Explaining the Levels of Popular Support for Hosting the Olympic

Popular Support in Semi-peripheral Polities 1

Explaining the Levels of Popular Support for Hosting the Olympic

Games in Semi-Peripheral Polities

Stephen Bodine

Senior Research Paper

Dr. Cassie

12/05/14


Introduction

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is a cosmopolitan, non-governmental

institution that both reflects and shapes the current political landscape. It is the authority of the

Olympic Games, which are an apolitical confluence of the international community where

participants celebrate the values of humanity, fair play and peace through sport (Nauright, 2004).

However, at their core, the Olympics are an inherently political institution through which

countries push their agendas to achieve soft power in the global arena as well as to realize short-

term economic gains and long-term legacies. To win the bid to host the Olympics is a cause for

celebration that will garner much recognition for the political elite and allow a state, region

and/or a city to showcase a staged version of their society and culture. For these reasons, it

proves invaluable for scholars to observe the Olympics as a microcosm of the international

system.

The Olympics enjoy an immense level of support throughout the world that defies

cultural and political boundaries. However, over the past decade the level of popular support for

hosting the Olympic Games has dwindled among liberal democratic and developed polities as the

total cost incurred from holding the Olympics has crept up into the tens of billions1. The costliest

Olympic Games to date were the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2008 Beijing Summer

Olympics where the total cost was estimated to be around $50 billion and $43 billion

respectively (Taylor, 2014). Before these two Olympic Games were held, the costliest Olympic

Games were the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics. It was purported that the country of Greece

spent $15 billion to $19 billion (Taylor, 2014). The majority of the total cost usually arises from

non-OCOG (Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games) indirect costs, which are incurred

1 It is important to indicate that there is no available official data on the total cost of each Olympic Games, each source has a differing estimate.


from the infrastructure and the investment necessary to prepare the city or region for hosting the

Games (Flyvberg and Stewart, 2012). One of the most notorious and criticized non-OCOG costs

in the history of the Olympics was the construction of a purported $9 billion dollar railway and

road that transported patrons 31 miles back and forth from Sochi to the ski resort of Krasnaya

Polyana (The Economist, 2013).

Many citizens of these polities perceive hosting the Olympics as a wasteful endeavor that

bears a high opportunity cost. Public funds are diverted away from more beneficial public

projects and into sports infrastructure that too often become white elephants. Time and again, it

results in polities becoming fiscally strained as cost overruns decrease the likelihood of the

Olympic Games becoming profitable and increases the burden of public debt. Flyvberg and

Stewart noted in their work “Olympic Proportions: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Olympics

19602012” (2012, p.13) that every Olympic Games in history has acquired significant cost

overruns for OCOG costs and non-OCOG direct costs. OCOG costs are those expenses required

for staging the Olympic Games, such as administrative cost, security cost and the cost of the

opening and closing ceremonies. Non-OCOG direct costs are defined as construction costs of the

Olympic facilities and sports infrastructure. Flyvberg and Stewart found that the average cost

overrun from both the Winter and Summer Olympics was 179% of the initial budget and

concluded that “the Games’ budget is more like a fictitious minimum that is consistently

overspent” (Flyvberg and Stewart, 2012, p. 11).

The low level of popular support does not hold true for the populace of nondemocratic

and developing polities that the scholars Black and van der Westhuizen (2004) refer to as

“semiperipheral polities”. The term originated from the World Systems theory by Immanuel

Wallerstein (O’neil, 2010). Semi-peripheral polities are the middle rung in a 3-level world


hierarchy that consists of core, semi-peripheral and peripheral polities. The core polities are the

major powers that wield economic affluence and political clout in order to set the global agenda.

An example of core polities are the OECD’s Development Assistant Committee (DAC)

countries, who are the primary donors of official development assistance. The semi-peripheral

and peripheral polities are dependent upon the core polities. Semi-peripheral polities represent

economies in the “middle range of global development”, and “socially marginalized” polities that

don’t conform to the expectations of the modernization theory (Black and van der

Westhuizen, 2004, p. 1197). For the research semi-peripheral polities will include lower-middle-

income economies and upper-middle-income economies, and marginalized high-income

economies, such as Qatar. A polity is marginalized when it does not possess much symbolic

capital or does not embody the common characteristics of the core polities, such as democracy.

