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Volume XX | June 2019
On January 17th, 2019, the National Liberation Army
(or ELN) carried out the largest attack to hit the
nation’s capital, Bogota, in 16 years—a car bomb
that killed 21 people at a police academy. The
attack represented a major escalation by ELN,
which has been attacking Colombian oil and energy
infrastructure with increasing frequency since
2015—compounding concerns over declining oil prices
and contributing to a GDP growth rate that ranks in
just the 30th percentile globally.
Many Colombians were optimistic that the historic
2016 peace deal between the government and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Map Algebra is a form of raster analysis
used to manipulate geographic data by
combining multiple complex raster layers
(each with similar dimensions but varying
values of significance) into a new raster
layer. In this instance, the output is a Maxar
Vulnerability Assessment, which is intended
to represent asimplified, but manageable
view of reality as it relates to violence
in Colombia.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Summary of Unique Tools & Applications
signaled the end of the country’s decades-long conflict
with violent opposition groups. But this peace process
is threatened by violent actors like ELN who maintain
the capacity to target critical infrastructure, social
leaders, and development initiatives. In fact, ELN has
increased its financial and operational strength by
gaining new territory in Venezuela, whose continued
instability makes it attractive to opposition groups.
But the areas most vital to the group’s survival are still
located in Colombia.
Geospatial modeling techniques like map algebra
allowed Maxar to identify several municipalities and
subregions that are highly vulnerable and strategically
important to Colombia’s violent actors. In
these areas, the belligerents have strong
influence and are solidifying or competing
for lucrative terrain. In addition, portions
of the population are either tolerant of or
acquiescent to illicit activity because of poor
human development and capital stock. These
highly vulnerable locations will likely require
significant attention for sustained peace and
stability to take hold in Colombia.
NariñoCaquetá
Meta
Cauca
Chocó
Antioquia
Córdoba
Norte de Santander
Vichada
Guainía
Guaviare
Vaupés
Amazonas
Putumayo
Arauca
Casanare
Cundinamarca
Cesar
La Guajira
Santander
Sucre
Atlántico
Huila
TolimaValle deCauca
Caldas
Bolívar
Boyacá
Magdalena
Lower Vulnerability
Vulnerability Assessment
Higher Vulnerability
2
S P O T L I G H T
Vulnerability Layer: ELN-AGC Competition
Although the FARC has largely laid down its weapons,
there are still a number of armed, sub-national groups
active in Colombia. The most significant are the ELN and
Autodefansas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), also called
Clan de Gulfo.
ELN is a left-wing insurgent group that has been active in
Colombia since the 1960s. Its approximately 2,000 fighters
are primarily located along the Venezuelan and Ecuadorean
borders. Although engaged in negotiations with the
government about a cessation of hostilities, ELN remains
active and is responsible for some of the localized increases
in violence in areas where the FARC was once dominant.
Government pressure and the waning of leftist ideologies
over the last three decades reduced the group’s ideological
focus and external support. Today, it is heavily engaged in
the illicit economy (coca cultivation and illegal mining) to
obtain needed funds.
AGC was formed in 2006 as a paramilitary organization
to protect civilians from the FARC and ELN. It has since
evolved into a full-fledged criminal network with over 7,000
members operating under a military-style organization
which is integrated into coca cultivation, illegal mining,
and cocaine trafficking. The organization also maintains
ties to other international criminal and drug trafficking
organizations, such as Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel.
In addition, there are between 1,200 and 1,500 FARC
dissidents loosely organized into 16-18 distinct groups
scattered across seven Departments. No longer interested
in waging an insurgency against the government, these
groups primary act to consolidate control in discreet
locations while increasing their access to the illicit economy.
The mapping of group territories (bottom-left) was used
to model areas with combined/competing ELN and AGC
influence (bottom-right). This was then used as a weighted
surface layer for the Vulnerability Assessment.
3
S P O T L I G H T
Vulnerability Layer: Assassinations and Coca Cultivation
As part of the FARC peace deal, the Colombian government
established numerous Territorial Areas for Training and
Reintegration (TATRs) in order to provide assistance to
former FARC members transitioning into Colombian society.
Due to a lack of funding, support, and organization, only 6 out
of an original 26 are considered fully functional. The TATRs
also reportedly have a 48 percent attrition rate. Additionally,
there is a small but growing pattern of violence against
former FARC members in some reintegration areas.
