Evolution of US Army Doctrine

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THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE:FROM ACTIVE DEFENSE TO AIRLAND BATTLE AND BEYOND

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

JEFFREY W. LONG, MAJ USAB.S., United States Military Academy,West Point, New York, 978Diplome, Institut d Etudes Politiques.Paris, France, 986M.P.A., John F Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 987

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas99

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: Major Jeffrey W LongTitle of thesis: The Evolution of U.S. Army Doctrine:From Active Defense to AirLand Battle and

BeyondApproved by:

Thesis Committee ChairmanCOL Thomas L. Coleman, Jr .S

, MemberSpiller, Ph.D.

Member

Accepted this 7th Day of June 1991 by:d A Director, Graduate DegreePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent theviews of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College orany other governmental agency. References to this studyshould include the foregoing statement.)


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BSTR CT

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE: FROM ACTIVE DEFENSE TOAIRLAND BATTLE AND BEYOND by M J Jeffrey W Long, USA,3 2 6 pages.This study explains the recent evolution of U.S. Armydoctrine. During the last two decades, the Army revised itscapstone manual FM 1 0 0 - 5 Operations three times: in1 9 7 6 1 9 8 2 and 1 9 8 6 . A fourth revision is underway in1 9 9 1 . This thesis chronicles the change in doctrine byanalyzing the differences between the four versions of FM1 0 0 - 5 . It then employs five external factors (the change intechnology, strategy, threat, domestic political context,and resource base) and four internal factors (the Army sorganizational interests, the process of doctrinedevelopment, the bureaucratic politics within the Army, andthe cognitive psychology of the Army s leaders) to explainthe recent change in doctrine.The thesis concludes that in 1 9 7 6 constraining externalfactors forced the Army to adopt a doctrine that was at oddswith its internal needs. The early Reagan years, incontrast, permitted a return to a doctrine that betterserved the Army s interests. Though environmental changescall that doctrine into question in the nineties, the Armyresists significant changes to a doctrine that satisfies itsinternal needs. The U.S. Army s current doctrine addressesorganizational preferences better than operationalrequirements.

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TABLE O CONTENTS

APPROVALPAGE iABSTRACT iiiLIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES vChapter

1. INTRODUCTION 1ResearchLiterature ReviewMethodology

2. THE CHANGE IN DOCTRINE 25Active DefenseAirLand Battle1986 Edition of FM 100 5AirLand Battle Future

3. EXTERNAL CAUSES OF DOCTRINAL CHANGE 122TechnologyStrategyThreatFailure in WarResources

4. INTERNAL CAUSES OF DOCTRINAL CHANGE 205Organizational InterestsOrganizational ProcessBureaucratic PoliticsCognitive Psychology

5 CONCLUSION 306BIBLIOGRAPHY 314INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 326


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LIST OF TABLESTable Page2 1. Revolutionary Changes in Doctrine 120

LIST OF FIGURESFigure Page2 1. Swings in Doctrine 121


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C H A F mINTRODUCTION

The past fifteen years have been an uncommon era ofcontinuing doctrinal innovation for the United States Army.This thesis identifies the factors that best explain thisdoctrinal renaissance so that we may better assess andemploy current doctrine better predict the future course ofdoctrine and perhaps better develop doctrine in the future.

n U n c o m ~ n o v a t i wThe doctrinal innovation of the U.S. Army since the

mid-seventies is unprecedented. First the frequency of the

doctrinal revisions and the magnitude of the consequencesfor the Army surpass those of any other period in thehistory of the U.S. Army. Second the futurism thatinspires the innovation is unique; rarely has a futureconcept figured so prominently in military doctrine.Finally the recent spate of doctrinal innovation isremarkable because it is anomalous. Factors thattraditionally explain innovation in military doctrines failto explain the extraordinary innovation of the last twodecades.


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During the last twenty years, the Army revised itsfundamental doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5,- three times in 1976, 1982, and 1986. Afourth revision, in progress, is scheduled for publicationthis summer.

M 100-5 is the cornerstone of U.S. Army doctrine.Even modest revisions to FM 100-5 propagate shock wavesthroughout the Army. Any change to M 100-5 can provoke therevision of dozens of more specific, derivative fieldmanuals. M 100-5 describes how the Army intends to fight,which determines, in turn, the Army's organization andequipment. Changes to the concepts described in FM 100-5can spark substantive change in the Army's organization andequipment.

While the 1986 revision might be considered modest,the revisions in 1976 and 1982 were significant. The 1976edition focused on.weapon systems and emphasized attritionwarfare more than any previous American doctrine. Itunderlined the merits' of an elastic defense that tradedspace for time. Though the manual was much broader inscope, soldiers labeled it Active Defense. The Armyequipped itself for the Active Defense. The new doctrinejustified the M1 Abrams tank, the M2 and M3 Bradley fightingvehicles, the AH-64 Apache helicopter, and the MultipleLaunch Rocket System (MLRS). The Army undertook a thorough


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reevaluation of its organization that culminated in theDivision 86 reorganization. The Active Defense doctrineprompted a new generation of equipment and neworganization, but the Army in the field never reallyaccepted it.

The 1982 edition of 100-5 took a 180 degree turn.This revision emphasized maneuver rather than attritionrates. The integration of air and land combat was soprominent that its authors labeled it AirLand Battle.AirLand Battle capitalized upon the new weapon systems thatthe Army had ordered for Active Defense and demanded more.Its emphasis on command and control and deep attackjustified a new radio (Single-Channel Ground/Airborne RadioSystem or SINCGARS), Mobile Subscriber Equipment, theManeuver Control System (MCS), the Army Tactical MissileSystem (ATACMS), and the Joint Surveillance and TargetAttack Radar System (JSTARS). AirLand Battle shaped thefinal revisions of Division 86 and framed the Army ofExcellence reorganiztion. Whereas Active Defense neverenjoyed the support of the field, the greatest significanceof AirLand Battle may be its widespread acceptance by the

. . ..

Army. Analysts credit AirLand Battle with restoring theArmy's aggressive, warrior spirit.1

lSee for example C. Kenneth Allard, Command. Control,and the Common Defense (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1990 .


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The 1991 edition, which will codify the results of aseries of studies collectively known as AirLand BattleFuture, promises to be significant as well. The new editionwill project a need for an Army capable of nonlinear combatand require new equipment and a new organization.2 To winon a nonlinear battlefield, the Army will need improveddeployability, long range surveillance, ground forceoperational range, lethality, and endurance, command andcontrol, and logistics. GEN John W Foss, Commander of theTraining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) which writesdoctrine, believes AirLand Battle Future will require areorganization of the Army's division.3 The shopping listof new equipment is shaping up: the Army Tactical Commandand Control System, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Armoredsystems modernization, Light helicopter and Longbow radar,and the Armored gun system.4 The 1991 edition of FM 100-5may rival all previous editions in significance.

The frequency and scope of change in U.S. Armydoctrine since the mid-seventies belies the stereotype of

2For a concise description of the emerging doctrine seeMG Stephen Silvasy, Jr., AirLand Battle Future: TheTactical Battlefield, U t a r v e vie LXXI.2 (February1991) and GEN John W Foss, AirLand Battle-Future, xmy41.2 (February 1991).

4Eric C. Ludvigsen, Future Combat Systems: A StatusReport, 41.2 (February 1991): 38-44.


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the military as the most hidebound bureaucracy. Innovationin doctrine, particularly innovation that provokes suchsignificant change, is uncharacteristic of largeorganizations, especially the military.

Large bureaucratic organizations are more apt toresist change than to innovate. They are normallyconservative: they adhere to standard operating procedures,stick to the tried and true, and when obliged to change,

change only incrementally.=This is especially true for the military.6 The

hierarchical organization, the discipline, the socializationsteeped in tradition, and the insular nature of the militarycombine to impede innovation. The uniquely direconsequences of failure at war further distinguish themilitary from other bureaucracies. The military more thanany other organization has good reason to be risk averse andto plan against the worst case.

sFor the theoretical development of these ideas see JohnD. Steinbruner, a e ybernetic Theorv of Decision: Newons of Political hn lyds (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1974) and Peter F. Drucker,e~r-~. Practice and w i ~ l e s(New York: Harperand Row, 1985), especially Chapter 14.

6For a colorful discussion of military conservatism inthis century, see John P Campbell, Marines, Aviators, andthe Battleship Mentality, RUS 109 (February 1964): 45-50.


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For these reasons, the military historically resistschange.7 Rather than preparing for future wars, themilitary tends to prepare to fight past wars. The U.S.Army's futurism since the mid-seventies contrasts starklywith the historical conservatism of most armies.

