Matthew Smith

Prof. Maddock

Sports Management Capstone

16 February 2016

The Evolution of the Offense in Football

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the offense in football has changed and

evolved throughout football history. This will be accomplished by looking at the history of the

offenses currently used in football. The methods used to research this subject were done through

interviews and researching historical data and documents from football across the decades.

Intro

There is an old saying that goes “Adapt or Die”. This saying truly illustrates the mental

and coaching aspect of the great sport of football. Throughout the history of football, there has

been a power struggle between offense and defense; each reacting to and attempting to counter

the other. One side of the ball would come up with a new strategy, and soon after the other side

of the ball would find a way to not only stop, but one-up that strategy. Though time, the power

struggle has gone back and forth between offense and defense in domination of the football field.

This shifting of dominance would force each side of the ball to evolve in attempt to stay one step

ahead of the other side of the ball. This constant power struggle is what makes football the

tactical game that it is. Contrary to popular belief, games aren’t won simply by muscle, speed

and athletic ability, but rather by knowledge of the game. It is no coincidence that football’s

most successful coaches have been the greatest tacticians. Coaches like Chip Kelly with his

hurry up spread read option, Bill Walsh with his infamous West Coast offense and even Tiger

Ellison with his run and gun offense have been responsible for the ever evolving styles of play

that make football the sport it is today. All through the history of football, coaches have focused

on finding ways to deceive and exploit weaknesses of the other team.

The question is, what is the next evolutionary step in football. Since we simply cannot

know where we are going until we know where we have been, we have to go back in time and

look and how offenses have evolved over the decades across all levels of football. We must look

at everything from formations and schemes to strategies and tempos. Only then will we be able

to have a clue as to what is next in football.

The Quarterbacks Effect on the Offense

Since the dawn of football, the offense has been built around the style of quarterback a

team has. For example look at current college and professional teams; teams with less athletic

but strong arm pocket passers tend to be primarily based around an air raid type of strategy. One

the other hand teams with more athletic quarterbacks tend to be more read based and scrambling

type strategies. All thorough the history of football the offenses have evolved and adapted to the

ever changing quarterbacks. (Needs more!)

The First Pass in Football

Prior to late 1906, there were no legal forward passes in any level of football. However

there had been a few attempts at forward passes in games prior to this date. For example in the

1876 Yale vs Princeton game, Walter Camp who played for Yale, threw a forward pass to his

teammate Oliver Thompson as he was being tackled. The pass was completed and Oliver carried

the ball in for a touchdown. Princeton immediately protested the action. The referee for the

game was unsure of what to do, so he decided to flip a coin to decide. After the flip of the coin,

the referee allowed the touchdown to stand. This is considered in football to be the first reported

attempt at a forward pass, but some would argue that this was more of a lateral than a pass. The

first actual and legal pass would not take place until September 5th, 1906.

On September 5th, 1906 on of the most infamous moments in football occurred, the first

legal and official forward pass was thrown. In the St. Louis University’s game against Carroll

College, St. Louis’s Bradbury Robinson threw the very first pass targeting Jack Schneider.

Unfortunately the first pass fell incomplete, and was ruled as a turnover according to the rules in

that time. Later in the game, Bradbury Robinson would again attempt another pass, but this time

it was complete to Jack Schneider for a 20-yard touchdown. From that moment forward, football

would never be the same again. Football’s first major evolution had just taken place.

According to many reporters and coaches from that time, many teams all around the

country had been practicing the forward pass in practice but had not had the chance to throw a

pass in a game. The reason St. Louis University had the luck and honor of completing the first

legal pass in football history was because their season had started earlier than most other teams.

Back in turn-of-the century football, teams did not begin their seasons until early October. St.

Louis University had the luck of the draw and were scheduled to play Carroll College as an early

game to help kick off the college football season and draw in some fans.

Once the college season did start, multiple teams were throwing the ball, and they were

doing it a lot for that time period. After seeing the success of the pass in the early games,

including the historic St. Louis University and Carroll College game, teams all around the

country began instituting the pass into their schemes and play books. On average, teams during

that season would throw the ball 1-2 times every 15 plays. Football was still primarily a running

game, but the passing offense now had its foot in the door, and pass attempts per game would

only increase from that point on.

Football in the 1930’s

In the 1930’s, football was not the most popular sport. At this point in American history,

baseball was king and took almost all of the attention in athletics in America. Because baseball

was so popular, it gave baseball teams the advantage of deeper pockets than any football team.

Since all the money was in baseball, if a man wanted to make a living as an athlete, he played

baseball. This took a lot of great athletes away from football which hurt the competitive level in

football. As far as football league popularities, the NCAA was much more popular than the NFL

was. This was in part because the best athletes in the country would play football in college, but

because there was a lack of money in the NFL, these athletes would continue on after college to

play professional baseball.

As far as the game of football itself, in the 1930’s football was all around a much

different game that the game you know today. Everything from rules, all the way to the ball was

different in the 1930’s. In this time period, football was primarily rushing. The forward pass

was legal, but was used very rarely. The forward pass was used at max 3-4 times per game in the

early 1930’s. There are two main reasons for this. The first reason is that the ball that was used

early in the 1930’s was much different than the ball used today. In the 1930’s, the football was

much rounder than the elongated style that is seen today. The ball was round almost to the point

where it looked like a white basketball. The ball was also very slick and lacked grip which made

it difficult for offenses to maintain possession of the ball let alone catch a ball. One particular

rule in the early 1930’s that made throwing the football risky was that an incomplete pass was a

turnover. The pass did not have to be intercepted or even swatted by the defense, all the ball had

to do was simply touch the ground and the defense would get the ball. Dropping a pass in the

1930’s was much easier to do than it is today. First off, receivers went barehanded; they didn’t

have the fancy receiver gloves that exist today. Also, it was very difficult for the quarterback to

even have time to allow his receiver to get down field so he could throw it to them. In the early

1930’s, it was illegal to block with your hands. Obviously this made it much more difficult for

the offensive line to block the defenders and pass rushers. This rule made it near impossible for

offenses to even mover the ball let alone throw it.

Until the mid-1930’s, football was old fashion smash-mouth football where the offense

would run the ball right up the middle over and over again regardless of failure or success.

Every once in a while, however the offense would try to throw the ball down field, but it usually

ended in an incompletion which mean a turnover Because of this, almost all football games

where very low scoring, if there was even any scoring at all. This made football predictable, and

therefore boring to watch. Because of this the NFL decided that the forward pass was the future

of football, and they decided to change some things. The first thing the NFL changed was the

shape and material of the ball. The shape of the ball was elongated and the circumference in the

middle was reduced by an inch and a half. This made getting a grip on the ball easier and also

made it more arrow-dynamic which made it easier for the ball to fly through the air. Another

change that the NFL made was allowing the use of hands in blocking. These two changed

opened the door for the modern pass game.

(Insert NFL 1930’s Offense Average yards/points Table Here)

(Possibly add more)

Football in the 1940’s and 1950’s (Pro T)

(insert Pro T picture)

With the start of the 1940’s, the entire game of football was beginning to change. The

obsolete formula of “three yards and a cloud of dust” as an offensive motto was quickly

becoming extinct in football and left behind as a part of rugby only. With the wild-fire like

spreading popularity of throwing the ball, this is the era where football really began

differentiating itself from rugby; offenses were becoming more and more complicated causing

much more strategic and creative thinking to be used in play calls from the sideline. In order to

facilitate these new offensive strategies, new formations had to be drawn up.

Football coaches looked to an older formation in football that had begun to lose

popularity in the early to mid-1910’s. The formation that was looked at was the original T

formation. This formation was born in 1882 and was said to have been created by Walter Camp.

The T formation, also known as the original full house formation is a formation in which the

quarterback lines up directly under center with three running-backs lined up in a line five yards

behind the quarterback. Depending on what play you were running you could either sub in a

pair of tight ends to line up on either side of the o-line or you could sub in two receivers to line

up on the outsides of the formation. The original T formation was effective early on in football

because of the ability to hand the ball off to one of the backs while the other two lead block for

the ball carrier. This formation was a hit in the early stages of football because of the level of

deception it brought to the game. Prior to this formation, there was little if any deception used.

