Exits and exit strategies

Government in financial services

Exits and exit strategies

Executive summary

Preface

Contents

Page

List of contributors 4

Executive summary 6

Contacts 16

1Government in financial services — Exits and exit strategies

In September 2008, the world’s financial system stood on the brink of total collapse but was held back from the abyss by unprecedented action from the public authorities. This inevitably led to a direct involvement by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) governments in financial services to a degree largely unprecedented since the Second World War. In “Options and Dilemmas,” a White Paper published by Ernst & Young in November 2009, we described and explored the policy issues that such involvement presented for policy-makers and concluded that governments and their agencies would remain heavily committed — as owners, guarantors, regulators and arbiters — for many years to come.

Nevertheless, with a certain amount of what may turn out to be misplaced optimism, we embarked this year on an analysis of the exit routes available to governments to reverse their directive role in the financial services sector and to explore the practical options and likely consequences of a progressive removal of the considerable level of state support. This analysis and discussion are presented in this second White Paper, again produced in association with the London-based Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, and in particular, the Centre’s Co-director, Jane Fuller.

It is worth reiterating that we do not believe that stability in the global financial system is by any means restored, nor that the crisis is in any sense over. To pursue a medical metaphor, the patient has survived a heart attack, but is still in intensive care with doctors clustering around the bedside debating how to prevent a relapse. How to do so, without at the same time irreparably damaging the prospects for growth in the ”real” economy, lies at the core of the debate.

The extent of government support for financial institutions is staggering. As at February 2010, according to Ernst & Young research, over US$3.8t was directly deployed by national governments to stabilize and support financial institutions, in addition to the €800m or so deployed by the European Central Bank (ECB) in providing liquidity to the banking market, and the wider liquidity and economic stimulus packages provided by national governments. Of these extraordinary support measures, three-quarters consisted of state guarantees, with the rest divided between recapitalizations, retail depositor protection, equity injections and outright nationalizations. Across the EU, 94 separate financial institutions received some form of particular financial assistance from their national government, with UK, Irish, German and Dutch institutions figuring prominently. In the USA, 740 financial institutions received capital investment worth around US$300b. In total, globally, some US$13t may have been committed as a consequence of the crisis, according to some estimates.

As this report makes clear, no government intends or desires this level of support to be permanent. While there is a determination that financial institutions should be kept on a much tighter leash in the future (the “never again school”), and indeed in some quarters a desire that banks’ activities should be severely circumscribed, nowhere is it seriously argued that the domestic banking system ought to be nationalized as a matter of principle. Governments do intend to reverse their investments and return the equity capital of healthy financial institutions to private

Preface

2 Government in financial services — Exits and exit strategies

hands. When and how practically to do that, in a way that delivers most value to the taxpayer, and in a manner that contributes most to a revival of growth in the wider economy, is explored in detail in the following pages. We do not, however, believe that government support where it exists is likely to be withdrawn in short order, and indeed see grounds for believing that further support — particularly within some parts of the Eurozone — may be required in the future.

Increasingly we detect willingness by some governments to consider more widely the question of the kind of banking sector society requires and whether state involvement provides a convenient platform for negotiating, shaping and implementing that new deal between the state, its citizens and its banks. As the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne said in his 2010 Mansion House speech, “a new settlement between our banks and the rest of society … a fairer settlement in which the banks support the people instead of the people bailing out the banks.”

Ironically, one major element to emerge from the financial crisis has been a recognition of just how vital sound, efficient and well-managed banks are to the health of a modern economy, and just how crucial are the many and varied roles which banks play in society. At the same time as we came fully to appreciate the magnitude of systemic risk posed by a thinly capitalized, over-leveraged and illiquid global financial sector, it was also clear that if banks did not exist we should have to invent them. Thus, once the populist clamor for redress has subsided somewhat, policy-makers are now striving to ensure that in designing global and regulatory architectures to prevent catastrophic institutional collapses in the future, financial institutions are not so bound and hamstrung that their ability to nurture and support wealth creation is neutered.

