Excerpt: "Out of the Mountains" by David Kilcullen

7/27/2019 Excerpt: "Out of the Mountains" by David Kilcullen

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Future Cities,Future Threats

Imaginea greatmetropolis coveringhundredsof square miles. Once a

vitalcomponent in a nationaleconomy, thissprawlingurban envi-

ronmentis now a vastcollection ofblightedbu ildings,an immensepetridish ofboth ancientand new diseases, a territory where the

rule of law has long been replaced by near anarchy in which the only

securityavailableis thatwhich is attainedthroughbrutepower. Yet

thiscity would stillbe globallyconnected. It would possessatleast

a modicum ofcommercial linkages, and some of its inhabitants

would have access to theworldsmostmodern communication and

computingtechnologies. It would, in effect, be a feralcity.

Richard Norton, 2003

I. SixtyHours inMumbai

As dusk fell on November21, 2008, the MV al-Husseini,an unre-markable coastalfreightera littlelargerthana fishingtrawler,left itsberth in theharborof Karachi.1 The Husseinisteamedinto thegatheringdarkness, blending in among a mass of smallcraft, fish ingtrawlers, con-tainervessels, and passengerships. The ship sailed out into the Arabian

Sea, bound fortheIndiancity ofMumbai, five hundrednauticalmilesto thesoutheast. On board, a raiding party ofthePakistaniterroris tgroup Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) prepared for themostaudaciousmaritime

terrorist attack in Indiashistory.The eventsthatwere about to unfold are worth examining in detail,sincealong with theother examples well look at in thischaptertheyhelp to illustrate therange ofthreatsthat will exist in theurban,networked,littoral environmentofthefuture.

The assaultteam had received thirteenmonths oftrainingfrom LeTinstructors,as wellas from retired(and, allegedly,active-duty)members

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futurecities,futurethreats 53

ofPakistaniSpecialForcesand Inter-ServicesIntelligence(ISI),ata campnearMuzaffarabad in Pakistani-administeredKashmir.One traineelater

testifiedthatthecamp was run by LeTbut was near a militarybase, wasguarded by Pakistanitroops,and receivedammunitionand weapons fromthearmy.2 The raiderspreparationincluded ideolog icalindoctrination,weaponsand tacticsinstruction,assaulttraining ,and amphibiousraidingexercisesusinginflatableboatson theManglaDam reservoir in Kashmir.Seven traineeswere chosen from an initial batch of thirty-two, recruitedfrom urban areas in Pakistanby LeTand itspoliticalwing, Jamaatud-Dawa.Afterselection was complete, threeexperienced LeToperativescame in to takecharge ofthegroup.3 The team commander, usingthenom de guerre Abu DeraIsmailKhan, dividedtheten-manteam into fivepairs,assigningeach to a target in thewaterfrontarea of SouthMumbai.4

Throughout2008according to evidence givenduring his terrorismtrialtheAmerican-born,ISI-trainedPakistaniintelligenceagentDavid

ColemanHeadley(Daood Sayed Gilani) had made a series oftrips toscoutthetargetlocations,passingdetailed geograph icalinformation tohis ISIhandler, MajorIqbal.5At thesame time, LeThad establishedanetwork of up to forty localsympathizers in and around Mumbai.6Alongwith otherspies, Headley(who wasconvicted on terrorism charges inJanuary2013, forthisand other operations)had generated a detailedpictureoftheenvironment,helping planners in Pakistanunderstandthe

layout ofstreetsand bu ildingsand theflow ofpeople, traffic,and com-modities in thecrowded urbanpeninsulaofSouthMumbai,a complexand densely populated area in which coastalslums,warrens ofnarrowalleyways,and residentialhousing were intermixed with office buildings,public spaces, and high-riseluxury hotels.7

On board theHusseinitheraiders were busyexaminingthe recon-naissance data,poringover Google Earthimages to studytheirtargets,confirming routesofattack,and ensuringtheyknewhow to navigatethecomplex urban terrain in which theywould be operating.Each man wasissueda RussianAK-47 orChineseType56 assault rifle,a Pakistani-madecopy ofa Colt automaticpistol,two clips of 9 mm pistol ammunition,sixhundredrounds ofrifleammunition,and eightto tenChinese-madeType86 handgrenades.8Some raiders were givenpacksof military-grade RDX

explosive, GarminGPS satellitenavigationdevices,and cellphones.ThreecarriedextraSIMcards ofIndianand U.S.origin fortheattack,and at


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54 out ofthe mountains

leastone had a Thuraya satellitephone. The terroristsloaded theircombatequipmentinto backpacksalongwith water, emergencyrations,a change

of clothes, false ID cards, Indiancash, creditcards, and detailed maps oftheirtargets.9 They also packed cocaine, LSD,and steroids,probably tokeep themselvesawake during theraid: Indianpolicelater found highconcentrationsofthesesubstancesin theblood ofseveraldead attackers.10

Their journey to Mumbai took roughly thirty-sixhours. On thenightofNovember23, theterroristshijackedan Indian fishingtrawler,theMVKuber,farout in theopen sea. They transferredfour crewmembers to theHusseinias theyseized thevessel, and thenordered thecaptain, AmarNarayan Solanki, to sail to a position a few miles offshore ofMumba i.Sometimeafterthisexactlywhen is unclear, since thereare no survivingwitnessesthefour crewmembers on board theHusseiniwere murdered.

As Kubersailed towardMumbai theraiders checked in with their handlersin Pakistanusingsatellitephones, carriedout final rehearsalsand briefings,

and assembledtheirexplosives, fuses,and timersinto aseriesofimprovisedbombs with which theywould latercreatehavoc on thestreetsofMumbai.The precise sequence ofeventson board Kuberisalso unclear, as allbutoneofthoseinvolvedwas also dead within a few days. But atleastone sourcehas suggestedthatSolanki,who had a historyofinvolvement in coastalsmugg lingand illicit trafficking ,and wouldnt have known thathis crewwerealreadydead, didnt resisttheterroristsbecausehemistakenlybelieved

theywere smugglersofthekind who normallyoperate in thesewaters.11At dusk on November26, Kuberwasaboutfour nauticalmiles off

Mumbai. On instructions receivedvia satellitephone from their handlersin Pakistan,theraiders seized thecaptain,tiedhis armsand legs, cuthisthroat,and threwhis body belowdecks.12 Theycross-deckedfrom thefishingtrawler into threemilitary-gradeGemini rigid-hullinflatableboatsadifficult operationatnight,out ofsight ofland, with a three-foot coastalswell runningthenabandoned theKuberand set off towardMumbai in theinflatables.13

NightfallinMumbai

The assaultteamslanded in two separate locations,near thefishing

colony of Badhwar Park andMachhimarNagar, in theColaba waterfrontarea ofSouthMumbai. Unliketheupscale residentialneighborhoods,


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hotels, and high-riseoffice complexesthatdominatethe rest ofthisarea, thelanding sites theterroristschose were dense, complex informal

settlementscoastalslumsmade up ofthousandsof tiny shacks, fish inghuts,and mooredboats.14 Loca lpeople noticed both landings. In onecase theterrorists,who were well groomed and woreneatWestern-styleclothes, successfullyexplainedthemselvesas students; in theothertheyintimidated localfishermen (who, likeSolanki,probably thoughttheywere smugg lersor members of localorganized crimegroups) by pointingto theirweapons.Though thelocals saw theteam land, none ofthose whospottedtheterrorists reportedthem to thepoliceprobablybecause ofthelack ofpolicepresence (orgovernmentservicesgenerally) in this partofMumbai.15 Justas theraiders had sl ippedout ofPakistanby nestingwithin thecoastaltraffic ofKarachi, theyhad now entered Indiaundercoverofthenormalbackground clutter of licit and illicit flows in andaround theslumsand port ofMumbai.

By 8:30 p.m. the full team of ten had landed and split into five pairs.Two ofthesepairs,guided by GPS, moved on foot to attacktheirprevi-ously assignedobjectives.Each ofthe remainingthreepairshailed one ofMumbaisblack-and-yellow Fiattaxisand blended into theheavy water-front traffic to move to theirtargets;two oftheseplaced an improvisedexplosive deviceundertheseatof theirtaxias theyleft it, havingset thedeviceon a timerto explode later, createconfusion, and tieup theIndian

emergencyservices.16From theirtacticaloperationscenter in a Pakistanisafe house in

Karachi, a team of attackcontrollersled by Sajid Mirof LeT,along withHafiz MohammedSaeed (thehead of Jamaatud-Dawa),MajorIqbal ofISI,and other Pakistanimilitaryand intelligenceofficers monitoredthesituationby usingcellphonesand satellitephones and by tracking Twitterfeeds, Internet reports,and Indianand internationalnews broadcasts.17UsingSkype, SMStextmessages, and voice calls,thecontrol room feda continuousstream ofupdates, instructions,directions,and warningsto theattackersateach stageoftheoperation,gatheredfeedback on theIndian response,and choreographed theassaultteamsmoves so as to keepit from beingpinneddown by Indiansecurityforces.18 ZakiurRehmanLakhvi, theoverallplanner and tacticianoftheraid, was also in theops

room; overthepastfew monthshe had acquiredseveralVoice-Over-Internet-Protocol(VOIP) telephony accounts(similarto Skype) as well


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as phone accounts in theUnited States, Austria,Italy,and India,to main-tainconnectivitywith theraiders.19

Lakhvihad designed thefirst assaultsas diversionaryattacks to drawoffIndianpoliceand emergencyservices,forcingthem to dealwith mul-tiple simultaneousincidentsacrossthecity,while themainassaultforceheaded for itstrueobjectives:a Jewishcommunitycenterand two luxuryhotels, all in thewaterfrontarea. Shortlyafter9:35 p.m., thefirst assaultpairburst into the LeopoldCaf, a popular drinkingspot forforeigntourists,abouttwo blocksfrom theTajMahalHotel. The two assaultersthrewgrenades,and thenfired into thecrowd, killing elevenand injuringmany others before withdrawing into thestreet.They then moved theshortdistanceto theTajMahalHotel ,firing as theywent alonga crowdedalleyway,killinganotherthirteenciviliansen route.20