The mentality was “I’m running the ball right there, stop me if you can”. This formation began

to die off with the introduction of the forward pass. Having the ability to throw the ball reduced

the need to have three running backs in the backfield, and teams that moved to the singleback

formation tended to have more success with the pass. Due to this, more and more teams began to

abandon the T formation.

The T formation continued to become less and less common until 1940 when Clark

Shaughnessy, who had just taken the head coaching job for Stanford University’s football team.

Coach Shaughnessy inherited a less than successful team with a record from the previous year of

1-7-1. In the previous years to Coach Shaughnessy arriving at Stanford, Stanford typically ran

most of their plays out of the singleback formation, which lead to a consistent lack of success.

Coach Shaughnessy brought with him his favorite play book and formation, the T formation or

as it would soon be called the Pro T. While at his previous coaching job at the University of

Chicago, he had been running the Pro T for years and had created his own twists on the

formation to be able to facilitate passes as well as deceptive runs. In his new version of the T

formation, his philosophy was speed and deception over simple brute force. He used things such

as formation shifts, subbing receivers, backs and tight ends in and out as well as men in motion

to throw off the defense. These new concepts such as men in motion opened up the offense to a

whole new style of play and types of plays. For example putting a man in motion enabled a

receiver to get a full sprint built up before taking the hand off and running a sweep off tackle to

the boundary of the field, which would leave defensive players in the dust.

Stanford’s first game under Coach Shaughnessy was a road game against San Francisco

University as part of the first-ever major college double header. During this game, Stanford ran

the Pro T to perfection putting up 27 unanswered points against San Francisco University. This

was not only a major victory for the Stanford Indians, but was a major victory for the Pro T

formation itself. This victory proved that the Pro T still had its place in football. Stanford would

continue on to a perfect 10-0 record and a Rose Bowl victory while using the Pro T as the

centerpiece of Stanford’s offense. When asked about Stanford’s offense later in the season,

Oregon Head Coach Tex Oliver was reported to have said “Half of the time neither we or the

spectators knew who was the ball carrier until someone would dart out from the sideline with the

pigskin under his arms… and it was probably Frank Albert (Stanford Quarterback)”.

After seeing the chaos that the Pro T caused amongst defenses in college, it wasn’t long

before NFL teams began using it in their own offenses. The first of which was the Chicago

Bears. The Bears were so impressed by the success of Stanford’s Pro T that they went ahead and

drafted Stanford halfback Hugh Gallarneau and Stanford fullback Norm Standlee to help

Chicago have the same success that Stanford did. It wasn’t long after that almost all other NFL

teams followed suited and ran the Pro T. As the 1940’s progress, the Pro T became more and

more popular until it was run almost exclusively by most teams in the NCAA and the NFL. The

Pro T quickly became the formation of the decade and a landmark in football history.

The 1950’s was an era of football where modern football began to take shape due to a

large number of rule changes. One of the major rule changes that helped shape football was the

institution of the two point conversion. Previous to this rule instillation, teams did not have the

option to “go for two” after a touchdown. This added a whole new level of strategy in football

and would change the way offensive coordinators would think.

Football in the 1960’s (The Veer)

Football continued to grow in popularity into the 1960’s. With Televisions becoming

more and more common, football was broadcast more and more helping it get to the popularity

where it is today. Early in the 1960’, football would again see another offensive playbook and

formation change that would add to the weaponry of any team’s offense. This new formation

would be called the Veer. The creation of the Veer offense is credited to Coach Bill Yeoman,

the head coach of the University of Houston Cougars at the time. The Veer is typically run out

of a split-back formation with the quarterback under-center and two wide receivers that line up in

the boundaries on either side of the O-line. (Insert Veer Picture Here)

The Veer is an offense that is designed for an undersized, yet fast and athletic team. It

utilizes double teams by the O-line on the D-line to set up opportunities for the backs. The Veer

also relies on the quarterback’s ability to read a defense and pick out its weak points during his

pre snap reads as well as during the actual play. Teams that ran the Veer had undersized players,

including their O-line, but these players were faster than their oversized opponents. Having a

fast O-line is the key to success in running this type of offense.

With the institution of the Veer came its premiere and perhaps most dangerous play, the

Veer option, or also known as the triple option. The triple option is a play where there are three

possible players on the offense who could get the ball depending on what the defense does.

During the quarterbacks pre-snap read, he must look to the side of the formation where the play

is going and identify the end man on the line of scrimmage (EOL) which will be the defensive

end, unless an outside backer walks up on the line of scrimmage. The EOL is always left

unblocked because he is what referred to as the “read man”. This means the quarterback is going

to read what he does in order to decide what to do with the ball. Once the quarterback identifies

the EOL, he must then identify the “alley player” which is the defender that is in the defensive

secondary outside of the play side offensive tackle and inside the wide receiver. This player is

usually the strong safety, but can also be a walked out linebacker who is in pass coverage. The

quarterback identifies these two players because depending on what each of them does, will

determine who gets the ball.

Now when the quarterback snaps the ball, all of his reads come in to play and he must

rely on his athletic ability, football IQ and ability to adjust on the fly to make this play work. His

first read is the EOL, and the EOL is going to do one of two things, he is either going to crash

down hard on the running back and try to take away the dive option or he is going to sit stay at

home and contain the outside run. The quarterback must identify his intentions immediately. If

the EOL sits and plays outside contain the quarterback will hand the ball off to the full back

running the dive option, and the full back will utilize the double teams on the d-line and up to the

secondary to try to break off a big run through the middle of the formation. This is known as the

first option. Now if the EOL crashed down hard and plays the dive, the quarterback fakes the

hand off and pulls it out at the last second and will run the ball off the tight end’s outside hip into

the flats. This is known as the second option. While the quarter back is running the ball into the

flats he is flanked by his back side running back, who is known as the pitch man in this play.

The pitch man rolls out with the quarterback while keeping pitch relationship, which is about one

yard behind and three yards outside. Now the quarterback must read the alley player when he is

in the flats to decide what to do next. Now the alley player can only do one of two things. He

must either commit to the quarterback or immediately try to take on the quarterback head to head

or he must play the pitch, in which he goes after the pitch man leaving the quarterback alone and

forcing him inside. If the alley player commits to the quarterback, the quarterback will pitch the

ball to his pitch man who will then utilize the wide receivers block to run the ball up the sideline.

Or if the alley player goes after the pitch man the quarterback will keep the ball and uses the

blocks downfield and his athletic ability to break off a big run. This is known as the third option.

This play, if run correctly is impossible to defend against; even if the defense knows it is

coming. No matter what the defense does, there is an open lane for the ball carrier. The whole

point of this play is that the offence simply reacts to what the defense does in order to achieve

the best possible outcome. Because there are so many moving parts, and so many different ways

this play could play out, teams could run this play rapidly and still have success. Being able to

do this would set the defense up for the next most dangerous part of this offensive strategy, the

play action pass downfield.

After a team runs this play with success a few times, the defense is going to be forced to

stop the run. The only way to even have a chance at this is to start blitzing your linebackers,

safeties or even your cornerbacks in hope that you will be able to overwhelm the quarterback

before he has a chance to play out his reads correctly. When a defense does this, it becomes very

vulnerable to this pass, which can lead to huge gains or even wide open touchdowns. Also when

defenses get frustrated, they are going to begin cheating up and not respecting the possibility of a

pass like they should. When this happens, the offense can run this play action pass with great

effect.

When running the play action pass out of the Veer, the quarterback must be able to read

the defense much like he would in running the triple option. Before the play starts, the

quarterback must be able to see the defense cheating up, which is an indicator of a blitz coming.

After he does this he must analyze which route will be open, and where that open window will

be based on who is blitzing from where. Now when the quarterback snaps the ball, he will fake

the handoff to the full back and the pitch man runs out into the play-side flats as if it is a triple

option play. This will draw the defense in to play the run. Now routes for the wide receiver can

vary, but usually consist of a four verts concept. The wide receivers on the outsides will run

fades down the sidelines, the tight end on the play side will run a post down the middle splitting

the safeties, the pitch man running back turns his fake run into a swing route and full back pass

blocks after faking the hand off. Once the defense has been draw in in by the fake triple option

the deep routes including the fades or the post are usually wide open, and the quarterback can

take a shot down field. Now if the defense smells a rat and ends up playing the pass, the

quarterback will throw the ball to the swing route into the flats as a check down and rely on the

running backs ability to be an athlete and make guys miss.