Demonstrated by tables A1 and A2, semi-peripheral countries exhibit higher levels of

popular support when considering both political systems and economic development. The data

for the percentage of popular support in Tables A1 and A2 was compiled from the IOC’s

Working Group Reports for all of the Winter and Summer Olympics between 2012 and 2022.

The level of popular support for each applicant city was measured through a poll conducted by

the IOC in each candidate city. The level of economic development in Table A2 was determined

by a country’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita based upon the World Bank’s Atlas

Method. The World Bank divides countries into four groups: low-income economies (GNI <

$1,045), lower-middle-income economies ($1,046 to $4,125), upper-middle-income economies

($4,126 to $12,745) and high-income economies (GNI >$12,746). It should be noted that no low-

income economies bid for the Olympics in the data. It can be assumed that these countries do not


possess the financial resources to host the Olympics and put a greater priority on the safety and

the physiological needs of their citizens.

The research in Chart A1 defines a country’s political system according to the Economist

Intelligence Unit’s 2013 Democracy Index. The Democracy Index grades each country on a scale

of 1 to 10 in five categories: civil liberties, electoral process and pluralism, functioning of

government, political culture and political participation (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013).

They then use a weighted average to categorize countries into the following four groups: full

democracies (8.0 to 10), flawed democracies (6.0 to 7.9), hybrid regimes (4.0 to 5.9) and

authoritarian regimes (0 to 3.9).

The introduction to the topic as proposed by this paper originated from a recent

development in the bidding process for the 2022 Winter Olympics. Three of the six applicant

cities dropped their bids due to popular opposition, all of which were applicants from core

countries (Bonesteel, 2014). The fourth applicant city of Lviv, Ukraine was forced to drop its bid

in response to the ongoing civil war in the country (Bonesteel, 2014). The two remaining

applicants that maintained their bids were the semi-peripheral countries of China and

Kazakhstan. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit and the World Bank, both China and

Kazakhstan are an authoritarian countries with upper-middle-income economies.

The international media quickly took notice of the political systems of the two remaining

applicants remarking that both countries were authoritarian. Many media outlets asserted that

developed liberal democracies are not willing to host the Olympics as a result of their democratic

political system. This is currently a prevalent, yet unproven argument in Western media. The

research will test the validity of this belief by seeking to answer the following question: Why do


citizens of semi-peripheral polities support hosting the Olympics more so than the citizens of

core polities?

Popular Support Among Semi-peripheral Poities: Two Perspectives

The recent developments in the bidding process for the 2022 Winter Olympics are strong

indicators that individuals in semi-peripheral polities are more attracted to the prospects of

hosting the Games. Many theories try to account for this incident, but only two schools of

thought provide enough scholarly research to justify any further analysis: the Economic

Development and the Political Institution schools of thought. The Economic Development school

of thought is based upon the idea that citizens of semi-peripheral polities value the economic

utility derived from hosting the Olympics. The proponents assert that citizens primarily seek to

gain intangible symbolic capital from signaling and tangible economic benefits, such as tourism,

employment, modern infrastructure and urban regeneration. Lastly, the Political Institution

school of thought recognizes that few semi-peripheral polities are the full democracies common

of the core polities. Proponents contend that citizens of semi-peripheral polities are more often

subjected to a suppressed civil society and minimal fiscal transparency. A lack of fiscal

transparency creates a principal-agent problem between the citizens and their government. Also,

the suppression of civil society results in fewer opportunities for citizen’s to be exposed to

opposing viewpoints. Both limit a citizen’s ability to produce a well-informed attitude towards

hosting the Olympics.

The proponents of the Economic Development school of thought assume that each

citizen is a rational actor and seeks to maximize economic utility. A consumer will support

hosting the Olympics only if the total perceived and realized economic benefits are greater than

the total cost incurred. This idea is modeled in the following consumer value equation:


Value= total benefits – total costs

This school concludes that citizens of semi-peripheral polities find value in the economic

benefits derived from the Olympics that are not as beneficial for the citizens of core polities. In

other words, the citizens of the less economically developed semi-peripheral polities exhibit

higher levels of support because they are positioned to gain greater total economic utility.

