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Modern History Home> Modern History> Core Study> World War I and its Aftermath 1914 - 1919: A Source-based Study> World War I: an overview 1918-1919

World War I and its aftermath

Image courtesy of David Clifton

This tutorial:

1918-1919

Geoff Lewis Kelso High School

Describes the role of key features, issues, individuals, groups and events of selected twentieth-century studies (H 1.1)

. Analyses and evaluates sources for their usefulness and reliability (H3.3)

. Explains and evaluates differing perspectives and interpretations of the past (H3.4) , Locates, selects and organises relevant information from different types of sources (H3.2)

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From this tutorial you will learn about key features of World War I and its aftermath 1914-1919:

• events leading to Armistice, 1918 • the roles and different ideas of Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson in creating the Treaty of Versailles • concepts

" imperialism militarism

() nationalism and internationalism ·, peacemaking

• significant historiographical issues u the variety of primary and secondary sources available for the study of the period 1918-19 () the usefulness and reliability of the sources for investigating the study c recognition of the different perspectives and interpretations offered by the sources

• events "1918

• Wilson's Fourteen Points • the Spring Offensive • the Armistice

1919 • the Paris Peace Conference • the Treaty of Versailles • the establishment of the League of Nations

Contents

• The Armistice, 11 November 1918 • The Fourteen Points • The Armistice • The Versailles Peace Treaty, January-June 1919 • Who's who at Versailles: The Big Four • The negotiations • Historiographical study: historians' opinions on the Treaty of Versailles • Notes

The Armistice, 11 November 1918

In a speech delivered in January I 9 I 8 US President Woodrow Wilson suggested a foundation for peace negotiations that would follow the end of the war in which the world was engaged. Initially the German government rejected the plan the so-called Fourteen Points. By October the war situation had deteriorated for the Germans to such an extent that the Reich called for an armistice to end the war, based on Wilson's Fourteen Points. However, the attitudes of the British and French towards the Germans had shifted and hardened. Wilson, somewhat idealistically, believed that the Fourteen Points would soften the post-war peace conferences and that the Germans would be treated with consideration and respect by the Allies. Events would prove that he would be seriously disillusioned and disappointed.

There are underlying principles to the Fourteen Points . These are relatively little known or are misquoted, but they are impo1tant and clearly reveal Wilson's idealism:

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which had touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world made secure once and for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore is nothing particular to ourselves. It is that the world be made safe to live in; and that particularly it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and self-aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we clearly see that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us ....

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The Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918

The program of the world's peace ... and this is the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at: diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the

seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions

among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. IV. Adequate barriers given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with

domestic safety. V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon strict observance of

the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for independent determination of her own political development and national policy ....

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations ...

VIII. All French territory shall be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted ...

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality. X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary ... should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured absolute sovereignty ... XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably

Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

( Congressional Record, Vol. 56, Part 1, 1918)

Questions

1. Word meanings: what do the following words mean within the context of the document? covenants guarantees colonial equitable independent determination evacuated restored sovereignty autonomous

2. What links can you discover between Wilson's statement of principles and the Fourteen Points? 3. What A1ticles in the Fourteen Points can you trace back to the causes of the Great War? 4. What Articles would have directly affected Germany?

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The Armistice

armistice: a cessation of hostilities - Oxford Dictionary

Even with the Fourteen Points widely known, an armistice with Germany was difficult to put in place, despite the failure of the spring offensives. For the British and the French there had been consultation, and they concluded that some of the Points were unclear or confusing. Wilson's adviser, Colonel House, opened negotiations with the Allies, and it was agreed that the Fourteen Points were a basis for the end of the war. British Prime Minister Lloyd George had difficulties with Article II, interpreting it to mean 'complete freedom' of the seas, as well he might, given the power of the Royal Navy. More significantly, Lloyd George and especially French Premier Clemenceau interpreted the A1ticles relating to the restoration of those territories that Germany had invaded to mean that, sometime in the future, Germany would have to pay compensation for damage to Allied countries and property.

By 7 November the Allies had prepared the document for presentation to the Germans. Matthias Erzberger, the German Secretary of State, arrived at Foch's headquarters at Rethondes in the Compiegne Forest to sign the Armistice. He was accompanied by Count von Oberndorff, Major-General von Winterfeldt and Captain Vanselow of the Imperial Navy. For the Allies, Foch and Admiral Sir Rosslyn Weymyss, the British First Sea Lord, were the signatories.

