5
ISSUE 10 Multilateral Matters The World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Bali reached a deal on some of the following areas of negotiations: a package for least developed countries (LDCs), trade facilitation and agriculture. But what does it all mean for developing countries in general, and for LDCs in particular? The Bali Ministerial Conference was preceded by intense negotiations in Geneva on the Doha Round. By the evening of 2 December, when officials were rushing to catch their flights to Bali, no “Bali package” was in sight—the result of continued disagreements on trade facilitation and agriculture. The goal for Bali was, therefore, to find a “safe landing zone” on all three areas of negotiations. The outcome of Bali should be measured not just on whether such a landing zone was found but, more importantly, whether it will allow the negotiations to take-off again and reach their final destination: the conclusion of the Doha Development Round. The LDC package has been the least controversial of the three negotiation areas, largely because the contents of the package are best endeavours rather than binding commitments. WTO members reaffirmed their commitment to duty free, quota free (DFQF) market access for LDCs. But the actual developmental benefits remain questionable. The limited export baskets of LDCs mean anything less than 100 per cent coverage is of little practical use. Tariffs are falling rapidly, so the incremental benefits of DFQF are eroding rapidly. Improvements in rules of origin and non-tariff barriers would have been more beneficial to LDCs as these are the barriers that really block market access. Negotiations on trade facilitation to reduce the cost of trading entailed making binding commitments to simplify customs procedures and regulations. Improvements in this area are a no -brainer but we need to distinguish between “improvements” and “commitments”. Commitments made in the WTO are binding and subject to legal action if they are not adhered to. Meeting trade facilitation commitments will require investment, and many will be capital intensive. Developing countries, and in particular LDCs, will need financial and technological assistance to upgrade and improve trade facilitation. The Bali Declaration provides assurance that developing countries and LDCs will be supported in building capacities to implement the agreement. The reaffirmation of commitments on Aid for Trade (AfT) is also to be welcomed. The new AfT work programme in the WTO is to be framed by the post-2015 global development agenda— a shift from the Hong Kong Ministerial declaration on AfT that will have implications for the 2006 AfT Task Force recommendations on AfT operationalisation. Bali has presented an opportunity for the future of AfT to be more streamlined and more focused on addressing the high cost of trading in LDCs. Negotiations on agriculture, more specifically on food stockpiles, presented the main action in Bali. There were two viewpoints on the price benchmark for the valuation of the volume of food stocks countries can legally hold. India’s position was to use current prices, which would mean amending the agriculture agreement of the Uruguay Round and would not be acceptable to other members. A final deal was struck to have an interim mechanism until a permanent solution is found, which means that more negotiation is still required to find a permanent solution. So where do we go from Bali? When WTO negotiations stalled in 2008 it looked as if the Doha Round had gone into a coma. One positive turn of events in Bali is that members are now actively negotiating. So while the Doha Round is coming out of JANUARY 2014 EXPERT TALK: MYANMAR AS 2014 ASEAN CHAIR …………………………………………....2 IE SINGAPORE CEO SPEAKS ON PROSPECTS OF SINGAPORES EXTERNAL ECONOMY ...……. 4 RSIS AND ISEAS CONSULT KEY STAKEHOLDERS ON VISION FOR ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BEYOND 2015……...…3 SELECTED PUBLICATIONS ….……………... 5 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Centre for Multilateralism Studies Bulletin PROFESSOR EVELYN GOH DISCUSSES ORDER TRANSITION IN POST-COLD WAR EAST ASIA….3 WTO Bali Declaration: What Does It Mean? By Yurendra Basnett Source: WTO/ANTARA WHATS NEXT FOR ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC I NTEGRATION: APEC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR SHARES VIEWS AT RSIS SEMINAR……..……………….4 JIIA-RSIS ROUNDTABLE ON MARITIME SECURITY IN EAST ASIA ………….. …..…..... 5

