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EVIDENCE (Part VIII of IX) Evidence (Rule 128-133) A. General Provisions 1.Definitions Rule 128, Sec. 1. Evidence defined. - Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1) Evidence – the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. Relevant evidence – evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence; evidence which tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. Material evidence – evidence which is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings; evidence of such quality of substantial importance to the particular issue, apart from its relevance Escolin: The terms “relevant” and “material” are practically the same. They are used interchangeably by the SC. They differ in effect. Material evidence has substantial effect. Competent evidence – evidence which is not excluded by the law or by the Rules of Court Direct evidence – evidence which proves a fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption Circumstantial evidence – proof of facts from which, taken collectively, the existence of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence Expert evidence – testimony of a witness regarding a question of science, art or trade, when he is skilled therein Prima facie evidence – evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome by other evidence Conclusive evidence – evidence which is incontrovertible and which the law does not allow to be contradicted Cumulative evidence – evidence of the same kind and character as that already given and tends to prove the same proposition Corroborative evidence – evidence of a different kind and character tending to prove the same point Best evidence – evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question Secondary evidence – evidence which is necessarily inferior to primary/best evidence and shows on its fact that better evidence exists

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EVIDENCE(Part VIII of IX)Evidence (Rule 128-133)A. General Provisions1. Deni!ionsRule 128" #ec. 1. Evidencedefned.- Evidence is !$e %eans"sanc!ioned &' !$ese rules" o(ascer!ainin) in a *udicial +roceedin)!$e !ru!$ res+ec!in) a %a!!er o( (ac!.(1)Evidence the means, sanctioned bytheserules, of ascertaininginajudicialproceeding the truth respecting a matterof fact.Relevan! evidence evidence hich hasa relation to the fact in issue as to inducebelief inits e!istenceor non"e!istence#evidencehichtendsinanyreasonabledegree to establish the probability orimprobability of the fact in issue. ,a!erial evidenceevidencehichisdirected to prove a fact in issue asdeterminedby the rules of substantivela and pleadings# evidence of such$ualityof substantial importancetotheparticular issue, apart from its relevance %scolin& 'he terms (relevant) and(material) are practically the same. 'heyare used interchangeably by the *+.'heydi,erine,ect. -aterial evidencehas substantial e,ect.Co%+e!en!evidenceevidencehichis not e!cluded by the la or by the .ulesof +ourt Direc! evidence evidence hich provesafactindisputeithouttheaidof anyinference or presumption Circu%s!an!ial evidence proof offactsfromhich, ta/encollectively, thee!istence of the particular fact in disputemay be inferred as a necessary orprobable conse$uence E-+er! evidence testimony of a itnessregardinga$uestionof science, art ortrade, hen he is s/illed therein Pri%a (acie evidence evidence hichsu,ices for the proof of a particular factuntil contradicted and overcome by otherevidence Conclusiveevidenceevidencehichis incontrovertible and hich the ladoes not allo to be contradicted Cu%ula!ive evidence evidence of thesame /ind and characteras that alreadygiven and tends to prove the sameproposition Corro&ora!ive evidence evidence of adi,erent /indandcharactertendingtoprove the same point .es! evidence evidence hich a,ordsthe greatest certainty of the fact in$uestion #econdar' evidence evidence hich isnecessarily inferior to primary0bestevidence and shos on its fact that betterevidence e!ists /ac!u%+ro&anstheevidentiaryfactby hich the factum probandum is to beestablished# materialevidencing theproposition, e!istent, and o,ered for theconsideration of the tribunal /ac!u% +ro&andu% the ultimate factsoughttobeestablished# propositiontobe established, hypothetical, and thathichone party a,irms andthe otherdenies /ac!u%+ro&andu%/ac!u% Pro&ansPropositiontobeestablished-aterial evidencingthe proposition+onceived of ashypothetical#thathich one partya,irms and theother denies+onceived of forpractical purposesas e!istent, and iso,eredassuchforthe consideration ofthe courtColla!eral (ac!s matters other thanfacts in issue and hich are o,ered as abasis merely for inference as to thee!istence or non"e!istence of the facts inissue Real evidenceevidencefurnishedbythe things themselves, or vie