According to media reports, 454 local social leaders and
human rights advocates have been murdered since 2016
without a clear motive or suspect; 163 of these killings have
been confirmed by the government. In addition, 85 former
FARC members have been killed in reintegration areas. These
deaths are concentrated in Cauca, Norte de Santander, and
Antioquia Departments. Colombian authorities suspect that
these individuals were singled out to better enable some of
the current armed groups to increase control of the local
drug trade or exploit new infrastructure programs.
Cultivation of the coca leaf (the foundation of cocaine) is up
sharply since 2013, increasing at an average of 45% per
year. As of December 2017, there were 171,000 hectares
of coca being cultivated in Colombia—a record high that
accounted for approximately 70% of the world’s total
coca leaf production. Nariño remained the most affected
department in the country, while the greatest increase
in production was noted in Antioquia, Cauca, Norte de
Santander, and Putumayo Departments.
The map on the bottom-left displays the locations of
assassinations that occurred in 2018. This data was used to
create a kernel density layer and a weighted surface layer
for the Vulnerability Assessment. The map on the bottom-
right displays a surface layer of areas with the presence of
coca cultivation, which was also added to the Vulnerability
Assessment.
Antioquia
Norte de Santander
Cauca
Putumayo
Nariño
Antioquia
Norte de Santander
Cauca
4
S P O T L I G H T
Vulnerability Layers: Capital Stock and Landcover
According to the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), Colombia ranks in the 44th percentile globally in
terms of inequality-adjusted human development. In an effort
to capture human development and capital stock throughout
the country, a raster calculation was performed on values
pertaining to health, education, employment, and housing.
The map on the bottom-left displays the capital stock
calculation normalized by population. The map on the bottom-
right displays a land cover raster. Both layers were applied
as a weighted surface layer to the Vulnerability Assessment.
Higher Capital Stock
Lower Capital Stock
Capital Stock Per Capita
More Desirable
Less Desirable
Landcover Classification
5
S P O T L I G H T
Vulnerability Layer: Transportation
According to the World Economic Forum, the quality of
Colombia’s road infrastructure ranks in just the 20th
percentile globally. Additionally, just 3 percent of the
country’s rural population is located within one hour of
a market. This isolation increases production costs and
significantly impedes small-scale commerce and crop
substitution efforts designed to eradicate coca production.
A key component of the government’s strategy to build on the
successful peace process with the FARC is to improve this
infrastructure, which would also increase economic growth
as well as improve the development and social inclusion of
Colombia’s rural regions.
In addition to the 4G road program, Colombia is working to
improve its air and sea ports. Projects under development
include modernization of nine existing regional airports
and the construction of two new airports at Bogota and
Cartagena. Of note, Bogota’s existing El Dorado airport
is Latin America’s third-busiest passenger hub and its
busiest cargo hub. Colombia is also expanding its maritime
commerce systems with plans to develop 17 port terminals in
seven Departments on the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean.
The map on the bottom-left displays Colombia’s road network.
The map on the bottom-right displays a density layer for both
road infrastructure and airfields. This was then added to the
Vulnerability Assessment as a combined weighted
surface layer.
6
S P O T L I G H T
conclusion
According to Maxar’s geospatial modeling and raster
analysis, a number of rural Colombian municipalities
and subregions were identified as highly vulnerable. The
locations identified by the Vulnerability Assessment are
historic strongholds for violent groups like the FARC,
ELN, and AGC. They are also critical to the violent groups’
continued survival because of three main factors:
1) They offer lucrative sources of revenue through coca
cultivation, illicit mining, and/or the facilitation of drugs and
other illicit goods.
2) They foster both active and ideological support for
Colombia’s violent actors, primarily out of practical
necessity. Residents in these remote locations feel a sense
of abandonment and fear any direct resistance against the
violent actors.
3) They offer valuable cover and concealment because of
their remote nature and limited infrastructure. Because of
the terrain and dense forestry, some of the locations serve
as strategic launch points for attacks against important
energy infrastructure or other targets of opportunity.
Antioquia
BolivarCórdoba
Chocó
Nariño
Highly Vulnerable Municipalities / Subregions
The powerful geospatial modeling and raster analysis capabilities provided by Maxar offer a unique look at the current
and historical status of violent extremist groups and the populations they look to exploit—providing governments and
NGOs with an increased ability to adjust their tactics in response.
7
S P O T L I G H T