Foch, taking the upper hand, told the Germans that the document was a fait accompli: 'Do you ask for an armistice?' he demanded. General Weygand, Foch's Chief of Staff, then read the conditions, giving the Germans seventy-two hours to accept or reject them. Erzberger played the Bolshevik card and, in asking for an immediate cessation of hostilities, said that his nation was on the verge of being overtaken by Bolsheviks, stirred on from Russia. This fear of Bolshevism was to become a theme in German history for the next three decades. He also asked that the Royal Navy immediately lift its blockade a key factor in Germany's inability to wage economic warfare. Foch bluntly denied both requests.

At 4.05 am on 11 November the Germans finally signed the Armistice document. Erzeberger commented, 'A nation of seventy millions suffers but does not die?' Foch's enigmatic response was, 'Tres bon!'

At 11.00 am buglers sounded a general cease-fire across the Western Front. Soldiers who were there said they knew it was coming as there was only sporadic rifle fire that morning from a few fanatics on both sides. They commented that, after eleven o'clock, the silence was memorable. There were no celebrations, just a quiet contemplation of four years of horror and the deaths of so many.

The main terms of the Armistice were:

I. Germany was to evacuate immediately all occupied territory and German troops were to withdraw behind a line of the frontiers of August 1914. Germany was to hand back Alsace Lorraine to France. Allied soldiers could enter these territories without hindrance.

2. The west bank of the Rhine River was to be evacuated and a neutral zone was to be established on the east bank. 3. Vast quantities of war material were to be surrendered to the Allies. 4. All Allied prisoners were to be repatriated, without immediate Allied reciprocity with regard to German

prisoners. 5. All German submarines were to be surrendered; but the Allied blockade would continue. 6. Treaties which Germany had signed during the war, such as Brest-Litovsk, were declared null and void. 7. The Germans were to pay 'reparations for damage done'. This was to include all valuables seized from the

invaded territories.

Questions

1. Which of these points can be related back to the Fourteen Points and to President Wilson's principles? 2. To which of these conditions could the Germans object? Give reasons.

Twenty days later Allied occupation forces entered Germany . In the meantime the Reichswehr had to extricate itself from the 'embarrassment' of losing the war and shift the blame for the defeat towards others. By the end of November the 'stab-in-the-back' myth was gaining wide currency. A.J.P. Taylor has described this as 'a sinister tale that betrayal and double-dealing at home had undermined Germany from within.' ill

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There is no avoiding the fact that Germany had surrendered and had lost the war. Social unrest, political revolt and economic collapse indicated that, in all probability, the Wehrmacht could not have continued past spring 1919. Fuel, food and ammunition were running out. ( All Quiet on the Western Front contains a graphic description of the collapse of the German Army on the Western Front.) The spring offensives of 1918 were the last throw of the German dice. The High Command knew it, and the ordinary soldiers knew it. ill

The Stab in the Back

Controversial German historian Fritz Fischer wrote of the stab in the back:

But even after the defeat of 1918, many Germans, and especially those who had played leading parts in political and economic life up to 1918, preserved. .. apolitical and historical image of themselves which was coloured by illusions. Because the German army on the western front had held to the last hour an unbroken defensive front outside the fi·ontiers of the Reich, and had marched home in order, these people failed to understand that Germany had been defeated. Thus the idea took root and spread that the cause of the collapse of Germany was not her own policy or exhaustion in the face of an enemy army made stronger than her own by active American intervention, but a 'stab in the back' behind the front. The accusation was [eventually] levelled ... against the Weimar democracy which had been forced to accept the 'dictated Treaty of Versailles' owing to 'treachery at home'. This view ... had been propagated by the German Army Council and the press ... since November, 1918. The Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, for example, wrote on October 20 - before the November revolution: 'Collapse behind the front not collapse of our heroic fi·ont, that is the shattering phenomenon of these last days . ... The home has not held out.'

And a week later the same paper described the actions of Prince Max's government as an 'organised betrayal of the Reich' and the day of its appointment as 'the Fatherland's blackest hour'.

