of exclusion in case of regime change. Members of the

MWC likely feared exclusion in the future both because of their high level of private

benefits, and due to the awareness that minority groups are more easily excluded and

Relatively broad MWC 

Low level of private 

benfeits per member 

No great fear of future exclusion 

Lack of loyalty 

(defections) 

Severity of state 

repression = intermediate 

60

even persecuted. The high degree of loyalty towards the regime meant that members of

the MWC were willing to participate in repression of the uprising, allowing Bashar al-

Asad to stay in Damascus and enabling an increased severity of state repression of the

uprising.

Figure 3. Causal chain for Syria

5.5 Additional Observations and Alternative Explanations  

5.5.1 Ethnicity 

As mentioned in the section on previous research, many studies explaining violent

outcomes have focused on ethnicity. Heger and Salehyan (2007) used size of the leader’s

ethnic group as a proxy for minimum winning coalition size when testing for the effect

on conflict severity. I have argued that minority ethnic rule is not a sufficient explanation

for repression severity. The concept of MWC contains more than ethnic belonging.

Having said that, ethnicity does indeed provide a natural basis for inclusion and

exclusion. Surely, it played a role in Syria, which can be seen from the Alawi

overrepresentation in the military for instance. At the same time, not all Alawis were

included in the winning coalition, and not all members of the MWC were Alawis. In

Syria, well-connected Sunni businessmen were an important component of the ruling

coalition. Capital and influence can thus trump ethnicity. Also, other minorities,

especially Christians, were included in the winning coalition. In Tunisia, on the other

Narrow MWC 

High level of private 

benfeits per member 

Fear of future 

exclusion 

High degree of loyalty (low level of defections) 

Severity of state 

repression = high 

61

hand, ethnicity is not a salient cleavage, but other bases for identification and belonging

do exist.

The factor of interest is then not the size of different ethnic groups in a country,

but rather factors that may influence when and how different ideas of group belonging

may be activated. In Syria, the notion of belonging on basis of adherence to the Alawi

‘tribe’ has been activated in different times by different rulers, from the French to the

current regime. In Tunisia, tribal and other identities have at different points in time been

activated for various purposes. Under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, these means for

distinguishing between people were not particularly salient, and even underplayed for

nationalist purposes (al-Qassemi, 2012). However, since 2011, tribal tensions in Tunisia

have increased and even led to deadly clashes (al-Jazeera, 2011).

In sum, the existence of reinforcing ethnic cleavages can exacerbate a conflict and

serve to increase fears among members of the ruling coalition in case of a challenge

against the incumbent. Alawis who did not support Asad or benefit from his rule

probably fear for exclusion simply by ethnic association. In other words, it is not

ethnicity as such which makes a difference for violent outcomes but rather the activation

of identities and the instrumentalization of policies of inclusion and exclusion. The

concept of minimum winning coalition and the mechanisms proposed in this study for

explaining violent repression can indeed account for such developments in a more

proficient manner than the ethnic makeup of a country.

5.5.2 The role of armed forces 

Several studies have emphasized the importance role and actions of the armed forces for

the success of resistance movements (Bellin, 2004; Lutterbeck, 2013; Nepstad, 2011).

The basic argument is that the success of a resistance movement in deposing the regime

depends on the military to shift allegiance from the state to the opposition. This claim is

consistent with the empirical evidence from Tunisia and Syria, but also from Egypt. In

Tunisia and Egypt, the military shifted their allegiance to the side of the people

demanding regime change. In both countries, the incumbent was ousted. In Syria, on the

other hand, the military remained loyal to the regime and indeed, Bashar al-Asad is still

in Damascus. The success of resistance movements can be assumed to be highly

62

correlated to repression severity as a response to popular uprisings, meaning that this

could be seen as an alternative explanation.

However, this does not necessarily disprove the argument that the size of the

MWC explains variation in severity of state repression as a response to popular uprisings.

Indeed, one of the factors which Bellin (2004) argues increases the willingness of the

armed forces to support political reform (i.e. take the side of the opposition), is the level

of institutionalization of the armed forces. A high level of institutionalization here refers

to a bureaucratic meritocracy. By contrast, in more patrimonial systems where “discipline

is maintained through the exploitation of primordial cleavage”, regimes may build “a

loyal base through selective favoritism and discretionary patronage” (Bellin, 2004, p.