With chaos descendingon thevastcityswaterfrontas the Mumbaipolice respondedto thefirst attack,theother raiders were movingto their

targets.Besides theteam thatwasalreadyshootingitsway towardtheTajMahalfrom the LeopoldCaf, anotherpairwas headed for thesamehotel. One assaultpairwas movingto theOberoiTrident Hotel,and oneto theChabad LubavitchJewishcultural centeratNarimanHouse.Thefinalpairconsisted ofMohammed AjmalKasab and theraidinggroupsground commander, Abu DeraIsmailKhan.The two men took a taxito ChhatrapatiShivaji Terminus,themagnificentcolonial-eracentral

railwaystation in downtown Mumbai.Kasab and Khan slipped into theenormouspassengerhallofthegreat

station .Afterobservingtheflow ofcommuters fora time,and notingthepositions ofthelightlyarmed policeand Railway Protection Forceofficers in thebuilding, theyopened fire into thecrowd on Platform13. Firinglong burstsfrom their AK-47s and throwinghandgrenades,theykilled52 people, wounded 108,and createda mass panic. Afteranattacklasting almost ninetyminutes,thetwo terrorists withdrew fromtheterminusand headed on foot fortheCama andAlblessHospital,awomensand childrenshospitaltwo blocksfrom thestation. Arriving,theyopened fire,but inflicted no casualtieson thehospitals180patients:thenursing staff,hearingthe firingand explosionsattherailwaystation,had lockedthebuildingsmetaldoors and guided theirpatientsinto back

rooms. The attackersdid kill twosecurityguards, Baban Ugreand BhanooDevuNarkar,but were forcedto fleewithout gettinginsidethehospital.21


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Though thetwo terroristsfailed to kill any patients,theCama Hospitalattackwas a turning point in theraid, because as theyfledthescene Kasab

and Khan succeededthroughpureluckin killingtheseniorIndiancounterterrorism policeofficerin Mumbai.HemantKarkare, joint commissioner oftheMaharashtra Anti-TerrorismSquad (ATS), was a respected,dedicated,and energeticofficerwho had successfullyinvestigatedseveralterroristattacks,by bothMuslimand Hindu extremists.22As ATS chief, he would have played a criticalrole in coordinatingtheIndian response to theraid. Karkareand threeofhis officers, responding to therailwaystationshooting, had movedthroughtheterminusbuilding from therearas theterroristsfled ;theyclimbed into a Qualisfour-wheel-drivevehicle and pursued Kasab andKhan towardtheCama Hospital. In a lane near thehospital,thepolicespottedand firedon Kasab, but failed to notice Khan in theshadows.Khan returned fire,killing Karkareand two ofhis officers. The raiders

dumpedthebodies onto theroadway, seized the Qualis,and drove offtowardSouthMumbai. They firedatpoliceoutsidea cinema, but thenhit a roadblock set up by officers from theGamdevipolicestation, onthecoastroad nearGirgaumChowpatty,one ofMumbaismostfamouspublic beaches.

The policeattheroadblock opened fire. In theensuinggun battleKhan was killedand Kasab was captured when a heroic policeconstable,

Tukaram Omble, charged him and seized themuzzle of hisAK-47,takinga burstoffirein thechestatpoint-blankrange but managingto keep holdofthe riflesbarrel,therebyallowingother policeto capture Kasab alive.23Omble diedatthescene, and alongwith CommissionerKarkarewas laterawarded theAshok Chakra,Indiashighestaward for non-battlefieldgal-lantry.Kasab, now wounded and in policecustody,would be the onlyterrorist to survive theraid.24

TheMainAssault

It was 10:45p.m., and thetwo assaultpairsattheTaj Mahalhadjoinedforces to attackthehotel. The fourmen charged throughthe frontentrance,shootingstaffatthe receptiondesk, thensplit into pairs and

attackedthehotels two ground-floorrestaurants,killingdiners andthrowinggrenades into thebasement.Theybegan seizinghostages,


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focusing on British andAmericannationals,and herded themup to thenineteenthfloor.

Despitethechaos, TajMahalstaffmanaged to move about250 peopleto thehotelsChambers area, but terrifiedgueststheresoon began usingcellphones to calland texttheirrelatives,and in so doing theyalertedthemedia.Indianand internationaltelevision, Twitter,and Internetnews sitessoon reportedthatalarge numberof hotel guestsweretrapped,and namedtheir hidingplace. Within minutes,the LeTcontrol room in Pakistan,monitoringthemedia,had passed thisinformation to theassaultteamin thehotel, who immediatelysenta search party to find them.25Alsoataboutthistimean Indiancabinet minister,trying to reassurethepublic,announced thatIndiaselite MarineCommando (MARCO) counter-terrorismforce was en route to thehotel and would arrive in two hours;thisinformation,whichtheKarachicontrolroom alsopassed totheraiderson theground, alertedthemthatno responseunitswere yet deployed

and thattheyhad a clearwindow oftime to consolidate and harden theirposition.26 The terroristsmoved aboutthehotel, takingmany hostagesatgunpoint;hundredsof others were trapped in theirrooms.Hearingthegunfire,eightpoliceofficers arrivedatthehoteljustbefore

midnight, but theysoon realizedtheywere too lightlyarmed to confronttheterroristslikemostIndianpolice,theyworeplastic-lined riot veststhatwould stopa hand-thrownrock but not a bullet, had vintage.303

bolt-action rifles with only a few rounds ofammunition,and carriedwoodensticksknown as lathis.Realizingtheywere seriouslyoutgunned,thepolice backed off to wait fortheMARCOs.The commandos weredelayed by theneed for coordinationbetweenIndiascentralgovernmentand theMumbai City and MaharashtraStateauthorities,a contentiousprocessthattook severalhours, but theyfinallyarrivedatabout 2:00a.m. along with operatorsfrom theNationalSecurityGuard (NSG),a national-levelcounterterrorism unit oftheIndianpolice.Two eight-man MARCO squads with an NSG team moved into thehotel, rescuingguests and engaging theterroristsin an intense firefight.27By 3:00 a.m. thehotelshistoricdome had caught firefrom a grenadeblast,and a gun battlewas raging on theupperfloors as theflamesspread.Firetrucksarrived,and firefighters attempted to deal with theblaze; theysucceeded in res-

cuingnearly two hundredhotel guestsfrom theirroomsusingladders, aheroic effortgiventhattheywere dealing with gunfireand grenadesas


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wellas smokeand flame.Again,theKarachicontrol room relayed mediareportson theemergency response to the LeTassaultteams, allowing

themto stayone jump ahead oftheIndiancounterterrorismoperators.28The Taj Mahal Hotel is on theeasternwaterfront oftheheavily

urbanized SouthMumbai peninsula;less thana mile away on thewesternside ofthepeninsula,one more LeTpairwasattackingtheOberoiTrident,another landmark luxury waterfronthotel. The assaultwas synchronizedwith theattackon theTajMahaland followeda similar tactical drill: theassaultpairburst into the receptionarea, killedhotel employees atthemaindesk, thenattackeddiners in thehotel restaurantbefore moving toan upperfloor,gatheringhostagesalongtheway. Disrupted by thelossofCommissionerKarkareand preoccupied by thesimultaneousattackattheTaj Mahal,Indiansecurityforces took morethanfour hours torespond.When theATS and localpolice finallymoved into theOberoicompound at2:25 a.m., theyagainfound themselvesoutgunnedby a well-

prepared and forewarnedterrorist pair, and had to pull back.At dawnthenextmorning , MARCO and NSG teamsclimbedtheoutsideofthebuildingvia the fireescape to thetop floor,thenassaulteddown throughthehotel, trappingtheterrorists in a room on theeighteenthfloor.TheLeTpairheld out throughoutthatday, allthenextnight,and into thefollowingafternoon(November28) before finallybeingkilledataround3:00 p.m. as theytried to change locations.Meanwh ile,police and

firefightershad rescuedmany hotel guests.29The third maintarget,theJewishcenteratNarimanHouse,was in one

ofthemostcongestedand densely populated partsoftheMumbai water-front. Unlikethetwo high-risehotels, thecultural centerwas a five-storyhouse in a maze of narrowback alleyswhere therewere extremely limitedfields offireand constrictedaccess.30Also unliketheattackersatthe twohotels, the LeTteam atNarimanHouseentered and immediatelyseizedhostages,thenengaged in a classichostagenegot iation,holding theirground and awaitingtheIndian response.Mumbai policeand NSG estab-lisheda cordon around thebuildingand periodicallyexchanged gunfirewith theterrorists,as well as intermittently trying to negotiate with themforthe releaseofhostages,but againtheylacked the firepowerto attemptan attackon thehouse.At aboutmidnight on November27 thepolice

managed to rescueninehostagesfrom thefirst floorofthehouse. By8:00 a.m. on thetwenty-eighth,however, interceptedcommunications


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suggestedthattheterroristswere killingtheirhostages,and NSG beganan airassault,with operatorsfast-ropingfrom helicopters onto theroofof

thehouse. As in thehotel attacks,internationaland localmedia reportedtheNSG operationliveon television, blogs, and Twitter,allowingtheKarachicontrol room to alerttheterrorists in thehouse in real-time. Asa result,NSG took allday to clearthehouse in an extended room-to-room gun battle;by 9:00 p.m. thebuildingwas finally secure, with bothterroristskilled. All the remaininghostages,includingIsraelirabbi GavrielHoltzbergand his pregnantwife, Rivka, were found dead: theyhad beenhorrificallytorturedbefore being murdered.31

All thistime,theTaj Mahalwas stillundersiege, and therewas littlelet-up in a seriesofintense firefightson theupperfloors ofthegrand hoteland in thenew high-risetowernext to thehistoricbuilding .The LeTteam set firesinsidethebuilding ,partlyto confusetheIndian respondersand createcover, partly to increasethevisualimpactoftheattacks from

a media standpoint.32

They may also have been trained to light fires toconfusethermalimagingequipmentthatmighthave been used to tracktheirmoves insidethebuilding.33 The terroriststook about150hostagesand executedmany, but dozensmorewere rescuedby MARCO,fire-fighters,and NSG. Afterafalsestart,by8:00 a.m.on November29, Indiansecurityforces were able to confirm thattheyhad cleared thebuilding.34

As thesmokecleared aftersixtyhours ofdestructiveviolence,thegreat

city began to clean up themess and analystsbegan piecing togetherwhathad happened. In all,172 people were killed in theattacks,including16police,27 hotel staff,2 commandos, and 9 out ofthe10 LeTterrorists,while another304were injured.35The vastmajorityof people killed andinjuredwere civiliansrandomly caughtup in theattacks,especially in therailwayterminus,where thegreatestcarnage (52 dead and 108wounded)took place among commuterstrapped in a tightspace, unable to escape.36Propertydamage from theraid was estimatedatover US$18 millionnotcountingthebroadercostto theIndianeconomy.37

InfestingtheMegacity

Whatdo theMumbai attackstell us aboutthefuturespectrumofthreats

in coastalcities?Manyexcel lentstud ieshave analyzedthecounter-terrorism lessons of theraid, but for ourpurposes itsworth focusing on