This false interpretation of defeat was accompanied by another popular illusion: that Germany had been the victim of an organised assault and that her war had been exclusively one of justifiable self-defence . .@l

Questions

I. Explain in your own words the 'stab in the back'. 2. According to German historian Fritz Fischer, why did the Germans delude themselves into thinking that their

Army had not been defeated in 1918? 3. Who did they blame for the stab in the back? 4. Can you explain why the Germans viewed the war as an act of self-defence of the Reich? 5. How far does the stab in the back explain German reaction to the Treaty?

[Those of you who will study Germany as a Twentieth-Century National Study will need to become more thoroughly acquainted with the stab-in-the-back myth as it became important in the politics of the Weimar Republic and in the rise of Hitler and the Nazi Paity.]

Versailles Peace Treaty, January-June 1919

Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929) was born in a village in the Vendee in France of a middle-class family. He studied medicine but then turned his attention to politics and earned a reputation as a radical. He spent time in gaol following his involvement in an anti-government riot. Clemenceau entered politics through local government in Montmartre (in Paris) and later as a member of the Chamber of Deputies and as a senator.

His flamboyant and aggressive oratorical style earned him the nickname of'The Tiger'. In addition, his writings as a journalist gained him a reputation as a patriot and anti-German.

He became Minister for the Interior in 1906 and in the following year headed a radical coalition government. During the war Clemenceau emerged as a fierce critic of military ineptitude, especially following the Verdun debacle. In 1917

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he became Prime Minister of France. He showed strong leadership and commanded great respect as he held France together during the military crisis that the German spring offensives caused on the Western Front in 1918. He was regarded in France as 'the father of victory'.

At Versailles he presided over many of the sessions, especially the plenary sessions, but was far from happy at the Treaty, as he believed that Germany had not been weakened enough and could re-emerge as a threat to French security.

He resigned as Prime Minister in 1920 to return to critical journalism.

He had one illusion France; and one disillusion mankind, including Frenchmen and his colleagues not least. (J.M. Keynes on Clemenceau in 1919)

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Who's who at Versailles: The Big Four

David Lloyd George (1863-1945) was born in Manchester in England but lived most of his life in Wales, a country with which he was most closely identified. He entered the British Parliament in 1890 as a radical Liberal and represented his seat for an unbroken 54 years. A gifted orator, he entered Cabinet in 1905 as President of the Board of Trade and then Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1908 to 1915. He gained a reputation as a social reformer, and in 1911 he waged a successful battle against the House of Lords to curb its power over the annual budget.

Before the war he travelled extensively across Europe by car; something that was most unusual at the time. His travels gave him a deep knowledge of European affairs. In 1911 he warned Parliament of the possible dangers to peace posed by Germany.

In May 1915 Herbe,t Asquith formed his coalition government, and Lloyd George was appointed Minister of Munitions, but his dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war led him to plot against Asquith with the Conservatives. He became Prime Minister of a coalition government on 7 December 1916. He was the first British Prime Minister to concentrate so much power in his hands.

He was a vigorous war leader, but he constantly clashed with Haig and Admiral Jellicoe over the conduct of the war. His conflict with Haig was notable and probably only the latter's royal connections saved him from removal, especially after the Somme disaster.

At Versailles he somewhat moderated his views towards Germany, seeking to establish a stable Germany in Central Europe rather than extract a harsh treaty.

After the war his most notable achievement was the Government of Ireland Act (1920) which separated the Irish Free State from Northern Ireland. The Conservatives left the coalition in October 1922, and Lloyd George was forced to resign. From 1926 to 1931 he was leader of the Liberals, but he was never really trusted after the earlier removal of Asquith.

He died on 26 March 1945 at home and is buried in a glade beside the stream at Llanystumdwy in Wales.

I do not claim that the Treaty is perfect in all aspects. Where it is not perfect, I look forward to the organisation of the League of Nations to remedy, to repair and to redress. (Lloyd George in the House of Commons, 16 April 1919).

(Thomas) Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) was the twenty-eighth President ofthe United States. Wilson's early life and career as an academic explain much about his stance at Versailles. He was brought up in a strict Calvinist household from the Old South. After completing a doctorate in Congressional Government, Wilson accepted a number of academic posts, culminating in the presidency of the prestigious Princeton University.

In 1912 he was chosen as the Democratic Party's nomination for the presidency. Almost immediately his idealism, feeling for humanity and intellectual reserve won him the respect but not the affection of his people.

