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Exchange E xchange R ate Rate Regimes R egimes a nd and Policies P olicies Thorvaldur Gylfason Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006 10-21 April 2006

Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

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Page 1: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Exchange Exchange

Rate Rate Regimes Regimes

and and PoliciesPolicies

                    

Thorvaldur GylfasonThorvaldur GylfasonLivingstone, ZambiaLivingstone, Zambia

10-21 April 200610-21 April 2006

Page 2: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

OutlineOutline

1)1)Real vs. nominal exchange ratesReal vs. nominal exchange rates2)2)Exchange rate policy and Exchange rate policy and

welfarewelfare3)3)The scourge of overvaluationThe scourge of overvaluation4)4)From exchange and trade From exchange and trade

policies to economic growthpolicies to economic growth5)5)Exchange rate regimesExchange rate regimes

To float or not to floatTo float or not to float

Page 3: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Real vs. nominal Real vs. nominal exchange ratesexchange rates1

*P

ePQ

Q = real exchange ratee = nominal exchange rateP = price level at homeP* = price level abroad

Increase in Q means real appreciation

ee refers to

foreign currency

content of

domestic currency

Page 4: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

RealReal vs. nominal vs. nominal exchange ratesexchange rates

*P

ePQ

Q = real exchange ratee = nominal exchange rateP = price level at homeP* = price level abroad

Devaluation or depreciation of e makes Q also depreciate unless P rises so as to leave Q unchanged

Page 5: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Three thought Three thought experimentsexperiments

*P

ePQ

1.1. Suppose e fallse fallsThen more kwacha per dollar, so X risesX rises, Z fallsZ falls

2.2. Suppose P fallsP fallsThen X risesX rises, Z fallsZ falls

3.3. Suppose P* risesP* risesThen X risesX rises, Z fallsZ falls

Summarize all three by supposing Q fallsQ falls Then X risesX rises, Z fallsZ falls

Page 6: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Foreign exchangeForeign exchange

Real exch

an

ge r

ate

Real exch

an

ge r

ate

Imports

Exports

Exchange rate policy Exchange rate policy and welfareand welfare2

Earnings from exports of goods, services, and capital

Payments for imports of goods, services, and capital

Equilibrium

Page 7: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Equilibrium between demand and supply in foreign exchange market establishesEquilibrium real exchange rateEquilibrium in the balance of

paymentsBOP = X + Fx – Z – Fz

= X – Z + F = current account + capital

account = 0

Exchange rate policy Exchange rate policy and welfareand welfare

Page 8: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Foreign exchangeForeign exchange

Real exch

an

ge r

ate

Real exch

an

ge r

ate

Imports

Exports

Exchange rate policy Exchange rate policy and welfareand welfare

Overvaluation

Deficit

RR R moves when e is fixed

Page 9: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Foreign exchangeForeign exchange

Pri

ce o

f fo

reig

n e

xch

ang

ePri

ce o

f fo

reig

n e

xch

ang

e

Supply (exports)

Demand (imports)

Exchange rate policy Exchange rate policy and welfareand welfare

Overvaluation

Deficit

Overvaluation works like a price ceiling

Page 10: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Market equilibrium and economic welfare

SupplySupply

DemandDemand

EE

ProducerProducersurplussurplus

ConsumeConsumerrsurplussurplus

Quantity

Price

AA

BB

CC

Total Total welfare gainwelfare gain associated associatedwith market equilibrium equalswith market equilibrium equalsproducer surplus (= ABE) plusproducer surplus (= ABE) plusconsumer surplus (= BCE)consumer surplus (= BCE)

R = 0, so R is

fixed when e floats

Page 11: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

SupplySupply

DemandDemand

Price ceilingPrice ceiling

EE

FF

GG

Quantity

PriceWelfareWelfarelossloss

Price ceiling imposes aPrice ceiling imposes awelfare losswelfare loss equivalent to equivalent tothe triangle the triangle EFGEFG