A careful analysis of the Napoleonic era convincedthe.senior leaders of the French Army that the offense wasthe superior form of war. German barbed wire and machinegun fire, however, proved the obsolescence of the Frenchoffensive doctrine in World War I. Seared by the experienceo the Great War, the French Army concluded that the defensewas the superior form of war. The French.built a defensivedoctrine and the Maginot Line. Unfortunately, the Germansdeveloped the Blitzkrieg.

This French example reveals the central paradoxthat normally haunts the doctrine of armies:

namely, that in few spheres of human activity arechange and progress so constant and the need foraccommodation and adjustment so unremitting as inthe military; yet in few spheres, seemingly, are theruling minds so rigidly resistant to change.8

7Edward L. Katzenbach provides one of the most widelyread examples in an essay that explains the persistence ofthe horse cavalry despite technological advances thatrendered it obsolete. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., The HorseCavalry in the Twentieth Century, in Robert J. Art andKenneth N. Waltz, eds., he Use of Force: Int-and Forelm Policy, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America, 19831 203-222.


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Armies are organizationally predisposed to resist change,yet obliged to keep pace with the dynamic environment. Thedoctrinal innovation of the last two decades seems toindicate the U S Army has escaped this paradox.

A number of factors provoked change in militarydoctrine in the past. Technological revolution thatproduced a marked increase in the mobility or lethality ofsystems, a change in the threat s capabilities,organization, or doctrine, demonstrated failure in war, andchanges in the national strategy have all triggeredsignificant shifts in doctrine in the past.

These traditional causes of doctrinal change,however, fail to provide a compelling explanation for theU S Army s doctrinal reversal in the early 1980s andaccentuation in 1991. Though technology, threat, andstrategy remained fundamentally constant, Active Defense wasreplaced in 1982 by a distinctly offensive AirLand Battledoctrine.9 The methodically studied firepower/attritiondoctrine was abandoned though it had never been tested bycombat. A doctrine affirming the decisiveness of maneuverreplaced it.

nation s strategy delineates and prioritizes themissions and capabilities of its armed forces. As a result,

SThis contention, presented without support here, willbe developed at length in Chapter 3


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doctrine adapts to changes in strategy. The rising statusof the offensive in our doctrine since 1982 does correlatewith the globalization of our national strategy and anincreased emphasis on contingency operations. However,since the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviets began withdrawingProm Eastern Europe, the U S strategy in Europe has aimedat increasing stability through arms control, primarily byconstraining the offensive capability of the antagonists.The on-going doctrinal revision, though largely provoked bythe changing European environment, is curiously out of stepwith the current American strategy. Rather than promotingdefensive alternatives, the 1991 edition of FM 100 5 willaccentuate the offensive disposition and capabilities of ourforces. The U S Army doctrine is apparently immune to themost recent turns in our strategy.

Traditional triggers to change in doctrinerevolution in technology, change in the threat,

demonstrated failure in war, and adaptation to a reformednational strategy) do not account for the curious andextraordinary doctrinal innovation of the U S Army sincethe mid-seventies. Rather, organizational preferences, notenvironmental obligations, sparked the innovation.

A final element distinguishes this recent spate ofdoctrinal innovation: the doctrinal twists and turns caused,and were caused by, a remarkably vibrant and unmilitary


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debate. Active Defense sparked and AirLand Battle fueledan often heated dispute recorded mostly in the pages of

tarv Reviey.10 Captains argued unabashedly withgenerals on the printed page. The unparalleled interest indoctrine and the tolerance for an open debate largelyaccount for what was truly a doctrinal renaissance.

rch Ques-What best explains the evolution of U.S. Army

doctrine from Active Defense through AirLand Battle toAirLand Battle-Future? What lessons can be drawn that mightinform the development and employment of U.S. Army doctrinein the future?

This thesis will argue that the recent wave ofdoctrinal innovation does not reflect a newfound ability tokeep up with objective change in the environment. Ratherinternal machinations explain recent change in doctrine.Current doctrine reflects the biases of the decision-makersthe organizations and the decision-making process.

Armed with that insight those who design doctrinecan strive to reduce the bias and more nearly approach the

optimum. Those who use doctrine to fight or to teachothers how to fight will find reason to think critically

loDr. Roger J Spiller Command and General StaffCollege is preparing an anthology of articles thatchronicles this debate.


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about each situation rather than accept doctrinalsolutions.

The case study will explore a number of dialecticsthat inspire recent, current, and emergent doctrine: therivalry between firepower and maneuver, the dispute betweensystems analyst and historian, the competition between theoffense and the defense. While the thesis will be unable toresolve these long-standing disputes, it may be able toexplain the pendulum-like swing between the poles of thedispute that results from personal and institutional bias.

By demystifying doctrine, the thesis may help toresto,re the primacy of strategy. If doctrine is scientifictruth, it must delimit strategy. f it is but thepreference of soldiers and services, then it can be readilysubordinated to a strategy. An increasing number ofstrategists believe we can escape the security dilemma andachieve stability at lower cost by relying on defensivedoctrines. In opposition, the authors of doctrine,particularly in the U.S.,seem most confident of offensivesolutions. Knowing the proper relationship between strategyand doctrine will be essential to seizing opportunitieswhile avoiding hazards in the international tumult of thenineties.


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Literature ReviewExtant literature on doctrinal change can be

classified as either descriptive history or theoreticalanalysis. This thesis is unique in the span of time coveredand the breadth of factors considered.

Descriptive HistoriesThe evolution of U S Army doctrine and the process

of doctrinal revision since the early seventies is welldocumented. In a Leavenworth Papa, MAJ Robert Doughty11reviews the evolution of U.S. Army doctrine from World WarI through the adoption of Active Defense. MAJ Paul Herbertin another hvenworth Paper12 takes a much closer look atthe adoption of the Active Defense. Both advance plausibleexplanations for the change in doctrine; neither employs adeliberate methodology that would allow him to derivegeneral conclusions about the forces that shape doctrine.An accurate history of the 1982 revision has been compiledby John L Romjue, TRADOC historian.13 His monograph is

11Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U S ArmyTactical Doctrine, 1946-1976, eavem- 1 (FortLeavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, August 1979).lzMAJ Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done:General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5,O~erations, eavenworth Papers 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS:Combat Studies Institute, 1988).13John L Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLandBattle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982, TRADOCHistorical Monoaraph Series (Fort Monroe, VA: United StatesArmy Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984).


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descriptive and deliberately avoids critical analysis.Aaron Blumenfeld's thesis entitled AirLand Battle Doctrine:Evolution or Revolution? l4 is a useful complement to thisofficial history. Finally, Daniel J Hughes, the U.S. ArmyCombined Arms Center Historian, has compiled a descriptivehistory of the AirLand Battle Future studies.15

This thesis will extend the work done by Doughty,Herbert, Romjue, and Hughes to incorporate the most recentdevelopments in doctrine. By spanning four revisions in asingle work, this thesis will be able to compare andcontrast the revisions and more accurately assess thecontent and significance of each revision.

More importantly, by including all four turn pointsin a single study, this thesis will be able to evaluate therelative weight of factors used to explain doctrinal changeacross multiple events. While the preceding studies havetaken a historical approach, aimed at explaining aparticular event, this thesis will be deliberatelyanalytical, aimed at explaining doctrinal change in general.

14Aaron Blumenfeld, AirLand Battle Doctrine: Evolutionor Revolution? A Look Inside the U S Army (B.A.dissertation, Princeton University, 1989).IsDaniel J Hughes, Y.S. Armv CombAnnualtorical &dew. 1983 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CACHistory Office, U S Army Combined Arms Center, 1990).


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Theoretical AnalysesSeveral authors have tried to explain deductively

the evolution of doctrine. All have chosen an empiricaltest spanning a different period and/or nation than thisthesis. None has tried to explain the evolution of U.S.Army doctrine across the last two decades. None hasconsidered as comprehensive a list of variables.

Robert Jervis and George Quester were among thefirst to develop theories about why nations choose differentmilitary doctrines.16 These original theories argued thatdoctrinal choices were determined by technology. Whiletechnology plays an important role, no single variable canadequately explain the multifarious change in U.S. Armydoctrine after 1976.

Barry Posen, in he Sources of Mutarv Doctm,lTmost closely approximates the method and design followed inthis thesis. e uses balance of power theory andorganization theory to explain the variance in nationaldoctrines of France, Britain, and Germany before the SecondWorld War. This thesis will differ from Posen's work in twoways.

1eSee Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the SecurityDilemma, World Politics 30 (January 1978): 167-214 andGeorge Quester, fense and Defense in the Interna-System (New York: Wiley, 1976).17Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France,

d Germany Between the World War% (Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 1984).


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First, Posen is really trying to prove that balanceof power theory or systemic analysis) is more powerful thanorganization theory or unit level analysis). This explicitagenda distorts his analysis and limits the value of hisconclusions about doctrinal change. This thesis will focusexclusively on identifying and weighing the determinants ofdoctrinal change.