During the first part of the war he strictly observed a neutral policy towards Europe . Even the torpedoing of the

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Lusitania by a U-boat in May 1915 with the loss of 128 Americans only provoked an indignant response. In 1915 he again won the presidency on a platform of'too proud to fight'. However, the resumption by Germany of unrestricted submarine warfare and the infamous (but forged) Zimmerman telegram, 'revealing' German intrigue and espionage against the US, led Wilson to declare war against Germany on 6 April 1917.

On 8 April 1918 he delivered his famous speech which outlined the Fourteen Points. He personally led the American delegation to Versailles, hoping to achieve a 'fair settlement based on national self-determination'. He was instrumental in establishing the League ofNations as a mechanism to resolve any wrongs in the Treaty of Versailles and to solve international disputes. Unfortunately the American public had moved back towards US isolation in world affairs. Thus he found on his return that Congress was unwilling to accept the Treaty of Versailles and voted not to join the League. He campaigned vigorously for the US to endorse his internationalist views, but to no avail. His health gave way, and during his last eighteen months as President declined into bitterness and self-recrimination. He died on 3 February 1924.

The world must be safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon trusted foundations of political liberty. (Woodrow Wilson to Congress, 2 April 1917).

Vittorio Orlando (1860-1952) was the Prime Minister of Italy from 1917 to 1919. He was born in Sicily and was Professor of Law before entering the Italian Parliament. He held a series of administrative posts between 1903 and 1916. On 28 October 1917 King Victor Emmanuel III appointed him Prime Minister, following the disastrous Italian defeat at Caporetto, hoping to restore pride and confidence in his nation. He was successful, and Orlando represented Italy at Versailles.

He was regarded as one of the 'Big Four', but the 'Big Three' spoke more from positions of strength and international experience. Thus Orlando's claims for Italy were largely rejected. Wilson especially condemned Orlando's claims as an affront to national self-determination. As a result he returned to Rome in a politically weakened position. The strain began to tell, and he lost his former political calm and instinct. On 20 June 1919, a week before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, he was defeated in Parliament. He retired to obscurity to his native Sicily and died in 1952.

US Senator Charles Seymour described the 'Big Four':

Clemenceau . .. always the dauntless apostle of victory, presiding in his squat black cutaway and square boots and eternally gray-gloved hands, dry and cruel in his rapier-like wit ... Wilson, poised and reassured by the homage of the weaker nationalities, with the proper air of a popular professor; Lloyd George ... on the edge of his chair, enthusiastic and mercurial, incredibly ignorant of continental history, but intuitively shrewd in his judgment of political issues ... Orlando ... jovial, generous and ineffectual. (Charles Seymour, quoted in Ivo Lederer, ed. The Versailles Treaty: Was It Foredoomed to Failure? Heath, 1960, pp. I 09-10)

Questions

1. What factors acted upon the main decision-makers at Versailles? Were they personal or political? Explain your answer.

The negotiations

Given the harsh terms of the Armistice, especially the financial condition 'Reparations for damage done', the Germans had little hope that the Peace Treaty would be kind to them. The concept of reparations and damages had been imposed on France by Germany following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The French never really forgave the Germans for this and other humiliations. Thus French foreign policy in the later decades of the nineteenth century, up to the war, was underpinned by a desire for revanche (revenge) against the Germans. The German defeat of 1918 gave Clemenceau the opportunity to redress wrongs. The public demanded this of their Premier.

There was war damage:

• 300 000 houses were destroyed in German-occupied France; • 6000 factories were stripped of machinery;

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• 1000 miles of railway line and over 1000 bridges were destroyed as the Germans retreated in 1918; • tens of thousands oflivestock had been slaughtered for food for the German Army.

The battlefields of Belgium and France obviously suffered. The French had to remove 300 million metres of barbed wire and fill 50 million square metres of trenches. Much valuable agricultural land was rendered useless by unexploded shells and leaking gas cylinders.

The British were also out to claim reparations, especially for the losses caused to British shipping by U-boats and to families of men who had drowned.

Question

1. Argue the cases for and against reparations claims that were made at the end of the war.

Unfortunately the prospects for an equitable peace suffered an irrevocable blow with the British general elections (the so-called 'khaki election' of14 December 1918) which were held on the eve of the peace negotiations . The public were eager for revenge and for reparations. Most responsible politicians tried to soften public opinion, but to no avail. Sir Auckland Geddes, a candidate for a London constituency, proclaimed that 'we should squeeze the German lemon until the pips squeak!'