The ability to run the triple option or a play action passes downfield made offenses in

football harder than ever before to stop. The Veer became very successful in College football

very quickly. After the success of the Veer in college, professional teams quickly began

adopting the Veer in the mid 1960’s and the Veer became the new style of football in the 1960’s.

The Veer was so effective, it is still in use today by in all levels of football. Currently, the Veer

is the most popular amongst high school teams across the country due to is ease of learning and

running the system. The best example of the Veer is currently run by the Naval Academy

Annapolis and the Army Academy West Point. These two NCAA schools still use the Veer and

the triple option as their main offensive play book even to this day. Schools like these still uses

the Veer because as a Military school, it is difficult to draw the best athletes in the country

because you are required to complete a military tour upon graduation. Because of this, their

athletes are usually undersized but fast, which makes the Veer offense a perfect match for these

football programs.

An example of further proof that the Veer is still efficient today in football is Navy’s

now recently graduated quarterback Keenan Reynolds. Amongst a ton of school rushing and

touchdown records, Keenan also broke the NCAA FBS single game rushing touchdown record in

Navy’s game against the Pitt Panthers in the Armed Forces Bowl. Keenan Reynolds is only the

third player in Navy history to have his number retired by the football program. Schools like

Navy prove every season that the Veer is still very much alive.

Football in the 1970’s and the 1980’s

Football players in the 1970’s were referred to as “the last head bangers” because this

was the end of the smash mouth football era. Up until this point, football was still a run

dominated game. It wasn’t until towards the end of the 1970’s where football would began

making the switch to the predominantly pass oriented game that it is today. Running downhill,

lowering your head and just bowling over whoever you could was the name of the game in the

early 1970’s. When a team did throw the ball, the plays and concepts where not very well

conceived and usually consisted of very basic routes such as the fade or curl. This would all

begin to change towards the later part of the 1970’s.

The 1970’s was the first decade where the pass players per game and running plays per

game swapped percentage wise. During this time, the Wishbone and Veer offenses were still

very common in all levels of football. At the beginning of the 1970’s, a typical team would run

the ball from 70-80 percent of the plays and throw the ball from at most 30-20 percent.

Completions were still relatively far and few between for teams and it weren’t uncommon to see

quarterbacks complete maybe 5 or 6 passes in an entire game. As the 70’s progressed, the

run/pass percentages began to change and settled to 60-40 to even 50-50 percentage wise.

Football began to take the shape of many of the typical “pro style” offenses that you see

today in the NFL, with game changing players like Terry Bradshaw (Steelers quarterback

through the 1970’s) and Walter Payton (Bears running back 1975-1987) who had the skill to

stretch the field in the passing game as well as the running game. Even though Terry Bradshaw

and Walter Payton where one of kind players, more and more players like them were appearing

all over the NFL as well as the NCAA. The rise of these types of players set many of the base

offenses that you see today in the NFL.

Because the quarterback skill set had begun to change toward pocket passing, teams

slowly began developing passing concepts that would change the entire thought process that

went into designing a game plan. Now that quarterbacks had the ability to deliver deadly

accurate balls at short, medium, and long range, the stage was set for the passing game to take

the helm in football.

Towards the latter half of the 1970’s, pocket passing offenses had become the norm.

The typical philosophy of run to set up the pass had changed to pass to set up the run. Teams

now would put the ball in the air three or four times in a row, which was something that had very

rarely if ever been seen before. Receiver routes and passing concepts were becoming

increasingly more complicated to keep the defense on its heels trying to cover receivers down

field. The days of simple and basic passing plays and concepts were over. The more

complicated concepts with reads, hot routes and pass progression had taken over as the new

norm for football across all upper levels of football.

Heading into the 1980’s, teams from the western parts of the United States dominated the

NFL. A prime example of western superiority includes the infamous Oakland Raiders under

John Madden. Teams from the western region of the United States had seem to come up with an

offensive formula that lead to unparalleled domination over the rest of the teams in the NFL.

This new type of offense would come to be known as the West Coast Offense.

There are several types of offenses that can be classified under a West Coast Offensive

style, but the West Coast Offense is defined as an offense that places much greater emphasis on

the pass than on the run. In a typical West Coast Offense, a team utilizes short and medium pass

concepts to set up a single long run or a long pass. In this offensive style, a team will chip away

yardage by throwing 3-5 yard quick passes every play forcing the defense to cheat up and try to

stop the short pass. Then when this happens, the offense will either run a draw play and catch

the defense off guard leaving the running back a ton of room to work, or even throw a deep ball

over the head of the defenders. When a team is consistently putting together multiple 3-5 yard

passes together in a pattern, a defense will typically jam the receivers in attempt to stop the short

pass. If the defensive corners are in press, they are very susceptible to a deep pass or a run. The

deep pass is wide open when this happens because all it takes for a receiver to beat a corner off

the line is one good move, and now the corner has to catch up to the receiver leaving him open

down the sideline on a fade or a double move. The advantage on a run play when the defense

cheats up and presses is the defense is expecting short pass again so the defense will more than

likely blitz and over pursue in attempt to sack the quarterback in the back field. With the

linebacker(s) and defensive line charging up field like this, a draw play is wide open. In a typical

draw play, the quarterback drops back like he is going to pass, and the offensive line drops back

and pass blocks as if it really is a pass. On the outside the receivers can either lock up with the

corners right off the line and take them out of the play immediately or they can simply run the

corners off forcing the corners to follow them down field taking them out of the play as well. At

this point the defense has committed to stopping the pass leaving a hole in the middle that you

could drive a truck through. Then at the last minute rather than throwing the ball, the

quarterback hands the ball off to the running back and now there is nothing but green in front of

him.

A typical West Coast Offense is usually run out of the Shotgun, the Spread or the Pistol.

Very rarely if ever is the West Coast style run under center. This is because having the

quarterback take the snap out of the Shotgun eliminates his drop back allowing him to get the

ball out of hands much quicker for the short routes, which is essential to running an effective

short range pass play. Out of the shotgun, all the quarterback has to do is catch, turn and throw.

It is that simple and quick. Getting the ball out of the quarterbacks hands is key to running a

successful West Coast Offense. On quick and short routes such as slants, hitches, curls and

quick fades, the receiver is only going to be open for a brief moment right of the line, then the

defense will cover him up again. The receiver is typically open right away off his breaks when

the defender has to adjust to his route. It is important to have the quarterback throwing the ball

at the exact same second the receiver is making his break, allowing the ball to arrive at the

receiver just as he is finishing his break and turning his head. If the ball is any later, the

defensive back covering the receiver will have the time to recover and intercept the pass.

With the West Coast Offense came a lot of key pass concepts that are used today in all

levels of football. The first of which is known as the stick concept. The stick concept is run out

of a 3x1 receiver set, and can be run to either the wide side of the field or the short side of the

field. However it is somewhat easier to have success when running the stick concept to the wide

side of the field. The stick concept is designed to get the ball out of the quarterback’s hands as

fast as possible. Now the quarterback has 3 reads when throwing the stick concept. The first and

primary read is the lone single receiver on the weak side of the formation. He is in isolation, so

it is simply the receiver verse the defensive back covering him. Typically the lone receiver will

run either a slant or a hitch, or a converted fade because the defensive back was in press. Upon

snapping the ball the quarterback will immediately look here first. If there is any doubt or

hesitation in throwing this route, the quarterback is to immediately look to his secondary read

which is the stick route. The stick route is typically run by the inside receiver on the trips side.