One basis for the Economic Development school of thought is the signaling theory by

Jacob Spence. According to Preuss and Alfs, signaling is “sending out signals to convey info

about otherwise hard to observe qualities of the sender in order to minimize the information

asymmetry and/or to accumulate symbolic capital” (2011, p.57). Information asymmetry is a

situation where one actor knows more than another actor resulting in misperceptions and other

inefficiencies (Rosser and Rosser, 2004, p.39). A polity would seek to minimize asymmetry in

order to disprove common misperceptions held by a population, differentiate itself or promote

commonality (Black and Van Der Westhuizen, 2004). Signaling results in the accumulation of

intangible symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is the value an actor gains through prestige and

respectability (Preuss and Alfs, 2011, p.56). It can be transformed into more tangible economic

capital in both the short-run and the long-run.

The Olympics provide the best opportunity for polities to conduct public diplomacy,

which is diplomacy aimed at foreign citizens (Grix and Lee, 2013, p.529). The Games have

achieved an unprecedented scale on the world stage in both participation and viewership.

Currently, they are broadcasted to over 200 countries and territories. The 2012 London Summer

Olympics reached an estimated 3.6 billion viewers, while the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games

reached an estimated 2.1 billion viewers (London Olympic Games 2012 Broadcast

Report, 2012; Sochi 2014 Global Broadcast and Audience Report, 2014).


Globalization has increased the importance of brand image in the international arena

(Black and Van Der Westhuizen, 2004). When one thinks about a polity, certain associations

come to mind. For instance, when an individual thinks of Beijing, China the negative

associations of pollution, crowds, inequality and communism may be recalled. Hosting the

Olympic Games allows a polity to redefine their brand image and therefore increase their

marketing power. When Beijing hosted the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, they showcased their

culture through one of the most celebrated opening ceremonies of all time. It included 15,000

performers and had an estimated cost of $100 million USD (Yardley, 2008). After watching the

Beijing Opening Ceremony, individuals may now identify the city with the more positive

associations of modernity, harmony and grandeur. This is an example of costly signaling where

an actor’s expensive endeavors increase its symbolic capital (Preuss and Alfs, 2011). Eventually,

Beijing’s accumulated symbolic capital will be converted into economic capital through induced

tourism and a greater inflow of foreign investment.

The emerging economies of semi-peripheral polities are often perceived to be risky

destinations for foreign investment and tourists. International investors and tourists are more

likely to choose the core economies of the United States, Japan and Western Europe, which have

amassed greater amounts of symbolic capital. Hosting the Olympics provides an opportunity for

semi-peripheral polities to demonstrate stability, competence and modernization. This signals to

investors their economic maturity and allows them to accrue symbolic capital. Thus,

semiperipheral polities better positioned to gain more economic value than developed polities

when hosting the Olympics.


The research done on the monetary value of the symbolic capital accumulated from

hosting the Olympics is incomplete. The economic value is hard to quantify because the

economic impact lasts an indeterminate length of time and can manifest itself into many different

forms. However, the research done by Li and McCabe (2013) indicates that economic legacies

such as induced tourism, economic growth, employment and Olympic facilities- decrease in

strength as time passes and are nearly nonexistent in the long-run (2013, p.391). The economic

legacies that do remain include infrastructure, - like highways, rail lines and parks - and Olympic

facilities (Li and McCabe, 2013). These leftover legacies do not benefit the core polities as much

as the semi-peripheral polities because they usually already enjoy quality public infrastructure.

The Economic Development school of thought does have its limitations. Proponents do

not account for bounded rationality. Full information regarding cost and benefits of hosting the

Olympics are never fully available. As previously mentioned, every Olympic Games on record

has incurred cost overruns which are not apparent until the Games are awarded and construction

has begun. Also, scholars Eric Barget and Jean-Jacques Gouguet emphasize that public-decision

makers too often base their determinations off of inadequate economic impact studies, and that

more accurate cost-benefit analysis are rarely utilized (2010, p.142).

Also, the Economic Development school of thought does not consider an individual’s

noneconomic motivations for supporting the Olympics. A citizen may be enthusiastic to

showcase their polity to the world. One would also assume that citizens may be eager to

participate in the Olympics themselves. However, scholar Peter Esinger (2000) refutes this

argument. He states that the patron base for sport mega-events have altered from locals to visitors

over the course of the century (Esinger, 2000, p.319). This becomes a more valid argument


when taking into account the citizens of poorer semi-peripheral polities who have trouble

affording the costly tickets for the events.