Lloyd George, getting carried away with the public mood, said that he would go to Versailles to make the Germans 'pay to the uttermost farthing and we will search their pockets for it!' Such rhetoric hid his true feelings. He believed that a weakened and humiliated Germany would open the door to Bolshevism. In secret he pressed his colleagues at Versailles to be lenient towards Germany and to send food to the millions starving in Germany at the time. However, the British public would not let him forget his public utterances. Nor would they let him forget the sacrifices that had been made between 1914 and 1918.

When he arrived in Paris, he found that Clemenceau reflected the popular views of the French and wanted the harshest possible treaty extracted from Germany. He demanded maximum reparations and that French security be assured. despite these obstacles, Lloyd George acted as a moderating influence at the conference. He addressed the House of Commons on 16 April 1919:

We want a stern peace, because the occasion demands it. But its severity must be designed, not to gratify vengeance, but to vindicate justice ... those who guide and direct public opinion [should not} soil this triumph of right by indulging in the angry passions of the moment, but to consecrate the sacrifice of millions to the permanent redemption of the human race fi·om the scourge and agony of war.

He may not ever have made a better speech!

If Lloyd George tried to moderate proceedings, then Woodrow Wilson was the idealist who tried for a settlement which would reflect that the Great War was indeed 'a war to end war'. However, his idealism was swept aside by his lack of international experience and his inability to come to terms with European realpolitik. In any case public opinion at home and Congress had moved on, and the Americans wanted to get out of Europe as soon as possible.

In the end it was the views of the French and British public opinion which largely carried the day. Clemenceau replied to the objections of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, head of the German delegation:

In the view of the Allied and Associate Powers the war which began on August 1st 1914 was the greatest crime against humanity and the fi·eedom of peoples that any nation, calling itself civilised, has ever consciously committed. For many years, the rulers of Germany, true to the Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance over Europe. They were not satisfied with that growing prosperity and influence to which Germany was entitled, and which all other nations were willing to accord her, in the society of free and equal peoples. They required that they should be able to dictate and tyrannise to a subservient Europe . .. Germany's responsibility, however, is not confined to having planned and started the war. She is not less responsible for the savage and inhuman manner in which it was conducted . ..

The terrible responsibility which lies at her doors can be seen in the fact that not less than seven million dead lie buried in Europe, while more than twenty million others carry upon them the evidence of wounds and sufferings, because Germany saw flt to gratify her lust for tyranny by resort to war. The Allied and Associated Powers believe that

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they will be false to those who have given their all to save the freedom of the world if they consent to treat this war on any other basis than as a crime against humanity and right . ..

Questions

I. What arguments does Clemenceau use to say that the Germans were responsible for the war? 2. What evidence is there to support Clemenceau's claims? 3. How useful is this source to an historian studying the evolution of the Treaty of Versailles? 4. To what extent does he appear to be reflecting public opinion in France at the time?

To many observers it became apparent that the Treaty was not going to be as vindictive as Wilson had feared. Still, there is strong evidence that the European victors were going to punish Germany harshly through the final document:

• A1ticle 80 forbade the unification of Germany and Austria; • A1ticle I 00 gave the German city of Danzig to Poland as a 'free city' in the Polish Corridor; • Article 118 took away Germany's colonies (including New Guinea, given to Australia); • The so-called 'military clauses' limited the German Army to I 00,000 men; it was forbidden to import arms or

introduce conscription; fortresses in the Rhineland were demolished, and this area was to be a 'demilitarised zone'; the German Navy was to be severely limited, including no U-boats, 15,000 men, six battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats; and there was to be no German Airforce.

There was an attempt to try the Kaiser 'for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties'. Despite British sentiment to 'hand the Kaiser', Lloyd George thought it would be a mistake, and Wilhelm II remained retired to his garden in Holland.

Although much of the following deals with events that continued into the nineteen twenties and beyond, student may find it of interest - especially those who study Option B: Conflict in Europe 1935 - 1945 as their International Study in Peace and Conflict.

The War Guilt Clause

Probably the most contentious clause in the Treaty was Article 241, the so-called 'War Guilt Clause'. This stated that:

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

The Germans had never denied that their armies had invaded Belgium Luxembourg and France. The question of compensation was strongly implied in this Article, even though they had denied aggression. It was felt, quite correctly as it turned out, that compensation could be paid to ALL nations on the Allied side whether they had been invaded or not. It was this A1ticle that most aggrieved the Germans in the inter-war period. As feelings and tensions settled in the 1920s, the question of'war guilt' hung over all diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany and other European states.