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aspects thatrelate to theurbanized, networked,littoral environment,where, as we ve seen, mostpeople will live in thefuture,and where most

conflict will occur.Thefirst and clearestobservation is thattheraiders consciously

exploited theurbanized coastalenvironment ofMumbai and Karachi.Karachi, a chaotic and unruly megacity of21 million, is Pakistanslargestcity and itsbusiest transportationhub. The city has experiencedextremelyrapid urbanizationsince Partition in 1947,when it grew rapidly with theinflux ofmillionsofMuslimsfrom newly independentIndia,and againin the1980s,when millions of refugeesfromAfghan istanand fromPakistanstribal areas settled in periurbanslums.38 The port ofKarachihandles 26 million tons offreightperannum, or 60 percent ofthecountrys totalshipping and cargo movement,givingtheharborand itsapproaches some oftheheaviestcoastalshipping traffic in theworld.39The LeTraiders slipped out ofKarachiunder cover ofthisdense maritime

traffic,infiltrated Indianterritory in a fishingvessel among thousands ofothers, made theirway into Mumbai by landingata busyjetty in a coastalslum,and exploitedthecrowded ,dense environment oftheMumbaiwaterfront to move without detection on foot and in public transport.Mumbai, a megacity ofjustover 20 million, is Indiassecond-largestcity,afterDelhi,and is one ofthemostdensely populated urban centers ontheplanet, with almostthirtythousandpeople per square kilometer.40

Itsurbanizationhas been largely organic and unplanned, resu lting in acomplex mix ofdifferenttypes ofbuildingsslumsbuttingup againsthigh-risehotels, alleywaysnext to industrialfacilities,and so on. Theattackersskillfully exploited thecomplexity ofthisurban environment,usingslumsand alleysto covertheirmovementbetweentargets.

The second majorfeature oftheattackwas thattheattackersexploitednetworksofconnectivitywithin and betweenthetwo coastalmegacitiesofKarachiand Mumbai. As I mentionedearlier,itspossiblethatCaptainSolankioftheKuberdidnt resisttheterroristsbecause he thoughttheywere smugglers,part ofa broader network ofcontrabandtrading ,drugsmuggling, and humantrafficking in thesea space around Mumbai,an illicit enterprise in which Solankihimselfmay have engaged in thepast,and whicheven ifhe wasntpersonallyinvolvedwou ldhave

appeared to him asjustpart ofthenormalbackground environment.The locals who saw theteam land mightalso have believedtheterrorists


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were smugglersorillegalimmigrants,while themanager on dutyattheLeopoldCaf initially mistookthem forbackpackers, part ofa busy

traffic oflow-budget touriststhatflows throughthearea.41 Its worthnotingonce againthatdark networksflows ofpeople, money, goods,and informationthatlie outsidetheview oflaw enforcementand gov-ernmentauthoritiesare, in themselves,neither good nor bad, and theirexistence createsa venue fora wide range ofbeneficial,neutral, or (inthiscase) harmfulactivities. In thissense,any negativeexternalities ofdark networksare effects oftheactivitiesofpeople in thenetwork, notcharacteristicsofthenetwork itself.

Once they landed in Mumbai, the terroristsalso exploited theconnected, networkednature oftheurban environment.TheyusedSkype, cellphones,and satellitephones to connect with theirhandlers inPakistan,who in turn monitoredTwitter,news blogs, international andlocalsatellitenews, and cable television in realtime,which allowedthem

to control theattacksand react as theIndian responsedeveloped.The importance oftheKarachicontrol node is obvious ifwe look attherole of Abu DeraIsmailKhan, theteam leader,who diedearly in theoperation, in a diversionaryattacka long way from themaintargets.IfKhan had been running theoperation in a classicalmilitarycommand-and-controlmanner, it would have made no sense forhim to lead a sec-ondary attack ofthiskind. Hisplace would have been with themain

team atthemainobjective:he would have giventhejob ofleadingthesecondaryattack to a trustedsubordinate.Thathe wasassigned to adiversionaryobjectivealbeitone requiringconsiderable on-the-flydecision makingunderlinesthecontinuousand intimatecontrol thattheKarachioperationsroom exercisedovertheteamsatthemainobjec-tives.Meanwhile,theassaultpairsthemselvesseem to have operatedautonomously, in a flatstructure with no hierarchyamong teams, eachdirectly responsiveto thecommand node in Karachi. The Mumbai attackwas thus, in effect, directedby remotecontrol,makingtheconnectivitybetweentheassaultteamsand the remotecommand centera criticalelement in theoperation.

Likewise,theattackteamsfocuson foreigners seems to have beencalculated by LeTcontrollers to maximize internationalattention,cre-

atingan extremelyhigh level ofnews coverageand resulting in anunusuallylarge number offoreigners (includingcitizens oftwenty-two


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countries)beingkilled.42 This may have been, in part, theclassic terroristtacticof maximizingpublicity,but it may also have been an operational

requirement:since theraiders command-and-controlmethodologyreliedon theKarachioperationsroom monitoring Twitter and Internetfeeds in orderto control theassaultteams, theraiders needed to do some-thing in orderto createlarge-scale Twitter and Internettraffic,so as togenerate a sufficientonlinesignature to close thefeedback loop with theircommand node.

The raiders mostlydidnt targetspecificindividualsthekilling ofCommissionerKarkare, theMumbai counterterroristchief, seems to havebeen a pureaccident, while theimportanceof each targetgroup seems tohave been determinedeither(in thecase ofthediversionaryattacks)byitsdisruptiveeffect on thecity or(in thecase ofthemainattacks)by itsmedia value. The attackersseem to have deliberatelydrawn out theoper-ationoveras many days as possible,hardeningand consolidating their

positionsas soon as theyentered themaintargetsites, and preparingfora lengthysiege. Theirgoalseems to have been to maximize theraidsdisruptiveimpactand increasetheeffectof terror and urban dislocationby shuttingMumbai down foras long as possible.The attackson trans-portationand public healthinfrastructure (thetaxis,railwaystation, andhospital) also seem calculated to maximize disruption within theurbanflow of Mumbai and slow theIndian response.

This responsewas affected by problemsin coordinationamong thecityauthorities ofMumbai (includinglocalpolice, firebrigade, ambulance,and hospitalservices),thegovernment ofMaharashtraState,and theIndiancentralgovernment in NewDelhi. In orderto use national-levelassets suchas theMARCO and NSG teams, thestategovernmenthad toapprove theirdeploymentand agreeto cede control overtheincidentsitesto centralgovernmentorganizations,a processthattook almostsix hoursto negotiate, delaying thenational response; in themeantime,thelocalpolicewere severelyoutgunned,while theMumbai antiterrorismsquadwas reelingfrom theloss of itscommander early in theraid.

The attacksdidnt involveweaponsof mass destructionorparticularlyhigh-techequipment.As in mostirregularconflicts,theraiders usedsmallarms (riflesand pistols), improvisedexplosive devices, and grenades;they

didnt even use rocket-propelledgrenades.Smallarms, however, becausetheyinvolveintimatecontactbetweenattackersand victims,because their


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use impliesthepresence of an enemy on thespot,and because gun battlestend to last longerthanbombings,can have a greater terror effect thana

bombing orhostagesituation. In an urban environment,where firefightstend to be fleetingand to occuratshortranges among smallnumbersofcombatants,theterroristsability to operate in a distributedswarm ofautonomoussmallteams, with low signature and highmobility (due totheirlightweaponsand combatloads), was a key tacticaladvantage.

Likewise,theraiders usedno unusuallysophisticated orspecializedcommunicationsdevices:theyemployed commerciallyavailablephonesand off-the-shelfGPS devices,and pulledmuch of theirreconnaissancedatafrom open-source, onlinetools suchas Google Earth.Theydid,however, displayan excel lentstandard ofpreparationand reconnais-sance, and extremelygood skills in sea movement,coastalinfiltration,and small-boathandling ,techniquesthatare obviously optimizedforlit-toral environments.They clearly understood theurban-littoral dynamics

ofMumbaithesystemslogic oftheway thecity workedandusedthisknowledge to theiradvantage. In this respect,assistancefrom statesponsors(orperhaps,nonstate sponsorswho somehow managed to gainexcellentaccess to military-gradeequipment,training ,intelligence, facil-ities,and weapons) was a key factorin theraidssuccess.

Whatdoes allthissay aboutthefutureenvironment?First, I shouldmake it clearthatMumbai representsonly one kind ofthreatthatwill exist

in theurban, networkedlittoral ofthefuture;well takea detailed look atothers laterin thischapter. Thatsaid, Mumbai exemplifiesthehigherendofthethreatspectrum,that ofstateproxies usingirregular(sometimescalledasymmetric)methods to temporarily disruptan urban target,ratherthan to control an urban popu lationover a long period oftime.Crime researchersJohnP. Sullivanand Adam Elkusdescribethisas anevolvedtwenty-first-centuryform ofurban siege:

There are severalmethods thatterroristsand criminalinsurgentsuse

to besiege cities from withinpureterror and systemsdisruption,

althoughthe two are often combined together.Both methods are

sustainedmeans ofbesieginga city with a campaign ofprotracted

urban violence.Pure terror is a form ofsocialsystemsdisruption .It

is a spasmofviolenceintended to demonstrate to thepublic thattheauthoritiescannot help them,and thattheyare helplessagainstthe


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powerofthegun. . . . While thesuccess oftheMumbai terroristscame

in large partfrom thetacticaland operationalinadequacy ofIndian

law enforcement response, it is easy to imaginea smallgroup of ter-roristscreatingmultiple centersof disorderatthesame time within a

major Americancity in same manner.An equallyterrifyingscenario

is a Beslan-typesiege in school centers with multiple active shooters.