Second, Posen concludes that balance of power theoryprovides the most complete explanation of doctrinal change.This thesis assumes that the two approaches arecomplementary and that the best explanation would integrateboth theories. While balance of power theory is dominant inexplaining doctrinal change in Europe in the interwarperiod, this thesis argues that organizational theory betterexplains doctrinal innovation by the U S Army since themid-seventies. This thesis reveals, therefore, that therelationship between the two theories varies over time andspace and that a complete explanation must accurately assessthe relative weights of these two macro-theories.

Jack Snyder, in he Ideolom of the Offensive,laattributes the evolution of European military doctrinesprior to the First World War to organizational politics andcognitive biases. He develops a compelling explanation for

laJack Snyder, The Ideoloav of the Offensive: Militaryand the Disasters of 9 4 Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 1984).


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why armies tend to prefer offensive doctrine, and exploresthe conditions that allow this bias to dominate doctrine.His theme will figure prominently in this thesis. Byfocusing on a single country, however, this thesis will holdgeography and national culture constant, thereby betterisolating organizational and psychological variables. SinceU.S. Army doctrine varies between a defensive and anoffensive emphasis during the last two decades, this thesiswill be able to weigh the influence of organizational andcognitive biases. It will examine periods when aninstitutional preference for the offense was subordinated tooperational requirements, as well as periods when theinstitutional preference dominated. This thesis will,therefore, be able to identify the conditions which allowinstitutional preferences, reinforced by cognitive biases,to dominate decision-making. Snyder s analysis cannot.

Both Posen and Snyder treat the military as aunitary whole. They explain national military doctrines,not the doctrines of services, as this thesis will try todo. Interservice rivalry, though a prominent force in theevolution of U.S. Army doctrine, is absent from theirstudies. Ken Allard, in Command, Control, and the CommonDefense,ls demonstrates that unique service paradigms and

1sC. Kenneth Allard, Command. Control. and the CommonDefense (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).


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interservice rivalries shape service doctrines whilefrustrating efforts to devise joint solutions. Asa Clark,in a chapter of The Defense Ref- Debate,zo goes a stepfurther, arguing that interservice rivalry can and hassufficiently threatened a military organization to sparkdoctrinal reform. While Posen's broad brush treatment oforganizational politics best explains organizationalinertia, and Snyder's analysis explains a persistentpreference for the offense, Clark's analysis shows athreatened organization may be innovative and may evendisregard its offensive preference. This thesis expands onClark's work.

A number of studies explain change in U.S. Armydoctrine during other periods. The pentomic era attracts agreat deal of attention, probably because the era of theatomic soldier seems so curious in retrospect.21 Thesestudies tend to emphasize the weight of external factors:technology (the advent of nuclear weapons), interservicerivalry (the rise of the Air Force), strategy (massiveretaliation replacing conventional defense), and national

2oAsa A. Clark IV Interservice Rivalry and MilitaryReform, in The Defense w o r m Debate, ed. ~ s a. Clark etal, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press,1984) 250 271.ZlSee for example: A. J. Bacevich, P(Washington, D.C.: National defense University Press, 1986)or Donald Alan Carter, From GI to Atomic Soldier (Ph. D.dissertation, Ohio State University, 1987).


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politics (changing priorities in executive and legislativebranch resulting in reduced funding and lower manpowerceilings). They provide a good model for parts of thethesis. Stephen Bowman, takes a similar approach in hisanalysis of the development of U.S. Army counterinsurgencydoctrine.22 Bowman's unique contribution is a deliberateanalysis of the distortion that is injected into doctrinewhen external forces drive the change. While these worksprovide a model of how to proceed, none deals with the sameperiod as this thesis, and none spans the full breadth ofvariables.

MethodoloavThis thesis is fundamentally deductive. By a

historical survey, this thesis identifies the independentvariables that have explained doctrinal change in the past.It then formulates hypotheses that postulate a relationshipbetween the identified variables and doctrinal change. Ittests the hypotheses across the four revisions of FM 100-5.When covariation seems to confirm the relationship, thedecision process is traced in detail in an attempt to

establish causation.

22Stephen Lee Bowman, The Evolution of U.S. ArmyDoctrine for Counterinsurgency Warfare: From World War I1 tothe Commitment of Combat Units in Vietnam (Ph. D.dissertation, Duke University, 1985).


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The Dependent VariableThe dependent variable is U.S. Army doctrine from

1973 to present. Enumerating the revisions is notsufficient. This thesis must characterize each phase ofdoctrine so that we can assess the impact of change in anindependent variable on the content of doctrine. Thisthesis is interested in explaining not only that a changeoccurs, but the specific nature of the change, the directiondoctrine takes.

Doctrine has been defined variously as a set ofauthoritative guidelines on the conduct of war, a consensuson the state of the operational art, a description of how anArmy fights or intends to fight, or a lexicon of militaryterms. The U.S. Army s fundamental doctrinal publication is

l l 100 5. Beginning with the 1976 edition, the seniorleadership of the Army explicitly sought, by revisions ofthis manual, to shape the Army through its doctrine. Theyaspired to spanning and reconciling all four definitions ofdoctrine. M 100 5 is the best single source on U.S. Armydoctrine. Its discrete revisions best mark the evolution ofU.S. Army doctrine across time.

To characterize the change in doctrine, this thesisfirst contrasts the old and the new versions of this keymanual. To appreciate the subtle nuances of each change,however, it goes beyond a direct comparison of the doctrinalmanuals and considers doctrine as it is marketed, understood


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in the field, trained in the schools, and employed inacquisition and force structure decisions. The thesisnecessarily takes into account the way each edition waspromoted and the debate each provoked. Only by consideringthis broader range of indicators can we discover thesometimes slight but consequential tonal shifts that arehidden in the sanitized language of the manuals. Chapter 2is dedicated to the full exposition of the dependentvariable.

The Independent VariablesPolitical scientists explain the behavior of complex

organizations in two fundamental ways: systemic and unitlevel analysis.23 Neither is sufficient alone. A thoroughexplanation of an organization's behavior often begins witha systemic analysis, because it is the most economical, butin the end resorts to a unit level analysis, because itprovides the most complete explanation.

The first explanatory method, systemic analysis,treats the organization as a unitary, rational whole. Thebehavior of the organization is logically determined by the

environment or system in which it operates. To predict the

23See for example Kenneth N Waltz, Reductionist andSystemic Theories, in Robert 0 Keohane, ed., Neorealismnd Its Crltlcs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986 :47-69. Reductionist is hardly a neutral label; it revealsWaltz's distrust of that body of theory. I use a moreneutral label unit level.


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behavior of an organization by a systemic analysis, thepolitical scientist studies factors external to theorganization. In a systemic analysis, external variablesdetermine the behavior of organizations.

Michael Howard provides a handy image of theexternal variables that traditionally explain doctrinalevolution. He contends that doctrine results from atriangular dialogue between operational requirement,

technological feasibility, and financial capability. z4This thesis will evaluate the role of all three vertices ofHoward's triangle. It will flesh out operationalrequirement to include two component parts: the threat andthe national strategy (which determines the Army's missionsand the level of resources). Since nothing generates morepressure for change than demonstrated failure in war, thisthesis will evaluate whether success or failure in combathas triggered the change in the Army's doctrine.

The second method of analysis, unit level analysis,assumes that different organizations will responddifferently to the same external stimuli. Organizationsbehave in a particularistic manner that undercuts anyanalysis that assumes organizations are similarly rational.

z4Michael Howard, Military Science in an Age of Peace,WSI. Journal of the Roval services Institute foxM e n c e S t u u 19 (March 1974 : 5.


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Indeed large bureaucratic organizations often behave in asub-optimal, less than perfectly rational manner.

To explain the behavior of an organization, the unitlevel analyst must look beyond external factors and focusinstead upon internal factors. Political scientists use twobodies of theory to explain the particularistic behavior oforganizations: the theory of organizations and the theory ofbureaucratic politics.25 Both theories contend that the waya decision is made colors the nature of the decision.Organization theory assumes organizational interests andprocess bias decisions; bureaucratic politics theory assumespersonal interests, parochial perspectives, and the unequaldistribution of influence bias decisions.

Organization theory explains the change in doctrineby identifying the organizational interests that are servedby the change. The Army may innovate to stave off areduction, in absolute or relative terms, in its budget ormanpower ceiling. It may innovate to reduce uncertainty orincrease its autonomy. It may innovate to protect, as itopposes reforms that threaten, its organizational essence.Finally, it may innovate to simplify running theorganization.

asGraham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision Boston:Little, Brown and Company, 19711 Chapters 3 and 5.


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Organization theory claims the process used todecide and implement doctrine ends up shaping the doctrineitself. The degree of centralization and the method used tovalidate the doctrine influence the content of doctrine.