Thus, once the fires are put out and we can once again speak of “business as usual,” it is likely that in some countries we shall move towards a new social contract between banks and their host governments, resulting in new models for some financial institutions. Certainly, the magnitude of structural challenge facing many countries in rebalancing and relaunching economies, restructuring public and private finances, providing for an aging population, and dealing with global competition, will require a healthy, innovative and vibrant financial services sector if the right answers are to be found. In thinking about how to find the exit, governments will simultaneously have to consider how they will forge new partnerships and relationships with the financial sector.

I would like to thank the many distinguished senior figures from government, financial services, academia and other bodies for their contributions to this White Paper. Throughout, they have stimulated, challenged and argued with us and with each other, in an attempt to move the debate further. We are certain that although this is unlikely to be the last word on the subject, it will be a well-reasoned and valuable one. We welcome further comments and contributions.

Philip Middleton Head of Financial Services Government Ernst & Young

Preface



Most of those listed were interviewed for this report. Other views were gained via exclusive meetings of the CSFI and other think tanks.

David Barker ► , Managing Partner, EMEIA TAS Financial Services, Ernst & Young

Robert R. Bench ► , former Managing Partner, Regulatory Advisory Services at PwC and Deputy US Comptroller of Currency

Sir Winfried Bischoff ► , Chairman of Lloyds Banking Group plc; former Chairman of Citigroup Inc

Rudi Bogni ► , Director, Old Mutual and other financial companies; former Global Head of Private Banking at UBS

Michael Buckley ► , Chairman of DCC; former Chief Executive of Allied Irish Bank

Sam Y. Cross ► , former Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; former adjunct: Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs; Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business

Michael Foot ► , Chairman, Promontory Financial Group (UK); former Managing Director, Financial Services Authority, and Executive Director, Bank of England

George Graham ► , Head of Strategy Development, Royal Bank of Scotland; former head of the Financial Times’ Lex column

Prof. Charles Goodhart ► , Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics; Senior Economic Consultant, Morgan Stanley; former Chief Advisor, Bank of England

David Green ► , Advisor on International Affairs, Financial Reporting Council; former Head of International Policy Co-ordination, FSA; ex-Bank of England

Mark Hoban ► , Financial Secretary to the UK Treasury; Conservative Member of Parliament for Fareham

Tom Huertas ► , Director, Banking Sector at the FSA; Vice-Chairman, Committee of European Banking Supervisors

List of contributors


René Karsenti, ► President, International Capital Market Association; former Director General of Finance, European Investment Bank

John Kingman ► , Managing Director, NM Rothschild; former Chief Executive, UK Financial Investments

Jacques Lafitte ► , founder of Avisa Partners, Brussels; former cabinet member, Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner

Philip Middleton ► , Head of Financial Services Government, Ernst & Young

Sir Jeremy Morse ► , former Chairman of Lloyds Bank

Ewald Nowotny ► , Governor, National Bank of Austria; member of the Governing Council, European Central Bank

John Plender ► , Financial Times columnist; former Chairman of Quintain

Eugene H. Rotberg ► , former Treasurer and Vice-President, World Bank; Executive Vice President, Merrill Lynch

Jesus Saurina ► , Director, Financial Stability Department, Bank of Spain; member of the Banking Supervision Committee, European Central Bank

Sir David Scholey ► , Senior Advisor to UBS and the FSA; former Executive Chairman, SG Warburg Group and Director, Bank of England

Prof. Hannah Scobie ► , Director, European Economics and Financial Centre, University of London

Charles Seidenberg ► , Director, Avisa Partners, European competition and state aid policy

Andrew Smithers ► , founder, Smithers & Co; former head of SG Warburg’s asset management business

Martin Taylor ► , Chairman, Syngenta; former Chief Executive, Barclays Bank

Mark Tennant ► , Chairman, Bluerock Consulting; Chairman, Scottish Financial Enterprise

Nicolas Véron ► , Senior Fellow at Bruegel, Brussels; Visiting Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC

Sir Malcolm Williamson ► , Chairman, National Australia Group Europe and Clydesdale Bank; also Chairman of Friends Provident Holdings (UK) Ltd and Signet Jewelers

List of contributors


Executive summary


IntroductionGovernments and their agents — central banks, regulators — are back in every corner of financial services: as lender, investor and market-maker of last resort, as guarantor and insurer. According to Ernst & Young research, government support measures in Europe totalled more than €3.17t by 2010. Ownership of stakes in banks has a high profile but is only a small part of this; by far the largest is state guarantees.