The Political Institution school of thought relies on the logic that the political elite or a

political system are inclined to suppress and/or divert the voices of civil society who are opposed

to hosting the Olympics. The non-democratic or weak democratic political systems of many

semi-peripheral polities are less likely to possess the characteristics conducive to civil society

and political openness, including fiscal transparency and civil liberties. It is believed that there is

limited political openness in these semi-peripheral polities and civil society is suppressed

resulting in fewer opportunities to voice dissatisfaction with the bids through referendums, polls

and other means. The political elites of these polities are left unchecked to pursue the bid for

their own self-gain. According to scholar Peter Esinger, hosting mega-events like the Olympics

are popular among political elites for a variety of reasons (Esinger, 2000). Local elites pursue

mega-events in order to attract tourist who “import spending and export the tax burden” (Esinger,

2000, p.321). Also, hosting the Games have the ability to garner the political elite popularity and

their ‘supporters’ large profits (Esinger, 2000, p.331).

This school of thought relies on the logic that many citizens do not wish to host the

Olympic Games due to the high opportunity cost and the heightened perceived risk. Esinger

found that when referenda were held in the United States for funding large sport facilities, the

majority resulted in negative decisions (2000, 324). Political elites are aware of this reality and

try to avoid public pressure in order to reap the awards of hosting the Games.

A case can be made that this school of thought applies to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic

Games as the “pet idea” of Russia’s current President Vladimir Putin (Petersson, 2014, p.32).

The scholar Petersson argues that Putin used the Sochi Olympic Games to enhance his “macho


image” (2014, p.32). Others scholars contend that he legitimized himself by being the head

proponent of the Games and used them as an expedient to reclaim the Presidency (Gronskaya

and Makaychev, 2014).

The Political Institutions school of thought fails to explain the high levels of popular

support among the core democratic semi-peripheral countries, like Brazil. However, it is

important to note that these semi-peripheral democracies are often classified under flawed

democracies or hybrid regimes. Nonetheless, they still maintain an imperfect degree of civil

liberties and rights that allows for limited, but present civil society and fiscal transparency. In

conclusion, the limited application of the Political Institution school of thought makes it the

weaker of the two schools. It does not explain why semi-peripheral polities with full

democracies, flawed democracies and possibly hybrid regimes demonstrate higher rates of

popular support than developed democracies.

Thesis

The Economic Development school of thought proves to be the strongest explanation for the

higher level of support among citizens of semi-peripheral polities. A model of the hypothesis is

as follows:

Stage of Economic Development → Level of Popular Support

Both schools of thought offer compelling arguments and both will likely explain

individual attitudes towards hosting the Olympics to an extent. The literature suggests that

citizens of the developing semi-peripheral polities value the perceived and realized economic


benefits more so than the citizens of core polities. Specifically, the less economically developed

a polity is, the greater the level of support for hosting the Olympics its citizens will demonstrate.

Methodology

I analyzed the levels of popular support exhibited by the citizens of the applicant cities

for the Olympic Games from 2010 through 2022. The data for the subset of applicant cities was

collected during and after the run-up to the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics. Many regard the

Athens Summer Olympics to be one of the most financially and economically scrutinized

Olympic Games in history. It became a symbol of wasteful spending and fiscal strain. Today, it

is considered to have been a catalyst for Greece’s current debt crises. The troubles in Greece

were widely reported by media around the world and many individuals began to view hosting the

Olympics as a financial burden.

The total sample size included 33 applicant cities for both the Summer and Winter

Olympics. In order to control for the political system, I excluded applicant cities that were

representative of authoritarian regimes. An authoritarian regime is any political system that held

an overall score from 0 to 3.9 in the Democracy Index. The subset of applicant cities included

representatives of full democracies, flawed democracies and hybrid regimes. Cities

representative of hybrid regimes were included in the subset because the majority -such as

Istanbul, Turkey and Borjomi, Georgia- are cities of weak democracies.

The subset of applicant cities represented the various stages of economic development,

with the exception of low-income economies. Twenty-three of the thirty-three applicant cities

were representative of the core, high-income economies with a GNI per capita greater than

$12,746. Five applicant cities were representative of semi-peripheral, upper-middle-income

economies with a GNI per capita between $4,126 and $12,745. The remaining five applicant


cities were representative of semi-peripheral, lower-middle income economies with a GNI per

capita between $1,046 and $4,125.