According to bureaucratic politics theory, adecision is a negotiated compromise between self-interestedparticipants who use their positional power to promote theirinterests. According to this theory, doctrine is shaped bythe personal interests of key decision-makers. Doctrinedoes not reflect the best available thought on how to fightand win. Rather, doctrine is a compromise between the manyproponents and advocates. The inclusion of an idea in thefinal compromise reflects the power of the idea s proponentmore than the objective merits of the idea. Bureaucraticpolitics theory attributes change in doctrine to thechanging leadership of the Army and the changing balance ofpower between the competing proponents.

Bureaucratic politics theory takes us to the levelof the individual decision-maker. Psychologists argue thathumans are rarely objective. Formative experiences uniquelyalter the way every individualTo evade cognitive dissonance,information in a biased manner

perceives his environmentdecisionmakers filterand slip into wishful


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thinking.26 To the extent that individuals influencedoctrine, individual biases and intellectual errors distortdoctrine.

In Chapter 3 and 4, this thesis will evaluate theexternal and the internal variables, respectively, thatcaused doctrinal change from the Active Defense to AirLandBattle and beyond. Each section will begin by positing ahypothetical relationship between the independent and the

dependent variable. Whenever possible, the thesis willconfirm the relevance of the hypothesis by providing ahistorical example that is more completely documented ormore widely accepted. It will then track the independentvariable across the four turn points in doctrine. Ifchanges in the dependent variable and independent variabledo not correlate, we can reject the hypothesis. We shoulddiscount that independent variable, confident that it playsno significant role in explaining the evolution of doctrinein recent years. If the dependent and independent variablesco-vary, we have reason to suspect the hypothesis may betrue. Through causal tracing, the thesis will try toestablish whether the covariation reflects a causalrelationship between the independent variable and the

2sSee Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmakina inForeign Pollcv. The Fffective Use of InformationBoulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980 , Chapter 2 and Snyder,25-30.


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CB PTERTHE CH NGE N DOCTRINE

The change in doctrine from Active Defense toAirLand Battle Future is both evolutionary andrevolutionary. Some elements of the doctrine, the tenetsynchronization 1 for example, first appear in the 1976

edition of FM 100-5 and then evolve gradually in subsequenteditions. Each edition, however, also includes uniqueelements that clearly distinguish it from preceding andsubsequent editions. The editions in 1976 and 1982 includechanges of such significance that they revolutionizeddoctrine. This chapter will characterize each edition andcapture its revolutionary aspects in a few handy, yetaccurate, phrases to simplify the analysis in the followingchapter.

lThe term synchronization appears once in the 1976edition of FM 100-5. U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Opera-(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 July 19761, 38. It is one of the four tenets of AirLand Battledoctrine in the 1986 edition. U.S. Army, FM 100-5,Overations (Washington, D C : Department of the Army, 5 May19861, 17.


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JCS Pub 1-01 defines doctrine as the fundamentalprinciples by which military forces guide their actions insupport of national objectives. It is authoritative butrequires judgment in application. Z If doctrine isauthoritative, then it must be captured in officialdocuments. The Army's field manuals are the officialexpression of doctrine. M 100-5 perations is thecapstone manual.3 By comparing and contrasting the editionsof FM 100-5 and other derivative field manuals, we candiscern the change in authoritative doctrine.

The field manuals, however, are an incomplete guideto doctrine. The balanced composition and neutral proseoften conceals the tonal shift that sets each edition apartfrom all the others. For example, both the 1976 and the1982 editions of M 100-5 dedicate a section to the offenseand another to the defense. In both editions, the sectionon the offense precedes the section on the defense. Theauthors of both manuals insist that the text of the manual

2Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 1-01 with Change 1D o c t r i n e Joint Tactics. Techniaues. and Proce--nt Program (Washington, D.C. Joint PublicationSystem, 15 April 19881 viii.


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favors neither form of war.4 The 1976 edition, however, iscommonly understood to be defensive. This common perceptionearned the manual its familiar label the Active Defense.Similarly, the 1982 edition, AirLand Battle, was widelyinterpreted as favoring the offense. NATO failed to adoptAirLand Battle as an Alliance doctrine because many WestEuropeans felt it was too offensive. A careful analysis ofthe manuals may not be enough.

This thesis will argue that the composition wasskewed and the prose, purple in both manuals, contrary towhat the authors contend. This thesis will also, however,broaden its analysis to consider other indicators of theArmy's doctrine.

General George H. Decker, former Army Chief ofStaff, said, Doctrine provides a military organization witha common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose anda unity of effort. s Turning GEN Decker's remark around, weshould be able to refine our characterization of doctrine bycarefully studying what is common in the'field army.

4See John L Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLandBattle: The Development of Army Doctrine from 1973-1982,m D O C Historical MononraPh S e a Fort Monroe, VA: U.S.Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984): 14, andGeneral William R. Richardson, FM 100-5: The AirLand Battlein 1986, U t a r v Reviea LXVI.3 (March 1986): 6.

5U.S. Army, TRADOC PAM 34-1, Doctrinal Terms: Doctrine,Tactics. Techniques. and Procedures (Fort Monroe, VA:TRADOC, 19841, 16.


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Throughout the period of this study, doctrine drivestraining, acquisition, and force structure. The 1976edition of FM 100-5 begins,

This manual sets forth the basic concepts of U.S.Army doctrine. These concepts form the foundationfor what is taught in our service schools, and theguide for training and combat developmentsthroughout the Army.6Paul Herbert, writing about the 1976 edition of FM 100-5,defined doctrine as an approved, shared idea about theconduct of warfare that undergirds an army's planning,organization, training, leadership style, tactics, weapons,and equipment. 7 These characteristics and functions of anarmy derive from and, therefore, should reflect doctrine.

The connection between doctrine, training, and forcedevelopment grew stronger in subsequent editions. Duringthe eighties, the U.S. Army established the Concept-BasedRequirements System (CBRS). This system places concepts, ordoctrine, at the center of combat development. Theconnection is unmistakable in the 1986 edition of FM 100-5which states, Tactics, techniques, procedures,organizations, support structures, equipment and trainingmust all derive from [doctrine]. 8

7Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: GeneralWilliam E DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5,Q~eratiQn9, eavenworth 16 (July 1988): 3.


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Since doctrine is the origin of the Army's tactics,force structure, equipment, and training, a change indoctrine should provoke change in these areas. Conversely,the nature of the change in these areas should disclose theprecise nature of the doctrinal change that caused it. Forexample, both the 1976 and 1982 editions of FM 100-5 addresswar in Europe and in other theaters. The 1982 edition seemsto place greater emphasis on contingencies outside Europethan the 1976 edition had. That suspicion is confirmed bythe Army of Excellence (AOE) restructuring, begun in 1983.AOE significantly altered the U.S. Army force structure tofacilitate deployment by air, a capability that is notrequired for Europe. By studying the evolution of theArmy's force structure, tactics, training, and equipment, wecan better ascertain doctrine during each period.

AirLand Battle Future is not yet published, and itsimpact on the Army is not yet evident. However, themarketing campaign has begun. Just before the Armypublishes a new manual, particularly a manual asconsequential as FM 100-5, TRADOC whets the Army's appetitewith journal articles that sketch out the key elements andprojected consequences of the emerging doctrine.9 When the

SSee for example, MG Stephen Silvasy, Jr., AirLandBattle Future: The Tactical Battlefield, Military ReviewLXXI.2 (February 1991): 2-12 and GEN John W Foss, AirLandBattle Future, rmv 41.2 (February 1991): 20-37.


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articles are authored by the TRADOC Commander and his DeputyChief of Staff for Doctrine, it is safe t assume thearticles are authoritative.

Revolutionarv ChangesThe 1976 and 1982 editions of FM 100 5 introduced

concepts that radically depart from previous doctrines.AirLand Battle Future places greater emphasis on non-linearwarfare than any preceding doctrine. The doctrinal changeassociated with each of these three versions is trulyrevolutionary.

Active DefenseThe 1976 edition of FM 100 5 is easily distinguished

from the field manuals that preceded it. Previous editionswere titled F i i ~ n1976 the title was reduced to simply D ~ e r a W . incewell before World War 11, the Army s field manuals werepublished with a bland, formal cover. A distinctivecamouflage pattern served as the background for the cover ofthe 1976 edition. Previous field manuals had an officiallayout. The format was formal and unremarkable. The 1976edition was filled with pictures, insets, graphs, andcharts. The text was printed in two colors and a wide rangeof fonts. Bullets and boxes drew the reader s attention tokey passages.


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The content of the manual is as distinctive as itsformat. The 1976 edition is, in many ways, unique.

AttrltlonTwo bodies of theory dominate the analysis of

warfare: attrition theory and maneuver theory.10 The 1976edition of FM 100-5 marks the apogee of attrition theory'sinfluence over U.S. Army doctrine after the Second WorldWar. 1

A doctrine inspired by the attrition theory ofwarfare will seek to destroy the enemy, while a maneuveristdoctrine will seek the enemy's dislocation.12 Themaneuverist targets the enemy's will to fight; the attritiontheorist targets the enemy's weapons.