EXPERT ALK T : MYANMAR AS 2014 ASEAN C RSIS ISEAS C … · Continued from previous page PAGE 2 2014 marks a watershed year for Myanmar as it becomes the ASEAN chair for the first

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ISSUE 10

Multilateral Matters The World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference

in Bali reached a deal on some of the following areas of

negotiations: a package for least developed countries (LDCs),

trade facilitation and agriculture. But what does it all mean for

developing countries in general, and for LDCs in particular? The

Bali Ministerial Conference was preceded by intense

negotiations in Geneva on the Doha Round. By the evening of 2

December, when officials were rushing to catch their flights to

Bali, no “Bali package” was in sight—the result of continued

disagreements on trade facilitation and agriculture. The goal

for Bali was, therefore, to find a “safe landing zone” on all

three areas of negotiations. The outcome of Bali should be

measured not just on whether such a landing zone was found

but, more importantly, whether it will allow the negotiations to

take-off again and reach their final destination: the conclusion

of the Doha Development Round.

The LDC package has been the least controversial of the three

negotiation areas, largely because the contents of the package

are best endeavours rather than binding commitments. WTO

members reaffirmed their commitment to duty free, quota free

(DFQF) market access for LDCs. But the actual developmental

benefits remain questionable. The limited export baskets of

LDCs mean anything less than 100 per cent coverage is of little

practical use. Tariffs are falling rapidly, so the incremental

benefits of DFQF are eroding rapidly. Improvements in rules of

origin and non-tariff barriers would have been more beneficial

to LDCs as these are the barriers that really block market

access.

Negotiations on trade facilitation to reduce the cost of trading

entailed making binding commitments to simplify customs

procedures and regulations. Improvements in this area are a no

-brainer but we need to distinguish between “improvements”

and “commitments”. Commitments made in the WTO are

binding and subject to legal action if they are not adhered to.

Meeting trade facilitation commitments will require investment,

and many will be capital intensive. Developing countries, and in

particular LDCs, will need financial and technological assistance

to upgrade and improve trade facilitation. The Bali Declaration

provides assurance that developing countries and LDCs will be

supported in building capacities to implement the agreement.

The reaffirmation of commitments on Aid for Trade (AfT) is also

to be welcomed. The new AfT work programme in the WTO is

to be framed by the post-2015 global development agenda—

a shift from the Hong Kong Ministerial declaration on AfT that

will have implications for the 2006 AfT Task Force

recommendations on AfT operationalisation. Bali has presented

an opportunity for the future of AfT to be more streamlined

and more focused on addressing the high cost of trading in

LDCs.

Negotiations on agriculture, more specifically on food

stockpiles, presented the main action in Bali. There were two

viewpoints on the price benchmark for the valuation of the

volume of food stocks countries can legally hold. India’s position

was to use current prices, which would mean amending the

agriculture agreement of the Uruguay Round and would not be

acceptable to other members. A final deal was struck to have

an interim mechanism until a permanent solution is found, which

means that more negotiation is still required to find a

permanent solution.

So where do we go from Bali? When WTO negotiations stalled

in 2008 it looked as if the Doha Round had gone into a coma.

One positive turn of events in Bali is that members are now

actively negotiating. So while the Doha Round is coming out of

JANUARY 2014 EXPERT TALK: MYANMAR AS 2014 ASEAN

CHAIR …………………………………………....2

IE SINGAPORE CEO SPEAKS ON PROSPECTS

OF SINGAPORE’S EXTERNAL ECONOMY ...…….4

RSIS AND ISEAS CONSULT KEY

STAKEHOLDERS ON VISION FOR ASEAN

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BEYOND 2015……...…3

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS ….……………... 5

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Centre for Multilateralism Studies Bulletin

PROFESSOR EVELYN GOH DISCUSSES ORDER

TRANSITION IN POST-COLD WAR EAST ASIA….3

WTO Bali Declaration: What Does It Mean? By Yurendra Basnett

Source: WTO/ANTARA

WHAT’S NEXT FOR ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION: APEC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR SHARES

