Explaining the (Re)Emergence of Populism in Europe and Latin America

Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser1

Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)

c.rovira.k@wzb.eu

Paper to be presented at the IPSA/ECPR Conference, in Saõ Paulo (Brasil)

February 16 to 19, 2010

(Please do not quote, or cite without the permission of the author)

Abstract:

Populism is becoming a common phenomenon both in Latin America and Europe. Indeed, the

rise of populist actors such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands

has generated a heated debate. Yet, in the literature on populism there is a dearth of scholarly

attention on cross-regional research. To contribute to fill this research gap, this paper aims to

compare the European and Latin American experiences of populism and contrast the causes

behind its (re)emergence. For this purpose, the paper is structured in two parts. I begin by

systematizing the arguments developed in the scholarly literature about the causes of populism

along two dimensions: on the one hand, demand-side and supply-side explanations, and on the

other hand, national and international factors. Second, I examine contra-factual arguments in

order to identify factors that may impede the (re)emergence of populism both in Europe and in

Latin America. In summary, this paper will argue that explaining the (re)appearance of populism

is a complex task, which cannot be achieved by developing a ‘general theory’, but rather by

identifying how different factors negatively and positively affect the rise of populism in distinct

cases.

Keywords: populism, Europe, Latin America, cross-regional research, causal explanation

1 For helpful comments, I thank Carlos de la Torre, Sofia Donoso and Cas Mudde. The research for this paper has been possible thanks to a post-doctoral scholarship from the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation.

1

Introduction

“The only general rule in history is that there is no general rule

identifying one order of motivation as always the driving force”

(Taylor 2004: 33)

There is little question that since the 1990s populism has been gaining strength both in Europe

and Latin America. This has generated an intense scholarly debate, in which theoretical issues and

practical questions are addressed. As a result, there has been an explosion of literature discussing

not only the concept of populism, but also the impact of populism on democracy (Decker 2006;

de la Torre and Peruzzotti 2008; Mény and Surel 2002; Taggart 2000). The growing interest in the

topic is due to the common view of populism as a dangerous trend, which, by emphasizing the

idea of popular sovereignty, may pursue problematic goals such as the exclusion of ethnic

minorities (Abt and Rummens 2007; Pasquino 2008). However, populism can also be conceived

of as a kind of democratic corrective since it gives voice to groups that do not feel represented by

the elites, and obligates them to react and change the political agenda (Arditi 2004; Panizza

2005a).

These opposing views have not been sufficiently discussed in the literature on populism.

Furthermore, there is a dearth of scholarly attention on cross-regional research, which indeed

could contribute to clarify the effects of populism on democracy. Instead, virtually all studies that

have investigated populism so far have focused their empirical and theoretical analyses on one

specific country or region. To contribute to fill this research gap, this paper addresses the

following questions: How can we explain the (re)emergence of populism in Europe and Latin

America since the 1990s? Are the arguments developed to elucidate the rise of populism in one

region also useful to understand the situation of the other region? What can we learn by

comparing the literature on the causes of populism in these regions?

Before continuing, it is worth stressing that the arguments delivered for certain case studies do

not necessarily explain the reality of other countries. For instance, the reasons behind the rise of

Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands are quite different from the factors that explain the electoral

triumph of Evo Morales in Bolivia. Therefore, I am sceptical about constructing a ‘general

theory’ of populism that aims to explain its (re)emergence in different parts of the world. Instead

of offering a conclusive heuristic model about the causes of populism, this paper seeks to

systematize and critically examine the arguments delivered in the academic literature.

2

Accordingly, I will distinguish different arguments, which might be more relevant in certain

regional contexts and/or countries than in others.

With this aim, the paper is structured in four sections. I begin by providing a brief description of

the concept populism, arguing why a minimal and ideological definition should be the starting

point of a cross-regional research agenda on populism. In the second and most extensive section,

I systematize the debate on the (re)emergence of populism in Europe and Latin America along

two dimensions: on the one hand, demand-side versus supply-side explanations, and on the other

hand, national versus international factors. In the third section, I stress the importance of taking

into account contra-factual cases, since these show that the rise of populism cannot be seen as a

mechanical development, but rather as a process which is strongly conditioned by both political

agency and the national and historical context. Finally, a brief conclusion is presented, in which

the main ideas of the paper are summarized and future paths of inquiry are proposed.

1. A plea for a minimal and ideological definition of populism

Arguably, most scholars would share the opinion that Jean-Marie Le Pen in France or Hugo

Chávez in Venezuela could be labelled as populist. However, scholars do not agree on the

specific features that make these leaders populist. In other words, populism is a good example of

a widely used concept and yet with different meanings. Especially in the study of one particular

country, populism can be defined in a way that not necessarily is appropriated to be used in other

contexts (Collier 2001). However, since we are interested in undertaking cross-regional research,

we need a concept of populism that can ‘travel’ across different cases and even geographical

areas. For this purpose, minimal definitions are extremely useful. By offering a ‘lowest common

denominator’ they help us to avoid conceptual stretching, i.e. the distortion that takes place when

a concept developed for one set of cases is extended to additional cases to which the

characteristics of the concept do not apply (Keman 2009; Sartori 1970).

How can we develop a useful minimal definition of populism for undertaking cross-regional

research? Paul Taggart (2000) put forward a definition of populism that is broad and amorphous

and which includes North America, Russia as well as Europe and Latin America. More recently,

Cas Mudde (2004; 2007) has built on this to propose an approach that can be used to lay the

foundation for contrasting the European and Latin American experiences of populism. With the

aim of fostering empirical research, he defines populism as “[…] a thin-centred ideology that

considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the

3

pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of

the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543)2.

This definition has several advantages for undertaking cross-regional research. First of all, it

grasps the nucleus of what the scholarly literature considers as populism, and hence it offers a

benchmark upon which we can distinguish if particular leaders, movements or parties might be

regarded as populist or not. Second, it permits us to separate populism from features that might

regularly occur together with it, but are not part of it. For example, scholars have convincingly

demonstrated that populism in Latin America is compatible with both neoliberal and state-led

economic models (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1996), and in consequence, there are no reasons to

assume that a certain economic doctrine is a defining attribute of populism. Third, it assumes that

the categories of ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’ can be constructed and framed in very

different manners (Stanley 2008). This means that particular forms of populism may defend

distinctive models of society, in which the inclusion and exclusion of certain groups is fostered

(Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2011). From this angle, populism must not be confused with

xenophobia and it is orthogonal with regard to the classic left-right axis (Ostiguy 2009).

Mudde’s notion of populism adheres to a discursive approach. Populism is conceived as a

particular ideology that since the 1990s is highly widespread around the world. Interestingly, he

states that his definition is broad and open to many usages, but “[…] this does not mean that all

political actors are (at every time) populist. Despite the move towards a more catch-all profile, the

ideological programs of most mainstream parties still accept the pluralist view of liberal

democracy” (2004: 545). The main point is that the populist ideology is at odds with pluralism,

and consequently, populism assumes that once ‘the people’ have spoken, nothing should

constrain the implementation of their will, i.e. vox populi, vox dei. In other words, populism is a

sort of democratic extremism, which it is not shared by actors and parties that defend the

existence of constitutional limits on the expression of the general will.