The continued exposure of governments to the cost of financial instability has reversed the “markets know best” approach and prompted national and international drives to re-regulate. Inhibitions about incorporating public policy objectives into the business environment have gone. The pressure is on to lend to small businesses, keep people in their homes and moderate bank pay. New taxes and levies to cover the cost of rescues are being imposed.

The trade-offs identified in the first Ernst & Young White Paper on government involvement in financial services are now being worked through. These include the constraints that higher capital requirements might place on credit-fuelled growth; the threat to competition from crisis-prompted consolidation; and the need to reduce indebtedness — but not just yet because it might damage economic recovery. This report examines the ways in which governments might withdraw (or not) from direct and indirect support for the financial system, and the manifestation of public policy in a much more demanding regulatory environment.

Chapter 1: what are the public policy objectives?In the midst of a large number of regulatory initiatives from national and international bodies, it helps if policy-makers have a clear picture of their ultimate objectives. The two main ones are financial stability and a healthy banking industry.

Financial stabilityDifficult to define, but the ECB talks of a financial system “capable of withstanding shocks” and thereby mitigating disruptions that threaten the “allocation of savings to profitable investment opportunities.” Tensions arise from the risks inherent in the lending, investing and trading activities that carry out the allocation task.

A healthy banking industryBeing profitable is not enough. The essential role played by the industry in funding the “real economy” is just as important. To maintain this role, financial institutions must have enough capital and liquidity to withstand cyclical downturns — without resorting to state bailouts. There should also be sufficient competition to offer customers choice and value for money. But again there are tensions: an oligopolistic industry is more stable than a fiercely competitive one.

Executive summary


Chapter 2: Government exit from the ownership of stakesThe acquisition of stakes was, for all the governments concerned, part of the rescue of the financial system, not an ideological act of nationalization. None of them intends to be a long-term owner. In Germany, the Financial Market Stabilization Fund’s holdings, including all of Hypo Real Estate and stakes in Commerzbank and WestLB, are described as “temporary.” A few, such as Switzerland, have made quick exits already. Others, including the UK, face a lengthy disposal programme but this is because of the size of the stakes not a desire to hold on.

What are the criteria for selling down the stakes?Recovering taxpayers’ money is more important than speed. It makes sense to turn the distressed institution around first. But prompts to exit as soon as possible, once value can be realized, include the uneasy relationship between politicians and banks and between a public sector culture and a commercial one.

What assets might be split off?Disposal by break-up is one option, of which the best example is the restructuring of AIG. The EU Competition Commission has laid down several conditions for approving state aid, including disposals that shrink dominant market shares. This does not, however, amount to a judgment against the universal banking model. The “too big to fail” issue remains a live one, with the Volcker Rule proposal in the US reform bill as a rare direct attempt to restructure the industry. In the UK and Switzerland, some regulators and policy-makers hope that a combination of additional capital requirements for subsidiaries, for size and for trading, coupled with organizational changes related to “living wills,” will lead indirectly to the break-up of financial conglomerates.

How will the stakes be sold?Where shares are to be sold on the public markets, the bigger the stake, the greater the number of tranches and the longer the process. Disposal of the UK Government’s 68% of the ordinary share capital of Royal Bank of Scotland is expected to take many years. No single buyer is likely to be allowed to accumulate a large holding. Barriers are unlikely to be erected against foreign buyers, whether they be other financial institutions or sovereign wealth funds. Other governments may be less open, or keener to preserve national champions. In addition to share sales, instruments such as options or convertible stock may well be employed. Any attempts by policy-makers to impose conditions such as clawbacks of profits or a say in appointments are seen as counter-productive and, therefore, unlikely.

Executive summary


If exit is prolonged, how will governments behave as shareholders?The message so far from governments is not only that they do not intend to hold on to the stakes but that they prefer them to be managed at arm’s length. Agencies have been set up in Germany and France, as well as the UK and Ireland, to do this. Nevertheless, there is evidence of political pressure at state-controlled banks. Restraint on pay has caught the headlines, but punitive action — such as bonus taxes in the UK and France — has been spread across the sector.

Pressure to lend to small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), or not to foreclose on defaulting mortgage holders, presents the greatest challenge to commercial judgment. The public policy justification is to minimize the broader economic impact.