The 1976 edition revealed its true colors in thefirst chapter, The purpose of military operations, and thefocus of this manual, is to describe how the U S Armydestroys enemy military forces and secures or defends

loFor a concise explanation of the two schools seeRichard E. Simpkin, &ge to the Swift: T h o w s on Twentv-i r s t London: Brassey's Defence Publishers,l985), 19-23.1lRobert A Doughty reached this conclusion in his studyof U.S. Army doctrine since World War 11. See Robert ADoughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine,1946-1976, Leavenworth Pa~ers (August 1979), 49.IzSimpkin, Figure 3, 21


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important geographic objectives. l3 The first purpose ofoffensive operations is to destroy enemy forces.

Destroying [the enemy's] will to continue the battle ismerely a part of the third purpose of the offensive.14 Thepurpose of the defense is to destroy the masses of enemyarmored vehicles in the assault. ls This emphasis ondestruction of enemy forces recurred throughout the manual.

Attrition theorists emphasize force ratios. The976 edition of FM 100 5 was the first and last to useexplicitly force ratios. The manual provided force ratiosto guide the commander as he concentrates combat power inthe offense or defense. For example, it warned that adefending force can defeat an attacker three times morepowerful, but an attacking force must concentrate six timesas much combat power as the defender to have a good chanceof success. 6

Attrition theorists advise commanders to seekbattles that would yield favorable exchange rates. The 976edition told the commander to attack only if he expects theeventual outcome to result in decisively greater enemy


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losses than his own, or result in the capture of objectivescrucial to the outcome of the larger battle. lT

The dominance of attrition theory is evident in theActive Defense. Doctrines inspired by attrition theorystress firepower rather than maneuver, favor the defenseover the offense, and focus on weapon systems rather thansoldiers. All three tendencies are conspicuous in theActive Defense.

Fire~owerThe 1976 edition of FM 100-5 focused on firepower to

the exclusion of maneuver. The authors contended that thenew lethality l8 of modern weapons transformed the

battlefield and justified their emphasis on firepower.The emphasis on firepower is evident throughout the

manual. All four prerequisites to victory in battle aimat maximizing the effectiveness of fires.19 In boldletters, the manual affirmed, Massive and violent firepoweris a chief ingredient of combat power. zo The manualadvised that, The skillful commander substitutes firepower

17FM 100-5, 1976,18This slogan firlSFM 100-5, 1976,oFM 100-5, 1976,

4-3. Italics added.st appears on page 2-1, FM3-3.3-5.

3


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for manpower whenever he can do so. zl It discouragedcommanders from securing a terrain feature by maneuver when

adequate control over the terrain could be achieved by firesalone.22 It called suppression, and particularlysuppression with direct fire weapons, the fundamentaltechnique upon which success or failure is almost whollydependent: 23 No previous edition placed as great anemphasis on firepower.

Previous editions of FM 100-5 struck a balancebetween firepower and maneuver. The 1976 editionsubordinated maneuver to firepower. In the new doctrine,units maneuvered to concentrate combat power. Weaponsystems moved to firing positions that enhanced thelethality of their fires. Maneuver alone achieved nothing,according to the 1976 edition.

hereas previous doctrines guided the employment ofarmed men, the Active Defense offered guidelines for theemployment of manned weapon systems. The contrast betweenthe 1976 edition of M 100-5 and preceding editions isstriking.


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Chapter 2 was devoted to a detailed analysis of thelethality of the various weapon systems. Previous fieldmanuals did not include a comparable chapter. The chapterconcluded,

The leader of the modern battlefield must be anexpert in weapons effects and employment both hisown and those of his enemy. War is becomingincreasingly complex. Morale and motivation must bebacked up in weapons and tactical proficiency.27The authors admitted that modern combat required courage,audacity, confidence, and stamina, but stressed thattactical and technical proficiency is equally important. ze

No previous manual gave comparable stature to technicalskill.

How to fig&The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 had a distinctly

tactical and technical perspective. It marked the beginningof a transition by the U S Army to manuals that would tellthe field army specifically how to fight. 29

The 1976 edition went further than preceding manualsin providing detailed guidance to the soldier and commander.For example, tank commanders were told to avoid duels withantitank guided missiles at ranges beyond 2 000 meters.


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efensePrevious manuals favored the offense; the 1976

edition clearly favored the defense. Critics of the ActiveDefense spent most of their time condemning this departurefrom tradition.

In a fairly traditional passage, the 1968 edition ofFM 100-5 argued that,

Offensive action is necessary to achieve decisiveresults and to maintain freedom of action. Itpermits the commander to exercise initiative andimpose his will on the enemy, The defensivemay be forced on the commander, but it should bedeliberately adopted only as a temporary expedientwhile awaiting an opportunity for offensive actionor for the purpose of economizing forces on a frontwhere a decision is not sought. Even on thedefensive, the commander seeks every opportunity toseize the initiative and achieve decisive results yoffensive action.32similar passage appeared in every edition from 1941

through 1968, with one exception. The 1954 edition,associated with the pentomic division and the atomicsoldier, was less enthusiastic about the offense. Even thatedition, however, cannot match the 1976 edition s defensivebent.

The 1968 edition underlined the greater difficultyof defensive operations:


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The conduct of defensive operations under adverseconditions is the supreme test of the fieldcommander. The defender must fully use thoseadvantages that he possesses and can improvise. Hemust take greater risks and conserve his resources,yet commit them unhesitatingly and decisively at theproper time. He must deal with the serious problemsof leading troops without the evident success ofoffensive combat. The highest order of leadershipand tactical skill is demanded. 3

The authors baldly stated that, Offensive actions arepreferred to defensive actions . 34

The 1976 edition, in contrast, carefully enumeratedthe built-in advantages of the defense:

Full use of cover and concealment, selection of theground on which to fight, weapons sited for maximumeffectiveness, reinforcement of terrain with minesand obstacles, and the choice of firing first.35In fact, the manual argued, the defender has every

advantage but one - - he does not have the initiative. 36The 1976 edition also points out the disadvantages

of the offense.The attacker, must expose his force bymoving to contact, must fight on ground selected bythe defender, must clear mines and obstacles whileunder fire, and must destroy or suppress weaponswhich have taken full advantage of cover andconcealment.

33FM 100-5 1968 6-13 and 6-14.


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The manual warned the attacking commander to steel himselfagainst the high losses he might suffer.38

Force modernization and training confirm thedefensive orientation of doctrine in the late seventies.The new family of armored vehicles increased the stayingpower of U.S. Army units. The M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2and M-3 Bradley fighting vehicle represented a major leap inlethality and crew protection. These vehicles givedefending forces the ability to hold ground even whenbombarded by Soviet artillery. The TOW missile on theBradley can only be fired when the vehicle is stationary.Its slow flight speed and pronounced signature require thefiring vehicle to be occupy a battle position that affordsgood cover and concealment. The TOW missile is optimallyemployed in the defense.

Similarly the Army invested heavily incountermobility in the late seventies neglecting mobilityneeds. A family of scatterable mines and a wide array ofdelivery/emplacement systems were developed in the lateseventies and early eighties. No new mobility systems wereintroduced in the same time frame. This focus oncountermobility is consistent with a defensive doctrine.

Finally the publication of the 1976 editioncoincides with an increased emphasis on training defensive


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operations in the field army.39 The defensive bent of the1976 edition of FM 100-5 is apparent in both the text of themanual and the aftershocks in the Army.btive Defense. A Linear Defense

The 1976 edition broke with tradition by favoringthe defense. The defense it proposed was alsountraditional.

Previous editions had defined two types of defensiveoperations. The 1968 edition of FM 100-5 referred to themas the mobile and area defense. In the 1976 edition, onlyone defense is described the active defense.40

The Active Defense divided the battlefield intothree zones: the covering force area, the main battle area,and the rear area. The covering force fights aggressivelyto force the enemy to deploy and reveal his main attack.Severely outnumbered, the covering force trades space fortime.

The forces in the main battle area use the time toconcentrate combat power opposite the enemy's main attack.A division commander must be willing to concentrate two-thirds or more of his combat power on one-fifth of hisfrontage. The Active Defense requires commanders to

39Doughty, 44. It also conforms with my personalexperience in the mid and late seventies.4oFM 100-5, 1976, Chapter 5.


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identify the enemy's main effort, concentrate against it,and accept risk by defending everywhere else with theminimum force possible.

reserve, a standard element in every previousdefensive doctrine, is noticeably absent. All forces aredeployed well forward in the main battle area. The authors,focused on fighting outnumbered, 41 believed that thedefending force had to get every gun into the fight.Counterattacks were discouraged. When unavoidable, theyshould be short and confined to the reverse slope of aridge.