AA

BB

CC

Consumer surplus = AFGHConsumer surplus = AFGH

HH

JJ

Market intervention and economic welfare Producer surplus = CGHProducer surplus = CGH

Total surplus = AFGC

Page 12: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

SupplySupply

DemandDemand

Price ceilingPrice ceiling

EE

FF

GG

Quantity

PriceWelfareWelfarelossloss

Price ceiling imposes aPrice ceiling imposes awelfare losswelfare loss that results that results from shortage (e.g., deficit)from shortage (e.g., deficit)

AA

BB

CC

HH

JJ

Market intervention and economic welfare

Shortage

Page 13: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

The scourge of overvaluation

Governments may try to keep the national currency overvaluedTo keep foreign exchange cheapTo have power to ration scarce

foreign exchangeTo make GNP look larger than it is

Other examples of price ceilingsNegative real interest ratesRent controls

3

Page 14: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Inflation and overvaluation

Inflation can result in an overvaluation of the national currencyRemember: Q = eP/P*

Suppose e adjusts to P with a lagThen Q is directly proportional to

inflationNumerical example

Page 15: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Inflation and overvaluation

Time

Real exchange rate

100

110

105 Average

Suppose inflation is 10 percent per year

Page 16: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Inflation and overvaluation

Time

100

120

Real exchange rate

110 Average

Hence, increased inflation increases the real exchange rate as long as the nominal exchange rate adjusts with a lag

Suppose inflation rises to 20 percent per year

Page 17: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

How to correct overvaluation

Under a floating exchange rate regimeAdjustment is automatic: e moves

Under a fixed exchange rate regimeDevaluation will lower e and thereby

also Q – provided inflation is kept under control

Does devaluation improve the current account?The Marshall-Lerner condition

Page 18: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

The Marshall-Lerner condition: Theory

T = eeX – Z = eX(e) – Z(e)Not obvious that a lower e helps TLet’s do the arithmeticBottom line is:Devaluation strengthens the

current account as long as

1ba

Suppose prices are

fixed, so that e = Q

a = elasticity of exportsb = elasticity of imports

Valuation Valuation effecteffect arises arises from the from the ability to ability to affect affect foreign foreign pricesprices

Page 19: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

The Marshall-Lerner condition

ZeXB )()( eZeeXB

de

dZ

de

dXeX

de

dB

e

Z

Z

e

de

dZ

e

X

X

e

de

dXeX

de

dB

1 1

-a b

- +

Export elasticityExport elasticity ImportImportelasticityelasticity

Page 20: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

The Marshall-Lerner condition

e

Z

Z

e

de

dZ

e

X

X

e

de

dXeX

de

dB

XbabXaXXde

dB 1

0de

dB 1baif

X

Assume X = Z/e initially

Page 21: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

The Marshall-Lerner condition: Evidence

Econometric studies indicate that the Marshall-Lerner condition is almost invariably satisfied

Industrial countries: a = 1, b = 1Developing countries: a = 1, b =

1.5Hence,

1ba Devaluation

strengthens the

current account

Page 22: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Empirical evidence from developing countries

Elasticity of Elasticity ofexports imports

Argentina 0.6 0.9Brazil 0.4 1.7India 0.5 2.2Kenya 1.0 0.8Korea 2.5 0.8Morocco 0.7 1.0Pakistan 1.8 0.8Philippines 0.9 2.7Turkey 1.4 2.7Average 1.1 1.5

Page 23: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Small countries: A special case

Small countries are price takers abroadDevaluation has no effect on the

foreign currency price of exports and imports

So, the valuation effect does not arise

Devaluation will, at worst, if exports and imports are insensitive to exchange rates (a = b = 0), leave the current account unchanged

Hence, if a > 0 or b > 0, devaluation strengthens the current account

Page 24: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

The importance of appropriate side measuresRemember:

It is crucial to accompany devaluation by fiscal and monetary restraint in order to prevent prices from rising and thus eating up the benefits of devaluation

To work, nominal devaluation must result in real devaluation

*P

ePQ

Page 25: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

From exchange and trade policies to growthGovernments may try to keep the

national currency overvaluedOr inflation may result in

overvaluationIn either case, overvaluation

creates inefficiency, and hurts growth

Therefore, exchange rate policy matters for growth

Need real exchange rates near equilibrium

4

Page 26: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

From exchange and trade policies to growthHow do we ensure that exchange

rates do not stray too far from equilibrium?

