CHAPTER ONE

This chapter gives the background to the study. It is followed by the

statement of the problem, purpose of the study, conceptual

framework, hypothesis, the scope of the study, significance of the

study, methodology, and limitations of the study.

1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.

Ghana has experienced different models of democracy since the

attainment of political independence in 1957. Each model had its

peculiar institutional design by which power was distributed among

the three organs of state. By the same institutional logic the

framework of governance was different. While Ghana’s democracy is

often cited as one of the most functional in Africa, its institutional

arrangements continue to be a constraint to democratic

consolidation. (Regina 2007:1). In this regard, this research is aimed

at getting fuller understanding of the Ghanaian Legislature and its

relationship with the Executive and presents the existing institutional

deficits and how this has hindered the efficient and effective

performance of Ghana’s parliament.

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana creates a hybrid political system that

combines elements of presidential and parliamentary systems. This

1

political structure has constrained parliament’s potential policy

influence by creating an expectation of parliamentary oversight while

simultaneously undermining its independence. In particular, the

constitution requires that the majority of government ministers also

be parliamentarians, and has thus partially fused the executive and

legislative branches.

It is generally recognized that as a consequence of the fusion,

majority of the Parliamentarians often aspire to ministerial and other

government appointments. This expectation constrains them from

presenting substantial challenges to presidential policies for fear of

damaging their appointment prospects. Further, it is difficult if not

impossible for a parliamentarian who doubles as a minister of state to

perform independent and unbiased oversight of government.

This partial fusion of the Executive and the Legislature is a key

problem in the 1992 Constitution. It undermines official separation of

powers and reinforces the negative pattern of executive dominance

in Ghanaian politics. The power and the opportunity granted to the

President under the constitution to appoint Members of Parliament

(MPs) to ministerial positions keeps the MPs beholding to the

President.

The requirement that majority of ministers of states be selected from

among members of parliament also has the potential to decimate the

institution of parliament and undermine its bipartisan cohesion as

2

MPs now serving as ministers of state will be distracted from their

legislative duties. This weakens the ability of parliament to

countervail executive powers and further pose a threat to Ghana’s

democratic consolidation process agenda.

(Prempeh 2003:8)

The combination of constitutional constraints and Ghanaian political

culture and practice has also made the laying of Private Member Bill

(PMBs) extremely difficult, a situation exacerbated by the divided

loyalty of many MPs between their legislative and executive duties. In

practice, sector minister have laid bills before parliament during the

entirety of the fourth Republic (1992-present), meaning that no

legislation has originated in Parliament.

As a result of the structural impediments and the incentive structure

that have been created, the executive essentially controls both the

legislative and public policy agenda.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATURE IN GHANA.

Legislative power was first exercised in the Gold Coast during the

reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901). During the period of 1850-1865,

the Gold Coast had a distinct Legislative Council consisted of the

Governor and at least two other persons designated by Royal

Instructions. Apart from the legislative body, the Gold Coast also had

3

an Executive Council. The Legislative and Executive Councils were

responsible for policy making and implementation. (Ayensu and

Darkwa 1999:16)

Since independence in 1957, Ghana has experimented with various

types of governments: “Westminster” model of parliamentary

government (1957-1960 and 1969-1972); one-party dictatorship

(1960-1966); military dictatorship (1966-1969; 1972-1979 and 1981-

1993); United States’ model of separation of powers (1979-1981) and

Fourth Republican Constitution (1992 to date),which is a combination

of Westminster type and the American Presidential model.

In all these duly elected constitutional governments (1957-1960;

1969-1972; 1979-1981 and 1991-Date) the authority of the state has

resided in the National Assembly elected on a competitive basis. A

Prime Minister or President for the Westminster and American

models either headed the government. In the case of the Westminster

model both the Prime Minister and other Ministers were members of

parliament whereas in the presidential system there was a strict

separation of powers (at least in terms of personnel) between the

executive and legislature – the President and the ministers are not

members of the legislative body and do not take part in its

proceedings. In contrast, the model adopted in 1992 requires that a

specific proportion of ministers were to be appointed from among the

4

members of the legislative body. The objective was probably to avoid

deadlocks that sometimes develop between the legislature and the

executive in the presidential system.

Ghana followed the Westminster type of democracy at independence

in 1957 with a liberal democratic Constitution and all its trappings

such as opposition parties, guarantees of civil liberties and an

independent Judiciary. In 1960 the country became a Republic and

four years (1964) later the Constitution of the First Republic was

amended and replaced with a one party state with substantial

legislative powers to the President. Although the traditional

legislative and oversight role of the then Parliament was not taken

away, it was virtually ineffective in checking the activities of the

executive. While few members of the House were able to express the

concerns of the electorate and made attempts to check the activities

of the executive, the majority of them tended to agree to whatever

policies and programs the executive initiated.

The 1969 Constitution of the Second Republic of Ghana re-introduced

multi-party democracy in Ghana with a more vibrant Parliament.

Unfortunately, the Constitution was overthrown in over two years of

its existence. The next constitutional attempt was made in 1979 with

late Dr. Hilla Liman as the President. Again, within two and half

years of its existence the Constitution was suspended and parliament

5

dissolved. Thus between 1972 and 1979, Ghana was ruled by a

succession of military officers (National Redemption Council (NRC),

Supreme Military Council (SMC) I and II) and in June 1979, by the

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Flight

Lieutenant J.J Rawlings.

Between December 1981 and January 6, 1991 the country was again

ruled by a military dictatorship under the Provisional National

Defence Council (PNDC).

The current Parliament of Ghana was established by Article 93 of the

1992 Constitution. The body is vested with legislative powers of the

state, which is exercised in accordance with the Constitution. The

legislative power is exercised by passing of Bills which is later

assented by the President to become laws. The tenure of each

Parliament is four years and there is no restriction on the number of

times an individual can seek re-election.

At the apex of the Parliament established by the 1992 Constitution

are the Speaker and two Deputies (first and second Deputy Speaker).

The next on the ladder is the Majority Leader also known as the

Minister for Parliamentary Affairs followed by the Minority Leader,

the Whips of the various parties and backbenchers. There are specific

rules and procedures governing the activities of the House. For

instance, no debate can take place in the floor of the house unless a

member moves it. The Parliament is a unicameral legislature with at

6

least 140 elected members as stipulated in the Constitution. The first

three Parliament of the Fourth Republic consisted of 200 members

elected once every four years, from 200 single-member

constituencies throughout the country. By the Representation of the

People Parliamentary Constituencies Instrument2004, CI 41, the

membership of parliament increased to230 from January 2005.

THE 1992 CONSTITUTION

The architecture of the 1992 constitution is complex. It is based on

the principle of separation of powers, as well as a system of

overlapping personnel, functions and powers resulting in a hybrid

of the presidential and parliamentary systems of government.

In the first instance, state power is shared among its three organs:

Article 58 (1) vests executive power in the president; Article 93

vests legislative power in parliament; and Article 125(3) vests

judicial power in the judiciary. Second, Article 78 (1) provides that

the President shall appoint ministers of state with the prior

approval of parliament, and that the majority of such appointees

should be “from among members of parliament.” The Vice

President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers who are not Members of

Parliament can participate in the proceedings of parliament, except

that they are not entitled to vote (Article 111). Third, though the

President exercises executive power, including the enforcement of

7

all the laws of Ghana under Article 58 (2) he or she cannot spend

public moneys without authorization by parliament. Nor can the

president make laws. The power to make laws as well as authorize

the use of public funds is vested in parliament; but it is only the

President who can introduce a bill or motion to impose a tax or

spend public money. (Article 108)

The president could refuse to assent a bill passed by parliament

even though parliament could override the President’s veto by a

vote of not less than two-thirds of its members (Article 106 (9-10).

Fourth, Article 81 (1) empowers parliament to initiate proceedings

to impeach or remove from office either a minister or deputy

minister, however, clause 5 of article 82 leaves it to the discretion

of the President to revoke the appointment of the minister or

deputy minister concerned.

The strong bond between the president and his party in

parliament creates a virtual monopoly over the decision making

apparatus of the state. That is, the president (together with his

cabinet) and the legislature are able to control these two critical

decision-making structures within the state system.

Though members of parliament could propose an independent

members’ bill, Article 108 of the Constitution vests in the president

the sole authority to propose bills that have financial implications.

8

Essentially the president and his cabinet, all of whom have so far

come from the same political party, exercise exclusive

responsibility for development policy. When a development policy

issue gets to parliament for approval the president uses his party,

which is in the majority, to get it approved. The majority party in

parliament tends to be less democratic when major national issues

come before parliament for consideration. It has turned

parliamentary deliberation on such issues into partisan contests for

hegemony in the legislature. Such partisanship has often forced

the opposition party or parties to bring the issues outside the

domain of parliament in order to mobilize a wider public to express

their viewpoint. But the majority party in parliament has always

had its way on such highly contested policy issues.

This hybrid system has lead to what has become known as

executive dominance over parliament in the Fourth Republic

1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The 1992 Constitution shares power among the various arms of

government, however, the legislature in a way has failed to overcome

executive dominance and to undertake its functions effectively within

the framework of the 1992 constitution.

What this research therefore seeks to unravel is the ineffectiveness of

parliament serving as a check on the executive.

9

The fusion of executive and legislative powers in certain respects,

and the hybridization of the parliamentary and presidential system

have given the executive a huge and unequivocal presence in

parliament. First, executive power is exercise in parliament through

the President’s majority party of which he becomes leader by virtue of

his position as President. On the one hand, this gives the President’s

party in parliament a strong stake in the President’s +++policies and

programmes that are brought before parliament. Because the success

or failure of the President’s policies and programmes affect the

electoral fortune of his party, the President’s parliamentary party

collectively and individually becomes a strong advocate of the

President’s policies and programmes. On the other hand, the

President also sees his party in parliament as an indispensable

resource for getting his policies and programmes through parliament.