VIEWS AT RSIS SEMINAR……..……………….4

JIIA-RSIS ROUNDTABLE ON MARITIME

SECURITY IN EAST ASIA ………….. …..…..... 5

Continued from previous page

PAGE 2

2014 marks a watershed year for Myanmar as it becomes

the ASEAN chair for the first time since it was admitted as a

member in 1997. This year, the government will be given the

opportunity to lead ASEAN at a critical time and showcase

the progress Myanmar has made towards democratic and

economic liberalisation. Likewise, ASEAN has much at stake

in Myanmar’s success as it deals with the South China Sea

dispute and the looming deadline of the ASEAN Community

in 2015.

Multilateral Matters invited three eminent analysts to share

their views on the following questions: Is Myanmar ready to

lead ASEAN? What are the most critical challenges (both

internal and external) that Myanmar will face as the ASEAN

chair in 2014?

Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Associate Professor, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies

Kyoto University

Myanmar has undergone a series of serious political reforms

and sought to engage with the opposition, as seen in the

release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners.

This suggests that the Myanmar regime needs some kind of

legitimacy and the ASEAN chairmanship could offer a

platform to achieve it. Now that the sanctions have almost

been lifted and the local economy has improved, Myanmar

may be ready to lead this organisation. One domestic

challenge lies in the fact that ethnic conflicts between central

government and minorities could derail Myanmar’s plan.

Another key question must be asked: does Myanmar have a

specific vision to fulfil ASEAN community building by 2015?

Donald Emmerson

Director, Southeast Asia Forum

Stanford University

It is conventional to think of Myanmar as being "tested" by

the need to prepare in 2014 for the declaration of the

existence of an ASEAN Community by the end of

2015. And that of course is a plausible focus for anyone

who would reply to the given questions. But it might also be

interesting to think beyond ASEAN's schedule and ask what

"black swans" could be swimming, e.g. in the South China

Sea. Beijing has stated that its declaration of an Air

Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over contested parts of

the East China Sea could be repeated for other airspaces,

including presumably the huge block of air above the South

China Sea.

So far ASEAN has managed to keep a low (and divided)

profile on the imbroglio over who owns what in the South

China Sea. Myanmar, if it is chairing ASEAN when China

announces its South China Sea ADIZ, will face pressure from

inside ASEAN to do more than merely reassert faith in the

delayed segue from a Declaration of Conduct to a Code of

Conduct.

Various scenarios are of course possible, including a decision

in Beijing not to pivot southward, at least not until the anger

over its eastward ADIZ has subsided. But one should not

assume that the success of Myanmar-in-the-chair in 2014 will

be a function solely of its ability to help welcome a "white

swan," i.e. to oversee preparations for celebrating the

inauguration of a regional community to which no one really

objects.

Tin Tin Htwe

Director (retired), National ASEAN Free Trade Area Unit

Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development

Myanmar

As a citizen of Myanmar, I proudly would like to say that

Myanmar is ready for ASEAN chairmanship in 2014. This is the

first experience for Myanmar to assume the role of chair after

17 years since her accession into ASEAN. On becoming ASEAN

chair in 2014, Myanmar has the opportunity to show her

reforms and ability towards more democratisation. Myanmar

could strengthen relationships with western countries, E.U.

countries and all dialogue partners of ASEAN. Not only that, it

could also show the natural beauty and heritage of the country.

Where there are opportunities, there are also challenges. Lack

of infrastructure is one major issue. There still are some internal

issues and conflicts, such as those involving Muslims and Kachin

tribes.

We know this and yet, far too often, we face a multitude of

challenges in taking the ASEAN chair, for the chairmanship is a

task easier said than done and could make an enormous

difference to the lives of our people. Anyway, Myanmar’s

assumption of the ASEAN chair will surely be high-profile and

eagerly awaited.