The inside receiver runs vertical for 5 yards, then reads where he is being covered from. Then

depending on the coverage he is to turn and sit either outside or inside depending on where the

window is. In a man to man defense, he is to turn out and simply show the quarterback his

numbers. If this route is also covered, the quarterback is to look to his last read, the out/bend

route. This route is run by the middle receiver on the trips side. This receiver is to run 8-10

yards (depth differs from team to team), stick his foot in the ground and snap his route outside

toward the sideline. If this route is covered, this means the quarterback has been in the backfield

for way to long and odds are the pass rush is reaching him at this point. Very rarely does all 3 of

these routes get covered up. The last rout that is run is simply a clear-out route and is run by the

outside receiver on the trips side. He just runs vertical as fast as he can in attempt to clear out the

defensive back covering him and open up either the out route or the stick route. In this concept,

the ball should be out of the quarterbacks hand in less than three seconds.

Another classic concept run in the west coast scheme is the spacing concept. The spacing

concept is identical to the stick concept with the exception of one route, the spacing route. The

spacing route is run by the inside receiver on the trips side of the formation. The spacing route is

run by the receiver stemming inside for two steps, then turning up field and continuing vertical

for 8-10 yards in attempt to sell the vertical route, then snapping the route back toward the

quarterback much like a comeback. The spacing route is designed to take a bit longer to allow

the defense to get into their proper zones of cover or clear out if they are in man coverage. Then

the receiver running the spacing route is designed to either sit in an open window or catch the

ball the moment the receiver gets out of his break. Everything else in this concept is the exact

same as the stick concept. This particular is great for 3rd and long situations, as it is very difficult

from a defensive perspective to stop.

The next concept used often in the west coast offense is the slant concept. The slant

concept refers to a quick pass run out of a 2x2 receiver set. This is another concept designed to

get the ball out of the quarterback’s hands in less than three seconds. In this concept, both the

strong and weak side of the formation are running mirrored routes. In the slant concept the

outside receiver runs a slant route, taking three steps vertical selling the fade, then plants his

outside foot in the ground and snaps the route in towards the middle of the formation at a 45

degree angle. If the ball is thrown to this player, the ball should already be in the air when the

receiver is snapping the route in and turning his head. The other route in this concept is run by

the inside slot receiver and is referred to as the bench or arrow route. This receiver begins this

route by taking two steps vertical, then, on steps 4, 5 and 6, he rolls his route out toward the

sideline. The depth of this route should be between 5 and 6 yards deep. Who gets the ball in this

concept is dependent on what the defensive back covering the outside receiver does. If he is in

man, he will stay with the outside receiver on the slant and follow him into the middle of the

formation leaving the bench route wide open. If the defensive back covering the outside receiver

is in zone coverage, he will sit and cover the flats covering the bench but leaving the slant wide

open between zone coverages in the window. It is on the quarterback to identify what that

defensive back does as fast as possible so that he may get the ball out of his hand quickly and

give the receiver the chance to work.

The next concept that is utilized quite often in west coast offensive schemes is the cross

concept, which be utilized as either a short pass concept or a deep pass concept dependent on the

defensive coverage. The cross concept can be run out of many different formations, but is

primarily run out of either an empty set, a 2x2 set or a 3x1 set. The formations that this concept

is run out of, differs from team to team. In the cross concept, there are four routes being run, the

under, the over, the post and the fade. The fade and the post are run by the outside receivers, and

the under and over are run from the inside receivers. The under and post are run by the receivers

on the strong side of the formation and the over and fade are run from the weak side of the

formation. Looking at the under and over routes first, these routes are designed to beat any type

of zone defense. The combination of an under route being run across the formation at a depth of

exactly three yards and an over route coming from the opposite side of the formation at a depth

of 10-12 yards forces the zones in the middle of the field to commit to one route leaving the

other alone. The zones covering the middle of the field are typically linebackers with the

possibility of a safety. Having one route in front of the backers (under route) and one route

behind the backers (over route)forces the backers in zone to drop back to cover the over route

leaving the under route open, or step up to cover the under route leaving the over route behind

them open. The quarterback must identify this and hit whichever route is open in the correct

window to allow for the most possible yards after the catch. This is the short pass aspect of this

concept. The deep pass concept is made up of the post coming from the strong side and the fade

coming from the weak side. If a team is playing cover two or man to man, the combination of

the post and fade will leave one of the routes wide open. By design, the fade is primarily a decoy

route to pull the free safety toward the sideline a bit more to open up the middle of the field for

the post route. However, if the defense presses the outside receivers out of man to man or cover

two, the receiver running the fade will be open between 8-15 yards for a quick fade down the

sideline. If this is to happen, the quarterback must see it before the ball is snapped and throw the

fade as soon as he catches the snap. Now the post is the usual “go to” route when going deep out

of this concept. The post route is run vertical for 10 yards, and then quickly snapped in at a 45

degree angle going directly at the goal post. This is where the route gets its name from. The

post is designed to split the two high safeties down the middle of the filed leaving a potential

home run ball opening.

The next concept is called the drive concept and is very similar to the cross concept.

Much like the cross concept, there is an over route, and under route, a post route and either a fade

or a comeback route. Again much like the cross concept, this concept can be run out of just

about any formation, it just depends on what team is running it. Where the drive concept

differentiates itself from the cross concept is the under route and over route come from the same

side of the formations creating a high low read for the quarterback. The read for the quarterback

to throw either the over or under are the same as they are for the cross concept. He is to read

wither the backers step up or drop back. The outside receivers are running a post from the strong

side of the formation and either a fade or a comeback from the weak side of the formation. The

rules for the quarterback to throw either of these routes are the same as they are in the cross

concept.

Lastly the smash concept is another classic west coast offense pass concept. A smash

concept is a high low read pass concept that is typical run out of a 2x2 receiver set. This concept

is another mirrored concept on both sides of the formations. The smash concept refers to the

combination of a hitch and a corner route. The corner route is run by the inside receiver and the

hitch route is run by the outside receiver. This concept is designed to be a shallow deep read on

the boundaries of the field. The rules for the quarterback on which receiver to throw to are really

quite simple. If the defense is in any sort of cloud coverage a deep zone such as cover 3, cover 4

or cover 6, the quarterback is to throw the hitch. In order to throw the hitch, the quarterback

must see what coverage the defense is in pre snap, and throw the hitch as soon as he catches the

snap. Now if the defense is in any short zone coverage or man to man coverage with 2 or less

safeties covering deep, he is to throw the corner route. The corner route is run by taking 7 steps

vertical, then sticking the outside foot in the ground and snapping the route toward the sideline at

a 45 degree angle. The ball should hit the receiver in stride just after he makes his break.

All of these concepts in the west coast offense have been a staple in football ever since

their invention, and are still very common today. This type of offense is seen at all levels of

football but primarily at the collegiate and professional level. The west coast offense does

require a certain degree of skill that is somewhat rare at the high school level and below.

However, there are high school teams who have players with the skill level required to run this

offense, and they do.

Football in the 1990’s

This era in football is the birthplace of perhaps the most unorthodox but effective type of

offensive formation, the Wildcat. The most notable feature of the Wildcat is that the running

back is the player who takes the snap out of the Shotgun rather than the quarterback. The

quarterback is usually lined up out in the slot as a receiver. The Wildcat is primarily a sweep, jet

sweep, power, dive and counter run offense. However, depending on how athletic the running

back is, passes can be thrown out of this offense which helps keep the defense off-balance. Any

throws coming out of this offense will either be short passes or play action passes.

The Wildcat is primarily run out of the shotgun with an unbalanced offensive line

utilizing tight ends rather than receivers; however in some variations receivers can be used. The

tight-ends and/or receivers line up in a stack position about 3-5 yards off the outside foot of the

weak side tackle opposite the unbalanced side. Lining up like this, forces the defense to bring a

large amount of their players inside the tackle box leaving the outsides relatively unprotected,

which sets up the sweep. The sweep is the most commonly run play out of the wildcat formation.

Usually to run the sweep, one of the tight-ends or receivers on the week side will come in motion

before the snap and take the handoff from the quarterback and run off the play-side tackle’s

outside hip in attempt to get outside before any defensive players do. The running back can also

run the sweep himself without handing the ball off to the receiver. When this happens, the

receiver in motion tends to be a decoy and ends up being a lead blocker for the running back

running the sweep outside.