Chapter 3: Exit from other financial commitmentsAccording to Ernst & Young research, three-quarters of the US$3.2t (€2.4t) deployed by 12 European governments to support financial institutions is accounted for by state guarantees. In the US, more than US$1t of guarantees has been provided by various state agencies. These schemes have helped to stabilize the system and restore banks’ access to affordable funding. They have started to wind down in 2010. This has the potential to trigger downgrades in credit ratings as firms switch from government-backed to standalone status. This assumes that no implicit guarantee remains. Meanwhile, deposit guarantee schemes (often expanded) will stay in place. The question is to what extent the industry will fund them and whether the risk-adjusted levies will pre-fund future rescues, or help to pay the bill after the event.

What will be the cost of insurance schemes such as the UK’s Asset Protection Scheme?It is impossible to know until the schemes expire and the claims are counted. In the UK, a maximum exposure of about £200b exists to the Asset Protection Scheme (APS) but no claims have been made so far. Ireland has set up a work-out vehicle, the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), to acquire mainly property-related loans from five distressed institutions. About €81b of loans are in the process of being bought at heavily discounted prices. The aim is to recover outlays of €40b-€50b over a seven to ten year period. In the US, the Federal Reserve has already enjoyed a profitable exit from financial assets held in its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).

Banks have had an incentive to buy in debt capital provided by governments because of the interest expense and the need to build up equity in anticipation of increased regulatory requirements for core tier 1 capital. French banks, such as BNP Paribas, are among those that have conducted rights issues to achieve this.

Executive summary


Will new government-backed investment funds be formed to lend to start-ups and smaller companies?Yes, but this is not new. KfW, in Germany, and the European Investment Bank are established examples. New ones include the Fonds Stratégique d’Investissement, with €20b to invest in “strategic companies” in France. The motives are political, but the distinction is preserved between these funds and fully commercial banks, and the funds available are limited.

Chapter 4: Exit from market support operations and lasting impact on marketsIn addition to governments becoming “investor of last resort” in the financial sector and central banks being the “lender of last resort,” market support operations have drawn central banks into increasingly unconventional activity. Withdrawing from these operations may be less straightforward than selling down stakes because the impact on market prices and liquidity has been widespread.

Relevant actions include monetary policy decisions in all the major economies to keep base rates very low. Further along the yield curve, central bank purchases of government bonds — Quantitative Easing (QE) — in the UK and US (which has bought a much broader range of assets) have also helped offset the upward pressure on rates from a massive increase in issuance. Rises in interest rates, triggered by concerns about inflation and bond supply, will be a big test of heavily indebted economies. With the winding down of QE and other asset purchase programmes, the transition from emergency measures to normal activity is under way. But, as in every other area affected by the crisis, “normal” will be more “hands on” than it used to be.

In the UK, what will be the impact of the suspension of QE?The Bank of England’s purchases of government bonds roughly offset the trebling of the amount issued to more than £200b in 2009-10. It is credited with reviving asset prices, including a rebound in the stock market and in corporate bond issuance. This helped quoted companies to compensate for restricted bank lending. But while the rest benefited indirectly from containment of credit costs, the effectiveness of QE in supporting the “real” economy has been questioned. In the first couple of months after the suspension of the policy, in February 2010, purchasing was passed to the private sector relatively smoothly. This could be disturbed by inflation and sovereign debt issues in the Eurozone.

In the US, more ambitious programmes were launched to kick-start markets for riskier assets, notably securitizations. This did help revive demand for well-understood packages of assets, such as credit card receivables, but some markets, e.g., for assets backed by commercial mortgages remained dysfunctional.

Executive summary


What will be the impact of the ECB’s withdrawal from its emergency action? The ECB has concentrated on the provision of liquidity, accepting as collateral a much more eclectic mix of assets than the Bank of England. Its exit plan is a gradual one and, with little to sell, it should happen naturally as the arrangements expire. The impact on its balance sheet had also been much more muted than for the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England. It is exposed to the deteriorating quality of some collateral, but will only end up owning it if the central bank that posted it defaults. However, in May, the ECB did start to buy Greek, Portuguese and other Eurozone government bonds in the market.

