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Expeditionary Logistics in the Age of AusterityDr David M Moore and Peter D Antill from Cranfield University consider the issues and challenges facing the UK in terms of the logistics required for expeditionary operations

D uring the 18th and 19th centuries, the UK maintained a small but highly professional army, with a large, modern, well-equipped navy to police its Empire. The First and Second World Wars saw

the UK having to undertake a massive expansion of the British Army, overcome the challenges of training, organising and equipping such a force in order to fight a well-trained, organised and motivated opponent in conventional warfare, on the continent of Europe1.

The Cold War saw a gradual withdrawal from empire and a return to an all-regular force. The UK also concentrated on its role within NATO, becom-ing more and more dependent on a logistics support system that delivered mass rather than velocity, across static lines of communication (LoC). Resupply was conducted by a hierarchical multi-layered system of stock holding, which had inventory management at each level, and provisioning in the previous level. Materiel was in essence pushed forward, thus refill-ing the following level of stockholding to a pre-planned amount. Such a system, involving a ‘back-to-front’ process invariably, has costs associated

with storage, the amount of stock held, transportation onto the next level and double handling. It was, therefore, a traditional linear or echelon pro-cess, consisting of lines of support, which were known as the first, second, third and fourth lines2.

Making progress?The end of the Cold War has seen the size and shape of the UK Armed Forces alter significantly, as has the method of supporting them logisti-cally, especially since successive governments have taken a more inter-ventionist approach to foreign policy, with operations in a wide range of conflicts across the globe, including Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya. As was proved in Operation TELIC (the invasion of Iraq in 2003)3, a smaller military does not necessarily mean an easier time supporting it in expe-ditionary warfare. These operations require the mounting and sustain-ment of an operation far from the home base, in areas that may have an underdeveloped infrastructure with demands that can vary from day-to-

A CH-47 Chinook brings much-needed resupplies to UK Royal Marines in Afghanistan

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day. This is known as the ‘Four Ds’ (distance, destination, demand and duration), with each operation having to have a logistics system flexible and robust enough to cope with its unique combination of factors. TELIC highlighted that the UK Armed Forces had failed to make the necessary changes (despite Operation GRANBY – first Gulf War, 12 years before) to their logistics processes in order to meet the demands of conducting a large-scale, high-intensity operation with short-deployment deadlines at a significant distance from the UK. A highly critical report from Lieutenant General Chris Brown was even suppressed within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) itself.4 The major problems encountered with the operation were: stock shortages, inadequate asset tracking, inadequate logistics commu-nication, an inability to deliver priority items, and inadequate control over the coupling bridge between the theatre and the UK.

Recent situationSince then, the logistics support afforded the UK Armed Forces has been under almost constant review. Not only has a major organisational change occurred5, but a series of reform programmes were initiated, with the Defence Logistics Transformation Programme in 20046, the Defence Logistics Programme in 20067 and the Defence Support Review in 20108, with additional papers appearing9 after the Strategic Defence and Security Review of October 201010. This ongoing transformation has been taking place against a backdrop of two major operational commitments (Iraq and Afghanistan), significant pressure on the defence budget and continued uncertainty in the international political system. While such a combina-tion makes it imperative that inefficiencies are removed from the system, it has also made it more and more likely that urgent operational needs are met by cuts or delays in the equipment programme, something that has finally happened under Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Industry, too, faces problems with pressure on the defence budget constraining orders for major new platforms, longer life cycles creating industrial capability sustainment issues and necessitating additional mid-life upgrade programmes, greater technological complexity, increased risk being transferred from the MoD and the requirement to operate closer and closer to the ‘front line’11.

Despite the ongoing attempts to reform the logistics support afforded the UK Armed Forces, a number of issues have remained critical to both the MoD and industry, exacerbated by the age of austerity:

Planning Confidence – For operational commanders today, it is vital ■■

that their plans are able to be executed, secure in the knowledge that any required logistic support will be available as-and-when required. It is essential to have physical and structural capability within the logistic support chain, especially as the UK now operates in challenging, complex operational environments that require flex-ibility allied to rapid response. As such, the UK no longer operates in symmetrical conflict settings; similarly the support chain for such

environments is not linear but is a network that requires differing approaches depending upon the operational support circumstances. Asset Visibility and Information Flow – In an ideal world, there would ■■

be an efficient and effective logistic information system that would carry all the necessary information back up the supply chain from the theatre of operations to the Home Base, assisting planners in rapidly responding to operational needs. While funding can often be made available for technologically advanced equipment, it is more challenging to find sufficient funds to establish an optimal logistics system. This is because there has been, and still is, a proliferation of systems originally designed for specific service application, many of which promised, but failed, to deliver optimised solutions. It may be that new adaptations, including Joint Asset Management and Engineering Solutions and Management of Joint Deployment Inventory, greatly assist in providing suitable solutions, although in an age of austerity that might not be possible. End-to-End Process – It is important to note that it is not just the ■■

supply chain that delivers materiel to the operational theatre, but that it is also the logistic engineering support chain that enables

The end of the Cold War has seen the size and shape of the UK Armed Forces alter significantly

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the maintenance, repair and availability of equipment as required. When discussing LoC, they must not be viewed in a simplistic man-ner. Instead they must be seen as a network, operating from the Home Base through to, and within the operational environment. This requires a genuine end-to-end perspective to be implemented (as well documented in supply chain management theory)12. At the front end of this network, there is a need to be able to move mate-riel quickly at the tactical level (company and battle group) and not just between logistic bases. The challenge here will be to ensure that there are Immediate Replenishment Groups (IRGs) and an element of forward stockpiling. This highlights the need to consider multiple concepts for logistic support ranging from ‘lean’ (possible in the Home Base) to ‘agile’ (necessary in the theatre itself). To facilitate this, there need to be ‘decoupling’ points that link the differing con-ceptual approaches in practice. This can be seen in an operational sense, but also from a strategic perspective. This requires innova-tive thinking, for example, rather than transporting equipment and vehicles to and from the UK for repair; it has been possible to build a repair facility within Afghanistan itself. Hence, strategic foresight

is paramount, assuming that the enduring nature of an operation is known at an early stage.Collaboration and Cooperation – This identifies that there is a ■■

need to work together with other key players and stakeholders in the current defence environment. So, for example, contractors are now a fundamental feature of support within theatres, such as Afghanistan, as recognised in the concept of a ‘total support force’ (TSF). Not only can contractors and civil servants play a major part in ensuring effective logistic support13, most if not all expeditionary operations undertaken by the UK in the future will be part of a larger Coalition (alongside such countries as the United States, France and Canada). Such Coalitions could well be based on NATO, but may also be formed under the auspices of the United Nations or even the European Union (although it is recognised that the UK seeks to retain a degree of sovereign integrity in relation to its own logistic support system). This idea of collaboration is necessary to achieve agility in logistics, in that it is often third-party logistic providers who undertake the bulk of the physical activity within the supply chain. This may include management of the relevant activities, although it

Royal Marine Commandos used up significant supplies during Operation Sond Chara to clear the Taliban from the Nad-e Ali district of Helmeand province, Afghanistan

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is vital that in the setting of requirements and the actual contractual arrangements, it is the MoD that acts as an intelligent customer to ensure that optimum solutions can be found. The utilisation of such resources can assist in adding certainty to supply/support that will assist in overcoming the need to hold stock ‘just in case’. This in turn will add to the confidence that the operational commander requires.People and Knowledge – On the one hand, this will require knowl-■■

edgeable personnel who can undertake strategic management of the entire supply chain on a holistic basis. Such personnel must be able to undertake and understand requirements planning and management, contract negotiation and management, as well as through-life support, all of which must be undertaken in the context of capability management. To achieve this will require a high level of both education and training. On the other hand, it will also require de-centralised personnel who have the skills, initiative and invention to understand force requirements, and who can undertake local pro-visioning and distribution tasks without excessive centralised plan-ning and force protection operations. This too will require training in line with existing and future operational doctrine. It is the ability to make decisions at all levels that will become critical because “two of the generally accepted critical characteristics of agile organisations are the ability to decentralise resources and decision-making and having uncommitted resources to deal with the unexpected”.14

Balancing Force Structures – Both current and future logistic force ■■

structures must assure the delivery of war-fighting capability (and the means to support it) under conditions of acceptable risk (however that is defined) and such risk be managed in order to reduce the UK’s foot-print in-theatre and minimise the pressure on the support chain. It is only by getting such a balance right in the total force, with the optimal collaboration of contractors and civil servants, alongside that of regu-lar and reserve forces that the UK can optimise in-theatre support.