He accordingly maintains keen interest in the decisions made by his

parliamentary party and closely monitors trends.

The executive again, has a more direct presence in parliament

through the ministers appoint from among members of parliament.

The executive is further represented in parliament through ministers

and deputy ministers who are not members of parliament but can

participate in the business of parliament except voting.

The majority party in parliament also ensures that the person

appointed as speaker is favorably disposed to the president.

10

Theoretically the speaker is an independent officer of the state who

has sworn The Speaker’s Oath to defend the constitution and do right

to all manner of persons in accordance with the constitution of Ghana

and the laws and conventions of parliament. The reality is that the

speaker is elected on the strength of the president’s party in

parliament, which makes the speaker indirectly part of the ensemble

of powers that represent the president in parliament.

It is therefore argue that, the framers of the constitution have

subordinated the Legislature to the Executive (the President) which

weakens the strength of parliament.

As a result, parliament has not been able to effectively perform its

oversight functions as required by the constitution.

Others further argue that, for the constitution to allow majority of

ministers to be appointed from within members of parliament, it

weakens the credibility of parliament in performance of its oversight

responsibility.

This means the executive arm is highly influential over parliament.

This undermines the effective constitutional checks and balances and

in effect, hinders accountability of the executive arm of government

under the fourth republic. This has therefore come to be known as

the Executive dominance of the Legislature.

1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

11

The research is aimed at critically assessing parliament under the

Fourth Republic and established why the Legislature had failed to

perform its oversight responsibilities on the Executive effectively.

Specifically, the study would look into the major factors that

militate against the work of the legislature.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The concepts of separation of powers and checks and balances

would be examined in relation to this work. According to Strong

C.F. (1963; 58) cited in Gilbert Keith Bluwey (2002: 63) “these

concepts first appeared in a work by Baron de Montesquieu

entitled Esprit des Lois, published in 1748. Montesquieu held that

when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same

person or, body of persons there can be no liberty because of the

danger that the same monarch or senate may enact tyrannical laws

and execute them in a tyrannical manner.”

He therefore advocated that in order to prevent abuse of power

and tyrannical rule, no two of the three functions of government

should be vested in the same hands. These functions are: law-

making, law-executing and the interpretation of the law in the

settlement of disputes.

Another classical interpretation of this concept is given by M.J.C.

Vile (1967: 13) cited in J.C. Johari (1982: 524) “it is essential for

12

the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the

government be divided into three branches or departments, the

legislature, the executive and judiciary. To each of these branches

there is a corresponding identifiable function of government,

legislative, executive or judicial. Each of these branches must be

confined to the exercise of its own functions and not allowed to

encroach upon the functions of other branches. Also, the persons

who compose of these agencies of government must be kept

separate and distinct, no individual being allowed to be at the same

time a member of more than one branch. In this way, each of the

branches will be able to control the machinery of the state.”

Separation of powers therefore implies that, there should be three

separate organs of government with their separate set of powers. It

also implies that the various arms should be kept separate in the

interest of the individual. This in essence is the division of powers

of government among the various organs in terms of functions and

personnel’s. Each organ must be confined to the exercise of its own

functions and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of other

organs. Also, persons who compose these three organs must be

kept separate and distinct; no individual must be allowed to be a

member of more than one organ.

Under the concept of separation of powers a member of parliament

who is appointed a minister of state is require to resign as Member

13

of Parliament before the person can assume the office as a minister

of state.

In order to ensure efficiency and accountability of each of the

organs in performance of their constitutional functions,

Montesquieu did not only propose a clear and permanent

separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions. He also

advocated that each of the organs should be made to check one

another in order to avoid the abuse of powers by any of the organs

through the concept of checks and balances. Here, each of the

organs is vested with powers to serve as a watchdog on each other.

Montesquieu thus gave to the world the twin concepts of separation of

powers and checks and balances.

Separation of powers would increase the competence of each of the

branches while the checks and balances would prevent abuse of

power.

This would promote the autonomy of each of the branches and enable

them constitute themselves and function effectively without undue

interference from each other.

1.4. HYPOTHESIS

The entire study is based on the assumptions that:

The President has being vested with excessive powers over

parliament.

14

Parliament and parliamentary committees lack office

accommodation, which inhibits their oversight role.

1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY.

The research study was carried out within Accra and Kumasi.

However, the offices of parliament, CDD and IDEG were specifically

selected within Accra.

For the purpose of our study, we limited our scope in Kumasi to

KNUST campus and Adum. This has enabled us to minimize cost and

elicited the relevant information for the study.

1.6. JUSTIFICATION

It is the conviction of the researchers that the findings of this study

will go a long way to assist policy makers to be well informed of the

extent to which parliament had failed to effectively perform its

oversight function over the executive. The researchers also believe

that, the findings of this research will inform Ghanaians on how the

constitution possesses certain limitations on the work of parliament.

Finally, the study will also be of immense benefit to students and

researchers who will carry out further research in this area.

The constitution reflects a hybrid of the parliamentary and

presidential systems which promotes executive dominance at the

expense of parliamentary accountability. The framers of the

constitution have handed us an executive-legislature arrangement

that reinforce one of the negative aspects of our political culture

15

which is excessive presidential powers over parliament. This affects

horizontal accountability between the legislature and the executive.

This means the executive will always dominate parliament so far as

the ruling party maintain majority in parliament and continue to draw

majority of ministers from parliament. This can be a root cause of bad

government.

1.6.0 METHODOLOGY

This section deals with the systematic way employed by the

researchers to arrive at the organized data in chapter three in relation

to the research objectives. Under this, the researchers outlined the

population under study and the sample size for the study as well as

the techniques adopted in getting the sample size. The methods

adopted in collections of data, presentation and analyzing of the data

are also included under this section.

1.6.1 Population

The population of this study is made up of Ghanaian adults who are

between the ages of eighteen and above. The target population was

however categorized into three. They were made up of the educated

elite, civil societies and the mass public. The educated elites

constituted parliamentarians, staffs of parliament and students. CDD

and IDEG were the main civil societies consulted.

1.6.2 Sample size

16

In order to obtain objective and accurate information on the problem,

a sample size of two hundred respondents was targeted. The targeted

population was sampled from each of the categorized of the

population. However, one hundred and twenty respondents were

consulted at the end of the research.

1.6.3 Sample technique

The non-probability sampling technique was used to obtain the sample

size. Specifically, the purposive sampling was used to obtain

respondents. This was due to the nature of the study which requires

some level of knowledge about the legislative and executive arms of

government.

1.6.4 Method of data collection

Both primary and secondary data were used. The primary source of

data includes administered questionnaires and discussions. Journals,

articles, reports, thesis from researchers, both published and

unpublished and the use of the internet were our secondary source of

information.

1.6.5 Types of data

Both quantitative and qualitative types of data were collected. The

qualitative data included the comments and suggestions from the

respondents. The quantitative date on the other hand, includes

statistical data and values collected from the respondents.

1.6.6 Method of Data Analysis

17

In analyzing the data obtained, both qualitative and quantitative

methods have been used. Analysis of the research work was in three

main processes, which is preparation of coding scheme, coding data

entry, and analysis. Analysis was done by the use of statistical

packages for Social Sciences (SPSS). Furthermore, the data was

analyzed by examining the features in relation to the objectives of the

study. Descriptive statistics were employed by the use of pie chart,

and bar graphs.

1.7 Organization of the study

The study has been organized into four chapters. Chapter one

constitutes the general background of the study, problem statement,

conceptual framework, hypothesis, scope of study, objectives,

methodology, and relevance of the study. The limitation, delimitations

and budget are also under this chapter. Chapter two consists of

literature review where relevant works relating to this study had been

reviewed. The review was captured under the following sub-headings;

Studies on the legislature, Historical overview of the legislature in

Ghana, Parliament of the fourth Republic, Factors that militate

against parliament and Review summary and evaluation. Chapter

three contains the demography of the respondent as well as data

presentation and analysis. The final chapter provides a summary of

the findings, conclusion, recommendation and bibliography.

18

1.8 Limitation

In the course of the research, the challenges encountered include;

getting access to information from the office of parliament and even

members of parliament (MPs). There were also time constraints and

financial set-backs. However, to overcome these challenges letters

were sent to the office of parliament and MP’s to give them prior

notice. Financial support was also sought from our parents and

guidance.

19

REFERENCES

1. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Accra, Ghana.

2. H. Kwasi Prempeh (2003), Executive Legislature

Relationship Under the 1992 Constitution: A Critical

Review.CDD Publication Accra, Ghana, September 2003.

Critical Perspective Number 15 (P:8).

3. Ninsin A. Kwame (2005). Executive- Parliament Interface in

the Legislative Process (1993-2006). A Synergy of Power,

Institute for Democratic Governance Publication Accra; Ghana

(P:2)

4. Center for Democratic Development Newsletter (2001),

Democracy Watch Volume 2 Number 1. CDD Publication,

Accra, Ghana March, 2001.

5. Regina Oforiwa Amanfo (2007), A paper presented on African

Legislatures Project Conference on African Legislature;

Integrating Research and Policy (The Case of Ghanaian

Parliament)

6. Center for Democratic Development Publication (2000),

Parliament and Democratic Governance in Ghana’s Fourth

Republic. CDD Publication, Accra, Ghana.