What will be the impact of tighter regulation of derivatives trading and measures to encourage central clearing? Regulators such as Lord Turner, Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority, are exercised by the explosive growth in derivatives trading and by the value of certain innovations. According to this view, some of the pre-crisis profits were illusory and those that were not had an element of harmful rent extraction by vendors and market-makers who knew rather more than buyers about opaque and complex products. The inclination of regulators to impose controls on over-the-counter trading has been reinforced by politicians’ unease over “speculative” trading and price volatility.

Proposed changes in regulation on both sides of the Atlantic share the following features: derivatives to be traded on exchanges and cleared through central counterparties, wherever possible; greater capital requirements for uncleared trading; and comprehensive data collection. The aim is to encourage the trading of more simple and transparent products and to limit the exposure to losses in Over The Counter (OTC) transactions. The impact could include “throwing sand in the wheels” of trading activity and making OTC derivatives less profitable. But because risk would be concentrated in CCPs, they would have to be robust, well capitalized and tightly regulated.

Chapter 5: Enter the macroprudentialists — the new normal in financial stability regulationThe now commonly used word “macroprudential” encompasses the connections between economic cycles, risk-taking by individual institutions and the soundness of the financial system. It has implications for monetary and fiscal policy as well as financial regulation. The central bank is often seen as best placed to carry out the macroprudential role, hence the proposal of the new Conservative-Liberal coalition Government in the UK to return prudential supervision of the banking sector to the Bank of England. The heavy involvement of taxpayers in the rescue has shocked governments into action on regulatory structure — from the Obama reform proposals to the EU’s implementation of the de Larosière report. There is some anxiety that this may threaten central bank independence.

Executive summary


Will the reassertion of central bank authority lead to tougher action to curb credit expansion? Yes, via a return to the tradition of “taking away the punchbowl.” Where monetary policy has been narrowly focused on consumer price inflation as in the UK, other factors to be taken into account are likely to include credit expansion and asset prices. The financial stability mandate places an emphasis on systemic effects, as well as on the financial soundness of individual firms. The establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board bears witness to this.

Will prudential regulators be given additional tools, other than interest rates?Yes, but the key thing is that the authorities have the courage to use them. Arguably, one of the causes of the crisis was that they did not use the main one they had — interest rates — proactively enough. The link between monetary and fiscal policy is important here. Tax changes may sometimes offer a better way to cool rapid domestic expansion or tackle bubbles in sectors such as housing.

Additional regulatory tools will include the suite of new minimum ratios and buffers being prepared by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in “Basel 3.” The main points are: more and better quality capital and liquidity; a new leverage ratio; much more capital to cover trading risks; and counter-cyclical buffers. The worry is that the cumulative effect of all the new and anticipated balance sheet requirements is restricting bank lending — just when governments are urging banks to keep it up.

At the national level, bubbles could be tackled by product restrictions, such as loan-to-value ratios in the housing market. Policing of the financial sector remains the province of national regulators: supervision and enforcement are already more intrusive and onerous than before the crisis.

What will be the political reaction to measures that curb economic growth? There needs to be political support for party-stopping measures. This is difficult because governments and voters enjoy the fruits of credit-fuelled economic growth. Voter anger at bankers is driving the re-regulatory wave and it vindicates governments’ renewed involvement — and their agents’ renewed activity — in every aspect of the financial sector. This does raise the question of whether there will be “overkill” on capital requirements, the management of institutions (including pay) and the workings of capital markets (including derivatives).

Such constraints should, however, be seen in the context of large government stimulus packages to mitigate the credit squeeze, and other action to suppress interest rates. So far, banks and borrowers have benefited from renewed access to cheap money, even if it is not always readily available to smaller companies. Tackling the underlying problem of over-indebtedness is a political issue, and one brought nearer to home by soaring levels of government debt.

Executive summary


Chapter 6: Impact on the banking industry So far, the outcome of crisis measures has not fulfilled public policy objectives on competition, or removed the implicit state guarantee behind “too big to fail” institutions. Rescue takeovers have led to a more concentrated sector. Recovering markets and access to cheap money have led to trading profit rebounds, while losses on legacy loans have not matched worst-case scenarios. Returning profits are helping to rebuild bank balance sheets but they have also kept the bonus issue alive.