Reparations

Linked with this Article was a reparations bill originally set at 24,000,000,000 pounds, but not finalised in 1919. At the end of the war the German economy was in a catastrophic state. The Weimar Republic made an offer to repair or rebuild the damage inflicted in the war zones, but did not think it was reasonable to pay reparations to all Allied paiticipants.

To settle the amount and arrange payment, a Reparations Commission was established under the auspices of the League of Nations. The final figure was reached in 1921 at 6,600,000,000 pounds to be paid in cash or kind over a period of 42 years. The interest rate was set at 6% a year, also for 42 years. In addition the Germans had to give the Allies 40 million tonnes of coal a year (most went to France) and 26% of income derived from exports for the 42-year period.

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The folly and absurdity of the reparations question was recognised by the economist J.M. Keynes:

The policy of rendering Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions of human beings and depriving a nation of happiness should be abhorrent and detestable ... if ever it were possible, even if it enriched ourselves, even if it did not sow the decay of the whole civilised life of Europe.

The Germans made their payments in 1921 and 1922, but they defaulted in 1923. The amounts continued to be whittled away by a series of international conferences until at Lausanne in 1932 the reparations were brought to an end. Ironically Britain made its final war debt payment to the United States in the 1960s!

The New Europe

If the reparations, loss of armed forces and the acceptance of causing the war were not enough, the most lasting legacy was the new frontiers that the peace-makers created.

Questions

Study the maps and answer the following questions:

1. What territory did Germany lose? 2. Why do you think the nations of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and

Yugoslavia were created? 3. What evidence is there that French security was guaranteed by the territorial settlements? 4. Why would the Germans be particularly outraged by the creation of the Polish Corridor?

The Versailles Diktat

The Germans had no real choice but to accept what they called the diktat. In May they were allowed to make objections in writing and received a few minor changes. By mid-June they were given an ultimatum: sign the Treaty without fu1ther amendment, or war would be renewed. For a disarmed and dispirited nation there was no choice. The responsibility fell on Ebert, President of the Weimar Republic.

Ebert contacted the old warrior Hindenburg, who replied to his 'phone call, 'You know what the answer must be. I am going for a walk!' The question was debated in the Reichstag. General Groener, who had replaced Ludendorff, was asked about the military situation. He replied that 'the army could hold its own against the Poles in the East. It could not resist an Allied advance in the West!' Chancellor Frederick Schniedemann's reaction captured the German mood: 'This Treaty, in the opinion of the Government, cannot be accepted' [tumultuous applause].

The Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919 in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles. It was in the same hall in 1871 that Wilhelm I proclaimed the German Empire. As a final gesture ofhumiliation, the German delegation of Dr Johannes Bell of the Centre Party and Dr Hermann Muller of the Social Democrats were obliged to walk the full length of the hall to sign the Treaty before the assembled delegates and their guests.

Treaties were signed with Germany's allies: Neuilly with Bulgaria; St Germain with Austria; Trianon with Hungary; and Sevres with Turkey.

Historiographical study:

Historians' opinions on the Treaty of Versailles

The views of historians on Versailles have changed since 1919. Immediately after the war, western historians in the main held the belief that the Treaty was just and reflected the sacrifices that Allied men had made at the Front. With the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 views softened towards Germany, and there was support for the case that the Germans had been poorly deal with. Nazi aggression and World War II saw historiography return to the 1919 stance. In the 1960s with the Cold War at its peak the German historians Fritz Fischer and lmanuel Geiss shocked the world of

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historiography by claiming that Germany had caused World War I for 'certain economic, strategic and diplomatic reasons'. They implied that there is no argument that the Treaty of Versailles was not as harsh as it could have been.

The following brief collection of sources represents a sample from recent times. So far as the war per se is concerned, historians have more recently focused on individual battles, assessing their significance in the ebb and flow of the war. The tutorial on the Australians at Hamel is an example of this.

Read these views on the Treaty of Versailles and respond to the questions that follow.

Source A - A.J.P. Taylor, in The History of the First World War, 1963:

Though the Germans accepted the treaty in the formal sense of agreeing to sign it, none took the signature seriously. The treaty seemed to them to be wicked, unfair, dictation, a slave treaty. All Germans intended to repudiate it at some time in the future, if it did not fall to pieces of its own absurdity.