20

7. K.B. Ayensu and S.N. Darkwa (1999), The Evolution of

Parliament in Ghana, Institute of Economic Affairs

Publication, Accra, Ghana.

8. Thomas E. Patterson (2002), the American Democracy (16

Edition), McGraw Hill Publication. United States of America.

9. Kumekpor Tom K.B (2002), Research Methods, Sonlife Press

and Service, Accra, Ghana.

10. Gilbert Keith Bluwey (2002) Political Science: An

Introduction. Legon Center for International Affairs (LECIA)

Publication. Accra, Ghana. (P:63)

11. J.C Johari (1982) Comparative Politics. Sterling Publishes

Limited, New Delhi, India. (P:524)

12. Shana Warren (2005) Legislative Performance in Ghana:

Assessment of the Third Parliament of the Fourth

Republic, 2001-2005. CDD Publication Accra, Ghana. (P:9)

21

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter deals with the review of some published works relating

to the research topic. A number of studies have gone into the

legislatures and parliament in Ghana, however, no single published

work emphasizes on the ineffectiveness of parliament in serving as a

check on the executive. Some of the works however, establish several

factors that militate against the effective performance of parliament.

For the purpose of the study, a brief review of literature is attempted.

The review is centered on the following sub-related topics:

1. Studies on the Legislature.

2. Historical Overview of Legislature in Ghana.

22

3. Parliament of the Fourth Republic.

4. Factors that militate against Parliament of the Fourth Republic.

5. Review Summary and Evaluations.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In general, a bewildering variety of terms are used to describe the

law making organ of government. It is often referred to as congress

in the USA, national assembly in France, and the House of

Representatives or diet in Japan, parliament in Singapore and Ghana,

congress of duties in Spain and so on. Parliament or legislature is

derived from the French word “parler” which meant to speak’ the

Latin origin of parliament is ‘parliamentum’.

Legislatures are perceived as “building where representatives meet

and discuss the main affairs of the nation, they pass legislation and

they exercise control, or try to exercise it over government”.

(Chapman et al. 1999:99).

Others contend that legislatures are deliberating bodies of states.

Legislature is also perceived as “Law making assembly of elected

members in formally equal relationship to one another”. (Mclean,

1996:280)

Legislatures occupy a unique position in the machinery of

government in every state. Today every state has a legislative body of

23

some kind. In some states legislatures are powerful decisions making

bodies, while in others they are merely advisory bodies, performing

only as rubber stamp institutions.

The constitutional arrangement of states however, established a

relationship between the executive and legislative arms of

government. This mostly depends on the system of government

practiced in that particular country. The most fundamental

differences between the various systems of government therefore lie

in the relationship between the executive and the legislature.

According to Andrew Heywood (2002:313), the executive-legislative a

relations in every state more commonly conform to one of three

institutional arrangements: Parliamentary Presidential, and Hybrid

system of government. In an attempt to explain these systems of

government, Heywood explain the parliamentary system as “one in

which the government governs in and through the Assembly or

Parliament, thereby fusing the legislative and executive branches.” He

emphasized that the central feature of this system is a fusion of

legislative and executive powers.

J/C. Johari (2009:494) also shared the same view with Haywood but

added that under the parliamentary system, “parliament has the

24

upper hand because it has the ultimate power: the ability to remove

the government”

The principal alternative to the parliamentary system according to

Haywood (ibid, 315) is the presidential system of government. The

presidential system to him is based on the strict application of the

doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and the

legislature. This ensures that the two are formally independent from

one another and separately elected.

J.C. Johari also emphasized that the essential feature of this system is

a separation of the legislature from the executive. To him, this system

does not allow the president and his ministers to become members of

the legislature. He maintained that in case the president appoints

someone as a minister who is also a member of the legislature, he

will have to resign his legislative membership before accepting the

ministerial assignment.

According to Haywood and Johari, states either adopts the

presidential system as practiced in the United States or the

parliamentary system as practiced in Britain. However, others also

practice a mixture of both the presidential and parliamentary systems

as it is in France and Ghana. Here there is an elected president who

can appoint some of his ministers from the legislature without them

resigning their legislative membership. This system is mostly known

as the hybrid system.

25

2.2 STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATURE

A lot of studies have been undertaken on the legislature. A

contemporary comparative politics series edited by Joseph

LaPalombara, offer a comparative perspective of legislature across

the globe, the work is fundamentally devoted to what legislatures can

do and cannot do what they can do best and under what conditions

these achievements can occur.

Andrew Heywood explores legislatures from a theoretical point of

view. He is of the considered view that legislators are often treated

with special respect and status as the public and even democratic

face of government. He continues with the definitions of the

legislature and identifies some of the functions of the legislature

which include; legislation representation, scrutiny, political

recruitment and legitimacy (Heywood 2002: 216-219). He further

discusses the structure of parliament and the committee system. He

concluded that, legislatures seem to be on decline largely because of

the emergence of disciplined political parties, the growth of big

government, organizational weaknesses of legislature and the rise of

interest groups and the media power. This study is very instructive as

the theoretical grounding of our study relies extensively on it.

The work of Jackson and Jackson on the legislature was brief but very

authoritative. They affirm the importance of legislature and assert

26

that in democracies, these bodies consist of representatives who

govern on behalf of the people (Jackson and Jackson 1997:243).

Jackson and Jackson identify some functions of legislatures such as

law making, the power to raise taxes, helping to elect a government

and teaching and informing the public (Jackson and Jackson 1997:

244-246).

The study also touched on the organization of legislatures by

explaining the two fundamental houses of legislature and reasons for

their adoption. Their study also indicates that the internal rules for

deliberations in legislatures are important in the determination of

member’s activities and their effectiveness. The study mentions the

committee system, the speaker and other bodies of the house which

help the institution to function effectively (Jackson and Jackson

1997:248-250).

They conclude, by discussing the relationship between the executive

and the legislature which they believe is very crucial to the way a

political system works. They consider two main opposing schools of

thought on this topic. One school of thought has it that legislatures

have declined over time and thus allowed executives to become more

powerful in the policy process. This position is countered by the

position that there never was a period when the legislature

dominated executives; legislative institutions have always been

relatively weak.

27

The relationship between the executive and the legislature is of

paramount importance to our study. The conclusion we draw on this

is that this asymmetrical relationship has undermined the

performance of the legislature.

The work of J. Blondel describes the legislature as one institution of

governments that poses the most fascinating problem. Legislatures

continue to be the most revered, the most hoped for and often the

least successful institution in contemporary governments. (Blondel

1973: 2). He maintains that legislatures are considered as mere

puppets, exercising little influence over policy-making. He also

opines that even though legislatures are expected to promote

liberalism and democracy, they have not been successful in that

endeavour.

(Blondel 1973: 3).

Among the other issues dealt with by the study are the constraints of

legislature, constitutional framework of powers and the role of

legislature on policies of immediate importance which relate to the

generation of new ideas and the control of output of administration

and government (Blondel 1973:104)

On the functions of the legislature, Blondel is of the views that,

legislatures serve as intermediaries for demands made by others or

28

may themselves serve as originators of suggestions. In relation to

output of the political system, it will ran from very detailed to

general, they often result from initiatives of members or triggered by

constituent and interests. (Blondel 1973: 16-17).

He concludes that even though there is an exaggerated view of the

importance of the legislature, they still remain very influential in

countries where they were originally created and elsewhere than is

usually claimed (Blondel, 1973: 133)

The study offers a general overview of legislature in a comparative

basis. It also provides some useful insights into the functions of

legislatures.

The work of Godwin and Wahlke was on forms of government. They

specifically discuss parliamentary and presidential system and also

focus on the responsibility and dissolution of parliament. They dilate

on the institutional framework of legislatures like legislative

competence, the number of chambers, rule of procedure, and the

authority and leadership structure. The committee system is also

discussed (Godwin and Wahlke 1997: 218-224).

Legislative processes such as initiative, deliberation and enactment

are elaborated. One legislative performance, the study identifies

representation as a very crucial function of the legislature.

29

They maintain that many people believe that a representative’s first

obligation is to protect the interests of the home district and to base

actions on the opinion of constituents (Godwin and Wahlke

1997:229). They further mention oversight and control over the

executive, community service, recruitment of political elites some

symbolic functions such as the oath of office and promising to uphold

the constitution and preserve the welfare of the entire country.

(Godwin and Wahlke 1997: 252).

Although the oversight responsibility of the legislature over the

executive was not elaborated much in their work, it is however,

crucial to our study.

2.3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATURE IN

GHANA

Legislative power was fist exercised in the Gold Coast during the

reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901). (Boafo-Arthur 2005:121).

During the period of 1850-1865, the Gold Coast had a district

legislative council consisted of the Governor and at least two other

persons designed by royal Instructions. Apart from the legislature

body, the Gold Coast also had an Executive Council. The legislative

and Executive council were responsible for policy making and

implementation. (Ayensu and Darkwa 1999:16). To them the

legislative council was specifically required to make all laws,

30

institutions and ordinances as may from time to time be necessary for

the peace, order and good governance in the Gold Coast which was

subjected to rules and regulations made by Order in Council. They

maintained that Ghanaians were under-represented in both the

legislative and executive councils. What was even worse according to

Ayensu and Darkwa was that both councils were mere advisory ones

and therefore their decisions were not binding on the Governor of the

Gold Coast.

According to Alabi (1998:9), under the British rule the first elections

into the legislative council took place under the 1925 Guggisberg

Constitution. Nine out of the thirty members who constituted the

legislative council were Ghanaians. This gave room to the people to

impact on policies and programmes that affected their lives.