Paramilitaryterrorists ofthiskind would aimformaximumvio lence,

targethardening ,and area denialcapabilitiesthatmany SWATunits

would be hard-pressedto counter.43

To my mind,Mumbai representsthecurrentstateoftheart in urban lit-toralterrorism.The attackhas servedas themodel foratleasttwoplannedcopycatraids on majorcoastalcities in SoutheastAsia and Europe, anditslevel of technicaldifficulty alonewas enough to raise LeTsstatureasa regionalterrorist organization .44 In thiscontextitsworth notingthat

guerrillasand terroristscan gain strategic advantagejustby demonstratingskill,daring, and tacticalcompetence: thestylepointstheyacquire,and theshock value of showing theyrea force to be reckoned with, can

outweightacticalfailures.But Mumbai was farfrom a tacticalfailure:on thecontrary,theattack

showed thata nonstatearmed group can carry out an appallinglyeffectiveseaborne raid on a majorcoastalcity,over a three-dayperiod, in several

dispersedlocationsthetypeofoperationtraditionallyassociated withhigh-tierspecialoperationsforces suchas theU.S.NavySEALs ortheRoyalMarinesSpecialBoatService.Indeed,Mumbai was a furtherdem-onstrationofa long-standing trend,sometimes calledthedemocratizationoftechnology, in which nonstate armed groups are fielding highlylethalcapabilitiesthatwere once thesole preserveofnation-states .As a combat-experiencedofficer with an understandingof urban riverineoperations inIraqsaid to me, theMumbai terroristscallousdisregard forhuman lifewasdeeply horrifying, but anymaritimespecialoperatorin the worldwould be proud to pull offsucha complex operation.45

This was farfrom thefirst majorseaborne terrorist attackitwasnteven thefirst suchattack in India.But theMumbai raiders showed anextraordinaryability to exploit transnationallittoral networksand both

legitimateand illicit trafficpatterns,insertingthemselves into a coastalfishingfleet to covertheirapproach to thetarget.Theiractionsblurred


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thedistinctionbetweencrimeand war:both theIndianship captainand loca linhabitantsinitially mistookthem forsmugglers,and their

opponentsfor much oftheraid were police,not soldiers. They exploitedMumbaiscomplex patterns ofcoastalurbanizationby landing fromthesea close to theurban core but choosing landingplaces in slum set-tlements with limited governmentpresence. Obviously enough, thisapproach wouldnt have workedwithout significanthelp from active orretiredmembers ofthePakistanimilitary,so Mumbai is rightlyseenas ahybrid state/nonstateattack.Equallyobviously, though,theattack couldonly have occurred in a highlynetworked,urban, littoral environmentprecisely theenvironmentthatsbecomingtheglobalnorm.

II. Mogadishu:ThingsFall Apart

Along with terrorism and proxy warfare, theurban, coastal,connected

environment ofthefuture will harbormorediffusethreatswhatwemightcallthreatswithout enemies,which, bydefinition,arentamenableto militaryor law enforcement responses.46 These may arise not from thepresence ofarmed groups perse but from complex interactionsamongcriminaland militaryactors, domestic and internationalnetworks,citypopu lationsand governments,and theurban organism and itsexternalenvironment.

Richard Nortonsidea oftheferalcity,quoted atthestart ofthischapter, is relevanthere. A decade ago, in an influential article in theNavalWarCollege Review, Norton defined a feralcity as ametropoliswith a popu lation ofmorethana million people, in a statethegov-ernmentof which has losttheability to maintaintherule of law withinthecitysboundaries yet remainsa functioning actorin thegreaterinter-nationalsystem.47 This kind ofcity,Norton pointsout, has no essential

services orsocialsafety net. Humansecuritybecomes a matter of indi-vidualinitiativeconflictentrepreneursand communitymilitiasemerge,MadMaxstyle.And yet feralcities dontjustsink into utter chaos andcollapsethey remainconnected to internationalflows of people, infor-mation,and money. Nonstategroups step up to control key areas andfunctions,commerce continues(albeit with much corruption and vio-lence), a black marketeconomy flourishes, and massivelevels ofdiseaseand pollution may be present,yet evenundertheseconditions,these


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cities continue to grow, and themajorityofoccupantsdo not voluntarilyleave.48 In urban metabolism terms,theseare cities whose flows have

overwhelmed thecarryingcapacity of theirinternalsystems:theproblemis not collapse (a lack offlow,as it were) but rathera superabundanceofuncontrolledflows, and thetoxic by-productsarising from thecitysfailureto absorb and metabolize them.

Likethenotion of urban metabolism, theidea oftheferalcity is drawnfrom a concept in biology.A feralanimalis a domesticatedone thathasregressed to thewild,adapting to wildernessconditionsand reacquiring(perhaps overgenerations)some characteristicsoftheoriginaluntamedspecies. The same thing happens with agriculturalcrops.49 Feralpopu la-tionsmay be coarser,rangier,and fiercerthantheirdomesticatedcoun-terparts.50 Norton applies thisbiolog icalmetaphorto cities thatkeepon functioning, after a fashion, even as they regress to the wild in theabsence ofgovernmentauthorityfollowinga statecollapse orduringa

war ornaturaldisaster.Feralanimals andplantsdoactuallyinfest cities duringandafterconflictordisasterand are prevalenton thefringes oflargerbuilt-up areas.51 InAustralianslang, theterm feralsis also sometimesapplied to humans wholive in shantysettlementsand reject thecountrysmetropolitanculture.(Australia, likemostdeveloped countries, is heavily urbanized and,because of theinhospitableterrainand climateofitsinterior, it also has

a very highdegreeof littoralization: 89 percentofAustraliaspopulationlives in cities and 82 percentliveswithin fifty miles ofthesea.)52 Theresaradical,antiurbanstreak in feralsubculture,and even thoughmembersmay come from inner-cityor middle-classareas, theyfavora radical chicthatmakes a fetish of grassroots resistanceto theMan.53

A variant ofthiscultureemerged in Britainduringthe August2011riots, in which marginalizedcity dwellers turnedantiurbanviolenceagainstthevery cities where theylived.The destructionled DailyMailcolumnistRichard Littlejohn to describetherioters, who looted shopsand vandalizedsymbols ofauthorityand prosperity,as a wolfpack offeralinner-citywaifsand strays.54The notion ofa lack ofgovernabilitytheexact kind ofthingHaussmannwastrying to prevent in Paris, ortheLondon authoritiessought to address in their plan forthe2012

Olympicsis important here. It manifests in diffuseand apparentlyrandom patterns ofcrimeand violence,and in self-marginalizationby


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city dwellers who see themselvesas victims ofsocialinjusticeand eco-nomic exclusion, standingapartfrom themainstreaminthecity, but

not of ityet stillmaintaina highlevel ofconnectednessboth with othermembers in theirgroup and with theebb and flow ofthecity itself.

The London riotsalso suggestthattheidea of a peripheralsettlementorpopu lation(which weve so farbeen usingmainly in a spatialsense,meaning people ordistrictsthatare located on theedge of town) can bebroadened to includepeople who are marginalizedor excluded in an eco-nomic,political,or cultural sense,even iftheylive in thephysicalcenterof a city. In this reading ,which is of course extremelyfamiliarto anthro-pologists orurban sociologists,theurban coreofa city isntjusttheolder, morecentral,downtown partofits built environmentbut also itseconomically,politicallyand culturally dominantterrain,thepartofthecity systemthataccumulates value attheexpense of a periphery.55 In fact,better-offpopulations in many countrieshave self-segregated,moving

fartherout ofcity centers to gated communitiesor simply to islands ofprosperity in thesuburbs,abandoningthecityscenter.56 Urban periph-eries, in thissense,arentmerely places on thephysicaloutskirtsof a city.Rather,theyreareas thatare dominated,marginalized,exploited, vic-timized,or excluded by thecorewherevertheyhappen to be physicallylocated. The feralityofthe2011London rioters thuswasntthatofa corepopu lationattackingitsown city but thatof a marginalizedpopu lation

attackinga city it saw as someone elses.57

Itsworth pointingout here thattheconditionsNorton describescanexistatmultiple levels within an urban fractalpattern, meaningthatonelevelofanurbansystemafewdistrictswithin acity, afewneighborhoodswithin a district,a few blocks within a neighborhood, ora few houseswithin a streetcanbecome feraleven while thebroadersystem remainswithin limits,or can slip out ofequilibriumeven as thehigher-levelsystemis gettingmorestable.Conversely, feralitycan bleed from one level of an

urban system into another, suchas when a citysbroaderequilibriumiscompromised by warornaturaldisaster,when a parentcity ordistrictloses theability to integrateitscomponentparts,when whole periurbandistrictseffectivelysecede from thelarger city (partof a broaderprocessthatsome politicalgeographers callinternalsecession), or whenas in

thecase of San Pedro Sula, discussed in Chapter1anurban metabolismloses thecarryingcapacity to processtheby-productsofthecitysflows.58


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The city ordistrictmay not collapse, and as we will see, it may be far fromanarchic or ungoverned, but as it slips from statecontrol and goesferal,

a seriesofoverlappingthreatsemergesboth for local residentsand forthebroader urban, national,and globalsystemsthatsurround it.

Obviously enough, thevery term cityembodies peace, order, and

tameness.Englishwords thatconnote domesticity,peace, tranquility,development, and order, and which we use everydaywords such aspoliteness,civilization,citizen,civility,civilian,urbane,and ofcourse

policeallderivefrom Latin and Greekwords forthecity (polis,urbs,civis). When Aristotle calledman a politicalanimal,he was referring tothepredominantlyurban habitatof ourspecies: humans,he was arguing ,are by theirvery naturecity-dwelling animals.59 This idea ofthecity astheculminationof humandevelopment (literally,civilization) is so deeplyembedded in ourthinkingthatthenotion ofaferalcity,movingbackwardin timeand downward in socialorder, regressing to thewarlikechaos of

thewildnot a noncity but an anticity, a perversion ofthenaturalway ofthingscanbe deeply shocking.

This, I suspect,is whatliesattheroot of our modern fascination withworld-endingsocietalcollapse, a scenario beloved of survivalistsand cin-ematographers.Think ofthebox-office success ofmovies suchas I AmLegend,MadMax,WorldWarZ, or28 DaysLateror, indeed, the

seductiveappealof any numberof zombie apocalypseor dystopian sci-fi

novels, comics, videogames, and television showsallof which tap intoa deep anxiety thatunderliescontemporaryurbanized society. Urbantheoristssuchas StephenGraham argue thatthisanxiety is actuallyadirect result ofthevery processes ofpopu lationgrowth,urbanization,and technologicalmodernizationthatwere examininghere,so attackson a cityscomplex system-of-systemscan be seen as a form offorcedde-modernization.60Grahamquotes thearchitecturecriticMartinPawley,who wrote thatfearofthedislocation ofurban serviceson a massivescale is now endemic in thepopu lationsofallgreatcities .61

TheBattle ofMogadishu

Richard Norton cited theSomalicoastalcity ofMogadishuas the only

full-blownexampleofaferalcityinexistence when hewaswritingin2003.Almosta decade later, my colleagueAnnaProuseand I were fortunate


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enough to briefly visit Mogadishu,workingon a field assessment foranNGO thatprovides reconstructionassistancein Somalia.By thistime (in

mid-2012)thecountryhad been without a functioninggovernment formorethantwentyyears, and thecity was a byword forchaos, lawlessness,corruption, and violence.