Now if the defense is playing to prevent the sweep, that’s when the offensive coordinator

can dig into his little bag of tricks and run a counter to the weak side or a power play up the

middle. Since the running back is taking the snap rather than the quarterback, he is a constant

running threat and can run a multitude of these play types. Having the running back take the

snap directly cuts down on the time it takes to hand off the ball in the back field giving the d-line

much less time to get a push into the backfield in attempt to stuff the run. Counters and powers

out of the wildcat are designed to look to the defense as if it as a sweep but at the snap of the

ball, the real play unfolds. Pre-snap everything is usually kept the same including the man in

motion, but once the ball is snapped, the running back will go in the direction of the actual play,

which is designed to catch the defense off balance.

The best play to run when the defense is playing sweep to the strong side is a counter

play to the weak side. A counter play is just that, a counter to the defense coming up filed too

hard. In a counter play out of the wildcat, the pre-snap looks and motions are all the same. Then

when the ball is snapped, the strong side guard will pull and lead block off the weak side tackle’s

outside hip. The running back will then run to the weak side of the formation staying in the

pulling guard’s back pocket reading the guard’s block. The pulling guard is to block the alley

player or the most dangerous player. Once the guard makes this block, the running back then

reads the block and runs accordingly.

The roots of this type of offense are traced all the way back to the Wing-T formations, as

the wildcat is a very distant descendent of the Wing-T. A lot of the concepts and plays are very

similar to plays and concepts that were originally seen in the Wing-T. The blocking schemes

and O-line formations that are seen in the Wildcat were also primarily and made famous in the

Wing-T.

The Wildcat was created by Bill Snyder, head coach of the Kansas State University

Wildcats. Using the Wildcat, Bill Snyder led his Wildcats to an AP National Top Ten ranking of

7. Snyder ran the Wildcat as his base formation creating his offense around this formation. This

was the first time that a Wildcat formation was the primary “go to” formation for any team in the

NCAA or the NFL.

At Kansas State, during the 1997 and 1998 seasons quarterback Michael Bishop would

prove that the Wildcat offense was here to stay. Bishop had the rare ability, at the time, to be

equally as dangerous running as he was throwing. Utilizing this ability, the Kansas State

Wildcats ran the Wildcat to near perfection reaching the peak of a number 7 national ranking.

The uncommon success of this new offense would draw national attention, but mostly from

Urban Meyer and his Florida Gators.

Urban Meyer would use this formation to launch his career and gain all of his notoriety

before he arrived at Ohio State. While Urban Meyer was the head coach at Florida, he had Tim

Tebow at the helm in his offense. Tebow was a run first and throw later quarterback. He had an

average arm, but his advantage was in his size and strength. Tebow was built like a linebacker

and had the strength of one too. He ran down hill and had the ability to break tackles by running

through the defensive player. He also had good speed for a quarterback running a sub 4.5 40

yard dash.

Urban Meyer utilized the abilities that Tebow brought to the table and used the Wildcat

as his primary go-to offensive formation. It was at Florida under Myer that the Wildcat would

become the infamous formation that it is. Tebow’s open field running ability made him a

national superstar grabbing the eye of football fans all over the country. Tebow would continue

to thrive in the Wildcat and eventually win the Heisman Trophy in 2007, raising his draft value

for the NFL. He would later play for the Denver Bronco’s bringing the new asset of a mobile

quarterback to the Bronco’s. After winning the starting position in Denver, the Broncos would

begin using the Wildcat much more often and it would lead them to their first play-off berth and

win in multiple years.

Currently the Wildcat can be found at all levels of football, but it is mostly seen in the

NCAA. The Wildcat still exists with teams that have fast, strong mobile quarterbacks such as

the 49’ers with Kapernick, the Panthers with Cam Newton and in just about every up-tempo

college offense you can think of. Since the late 90’s the Wildcat has done nothing but grow in

popularity. The Wildcat has secured its position in the future of football and will only grow

larger from here.

Football in the 2000’s The Pistol

In 1999, football programs all over the country were running into the same major issue; ever

evolving and complicated blitz patterns were tearing apart quarterbacks before the quarterbacks

could even finish a three step drop back. By the time the quarterback dropped back into the

pocket, swarms of D-linemen and linebackers were in his face. This was especially true for Ohio

Northern University, an NCAA Division III school coached by Tom Kaczkowski. His offense

was a run based offense that used the run to set up the pass. All of their plays were run under

center out of a single back formation. Coach Kaczkowski had a running back with unparalleled

speed and elusiveness, and to compliment this running back Coach Kaczkowski had a tall strong

arm quarterback who could deliver deadly accurate passes downfield. The only problem was

this quarterback lacked the elusiveness and speed to avoid and escape a decent pass rush. Every

time he would drop back to pass he would barely get the ball out of his hand if at all.

Coach Kaczkowski took this issue to the chalk board and started drawing up new

formations. He needed a formation that could allow his speedy one-cut running back to run

downhill while also allowing his quarterback to get comfortable in the pocket as well as having a

good pre-snap view of the defense to see what was coming. Thus the Pistol formation was born.

What made the Pistol formation different from the spread formation was the runningback lined

up directly behind the quarterback. Because of this, the quarterback runningback exchange

happened much closer to the line of scrimmage which allowed the running back to hide behind

his linemen making him harder to see. Also since the runningback was behind the quarterback

rather than beside him, this allowed him to build up speed before taking the hand off giving him

much more downhill speed and momentum. This makes it much harder to bring the running back

down.

Coach Kaczkowski had created an entirely new offensive package where the quarterback

would line up 3-4 yards behind the center with the running back directly behind the quarterback

about one yard deeper. This would be the base Pistol formation which is nothing different than a

single back formation 3 yards behind the center, but out of this a bunch of new formations were

possible. If you were playing a team that had a great pass rush, you could bring in extra

protection by exchanging receivers out to put two tight ends into the formation, or add more

backs in the back field. These formations would be known as deuce (double tight ends) or full

house (2-3 running backs around the quarter back). Out of these formations runs are extremely

dangerous, especially counters, traps, powers and options. When going against defenses that

were susceptible down field, you could swap out the extra protection for spread out receivers,

and these formations would go back to your basic 3x1 and 2x2 pistol single back formations.

Out of these formations downhill runs from a speedy running back could be used to set up a

deadly play action pass downfield.

This new formation had great success and it wasn’t long before teams from all divisions

of the NCAA began installing it into their playbooks. The most famous of these teams that run

exclusively out of the Pistol formation include schools such as Clemson, LSU, Alabama, UCLA,

Louisville and Arizona State. It wasn’t long before the success of this formation reached the

NFL. The NFL team that made this formation famous in the NFL was the Pittsburgh Stealers in

2010. Late in the season in 2010, Ben Roethlisberger injured his foot and lost all mobility. He

became strictly a pocket passer while he was injured. In order to utilize Ben Roethlisberger and

use him to the best of his ability while he was injured, Mike Tomlin (Steelers head coach) started

running almost all of their plays out of the pistol formation, and it was a huge success for them.

With the pistol formation instituted in their offense, the Steelers would finish the season 12-4 and

would make it all the way to the Superbowl before being narrowly defeated by the Green Bay

Packers who used the pistol formation as their go-to formation in the Superbowl. After the rest

of the NFL saw the success of this formation in the NFL, countless teams began installing it and

using it quite often. Some of the teams that use it the most often are the Steelers, Panthers,

Seahawks, 49ers, Red Skins, Lions and the Bronco’s.

Football 2010-Today The Spread Option

In the past 5-6 years, more and more teams have begun running read-based plays out of

the Spread Formation which has come to be known as the Spread Option. The read-plays and

spread formation had been around for a while in football at this point, but the unrivaled success

of some teams such as Oregon University, Clemson University, University of Utah and multiple

other schools. All of these schools adopted many forms of the spread option and put their own

unique twists on it, but run at least 70 percent of their total offensive plays out of the Spread

Option. The success of programs such as these while using the spread option playbook has led to

a massive increase in this offensive philosophy’s popularity amongst many college teams as well

as some professional teams.