It is important to underline that this definition does not refer to the type of mobilization of the

masses undertaken by the populist actor, an aspect that is central in definitions of populism in

Latin American studies (e.g. di Tella 1997; Weyland 2001). In short, while it is true that a logical

2 It is worth noting that Hawkins (2009; 2010) has developed a similar concept of populism to study the Latin American experiences. In his opinion, “[p]opulism is a set of fundamental beliefs about the nature of the political world – a worldview or, to use a more rarified term, a ‘discourse’ – that perceives history as a Manichean struggle between Good and Evil, one in which the side of the Good is ‘the will of the people’, or the natural, common interest of the citizens once they are allowed to form their own opinions, while the side of Evil is a conspiring elite that has subverted his will” (Hawkins 2010: 5).

4

connection to certain type of institutional aspects (e.g. direct communication between leader and

the followers, lack of strong party organizations, etc.) exists, the latter are not a constitutive

element but rather a consequence of populism (Hawkins 2010: 40). Seen in this light, populism

can take different organizational forms and diverse patterns of socio-political mobilization

(Roberts 2006).

Moreover, Mudde’s concept of populism intends to go beyond normative discussions about the

ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy. This point is not trivial, since authors

who adhere to the model of liberal democracy usually see populism as a pathology (e.g.

Rosanvallon 2008), while scholars who sympathize with the notion of radical democracy are prone

to conceive of populism as a positive force that strengthens political representation (e.g. Laclau

2005). Instead, Mudde’s minimal definition focuses the debate on the core aspects of populism,

and in consequence, it does not make broader generalizations about the potential impact of

populism on democracy. Populism is not anti-democratic per se, and in light of this, cross-regional

comparisons can contribute to gain new insights into the conditions that may determine when,

why, and how populism works as a threat to or a corrective for democracy (Rovira Kaltwasser,

forthcoming).

Finally, it is worth stressing a last – and for the purpose of this paper very decisive – advantage of

the approach proposed by Mudde. As it was previously stated, many definitions of populism tend

to emphasize organizational aspects, since they assume that populism must be understood as a

political strategy, which is used by political entrepreneurs with the aim of gaining support from a

disaffected electorate (e.g. Jun 2006; Mayorga 2006; Paramio 2006). Although these definitions

are not entirely wrong, they are problematic in the sense that they focus the debate nearly only on

the supply-side of the populist phenomenon. By contrast, an ideological definition of populism

assumes that to explain its (re)emergence we must take into account both the demand-side and

the supply-side, because every ideology may be present at the mass-level and the elite-level

(Freeden 2003: 74; Rueschemeyer 2006: 249). Put shortly, populism should be considered less as

a political strategy that is implemented by ‘malicious’ actors, and more as a Manichean worldview

which might be raised by particular political leaders and is shared by different groups of a society.

As several European and Latin American cases show, the support for populism do not only stem

from the lower classes, but also from the middle and upper classes.

5

2. Systematizing the debate on the (re)emergence of populism in Europe and Latin

America

Explaining the (re)appearance of populism is an academic endeavour, which has been undertaken

by many authors whose analyses generally are focussed on one region. For instance, Oxhorn

(1998) maintains that Latin American societies are characterized by a social structure that favours

the recurrent rise of populist leaders. Due to the widespread informal economies and the

difficulties that this involve in terms of forming a class consciousness within the popular sectors,

populism appears to be a usual way to mobilize the masses and claim the ‘true’ representation of

the common people. For the case of Europe, Mair (2002; 2006) has postulated that the declining

importance of the political parties is generating a political void, which provides a fertile soil for

the emergence of populist leaders, who try to establish a direct relationship with ‘the people’. As

these examples illustrate, there are many arguments when it comes to explain the irruption of

populist movements and parties. Accordingly, we need to organize the existing explanations that

have been developed separately to analyze Europe and Latin America. For this purpose, it is

crucial to distinguish between two dimensions that are present in the current scholarly debate on

populism.

The first dimension refers to demand-side versus supply-side explanations (e.g. Decker 2000;

Eatwell 2003; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007). The so-called demand-side explanations

tend to focus on changing preferences, beliefs, and attitudes among the voters. By contrast, the so-

called supply-side explanations put attention on the transformation of the political actors and parties,

i.e. on the formation of new political proposals that can be appealing for the electorate. For

instance, the increasing flexibilization of labor – due to the implementation of neoliberal policy

recipes – and the consequent expansion of the informal sector would be an example of a

demand-side explanation for the support for populist leaders in Latin America (de la Torre 2000).

On the contrary, a supply-side explanation for the rise of populist radical right parties in Europe

would be that the move towards the centre of the main parties has created a deficit of democratic

representation that can be filled by new political entrepreneurs with a radical discourse (Bale

2003; Ignazi 2003). As these examples illustrate, while the demand-side explanations tend to

analyze structural factors, the supply-side explanations usually develop arguments related to the

agency.

The second dimension is very obvious, but almost no author has taken it into account in an

explicit manner. It refers to the distinction between national and international factors involved in

6

the emergence of populism. A good example of this dimension can be found in the ‘transitology’

literature. In the seminal work on the transitions from authoritarian rule, Whitehead (1986)

distinguishes between national aspects (e.g. bad economic performance) and international

features (e.g. normative isomorphism) in relation to the forces that favour the decay of

authoritarian systems. Without a doubt, in the case of populism it is also crucial to refer to the

national and international factors that may be influencing its (re)emergence. For instance, the

decline of the United States’ historic hegemony in Latin America has facilitated the

(re)appearance of left-wing populist leaders, who foster new forms of international cooperation

and condemn the neoliberal ideology promoted by the international financial institutions (Rovira

Kaltwasser 2010: 56-57). At the same time, the rise of populist radical right parties in Europe is

linked to the expansion of the European Union (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008: 13). Due to the

latter, constitutionalism is becoming more and more developed but at the cost of the popular

will, and as a result, there is a fertile soil for the appearance of political entrepreneurs who defend

the idea of popular sovereignty and seek to stop – or even reverse – denationalization (Meny and

Surel 2002: 7–11).

Typology of the arguments used to explain the (re)emergence of populism

National factors

International factors

Demand-side

Explanations

Discontent with the political class

and/or the economic situation

Demonstration effect

Supply-side

Explanations

Political polarization of leaders

and/or parties

Criticism to global governance and/or

foreign powers

Relying on these two dimensions – demand-side versus supply-side, and international versus

national factors –, it is possible to build a two-by-two matrix (see above). The development of

this matrix represents a helpful starting point for the systematization of the existing debate about

the causes of populism in Europe and Latin America. In the following, each box of the matrix

will be explained in order to show the most common explanations, and offer a critical assessment

7

of the arguments delivered in the scholarly literature. It is worth noting that these arguments have

been used to shed light on both the breakthrough and the electoral persistence of populism.