But thiswasnttheMogad ishuwe saw. Far from it: on thesurface,thecity was a pictureofprosperity.Manyshops and houses were freshlypainted,and signson many streetcorners advertisedautoparts,courses inbusinessand English,banks,money changers and remittanceservices,cell-phones, processedfood, powdered milk,cigarettes,drinks,clothes, andshoes. The Bakara market in thecenterof town had a monetary exchange,where theSomalishillingacurrency thathas survivedwithout a state ora centralbank formorethantwentyyearsfloated freely on marketratesthatwereset and updated twicedaily. There were restaurants,hotels, and agelato shop, and many intersectionshad busyproduce markets.The coffee

shops were crowded with men watch ingsocceron satellitetelevisionand good-naturedlyarguing aboutscoresand penalties.Trafficflowedfreely, with occasionalblue-uniformed, unarmed SomaliNationalPoliceofficers (male and female) controllingintersections.Besides motorcycles,scooters, and cars, therewere horse-drawn cartssharing theroads with

trucksloaded above thegunwales with bananas, charcoal, or firewood.Offshore, fish ingboatsand coastalfreightersmovedabouttheharbor,

and nearthedocksseveralflocksofgoatsand sheep were awaitingexportto cities around theRed Sea and fartherafield. Powerlinesfestooned tele-graph poles alongthe roads,many with complex nestsof telephone wiresconnectingthem to surroundingbu ildings.MostSomalison thestreetseemed to prefercellphones,though,and many traderskeptup a constantchatteron theirmobiles.Mogadishuwas a fully functioningcity.

To be sure,after much time in Iraq, Afghanistan,and other gardenspots,our standards ofprosperityand orderare somewhatelastic. (Anna,a civilianjournalistby training ,has eightyears ofcontinuouswarzoneexperience in Iraq,working fortheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross, runninga field hospital in Baghdad, thencommandingtheItalianprovincial reconstructionteam in Nasiriya ;she tends to shrug offa littlelightmayhem asjustpartof an honestdayswork.) And therewere admit-

tedly many signsof war and chaos: in theold partof town many housesremained ruined orpitted by bulle tsand shrapnel, and you could see


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thedistinctivesplashmarks ofRPG hitson many bu ildings.Refugeeswere camped in clusters of round,tarpaulin-covered,wood-framed huts

in severalpartsof town, and (especiallyon thecitysoutskirts)civilianscarriedAK-47s casuallyslung overtheirshoulders orrestingbeside themas theyworked.Weavinginand out ofthetrafficweretechnicals (pickuptrucksthatmount a heavy machinegun on theflatbedbehindthedriverscab) crammed with SomaliNationalArmy troops in camouflage fatigues,armed police, orgreen-uniformedmilitia,and therewere Soviet-madetanksand armored fightingvehicles on theroads out oftown. On thefringesofthecity therewere signsof more recent fighting ,with destroyedhouses, downedtrees,and theoccasionalshot-outvehicle or dead animal.Much ofthecountrywasstill recoveringfrom a deadly drought andfaminethataffected allofEast Africa in 201011,and Shabaab militantsstillcontrolleda sizeable chunk ofSomaliasterritory and popu lation,thoughtheywere fastlosing ground.

Some governmentbu ildings in thecentralVillaSomaliacompoundwere wellmaintainedand luxuriously furnished, but others were muchless salubrious: Annaand I sat in on a meetingbetweenan NGO and aminister oftheTransitionalFederalGovernment in his well-furnishedbut darkened office, theonly air-conditionedroom in a large, mostlyemptyministrybuildingotherwise without water, furniture,orelectricalpower. This ministersfamilyhad fledSomalia in theearly 1990s,and hed

livedmostof his life in theUnited States;still,he unabashedly soughtabribe in returnfor helping theNGOswork by callingoff members ofhisown ministrywho were obstructing it. There wasgunfirefrom time totime,Shabaab sentscoutsand probing attacksinto town on some nights,we movedmainly in SouthAfricandesigned mine-resistantCasspirvehicles, and convoys belonging to AMISOMtheAfrican UnionMission in Somalia,a peacekeeping force thathad succeeded,againstallexpectations, in seizingMogadishufrom Shabaab overthepastyearwere occasionallyambushed. But it wasnothingliketheintensity ofIraq, Afghanistan,or even Pakistan:theconflict in Somalia in 2012was agenuinelysmallwar.

And Mogadishuwas farfrom thedust-blowndesertof popularimag-ination, with hopelesshordes ofstarving refugees,sinistergold-toothed

warlords,and murderousmilitiasbattened likeleeches onto thecitys fly-infestedcorpse. Thatimage,thedominantpictureofMogadishu in much


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oftheWesternworld,crystallized in BlackHawk Down, MarkBowdensgraphic and intimatelyobservedaccount ofthebloody battle ofMoga-

dishu on October34,1993, and in the2002 Hollywood movie based onhis book. Bowdensdepiction ofMogadishudefined thecity for a gener-ation,creatinga pictureoftheplace in thepublic imagination(and in themindsof many militaryofficers who readhis book orstudiedaccounts ofthebattle)that, in therueful words of one Somaliwriter,would informalldiscourse on Mogadishuand Somaliafrom thenon .62

There has been a debate in both popular and academic circles aboutwhetherMogadishu in 2012was improvingand recoveringfrom conflictorwhetherin fact theprogressmade since 2010 remainedfragile andreversible. Some pointed to thecitysgrowthand businessactivityas asign ofrecovery. But many oftheaspects Ivedescribedfunctioningbusinesses, internationalconnectedness, popu lationgrowth,corruption,thepresence ofnonstatearmed groups alongsidestate representatives, and

so onareaccounted for in Richard Nortonsconcept oftheferalcity,so thecitysvitalitymay have reflected not bettergovernanceorstabilitybut ratherjusta robustand well-establishedferalityaftertwo decadesof conflict. Still,thecityAnnaand I saw in mid-2012seemed to be veryunlikethebleak, violentwastelandportrayed in BlackHawkDown.

Black Hawk Down, ofcourse, is a work ofnarrativenonfiction. Assuch,thebook describesMogadishuthroughtheeyes oftheRangers,

SEALs, and DeltaoperatorsofTaskForce (TF) Rangeras theyflew intotheheartofthecity duringtheafternoonraid thattriggeredthebattle.IntheRangerseyes, Mogadishuwasindeedthe world capital ofthings-gone-completely-to-hell. It was as ifthecity had been ravaged by somefatalurban disease. The few paved avenues were crumblingand litteredwith mountains oftrash,debris, and the rustedhulks ofburned-outvehicles . . . everything ofvalue had been looted, rightdown to metalwindow frames, doorknobs, and hinges. At night,campfiresglowed fromthird- and fourth-storywindows oftheold Poly technicInstitute.Everyopen spacewasclotted withthedense makeshift villagesofthedisinherited,round stickhutscovered with layers of rags and shacksmade ofscavengedscraps of wood and patches ofrustedtin.From above theylookedlikeanadvanced stageof some festeringurban rot.63

The raid was intended as a quick, in -and-out snatchoperation,lastingan hour atmost. The missionwas to seize two seniorleaders of


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MohammedHassanFarahAididsSomaliNationalAlliance,includingelders of theHabrGidr,AididssegmentoftheinfluentialHawiyeclan.A

securityforce from the3rd Battalion,U.S.75thRangerRegiment wouldlead theairassault,fast-roping into urban intersections to createa four-corner cordon around thetargetbu ilding, while Deltaoperators andSEALs would land on itsroof and clearthebuildingdownward,floorbyfloor, to securetheircaptives.A ground convoy from thetaskforce baseattheMogadishuairport,on thecoastjustoutsidetown, would pick uptheassaultteam and thedetaineesand returnthem to thebase for ques-tioning ,underaircover from MH-60L Black HawksandAH-6J LittleBird attackhelicopters. The plan wasbased on a standard izedmissiontemplate thatthetaskforce planners had developed over dozensofraids,and it had workedbefore. But thisafternoon, in thedense urban mazearound theBakara market,thingsquickly unraveled.

From themomenttheRangers fast-roped into theocherdust cloud

theirhelicopters kickedup on thestreetsof Mogadishu, it was clear thattherewould be much more resistancethanon previousraids: thetargethouse was smack in themiddle ofthedistrictthatwas themainstrong-hold forAididsSomaliNationalAlliancemilitia, in one ofthedensest,busiest, and economicallymostimportant partsofthecity,theso-calledBlack Sea. Though theassaultforce successfullycleared thehouse andseized thecaptives, both theassaultersand theground convoy suffered

many killedand wounded duringtheextraction,and theywere forced tofighta seriesofrunninggun battlesthroughthenarrowstreetsofdown-town Mogadishuthatincluded severallarge ambushes and dozens ofsmallerones. By 4:30 p.m., two Black Hawks oftheU.S. Armys160thSpecialOperationsAviation Regiment(160th SOAR)had been shotdown in thecity.TF Rangerbecame pinneddown, unable to maneuverfixed, in militaryparlancebecause of itsneed to securethehelicoptercrashsites and to protect and extractits wounded.

Attackedfrom allsides by a self-organizingswarm ofSomaliNationalAlliancefightersand loca lcitizens,who seemed able to concentrateand disperseat will and to predictthetaskforce smoves fasterthantheAmericanscould react, TF Rangerwas quickly surrounded.As nightfell,thetroopswere trapped in a makeshift perimeter,bunkered in several

houses near one oftheBlack Hawkcrashsites, fighting fortheirlives.Justbefore dawn thenextmorning ,an ad hoc reliefcolumn ofPakistani,


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Malaysian,and U.S.troopsunder United Nationscommand, riding intanksand armoredpersonnel carriers,shot itsway in and rescuedthem,

but not before thestranded unit losteighteensoldiers killed,seventy-threewounded, and one pilot captured. TheUN reliefforce suffered twokilledand nine wounded.

Several ofthe Americandead were later dragged throughthestreetsand publicly mutilatedby themob. This was a stinginghumiliationfortheworldsmostpowerfulmilitary,theelite troopsof a superpowerthathadjustemergedvictoriousfrom theColdWarand theGulfWar,with expan-sive ambitionsforwhatPresidentGeorge H.W.Bush had calleda newworld orderdefined byAmericanprimacy.64Americanlosses were farlessthanthose oftheSomalis ,however: militia sourceslaterestimatedthatAididsmilitia lost315 fighters killedand 812 wounded in thebattle, whiletheInternationalCommitteeoftheRed Crosscalculated thatthebattlecostsomewhere between1,500and 3,000Somalicasualties,including

many civilians.65

Within weeks, PresidentClinton pulled Americanforcesout, theUnited Nationsdrewdown itsinvolvement,and Somaliasankback into a pattern of chaotic violencethatwould lasttwo moredecades.