Will the structure of the industry be changed by legislation? Under US financial reform proposals, passage of the Volcker Rule, removing proprietary trading, hedge funds and private equity from banks, would make a difference, as would proposals for the spin-off of swaps trading businesses. There appears to be little backing for more radical solutions such as “narrow banking.” Yet doubts remain on conflicts of interest and the “to big to fail” problem. Supporters of the universal banking model, which is traditional in Europe, cite the argument that it provides a comprehensive service to clients and point out that bank failures came in all shapes and sizes.

Might other changes have an indirect impact on bank structure?Changes that could cause boards to question whether it is worth keeping all the parts together include: subsidiarization — more capital/liquidity dedicated to national subsidiaries; greater capital charges for trading — i.e., more of a functional distinction; living wills — recovery and resolution plans that make it easier to sell units or break up the group. Lord Turner has even referred to “a new Glass-Steagall by capital requirements not law.”

Other incentives to shrink could be provided by systemic risk taxes or other levies aimed at pre- or post-funding the cost of bailing out failed banks. The brunt of such charges is likely to be borne by big banks, especially investment banks.

But the separability theme has its drawbacks. It might hinder the efficient deployment of capital and, in practice, it is difficult for a group to cut off part of its operations without undermining confidence in the rest.

How will the trade-offs between competition, consumer protection and a profitable industry that is attractive to investors be handled?Symptoms of a lack of competition, including consolidation and high returns on equity, pre-date the crisis. Once the sector has returned to sustained profitability, efforts might intensify to tackle dominant market positions, conflicts of interest and complaints about high fees, which some characterize as oligopolistic. The question is why are professional, or wholesale, customers not more discerning?

Executive summary


On the retail side, in the UK at least, the authorities have traditionally been active in regulating sales techniques and tackling high charges. The advent of consumer protection agencies, proposed in the US and the UK, might ratchet this up and has the potential to introduce product regulation.

More generally on customer choice, some believe that encouraging new entrants and diversity should be part of public policy. Retailers have entered the field, for instance, and may pick up operations being sold by banks. How mutuals or cooperative organizations might be encouraged, bearing in mind the high barriers to entry on the capital front, is not clear. Most European countries still have numerically large non-plc sectors, but here too there has been consolidation to create fewer stronger institutions.

The uncomfortable point for policy-makers is that an industry that is not very competitive is more sustainably profitable and more stable; witness Canada. Highly volatile returns created through heavy leverage do not fall into this category, so returns on equity are set to fall as capital is built up. To protect margins, costs might be cut — including bonus levels — and where charges are low, e.g., in UK retail, attempts will be made to raise them.

Banks that escaped state ownership of stakes might come to look back on 2009 and early 2010 as a honeymoon period of low competition and cheap funding. They can still look forward to receding loan losses, but otherwise they face a much tougher regulatory environment that will reduce returns. More broadly, residual anger towards bankers will keep the sector in the political spotlight for years to come.

Executive summary


Contacts


Europe, Middle East, India and Africa and the United KingdomPhilip MiddletonHead of Financial Services Government+44 (0) 20 7951 [email protected]

BelgiumMarc Van SteenvoortPartner +32 2 774 [email protected]

Channel IslandsAndrew DannPartner +44 1534 [email protected]

FranceLuc ValverdePartner +33 1 46 93 63 04 [email protected]

GermanyDirk Müller-TronnierPartner +49 6196 996 [email protected]

IrelandPat MoranPartner +353 1 2212 [email protected]

ItalyGiacomo BugnaPartner+39 [email protected]

LuxembourgBernard LhoestPartner+352 42 124 [email protected]

NetherlandsWimjan BosPartner+31 88 40 [email protected]

Portugal Ana SalcedasPartner +351 21 791 [email protected]

SpainAlberto Placencia Partner +34 915 727 [email protected]

SwitzerlandPhilippe ZimmermannPartner +41 58 286 [email protected]

AmericasBarry KroegerPartner+1 703 747 [email protected]

OceaniaTim CoynePartner+61 3 9288 [email protected]

AsiaKeith PogsonPartner+852 2849 [email protected]

Middle EastMehryar GhazaliDirector+966 1 215 [email protected]

Government in financial services — Exits and exit strategies

Contacts

Ernst & Young

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Exits and exit strategies