All of the issues noted above provide particular challenges, but in the age of austerity, the topic of Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) is partic-ularly demanding15. There are some who would argue that the concept and application of UORs is a great success, but this is to ignore the logistic sup-port challenges that may emerge as the resupply, repair and maintenance of a varied equipment pool has to be dealt with. Not only can this mean

an excess of stocks or indeed a lack of stock, but prediction, planning and provisioning become more complex. As funding is found for the essential UORs that significantly improve operational performance, so the challenge builds to continue supporting an ever expanding equipment range.

Paying the price in an age of austerityA number of issues and challenges have been identified that must be addressed to ensure that operational performance is enhanced through logistic support, not endangered. Some of these are at the strategic level; others are at an operational or tactical level. It is anticipated that funding will remain static but will not increase; hence it may be that some improve-ments do not take place or at least are pushed back. This is the price that must be paid in an age of austerity. ■

Footnotes

Dr Colin McInnes, 1. Hot War, Cold War: The British Army’s Way in Warfare 1945-1995,

London: Brassey’s UK, 1996, pp. 3-4.

P Antill and David Moore, ‘British Army Logistics and Contractors on the Battlefield’ in The 2.

RUSI Journal, Volume 145, Number 5, pp. 46-52.

See House of Commons Defence Committee. Lessons of Iraq, HC57-I, London: TSO, 3.

16 March 2004; Ministry of Defence. Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, London:

DGCC, December 2003; National Audit Office. Operation TELIC – United Kingdom

Military Operations in Iraq, HC60, London: TSO, 11 December 2003.

Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Suppressed MoD Report on Iraq War Damns Military for Being 4.

Ill-Equipped’ in The Guardian, located at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/apr/06/iraq-

suppressed-report-damns-uk-military (dated 6 April 2011) as of 8 April 2011.

The DLO and DPA merged in 2007. See House of Commons Defence Committee. Defence 5.

Equipment 2008, HC295, London: TSO, 27 March 2008, p. 5.

Http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060424202216/http://www.mod.uk/6.

DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DLO/OurTeams/TheDefenceLogisticsTransformation

Programmedltp.htm.

Http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060424202216/http://www.mod.uk/NR/7.

rdonlyres/4706B809-B486-4BAF-82CB-45C1C88B6562/0/deflogprog2006.pdf.

Jeremy Lemer, ‘MoD considers call for big rise in outsourcing’ in the 8. Financial Times (at

www.ft.com), 18 November 2009, located at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eb308626-d3e2-

11de-8caf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1IqbGfvh5 as of 7 April 2011; MoD / Deloitte. Defence

Support Review. Phase 1 – Report, Internal Report, February 2010.

See for example Chris Mace, (D DSR). 9. A Strategic Vision for Defence Support, DSR/VP/001,

15 November 2010.

HM Government. 10. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and

Security Review, Cm7948, London: TSO, October 2010. See also the Fact Sheets associated

with this at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/strategic-defence-and-security-

review-securing-britain-age-uncertainty.

Christianne Tipping, ‘Key Issues Affecting the Provision of Logistics Support to the UK 11.

Armed Forces in Expeditionary Operations’, RUSI, IBM Sponsored Occasional Paper, 30

June 2008; House of Commons Public Accounts Committee. ‘MoD: Support to High Inten-

sity Operations’, HC895, London: TSO, 13 October 2009; National Audit Office. Support to

High Intensity Operations, HC508, London: TSO, 14 May 2009.

Martin Christopher, 12. Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2005.

D Moore, S Young, & P Ito, ‘Innovative UK Approaches to Acquisition Management’, 13.

Acquisition Research Symposium 2009, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA.

Ministry of Defence. 14. Strategic Trends Programme: Future Character of Conflict, DCDC,

Shrivenham, 2 February 2010.

D M Moore, ‘Urgent Operational Requirement: Increasing or Decreasing Challenges for UK 15.

Acquisition?’, IDEAA Conference, Washington DC, 2009.

Winds of 20 mph make this backdrop from a C-130 Hercules to the Sweeney Forward Operating Base in Afghanistan a tricky undertaking