The dependent variable that we sought to explain was the level of support demonstrated

by the citizens of an applicant city. I acquired the data from the Working Group Reports

compiled by the IOC for the selection process of each Olympic Games. The Working Group

Reports included both the level of popular support within the applicant city as well as the level of

popular support in the entire country. I analyzed the level of local support instead of the level of

national support because the citizens of applicant cities experience the majority of the positive

and the negative ramifications of hosting the Olympics. Thus, they should possess stronger and

more informed opinions. Also, the local IOC Poll was more reliable than the national poll,

which was conducted by each country’s Bid Committee. There was no standardized method for

conducting each Bid Committee poll and there was a significant incentive to demonstrate higher

levels support by the Bid Committees. When selecting a host country, the IOC Working Group

graded each applicant city on 14 criteria, including Government and Public Support. Both polls

were factored into the Government and Public Support criterion.

I operationalized the level of economic development with the Gross National Income

(GNI) per capita of each applicant city’s country. The GNI per capita was calculated using the

World Bank Atlas method. Usually, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the preferred economic

indicator used to measure the level of economic development within a polity. However, I used

GNI because it is a more holistic measure that includes the income attained from abroad. By

including the factor incomes generated in other countries we better account for the levels of

international economic integration of each polity. International economic integration is an


outcome of accumulating symbolic capital, which is sought by semi-peripheral polities when

bidding to host the Olympics (Rose and Spiegel, 2009).

To test the veracity of the hypotheses I conducted a linear regression analysis in order to

calculate the amount of variation in the level of popular support that can be explained by the

level of economic development. The data will be calculated with the SPSS data analysis

software. The results will be encouraging if there is a noticeable negative association and a

correlation with a r² value that is greater than .4.

One limitation of the analysis is the small sample size of 33 applicant cities. The sample

size is acceptable, but not ideal. It will result in a greater adjustment for the r² value.

An individual’s attitude towards hosting the Olympics is formed from a variety of

motivations, both utilitarian and hedonic. It is highly unlikely for a citizen of an applicant city to

base his or her opinion solely on the economic utility. It is important to keep in mind that

because an individual’s attitude is the product of an indeterminate number of variables, any

relationship found will likely be weaker.

Evaluation of Results

The objective of the linear regression analysis was to accept or reject the hypothesis that

the less economically developed a polity is, the greater the level of support its citizens will

demonstrate. The criteria that needed to be met in order consider accepting the hypothesis was a

negative association and a r² value greater than .04. Even if the conditions are met, it does not

guarantee the findings are significant. It is almost a certainty that there are underlying variables

that are not accounted for.


The results from the linear regression analysis are encouraging. (See Table C1). The

calculations provided a Pearson correlation value of -.687 and a r² value of .472. The Pearson

correlation value indicates that the analysis produced a strong negative correlation. There is a

small discrepancy between the r² value (.472) and the adjusted r² value (.456). Based upon the

adjusted r² value, 45.6% of the variability in popular support can be accounted for by the level of

economic development. Overall, the relationship between popular support and economic

development is satisfactory, and the data supports the hypothesis.

The results of the linear regression analysis support the hypothesis, but one should take

these findings with a grain of salt. The Economic Development school of thought assumed that

all of the citizens were rational actors and sought to maximize their economic utility. However,

in reality this is never the case. It does not consider the noneconomic explanations for individuals

supporting the Olympics. An individual may desire to host the Olympic Games for the affect.

An example of a noneconomic motivation that serves as a lurking variable is patriotism. A

citizen of a developing semi-peripheral polity may support hosting the Olympics because it

symbolizes the ascension of the polity onto the global scene.

The statistical analysis did not account for the discrepancies in the level of development

between cities. An alpha city, such as London or Paris, will not receive as much economic utility

as beta or gamma city, such as Baku. These classifications are assigned by the Globalization and

World Cities (GaWC) Research Network based upon the level of integration in the international

economy. Alpha cities are the most integrated followed by beta, gamma, high-sufficiency and

sufficiency cities. Alpha cities possess more symbolic capital than beta and gamma cities. An

alpha city such as Moscow might be located in a semi-peripheral country (GaWC, 2012). Also,

the analysis did not account for the development discrepancies between cities within the same


country. The gamma city Leipzig, Germany (82%) demonstrated a greater level of popular

support than the alpha city Munich, Germany (70%) (GaWC, 2012).