The Spread Option refers to a particular playbook designed around a unique base

offensive formation. The traditional spread is somewhat similar to the shotgun or even the

pistol, but has some unique twists. In the traditional spread the quarterback lines up between

three and five yards behind the center, much like in the Pistol. But rather than have the running

back line up directly behind the quarterback, the running back lines up beside the quarterback

with about a 1 yard split or less. The running back is lined up like this because it opens up a ton

more outside read option play possibilities. In the pistol where the running back lines up behind

the quarterback, most running plays are designed to go up the middle with really only one or two

possible read plays. In the spread the setup is designed for outside runs getting the ball carrier

into the flats rather than up the middle. Also out of the spread, there are countless types of read

options that can be run. These read options are anything from your typical read option, all the

way to your more complicated buck sweep read options, veer read options, midline read options

and counter or trap read options. The possibilities are endless.

The Spread Option is currently in use at most levels of football, but is mostly utilized in

the NCAA. This is because the spread option is a very complicated play book which makes it

very difficult for high school athletes to run it properly. Now there are some exceptions and

some high schools so run this playbook, but these high schools a far and few between. The

majority of high school athletes lack the high level football IQ and high level athletic ability

required to run this type of play book. High level skills and knowledge required to run this type

of offense is usually acquired and developed in college football programs.

In professional football, it can prove difficult to exclusively run the spread option. This

is because defensive players can be, and a lot of time are too fast, strong, smart or simply too

good to effectively run this against them. Because the spread utilizes the entire field, an inherent

problem with the plays run out of it is that they can take a long time to develop. On run plays,

since the running back is lined up directly beside the quarterback, it is very difficult for him to

reach top speed before he reaches the line of scrimmage which can give the defense just enough

time to make a tackle and stop a big play. In the passing game, because the receivers are spread

out so far, the distance the quarterback must throw the ball greatly increases, which means the

ball is in the air for a greater amount of time giving the defense slightly more time to react to the

pass which can lead to an interception or being right on top of the receiver as he catches the ball

stopping him from breaking off a run after the catch. Because of these inherent problems, teams

must depend on deception and speed to catch the defense off guard or create openings, but in the

NFL, a lot of times players are too smart and too good to be drawn out of position. Also players

in the NFL tend to be fast enough to recover and get back into position after they do make a

mistake.

Because of the level of skill and knowledge required to run this particular type of offense,

college is the perfect level to run the spread option in. By this point in their careers, players have

developed the athletic skill and knowledge to be able to run the spread option. Also, defensive

players are skilled enough to be able to stop this playbook if it is not run correctly, but they are

not quite to the caliber where they have the ability to stop it even if the play plays out perfectly.

Since the late 2,000’s after huge success with this playbook had become more and more common

in the NCAA, it began to spread through college like wildfire, and continues to grow to this day.

The Spread Option is so effective because of the vast amount of plays and concepts that

can be run out of it. Most teams that run the spread option tend to have a mobile quarterback

who is equally as dangerous with his feet as he is with his arm. Because of this, the spread

option tends to have a lot of roll out pass plays involved. A roll out pass play is usually run out

of a 3x1 offensive formation with the three receivers lined up to the field side and the single lone

receiver lined up to the short boundary side. The three receivers are lined up to the field side to

give them more room to run their routes without being right on top of each other, which would

allow the defense to cover multiple routes with a single defender giving them the best chance of

getting open. Having the three receivers to the field side rather than the boundary spaces them

and their routs out which in-turn stretches the defense out giving the offense a greater chance of

success. Most of the roll-out passes that are run out of this particular formation consist of similar

route concepts. There is usually one receiver whose route is inside 5-6 yards, a second receiver

whose route is between 10-15 yards, a third receiver whose route is beyond 15 yards and a fourth

backside receiver dragging across the back of the formation. These plays are usually flood

concepts, smash concepts, stick or spacing concepts, and four verts concepts. These are typical

pass play concepts that can be ran out of most formations, but what makes them so unique out of

the spread 3x1 is that the quarterback rolling out to the flats can be played as either a pass or a

designed run. Most pass plays have a check down, but these particular plays give the

quarterback the option to tuck and run if nothing is open as the check down. This is very

difficult to defend because defenses have to play both the pass and contain the run which is a

very difficult thing to do. Also the route concepts are designed to get receivers to sit in the

windows between the zones of coverage against a zone defense. If the defense does end up

committing to the pass, the quarterback already has a full head of steam from rolling out into the

flats and if he keeps it, only will have to beat a single defender who is covering the flats. At this

point the quarterback would have the advantage because he is already at full sprint and should be

more athletic that the outside backer that is playing the flats. However, if the defense does go

into outside contain and takes away the quarterbacks running lane, he will be forced to throw. In

order for this play to work, the quarterback must have the ability to be able to throw off the run

and throw off his back foot. Any throws that come out of this play are designed to be thrown on

the run, and since the route concepts are designed to be in between tight zones, the throw has to

be very fast and very accurate or it will be intercepted. But if a team has the right type of

players, this type of play can be very dangerous, especially if the running game has already been

established.

A huge advantage that goes along with running the Spread Option is that there is no limit

to the types of formations and personal packages you can run out of it. All across college

football, each team has their own different set of formations that they run with the spread option.

These formations range from your basic 2x2, 3x1, empty and split back fields to the complex and

unique 2x2 stack, 3x1 stack/trident formations. With the spread option, the possibilities are

endless and the types of formations you can run are only limited by your imagination. Also,

many teams in college have added motions and shifts to their formations to better deceive the

defense and open a potential hole. Running the spread option is a football tactician’s dream

playbook.

The Spread Formation gets its name from what it does to a defense, which is “spread” the

defense out. The spread formation tends to utilize the entire width of the field in attempt to force

the defense to spread their players out to cover all of the offensive players. Spreading the

defense out like this opens up a lot of pass and run opportunities because the defenders are

isolated. In a man-to-man defense, all that each individual offensive player must do is beat the

man on the defense lined up across from him. In the man-to-man defense, each defender is

responsible for one offensive player, hence the name man-to-man. In this particular defensive

set, defenders are going to line up on top of their responsibility and their only responsibility is to

cover their man. The spread can take advantage of this in both the run game and the pass game.

In any man-to-man defensive sets, the biggest weakness is the mismatches. Throughout the

course of a game, it is relatively easy to identify where the mismatches are simply by watching

how each play pans out. If a defender is consistently getting beat in certain way (deep pass, short

pass, out muscled, out blocked, cant tackle well) the offensive play call will change in attempt to

exploit this weakness. Say for example, there is a cornerback that has a difficult time getting off

blocks to make a tackle in the run game or on a screen. The offensive play call should adjust to

highlight this particular mismatch. Since the defense is in man-to-man and every defensive

player is responsible for a different individual player, help on the defensive side can be slow. So

the offence will call a run or a screen to the mismatch, and since it takes the defense so long to

get other players off blocks to help the mismatched corner, the play now has a much greater

chance of becoming a huge play and a momentum shift that could be crucial in deciding the

outcome of the game.

If the defense knows that the offense they are going against has better skill players than

their own defensive skill players, they will more than likely run a zone type of defensive look. In

this zone, each defensive back is responsible for their own particular zone rather than an

individual man. The zone defense is designed to have slight overlapping of most individual

zones to increase the chance of a two on one match up in favor of the defense. The zone also is

designed to stop a receiver or running back from getting open by beating just one single defender

because no one player is covering them, but rather covering zones to keep constant coverage on

the receiver. This usually makes the quarterback keep the ball in his hand a bit longer to give the

defense a better chance at getting a sack. However, running the Spread Option does create

designed weaknesses in the zone defense. Much like against a man defense, the Spread does

spread a zone defense out which creates bigger windows for offensive players to sit in or utilize

to get open. Because these covered zones are farther apart, it takes slightly more time for

defenses to get into their position and to adjust/ react to the play which can give the offense just

the time it needs for the play to work.

The “Hurry Up” Offense

The hurry up offense is an offense in which plays are run as quickly and closely together

as possible. The defining feature of the hurry up offense is the removal of the huddle between

plays and calling the play at the line. No program in history has had more success with this

strategy than the Oregon University Ducks. This is a relatively new strategy and was officially

started in 2007 with the Ducks under Offensive Coordinator Chip Kelly, and was quickly dubbed

the “Quack Attack”.