Either by floating …Then equilibrium follows by itself

… or by strict monetary and fiscal discipline under a fixed exchange rate

The real exchange rate always floatsThrough nominal exchange rate

adjustment or price change, but this may take time

Page 27: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Why inflation is bad for growth

We saw before that inflation leads to overvaluation which hurts exports

So, here is one additional reason why inflation hurts economic growthExports and imports are good for

growth

Several other reasonsInflation distorts production and

impedes financial development, and scares foreign investors away

Page 28: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

How trade increases efficiency and growth

Trade with other nations increases efficiency by allowing1. Specialization through

comparative advantage2. Exploitation of economies of scale3. Promotion of free competition

Not only trade in goods and services, but also in capital and labor“Four freedoms”

Page 29: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

How trade increases efficiency and growth

Trade also encourages international exchange of Ideas Information Know-how Technology

Trade is tantamount

to technological

progressTrade is education

Which is also good for growth!

Page 30: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Efficiency is crucial for economic growth

Need economic policies that help increase efficiencyProduce more output from given

inputs Takes fewer inputs to produce given

outputMore efficiency, better technology are

two ways of increasing output per unit of input

So is more and better education

Trade increases efficiency and thereby also economic growth

Page 31: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Openness to Openness to FDIFDI and and growth 1965-98growth 1965-98

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8

Actual less predicted FDI 1975-1998 (% of GDP, ppp)

An

nu

al g

row

th o

f G

NP

per

cap

ita 1

965-9

8,

ad

juste

d f

or

init

ial in

co

me (

%)

An increase in openness to FDI by 2% of GDP is associated with an increase in per capita growth by more than 1% per year

r = 0.62

85 countries

Botswana

Page 32: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Openness to Trade and Growth 1965-98

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

-40 -20 0 20 40

Actual less predicted exports 1965-98 (% of GDP)

An

nu

al g

row

th o

f G

NP

per

cap

ita 1

965-9

8,

ad

juste

d f

or

init

ial in

co

me (

%)

87 countries

An increase in openness by 14% of GDP is associated with an increase in per capita growth by 1% per year

r = 0.42

Guinea Bissau

Korea

Malaysia

Belgium

Page 33: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Tariffs and Growth 1965-98

82 countries

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

0 10 20 30 40

Import duties (% of imports 1970-98)

An

nu

al g

row

th o

f G

NP

per

cap

ita 1

965-9

8,

ad

juste

d f

or

init

ial in

co

me (

%)

An increase in tariffs by 10% of imports is associated with a decrease in per capita growth by 1% per year

r = -0.52

India

Cote d'Ivoire

Botswana

Average tariffs around the world

have decreased from 40% to 5%

since 1945

Page 34: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

MEFMI countries:MEFMI countries: ExportsExports 1960-2002 1960-2002 (% of (% of GDPGDP))

Botswana

Weighted

average(unweighte

d average

is higher because US and Japan then

have lower

weights)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1960

1964

1968

1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

Mefmi countries

High-income countries

Unweighte

d average

Page 35: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

MEFMI countries:MEFMI countries: ExportsExports 2002 (% of 2002 (% of GDPGDP))

Botswana

0 20 40 60 80 100

Uganda

Tanzania

Zimbabwe

Malawi

Kenya

Zambia

South Africa

Namibia

Botswana

Lesotho

Angola

Swaziland

Average

Page 36: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

MEFMI countries:MEFMI countries: GDP per GDP per capitacapita 1960-2003 1960-2003 (USD at 2000 (USD at 2000 prices)prices)