According to Ayensu and Darkwa “legislative authority of Ghana has

been vested in parliament which has exercised it in varying degree

since independence in 1957”. (Ayensu and Darkwa 1999:122)

Aye is of the View that “Ghana has experimented with various types

of governments: “Westminster” model of parliamentary government

(1957-1960 and 1969-1972); one-party dictatorship (1960-1966);

military dictatorship (1966-1969; 1972-1979 and 1981-1993); United

States’ model of separation of powers (1979-1981) and Fourth

Republic constitution (1992 to date) which is a combination of

31

Westminster type and the American Presidential model” (Aye

2005:91)

In all these duly elected constitutional governments (1957-1960;

1969-1972; 1979-1981 and 1991-date), Aye maintained that legislative

authority of the state has resided in the National Assembly elected on

the competitive basis. A prime minister or President for the

Westminster and American models either headed the government. In

the case of the Westminster model both the Prime Minister and other

Ministers were members of parliament whereas in the presidential

system there was a strict separation of powers (at least in terms of

personnel) between the executive and legislature- the president and

the ministers are not members of the legislative body and do not take

part in its proceedings.

Ghana followed the Westminster type of democracy at independence

in 1957 with a liberal democratic constitution and all its trappings

such as opposition parties, guarantees of civil liberties and an

independent judiciary. In 1960 the country became a Republic and

four years (1964) later the constitution of the First Republic was

amended and replaced with a one party state with substantial

legislative powers to the president. Although the traditional legislative

and oversight role of the then parliament was not taken away, it was

virtually ineffective in checking the activities of the executive.

32

While few members of the House were able to express the concerns of

the electorate and made attempts to check the activities of the

executive, the majority of them tended to agree to whatever policies

and programs the executive initiated.

The 1969 constitution of the Second Republic of Ghana re-introduced

multi-party democracy in Ghana with a more vibrant Parliament.

Unfortunately, the constitution was overthrown in over two years of

its existence. The next constitutional attempt was made in 1979 with

late Dr. Hilla Lima as the president. Again, within two and half years

of its existence the constitution was suspended and parliament

dissolved. Thus between 1972 and 1979, Ghana was ruled by a

succession of military officers National Redemption Council (NRC),

Supreme Military Council (SMC) I and II) and June 1979 by the Arm

Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Flight Lieutenant J.J

Rawlings. Between December, 1981 and January 6, 1991 the country

was again ruled by military dictatorship under the Provisional

National Defence council (PNDC)

2.4 PARLIAMENT OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

The work of Ayensu and Darkwa offer a panoramic view of the

evolution and development of parliamentary practice in Ghana. They

started with the Bond of 1844 and the beginning of the exercise of

legislative authority in the Gold Coast up to the second parliament of

the fourth Republic. Their work was motivated by the fact that the

33

decisions of parliament affect the lives of everybody in Ghana. It is

therefore very important for people and MPs to appreciate the

history and the workings of the institution. While offering the

overview of parliaments in Ghana, they also explained that most of

them could not live their constitutional mandated term, largely

because of military adventurism.

There is also a discussion of the activities of the big six and the

various phases of constitutional development in the country. Their

work highlights the various parliaments from 1957 through to the

fourth republic.

They maintained that the First Parliament of the First Republic

(1960-1965) and the first parliament of the fourth republic (1993-

1997) completed their statutory terms of office (Ayensu and Darkwa

1999: 148). The life of the Independence Parliament of 1957 was cut

short by the nations overwhelming desire to become a republic. The

second Parliament of the first republic and the parliament of the

second and third republics had their terms terminated by military

interventions.

In concluding their work Ayensu and Darkwa (1999) shed light on the

development of the committee system, which they maintained has

being a common feature of most our republican parliaments. They

explained that the committee system enables parliament to scrutinize

bills brought before them. Their work is very authoritative in that it

34

provides elaborate information on parliaments in Ghana. This would

enable us examine the fourth republican parliament very effectively.

A Guide to Parliament of Ghana is a handbook prepared by the

Parliament of Ghana. The book has given a brief outlook of the

Parliaments of Ghana. It tries to compare the various parliaments and

bring out some peculiar features of each. The work however

concentrate on the fourth republic, pointing out the basic features of

these parliaments include, multi-party system, hybrid system, role in

governance, representation, and oversight (Parliament of Ghana

2004 :14). The book also gives an overview of the evolution of the

legislature in Ghana.

The structure of the fourth republican parliament, areas like

composition, qualification of MPs, declaration of vacancy and seating

arrangement of parliament had all been examined in the guide. The

Parliamentary Guide also identifies the functions of parliament as

legislative, financial, oversight of the executive, representational and

deliberative. It concludes with a discussion on functionaries and

parliamentary service and their role in effectively managing the

affairs of parliament. The oversight role of parliament discussed in the

work would be very helpful because it is very keen in this research.

35

Boafo-Arthur (2005) takes a view of Ghana’s parliamentary practices

for the past 150 years. He tackles the struggle of local elites for

greater representation and how they are governed. He also covers the

period between 1957 and 1992, where the legislature went through

several mutations. He gave the structure of the fourth republican

parliament focusing on the officers of the house and the composition

of parliament from 1993 to 2005.

On the functions of parliament, Boafo-Arthur (2005) states that

parliament embodies the will of the people because parliamentarians

who represent 230 constituencies of the country try to highlight the

developmental needs of their constituents. He also identified law

making, control of the public fund, the exercise of oversight over the

executive and the vetting of nominees to fill ministerial and other

important positions as other functions of parliament. He concludes

that “a strengthened parliament with functional committee system, to

a large extent, holds the key to national efforts to ensure

governmental accountability, transparency and democratic

consolidation”. Boafo-Arthur, 2005:140)

In a presentation by Regina Oforiwaa Amanfo (Program Officer of the

Ghana Center for Democratic Development), on African Legislatures

specifically the case of Ghana, she was of the view that, the current

Parliament of Ghana was established by Article 93 of the 1992

36

constitution. The body is vested with legislative powers of the state,

which is exercised in accordance with the constitution. The

legislative power is exercised by passing of bills which is later

assented by the president to become laws. The tenure of each

parliament is four years and there is no restriction on the number of

times an individual can seek re-election.

In terms of the structure of parliament, Regina identified that, at the

apex of the parliament established by the 1992 constitution are the

speaker and two Deputies (first and second deputy Speaker). The

next on the ladder is the Majority Leader, the Whip of the various

parties and backbenchers. There are specific rules and procedures

governing the activities of the House. For instance, no debate can

take place in the floor of the house unless a member moves it. She

added also that, the parliament is a unicameral legislature with at

least 140 elected member as stipulated in the constitution. The first

three Parliament of the fourth republic consisted of 200 members

elected once every four years, from 200 single-member

constituencies instrument 2004, CI 41, the membership of parliament

increased to230 from January 2005.

To her, the parliament of Ghana like any other parliament of the

world over, performs three important functions namely

representation, legislation and oversight. She maintained that

parliament’s representative mandate involves identifying the needs of

37

its constituent, the citizens of Ghana, and reflecting them their needs

in its deliberation, legislative and oversight roles. She added that

parliament is responsible for the oversight of the executive, its

actions and spending. She maintains that, parliament needs constant

access to information on the activities of the executive branch. She is

also of the view that parliament fulfills its legislative functions

through the creation and passage of bills, and scrutinizing existing

statutory instruments and evaluating when and how they should be

applied.

To effectively exercise these functions, the institution of parliament is

composed of 230 elected members and is headed by a speaker on the

first day of the life of each parliament according to Regina. She

added that the speaker is assisted by two deputy speakers who by

practice and convention are expected to come from a different

political parties for the sake of preserving a balance of power within

parliament.

The work by Aye is a reflection on government, politics and

development of Ghana in fifty years of independence. He generally

examined the atmosphere of governance after independence and

the development that have taken place in Ghana as an independent

state. Looking at government specifically on the role of the

legislature, Aye maintained that, generally the legislature performs

38

a number of functions and this may include; representative role. He

is of the view that the legislatures represent the interest of at least

some or all social class in the state. Aye believe that, although the

legislature performs other functions such as law making, vetting

and approving government nominees and so on, crucial to these is

to keep the bridle on king, which is to limit abuse of power by the

executive. He added that the “legislature both in parliamentary

and presidential systems have power to keep tabs on the executive

branch and its agencies” (Aye 2007:89) this to him is normally

done through the use of ‘question time’, the power to impeach the

president for gross misconduct and other act which have the

tendency of bringing the office of the president into disrepute and

the power of the purse.

2.4 FACTORS THAT MILITATE AGAINST PARLIAMENT OF

THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

A number of studies have being conducted on parliament of Ghana

especially under the Fourth Republic. However, three major works

would be reviewed. One of such works is by H. Kwasi Prempeh. His

work is a review of the relationship that exists between parliament

and the executive under the 1992 Constitution. He maintained that

“the legislature has failed to overcome executive dominance and to

39

undertake its functions effectively within the framework of the 1992

Constitution” (Prempeh 2003:4). According to him, of the three arms

of government, parliament has had the most discontinuous and

punctuated existence in Ghana’s history. Unlike the judiciary and the

administrative machinery of the state that have always survived the

forced overthrow of constituted authority in Ghana, there was no

parliament to speak of 1966 to 1969, 1972 and 1979, and 1982 to

1993. To him, this institutional discontinuity has retarded the smooth

and consistent development of a parliamentary tradition in Ghana.

Consequently, the parliament of the fourth Republic started the

ongoing transition to constitutional democracy with the most

institutional deficit of all the three branches of government.

