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EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning, and from Gerber and Green (2012), Angrist and Pischke (2009), Mutz (2011), and several journal articles.

EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

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Page 1: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE1

S. Erdem AytaçKoç University

March 12, 2015

Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning, and from Gerber and Green (2012), Angrist and Pischke (2009), Mutz (2011), and several journal articles.

Page 2: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Growth of experiments

Page 3: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Experiments• Experiment: an investigation where the researcher

intervenes in the data-generating-process by purposely manipulating elements of the environment (treatment)

• System under study (individuals/material investigated, nature of manipulations, measurement procedures) is under the control of the investigator

• Observational study: some of these features, and in particular the allocation of individuals to treatment groups, are outside the investigator’s control (Cox and Reid 2000:1)

Page 4: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Randomized (controlled) experiments• A sample of N individuals/units is selected from the population

• Note that this sample may not be random and may be selected according to observables

• This sample is then divided randomly into two groups: the Treatment group and the Control group

• The Treatment group is then treated by stimulus X while the Control group is not. Then the outcome Y is observed and compared for both Treatment and Control groups

• The effect of stimulus X is measured in general by the difference in empirical means of Y between Treatment and Control groups

Page 5: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

An example• Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-

Scale Field Experiment (Gerber et al. 2008)

• Why do large numbers of people vote despite the fact that “the casting of a single vote is of no significance where there is a multitude of electors”?

• Citizen duty and social pressure• Voting is widely regarded as a citizen duty• Do people worry that others will think less of them if they fail to

participate in elections?

• Priming voters to think about civic duty while at the same time applying different amounts of social pressure

Page 6: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Research design• Obtain the official state voter list• ~ 80K households (out of ~180K) were sent one of four

mailings encouraging them to vote ahead of the 2006 primary election in Michigan

Page 7: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 8: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 9: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 10: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 11: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 12: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

We’ve got questions

Some questions in applied research in political science are primarily descriptive

• How did inequality change during the twentieth century in advanced industrial democracies?

• Do civil wars last longer in countries with rough terrains?• Are elections for European Parliament more competitive

in the last decade than previously?

We ask questions to make descriptive inference – learn about some unobserved phenomenon on the basis of some set of observed facts

Page 13: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

We’ve got questions

But often what we want to know is the answer to a counterfactual question

• Would a particular individual voted if she had been contacted by a campaign worker in person?

• Would a particular individual vote for party X if he had more education?

• Do regional trade agreements increase trade?

We ask questions of the form what would have happened to this person’s/city’s/state’s behavior/outcome if she/it had been subjected to some stimulus, T.

Page 14: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Counterfactual questions

Our questions are often cause-and-effect questions

• Does X cause Y?• If X causes Y, how large is the effect?

This is actually pretty hard to do

An example and some notation will show why it is hard

Page 15: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Potential outcomes modelCounterfactual model of causality (potential outcomes model or Neyman-Rubin model)

• Does college education increase people’s income?

• Di = {0,1} binary random variable indicating college education of individual i

• Yi outcome of interest, a measure of income

• Let us call Y1i the income of an individual if she has college education, irrespective of whether she actually had, and Y0i the income of the same individual if she does not have college education.

• For any individual, there are two potential income variables:

Potential outcome = Y1i if Di = 1

Y0i if Di = 0

Page 16: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

The problem of causal inference• We want to know Y1i − Y0i , the causal effect of having college

education for individual i

• Problem: We will never have an individual both with and without college education at the same time

• The fundamental problem of causal inference (Holland 1996) • One can never calculate unit-level causal effects

Observed outcome Yi = Y1i if Di = 1

Y0i if Di = 0

= Y0i + (Y1i - Y0i) Di

Page 17: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

What can we do?

We will never know the effect of having college education for a particular individual but we may hope to learn the average effect that it will have on individuals:

E [ Y1i − Y0i ]

E [ Y1i − Y0i ] is the average treatment effect or average causal effect. This equation is defined with reference to the population of interest.

The most common subject of investigation in the social sciences

Page 18: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Naïve estimation

So imagine we have a random sample of the population. Some individuals have college education and others do not.

Look at the difference between average income of individuals with college education and average income of individuals without college education

Observed difference in average income

E [ Yi | Di = 1 ] − E [ Yi | Di = 0 ]

Page 19: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Is E [ Yi | Di = 1 ] − E [ Yi | Di = 0 ] equal to E [ Y1i − Y0i ] ?