Expert Talk: Myanmar as 2014 ASEAN Chair

its coma, it is still very much in the intensive care unit. The rise of

regional and mega-regionals is being pointed to as a

challenge to the future of the multilateral trading system. But

ministers in the plenary sessions in Bali were quick to put this

down and present arguments on why WTO still remains

important for global economic governance.

A deal in Bali has certainly helped to breathe life into the

Doha Development Round. The symbolism of the Bali

declaration is perhaps more important than the outcome as it

covers only a small portion of the Doha Development Agenda

and much ground still needs to be covered. A number of

country delegation members in Bali expressed that the

conclusion of the Doha Round is now in sight. But there was also

a sober realisation that, whatever the final agreement is, it will

not encompass the ambitious Doha Development Agenda in its

entirety. It will be a leaner version that is already being

referred to as “Doha lite”.

Dr Yurendra Basnett is a Research Fellow with the International

Economic Development Group of the Overseas Development Institute

(ODI).

An expanded version of this article was posted on the ODI website

on 6 December 2013.

RSIS and ISEAS Consult Key Stakeholders on Vision for

the ASEAN Economic Community beyond 2015 ASEAN economic cooperation and integration have come a long

way since ASEAN’s founding and the ASEAN Economic

Community (AEC) will be yet another milestone. The 2015

deadline for the realisation of the AEC is fast approaching;

however, work on forming a competitive, connected and

inclusive regional economic community will take time and will

have to be continued beyond 2015.

RSIS and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) were

tasked by the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic

Integration (HLTF-EI) to draft a vision paper to provide inputs

for a possible framework and policy agenda on what ASEAN

should do beyond 2015. The “Vision Paper on AEC beyond

2015” aims to: (i) assess the progress in AEC 2015; (ii) identify

and analyse the regional and global challenges confronting the

region and (iii) recommend policies for the AEC beyond 2015.

To ensure that the Vision Paper reflects the concerns and needs

of the broader ASEAN community, RSIS and ISEAS organised a

consultation workshop on 22 October 2013 at the NTU One-

North Campus. Over 30 participants from regional institutions,

the private sector, academe and think tanks representing each

ASEAN member state attended the workshop where they

expressed their support for the initiative and provided

comments on the draft Vision Paper. Feedback from the

participants focused on political (e.g. ratification of domestic

legislation to support regional arrangements) and institutional

(e.g. resource and capability constraints faced by the ASEAN

Secretariat) limitations and the evolving regional and global

strategic landscape and related trends. Discussions also stressed

the importance of having a shared vision—both across and

within ASEAN member states—for the AEC post-2015. Beyond

the usual state and private sector actors, the participants

believed that the success of the AEC beyond 2015 will also

depend on stronger public buy-in and awareness of initiatives

under the AEC agenda.

PAGE 3

(L-R) Assoc Prof Pradumna B Rana, Assoc Prof Mely Caballero-Anthony, Prof Joseph Liow and Mr Rodolfo Severino

Professor Evelyn Goh Discusses Order Transition in Post-

Cold War East Asia On 23 October 2013, Professor Evelyn Goh, Shedden Professor

of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University,

gave a seminar at RSIS on the topic “Hegemony, Hierarchy and

Order Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia.”

Goh made four observations about the evolving regional order.

First, regional institutions are not just about norms—they are

also used to tame and harness power. Second, regionalism

poses a limited challenge due to Sino-Japanese competition for

regional influence and the difficulty of distinguishing the

regional from the global. Third, great power authority,

particularly from the United States, continues to be emphasised

in regional conflict management. Fourth, the East Asian fractured

order stems from the different interpretations of history and

collective memory in Northeast Asia.