Although I am aware that these are two different but interrelated processes (Mudde 2007: 254,

301), I will mainly focus the debate on those factors that are influential in the breakthrough

phase. Given that the paper does not aim to elucidate the mechanisms through which populist

parties and movements endure, the organizational elements that explain their electoral persistence

will not be discussed.

2.1. Political polarization of leaders and/or parties

Leaders and parties are commonly placed along the left/right axis. For instance, while the

Spanish ‘Partido Popular’ is considered to be on the right, the Spanish ‘Partido Socialista Obrero’

is regarded to be on the left. According to Bobbio (1996), these dimensions must be understood

as a way of categorizing political positions in relation to their attitude to the ideal of equality.

From this angle, while the right is prone to assume that the majority of the inequalities are natural

and they cannot be eradicated, the left tends to take for granted that inequalities are mainly

socially constructed, and in consequence, they can and should be removed. Based on this, or a

similar notion of left and right, it is possible to classify leaders and parties within a spatial

dimension.

Moreover, the distinction between left and right permits to analyze the polarization of a political

system, i.e. the expansion of the ideological spectrum and the formation of an extreme position

in one or both poles of the left/right axis (Sartori 1976: 135-136). Of course, increasing

polarization does not automatically lead to the appearance of populism. In fact, in countries like

Italy and Germany both communism and fascism emerged under the circumstances of a process

of growing political polarization. However, democracy is nowadays regarded as ‘the only game in

town’, and in consequence, political polarization tends to be channelled through democratic

channels. This provides a fertile ground for the rise of populist forces, which – as was stated

before – are not per se anti-democratic: while they support majority rule, they are at odds with

proclaiming restrictions to the principle of popular sovereignty.

It is worth indicating that the argument about political polarization as a driver of populism is

much more common in the European than in the Latin American debate on populism. The

‘classic’ thesis in this regard was developed by Ignazi (1992), who argued that the formation of a

new party family of populist radical right parties in Western Europe is directly related to the

8

increasing polarization of the political system. From this standpoint, political polarization is the

by-product of the growing importance of post-materialist values, which have triggered the

emergence of two new party families in each side of the political spectrum: on the one hand, the

Greens, and on the other hand, the populist radical right.

More recently, Ignazi (2003) refined his thesis by arguing that the emergence of populist radical

right parties must be conceived of as a two step process. First, a radicalization of the existing

political actors and parties must take place, since this opens a space for defending certain

arguments that previously were unaccepted in the public opinion (e.g. anti-immigration). In a

second phase, these actors and parties decide to moderate their positions and move to centre,

unintentionally generating a political void which can be appropriated by new political

entrepreneurs who wave the populist flag.

Ignazi’s argument about the impact of the growing ideological convergence of the mainstream

parties on the formation of populist radical right parties in Western Europe has been brought

forward by many other authors (e.g. Betz 1998; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Mouffe 2005; Norris

2005). Accordingly, an increasing move to the political centre might not only favour the status

quo, but also give rise to new political actors or parties which attack the establishment and

propose ‘radical’ solutions. This idea is indeed very common in Latin America, where populist

actors underscore that there are no differences between the mainstream political parties, which

are all interested in preserving their own interests and privileges, without taking into account the

demands and needs of ‘the people’. As de la Torre (2000) posits, Latin American populists are

truly innovators. Their rhetoric and proposals break with conventions and attack the very idea

that ‘there is no alternative’. Not surprisingly, they usually are or present themselves as political

outsiders who seek to get rid of the corrupt elites (Barr 2009).

It is worth clarifying that the thesis of an excessive convergence of the mainstream leaders and

parties as a trigger of populism in Latin America has been put forward rather implicitly than

explicitly. For instance, Roberts (2007) contends that one of the common denominators of Latin

American populists is their capacity to foster a (re)politicization of certain topics, which

intentionally or unintentionally are not being addressed by the political establishment. This

signifies that the mainstream political actors and parties do have a relatively high degree of

ideological convergence, or that they simply do not allow for exercising political opposition – as

was the case in the so-called oligarchic regimes that existed in Latin America until the middle of

the 20th century (Collier and Collier 1991). Otherwise, there would not be much space left for the

9

emergence of populist actors who are able to (re)politicize those issues which seem to be relevant

for great part of the electorate.

In summary, the idea that political polarization either directly or indirectly leads to the irruption

of populist leaders and parties is one of the common explanations for the (re)emergence of

populism in Europe and/or Latin America. To improve the analytical leverage of this thesis it

might be relevant to take into account the national and historical context, since there is no

mechanical link between political polarization and the rise of populism. As the analysis of several

European countries reveal, a growing political polarization can favour not only (right-wing)

populist parties, but also other kind of political parties, such as the Greens or even mainstream

parties (e.g. Meguid 2007). Moreover, a Latin American country like Uruguay has experienced a

process of political polarization since the 1990s, which did not culminate in the irruption of

populist actors, but rather in the formation of a well-organized left-wing political party that ended

the bipolar nature of the political system (Altman, Castigiolni and Luna 2008).

2.2. Discontent with the political class and/or the economic situation

This is probably one of the most common explanations for the rise of populism both in Europe

and Latin America. The argument is that a growing discontent with the political class and/or the

economic situation leads to the rise of a populist leader, who promises solutions to overcome the

crisis in question. Panizza (2005a: 11-12) has argued, for instance, that the emergence of

populism goes hand in hand with economic hardship, since the latter generates deprivation and

suffering for a great part of the population. Under these circumstances, the electorate might be

attracted by the populist ideology, which emphasises that ‘the people’ is the sovereign and has the

right to overthrow leaders and regimes that are acting against its will. This is what Canovan

(1999) calls redemptive politics: the democratic promise of a better world through action of the

sovereign people.

In the case of Europe, the link between economic conditions and populism comes to the fore in

the thesis of the so-called ‘Modernisierungsverlierer’. This thesis is based on a political economy

approach that maintains that both the growing liberalization of the European economy and the

retrenchment of the welfare state have resulted in the formation of an important number of

modernization losers, which are particularly tempted by the appeals of populist radical right

parties (e.g. Betz 1994; Decker 2000; Kriesi 1999). Nevertheless, the empirical validity of this

thesis has been questioned by certain authors who show that populist radical right parties have

10

been successful in national districts and/or countries in which there are no signs of economic

decline (Betz 2002; Norris 2005). Accordingly, it is important to stress that the notion of

modernization losers refers not only to objective indicators, such as the level of unemployment

and poverty. As Lipset (1960) noted in his famous study, the fear of status loss is one of the most

important drivers for the emergence of radical positions within the electorate. This means that

the (re)appearance of populism should also be linked to subjective aspects, such as the anxiety

produced by the potential inflow of immigrants.

Political economy explanations are also common in Latin America, although in this context the

emphasis lies not so much on the rise of modernization losers as on the structural transformation

of the economy, and the consequent weakening of the traditional class-cleavage (Roberts 2002).