He added that, the parliament of the fourth republic started its life

facing a crisis of legitimacy. The fist parliament was a de facto one

party parliament since the opposition party boycotted the

parliamentary election. All the candidates put forth by the National

Democratic Congress (NDC) won by default.

Prempeh focus specifically on Articles 78 and 108 of the 1992

Constitution which require the President to appoint majority of

ministers from among MPs and where parliament is forbidden from

proceeding on bills or motions regarding taxation, payment or

withdrawal from the consolidated fund that does not come from the

President respectively.

40

To him, “given the superior attractiveness of ministerial positions,

Article 78 helps to divert the interest and ambitions of MPs away from

their role as legislators and towards the Executive. Election as a

Member of Parliament has become for many MPs, merely a way of

enhancing their chances of making into the President pool of

ministers. And once their ministerial ambitions have been satisfied,

MPs generally pay little attention to their role as legislators” (ibid: 9).

He added that what make article 78 more problematic is the absence

of ceiling on the president’s ministerial appointment. To him this does

not promote effective checks and balances and horizontal

accountability to ensure good governance. He also believes that

Article 108 essentially reduces parliament to a law passing instead of

law making. Second, it denies parliament institutional autonomy in

determining the level of funding that it needs to carry on with its

work. Parliament budget is subject to item by item control by the

ministry of Finance.

He added that, it is not surprising that parliament has persistently

lacked the resources and capacity to perform its work. Partisanship is

also another factor indicated by Prempeh as contributing to

parliamentary ineffectiveness. He thinks parliament of the fourth

republic has failed to speak with a collective voice and to take

resolute action to stem abuse, corruption, inefficiency and waste in

the public half of the national economy. Prempeh however, hold the

41

view that parliament’s ineffectiveness cannot all be blamed on the

constitution or partisanship. In certain instances, legislative lethargy

appears to be more appropriate culprit. He thinks although

parliamentarians have the constitutional mandate to introduce a

“private member bill”, yet for the past years parliament has not

enacted such legislations require by the constitution.

The standing orders of parliament according to Prempeh also hamper

its institutional effectiveness. Parliament’s standing orders give little

initiative or scope to parliamentary committee, caucuses, or

individuals members to trigger investigations or inquire into matters

of public concern. Only the full house can initiate committee

investigations, this means that the party with majority in parliament

can always veto any attempt to initiate investigation into allegation

into of scandal and other cases of executive malfeasances.

Parliamentary committee system was also examined in his work and

maintained that effective parliamentary committees promote good

governance in many respects. He added that, if parliament appears to

be weak vis-á-vis the executive it because it was designed

constitutionally to be so. He therefore concluded that, indeed

requiring, the president to use his patronage power to co-opt MPs to

the executive side of government only serve to emasculate parliament

thereby entrenches the culture of executive hegemony in Ghana. The

42

relationship between the executive and parliament to him is however

crucial to enhance good governance and consolidate democracy.

Another important work on the Fourth Republic parliament is

“Refection on the effectiveness of the parliament of the fourth

republic of Ghana by Peter Ala-Adjettey. He began his work by

examining the legislative council under colonial rule through to

independence. He continued with parliament from the independent

constitution to the fourth republic. To him “legislative competence of

the Parliament of Ghana since 1969 has been subject to limitation

imposed by the constitution themselves” (Ala-Adjettey 2006: 16).

Focusing his work on the Fourth Republic parliament, as a former

speaker of parliament he shared the same view with Kwasi Prempeh.

He however added that article 108 of the constitution “by one stroke

of pen has taken away from parliament one of its most important

weapon or tool for securing control over or compliance by the

executive, namely what has been described as ‘the power of the

purse’. (Ala-Adjettey 2006:17). By prohibiting parliament from

debating matters involving the raising of taxation or increases in the

rate of taxation or increase in the level of expenditure, parliament has

been denied the use of weapon which can bring a recalcitrant

executive to heel.” To him the people’s representatives are effectively

prevented from having their way in matters that vitality affects the

people. He however concluded his work that, looking at the

43

constitutional history of this country parliamentary supremacy can be

dangerous tool in the hands of supine parliament and a determined

president. However, parliament should be clothed with sufficient

independence to enable it exercise oversight control of the executive.

The work Staffan I. Lindberg examines the rise and decline of

Parliament of Ghana. He agreed with Prempeh that parliament of the

fourth republic started its life facing the crisis of legitimacy. The

opposition NPP boycotted the parliamentary election nationwide after

their complaints of voting rigging in the 1992 presidential ballot. As a

result, the first parliament of the fourth republic was a defacto one

party parliament, as nearly all the candidate put forth by the NDC

won the seats by default. Out of the 200 seats contested the NDC won

189 representing 94.5% National Convention Party had 8

representing 4.0%, Eagle Party pulled 1 representing 0.5% and 2

seats representing 1.0% going to independent and candidates shared

the 11 remaining seats representing 5.5%. The NPP which was the

strongest opposition party had no seat in parliament. This outcome

weakened the representativeness and the credibility of parliament

during the first four years of the fourth republic.

To him the second parliament of the fourth Republic presented amore

balance situation as the opposition parties contested the elections and

posed some impressive results.

44

For Staffan, although the first parliament (1993-1997) was often seen

as a “rubber stamp parliament”, MPs made significant impact on

many of the bills introduced by President Rawlings government.

Despite being essentially one-party parliament, the first parliament

nevertheless managed to have four out of 88 bills (4.5 percent)

withdrawn by the executive. (Staffan 2003:8). Staffan also maintains

that, in the second parliament, influence over legislation was further

pronounced with 14bills out of a total of 78 (18 percent) withdrawn.

Notwithstanding the impressive performance put forth by the Fourth

Republic Parliament in the area of legislation, parliaments under the

fourth republic are still coupled with a lot of challenges. Staffan

agreed with both Prempeh and Ala-Adjettey on the constitutional

provision that allows MPs to double as ministers as one of the major

challenges of parliament. To him, the effect of this is felt directly in

parliament as those MPs who double as ministers spend less time in

the legislature.

He also believed that parliament power to obstruct-cum-control the

president’s political agenda is circumvented by Article 108 preventing

parliament from proceeding on any legislative initiative that would

incur budget or tax increase unless such initiative comes from the

executive.

2.5. REVIEW SUMMARY AND EVALUATIONS.

45

From the above literature review it is very clear that, of all the formal

institutions of government, the legislature plays a very important role

in promoting checks and balances in any political system. In Ghana

for instance, unlike the judiciary that must wait for aggrieved

plaintiffs to bring justifiable cases before it, parliament can act on its

own initiative to investigate any issue of public interest imaginable

issues like corruption, mismanagement of state enterprises,

ministerial abuse of power, and government profligacy.

The review above has looked at the various views hold by different

authorities on the legislature in Ghana and legislatures in general.

They content that, legislature are of vital importance in democracies

because it is through the legislature that citizens are represented.

Many of the authors were of the view that, legislatures are sometimes

faced with some challenges in the performance of their constitutional

duties. In the case of Ghana, the authors were of the view that, there

are certain constitutional provisions that militate against the work of

the legislature. Others believe that instead of parliament to use its

institutional powers to check the executive, parliament has stood by

like a spectator while report upon report has carried stories and

anecdotal evidence of waste, corruption, self-dealing and ultra vires

transaction at a number of taxpayer-funded entities. Some authors

contend that parliament of Ghana has failed to show bold and timely

46

initiatives in its quest to serve as a check on the executive under this

fourth republic.

Based on this theoretical analysis about the Ghanaian Legislature,

what is left now is actually to examine the situation on the ground.

This is the purpose of the research work.

REFERENCES

1. Andrew Haywood (2002) Politics, Second Edition. Macmillan

Publication: London (Pp:216-219,313,315)

2. Alabi Niyi (1998) Parliamentary Democracy in West Africa.

Friedrich Ebert Foundation: Accra. Ghana.(p:9)

47

3. J.C Johari (1982) Comparative Politics. Sterling Publishes

Limited, New Delhi India.(P:494)

4. Jackson Robert and Doreen Jackson (1997) A comparative

Introduced to Political Science. Prentice Hall Publication:

New Jersey. (244-246,248-250)

5. Blondel J. (1973) Comparative Legislature. Prentice Hall

Publication: New Jersey. (Pp:2,3,16-17,133)

6. Godwin Kenneth and Walhlke (1997) Introduction to Political

Science. Harcourt Brace: New York. (Pp 218,224,29)

7. K.B. Ayensu and S.N Darkwa (199), Evolution of Parliament

in Ghana. Institute of Economic Affairs Publication. Accra:

Ghana. (Pp.160, 148)

8. Ghana Parliament (2004) A Guide to the Parliament of

Ghana. Parliament of Ghana Publication. Accra. (P;14)

9. Boafa-Arthur K. (2005) “ Longitudinal View on Ghana’s

Parliamentary Practices” in Salih Mohammed M.A (Ed),

African Parliaments between Governance and

48

Government. Palgrave Macmillan Publication. New York.

(P:140)

10. H. Kwasi Prempeh (2003), Executive Legislature

Relationship Under the 1992 Constitution: A Critical

Review. CDD Publication Accra, Ghana, September 2003.