Source B - David Thomson, in Europe since Napoleon, 1966:

The men in Paris never had a free hand. Constricted not only by their wartime agreements with one another and by pledges at home, but also by the accumulated debris of war itself, they could do no more than try to produce some order from chaos, determine the details of frontiers and plan projects of compensation, and leave the achievement of greater precision and perfection to subsequent negotiation and good sense. They were not, as they have sometimes been depicted, men behaving like gods and re-shaping a new heaven on earth ... Perhaps the biggest mistake they made was to mention at all the ideals of absolute justice or perpetual peace; for these, surely, were a most impossible outcome of the conditions in which Europe found itself when the guns no longer thundered and the men came marching home.

Source C - Fritz Fischer, in The War Aims of Imperial Germany, 1976:

... The German Empire made a bid between 1914 and 1918 to secure a position in the world which she believed was hers by right. Moreover, this mentality did not disappear with the fall of the monarchy in 1918; it continued to survive and took even more grotesque forms during the frustrating years of the Weimar Republic when a constant aim of all German governments had been to effect a revision of the Versailles settlement. Only against his background is the emergence of the 'Bohemian corporal' with his pathological lust for revenge and aggrandisement understandable.

Source D - John Terrain, in The Mighty Continent, 1976:

[The War Guilt Clause]: a stigma on an entire nation. This was a moral judgment which an entire nation felt entitled to resent. Schneidemann resigned, exclaiming: 'May the hand wither that signs this Treaty'. But there was nothing for it: Germany was powerless; sign she must.

Source E - G. Schultz, in Revolutions and Peace Treaties 1917-1920, 1970:

The war had ended with the collapse of the strongest military powers in Europe; they could therefore not make any significant contribution to the discussion on the shape of the future peace. For the moment the Allies were therefore objectively free to decide their policies without limiting factors ... The peacemakers failed to establish a permanent order ... If one examines the work of the Paris conference one finds errors and mistakes in rich measure and can criticise to one's heart's content ... The historian only does justice to his legitimate task ifhe detaches himself from contemporary judgments with their over dependence on first impressions. There is a wide gap between the real significance of the peace treaties and the subjective verdict passed on them. Yet both were undoubtedly of great importance.

Source F - John Sherer in World War I, 1980:

Of the former Empires shaken by the War, only the German Empire survived .. .its sovereignty was secure ... alone of all the defeated nations it preserved its territorial unity. The treaty restrictions were irksome, but made no serious inroads on national sovereignty, and, if anything, it provided a powerful stimulus to German nationalism. The Treaty of Versailles may have created Hitler, and it also preserved as a state the country in which he was to make his mark ... If

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the First World War was fought to prevent Germany from creating hegemony in Europe, it failed. Germany was weakened, but not so weakened that it could not rise within a generation to threaten the balance of world power once again. The Empires of Old Europe had been swept away. The provisions of the victorious peace-makers failed to fill the vacuum millions died in vain.

Source G - Douglas Newton, in Germany 1914-1945, 1990:

Whether Germany was treated justly or unjustly by the victors at the Peace Conference is not a question of fact but of moral judgment. Some argue that, if the Versailles Treaty was harsh, so too would have been any framed by a victorious Germany, as in the case ofBrest-Litovsk. Others argue that any peace which fell short of the ideals of reconciliation was unjust because of the high ideals for which Allied statesmen had claimed to be fighting ... What is beyond question is that the process of peacemaking or rather the absence of any genuine peace negotiations ... made all of Germany believe that the [Weimar] Republic had been treated shabbily.

Questions

1. Summarise the main argument(s) of each historian. 2. Quote evidence that suggests that:

,i the Treaty was harsh towards Germany; u the Treaty was fair to Germany.

3. Which historians claim that the Treaty caused problems for the future? What were some of these problems? 4. To what extend does the Treaty of Versailles reflect that the Great War was NOT the war to end war? 5. Prioritise each source in terms of usefulness and reliability to an historian studying the aftermath of the Great

War.

Notes

1!l A.J.P. Taylor, in J. Sherer, World War I, 1980.

ill For a full description of the conditions on the Western Front and the decline of the German Army see Robert B. Asprey's The German High Command at War, W. Morrow, 1993.

ill Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, W.W. Norton, 1967, p. 637.

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