145). In such systems, officers cannot see a future separated from the state, and as such

believe they will be ruined by reform. In other words, Bellin’s argument and causal

mechanism is very similar to the one put forward in this thesis. The question then, is

whether or not it is sufficient to look at the role of the armed forces to explain the success

of popular uprisings, and thus the severity of state repression in response to such events.

The broader picture is that it does not only matter if the military remains loyal to

the regime. The ability of a regime to repress a popular dissent movement depends on the

loyalty of the support base at large. The MWC is a combination of groups and individuals

without which the regime cannot survive. When individuals, or entire segments, of the

MWC start defecting, the regime loses the pillars on which it has rested and is forced to

end its repression of the popular challengers.

In order to repress an uprising, there is no denying that a regime needs someone to

exercise the use of force against those challenging its power. Theoretically, if members of

the military start defecting, the regime can recruit soldiers from other loyalist groups in

society. The overall level of loyalty (which I argue is a result of the size of the MWC)

will ultimately be the determinant of the severity of repression. In cases when the military

shifts allegiance to the opposition, this indicates that other members of the MWC are

disloyal to the regime as well. As in the case of Tunisia, it was not only the army chief

who denied to follow the president’s orders. In fact, other groups such as the UGTT and

the RCD were the first to reject the incumbent and go over to the side of the opposition.

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5.6 Limitations 

The choice of research design presents several limitations to the results of the study.

which will be discussed in the following section. Case selection in qualitative studies is

always fraught with potential issues, which need to be recognized. One central issue is

the fact that in contrast to quantitative studies, case studies do not allow for

randomization in the case selection, which introduces the possibility of selection bias.

Since the task of selecting cases falls upon the researcher, there is a risk that cases will be

selectively chosen to prove the hypothesis (George & Bennet, 2005; Gerring, 2007). This

was a risk also in this study. While the method of case selection is meant to address this

issue, it is difficult to guarantee that no selection bias was present. For instance, previous

knowledge about the cases meant that some assumptions were made about the

explanatory variable, the size of the MWC, as the cases were selected.

The choice of methodology also implies a shortcoming in terms of external

validity, or generalizability. Case studies in general will inevitably have weaker external

validity than large-n studies. In other words, the findings will be less representative and

less generalizable to the larger population (Gerring, 2007). While choosing to compare

two most-similar cases served to control for a number of factors, it also raises the

question of whether the findings and conclusions can extend to cases in for instance other

geographical regions. This shortcoming should be considered when interpreting the

results of this study. Meanwhile, doing case study research one has to admit to the losses

in terms of external validity, and at the same time recognize the gains in terms of internal

validity. Indeed, the main purpose of this study was to explore and observe the causal

mechanism, for which purpose the methodology chosen was deemed the most

appropriate.

Other limitations regarding the research design regard the sources used. Relying

only on secondary material, the study is subject to any potential bias or shortcoming in

the sources used. To avoid this, sources were triangulated whenever possible, meaning

more than two sources were used to prove the same fact, and the reliability of the sources

was carefully considered. Any remaining errors fall on the researcher.

   

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6. Conclusions 

The purpose of this study was to investigate the mechanisms behind state responses to

popular dissent, explaining why these may differ in terms of repression intensity. The

puzzle which motivated this study had to do with the varying responses to the popular

uprisings of the Arab Spring; why did some leaders show restraint and concede, while

other regimes used extreme violence to repress the protests? By examining two cases

with different outcomes, this study has argued that the size of the MWC, that is, the

segments of the population without which support the regime would not survive, varies

with the severity of repression. Evidence has also been found to support the existence of a

causal link between these two variables.

The main contribution of this study has been to elaborate on the causal

mechanism linking MWC size to severity of state repression, and to observe this

mechanism in action. The findings suggest that the more narrow the winning coalition,

the more likely is a popular uprising to be met with increasingly severe repression from

the state. The loyalty of coalition members to the regime as well as their fear of

permanent exclusion in the future were identified as two factors linking coalition size to

repression severity. By contrast, in states where the regime is supported by a relatively

broad coalition, the supporters are less likely to be loyal, more likely to defect, and as

such repression is less likely to be as severe. Loyalty and fear are strongly influenced by

coalition members’ level of private benefits, which in turn is influenced by the size of the

coalition. The size itself has an impact on the fear of members to be excluded in the

future; it is easier to exclude and persecute small groups.