Critical Perspective number 15. (Pp:4,5)

11. Peter Ala-Adjettey (2006). Reflection on the

Effectiveness of the Parliament of the Fourth Republic of

Ghana. CDD Publication, Accra: Ghana. (Pp.16,17)

12. Staffan I. Linberg (2003). The Rise and Decline of

Parliament of Ghana. Center for Africa Studies. University of

Florida. (P:8)

13. Ayee R.A.Joseph (2007), Ghana at 50: Government,

Politics and Development. University of Ghana Publication,

(Legon), Accra, Ghana (77,88)

14. Regina Oforiwa Amanfo (2007) A paper presented on

Africa Legislatures Project conference o Africa

Legislature; Integrating Research and Policy (the case of

Ghanaian Parliament) CDD Publication, Accra: Ghana (P:2)

15. Bealey F. Chapman and R.A. Sheehan (1999), Element in

Political Science. Edinburgh University Press; Edinburgh

(P:99)

49

16. Mclean Latin (1996), Oxford Concise Dictionary of

Politics. Oxford University Press;(P; 280)

CHAPTER THREE

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION.

This chapter deals with the presentation and analysis of data collected

on the study. Questionnaire was the main technique employed in

collecting data. The questionnaires were personally administered to

the respondents by researchers.

As mentioned in the chapter one, bar charts and pie charts have been

used in presenting and analyzing the data, through the use of the

Statistical Package for Social Science.

3.2 .0 SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS.

3.2.1 Respondents’ Gender

In order to ensure a fair gender representation, both males and

females were consciously selected as respondents. Out of the one

hundred and twenty respondents selected, 75 were males

50

representing 62.5% and the remaining 45 were females representing

37.5%.

This is illustrated in the figure below.

3.2.2 Category of Age Groups of Respondents.

51

37.5%62.5%

For purposes of effective data collection, the research defined three

ranges of age groups. Respondents ageing from 18-30years

constituted 46.7%. Those from 31- 45years also constituted 34.2%

the respondents. The remaining 19.1% was composed of those ageing

from 46years and above.

The above statistics indicates clearly that majority of the

respondents fall within the ages of 18-30years.

3.2.3 Educational level of Respondents.

52

46.7%

19.1%

34.2%

All the one hundred and twenty respondents selected had attained

formal education. Out of that 7.5% had basic education and 29.2%

also had secondary education. The remaining 63.3% were those who

had either completed their tertiary education or were still at tertiary

institutions.

3.2.4 Respondents Occupation

The occupation of respondents is categorized into four sectors after

coding. 34.2 percent were made up of public servants who composed

of Members of Parliament and Staffs of Parliament who were

purposively selected. 22.5 percent made up of civil servants, Students

53

63.3%

29.2%

7.5%

were made up of 20.8 percent and 15.0percent were also self

employed. 7.5 percent were unemployed.

ANALYSIS OF FIELD INFORMATION

3.3 General Performance of Parliament.

This section of the research sought to assess the general performance

of Parliament. The overall performance is perceived to have improved

steadily. Responding to the general performance of Parliament, the

elite respondents rated Parliament very high. However, they were of

the view that there is more room for improvement. 69.2 percent of

the respondents perceived the general performance of Parliament to

be good. 18.3 percent of this segment of respondents felt satisfied

with Parliament general performance and rated parliament very good.

54

7.5%

15.0%

22.5%

20.8%

34.2%

The general performance of Parliament was rated poor by 12.5

percent of the respondents who were mostly composed of the mass

respondents.

3.4 Parliament Serving as a Check on the Executive.

In assessing Parliament on its role of serving as a check on the

executive, many of respondent believed parliament had not perform to

their satisfaction. 60.8 percent of the respondent were of the view

that parliament is ineffective in the area of its oversight role on the

executive. However, 39.2 percent of the respondents were also of a

different view that parliament is effective in that regard.

55

18.3%12.5%

69.2%

3.5 Ensuring Financial Accountability of the Executive by

Parliament.

Of prime importance in democratic governance is promotion of

executive accountability. Parliament serves a vital link in the chain of

accontability between government and the citizens. On effecctiveness

of Parliament in this area, majority respondents of 50.0 percent rated

parliament poor. Majority of the elite respondents were diassastisfied

in this regard. On the contrary, 25.8 percent of the respondents were

satified with the work of parliament. 20.0 percent of this segment of

respondent rated parliament good whilst the remaining 5.8 percent

also rated the work of parliament in this regard very good. A good

number of 24.2% of the respondents rated the work of parliament in

ensuring financial accountability of the executive very poor. To them

56

39.2%

60.8%

the high incidence of corruption allegations against former ministers

is an indication of parliament’s ineffectiveness of ensuring financial

accountability. They added that parliament had allow the Excutive to

spend state funds for their own private gains without any proper

checks by parliament. A study by CDD also revealed that, the overall

performance of parliament in this area is less than satisfactory. Many

Ghanaians believe parliament is not doing any good job in the area of

ensuring financial accountability of the executive.

3.6 Facilities at Office of Parliament.

57

5.8%

20.0%

24.2%

50.0%

For parliament to function effectively as an institution there is the

need for adequate facilities for both MPs and Parliamentary Staffs’ In

responds to indicate a simple Yes ∕No whether the office of parliament

had been well equipped for effective performance, 43.3 % of the

respondents indicated Yes whilst the remaining 56.7% were for No.

Many of the respondents at the office of parliament responded no to

this question. A chart with some of the staff at parliament revealed

that, most of them are accommodated in small shells which are mostly

overcrowded due to their number. This to them, affect effective

discharge of their duties

58

43.3%56.7%

3.6 Assessment of Office Facilities for MPs and Select

Committees of Parliament.

In assessing office facilities for MPs and Select Committees of

Parliament, 28.3 percent of the respondents indicated adequate whilst

the remaining 71.7 percent also indicated inadequate. A visit to

parliament by researchers attested to the fact that only the leadership

of both the majority and the minority has offices to operate. Reactions

from some MPs to this question also revealed that most of the

Parliamentary Select Committees attend their meetings in the

conference rooms of some ministries outside parliament. This results

to the lateness of some MPs to parliamentary proceedings. Others

may even stay out of parliament for committee work. Other committee

meetings which are organized within parliament are mostly done in

the open. As a result certain issues are not objectively discussed by

committee members due to the presence of the press. Others also

shared the view that, parliament’s power is mainly derived from the

formal provisions of the constitution without the political and material

means for actualizing it.

59

3.7 Opinion on whether lack of Offices for MPs Affect the work

of Parliament.

Having identified lack of offices for MPs as one of the major

challenges of Parliament, a different stage was then set to find out if

60

71.7%

28.3%

that contribute to the inefficiency of Parliament. Responding to a Yes

and No question, 60.8 percent of the one hundred and twenty

respondents admitted that lack of offices for MPS also contribute to

the administrative inefficiency of Parliament, as against 13.3 percent

who said No. However, 5.9 percent of the respondents left the

question unanswered. A further probing into this question from the

MPs themselves revealed that most of them operate from their car

boots where all relevant documents are kept. To them this does not

ensure effective performance as parliamentarians. Although, they

have research assistance to assist them in their work, they lack the

facilities to enable them do their work effectively.

61

60.8%

33.3%

5.9%

3.8 Assessment of Presidential Powers over Parliament.

Another key area that has raised concerns on the ineffective of the

Ghanaian Parliament is the excessive powers of the President over

Parliament. When respondents were asked whether the office of the

President has being vested with excessive powers over Parliament.

An overwhelming majority of 79.2 percent responded yes to the

question as against 20.8 percent who indicated no. This result validate

the notion that the 1992 Constitution grants more powers to the

President then to Parliament which constitute the representatives of

Ghanaians.

3.9 Opinion on whether the Excessive Powers of the President

weakens Parliament.

A follow up question was asked as to whether parliament is affected

by the excessive powers of the President. Although responses were

62

79.2%

20.8%

different among respondents, those who responded yes maintained an

overwhelming majority of 79.2 percent as against 13.3 percent of

those who answered no. However, 7.5 percent recorded was

unanswered. This result authenticates the notion of executive control

of parliament.

3.10 How the Excessive Powers of the President weakens

Parliament.

Respondents were asked to identify ways by which parliament is

affected by the Powers of the President. With this, responses of

respondents were centered on four key areas after their answers have

63

79.2%

7.5%13.3%

been coded. 25.8 percent of the respondents indicated that parliament

has been reduced to a rubber stamp with the kind of majoritarian

parliamentary system practice in Ghana. To them because majority

takes all when it comes to voting on the floor of parliament, whenever

the ruling party controls majority in parliament the President is able

to push certain policies through parliament without any proper

scrutiny by Parliament. 12.5 percent of the respondents also indicated

that parliamentary independence is affected by the powers of the

President.

fvcvmAmong the elite respondents some quoted Article 78 of the

Constitution that allows the President to appoint majority of MPs as

ministers as militating against parliamentary independence. To them

this provision of the constitution is one of the means the executive

uses to dominate parliament. Some of them cited the case of the

recent appointment of the entire leadership of the majority NDC Party

in Parliament as ministers as a clear indication of parliament being

weaken by presidential powers. 39.2 percent were also of the view

that the excessive powers of the president weaken parliament

oversight powers on the executive. To them majority party in

parliament for the past have always toe the line of the president

because most of the MPs within the majority always aspire to be

appointed by the President as ministers. They therefore find it

extremely difficult to come out objectively to criticize the actions and

64

policies of the President. Some MPs attested to this and added that

parliament is mandated to approve ministerial appointments through

the activities of the Appointment Committee of Parliament, however,

when it comes to firing or reshuffling ministers’ parliament is not

consulted. Some further added that, although, the Public Accounts

Committee of Parliament has the powers of a high court to prosecute

public officials who are found guilty of corruption, the committee in

practice had failed to exercise such powers over the years. The

remaining 22.5 percent of the respondents were of the view that the

excessive powers of the president limit parliament’s legislative

powers. Although several reasons were given to support their view,

majority of them especially the elite respondent were of the view that

because the President can refuse to assent to bills passed by

Parliament to become laws, parliament had in a way been limited in

its legislative powers. To them whether a bill would become law or

not, it lies in the hands of the President not Parliament. These

responses affirm how parliament had been weakened by executive

powers over the years.