Now this particular strategy had been seen before Oregon began running it, but only ever

in the last two minutes of a game, and not nearly to the tactical and deceptive extent that Oregon

would run it. Previously to Oregon’s running of this strategy, the hurry up offense would be

very unorthodox, very basic and predictable, sloppy and full of mistakes. It was essentially a

team’s last desperate attempt to score as quickly as they can to take the lead before with under 1

or 2 minutes left in the game.

Chip Kelly took this strategy and turned it into a science with Oregon where everything

was carefully calculated, planned and designed. Oregon’s hurry up offense was designed to

create chaos, panic and miss matches in the other team’s defense. The biggest question that Chip

Kelly had to answer was how do we communicate the plays to our offense without a huddle.

Now most people would say simple, you use play cards on wristbands or tell your quarterback

the play from the sideline. But if you have ever been in a football stadium on game day with the

sounds of countless fans screaming their faces off, you know that is impossible. Too many

issues could come from this. First having your quarterback run from the formation to the

sideline, get the play and run back to the formation takes way to much time and will exhaust

your quarter back. Also with al the noise, you run the risk of the quarterback not hearing you

correctly and running the wrong play which could be devastating. And lastly, which is perhaps

the biggest problem, is how do you relay the play to every single player on your offense at the

same time, as quickly as possible without them moving from the formation. Chip Kelly found

the answer to this, giant play cards with pictures from the sidelines.

How this works is on the sideline, Oregon has 5 guys signaling plays all with head sets on

that connect to the booth where the Offensive Coordinator is calling the plays. Each of the 5

guys has an individual job for signaling in the play. How a typical play is called in, is by first

choosing the formation, the calling the play, then tagging any individually routes or concepts. In

Oregon’s system, this is all done at the same time in order to communicate the quickest. So, on

the headsets, the Offensive Coordinator will call out the formation, play and all the tags. Then

the first guy will give a pre-determined signal to tell the offense what formation to be in, and/or

who to motion where.

The second and third guys are working the boards. Now on the back of these boards are

numbers and letters so the guys on the sidelines know how to hold the boards to show the correct

play. ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA are labeled on each of the sides on the indicator

board and 1-25 or higher if need be is on each of the play cards. So say the Offensive

Coordinator calls in BRAVO 2. The indicator holds up the indicator board so that the side

labeled BRAVO is on top and the play card guy holds up the play card labeled 2. On each of the

two play boards there are four quadrants each with a picture. The first play board is known as an

indicator board, and the second board is the actual play board. These two boards must work

together to relay the play, and this is design to maintain the element of deception. On the

indicator board their will be 4 different basic shapes with different colors in each of the four

quadrants (red cross, yellow star, blue square and black circle). Before the game the offense will

be told which shape will indicate where the live play is on the play board. So say for example,

the pre-determined symbol for the game is Red Cross. Then during the game, to get the play you

look at the indicator board first and find where the Red Cross is. Then when you find what

position the Red Cross is in, you look at the corresponding spot/quadrant on the play board next

to it and decipher the picture to get your play. The pictures on the play board are placed in

quadrants same as the indicator board. Now the pictures on the play boards can be anything and

everything, but will have a specific meaning. For example say the picture of the play you are

supposed to run is a steering wheel followed by the numbers 972. The steering wheel would

stand for “Drive” so you know the play is a “Drive” concept, the last number is 2 and even

numbered plays go to the right and the 97 represents the blocking scheme.

Now the 4th and 5th guys are signaling in routes or tags to the offense depending on what

routes or tags the Offensive Coordinator calls out. Now either the 4th or 5th guy is signaling in

live routes while the other is giving dummy signals to help confuse the defense to ensure they

don’t catch on. All of this takes place in less than 10 seconds between plays. Utilizing this

system ensures that all of your players receives the correct play, and does it quickly keeping the

defense off balance.

The whole point of the hurry up offense is to create openings/opportunities and exploit

them for big gains. For example, one of the huge advantages of running the hurry up is that you

can change formations, sub in and out extra receivers, tight ends or running backs at any time

without giving the defense a chance to sub in their players to be able to properly cover these

players. So say you’re Oregon and the first formation you run a play out of is split back

formation with two running backs, one tight end and two receivers. The defense is more than

likely give you a 4-3 look with four down linemen, 3 linebackers, 2 safeties and 2 corners. This

defense is clearly designed to stop a run or cover short passes. Now after running a couple of

plays out of your split-back formation, you decide to take full advantage of the slow run stopping

defense that out on the field and you quickly change to an empty formation subbing in receivers

for both of your running backs. Now you have a quarterback all alone in the backfield with 5

receivers all spread out. Now because you are running the hurry up and you changed formations

between plays, the defense doesn’t have the time to sub in defensive backs to cover all the

receivers and now must cover your speedy receivers with much slower line backers. You have

now created some serious mismatches which will give you a great opportunity to go downfield.

This can also work vice versa by subbing in running backs and tight ends for receivers to create

mismatches in the running game when the defense over commits to the passing game with too

many defensive backs.

The next major advantage associated this type of offense is it gives some of the play

calling power back to the quarterback. Quarterbacks with good football IQ’s tend to thrive in

this type of offense because they have the ability to see potential openings that the defense is

showing and will audible to best exploit that opening. Most teams, including Oregon that run

this offense grant their quarterback the power to change what needs changing including routs,

blocking schemes, formations and even plays at the line to best adjust for what the defense is

giving them. Most quarterbacks in the Oregon system become true field generals. The most

famous of which being the Heisman winner from Oregon, Marcus Mariota.

Perhaps the most important advantage that running the hurry up offense gives a team is

that the offense controls the tempo of the entire game. If the offense is firing on all cylinders,

they can speed the game up to completely demoralize the defense and create even more

openings. Now if the defense has been stringing together some good plays, the offense can slow

down the game or alternate game speeds which can shake up a defense a stop their momentum.

Now the fatigue factor can play a huge part in deciding a game. Say for instance, the

offense has put together a long drive of 10 plays or more and they are now in the red zone. First

off, the defense is going to be not only physically fatigued from the high speed of the drive, but

they will be mentally fatigued as well from both exhaustion and frustration. This is where

mistakes happen. The defense will be more focused on how exhausted they are rather than on

important things such as snap count or proper alignment. When the defense starts showing signs

of fatigue, that’s when the offense can throw in a hard count and get the defense to jump offside

and get free yards. So if offense has had a snap count of one the entire drive and they can see the

defense with their hands on their knees, they will speed the tempo up even more but switch the

snap count to two or even three. The defense is so used to going on one in a high speed game,

they are guaranteed to show their formation if not jump offside when the offense hits them with a

hard count. And if the defense does tip their hand on the hard count, it will lead to more mental

fatigue and they will begin to break even more. At this point, the offense will have the defense

on the ropes and can impose their will on the defense.

Even though there are many advantages with running this high speed offense, it is not run

very easily. In order to properly run the hurry up you must have the right type of players. This

type of offense requires very fast and very agile athletes with the ability to make people miss in

the open field. This is where the saying “In order to run an Oregon offense, you must have

Oregon players” comes from. In this system, a simple strong arm, pocket passing quarterback

simply will not do. You need a dual threat athlete in your backfield with a speed and shifty

running back to compliment him. For Oregon, these players were named Dennis Dixon and

Jonathan Stewart. Dennis Dixon was a quarterback who had the ability to make plays with his

feet as well as his arm. Jonathan Stewart was a speed running back who was a constant danger

to defenses because he had the ability to make any player miss and had unparalleled breakaway

speed. It was on these two young players that Oregon would build its program on.

Over the next few years, Oregon would build its dynasty by exclusively running the hurry

up while utilizing the spread option. Pairing the spread option playbook with the hurry up

strategy, Oregon would quickly become one of the most explosive offenses in college football.