The rear area is dedicated to logistics. Forces inthe rear area must defend themselves as much as possible.

The defense must be elastic not brittle. az Thedefender may allow the enemy to penetrate into the mainbattle area, but he must maintain a continuous and coherentline of contact. Too deep a penetration risks allowing abreakthrough (which is presumably ruinous) and complicatesflank coordination between adjacent units.

This conceptualization of the main battle fightreveals that the Active Defense was a linear defense. Thisis consistent with the theoretical origin of the doctrine.Attrition theory posits a relationship between force ratios,


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casualty rates, and the movement of the line of contactThe Active Defense doctrine, derived from attrition theory,presents a linear view of warfare.

The effective use of terrain was emphasized more inthe 1976 edition of FM 100 5 than in the preceding manuals.According to the authors of the 1976 edition,

Terrain, provides a combat equalizer ormultiplier when the tactician uses its strengths andreinforces its natural advantages through mining,barriers, and other obstacles.43They further argued that cover and concealment werefundamental to success on the highly lethal, modernbattlefield. They warned that, Failure to make fullprotective use of the terrain can prove fatal. 44 Theheightened importance of terrain is consistent with thedefensive bias and firepower approach of Active Defense.

European emphasisThe Active Defense focused on the European theater,

more than any preceding doctrine. An entire chapter wasdedicated to Operations within NATO. In the chapter

dedicated to Special Environments, the largest sectionconcerned military operations in urban terrain, inspired by


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European urban sprawl. No other geographic region wasaddressed explicitly.

The European focus was evident throughout themanual. Whenever the authors needed an example they turnedto Europe. For example, all comparisons of weapon systemsand tactics placed U.S. against Soviet.

The Active Defense was designed to answer thechallenge of battle in Central Europe. The manual toldcommanders to prepare to fight outnumbered, to combatforces with ultra-modern weapons, greater numbers, andnearby supply sources. rs The manual identified battle inCentral Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact as the mostchallenging scenario; this scenario inspired the ActiveDefense

The dominance of the European scenario was evidentin force development in the late seventies as well. TheU.S. Army modernized its heavy forces, but gave littlethought to strategic deployment of that force. The battlein Central Europe required heavy, modern weapon systems.Since the U.S. Army was forward deployed in Europe,strategic lift was not an immediate concern. These forcedevelopment choices confirm the doctrinal focus on Europe.


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First BattleThe Active Defense focused commanders on winning the

first battle of the next war. This emphasis wasunprecedented. The importance of the first battle wasexplained on the first page of the manual:

Because the lethality of modern weapons continues toincrease sharply we can expect very high losses tooccur in short periods of time. Entire forces couldbe destroyed quickly if they are improperlyemployed. Therefore the first battle of our nextwar could well be its last battle: belligerentscould be quickly exhausted and internationalpressures to stop fighting could bring about anearly cessation of hostilities. The United Statescould find itself in a short intense war theoutcome of which could be dictated by the results ofinitial combat. Today the US Army must aboveall else prepare to win the first battle of thenext war.This passage was doubly remarkable.

First the Active Defense told commanders that theywould not have time to mobilize for the.next war. They hadto be ready to fight. The Active Defense emphasizedpeacetime readiness more than any previous doctrine.

Second the Active Defense emphasized winning thefirst battle because domestic support might evaporate andinternational diplomacy might intervene before a decisiveoutcome is achieved on the battlefield. In fact the passagehas a third meaning: early success may precipitate anegotiated solution. In fact an outnumbered force might

46FM 100-5 1976 1-1. Italics were used in the citedmanual.


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hope that high initial casualties would discourage anaggressor. The aggressor might abandon the effort, even if

the continued battle at those exchange rates would haveeventually defeated the defender. The manuals of thesixties had introduced the spectrum of conflict and theconcept of limited war, but they assumed that once politicalleaders resorted to war, the outcome would be decided bybattle. Active Defense admitted that political forces mayprevent limited wars from being decisive and preventbattlefield commanders from achieving decisive militaryoutcomes.

The Active Defense was revolutionary in many ways.Grounded in attrition theory, emphasizing firepower,favoring the defense, focusing on Europe and the firstbattle, and taking a technical view of war, the ActiveDefense broke cleanly with previous doctrines. In sixyears, well before the Army had been able to assimilate allthese changes, M 100 5 launched another revolutionAirLand Battle.

AirLand BattleThe 1976 edition of FM 100 5 was easily

distinguished by its cover, its format, and itsillustrations. The 1982 edition followed this example. Theformat of the 1982 edition was, however, distinctive in oneway. The 1976 edition was filled with numerical analysis,


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graphs, and charts. There was only one graph in the 1 9 8 2edition.47

The authors instead used history to persuade andconvince the field army. Historical examples peppered thetext.48 Two case histories were fully developed. TheBattle of Vicksburg demonstrated the fundamentals of theoffense; the Battle of Tannenburg, the fundamentals of thedefense.43 No historical examples were used in the 1 9 7 6edition. In Chapter 2 , the authors tracked the evolution ofweapon lethality since the Second World War, but they neverreasoned by historical analogy. This was the method ofreasoning that dominated in the 1 9 8 2 edition. Editions thatpredate the 1 9 7 6 edition often included a chapter thatdeveloped an historical example, but none had relied asdirectly as the 1 9 8 2 edition on historical example to conveyand defend the intent of the doctrine.

The authors of the 1 9 8 2 edition also relied heavilyon the military theorists of the past. Erudite quotationsfrom Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and many other military theoristsfrom the past were highlighted in the margins of the 1 9 8 2

47U.S. Army, FM 1 0 0 - 5 , O~eratiom Washington, D.C.:Department of the Army, 20 August 1 9 8 2 , 7 - 9 . The graph isactually an artist s conception of the risk analysis formassing troops in a nuclear and conventional environment.48Examples can be found on pages 3 - 1 , 3 - 5 , and 3 - 7 , FM1 0 0 - 5 , 1 9 8 2 .43FM 1 0 0 -5 , 1 9 8 2 , 8 - 1 to 8 - 3 and 1 0 - 1 to 1 0 - 2 .


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edition.50 The principles of war, which figured in trainingregulations and field manuals since the early twenties, wereleft out of the 1976 edition. The principles recoveredtheir place of honor in the 1982 edition. The 1982 editionadvanced seven new combat imperatives, but explicitly drewthe connection between these imperatives and the traditionalprinciples of war.51 The authors of the AirLand Battledoctrine took great pains to place their edition in thehistorical continuum of military doctrine.

More than methodology distinguished the 1982 editionfrom the 1976 edition. The 1982 edition rejected much ofthe substance of the Active Defense doctrine. AirLandBattle derived from maneuver theory, not attrition theory;it focused on maneuver rather than firepower; it stressedthe human dimensions of war instead of the technical; and itfavored the offense over the defense. The 1982 edition wasas different from the 1976 edition as the 1976 edition hadbeen from the Army s doctrinal tradition. In many ways,AirLand Battle doctrine was a return to the Army s doctrinaltradition. While the 1982 edition looked more like the 1976edition, it had more in common substantively with thedoctrines that preceded the Active Defense. For that

50For example see FM 100-5 1982 1-4 2-1 and 8-4.51FM 100-5 1982 2-6 to 2-10.

48


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reason many of the revolutionary changes in AirLand Battleare more accurately characterized as reactionary.

AirLand Battle also included some true innovations.Its emphasis on the deep battle and the delineation of anoperational level of war were unprecedented in U S Armydoctrine.

aneuverWhile the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was based on

attrition theory the 1982 edition was inspired by maneuvertheory. The force ratios that had been so prominent in the1976 edition were absent from the 1982 edition. Maneuvertheory places little stock in force ratios and the numericalanalysis associated with attrition theory. The authors ofthe 1982 edition underscored the limits of the numericalanalysis that had justified the Active Defense:

Force ratios and the effects of fire and maneuverare significant in deciding battles; however anumber of intangible factors often predominate.Among these intangible factors are the state oftraining troop motivation leader skill firmnessof purpose and boldness the abilities toperceive opportunities to think rapidly tocommunicate clearly and to act decisively.52Maneuverists distrust numerical analysis because it does notadequately account for these intangible factors

Firepower was the centerpiece of the 1976 edition.In the Active Defense commanders maneuvered to concentrate


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fires. The goal was maximizing firepower. Maneuver becamethe centerpiece of the 1982 edition. In the AirLand Battle

doctrine, Firepower provides the enabling, violent,destructive force essential to successful maneuver. Sl Thesuppressive effects of direct and indirect fires allowed thecommander to maneuver on the highly lethal battlefield. Thegoal in the AirLand Battle doctrine was to maneuver;firepower merely supported the achievement of that goal.