As is well-known, the debt crisis of the 1980s brought about a period of neoliberal reforms

within the region. One of the main consequences of these reforms has been an expansion of the

informal economy vis-à-vis a decline of both state employees and labour unions (Centeno and

Portes 2006; Klein and Tokman 2000). This structural transformation of the economy implied a

major challenge for the established political parties, since their linkages with the electorate

eroded. Moreover, the great heterogeneity of the so-called informal sector makes political

representation through intermediate organizations difficult (Oxhorn 1998). Thus populist

leadership seems to be a common way to articulate and mobilize the masses.

At the same time, the rise of populism in Europe has been linked not only to an economic but

also a political crisis. The common argument is that contemporary transformations such as

globalization, the growing influence of the mass media and the omnipotence of lobbying

activities are changing the way in which politics are structured. Most notably, Crouch (2004)

maintains that we are witnessing the beginning of a ‘post-democratic’ era. This means an epoch

marked by the respect of the core democratic institutions (e.g. free and fair elections), but the

reduction of the citizens to the role of manipulated, passive and rare participants. According to

this account, populism might have a prosperous future in Europe in the 21st century, since it

embodies a democratic method through which the people can express their unease about politics

and dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008).

With regard to the discussion of the increasing problems of democratic representation in Latin

America, the link between the idea of a political crisis and the emergence of populism is

particularly evident. While the third wave of democracy has implied the (re)introduction of basic

democratic institutions such as free and fair elections, few countries in the region have seen their

11

governments’ performance improving. Under these circumstances, there has been an increase of

the electorate’s dissatisfaction with the existing politicians and parties. State deficiencies in policy

areas like citizen security, reduction of corruption and economic development do undermine the

legitimacy of democracy in Latin America, paving the way for the rise of populist leaders

(Mainwaring 2006; Mayorga 2006; Paramio 2006). In this sense, the (re)appearance of populism

can be conceived of as an unintended consequence of the installation of low-quality democratic

regimes, since they promise something they are not able to deliver.

Although the argument of a growing discontent with the political class and/or the economic

situation is very plausible for explaining the (re)emergence of populism, it would be erroneous to

think of it as a kind of universal law. Indeed, as Bermeo (2009: 29) has pointed out, increasing

economic inequality does not correlate in any simple way with populism neither in Eastern

Europe nor in Latin America. Moreover, problems of democratic representation and

dissatisfaction with the political establishment do not lead automatically to a growing demand for

populist leadership. In consequence, discontent with the political class and/or the economic

situation must be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rise of populism.

Comparative studies must show why this discontent leads to the emergence of populism in some

countries and not in others.

2.3. Demonstration effect

From a theoretical point of view, the understanding of the rise of populism as a kind of

demonstration effect can be traced back to the crowd psychology developed by authors like

Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon. These scholars maintained that human beings are not

rational actors and that their collective behaviour is determined mainly by emotional factors,

particularly with regard to political leadership (Moscovici 1993). To a great extent, the bad

connotation that the concept of populism has in the social sciences derives from the crowd

psychology. As Laclau (2005) argues, the latter developed an analytical framework, which

denigrated ‘the masses’ and saw the very constitution of ‘the people’ as a pathological

phenomenon. In fact, this idea appears implicitly or explicitly in the analyses of many scholars,

who consider that populism is one of the main challenges of contemporary democracy (e.g. Abt

and Rummens 2007; Pasquino 2008; Rosanvallon 2008).

Beyond the (normative) debate about the impact of populism on democracy, there are good

reasons to think that the former might be seen as a contagious phenomenon. Rydgren (2005) in

12

particular has proposed that the rise of the French Front National in 1984 has had an impact in the

whole of Europe, since this party established a new ‘master frame’ which not only was different

from fascism, but also combined three key features that are highly appealing for the European

electorate: ethno-nationalism, cultural racism and populist attitudes. Rydgren’s account is based

on the contentious politics approach and the very idea that the people share mental maps and

construct frames that not only allow for the codification of problems and solutions, but also for

the mobilization of political claims. Seen in this light, diffusion is facilitated when a new ‘master

frame’ is developed and is capable of interpreting the feelings and interests of many citizens

(Kolins Givan, Roberts and Soule 2010: 7). Thus, the populist ideology might spread among the

population insofar as it makes sense to common people, touching themes that are not being

addressed by the political establishment.

In the case of contemporary Latin America, scholarship distinguishes between two ‘waves of

populism’: a neoliberal one in the 1990s, and a radical left-wing one from the 2000s onwards (e.g.

Freidenberg 2007; Gratius 2007). The very notion of a ‘wave of populism’ implicitly says

something about its diffusion. In fact, the concept of ‘democratic wave’ is based on the idea that

transitions from authoritarian rule usually occur within a specific period of time, in which

international and regional factors have an impact across borders (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán

2005: 39). In the words of Nancy Bermeo (1992: 284): “…what we can not doubt is that people

takes cues from the experience of their counterparts abroad and that they use these cues as

cognitive and behavioural guidelines. This is probably especially true in situations of instability

[…]. It is then that ‘demonstration effects’ are likely to be most powerful”.

Furthermore, de la Torre (2007) postulates that the current rise of radical left-wing populist

leaders defend a particular model of democracy, which is very appealing to the Latin American

electorate. This model of democracy is not based on the support of liberal procedures, but rather

on the promotion of mass rallies, occupations of public spaces and direct forms of representation

of the people’s will. In a similar vein, Roberts (2007) maintains that the revival of left-wing

populist alternatives is linked to a new critical juncture, which paves the way for the emergence of

new patterns of political contestation across the region. As these examples illustrate, the

(re)appearance of populism in Latin America is related to the diffusion of both ideas about how

democracy should function, and frames that help to channel the political discontent of the people

on the streets.

13

It is important to note that a demonstration effect refers to a particular mechanism of diffusion,

which is focussed on the demand-side and not on the supply-side of populism. This implies that

the study of a demonstration effect seeks to understand the behaviour of individuals, like for

example, in what way and under which circumstances voters of one country start replicating the

claims of the electorate of neighbour countries. The mechanism of diffusion that lies behind a

demonstration effect is emulation. The latter must be understood less as a simple imitation, and

more as borrowing the object of diffusion (i.e. the populist ideology) and adapting it to the local

conditions (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2008: 32). Not surprisingly, to explain the

(re)emergence of populism several authors refer to the impact of the mass media (e.g. tabloid

newspapers) due to its tendency to frame topics (e.g. immigration) in a way, which either directly

or indirectly agrees with the populist claims (Mazzoleni 2003, 2008; Meyer 2006; Mudde 2004).

In order to gain a better understanding of the diffusion of populism across countries,

comparative and single case studies should put more attention in at least two aspects. On the one

hand, scholars must analyse the way in which a particular articulation of the populist ideology is

formed and then starts to spread. This implies that it is important to examine how a populist

discourse formed in a singular country is adapted to the reality of another country. On the other

hand, it is relevant to identify different networks supporting the propagation of populism among

the population. In other words, the diffusion of populism relies on different mechanisms, such as

personal ties (relational diffusion), indirect devices as the media (nonrelational diffusion), and

third actors or mediators (mediated diffusion) (Tarrow 2010).