Goh proposed a new framework comprising three tenets for

understanding the East Asian strategic order. First, the post-Cold

War era is witnessing a parallel strategic resurgence of the

United States and China. In this regard, Southeast Asia handles

its relations with the United States and China differently—

regional institutions are used to harness and channel U.S. power,

while at the same time constrain and socialise China. The second

element of the new framework involves a transition in the

regional order in terms of conflict management, social norms

and institutional bargains. Finally, East Asia is currently

governed by a layered hierarchy. U.S. hegemonic authority

persists, China is a second-ranked regional power, and the

other regional states are ranked below China.

Stress points in the regional hierarchy include Sino-U.S. power

sharing, Sino-Japanese competition for regional influence, and

the linkage between security and economic issues. Goh added

that strategic choices for East Asian states were not confined to

balancing, bandwagoning or hedging. The real challenges for

the region were: (i) how to perpetuate the preferred U.S. led

regional order even as the gap narrows between U.S. primacy

and a rising China; and (ii) how to help China become a

satisfied power with adjustments that are acceptable to other

states.

For a more comprehensive report on the content of Professor Evelyn Goh’s presentation, please refer to Evelyn Goh, “Ringing in a New

Order? Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in East Asia,” The Centre of Gravity Series, October 2013. Her book, “The Struggle for

Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Order Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia,” was published in August 2013.

IE Singapore CEO Speaks on Prospects of Singapore’s External Economy As the global economy continues to undergo dramatic changes,

Singapore must take the necessary action to manage risks and

capitalise on opportunities to strengthen its external economy.

Mr Teo Eng Cheong, Chief Executive Officer of International

Enterprise (IE) Singapore, gave a seminar on “Enhancing the

External Economy of Singapore” on 13 November 2013 to

discuss Singapore’s strategy and how it can stay relevant in the

evolving global economy.

Teo focused on overseas investment opportunities for Singapore

and listed a number of key trends that will drive growth in this

area. These include rising urbanisation in Asia, increasing

consumption power and demand for products of higher value

and quality, ongoing transformation of the energy sector,

structural changes in global manufacturing and strong growth in

certain Sub-Sahara African economies. While these trends

present a number of promising prospects for Singapore, it also

has to deal with several internal challenges such as productivity

concerns, manpower constraints and limited land area.

During the open discussion, participants raised the topic of

Singapore’s ties with Africa and Myanmar. On the former, it

was observed that the country’s interest in Africa has been

growing and China’s involvement in the region has created

opportunities for Singapore to work together with China in

Africa. Discussions also covered Singapore’s deepening links

with Myanmar, particularly its potential as a new market and

the country’s abundant natural resources. However, while

government policies in Myanmar are encouraging, institutions

continue to be weak so next steps must be viewed with cautious

optimism. Participants also shared their opinions on the ASEAN

Economic Community (AEC) and what its realisation would mean

for Singapore. Achieving the AEC will require more time and

strong political will as it involves very ambitious goals. At the

very least, harmonisation of standards and procedures will

happen and Singapore stands to benefit significantly from a

more homogenous ASEAN market.

PAGE 4

What’s Next for Asia Pacific Economic Integration: APEC Executive Director Shares Views at RSIS Seminar

Dr Alan Bollard, Executive Director of the APEC Secretariat,

gave a talk entitled “A Tale of Three Meetings: Some Important

Steps in Asia Pacific Economic Integration” on 4 December 2013

at the RSIS Lecture Theatre. Bollard used three cases to illustrate

the direction, process and prospects of Asia Pacific economic

integration, namely: (i) the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting

(Bali, 7-8 October 2013); (ii) the World Trade Organization

(WTO) Ministerial Conference (Bali, 4-6 December 2013) and

(iii) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Ministerial Meeting

(Singapore, 7-10 December 2013).

On the APEC meeting, Bollard noted how the agenda has

shifted from traditional trade liberalisation to greater focus on

facilitation. He highlighted APEC’s role in fostering regional

economic integration as an incubator (e.g. IT agreement),

initiator (e.g. connectivity issues) and integrator (e.g. possible

merging of the TPP and Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership [RCEP] to a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific).