65

3.11. Why Parliament is Unable to perform its Oversight Role

on the Executive Effectively.

One of the key responsibilities of parliament in every state is to serve

as a watchdog on the actions and policies of the President and the

entire executive arm of government. However, this seems to be

ineffective in the case of the Ghanaian Parliament. This question

therefore sought to know the views of respondents as to why

parliament is unable to perform such a task effectively over the years.

66

25.8%

12.5%

22.5%

39.2%

52.5 percent of the respondents endorsed the fact that the executive

specifically the President wields too much power over parliament and

has therefore cripple parliament in that regard. However, most of

them explained with the same reasons as provided in figure 3.12. 24.2

percent were of the view that parliament is ineffective in this regard

because MPs double as ministers. They buttressed their view with the

fact that the moment someone is appointed as a ministers such a

person is accountable to the President. Therefore, the moment an MP

is appointed a minister automatically the person become accountable

to the president. It now becomes extremely difficult if not impossible

for an MP who doubles as a minister to check someone he or she is

accountable to. MPs that double as ministers always toe the line of the

President when an issue comes to the floor of parliament. A staff of

Parliament affirmed that the situation is even worse if an MP is

appointed as a cabinet minister. Another important issue raised by

19.2 percent of the respondent is lack of office accommodation for

MPs and Select Committees. This segment of respondents were of the

view that much of the oversight role of parliament is done at the

committee level but sadly enough these committees are not well

resourced in terms of facilities and finance.

Victimization of MPs by the Executive was also recorded by 4.2

percent of the respondents. Among the mass public many were of the

view that MPs are given certain packages to toe the line of the

67

executive. However, if a Member of Parliament comes out public to

reveal such an act he or she is victimized. This has keep some of the

MPs mute even when they know clearly that a decision being taken is

not in the interest of the country. Some of them cited the case of the

Member of Parliament for Odobeng Brakwa; Hon. P.C Appiah Ofori.

These are clear indications that Parliament as one of the key

institutions of the country exist with challenges which need greater

attention of Ghanaians in order to consolidate our democracy

effectively.

3.12 How Parliament can be Strengthen to perform its

oversight role.

68

24.2%

52.5%

19.2%

4.2%

Having established these challenges and how disastrous they could be

to our democracy in terms of horizontal accountability between

parliament and the executive, it was prudent to solicit for the views of

respondents on how best parliament can be made to perform its

oversight responsibilities effectively. Among the several options

provided by respondents, Parliamentary independence recorded

51.7%. The mass publics were of the view that the hybrid system

being practiced does not ensure horizontal accountability. Ministers

of State must therefore be selected from outside parliament. Secret

balloting doing parliamentary proceedings was also identified by 12.5

percent of respondents. To them voting by head count as done during

parliamentary proceedings does not allow for objectivity on the part of

MPs. Some are influenced by the actions of their chief whips.

18.3 percent were of the opinion that parliament should be well

resourced in order to ensure effectiveness. They believed parliament

should be financially autonomous for it to be able to carry out their

oversight responsibility effectively. Some Members of Parliament

were of the view that, financial autonomy of the legislature is

guarantee by Article 179(2) of the constitution and Act 460 of 1993

providing that the administrative and operational expenses of the

Parliamentary Service are neither subject to budgetary review or

control by the Ministry of Finance, but this autonomy has been

compromised and parliamentary budgets have being subjected to

69

scrutiny by the Finance Ministry. 12.5 percent also believed the

partisan attitude of parliamentarians must also be avoided in order to

ensure objective and effective oversight. A study also by CDD

suggested that one crucial means to enable parliament to effectively

serve as a check on the executive is to get enough information about

the activities of the executive. To them information is an important

lubricant for every institution, and more important for an institution

charged with the responsibility of lawmaking and policy deliberation.

70

17.5%

51.7%

18.3%

12.5%

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND

CONCLUTION

4.0 RESEARCHERS MAIN FINDINGS.

After we have been to the field to carry out the research, the following

are our main findings.

There is poor public awareness of what parliament does as an

institution of the state. Some people do not even know the

kind of relationship that exists between parliament and the

executive.

The overall performance of parliament had improved. Many

Ghanaians think parliament is performing better today in its

legislative functions then some year back. However, many are

of the view that, the performance of parliament in terms of

71

the effectiveness with which it carries out its oversight role on

the executive has been low.

The rationale for the provision that majority of ministers be

picked from parliament was intended for them to inform

parliament on its deliberation. However, the reality on the

ground is different because those ministers see themselves

more as members of the executive than as MPs and therefore

compromising their independence.

Both qualitative and quantitative data suggest that parliament

had failed to overcome executive dominance and to undertake

its oversight responsibilities on the executive effectively.

Many of our respondents were of the view that because MPs

double as ministers they are unable to be independent in

order to exercise a check on the executive as

parliamentarians.

The current Ghanaians political dispensation creates the

attitude of partisanship in MPs who hope to be offered

ministerial appointment.

The excessive power of the President over Parliament is seen

as one of the main source of parliamentary weakness

Lack of offices for MPs also affects the performance of

parliamentarians.

72

There are constitutional constraints that also militate against

parliament in its oversight role on the executive.

4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS.

The research findings reveal clearly that there are still more to be

done for parliament to be able to exercise its constitutional checks

effectively on the executive in order to achieve horizontal

accountability between the legislature and the executive arms of

government. A number of recommendations result from the study

conducted. The implementation of these recommendations would help

strengthen the capacity of parliament to perform its oversight role

effectively on the executive.

There should be effective public education on the work of

parliament so that people can understand how parliament works

and what they should expect from it. Ghanaians should be

educated to understand how they are governed.

Good governance practices that promote complementary rather

than partisan and conflicting relationship between the three

main institutions of government in the performance of their

functions should be adopted

Institutional network that promote greater interaction,

collaboration, communication and consensus building between

the organs of government on: setting national priorities,

73

determining resource allocation and regular appraisal based on

agree indicators should be established

Infrastructural and resources capacity of parliament must be

improved

Voting by head count in parliament must be replaced by secret

balloting in order to enhance independence of voting and

thereby reduce partisan approach to the business of parliament

The need to strengthen the committee system. In order to

reduce the executive dominance of parliament and to

strengthen the oversight functions of the legislature, members

other than from the ruling party should chair committees of

parliament.

In order to make parliament more relevant and eradicate the

perception of parliament as a mere approving body, a

mechanism should be put in place to involve parliament in the

process of policy initiation at very early stages to enable it

prioritize and influence allocation of resources and not just wait

to be given completed policies that require ordinary approval.

Parliament should be strengthened to have necessary

independence to do its work. This will require the development

of a national vision and strategic plan for parliament as an

institution; identification and adoption of best practice norms to

foster the insulation of key national issue from excessive

74

partisanship and the development of consensus based decision

making in parliament.

In order for parliament to effectively carry out its oversight

functions effectively it is important for parliament to keep the

executive at arm length so that it can more effectively perform

the oversight function.

4.2 CONCLUSION

It is a little disappointing that one of Africa’s most successful cases of

democratization has a parliament that does not seem as potent as a

democratic institution as the country deserves looking at the overall

situation for democracy. It is not unique, however, that a young

democracy experience a period of executive dominance. Executive

branches of government after all generally seek to extend their

influence beyond their bounds not only in emerging democracies but

also in established ones. Known in Latin American politics as the lack

of strong horizontal accountability (O’ Donnell 1998), this

phenomenon is expressing itself in various ways in Africa.

The Parliament of Ghana since its inception in has not been able to

enjoy all the necessary organizational resources that will enable it

perform it oversight, representation and legislative functions. The

75

history of Parliament in Ghana has been tumultuous; but, the overall

performance of the Ghanaian Parliament has been better than before.

However, quantitative data suggest that parliament has failed to

overcome executive dominance and to undertake its functions

effectively within the framework of the 1992 Constitution.

The major challenges that weaken Parliament in the Fourth Republic

include; domination of parliament by the executive in the current

political environment, the constitutionally mandated selection of

Ministers of State from among MPs, frequent voting by head count

rather than by secret balloting, weak infrastructural and resource

base and the excessive powers of the president over parliament. The

organizational resources are necessary for the effective performance

of parliament, and therefore Parliament must exert itself to ensure it

is guaranteed financial autonomy and the resource to carry out all its

activities. MPs should have well equipped offices both in Parliament

and their various constituencies, capable, competent and professional

staff to assist MPs and Parliament in their assigned roles. The

Parliamentary Committees should also have well equipped meeting

rooms to facilitate their investigative and oversight roles.

However, improved infrastructural and resource base of parliament is

not enough to alter the situation. There would still be significant

obstacles to the ideal operation of the Ghanaian Parliament even if

76

these constraints are removed. For parliament to fulfill its duties, a

very fundamental issue must be resolved, namely the constitutional

right of the President to appoint a large number of appointees of the

executive wing of government from parliament so as to achieve an

effective separation of power between Parliament and the Executive.

More so the present state of affairs where parliament has to depend

almost entirely on the executive for funds to provide its functioning

and the constitutional right of the president to determine the salaries

and other allowances of Members of Parliament. All these constraints

tend to derogate substantially from the effectiveness of Parliament.