2.4. Criticism to global governance and/or foreign powers

Populism actors tend to conceive of the people in national terms, framing a political community

with closed borders with a common past. Although this sovereign people might praise universal

solidarity with people in general (e.g. the appeal of the European populist radical right parties to

Christian values, especially after the events of 9/11), the core message is about a particular

population living in a singular territory. Thus, the people are portrayed as a unity, which is

threatened from both particular interests and foreign powers. This is what Taggart (2000) has

called the politics of the heartland: a homogenising imaginary about who is the people that allows

for indicating its ‘real’ problems and reinforcing a sense of common identity.

In fact, as was previously noted, populism is based on a Manichean distinction between ‘the pure

people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’. In this very process of differentiating between ‘us’ and ‘them’,

14

populist actors normally make reference to global governance and/or foreign powers, whereby

the latter are depicted as one of the biggest problems of contemporary democracy. To a certain

extent, this criticism to international forces can be seen as an oversimplification of reality by

which populist actors appeal to chauvinistic sentiments. Furthermore, both right-wing and left-

wing populism tend to be inward-looking (Priester 2007: 44). Not surprisingly, contemporary

forms of populism usually proclaim that the nation is in danger, because new forms of global

governance and the influence of foreign powers are undermining the principle of self-

determination (Canovan 2005: 47).

This criticism to global (f)actors is particularly evident in the case of contemporary populism in

Europe. An important reason for this lies in the elitist nature of the project of the European

Union. Since the latter has been designed and carried out from above, populist actors have been

able to exploit anti-elitist sentiments, claiming that the necessary public support for the

realization and expansion of the European project is missing (Hayward 1996: 28). Although

populist radical right parties’ levels of criticism to the European Union range from scepticism to

rejection (Mudde 2007: chapter 7), there are little doubts that they are more prone than other

parties to argue against the European Union. They are especially critical of giving up political

power to Brussels, because this implies a frontal attack to the principle of popular sovereignty. As

Christina Schori Liang (2007: 12) has argued, “[d]rawing on their ethno-pluralist values, the

populist radical right promotes the idea of a ‘Europe of the Europeans’, based on the core values

of a ‘European civilization’ – a Europe whose sovereignty does not lie with Europe or with the

existing states but with their cultural communities”.

Seen in this light, the emergence of populism in Europe is related to the formation of new forms

of governance that go beyond the nation-state. Indeed, ceding sovereignty to supranational

bodies is a process, which is not welcomed by all political actors. Hence, reasserting the national

values against Europe seems to be a logical reaction, and populist radical right parties are one of

the main players when it comes to defending the integrity of the nation-state (Berezin 2009: 243).

This means that an unintended consequence of the Europeanization process, in part due to its

elite-driven character, has been the generation of a fertile soil for the rise of political

entrepreneurs, who are keen on waving the populist flag.

Although in contemporary Latin America populism does not materialize in form of radical right

but rather of radical left movements, the criticism to global governance and/or foreign powers is

also very evident. In effect, the current wave of Latin American populism is characterized by a

15

frontal attack to the actors and institutions that are normally perceived as the guardians of

neoliberalism: the United States, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The latter

are portrayed as foreign powers seeking to impose economic policies, which are not only against

the will of the people, but also permit the expansion of global capitalism at the expense of the

poor (Silva 2009). Therefore, the (re)emergence of left populism in Latin America goes hand in

hand with the growing legitimacy problems of the Washington Consensus, and the emergence of

political entrepreneurs who have sought to outline a post-neoliberal model of development

(Filgueira and Luna 2009; Macdonald and Ruckert 2009).

To understand how the success of current Latin American left-wing populist actors is related to

international factors, it is important to highlight two aspects. First, since the end of the 1990s, the

commodity prices have been increasing and this has opened a singular opportunity for populist

leaders in power to implement reforms that go beyond the neoliberal paradigm and are popular

within the electorate (Cortés 2009; Weyland 2009). Second, both the increasing worldwide

economic presence of China and the involvement of the United States in the Middle East

represent a major change for the Latin American states, since they have much more room of

manoeuvre for developing and implementing a new kind of economic and foreign policy

(Hershberg 2010; Rovira Kaltwasser 2010). Under these circumstances, populist actors have had

more resources and more space to promote a political agenda that not necessarily is the one

favoured by the United States, but which is very appealing for certain groups of the electorate.

3. Contra-factual arguments

As the previous debate has shown, the (re)appearance of populism occurs for various reasons in

different national and regional contexts. Therefore, domestic factors and political agency are key

for understanding why populism does emerge in some places and not in others. As Faletti and

Lynch (2009) have argued, credible social scientific explanation can come about only if

researchers are attentive to the interaction between causal mechanisms and the context in which

they operate. Accordingly, there is no ‘general law’ when it comes to clarifying the (re)emergence

of populism in Europe and Latin America. The above sketched explanations must be understood

as necessary but not sufficient conditions: they must be present for the effect to occur, but it may

not always be enough for causing the phenomenon in question (Brady 2008: 227).

In consequence, organizing the arguments that explain the (re)emergence of populism can be

seen as one side of the coin. The other side refers to the identification of counter-factual claims.

16

This means that we need to take into account factors, which might hinder the (re)appearance of

populism. Counter-factual analysis aims to show why in a context where the causes that

hypothetically should produce an effect are present, the phenomenon in question does not come

into view because other features of the context are not propitious (Levy 2008: 629). By

emphasising that the context is an important element of causal explanation, counter-factual

analysis is closely linked with comparative-historical methodology, which argues that early events

shape subsequent causal trajectories (Mahoney 2004: 91-92). Following this approach, it is

possible that past events can trigger self-reinforcing dynamics, which may well hamper the

(re)appearance of populism.

Without the aim of developing a detailed account of counter-factual arguments, in the following I

will briefly discuss three lines of reasoning that are common in the scholarly literature on

populism in Europe and Latin America.

3.1. Dealing with the authoritarian past in Europe

If we revise the above-sketched explanations, the situation of a European nation like Germany is

very puzzling. In this country we can find many of the factors that explain the (re)emergence of

populism (e.g. discontent with the political class, political polarization of leaders and parties, etc.),

but populist actors have been extremely unsuccessful. Even though it is true that populist radical

right parties have occasionally been present at the federal level, they have not achieved to enter

into the national parliament. This can neither be explained by an absence of demand for

populism, nor by organizational failures and institutional constrains (Decker and Hartleb 2006:

201). Populist radical right parties in other European countries face similar difficulties yet they

have emerged at the national level, and in some cases with great success.

This German singularity is related to the political culture of the country. The shadow of the Nazi

past is so pervasive that the populist discourse faces a very hostile environment, particularly when

it appears combined with the topic of anti-immigration (Decker 2008: 125). Thus in Germany

populist radical right leaders and parties are confronted with the problem of being stigmatized as

defenders of the Nazi ideology. As David Art (2006) has argued in detail, the poor performance

of right-wing populism in Germany goes hand in hand with the negative reactions of established

political parties, the media and civil society. Since they combat the populist radical right strongly,

almost no space is opened for its breakthrough. Accordingly, the rise of right-wing populism in

Germany is hindered by the existence of a political culture, which is very sensitive to the

17

emergence of extreme political positions that might show any similarity to fascism. In fact, if

populism has possibilities of success in Germany, then this will rather be on the left-side than on

right-side of the political spectrum (Hough and Koß 2009).