Conclusion

The Olympic Games serve as a microcosm of the international system. They reflect the

defining economic and political conditions of the time. In the research, I sought to explain the

observed lack of interest in hosting the Olympics by the citizens of core polities by asking the

following question: Why do citizens of semi-peripheral polities support hosting the Olympics

more so than the citizens of core polities? Could it be an indicator of the rise of the Global South

and/or an evolving world order? Based on past literature, I came to the conclusion that the best

explanation considers the perceived and realized economic benefits derived from the Olympics. I

reasoned that citizens of semi-peripheral polities gained more economic utility from hosting the

Games, and thus valued it more. More specifically, the less economically developed a polity is,

the greater the level of support its citizens will demonstrate.

The results of the linear regression analysis upheld the hypothesis, but did not confirm it.

When measuring an individual’s attitude there are too many factors to consider because each

individual possesses their own idiosyncrasies. That being said, the results did demonstrate the

importance of economic value to the relevance of mega-projects, like the Olympics. Applicant

cities around the world could use these findings in order to enhance the value of the Olympic

Games for their own citizens. Instead of leaving legacies of white elephants, a polity could

propose a plan to repurpose those facilities into something more beneficial. The International

Olympic Committee should consider excluding the nonessential requirements for hosting the

Olympics. If not, it risks alienating itself from many of its biggest and wealthiest markets.


Overall, the greater levels of popular support among semi-peripheral economies signifies

the rise of the Global South and increasing globalization. A decade ago, many of these polities

could not afford to host the Olympics. Today, their growth has unlocked the benefits that can be

derived from hosting these sport mega-events and globalization has increased the potential

economic bounty. Their citizens wish to gain the economic benefits acquired from being put on

the map in one of the greatest global competitions in world history.

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Appendix A

Table A1

Political System Classification and Popular Support for the Olympics

The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index Country Classification

Full Flawed Hybrid Authoritarian Democracies Democracies Regimes Regimes

Popular Support 67% 83% 81% 80%

Table A2

Economic Development and Popular Support for the Olympics

World Bank’s Atlas Method Economic Classification

High-income Upper-middle-income Lower-middle-income Economy Economy Economy

Popular Support 70% 78% 86%


Appendix B

Table B1 Development Levels and Percentage of Popular Support

Applicant City Popular Support

Economic Development Level (GNI per capita, in USD)

Oslo, Norway

36.00%

102,610

Istanbul, Turkey 73.00% 10,810 Tokyo, Japan 47.00% 47,690 Madrid, Spain 78.00% 29,340

Munich, Germany 70.00% 43,400 Annecy, France 74.00% 42,390

PyeongChang, South Korea 90.00% 21,320 Chicago, United States 74.00% 49,350 Prague, Czech Republic 31.00% 46,790

Tokyo, Japan 59.00% 37,870 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 77.00% 7,480

Madrid, Spain 90.00% 31,580 Sochi, Russia 78.00% 5,820

Salzburg, Austria 46.00% 39,640 PyeongChang, South Korea 96.00% 19,980

Jaca, Spain 79.00% 27,320 Borjomi, Georgia 95.00% 1,680 Sofia, Bulgaria 83.00% 4,080 Paris, France 72.00% 30,420

Leipzig, Germany 82.00% 30,750 New York, United States 68.00% 43,690

Moscow, Russia 76.00% 3,410 Istanbul, Turkey 82.00% 5,070

London, United Kingdom 67.00% 34,990 Madrid, Spain 85.00% 21,470

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 87.00% 3,310 PyeongChang, South Korea 85.00% 12,470

Salzburg, Austria 76.00% 24,110 Vanncouver, Canada 58.00% 23,330

Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina 95.00% 1,700 Jaca, Spain 74.00% 15,070

Bern, Switzerland 42.00% 37,670 Andorra la Vella, Andorra 60.00% 18,990


Appendix C

Table C1 Economic Development and Percentage of Popular Support for Hosting the Olympics

Model Summary

Model R R Square Adjusted R

Square

Std. Error of the

Estimate

1 .687a .472 .456 12.36857%

a. Predictors: (Constant), GNI per capita

ANOVAa

Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

1

Regression 4380.355 1 4380.355 28.633 .000b

Residual 4895.410 32 152.982

Total 9275.765 33 a. Dependent Variable: Popular Support

b. Predictors: (Constant), GNI per capita

Figure C1