Observed outcome Yi = Y1i if Di = 1

Y0i if Di = 0

E [ Y1i | Di = 1 ] − E [ Y0i | Di = 0 ]

Add and subtract E [ Y0i | Di = 1 ] and rearrange

E [ Y1i | Di = 1 ] − E [ Y0i | Di = 1 ] + E [ Y0i | Di = 1 ] − E [ Y0i | Di = 0 ]

Average treatment effect on the treated Selection bias

Page 20: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Selection bias

E [ Y0i | Di = 1 ] ≠ E [ Y0i | Di = 0 ]

• Individuals who “select” themselves to Di = 1 (college education) are likely to be different than others in ways that could affect Y0i

• Better motivated• Wealthier• Educated parents with connections

• Treatment status is not independent of potential outcomes

Page 21: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Random assignment solves selection problem

• Random assignment to treatment and control makes Di

independent of potential outcomes

E [ Yi | Di = 1 ] − E [ Yi | Di = 0 ]

= E [ Y1i | Di = 1 ] − E [ Y0i | Di = 0 ]

= E [ Y1i | Di = 1 ] − E [ Y0i | Di = 1 ]

= E [ Y1i − Y0i | Di = 1 ]

= E [ Y1i − Y0i ]

This was what we sought to learn in the first place!

Page 22: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

A (much) more concise approach

Page 23: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Analyses of observational data• Model-based inference – statistical adjustments for potential

confounders• Conditional independence of treatment assignment and potential

outcomes

• Difficult to achieve• Relevant confounding variables must be identified & measured• No one can be sure what the set of confounding factors comprises

Without an experiment, natural experiment, a discontinuity, or

some other strong design, no amount of econometric or

statistical modeling can make the move from correlation to

causation persuasive (Sekhon 2009, 487)

Page 24: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Threats to internal validity• Noncompliance

• Subjects receive a treatment other than the one which they were assigned

• Attrition• Outcome data are missing & systematically related to potential

outcomes

• Interference between units• Observations are influenced by experimental conditions to which

other observations are assigned

Page 25: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Experiments by type – APSR, AJPS, JOP

Page 26: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Online Experiments• Experiments administered over the internet

• Recruitment• Online panels, Online labor markets (e.g., Amazon.com’s

Mechanical Turk), Social networks (e.g., Facebook)• Large and more diverse samples (including representative

samples) than usual convenience samples

Page 27: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Advantages of online experiments• Complex experimental designs are possible

• Multiple variations of multiple factors• May not be practical in traditional paper-format• Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) and Lab

• CATI – difficult for purposes for explaining the rules• Labs – difficult to reach a diverse sample

Page 28: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Bullock et al. (2013)• Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics

• Large differences between Democrats and Republicans in stated attitudes about factual matters

• Real or artificial?• Differences in true beliefs OR “expressive value of offering survey

responses that portray one’s party in a favorable light”

• Test: ask factual questions, pay for correct answers

• YouGov/Polimetrix

Page 29: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 30: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 31: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 32: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Advantages of online experiments• Facilitates complex experimental designs

• Graphics, photos, video, audio stimuli possible

Page 33: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Bailenson, Iyengar et al. (2009)• Facial similarity between voters and candidates causes

influence

• Voters are attracted to candidates who most resemble them on ideology, issue positions, party affiliation

• What about physical resemblance? Are voters attracted to candidates who look like them?

• Facial similarity

Page 34: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 35: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 36: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Advantages of online experiments• Images might be less obtrusive treatments

• Stimuli: race, gender

• Text-based treatment: why mention race/gender? – intent might be recognized

• Images convey information by themselves

Page 37: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 38: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

• Games• Economic games• Social games

• Instructions are more easily conveyed, large number of “players”

• (When recruited through an online panel) Payments are more credible, straightforward

• People are accustomed to interactions/communicating with others over the internet

Advantages of online experiments

Page 39: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Advantages of online experiments• Lower levels of socially desirable responding than in

surveys delivered over the phone (Chang and Krosnick 2009)

• Quickly unfolding opportunities for experiments – infrastructure ready

• Collecting data inconspicuously • Time spent answering (e.g., in Qualtrics)• IP addresses – location, housing density, crime rates

Page 40: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Recruiting subjects online• Facebook

• % National population: 45 Argentina, 42 Turkey, 48 UK, 37 France, 27 Germany (Samuels and Zucco 2012)

• Put an ad, conduct the experiment on Qualtrics • Targeting demographics possible (Age group, location, gender,

interests)

• Pay per click to Facebook• Completion rate: 1 in 7 clicks in Brazil, 1 in 40 in Turkey• ~.10$ / click -> ~ 4$/completed survey

Page 41: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,
Page 42: EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1 S. Erdem Aytaç Koç University March 12, 2015 Much of this material is from lectures by Kenneth Scheve and Thad Dunning,

Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk• Web-based platform for recruiting and paying subjects to

perform tasks• Low-cost, easy-to-field platform for survey/experiments

• More than 500,000 individuals from 190 countries (2014)• US, India dominated, less than a quarter in other countries

• Workers are diverse but not representative• Younger, over-educated, under-employed, less religious, more

liberal (Berinsky et al. 2012)

• Results from published studies can be replicated (Berinsky et al. 2012)