This brief analysis of the German case shows that, at least in Europe, the way in which a country

deals with the authoritarian past can have an impact on the appearance of populist radical right

parties. Indeed, Germany had a genuine ‘working-through’ (Aufarbeitung) of the past, and as

result, there is little ground for the development of nationalist and nativist attitudes. By contrast,

European countries with strong nationalist subcultures (e.g. Austria, France or Poland) have a

fertile soil for the emergence of the populist radical right, since the latter can appeal to ideas and

sentiments about ‘national superiority’ that are not only widespread among the electorate, but

also tolerated and shared by part of the elites (Mudde 2007: 245-7).

3.2. Learning process within the Latin American left

As is well-known, most Latin American countries went through terrible authoritarian regimes

during the 1970s and 1980s. The rise of these dictatorships cannot by explained by a singular

cause. Nevertheless, the behaviour of not only leftist, but also populist actors and parties

previous to the democratic breakdowns in the region was a key factor. Given that they showed

little commitment – and in some cases even open disdain – to the rules of public contestation

that are inherent to the model of liberal democracy, many have argued that their attitude and

behaviour to great extent provoked the authoritarian reversals that took place in most Latin

American countries in the 1970s and 1980s (Castañeda 1993; Lechner 1999). In light of this

experience, the transition to democracy was facilitated by a learning process within the Latin

American left. This was particularly evident in the Southern Cone, where the left parties no

longer saw democracy as a bourgeois pretence and started to praise the rule of law (Angell 1998:

121; Bermeo 1992: 284-7).

However, this learning process did not take place with the same intensity all over the region. This

is one of the reasons why the contemporary left in Latin America differ in many aspects and even

supports different models of democracy. In certain countries, most evidently in Bolivia and

Venezuela, there is a populist left, which “mistrusts political parties and other representative

institutions as the instruments of corrupt politicians and entrenched oligarchical interests. It

privileges majoritarianism over the checks and balances of liberal politics” (Panizza 2005b: 721-

2). By contrast, in countries such as Chile and Brazil, a moderate left has emerged, which tries to

18

“improve the operation of the new market model to produce more dynamic growth, use the

proceeds to fund social initiatives sustainably, and negotiate these reforms with the opposition in

a setting of liberal pluralism” (Weyland 2010: 10). This distinction between these two lefts has

been underpinned by a political economy argument: Latin American countries that are heavy

dependent on one natural resource, like oil or gas (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela), have

more propensity see the emergence of a populist left, since the latter can use the recent

commodity boom to argue against alleged constrains on socioeconomic and political change

(Schamis 2006; Weyland 2009).

Quite different is the situation of those Latin American nations that have a more diverse

economy, and where the left has experienced a lasting learning process in terms of adhering to

the model of liberal democracy. As the political development of countries like Brazil, Chile and

Uruguay demonstrate, the left can avoid the populist discourse and can adapt a moderate

approach (Lanzaro 2006). This implies a long process of ideological and programmatic

revisionism that paves the way for a gradual movement to the centre. In these cases, left actors

and parties consider populism not only morally but also strategically dangerous.

3.3. Proper functioning of the institutions of democratic representation

Populism and democracy have an ambivalent relationship. Arguably, many scholars assume that

populism is a pathological development, which is at odds with democratic representation. For

instance, Taggart (2002) maintains that populism has an aversion to all kind of institutions that

seek to establish a vertical link between the demos and the political elite, and in consequence, it is

a dangerous phenomenon. In a similar vein, Rosanvallon (2008: 265-73) postulates that populism

triggers an endless process of scrutiny and criticism of the government, to the point that the

ruling authorities are seen as enemy powers and where the only legitimate authority are the

masses and the leader that they select.

This negative view of populism is also very common in Latin America, where populist leaders are

depicted as ambiguous democrats, who have a tendency to concentrate power and transgress the

‘checks and balances’ in order to fulfil their electoral promises (e.g. Mayorga 2006). As the cases

of Chile and Uruguay show, a possible mechanism to hamper the rise of populism is to foster

and secure the proper functioning of institutions of democratic representation, particularly

political parties and other mechanisms aiming at cultivating a vertical linkage between governed

and governors. As Navia and Walker (2010: 246) have pointed out, “[b]ecause populism cannot

19

be combated by limiting the electoral and participatory components of democracy, the best

antidote to populism lies in strengthening democratic institutions”.

From this point of view, to hinder the rise of populism it is necessary to develop solid democratic

institutions. This represents a real challenge for many Latin American countries, since many of

them have real problems in terms of state capacity. State deficiencies in areas such as fighting

corruption, providing public security and counting on effective policy-making undermine the

very capacity of politicians to generate the outcomes expected by the electorate (Mainwaring

2006: 305-7). Thus, if states were more effective, confidence in the core institutions of

democratic institutions would improve, avoiding through this the rise of populist leaders and

parties. In the case of Europe it would be an exaggeration to talk about state deficiencies – at

least compared to the situation of Latin America. Accordingly, the European challenge is rather

related to developing proper methods to cope with the erosion of party democracy, i.e. finding

new ways to cultivate the link between governors and governed. And probably this cannot by

achieved by fostering direct democracy, but rather by taking into account certain topics which are

considered as ‘disgusting’ and ‘vulgar’ by the political establishment (Mudde 2004: 557-62).

4. Conclusion

Causal analyses of populism face similar problems to the ones of the studies on the origins of

democracy: while there is no theoretical model sufficiently parsimonious to elucidate when and

why populism does (re)emerge, there are several arguments that can be used to understand the

rise of populism in singular case studies. In other words, given the variety of factors involved in

explaining the (re)appearance of populism, this is not an easy task. Consequently, it seems

impossible to reduce the debate about the (re)emergence of populism to one single driving force.

Moreover, given that populism is widespread both in Europe and Latin America, it is plausible to

think that its rise depends upon a set of different factors, some of which might be more

influential in one regional context than in the other one.

Accordingly, this paper assumes that it is not worth trying to develop a general and conclusive

theory about the causes of populism. Instead of this, I have argued that scholars should be aware

of the existence of different factors which can explain the (re)emergence of populism. For this

purpose, I suggested a novel way to systematize the diverse arguments that have been developed

for studying European and Latin American populism separately: on the one hand, demand-side

and supply-side explanations, and on the other hand, national and international factors. Based on

20

these two dimensions, I offered a critical assessment of the most common arguments, which

should be considered as necessary but not sufficient conditions for the rise of populism.

At the same time, I have stressed that to explain the (re)emergence of populism it is necessary to

take into account counter-factual arguments. The latter help us to understand that certain factors

might hinder the (re)appearance of populism. From this angle, necessary conditions are not

sufficient, because in certain cases there are other factors which can impede the rise of populist

leaders and parties. To understand this, it is relevant to have reservations regarding general

assumptions (e.g. populism is the product of an economic crisis) and reflect on the historical,

national and regional contexts. In fact, by considering the context it is possible to explain why

populism does emerge in certain cases but not in others.