Consistent with maneuver theory, the 1982 editionencouraged commanders to dislocate the enemy. The manualasserted that, destruction is the most practical after theenemy has been turned out of a position or is caught in aposture vulnerable to fire. s4 Without maneuver, the 1982edition argued, the enemy could not be efficiently destroyedby fire.

Consistent with maneuver theory, the AirLand Battledoctrine told commanders to target the will of the enemy,rather than his forces. The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 toldthe defending commander that He does not have to kill eachenemy tank, squad, or combat system; he has only to destroythe ability of the attacking force to continue fighting. SsThe manual told the attacking commander that,


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Attacks that avoid the enemy's strength but shatterthe will of the defending commander or reduce thefighting capability of his troops are the fastestand cheapest way of winning.56The manual further explained that,

The enemy's strength depends in part on his numbersand resources. It also depends on the morale of histroops, his dispositions, the stability of hiscommand and control, and the effectiveness of hiscombat support and logistic arrangements. Attackingany of these soft underpinnings can seriouslyundermine his ability to fight.57The objective of military operations in the 976 edition wasthe destruction of the enemy forces; the 982 edition toldcommanders to defeat the enemy and warned that destroyinghis forces was often an inefficient way of defeating him.

The indirect approach, opularized by LiddellHart, is the essence of maneuver theory. The 982 editionrepeatedly encouraged the commander to avoid head onencounters, to avoid the enemy's strength and to strike athis weaknesses. sa The manual told commanders that,

The best results are obtained when initial blows arestruck against critical units and areas whose losswill degrade the coherence of enemy operations,rather than merely against the enemy's leadingformations. 9


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The 1982 edition asserted that, Accomplished tacticianshave consistently preferred well-conceived attacks againstweakness rather than force-on-force battles of attrition. sO

Here and elsewhere in the 1982 edition, the authorsseemed as interested in refuting the Active Defense doctrineas explaining the AirLand Battle doctrine.

The theoretical split between the 1976 and 1982editions caused a number of specific differences in the twodoctrines. Many of the differences represent significantpractical changes in the way the Army thought about war.

Initiative had two meanings in the Active Defensedoctrine. It was the only advantage of the attacker, whowas most often presumed to be the enemy. It was thecapacity to act in the absence of orders, required in everysubordinate on a modern battlefield because radio jammingand electromagnetic pulse could prevent the communication oforders. Initiative retained both meanings in the 1982edition and assumed a much greater prominence.

The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 defined initiative asthe ability to set the terms of battle by action, and

considered it the greatest advantage in war. sl In this

61FM 100-5, 1982, 7-2. This text is set off in italicsin the original.


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MomentumThe 1982 edition of FM 100 5 introduces a new

element of combat power momentum. It is never explicitlydefined but it recurs in the text.

The concept of momentum, drawn from maneuver theory,posits a relationship between mass, speed, distance, andcombat power. The theory asserts that a smaller unit thatmoves faster and exercises greater leverage against thelines of communication of a larger opponent enjoys greatermomentum and may succeed.67 There can be little doubt theauthors understood the theory. In addressing the virtues ofspeed in execution, they concluded, Finally, as itcompensates for a lack of mass, speed can provide themomentum necessary for attacks to achieve their aims. 68

Any field commander knows that momentum favors theattacker. Unless obstacles and fires break the attacker'smomentum, a defensive position, even one enjoying afavorable force ratio, may be overrun or bypassed. TheActive Defense recommended obstacles covered by fire anddefense in depth to absorb momentum. The 1982 editionviewed momentum from the attacker's perspective and included

it as an element of combat power that derives from maneuver.


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proficiency.71 The manual claimed, The primary function ofleadership is to inspire and to motivate soldiers to dodifficult things in trying circumstances. 72 The 1982edition told commanders they could only perform thisimportant function if they lead well forward.73 Thecontrast with the emphasis on technical and tacticalproficiency in the Active Defense doctrine could hardly bemore stark.

f f e n s eIn yet another reversal, the 1982 edition of FM 100-

5 unequivocally favored the offense over the defense. Itstated this predilection clearly: The offense is thedecisive form of war, the commander's only means ofattaining a positive goal or of completely destroying anenemy force 7

The offensive slant of the manual was apparent ineach of the chapters. For example, in analyzing the impactof weather on combat operations, the 1982 edition emphasizesthat inclement weather and dark nights favor the attacker.75

72FM 100-5, 1982, 2-5. This text was in italics in themanual.

75FM 100-5, 1982, Chapter 3.


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Its analysis of terrain admits that terrain can hindermovement, but asserts there are few truly impassableareas. 76 Avenues of approach received as much attention askey terrain in section on terrain analysis. Mobilityovertook countermobility as the first purpose of engineersupport.77 These passages reveal the edition's offensivebias.

Even the defense was offensive in the 1982 editionof FM 100 5. The ideal defense, in AirLand Battle doctrine,was conceived as a shield of blows. 78 In the 1976edition, the defense was the most efficient way to destroyenemy forces. The 1982 edition gave the defense a much moremodest purpose: The defense denies success to an attackingenemy. The authors hastened to follow up with: To win,one must attack. *[s The chapter on defense is half the sizeof the chapter on offense. Much of the chapter on defenseis spent telling the defender to employ offensive techniquesand maintain an offensive spirit. The 1982 edition clearlysaw the defense as a temporary expedient. The manual toldthe defending commander to seek every opportunity to turn


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the tables. ao Again, the 982 edition had more in commonwith the Q~erati- manuals of the forties than the 976edition.

Admittedly, the Active Defense called forcounterattacks, but they were merely short counterstrokes.The authors warned, Sweeping counterattacks which exposeour forces to heavy losses as they surrender the advantagesof the defender must be the exception. al This falls wellshort of the offensive spirit the 982 edition demanded ofdefending commanders. Instead, the 982 edition argued thatA well-executed counterattack to the flanks or rear of anenemy just as he meets a resolute defense to his front canentirely upset his plan. 82 Whereas the 976 edition didnot provide for a reserve in the defense, the 982 editiontold the commander to keep one third of his force as areserve. Its primary purpose was to counterattack.83

The Active Defense was preoccupied with fightingoutnumbered. Its solution was to rely on the innateadvantages of the defense to multiply the combat power ofthe smaller forces. The AirLand Battle doctrine argued thata smaller force can only win if it capitalizes on the


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advantages of the offense. The 1982 edition of FM 100 5stated that by maneuver the attacker gains the advantages

of surprise, psychological shock, position, and momentumwhich enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones. 84 Towin when outnumbered, the Active Defense doctrine prescribedthe optimization of firepower in the defense. The AirLandBattle prescribed the full exploitation of the potentialvalue of maneuver and the offense.

Deep AttackThe most significant innovation of the 1982 edition

of FM 100 5 is the deep battle. The AirLand Battle doctrinetold commanders to fight the enemy through the full depth ofhis formation. The 1982 edition explained the purpose ofthe deep battle:

In the offense, the deep battle initiallyisolates, immobilizes, and weakens defenders indepth. As the attack continues, it sustainsmomentum by preventing the reorganization ofcoherent defenses, by blocking the movement of enemyreserves, and by preventing the escape of defendingunits. In the defense, the deep battle prevents theenemy from concentrating overwhelming combat power.Its major objectives are to separate and to disruptattacking echelons to protect the defender'smaneuver, and to degrade the enemy's fire support,command and control, communications, combat support,and combat service support.


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Deep battle opens opportunities for decisive.action by reducing the enemy's closure rate andcreating periods of friendly superiority in order togain or retain the initiative. If the enemy isprevented from reinforcing his committed forces,even temporarily, he may be defeated piecemeal.85

The deep battle could be fought with Air Force BattlefieldAir Interdiction (BAI) assets, Army missile systems,artillery, aviation, airborne or airmobile troops, or evenmechanized ground forces.

The 1982 edition insisted that the deep battle wasthe key to defeating a numerically superior force.

The AirLand Battle will be dominated by the forcethat retains the initiative and, with deep attackand decisive maneuver, destroys its opponent'sabilities to fight and to organize in depth.86Commanders were told to plan a deep battle in alloperations. In either attack or defense, timely and well-executed deep actions against enemy forces not yet incontact are necessary for effective operations. a? Whileconceding the corps was the focal point for intelligencecollection and distribution, the authors insisted the deepbattle was just as important at division and lowerlevels. 88


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the corps commander to detect and strike enemy targetsthroughout the depth of his area of influence. Army schoolsroutinely trained cross-FLOTso operations by aviation andground maneuver forces and required students to address thedeep battle in operations orders. The deep battle became anintegral part of Army practice.