From the time Chip Kelly took over as Offensive Coordinator until the time he moved to the

Philadelphia Eagles, Oregon was able reach 4 BCS bowl games including the 2010 Rose Bowl,

2011 BCS National Championship Game, 2012 Rose Bowl and the 2013 Fiesta Bowl. Over the

6 years that Chip Kelly was Offensive Coordinator (2 years) then Head Coach (4 years) Oregon

would have a final record of 65-14. Oregon would also produce many notable football alumni

including players such as Patric Chung (Currently New England Patriot), Joey Harrington

(former Detroit Lion), De ’Anthony Thomas (current Kansas City Chief) and Josh Huff (current

Philadelphia Eagle).

After noticing Oregon’s quick rise to the top of college football and unrivaled success,

coaches from all levels of football including the NCAA and the NFL quickly began adopting this

new style of play. Currently this style of play exists most commonly in college football across

many conferences and teams, but it also does appear in the NFL amongst fast an athletic teams

such as the Carolina Panthers, Philadelphia Eagles (under Chip Kelly)and a few other teams that

do not exclusively run only the hurry up.

This innovation in football is still in its growth stage and is still spreading across football

teams all over the country. For the time being, this new type of strategy is the near future of

football in the NCAA and quite possibly in the NFL. This strategy is here to stay; all that will

change is the types of plays run out of it and possibly the formations. But as far as this strategy

goes, it will lead to a whole new evolution of football.

The Future of Football

The future offenses will continue to be read based. A relatively new play concept that

will undoubtly spread like wildfire in the next few years is the pass-run read option. This is

perhaps the most deceptive play type in the history of football, and is near impossible to defend.

A pass-run read option is exactly what it sounds like. It is a read option play which includes

three options, and who gets the ball is all dependent on what the defense does. This play type

can be run out of just about any formation, but tends to be the most dangerous out of the Spread

or Pistol.

How this play works is as with any other read option play the quarterback must identify

the read men on the defense. The first read the quarterback must identify is the play side outside

linebacker or whoever is covering the shallow alley zone. This is usually the outside backer or a

walked up safety/cornerback. The read that depends on what this player does is whether the

quarterback hands the ball off to the dive back or if he pulls it out and throws the read route to

the receiver. So as the quarterback is holding the ball out for the half back to take he will watch

the shallow alley player. If this player steps up and plays the run the quarterback will pull the

ball out and throw it to the receiver. The receiver on this play is usually the outside receiver and

he is running either a slant route or a replace route. In the slant route, the receiver will take three

steps straight up field, and on the third step he will plant his outside foot in the ground and slant

across the formation at a 45 degree angle. He must look for the ball as soon as he makes his

break. Now if he is running the replace route, he will delay at the line at the snap of the ball,

then he will run to replace where the alley player was originally standing and wait for the ball.

The second read that could be made is if the quarterback pulls the ball out and looks for the pass.

If the quarterback cannot get the ball out of his hand in under 2 seconds, he is to roll out to the

flats where he will have the choice of running the ball himself or throwing the ball to the inside

receiver who is running what is called a “pick” route. The pick route is a route concept

involving both the inside and outside receiver and one side of the ball. The outside receiver runs

either a slant or a replace route, while the inside receiver runs and arrow route towards the

sideline which will run him into the cornerback covering the outside receiver. The inside

receiver is to briefly set a pick by running into the cornerback. This gets the cornerback off the

outside receiver leaving him open across the middle. After making contact with the cornerback,

the inside receiver is to release the cornerback to avoid a pass interference call, and continue to

the sideline. When the quarterback is rolled out into the flats, he is to read what the cornerback

is doing. Now the quarterback is in a position to be a dual threat, he can either run the ball

himself or throw a quick pass to the inside receiver. This is a simple 2 on 1 situation. Now

because of this, the cornerback must do one of two things, he must commit to covering the

receiver leaving the run wide open, or commit to the running quarterback leaving the short pass

open. At this point, no matter what that cornerback does, this play is going to pick up positive

yards.

This pass-run read option is typically run to the boundary or short side of the field. It is

near impossible to run to the wide side of the field because it gives the defense a chance to

recover and play all three options. Running the play to the boundary side of the field also gives

the player with the ball a little bit more room to work with in the middle of the field. This is

because is the offense shows a three by one formation with the three receivers lined up to the

wide side of the field, it forces the defense to respect those extra players and over play the wide

side. This leaves the boundary and middle of the field more vulnerable in most man-to-man

defenses. Most defenses are smart enough to know this so they will more than likely play some

type of zone or combo coverage in attempt to make up for the one on one mismatches. If the

defense does this, it really opens up a ton of pass read opportunities because the defensive

players will only be covering their zones. A smart quarterback will see this in his pre snap read,

and will know exactly what he is going to do with the ball before the ball is even snapped. When

he sees the defense showing any type of zone, he knows there will be windows on the field that

are uncovered and all he has to do is wait for his intended target to get in between the zones and

sit in the window and the play can result in a big gain.

The next thing that will become more and more prevalent in the near future of football is

power being returned to the quarterback. Early on in football, the quarterback had a ton of

power in calling the plays. The offense would line up and it was usually up to the quarterback to

decide if want he wanted to run. As football evolved through the years, the quarterback had less

and less play calling power. Most of the play calling power was fall upon the offensive

coordinator. However, when teams began running read options and hurry up offensive

formations, coaches began giving the power back to the quarterbacks to audible the play

depending as what they saw in the defense. Because the way the read options are trending in

football currently and how more and more teams are adopting this style of play, teams will keep

giving more and more power to their quarterbacks, eventually turning them into “field generals”

in the near future. In order for this to happen, quarterbacks will have to become smarter and

continually grow their football IQ. Within the next decade, the football intelligence and

knowledge of the scheme will be as important if not more important than their physical and

athletic ability. The more football progresses, the more tactical it becomes, and this requires

smarter players. It requires players who can see what is going too happened well before it even

happens.

As far as formations go, the Spread will be the base formation of the future. This is

because the read option and play action passes out of the Spread are the most dangerous plays in

football and reek havoc on defenses. Over the past few years, more and more teams have

adopted the Spread formation and have used it as the base for all of their formations. The spread

is such a popular formation simply because you can run anything out of it and you can run it with

any and all types of players and skill sets. With the spread, the possibilities are endless. The

spread also tends to be a favorite of quarterbacks and running backs because it allows them to

see what is going on in the defense. For the quarterback, he is also able to get the ball out of his

hand faster because he does not have to take such deep drop backs like he would if he was under

center. Any decent quarterback can get the ball out of his hands from the spread in less than 2

seconds consistently. This essentially takes the defensive line and the pass rush out of the

equation all together. This means the quarterback is not taking near as many hits, and he can get

more comfortable in the pocket which leads to higher confidence and ultimately increased

performance.

From the running backs perspective, lining up beside the quarterback in the spread gives

him a multitude of advantages. First off, being that deep allows the running back to read the

defense and flow with the play as it develops. Say for instance the play calls for the running

back to run off tackle and as the running back gets the ball, he sees that the play side tackle has

sealed off the defensive end to the outside leaving the hole inside the tackle rather than outside.

The running back has time to not only see this but react to it and hit the appropriate hole giving

the play a better chance of success. Another huge advantage that the spread gives the running

back is room for him to build up speed. Most runs out of the spread are designed to go outside

because of the running back being line up next to the quarterback rather than behind the

quarterback. This alignment allows him to gather speed before he gets anywhere near the line of

scrimmage which makes it much easier to outrun defenders off the edge of the line. At this point

it is a footrace to the sideline between outside backers and running backs. Because of the head

of steam the running backs build up, even the fastest outside backers don’t stand a chance if the

play unfolds correctly.

The last major advantage that the spread gives the running back and the quarterback is a

better read on read options and an increased level of deception. Again because the running back

and the quarterback are lined up deep behind the offensive line, on a read option play both the

running back and quarterback have much more time to read the read man on the defense and

make the proper read depending on what that man does. All too often when the quarterback is

under center and runs a read option, the quarterback-running back exchange gets mucked up

because there is not enough time to make the proper read. This issue is eliminated in the spread.

As far as deception goes, the quarterback can ride the running backs hip longer before he decided

to give or pull the ball giving the defense less time to react and more of an opportunity to go after

the wrong player. All of these things compound and give the offense an even greater chance of

success.