For the Parliament of Ghana to be truly independent and function well

as an autonomous arm of government, Ghana must re-evaluate the

1992 Constitution which shapes Parliament as an institution.

77

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alibi Niyi (1998) Parliamentary Democracy in West Africa.

Friedrich Ebert Foundation: Accra. Ghana

Andrew Heywood (200) Politics, second Edition. Macmillan

Publication: London.

Ayee R.A. Joseph (2007). Ghana at 50: Government, Politics

and Development. University of Ghana Publication, (Legon),

Accra, Ghana.

Bealey F. Chapman and R.A. Sheenhan (1999), Elements in

Political Science. Edinburgh University Press; Edinburgh.

78

Boafo-Arthur K.(2005) “Longitudinal View on Ghana’s

Parliament Practices” in Salih Mohammed M.A. (Ed), Africa

Parliaments Between Governance and Government.

Palgrave Macmillan Publication. New York.

Blondel J. (1973) Comparative Legislature. Prentice Hall

Publication: New Jersey.

Center for Democratic Development Newsletter (2001)

Democracy Watch Volume 2 Number 1. CDD Publication,

Accra, Ghana March, 2001.

Center for Democratic Development Publication (2002),

Parliament and Democratic Governance in Ghana’s Fourth

Republic. CDD Publication, Accra, Ghana Publication. Accra.

Gilbert Keith Bluwey (2002) Political Science: An

Introduction. Legon Center for International Affairs (LECIA)

Publication. Accra, Ghana.

Godwin Kenneth and Wahlke (1997) Introduction to Political

Science. Harcourt Brace: New York.

79

H. Kwasi Prempeh (2003)|, Executive Legislature

Relationship under the 1992 Constitution: A Critical

Review. CDD Publication Accra, Ghana, September 2003

Critical Perspective Number 15.

Jackson Robert and Doreen Jackson (1997) A Comparative

Introduction to Political Science. Prentice Hall Publication:

New Jersey.

J.C Johari (1982) Comparative Politics. Sterling Publishes

Limited, New Delhi, India.

K.B. Ayensu and S.N Darkwa (1999), The Evolution of

Parliament in Ghana, Institution of Economic Affairs

Publication, Accra, Ghana

Kumekpor Tom K.B (2002), Research Methods, Sonlife Press

and Services, Accra, Ghana.

Mclean Lain (1996). Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics.

Oxford University Press; Oxford.

80

Ninsin A. Kwame (2005). Executive-Parliament Interface in

the Legislative Process (1993-2006). A Synergy of Power,

Institute for Democratic Governance Publication Accra; Ghana.

Peter Ala-Adjettey (2006). Reflection on the Effectiveness of

the Parliament of the Fourth Republic of Ghana CDD

Publication, Accra: Ghana.

Regina Oforiwa Amanfo (2007), A paper presented on Africa

Legislatures Project Conference on Africa Legislature:

Integrating Research and Policy (the case of Ghanaian

Parliament) CDD Publication, Accra: Ghana.

Shana Warren (2005) Legislative Performance in Ghana: An

Assessment of the Third Parliament of the Fourth

Republic, 2001-2005. CDD Publication Accra. Ghana

Staffan I. Lindberg (2003). The Rise and Decline of

Parliament of Ghana. Center for Africa Studies. Unversity of

Florida

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Accra, Ghana.

81

Thomas E. Patterson (2002), the American Democracy (16

Edition), McGraw Hill Publication. United States of America.

APPENDIX A

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.

82

Figure 3.1: Respondents' Gender

Frequen

cy

Percen

t

Valid

Percent

Cumulativ

e Percent

Valid Male 75 62.5 62.5 62.5

Femal

e45 37.5 37.5 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

Figure 3.2: Respondents' Age

Frequen

cy

Percen

t

Valid

Percent

Cumulativ

e Percent

Valid 18-30 years 56 46.7 46.7 46.7

31-45 years 41 34.2 34.2 80.8

46 years and

above23 19.2 19.2 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

83

Figure 3.3 Respondents' educational level

Frequen

cy

Percen

t

Valid

Percent

Cumulativ

e Percent

Valid Basic 9 7.5 7.5 7.5

Seconda

ry35 29.2 29.2 36.7

Tertiary 76 63.3 63.3 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

84

Figure 3.4 Respondents' occupation

Frequen

cy

Percen

t

Valid

Percent

Cumulativ

e Percent

Valid Public

Servant41 34.2 34.2 34.2

Civil

servant27 22.5 22.5 56.7

Self-

employed18 15.0 15.0 71.7

Unemploye

d9 7.5 7.5 79.2

Students 25 20.8 20.8 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

85

Figure 3.5 Assessment of parliament's general

performance

Frequen

cy Percent

Valid

Percent

Cumulative

Percent

Valid Very

good22 18.3 18.3 18.3

Good 83 69.2 69.2 87.5

Poor 15 12.5 12.5 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

86

Figure 3.6: Parliamentary role of serving as a

check on the executive

Frequen

cy

Percen

t

Valid

Percent

Cumulativ

e Percent

Valid Effectiv

e47 39.2 39.2 39.2

Ineffecti

ve73 60.8 60.8 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

87

Figure 3.7 Parliament oversight role of

ensuring financial accountability of the

executive.

Frequen

cy

Percen

t

Valid

Percent

Cumulativ

e Percent

Valid Very

good7 5.8 5.8 5.8

Good 24 20.0 20.0 25.8

Poor 60 50.0 50.0 75.8

Very

poor29 24.2 24.2 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

Figure 3.8 Views on whether Parliament has adequate facilities

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid Yes 52 43.3 43.3 43.3

NO 68 56.7 56.7 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

88

Figure 3.9 Assessment of Parliament in terms of

office space for MPs and Parliamentary Select

Committees

Frequen

cy

Percen

t

Valid

Percent

Cumulativ

e Percent

Valid Adequat

e34 28.3 28.3 28.3

Inadequa

te86 71.7 71.7 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

Figure 3.10 View on whether the office of Presidents has been invested with excessive powers over parliament

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid Yes 95 79.2 79.2 79.2

No 25 20.8 20.8 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

89

Figure 3.11 Opinion on whether the excessive powers of the president weakens parliament.

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid Yes 95 79.2 79.2 79.2

No 16 13.3 13.3 92.5

Unanswered

9 7.5 7.5 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

90

Figure 3.12 Views on how the powers of the president

weakens parliament

Frequen

cy

Percen

t

Valid

Percent

Cumulativ

e Percent

Valid Reduces

parliament to a

rubber stamp

31 25.8 25.8 25.8

Affects

parliamentary

independence

15 12.5 12.5 38.3

Limits

parliament's

legislative powers

24 20.0 20.0 58.3

Weakens

parliament

oversight powers.

50 41.7 41.7 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

91

Figure 3.13 Views on the causes of parliamentary failure in its watchdog role

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Valid Because MPs double as ministers

29 24.2 24.2 24.2

Excessive powers of the president

63 52.5 52.5 76.7

lack of offices for MPs and select committees

23 19.2 19.2 95.8

Victimization of MPs by the executive

5 4.2 4.2 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

92

Figure 3.14 How Parliament can be strengthen to

effectively serve as a check on the executive

Frequen

cy

Percen

t

Valid

Percent

Cumulativ

e Percent

Valid Parliament should

be made

independent from

the executive

62 51.7 51.7 51.7

Parliamentarians

should avoid

partisan politics

21 17.5 17.5 69.2

Parliament must

be financially

autonomous

22 18.3 18.3 87.5

Parliamentary

voting should be

done secretly to

avoid victimization

15 12.5 12.5 100.0

Total 120 100.0 100.0

93

APPENDIX B

94

QUESTIONNAIRE

We are final year students at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science

and Technology undertaking a research on the topic: Executive

dominance of Parliament in the Fourth Republic). We would be

grateful if you could answer the following questions on the topic in

order to help us gather the necessary data. The research is for

academic purpose only. We wish to assure you that any information

given will be treated in strict confidence and used only for the stated

purpose and subject to any other condition that you may impose.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Where the alternatives have been provided tick the required one

in the box.

2. For other questions write your answer in the space provided.

SECTION A

BIOGRAPHIC DATA OF RESPONDENTS.

Please tick [ ] or answer where appropriate.

1. Gender of respondent.

Male [ ] Female [ ]

2. Age of respondent.

18 – 30 [ ] 31 – 45 [ ] 46 and above [ ]

3. Level of education.

95

Basic [ ] Secondary [ ] Tertiary [ ] others,

please

specify……………………………………………………………………

4. Respondent’s occupation.

………………………………………………………………

SECTION B

PERFORMANCE OF PARLIAMENT

1. How would you assess the general performance of parliament?

Very good [ ] Good [ ] Poor [ ]

2. In terms of serving as a check on the executive, how would

assess parliament?

Effective [ ] Ineffective [ ]

3. How would you assess parliament in the area of ensuring

financial accountability of the executive?

Very good [ ] Good [ ] Poor [ ] Very poor [ ]

4. Has parliament been well equipped in terms facilities to perform

its oversight role?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

5. In terms of office accommodation for MPs and Parliamentary

Select Committees, how do you assess Parliament?

Adequate [ ] Inadequate [ ]

96

6. Is the work of MPs affected by lack of office accommodations?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

7. Do you see the office of the President being vested with

excessive powers over parliament?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

8. Do the excessive powers of the president weaken parliament?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

9. Would you please indicate how parliament is weakened by the

powers of the president?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

10. What in your view had account for the failure of

parliament in serving as a check on the executive effectively?

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………

11. How can parliament be strengthened to effectively serve

as a check on the executive?

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

97

98