To the Americans,thedense coastalcity ofMogadishuwas an active,livingparticipantin thebattle:It seemed likethewhole city was shootingatthem. . . Mogadishuwas massingand closing in on them. . . thecitywas shreddingthemblock by block . . . thewhole fuckingcity was trying

to kill them!66 These words resonatewith what I (to a very slightdegree,and others farmoreintensely)experiencedduringtheurban counter-insurgency in Iraq:a powerfuldread thatseemed to seep out oftheverybuildings,roads, and other structures oftheurban landscape itself.I remember one wargame back in theUnited States inMarch2008 whenLieutenantColonel Joe LEtoile,one ofthemostsuccessfulMarinebat-talioncommanders ofthewar, was givinga brief on theway his unit hadcrushedAl Qaeda in theZaidon area, westof Baghdad, theyearbefore.Hebegan talkingaboutwhat it felt like to patroltheIraqistreets, andI found myselfbreakingout in a cold sweatfrom thesuddeninrush ofmemories. I turned,embarrassed, to leave and compose myself, only tosee thatatleasthalfofthetwo hundredcombat-experiencedofficers inthebriefing room were sweatingthesame cold sweat; I quietly resumed

my seat.The writer DavidMorris captured thisfeeling in his descriptionofthecity ofRamadi:


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Even now when I try to recallwhatthecity lookslike,whatcomes to

me is nothingmorethana pocked stretchofboulevardsurrounded on

both sides by heaps of rubbled concrete, iron palings,trash.Swirls ofdust playing overtheblacktop. The smellof cordite. Everythingstill but

a grizzleddog patrollingthe ruins. It can be likethishighnoon, not

a soularound, no threatimminentbut you can feel thesheersinister

energy ofthe joint.As if even thestreetswantyou dead. Driving

throughdowntown Ramadi forthefirst timegave me an unshakable

vision ofmysteryand death.Juststaringattherubble set my heart

poundingwith theknowledge oftheliveslostperyard.67

In thecase ofMogadishu, theRangers had pokeda hornetsnest in theBlack Sea district:theyhad attackedthecity itself,only to be chewed upand spatout, stunnedand bloodied. In systemsterms,thisis pretty muchexactly whathappened on theday ofthebattle,which even today local

civiliansknowasmaalintiirangers,thedayoftheRangers,marking it asanunusuallyintenseepisodeeven for a city thathad alreadybecome habit-

uated to enormousbloodshed duringthecivil war and would see atleasttwo morepitched battles, in 2006 and 2011. TF Rangersactionsovertheweeksbeforethebattlehadmassivelydisruptedthecityasasystem:previousraids (inparticular,anattackonaMogadishuhouse byhelicopters that firedHellfiremissiles,killingfifty-fourpeople, includingmany noncombatants)

had generated intensehatred oftheRangers and even greaterhostilitytowardtheirhelicopters. This contributedto theferocity with which localfightersAididsmilitiaandarmedciviliansalikerespondedafterthe twoaircraft wentdown on October3. The Americanshad thrusta large force,withheavy weapons,manyvehicles, andmorethanadozenhelicopters, intothecore ofthecity. When theypushed hardinto a key pressurepoint in thepolitical,economic, and materialflow oftheurban organism, theyjabbedthesystemin a place thathurt, and thatsystempushed back even harder.

Severaldays after thebattle,as formerambassadorRobert Oakleynegotiated withHabrGidr elders forthe release ofMikeDurant (the

160thSOAR pilot capturedbyAididsfighters),he made a revealingcomment:

What will happen ifa few weeksgo by andMr.Durant is not released?Well decide thatwe have to rescuehim,and whetherwe have the right


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place or thewrong place, theresgoing to be a fight with your people.

The minutethegunsstartagain,all restrainton theU.S.side goes. Just

lookatthestuffcominginherenow.Anaircraft carrier,tanks,gunships. . .theworks.Once the fightingstarts,allthispent-upangeris going to

be released.This whole partofthecity will be destroyed,men women,

children,camels, cats,dogs, goats,donkeys, everything. . . That would

be tragicforallof us, but thatswhat will happen.68

AmbassadorOakleywas, in effect, warningtheclan elders that iftheydid not releasetheirprisoner, the Americanswould kill thecity.This ten-dency ofmilitaryforces to kill citiessomethingpoliticalgeographersca llurbicideis something to which well returnattheend ofthischapter.But first itsimportant to understandhow TF Rangersactionsintersected with themetabolism ofwhatclearly wasalready,by 1993, aferalcity.

To understandthis ,itsuseful to compare whatoccurred in Moga-dishu in 1993 with whathappened inMumbai in 2008. In both cases, anexternalactor conducted a raid on a preidentifiedtarget;in both cases theraid drewa strong responsefrom thetargetedcity. In Mumbai the LeTraiders moved dispersed in smallteams, outmaneuveringtheponderousIndian response,and usinglow-techweaponry, combined with high-techsituationalawareness tools and a remotecommand-and-controlnode, to

maintaintheinitiative, inflict severedamage, and achieve theirpoliticalgoal. In Mogadishu, on theother hand, it was theraiders whodespitetheir high-techweaponry and helicopterswere outmaneuvered,becamepinneddown in thecity by a swarm of smallgroups oflocalfighters, andlosttheinitiative.Lackingheavy armoredvehicles, which would haveallowedthem to move throughtheurban environmentwithout havingeitherto leave thearea or to shoot back and thusrisk killingcivilians,theywere forced to apply heavy ground and airbornefirepowerin orderto protect and extractthemselves.Once theylosttheir mobility aftertheaircraft were downed,theraiders were forced to hold a staticdefensiveposition and to sufferand inflict very significantcasualties. It was onlythearrivalofthearmored reliefcolumn, with itshardened and protectedmobility,thatallowed TF Rangerto be safely extractedfrom thetrap.

In whatwassupposed to be a humanitarianoperation to feed starvingSomalis,suchcarnage was politicallyunacceptable atthestrategiclevel,


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and thebattleultimatelyforced aU.S. withdrawalfrom Somalia.Whatwas it thatmade thedifference?

Ivealreadymentionedhow the LeTraiders atMumbai nested withintheurban metabolism ofthetwo megacitiesKarachiand Mumbaithatformed thelaunchingpad and targetfor theirraid. They slipped outofKarachiunder coveroftheharborsdense maritimetraffic,blendedinto theflow oflocalcargo and fishingfleets,thenslipped into Mumbaiby nesting within the illicit networks ofsmugg ling, tradeflow, andmovement ofpeople, exploitingthepresence ofinformalsettlementswith littlegovernmentpresence (in effect, feralsubdistricts)close to theurban core ofthegiantcoastalcity.Once ashore, theteamsdispersedand blended into theflow ofthecitysdensestarea as theymoved towarddiversionarytargets (taxis,therailwaystation,a caf, a hospital) thathadbeen carefullyselected precisely to disruptthecitysflow,draw offIndiancounterterrorismforces, and hamper an effective response,before theyhit

maintargetsthathad been chosen forsustainedlocaland internationalmedia effect.This type ofattack relieson understanding in greatdetailtheurban

metabolism and theassociatedmaterialand nonmaterialflows thatmakea city function.This is probably why the LeTraiders and theirsponsorsput so much effort and time into detailed reconnaissance,bu ildingapictureofthecitysphysicaland humanterrainand oftheurban metab-

olism of Mumbai and itssurroundingcoastalwaters. In effect, theraidershad infestedthecity and were ridingitsinternalsystems,much as, say, aparasite infestsand moves within theflow ofa hostsbloodstream.

In contrast,TF RangerinMogadishuhad very littletime (lessthansixweeks) to develop an understanding oftheway thecity workedwhatweve calledtheterritoriallogicor systems logic ofthecity. Like LeT,theraiders came from thesea, maneuveringovertheocean in theirhelicop-ters before coming in low from thenorth to strikethetargetbuilding .Unlike LeT,however, the Americansdidnt nest in thecitysnatural flow:theydeliberatelyignored it. The taskforce commander,MajorGeneralWilliam Garrison,knewthe risksofgoingintoAididsstronghold in theBlack Sea neighborhood. Most oftheUnited Nationsforces in Moga-dishu stud iouslyavoided thatarea, includingtheBakara marketthekey

economicterrain in thecity,central to theHabrGidrscontrol ofMoga-dishusurban flow.By assaultingstraight into thearea, in broad daylight,


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TF RangerwasdirectlychallengingAididspowerbase and courtingastrongcounterpunch .

As Garrisonhad warned in a memo toWashingtononly a few weeksbefore thebattle,Ifwe go into thevicinity oftheBakaraMarket,theresno questionwell win the firefight,but we mightlose thewar.69Apartfrom theobviouspoint thatthiswas not a warbut (in itsoriginal intent,atleast)a humanitarianassistanceoperation,Garrisonsmemo makesit clearthathe knewthe risksinvolved.These risksarose not only fromignoringthespatiallogic ofthecity (attackingtheplaces where an enemywas strongest) orthetemporal logic oftheenemy network (selectingaplace where Aididsmilitia could respondquickly by massingcombatpoweratshortnotice) but also from ignoringthecitysmetabolic flowin particular,thedaily qatcycle.

The leafy greenqatplantis chewed as a stimulantacrossSomalia andthebroaderHorn of Africaand southwestArabian region .Qat isvery

perishable and sours qu ickly,so over timea complex and informal buthighlyefficientsystemhas evolved to ensureitstimelydistribution .Theqatsysteminvolvesa network ofdistributorsand smalltraders in allmajortownsand cities and uses aircraft,boats,and trucks to link ports,airports,and distributionhubs with marketsand smallroadside stalls .This systemputsthedaysfresh crop on marketstallsacrosstheentireregionby mid- to late morning everyday, almost without fail.The plant

containsan alkaloidcompound calledcathinone,which has ephedrine-oramphetamine-likequalit ies.True aficionadosmost if not all ofwhom are mencrave Coca-Cola and othersweet drinksto accompanyit. (This, incidentally,is partlywhy one ofthefew manufacturing facil-ities to survive in Somaliathroughouttheferalchaos ofthelastdecadewas a Coca-Cola bottling plant, financed by clan contributions, whichopened in Mogadishu in 2004 .)70 By midafternoonthedaily qatchewis in full swing acrossthe regionstownsand cities, with thousands ofyoung, armed men engaged in argumentativeconversationand agitatedpoliticaldiscussionthatoftenleads to fightsand celebratory (or homi-cidal) gunfire.By early eveningthebuzz is over, theqatchewers havecrashed,and thecity goes quiet. But in themiddle oftheafternoonmostmilitary-agemales in town are stillviolentlyhigh,makingthis

perhaps not thebesttime to attacka nestof heavily armed qat-chewingmilitiamen.