NonlinearityThe 1 9 8 2 edition rejected the linearity of attrition

models. In a section entitled Nonlinear Maneuver Battles,the manual argued,

Opposing forces will rarely fight along orderly,distinct lines. Massive troop concentrations orimmensely destructive fires will make somepenetrations by both combatants nearly inevitable.This means that linear warfare will most often be atemporary condition at best and that distinctionsbetween rear and forward areas will be blurred.91The assumption that the battlefield would be nonlinearprovoked two doctrinal changes.

First, cover and concealment was devalued. Thelethality of modern weapons worried the authors of bothdoctrines. The solution in 1 9 7 6 was to maximize cover andconcealment by hugging the terrain. The AirLand Battledoctrine rejected this solution. It assumed that highlylethal and accurate fires made stationary and concentrated

SoForward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)3lFM 1 0 0 - 5 1 9 8 2 1 2.

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forces vulnerable. It assumed that penetrations would turnour forces out of their covered and concealed positions.The AirLand Battle doctrine concluded that maneuver,dispersion, and deception were the only real protection onthe modern battlefield.

Second, the vulnerability of rear areas wasaccentuated. The Active Defense doctrine envisioned tworear area threats lightly armed airborne or airmobile

troops and attack helicopters. The 1976 edition of M 100-5recommended that support elements prepare to defendthemselves against these threats.92 If penetrations arelikely to occur, however, then heavily armored forces maythreaten support elements, and self-defense will not beadequate. The 1982 edition concluded that the nonlinearbattle required the commander to dedicate combat forces tothe defense of the rear area. Rear area protection, whichhad merited a single paragraph in the 1976 edition of M100-5, earned a full chapter in the 1982 edition.

The 1982 edition defined three levels of war.93 Atthe strategic level a nation s armed forces are employed tosecure the objectives of national policy. At the


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operational level, military resources are employed to attainstrategic goals within a theater of war. At the tacticallevel, units fight battles and engagements to achieveoperational objectives.

The 1976 edition of M 100 5 also identified threelevels when it said generals concentrate the forces,colonels control and direct the battle, and captains fightthe battle.94 All three would qualify as tactical under thecriteria established in the 1982 edition of M 100 5.

The 1982 levels served two purposes. First, itallowed the authors to set aside the strategic level asbeyond the scope of this manual. ss Since strategy sets

the fundamental conditions for operations, s6 Army doctrinerenounced its role in setting those fundamentalconditions.

Second, it introduced the operational level of warto U.S. Army doctrine. Edward Luttwak distinguished theoperational level of war from the tactical level of war inthe following way:


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Just as it is the weapons themselves that interactat the technical level . . . and the forcesdirectly opposed that fight one another at thetactical level, at the operational level weencounter the struggle of the directing minds, asexpressed in conceptual methods of action . 9By demarcating the operational level of war, AirLand Battledoctrine introduced a level of analysis where the moraldimension of war, the contest of wills, could be studiedindependent of the technical aspects.

Bow to Think about Fi~htiagThe 1976 edition of FM 100-5 told the Army how to

fight. The 1982 edition sought instead to tell the Army howto think about fighting. Where the 1976 edition hadprescribed solutions, the 1982 edition raisedconsiderations. For example, the 1976 edition advanced asingle method of conducting the defense the Active

Defense. The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 said pointedly Armydoctrine does not prescribe a single technique fordefense. se Instead, the manual described a defensivecontinuum, ranging between two ideal forms - - the staticdefense and the dynamic defense. Weighing the mission, theenemy, the terrain, the troops at his disposal, and the timeavailable, the commander was told to choose the appropriatebalance for his defense plan. The 1982 edition reminded the

97Edward N Luttwak,Peace (Cambridge,MA: Belknap Press, 19871 91.9aFM 100-5 1982 11-9.

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commander to retain an offensive spirit in the conduct ofall operations. Ss Furthermore, it emphasized thatCommanders who are flexible rather than mechanical will win

decisive victories. loo A doctrinal solution wasdeliberately avoided. The AirLand Battle doctrine insteadoffered guidance on how to think about the defense.

he 1976 edition was designed for the battle inCentral Europe. The 1982 edition was decidedly global inperspective. Chapter 17 Combined Operations, spent moretime discussing the Pacific theater than Europe. An entirechapter on contingency operations was added. Theintroduction of sections on unconventional warfare,psychological, ranger, and civil-military operationsdemonstrated that the 1982 edition thought more about thefull spectrum of conflict.lol The Army of Excellence,discussed earlier in this chapter, restructured the Army toincrease its strategic deployability. AOE is strongevidence of the Army's genuine commitment to a more global(less Euro-centric) orientation.


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ntearatedmThe 1976 edition of FM 100-5 addressed nuclear

weapons in a separate chapter. The heart and soul of the1976 edition, Chapter 3 How to Fight, refers to nuclearweapons only once. That reference underlined the potentialof nuclear weapons, when employed by the U.S. todecisively alter force ratios when and where we choose. lozThe authors did not mention the impact on the nature of war,nor did they apparently consider the use of tactical nuclearweapons by the enemy. In the introductory paragraph of thiscornerstone chapter, the authors explained that the purposeof this chapter (and therefore the bulk of the manual) wasto explain How to fight the conventional battle. los Theauthors relegated the discussion of conventional-nuclearbattle to Chapter 10 and the problems, tactics, andtechniques associated with the conduct of tactical nuclearwarfare to a separate manual of the 100-series. lo4

Chapter 10 was disappointing. The authorscontended, The use or threatened use of nuclear weaponswill significantly influence every phase of the battle, toinclude purely conventional operations. los They further


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warned that the use of nuclear weapons could change thecourse of battle very quickly. l06 The 1976 edition,however, never specified how the nature of battle wouldchange, in what way the phases of conventional war would beinfluenced, the manner in which conventional-nuclear

operations differ from purely conventional operations.The Active Defense doctrine was actually a

conventional doctrine. It did not provide concept foroperating on a nuclear battlefield. Indeed, the defensivetechnique it proposed linear defense, lateral movement toconcentrate opposite the enemy's main effort wasparticularly vulnerable to nuclear fires. Nuclear fireswere much more closely integrated into the AirLand Battledoctrine.

The only graph in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 wasused to explain the transition from conventional to nuclearwar.107 The authors believed that the greater thelikelihood of nuclear war, the more hazardous it was toconcentrate and to assume static positions. The authorsargued that,


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The destructive effects of nuclear weapons willincrease the tempo of decisive combat. Engagementswill be short and violent. Decisive battles maylast hours instead of weeks and days.108The authors further believed that nuclear fires would openup the battlefield and create opportunities for maneuver.103In fact, the prospect of enemy use of nuclear weaponsexplains in large part the manual s embrace of maneuvertheory.

In the 982 edition, virtually every chapterdiscussed the potential use of nuclear weapons. Commanderswere warned to evaluate their plans against the possibilityof enemy use of nuclear weapons and to avoid presentinglucrative targets.110 In both the offense and the defense,the 982 edition advised the commander to mass at the lastpossible moment and to disperse as soon as possible.Commanders were told to develop contingency plans so theycould continue the mission despite nuclear fires. Nuclearweapons were considered superior weapons for the deepbattle. The 982 edition explained:

Nuclear weapons are particularly effective inengaging follow-on formations of forces in depthbecause of their inherent power and because ofreduced concerns about troop safety and collateraldamage. 1


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Conventional weapons might only delay, disrupt, or divert:nuclear weapons could achieve destruction of deep targets

These considerations were not hidden in a separate chapter,they were an integral part of the keynote chapters of the1982 edition. The AirLand Battle doctrine posited a trulyintegrated conventional-nuclear battlefield.

l'echnoloeical O ~ t uAfter arguing strongly that the military resists

change, Robert W. Komer admitted that There is one majorexception, high technology, where the military hassystematically organized itself to keep up with the state ofthe art. llz The military has often chased the latestdevelopment in technology, but that should not be confusedwith innovation. G N David C. Jones, former Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, characterized the armed services aslarge, rigid bureaucracies which embrace the past and

adapt new technology to fit traditional missions andmethods. lls For example, the Army, in the interwar period,used tanks initially as infantry support weapons, unaware of

ll2Robert W. Komer, Strategy and Military Reform, inDefense Reform Debate, ed. Asa A. Clark IV and others(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 19841,14 (in footnote 1 .ll3David C. Jones, What's Wrong with the DefenseEstablishment? in Defense Reform Debate, ed. Asa A. Clark

IV and others (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 19841, 273.


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their potential when massed and free to maneuver.114Traditionally, the Army's doctrine lags behind the

technological breakthrough.The 1982 edition breaks with this pattern. TRADOC

designed this doctrine to guide the Army's future materieldevelopment and to ease the integration of the new systemsinto the force structure.lls The Marine Corps in theinterwar period provided a pale precedent. In the thirties,the Marine Corps wrote its amphibious doctrine first andthen developed the landing craft and beaching ships

Documents

Evolution of US Army Doctrine