Bollard shared his insights on the negotiations leading to the

WTO meeting and discussed the agreements and roadblocks

concerning the Bali Deliverables on agriculture, concessions for

the least developed countries and trade facilitation measures.

On the WTO’s future role in global trade governance, he felt

that the WTO would be more successful in sectoral areas (e.g. IT

and services) and in an enforcement function.

On the TPP meeting, Bollard cited the significant progress in the

negotiations as TPP member countries remain committed to

meeting the 2013 deadline. However, major issues still need to

be resolved in the areas of agriculture, intellectual property

and the role of state-owned enterprises.

While economic objectives clearly drive the agenda of these

meetings, the open discussion touched on the political context

including ASEAN centrality and perceptions of conflict between

the TPP and the RCEP and the expansion of APEC membership.

Mr Teo Eng Cheong (CEO, IE Singapore) and Mr Tan Seng Chye (Senior Fellow, RSIS, and seminar chair)

Dr Alan Bollard

PAGE 5

JIIA-RSIS Roundtable on Maritime Security in East Asia

On 10 December 2013, RSIS and the Japan Institute of

International Affairs (JIIA) co-organised a roundtable on

“Maritime Security in East Asia.” Held at the Four Seasons Hotel

Singapore, over 20 participants from Track I and Track II

engaged in dynamic discussions about maritime issues in both

Northeast and Southeast Asia. The roundtable focused on three

issues: (i) the shifting military balance in the East and South

China Seas; (ii) the legal dimensions of the territorial disputes;

and (iii) actions for stability and the Japan-ASEAN security

relationship.

In both the East and South China Seas, China’s maritime

expansion was a critical element in defining the naval balance.

As such, participants agreed that China must be included in the

conversation on regional maritime affairs. It was also important

to enhance regional confidence building measures, even as

Southeast Asian naval cooperation remained hindered by the

trust deficit among states and capability mismatches.

Participants were not optimistic about international law as a

tool for resolving the territorial disputes, given the varying

interpretations by different states of the provisions under the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

However, it was opined that UNCLOS provisions could help to

clarify certain issues and prevent the situation from escalating.

As Japan and ASEAN members shared several common

interests, there was scope for both sides to cooperate to

maintain regional peace and stability. These common interests

included ensuring the freedom of navigation, engaging China,

as well as maintaining ASEAN neutrality and unity.

ABOUT THE CENTRE The Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS) is a research entity within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. The CMS team conducts cutting-edge research, teaching/training and networking on cooperative multilateralism in the Asia Pacific region. The Centre aims to contribute to international academic and public discourses on regional architecture and order in the Asia Pacific. It aspires to be an international knowledge hub for multilateral cooperation and regional integration.

For more information, contact us or visit our website: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/cms/

CONTRIBUTORS Theresa Robles

Sarah Teo

CONTACT US Centre for Multilateralism Studies

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University

Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS The US Rebalancing Strategy: Impact on the South China Sea Ralf Emmers, National Security College Occasional Paper no. 5, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, October 2013 Governance of East Asian Regional Economic Architectures Theresa Robles and Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit (eds), RSIS Policy Report, November 2013 South Korea’s Middle Power Engagement Initiatives: Perspectives from Southeast Asia Sarah Teo, Bhubhindar Singh and Tan See Seng, RSIS Working Paper no. 265, November 2013 Five Years After the Global Crisis, the World Is No Safer Pradumna B Rana, East Asia Forum, 15 November 2013 South Korea’s Defence Diplomacy in East Asia Sarah Teo, RSIS Policy Brief, December 2013 Bali Deal Process Highlights WTO’s Fractured Nature Deborah Elms, The Straits Times, 10 December 2013 Momentum Brings Flash of Hope for WTO Oh Ei Sun, Global Times, 16 December 2013