Botswana

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

1960

1964

1968

1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

AngolaBotsw anaKenyaLesothoMalaw iMozambiqueNamibiaRw andaSw azilandTanzaniaUgandaZambiaZimbabw e

Page 37: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Exchange rate regimes

The real exchange rate always floatsThrough nominal exchange rate

adjustment or price change

Even so, it makes a difference how countries set their nominal exchange rates because floating takes time

There is a wide spectrum of options, from absolutely fixed to completely flexible exchange rates

5

Page 38: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Exchange rate regimesThere is a range of options

Monetary union or dollarizationMeans giving up your national

currency or sharing it with others (e.g., EMU, CFA, EAC)

Currency boardLegal commitment to exchange

domestic for foreign currency at a fixed rate

Fixed exchange rate (peg)Crawling pegManaged floatingPure floating

Page 39: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Benefits and costs

BenefitsBenefits CostsCosts

Fixed Fixed exchange exchange ratesrates

Floating Floating exchange exchange ratesrates

Page 40: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Benefits and costs

BenefitsBenefits CostsCosts

Fixed Fixed exchange exchange ratesrates

Stability of Stability of trade and trade and investmentinvestment

Low inflationLow inflation

Floating Floating exchange exchange ratesrates

Page 41: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Benefits and costs

BenefitsBenefits CostsCosts

Fixed Fixed exchange exchange ratesrates

Stability of Stability of trade and trade and investmentinvestment

Low inflationLow inflation

InefficiencyInefficiency

BOP deficitsBOP deficits

Sacrifice of Sacrifice of monetary monetary independenceindependence

Floating Floating exchange exchange ratesrates

Page 42: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Benefits and costs

BenefitsBenefits CostsCosts

Fixed Fixed exchange exchange ratesrates

Stability of Stability of trade and trade and investmentinvestment

Low inflationLow inflation

InefficiencyInefficiency

BOP deficitsBOP deficits

Sacrifice of Sacrifice of monetary monetary independenceindependence

Floating Floating exchange exchange ratesrates

EfficiencyEfficiency

BOP BOP equilibriumequilibrium

Page 43: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Benefits and costs

BenefitsBenefits CostsCosts

Fixed Fixed exchange exchange ratesrates

Stability of Stability of trade and trade and investmentinvestment

Low inflationLow inflation

InefficiencyInefficiency

BOP deficitsBOP deficits

Sacrifice of Sacrifice of monetary monetary independenceindependence

Floating Floating exchange exchange ratesrates

EfficiencyEfficiency

BOP BOP equilibriumequilibrium

Instability of Instability of trade and trade and investmentinvestment

InflationInflation

Page 44: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Exchange rate regimes

In view of benefits and costs, no single exchange rate regime is right for all countries at all times

The regime of choice depends on time and circumstanceIf inefficiency and slow growth are

the main problem, floating rates can help

If high inflation is the main problem, fixed exchange rates can help

Page 45: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

What countries actually do (2004, 193 countries)No national currency 17%Other types of fixed rates 23Dollarization 5Currency board 4Crawling pegs 3Bilateral fixed rates 3Managed floating 26Pure floating 19 100

51%

49%

There is a gradual tendency towards floating, from 10% of LDCs in 1975 to over 50% today

Page 46: Exchange Rate Regimes and Policies Thorvaldur Gylfason Livingstone, Zambia 10-21 April 2006

Bottom lineBottom line

The EndThe EndExchange rate policy is important Exchange rate policy is important

because external trade is important, because external trade is important, also for growthalso for growth

Need to maintain real exchange rates at Need to maintain real exchange rates at levels that are consistent with BOP levels that are consistent with BOP equilibrium, including sustainable debtequilibrium, including sustainable debt Must avoid overvaluation!Must avoid overvaluation!

Need to adopt exchange rate regime Need to adopt exchange rate regime that is conducive to moderate inflation that is conducive to moderate inflation and rapid economic growthand rapid economic growth

These slides will be posted on my website: www.hi.is/~gylfason