The findings suggest that violent outcomes are products of complex processes and

calculations of costs and benefit that take place within societal groups as well as within

the top leadership. Rulers, no matter how autocratic, are dependent on a certain set of

supporters for their survival. As such, the findings of this study urge that explanations

conceptualizing the state as a unitary actor should be used carefully. Rather, this research

has suggested that a disaggregation of the “state” into principals and agents, and a

differentiation between different agents, is useful when explaining violent outcomes. In

other words, the severity of state repression is not an outcome of a decision made solely

by the leader of the country. All leaders want to survive, but only some have the means

65

and the support needed to repress uprisings successfully. Further, severe repression is not

always a success strategy for the state. The extremely violent response by Bashar al-

Asad’s regime to the Syrian uprising has by many commentators been interpreted as a

strategic mistake. The “decisions” of leaders to use extreme violence to repress an

uprising may seem irrational, but are in fact the result of coalition members’ expectations

and fears about the future. Leaders are, even in the most autocratic states, restricted by

those groups and individuals on which they have based their rule. The outcome in terms

of severity or repression will, as demonstrated in this thesis, depend on the size of the

winning coalition.

6.1 Directions for Future Research 

One of the main challenges that remain for future research concerns the conceptualization

and operationalization of minimum winning coalition. Researchers have previously raised

the difficulties with developing a good proxy for MWC size for quantitative research.

The aim of this research was to explore and observe the causal mechanism which

explains the correlation between MWC size and violent outcomes, in this case, state

repression. The question remains of how one can operationalize MWC for future

quantitative research, and hopefully this study has provided some insights on how this

can be done.

One lesson that can be drawn from this research is that MWC is a complex

concept which is difficult to proxy with a single indicator, such as for instance the

leaders’ ethnic group. Complexity is not necessarily negative, but the difficulty to

operationalize MWC could also point to the limited analytical value of the concept. The

concept has a sound theoretical basis, and seems intuitive. However, the difficulties

concerned with measuring it points to the fact that it is quite a broad concept which can

be imagined to include a number of different dimensions. If researchers interested in the

MWC continue to use different operationalizations, we may ask ourselves if we are at all

measuring the same thing? This presents a problem of reliability in the research. As such,

efforts should be made to continue developing reliable indicators for this concept.

In addition, this research has only been concerned with the behavior of autocratic

regimes. While one could assume that the relation between coalition size and repression

severity would hold also for democracies, this needs further investigation.

66

Another suggestion for future research is to investigate the effects of external

factors on elites’ decisions to participate in repression or join the protests movement. The

explanatory framework employed in this thesis is limited to domestic factors,

disregarding any potential external factors which could have an effect on the outcome.

For instance, it is possible that the behavior of other states, such as the imposition of

sanctions against the regime, could affect elites’ behavior in the face of a popular

uprising. It would therefore be interesting to study the interaction effects of domestic and

external factors in this regard.

6.2 Implications for Policy 

At the time of writing, the civil war in Syria which followed from the 2011 uprising is

still ongoing, with devastating consequences. The severe repression that met the

protesters in the first months of the uprising led to escalating conflict after the opposition

militarized in mid-2011.

This research has suggested that resistance movements including segments of the

population which the regime has relied on for support, are less likely to face severe

repression, and as such perhaps more likely to succeed. This is supported by the

suggestion that “cross class coalitions are vital for the success of revolutions” (Goldstone,

2011, p. 462), assuming that broad class coalitions are more likely to form in countries

with broadly formulated MWCs. The implication then from a policy perspective would

be to encourage broad winning coalitions, the idea being that violent outcomes and

prolonged civil conflict can be avoided this way. Broad coalitions will institutionalize

limits on autocratic rulers’ capabilities to repress uprisings violently. When the

broadening of the coalition is combined with democratization, revolutions can be avoided

in favor of legal, non-violent paths to turnover of power.

67

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