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The aviators of160thSOARare known as NightStalkersbecause oftheirpreferencelikelightinfantry and specialoperationsforces the

world overforfightingatnight.Infraredand thermalimaginggivemodern forces ofthiskind a truenighttimeedge and (combined todaywith real-timeimageryfrom drones, satellites,and surveillanceaircraft)can allowrapid and effectivemaneuver under pitch-black conditions.Indeed,thedarkerthenight,thegreatertheadvantage in strikeopera-tionsofthesort in which TF Rangerspecialized.Again,a midafternoonattackis hardlyideal fora force thatsoptimized to fightatnight. ThatGeneralGarrisonchose to ignoretheseissues impliesconfidence ratherthancarelessness: as weve seen, he knewthe risksbut countedon hisforcesspeed ofmovementand superiorcombatpower,especiallyitshelicoptersupport, to overcome them.Hischoice of an afternoontimeframe was also almostcertainlydrivenby theperceived need to strikeahigh-valuetargetameeting ofAididstwo lieutenantsand theHabr

Gidr leaders, beingheld in thehouse thatwas attackedbefore it disap-peared. Indeed,thiswhole styleofoperationsis known in thespecialopsbusiness as time-sensitivetargeting ,orTST,because of theparamountneed for speed.

This highlightsanother key d ifferencebetweenMogad ishu andMumbai: theMumbai raiders were moreor less agnosticas to the indi-vidualidentity ofthosetheykilled.They focusedon causingmaximum

disruptionand shock to thecity itself,and as describedearlier,theykilledciviliansbecause of theirgroup identity (theirrole in thecitysemergencyservices,theirpresence ata key urban node, or theirnationality)ortheirmedia value, ratherthantargetingparticu larindividuals. In contrast, TFRanger wasgoing afterspecificindividuals,so theorganizingprincipleoftheoperationtime-sensitivetargetingand individualidentitywascompletely different.Forthe LeTraiders thecity itselfwasthetarget,while individualswere secondary;for TF Rangertheindividualswere thetarget,and thiscombined with confidence in their own airborne fire-powerand mobilitymayhave led them to discounttheeffect of theirraid on thecity as a system;when thatsystempushed back (and in par-ticularwhenAididsmilitia unexpectedly succeeded in disablingtheirairassets), theyquickly losttheinitiativeand got bogged down in an urban

fight in which thelocals had clear advantages. IftheMumbai raiders werelikea parasite thatinfestedthecity and made it convulse, TF Ranger


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acted instead likea belligerentdrunk in a bar brawl, poking someone intheeye and gettingpunched in return.

Itshard to confirm how many ofthefighterswho confronted TFRanger in thebattle ofMogadishuwere members ofAididsSomaliNationalAlliancemilitia and how many were simply localarmedcivilians:militia affiliations in Somaliawere,and are, loose and informal.In any case, theurban density and connectednessofMogadishuwere keyfactors in thelocals quick reaction againsttheraid. As we noted earlier,

thesedays cellphoneuse is widespread among Somalis,but even in 1993,in thepre-cellphonearea, theability to pass word rapidly in downtownMogadishu,usingradios, runners, and signal fires,was a key localcapa-bility.The battleoccurred in an area where theterrainand popu lationwere intimatelyfamiliarto thelocals, distanceswere short, it was easy tomove on foot, Aididscore group could quickly draw on loca lallies forreinforcements,and therewere multiple routesthroughthecity to and

from any givenpoint. The locals could thusreact flexibly to Americanmovestheycould aggregateordisperse,theirforce could shrinkorgrowin size in responseto thechangingthreat,and theycould put ambushes orroadblocks in place ahead of theground convoy.

OnceAididsmilitia succeededin downingtheBlackHawksusingspe-ciallymodifiedRPGs,the Americansbecame pinneddown, and theywereforced to concentratetheirfirepowerand airassets around thecrashsites.

When thishappened, insteadofexertinga generalsuppressiveeffect, TFRangerwas now focusing intensebut localizedcombatpower in a tightlylimited area, and this relievedthepressureon fighters in otherpartsofthecity,making it easier forthem to maneuverwith impunity and withoutdetection. Loca lcity dwellersinfuriated by theraids and humilia-tions ofthepastfew weeks, motivated to repel theviolentintrusion ofthe Americans,and hoppedup on qatand Cokequickly swarmed to theattackfrom alldirections. TF Rangerwasindeed in a fightagainstthewhole city.

Somali Swarm Tactics

On theother side of that fight,theSomalimilitia who facedoffagainst

Garrisonstroops in thestreets ofMogadishuhad no formalmilitarytraining, and many ofitsmembers were killed orexiled in theyears of


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aboutone visualdistanceapart(a varyingspace, constantlychangingsothateach vehicle keptitsneighborsjustbarely in view),and generally

avoiding roads. In open terraintheformationwould be extremelywidelyspread,and where visualranges were shorter it would tightenup. In anurban environmenttheSNA troopswould adopt a variation on thisapproach, movingwhenever possibleon severalparallelstreetsatonce,pickingup theirbearingsateach intersection in orderto stay roughlylevel with each other. In thisway, theyachieved theclassic tacticalgoalofmovingdispersedbut fightingconcentrated. Likewise,by expandingthesize of theirformationas faras theterrainand visibility would allowwhenevertheywere out ofactualcontactwith theenemy, theyincreasedthelikelihoodthatwhen theydid make contact,theflanksof theirfor-mationwould be wider thantheenemysposition. Likea rugby teamplaying a runninggame, theirentireapproachthetempo and flow oftheway theymovedand foughtwasdesigned around creating and

exploitinga seriesoftheseoverlaps.Because ofthe fluid nature ofthefighting in the lowerShebelleRivervalleyatthistime,mostcombatactionswere encounterbattlesengagementswhere one or both sides are moving or temporarily halted(ratherthandug-in in prepared defensive positions). When theSNAencountereda Shabaab group, theSNA vehicles thatwere first to meettheenemy would immediatelyhaltand lay down heavy suppressive fire.

The naturalmomentum oftheadvance would cause theothervehicles,not yet in contact with theenemy, to push forwarda shortdistance,perhaps twenty-fiveor fifty yards, before theyhad time to react and turnin towardthe firefight,putting themnaturally in a flanking position.Bythetimetheflankingvehicles did beginto react, therewould be no needforradio communication,formalorders, or coordinationeachvehiclewould simply angle in towardtheclosestgunfireand, maintainingtheextended line,sweep forward until it could see theenemy. This wouldnaturally(againwithout orders) place thesevehicles on theflanksor rearoftheenemy, resulting in a quick and automaticencirclement,ornear-encirclement,oftheShabaab position.

Once theycould see theenemy, thetroops in theback ofeach tech-nicalwould dismountand form another extended lineon foot about ten

yards in front oftheirgun truck .The vehicle and thesoldiers who haddismountedwould thensweep forwardtogether,thelightlyequipped


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fightersjoggingfastthroughthebush until theycame under fire andwere forced to takecover. Because of thetechnicalsheight, themuzzle of

itsweapon (oftena Soviet- or Chinese-made12.7 mm or 14.5mm heavymachinegun) could be as highas nineor ten feet above theground, and itcould thuscontinue firingsafely overtheheads of thedismounted fighters.The squad leaderwould coordinatemovementusingvoice commands. Hewould eitherfiretheheavy weapon himselforstandnext to thegunneron theflatbedofthetechnical,from where he could lean down and directthedriverthrougha window.Once thedismountedtroopswere engagedin a direct firefight,thegun trucksforwardadvance would stop,and itwould lay down fireon theenemy position, allowingother vehicles andtheirdismountedtroops to close in on it (againwithout orders, simplyguided by thesound oftheguns). These reinforcementswould pile onuntil theenemy was destroyedor forced to break contact.Now,thisis an obviouspoint, but you should understandthat Im

puttingthis into my words, not theirs,and thatthisis a neatened-up ,theoreticaldescription.Real fightsare alwaysmessy and chaotic, and realfighters rarely do exactly whattheyresupposed to do underfire.And yetany leaderofirregularcavalryorlightinfantry (or,indeed, any mountedconstabulary officer) ofthepastcenturywould recognize thesesimpletactics.Echoing thecommentofthespecialoperationsofficer onMumbai,any professionalsoldierin theworld would be proud to command troops

with thiskind oftacticalinitiative.Indeed, I found only one slightissueon which to faulttheSNA tactics:thefact thatthesquad leaderstayed inthevehicle while his troopsdismountedto assault.Westerntactics wouldcall fortheleaderto dismount with thetroops,carrying a radio to talkback to thevehicle and directits fire,and leavinga trustedsubordinate,asvehicle commander, to maneuverthegun truck .

But as soon as thisthoughtentered my head, I realized I was lookingattheSomalisquad in completely thewrong way: I wasmisapplyingthesocialand economicframework ofa professionalstate-runmilitaryto an organizationthathad evolved from an irregularmilitia . In theSomalienvironment offragmented,semianarch icclan organizationsin which thesetacticshad emerged,theway someone became a squadleader in thefirst place was to own thetechnical(an extremelysubstantial

piece ofcapitalequipment).The squad leader became thesquad leaderprecisely because it was his vehicle, so it would have been theheight of


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stupidityfor him to dismountand therebycede control ofthegun truckto someone elselet aloneto leave someone behindhim with a machine

gun. Hemightnot have remainedthesquad leader forlong!Moreover,dismountedfighters arecheap and replaceable,butthevehicle is apreciousinvestmentthatis decidedly not expendable. Seen from thisperspective,theSNAsmountedswarmtacticshave (likeany tacticalsystem) an eco-nomic,political,and sociallogic,as well as a militarygrammar.

It actuallytakesmuch longer to read thesewords than to executeaswarmingmaneuverofthiskind. Because each vehicle and its fightersis a semiautonomous unit thatneeds no formalorders, because themomentumoftheadvance putseach vehicle in roughly the rightpositionatany givenmoment, and because theoverhead geometry of supportingfirefrom thevehicle avoids theneed for complicated firecontrol orders, aswarm fightcan be incrediblyfastand smooth.

Each dismountedfighterand each vehicle commander need only

remember five basic rules. These rules define how thegroup fightsateveryscale (theindividual,thedismountedsquad, thevehicle, and thegroupof vehicles) and theynever change, regardlessoftheterrain,thetacticalsituation,orthesize of theengagement. They are: Maintainan extendedlineabreast,Keepyour neighborsjust in sight, but no closer,Move tothesound oftheguns,Dismount when you see theenemy,and Whenyou come underfire,stopand fireback.