In summary, this paper has aimed to advance a framework for studying populism cross-

regionally. Future studies can build on this framework in order to demonstrate if certain factors

are more relevant in one region than in another one. Furthermore, singular case studies can use

this framework to show if and how the sketched factors affect the rise of populism negatively or

positively. Finally, new comparative research can improve this framework in at least two aspects.

First, certainly it can be possible to identify other factors to explain the (re)emergence of

populism. Second, it might be important to develop other counter-factual arguments and

elucidate how certain self-reinforcing dynamics may hamper the (re)appearance of populism.

21

Literature

Abts, Koen, and Stefan Rummens (2007): ‘Populism versus Democracy’, Political Studies 55(2):

405–24. Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell (2008): ‘Conclusion: Populism and Twenty-First

Century Western European Democracy’, in Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western Democracy, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Altman, David, Rossana Castiglioni and Juan Pablo Luna (2008): ‘Uruguay: A Role Model for the Left?’, in Leftovers. Tales of the Latin American Left, ed. Jorge Castañeda and Marco Morales. London: Routledge.

Angell, Alan (1998): ‘The Left in Latin America since c. 1920’, in Latin America. Politics and Society since 1930, ed. Leslie Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arditi, Benjamin (2004): ‘Populism as a Spectre of Democracy: A Response to Canovan’, Political Studies 52(1): 135–43.

Art, David (2006): The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Barr, Robert (2009): ‘Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics’, Party Politics 15(1): 29–48.

Bale, Tim (2003): ‘Cinderella and her ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems’, West European Politics 26(3): 67–90.

Berezin, Mabel (2009): Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times. Culture, Security and Populism in the New Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bermeo, Nancy (1992): ‘Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship’, Comparative Politics 24(3): 273–91.

— (2009): ‘Does Electoral Democracy Boost Economic Equality?’, Journal of Democracy, 20(4): 21–35.

Betz, Hans-Georg (1994): Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Betz, Hans-Georg (1998): ‘Introduction’, in The New Politics of the Right. Neo-Populist Parties and

Movements in Established Democracies, ed. Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall. New York: St. Martin’s.

Betz, Hans-Georg (2002): ‘Rechtspopulismus in Westeuropa: Aktuelle Entwicklungen und politische Bedeutung’, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 31(3): 251–64.

Bobbio, Norberto (1996): Left and Right. The Significance of a Political Distinction. Polity: Chicago University Press.

Brady, Henry E. 2008: ‘Causation and Explanation in Social Sciene’, in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, ed. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier. New York: Oxford University Press.

Canovan, Margaret (1999): ‘Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy’, Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16.

— (2005): The People. Cambridge: Polity. Castañeda, Jorge (1993): Utopia Unarmed: The Latin Left After the Cold War. New York: Vintage. Centeno, Miguel Angel and Alejandro Portes (2006): ‘The Informal Economy in the Shadow of

the State’, in Out of the Shadows. Political Action and Informal Economy in Latin America, ed. Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Jon Shefner. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Collier, Ruth Berins (2001): ‘Populism’, in Smelser, N.J. and Baltes, P.B. (eds.): International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier, 11813–16.

Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier (1991): Shaping the Political Arena. Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Analysis in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cortés, Rosalia (2009): ‘Social Policy in Latin America in the Post-Neoliberal Era’, in Governance after Neoliberalism in Latin America, ed. Jean Grugel and Pía Riggirozzi. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Crouch, Colin (2004): Post-democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

22

de la Torre, Carlos (2000): Populist Seduction in Latin America. The Ecuadorian Experience. Athens: Ohio University Press.

— (2007): ‘The Resurgence of Radical Populism in Latin America’, Constellations 14(3): 384–97. de la Torre, Carlos and Enrique Peruzzotti (ed.) (2008): El retorno del pueblo: populismo y nuevas

democracias en América Latina. Quito: FLACSO-Ecuador. Decker, Frank (2000): Parteien unter Druck: Der neue Rechtspopulismus in den westlichen Demokratien.

Opladen: Leske + Budrich. — (2006): ‘Die populistische Herausforderung. Theoretische und ländervergleichende

Perspektiven’, in Populismus: Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches Korrektiv?, ed. Frank Decker. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

— (2008): ‘Germany: Right-wing Populist Failures and Left-wing Successes’, in Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western Democracy, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Decker, Frank and Florian Hartleb (2006) ‘Populismus auf schwierigem Terrain. Die rechten und linken Herausfordererparteien in der Bundesrepublik’, in Populismus. Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches Korrektiv?, ed. Frank Decker. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

di Tella, Torcuato (1997): ‘Populism into the Twenty-first Century’, Government and Opposition 32(2): 187–200.

Eatwell, Roger (2003): ‘Ten theories of the extreme right’, in Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg. London: Frank Cass.

Faletti, Tulia G. and Julia F. Lynch (2009): ‘Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies 42(9): 1144–66.

Filgueira, Fernando and Juan Pablo Luna (2009): ‘The Left Turns as Multiple Paradigmatic Crises’, Third World Quarterly 30(2): 371–95.

Freeden, Michael (2003): Ideology. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freidenberg, Flavia (2007): La tentación populista. Una vía al poder en América Latina. Madrid: Síntesis. Gratius, Susanne (2007): ‘La “tercera ola populista” de América Latina’, Working Paper Fundación

para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Madrid. Hawkins, Kirk A. (2009): ‘Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative

Perspective’, Comparative Political Studies 42(8): 1040–67. — (2010): Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge

University Press. Hayward, Jack (1996): ‘The Populist Challenge to Élitist Democracy in Europe’, in Élitism,

Populism, and European Politics, ed. Jack Hayward. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hershberg, Eric (2010): ‘Latin America’s Left: The Impact of the External Environment’, in Latin

America’s Left Turn: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change, ed. Maxwell A. Cameron and Eric Hershberg. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Hough, Dan and Michael Koß (2009): ‘Populism Personified or Reinvigorated Reformers? The German Left Party in 2009 and Beyond’, German Politics and Society 27(2): 76–91.

Ignazi, Piero (1992): ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution. Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme-Right Wing Parties in Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 22(1-2): 3–34.

— (2003): Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jun, Uwe (2006): ‘Populismus als Regierungsstil in westeuropäischen Parteiendemokratien:

Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien’, in Populismus. Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches Korrektiv?, ed. Frank Decker. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag,

Keman, Hans (2009): ‘Comparative Research Methods’, in Comparative Politics, ed. Daniele Caramani. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert and Anthony McGann (1995): The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Klein Emilio and Victor Tokman (2000): ‘La estratificación social bajo tensión en la era de la globalización’, Revista de la CEPAL 72(3): 7–30.