This explainsthespeedand flexibility with which thefighters wereable to react to TF Rangersforay into theBlack Sea: theswarm tacticsIwas observing in 2012were directlydescended from thoseusedbyAididsmilitia in 1993. In systemsterms,thiskind ofautonomous, rule-basedmaneuver is theessence ofa self-synchronizingswarm: likeindividualbirds in a flock,each vehicle and itstroopsfollow a few simple rules tomaintainformationand react to theenemy, and liketheoverallflock,theirformationconstantlyshiftsand changes size and shape (withoutorders) in responseto changes in theterrainand thetacticalsituation.Thesame rules thatbring reinforcements to swellthesize of theswarm whenit hitsa majorobstaclealso cause it to dispersewhen thereis no imminentthreat. In fact, thesize, shape, and disposition ofthetacticalswarm arecompletely emergentpropertiesofthe rule-basedswarm maneuversystem

itself,somethingthathappenswithout consciousdirection orformalcontrol from a centralcommander.


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uncomfortablepossibilitythateven ifTF Ranger had succeededin killingGeneralAidid,theloss ofitscommander would have had a neglig ible

effect on his organizationsabilityto function.The Somaliapproach is also a very differentsolution to thesame

problem thatled Lashkar-e-Taiba to adopt its remote-nodecommandmodel fortheMumbai attack:where LeTmade itscommand node invul-nerable by putting it in anothercountryand relyingon Internetand sat-elliteconnectivityto connect theoperationsroom to theassaultteams ontheground, theSomalimilitia made theircommand node invulnerablebynot havingone atall.When I askedtheSNA soldiers how theirtactics dif-fered from thoseof Shabaab and thevariouslocalmilitias,theylaughed.They are us,theysaid with a shrug, pointingout thatmany ofthemlikemany Shabaab fightershad previouslyserved with militiasofonekind oranother beforejoiningtheSNA.

Long-TermFlows

As wellas theseswarm tactics(which well return to in Chapter5), wevealreadynoted theway thattemporalrhythm and spatiallogic affectedtheMogadishubattleovertheterm ofthecitysdaily flow cycle. But thereis alower-frequencycycle also, a longer-termmetabolic flow thatshapes theurban environment in a place suchas Mogadishu. This is thepattern of

popu lationmovement,urbanization,and littoralization, occurring overdecades, and it wasthispattern thatgave thecity itsstructure,both in1993 and today. Thisisobvious ifwe notethatin common with otherorganismsthehistoryof an urban organism is physicallyrecorded in itsstructure,justas scar tissue,a lostdigit, a callus,ora growthin a biologicalorganism is a permanentstructuralmanifestationofthatorganismspast.Mogadishutoday, likeany other city ororganism, embodies a physicalrecordofitshistory.

The Somali writerNuruddin Farah, writing in 1998 ,bril liantlycaptured thelong-term flows thathave shaped Mogadishu. IfMogadishuoccupies an ambiguousspace in ourmindsand hearts,Farah wrote, it isbecause ours is a land with an overwhelmingmajorityofpastoralists, whoare possessed of a deep urbophobia. Maybethisis why mostSomalis do

not seem unduly perturbedby thefateofthecapital:a city broken intosegments,each of them ruthlesslycontrolledby an allianceof militias.73


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and theformer peasantsor rural dwellers arrivingas migrantsfrom thecountryside.Batatuidentifiesthisas a cyclicalflow,aphenomenon that

repeatsitself:rural people, drivenby economicdistressor lack ofsecurity,move into themaincities, settle in theoutlyingdistricts,enterbeforelong into relations orforge common links with elements ofthe urbanpoor, who are themselvesoftenearliermigrantsfrom thecountryside, andtogethertheychallengetheold establishedclasses.75

Batatusnotion echoes an old and very influentialidea thatcame outofthecoastalcities ofNorth Africa in thefourteenthcenturyatheoryofthecirculationof elites put forwardby thegreatTunisian scholarIbnKhaldun.As MaliseRuthvenpointsout, Khaldunstheory,sometimesca lledKhalduniancirculation, is based on the idea thatleadershipexiststhroughsuperiority,and superiorityonly throughasabiyyasocialcohesion orgroup feeling. In desertconditions,thesocialsolidarity ofthetribeis vital to itssurvival. Ifand when thetribesdecide to unite,

theircohesion putsthecity-folk attheirmercy. Inspiredby religion,theyconquerthetowns,which are incapable ofdefendingthemselves,and become therulers until suchtimeas, corrupted by luxury and theloss of theirgroup cohesion, theyare in turn replaced by a new nomadicdynasty.76

This same cyclic flow seems to have been present inMogadishusevo-lution .Indeed,Farahsand Batatusanalyses turn on itshead one common

interpretation ofSomalihistory :namely, theidea thattheintergroupcompetition,corruption, winner-take-allabuse ofdefeated opponents,and clan-basedviolencethatMogadishuexperiencedafterthefall oftheBarre regime in 1991 was primarily a symptomofstatecollapse. Thepopular notion is thatthischaos emergedafterBarresrule fell apartunderthepressureof war, drought, and economiccollapse. On the con-trary, in Farahstelling, it wasthepattern offragmentedurbanization(producingmarginalizedgarrison communities with patron-client con-nections to politica lleaders) and rapid popu lationgrowth (with theresultantlack of resilience and carryingcapacity in thecitysmetabolism)thatproduced theviolenceand instabilitythateventuallydestroyedthestate. In thisversion ofevents,Mogadishu didnt become a feralcitybecause thestatecollapsed; rather,thestatecollapsed because thecity

was already feral. Mogadishusvery structurecreateda politicaland socialspace forthecitysown destructionatthehands ofacastofborderline


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supportershad takenover theKingstonPublic Hospital,violencehadspilled into halfa dozen districtsacrossthecity,and roads and airports

were closed, cutting Kingston off from theoutsideworld. Schools andbusinesses were shutteredand would stayclosed forweeks.Kingstonshospitals were treatingdozens ofinjuredciv il ians,many of whomwould later die from gunshot wounds. The Jamaicangovernmentwasmortaring, bulldozing, and assaultingitsown capital,and thecity waspush ingback.

According to theU.S. embassycable, Kingstonhad become a warzone in thecourse ofenforcinga United Statesextradit ion requestagainsta single internationaldrug trafficker.Cokesnetwork operatedin NewYork,Toronto, London, and fartherafield. Parnellhad sentcopies of his cable to the CIA and DEA because United Statesagencieswere intimatelyinvolved in thisoperation:as Parnellsteam was com-posing themessage, a Department ofHomelandSecuritysurveillance

aircraftwasflyingoverTivoli Gardens, recordinglivevideo oftheattack.79 JDFmajorWayneRobinsonsmastersthesis,completed in2008 attheUnited StatesMarineCorps Command and StaffCollegeat Quantico,Virginia ,exploredtheapplication of Americancounter-insurgency tacticsfromAfghan is tan to counterJamaicanorgan izedcrime : it became a key source fortheJDFoperation,which plannersconceptualizedas urban counterinsurgency.80 DEA advisers, U.S. and

CanadianSpecialOperationsForces,and U.S.surveillancedrones hadallhelped prepare Jamaicanforcesfortheoperationor were supportingit in realtime.81

This assistance came with strong in ternationa l pressure on aJamaicangovernmentthatwasextremely reluctant to comply with theAmericanextradit ionrequest. PrimeMinisterGoldinghad alreadydelayed action formorethanninemonths,claimingthattheevidenceagainstCokehad been obtainedil legallythroughunauthorizedU.S.surveillance ofCoke selectronic communications.Golding, leaderofthecenter-rightJamaicanLaborParty ( JLP), represented TivoliGardens in parliamentand allegedlymaintaineda long-standing andclose relationsh ip with Cokeand, before him, with his fatherandbrother.The ShowerPosse keptthepeace, regulated criminalactivity,

and mobilized thedistricts residents to supporttheJLP in elections,makingthisa supersafeJLPconstituency. In turn, JLPpoliticianssuch


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as Goldingensuredthatthedistrictreceived lucrativegovernmentcontractsand public services.

In theevent, ChristopherCokeescaped arrestduringtheinvasion ofhis district,known as OperationGardenParish, but themilitaryoccu-pationof Tivoli Gardens,undera nationalstateofemergency,wenton forweeks. It left partsofthecity in ruins,disruptedKingstonsport, railway,and airport(all located close to Tivoli Gardensand allespeciallytheportinfluencedby Cokesnetwork), led to morethanfivehundredarrests,displacedthousands oflocalinhabitants,killedatleastseventy-threeciviliansand six policeand militarypersonnel, and injuredmanymore.82 The upheavalcostGoldinghis position and contributed to theJLPslandslide December2011election defeatatthehands ofitsarchrival,

theleft-wingPeoplesNationalParty(PNP). ChristopherCokewas even-tuallycaptured a month afterthestartofOperationGardenParish. Policefound him hiding in thetrunk ofa car while attempting to fleethearea,

which had been cordoned off and subjected to weeks ofstrictcurfews,searches, and policeand militarysaturationpatrols.Cokewas extraditedunder heavy guard, tried in NewYork on weaponsand drugscharges,found guilty,and on June 8, 2012,sentenced in federalcourt to twenty-threeyears injail.83

But to frame thisseriesofeventssolely as a law enforcementaction toarrest an internationaldrug traffickeris entirely to misunderstandwhat

happened in Tivoli Gardensthroughoutthesummerof2010. Likewise,to characterize theShowerPosse solely as theU.S.embassy cable didasan internationalcriminalsyndicateis to describeonly a smallpart ofthegroupsrole. The ShowerPosse was (and is) both localand transna-tional,a nonstatearmed group thatnestswithin a marginalizedand poorbut tightly knit localcommunity in Kingston,yet is connected both totheJamaicangovernmentand to a farbroaderinternationalnetwork.Itwas and is as much a communitarianmilitia,socialwelfareorganization,grassrootspoliticalmobilizationtool,dispute resolutionand mediationmechanism, and localinformaljusticeenforcementsystemas it is anextortionracket ora transnationaldrug traffickingorganization .Drugtraffickingdoesntdefine whatan organizationlikeCokesgroup is; itsjustone ofthethingsthegroup does. To graspthisdeeperbackground,

we first have to understandtheorigins of Tivoli Gardensand theothergarrison districtsofKingston .

Documents

Excerpt: "Out of the Mountains" by David Kilcullen