23

Kolins Givan, Rebecca, Soule Sarah A, and Kenneth M. Roberts (2010): ‘Introduction: The Dimensions of Diffusion’, in The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects, ed. Rebecca Kolins Givan, Sarah A. Soule and Kenneth M. Roberts. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, Hans-Peter (1999): ‘Movements of the Left, Movements of the Right: Putting the Mobilization of two types of Social Movements into Political Context’, in Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John D. Stephens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laclau, Ernesto (2005): On Populist Reason. London: Verso. Lanzaro, J. (2006) ‘La “tercera ola” de las izquierdas latinoamericanas’, in La “izquierda” en América

Latina, ed. Pedro Pérez Herrero. Madrid: Editorial Pablo Iglesias. Lechner, Norbert (1999): Los patios interiores de la democracia. Subjetividad y política. Santiago de Chile:

Fondo de Cultura Económica. Levy, Jack S. (2008): ‘Counterfactuals and Case Studies’, in The Oxford Handbook of Political

Methodology, ed. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier. New York: Oxford University Press.

Liang, Christina S. (2007: 12): ‘Europe for the European: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right’, in Europe for the Europeans. The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right, ed. Christina S. Liang. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Lipset, Seymour M. Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City: Doubleday, 1960. Macdonald, Laura and Ruckert, Arne (2009): ‘Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas: An

Introduction’, in Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas, ed. Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruckert. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mahoney, James (2004): ‘Comparative-Historical Methodology’, Annual Review of Sociology 30: 81–101.

Mainwaring, Scott (2006): ‘State Deficiencies, Party Competition, and Confidence in Democratic Representation in the Andes’, in The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes, ed. Scott P. Mainwaring, Ana María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (2005): ‘Latin American Democratization since 1978: Democratic Transitions, Breakdowns, and Erosions’, in The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, ed. Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mair, Peter (2002): ‘Populist Democracy vs. Party Democracy’, in Democracies and the Populist Challenge, ed. Yves Mény and Yves Surel. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

— (2006): ‘Ruling the Void. The Hollowing of Western Democracy’, New Left Review 42: 25–51. Mayorga, René Antonio (2006): ‘Outsiders and Neopopulism: The Road to Plebiscitary

Democracy’ in The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes, ed. Scott P. Mainwaring, Ana María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mazzoleni Gianpietro (2003): ‘The Media and the Growth of Neo-Populism in Contemporary Democracies’, in The Media and Neo-Populism. A Contemporary Comparative Analysis, ed. Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Julianne Stewart and Bruce Horsfield. Westport: Praeger.

Mazzoleni, Gianpietro (2008): ‘Populism and the Media’, in Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western Democracy, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Meguid, Bonnie M. (2007): Party Competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mény, Yves and Yves Surel (2002): ‘The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism’, in Democracies and the Populist Challenge, ed. Yves Mény and Yves Surel. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Meyer, Thomas (2006): ‘Populismus und Medien’, in Populismus. Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches Korrektiv?, ed. Frank Decker. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Mouffe, Chantal (2005): On the Political. London: Routledge.

24

Mudde, Cas (2004): ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government & Opposition, 39(4): 541–63. — (2007): Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2011): ‘Voices of the Peoples: Populism in Europe

and Latin America Compared’, Kellogg Institute Working Paper (forthcoming). Navia, Patricio and Ignacio Walker (2010): ‘Political Institutions, Populism, and Democracy in

Latin America’, in Democratic Governance in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Norris, Pippa (2005): Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ostiguy, Pierre (2009): ‘The High-Low Political Divide. Rethinking Populism and Anti-Populism’, Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series, 35.

Oxhorn, Philip (1998): ‘The Social Foundations of Latin America's Recurrent Populism: Problems of Popular Sector Class Formation and Collective Action’, Journal of Historical Sociology 11(2): 212–46.

Panizza, Franciso (2005a) ‘Introduction: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy’, in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. Francisco Panizza. London: Verso.

— (2005b): ‘Utopia Unarmed Revisited: The Resurgence of Left-of-centre Politics in Latin America’, Political Studies 53(4): 716–34.

Paramio, Ludolfo (2006): ‘La izquierda y el populismo’ in La “izquierda” en América Latina, ed. Pedro Pérez Herrero. Madrid: Editorial Pablo Iglesias.

Pasquino, Gianfranco (2008): ‘Populism and Democracy’, in Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western Democracy, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Priester, Karin (2007): Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungen. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus. Roberts, Kenneth (1995): ‘Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America:

The Peruvian case’, World Politics 48(1): 82–116. — (2002): ‘Social Inequalities Without Class Cleavages in Latin America’s Neoliberal Era’, Studies

in Comparative International Development 36(4): 3–33. — (2006): ‘Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America’,

Comparative Politics 36(2): 127–48. — (2007): Repoliticizing Latin America: The Revival of the Populist and Leftist Alternatives. Woodrow

Wilson Update on the Americas. Rosanvallon, Pierre (2008): Counter-Democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal (2010): ‘Moving Beyond the Washington Consensus: The

Resurgence of the Left in Latin America’, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 3: 52–62. — ‘The Ambivalence of Populism: Threat and Corrective for Democracy’, Democratization

(forthcoming). Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (2006): ‘Why and How Ideas Matter’ in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual

Analysis, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rydgren, Jens (2005): ‘Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a

new party family’, European Journal of Political Research 44(3): 413–37 — (2007): ‘The Sociology of the Radical Right’, Annual Review of Sociology 33: 241–62. Sartori, Giovanni (1970): ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, American Political Science

Review, 64(4): 1033–53. — (1976): Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. New York: Cambridge University

Press. Schamis, Hector E. (2006): ‘Populism, Socialism and Democratic Institutions’, Journal of Democracy

17(4): 20–34. Silva, Eduardo (2009): Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University

Press.

25

Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett (2008) ‘Introduction: The Diffusion of Liberalization’, in The Global Diffusion of Market and Democracy, ed. Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stanley, Ben (2008): ‘The Thin Ideology of Populism’, Journal of Political Ideologies 13(1): 95–110. Szczerbiak, Aleks and Paul Taggart (2008): ‘Introduction: Researching Euroscepticism in

European Party Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical Framework’, in Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism (Volume 2), ed. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taggart, Paul (2000): Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. — (2002): ‘Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics’, in Democracies and the Populist

Challenge, ed. Yves Mény and Yves Surel. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Tarrow, Sidney (2010): ‘Dynamics of Diffusion: Mechanisms, Institutions and, Scale Shift’, in The

Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects, ed. Rebecca Kolins Givan, Sarah A. Soule and Kenneth M. Roberts. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, Charles (2004): Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Weyland, Kurt (1996): ‘Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected

Affinities’, Studies in Comparative International Development 31(3): 3–31. — (2001): ‘Clarifying a Contested Concept. Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics’,

Comparative Politics 34(1): 1–22. — (2009): ‘The Rise of Latin America’s Two Lefts. Insights from the Rentier State Theory’,

Comparative Politics 41(2): 145–64. — (2010): ‘The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America: Conceptual and

Theoretical Issues’, in Leftist Governments in Latin America. Successes and Shortcomings, ed. Kurt Weyland, Wendy Hunter and Raul Madrid. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Whitehead, Laurence (1986): ‘International Aspects of Democratization’, in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Volume 3), ed. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.