orinspection as distinguished from adescriptionby themof aitness# thathich is addressed directly to the sensesof the court ithout the intervention of aitness Re&u!!al evidenceevidencehichisgiven to e!plain, repel, counteract ordisprovefactsgiveninevidencebytheadverse party Posi!ive evidence hen a itnessa,irms that a fact did or did not occur Ne)a!ive evidence hen a itnessstatesthat hedidnot seeor/notheoccurrence of a fact 2. Dis!in)uis$ Ad%issi&ili!' o(evidence0ei)$! o(evidencePertains to theability of theevidence to bealloed andaccepted subjectto its relevancyand competencePertains to thee,ect of evidenceadmitted *ubstantiveessence orcharacteristicfeature of evidenceas ould ma/e itorthy ofconsideration bythe court before itsadmission 'he probativevalue of evidencehich the courtmaygivetoadmitafter complyingith the rules ofrelevancy andcompetency Proo( Evidence%,ect and result ofevidence -edium of proof%nd .esult -eans to the end 3. #co+e a. Rule 128 12 #ec. 2. Scope.- 2$e rules o(evidence s$all &e !$e sa%e in allcour!s and in all !rials and $earin)s"e-ce+!aso!$er3ise+rovided&'la3or !$ese rules. (2a)&. CasesReyes v. CA " 214 #CRA 25 (1662) 'he .ules of +ourt, and its rules on%vidence, are not even suppletorilyapplicable to agrarian cases. *pecial laallos a,idavits to be admitted inevidence in agrarian courts, even ithoutthe itness testifying nor subject tocross"e!amination. %scolin& 1ote that inReyes, hat aspresented ere a,idavits. 2rdinarily,a,idavits arenot admissiblebeforetheregular courts because there is noopportunity for theother party to cross"e!amine. 3epositions are admissiblebecause there as an opportunity for theadverse party to cross"e!amine. P+ v. 2urco 337scra718 (2999)*ubject& 4ailure to $ualify the doctor hoconducted the medical e!am as an e!pertitness.In People vs. Bernaldez (supra),the court a quo erred in giving eight tothe medical certi5cate issued by thee!amining physician despite the failure ofthe latter to testify. 6hile the certi5catecould be admitted as an e!ception to thehearsay rule since entries in o,icialrecords (under *ection 77, .ule 89:,.ulesof +ourt) constitutee!ceptionstothe hearsay evidence rule, since itinvolved an opinion of one ho must 5rstbeestablishedas ane!pert itness, itcould not be given eight or credit unlessthedoctor hoissued it is presentedincourt to sho his $uali5cations. 6e place emphasis on the distinctionbeteen admissibility of evidence and theprobative value thereof.%vidence isadmissible hen it is relevant to the issueandis not e!cludedbythelaor therules (*ection 9, .ule 8;>EB). It is ell"settled that amedical e!amination is not indispensablein the prosecution of rape(People vs.Lacaba,F...1o.89:?>8, 1ovember8E,8>>>#Peoplevs. Salazar,;?>CB#People vs. Venerable, supra).'heabsence of medical 5ndings by a medico"legal o,icer does not disprove theoccurrence of rape(People vs. Taneo,supra).It is enough that the evidence onhand convinces the court that convictionis proper(Peoplevs.Auxero, supra).Intheinstant case, thevictimGs testimonyalone is credible and su,icient to convict.4amador& medical certi5cate can be usedby the defense hen&8. the lacerations have already healedorthatthelacerationsarealreadyold.;. theadmissionofmore5ngersintothe vagina ould prove the(seetheart defense)I%+erial 2e-!ile ,ills" Inc. v. N:RC"217 #CRA 237 (1663) 'heunveri5edpositionpaperisamereprocedural in5rmity hich does not a,ectthe merits of the case. Proceduraltechnicalities do not strictly apply toproceedings before the =D. 'he rules of evidence does not apply to 8. probation board;. +'D9. *%+7. Immigration cases?. =D01=.+C. +D...Ad%issi&ili!' o( Evidence#ec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. -Evidence is ad%issi&le 3$en i! isrelevan! !o !$e issue and is no!e-cluded&'!$ela3or!$eserules.(3a).e$uisites for admissibility 8. relevant;. competent 1. Relevanc'a. Rule 128 18 #ec. 8. Relevancy; collateralmatters. ; Evidence %us! $ave suc$ arela!ion !o !$e (ac! in issue as !oinduce &elie( in i!s e-is!ence or non-e-is!ence. Evidence on colla!eral%a!!erss$all no!&eallo3ed" e-ce+!3$en i! !ends in an' reasona&lede)ree !o es!a&lis$ !$e +ro&a&ili!' ori%+ro&a&ili!' o( !$e (ac! in issue. (8a).elevance relation to the facts in issueas to induce belief in its e!istence or non"e!istence %vidence on collateral matters alloedonly hen it tends in any reasonabledegree to establish the probability orimprobability of the fact in issue. &. CasesBautista v. Aparece" 51 ed +erson an'in(or%a!ionrela!ive!o!$e(undsor+ro+er!ies in !$e cus!od' o( !$e &anB&elon)in) !o +riva!e individuals"cor+ora!ions" or an' o!$er en!i!'CProvided" 2$a!3i!$res+ec!!o&anBde+osi!s" !$e +rovisions o( e-is!in)la3s s$all +revailD%lements of the e!clusion8. director, o,icer, employee, or agent ofany ban/;. disclosure to unauthoriNed person9. information relative to the funds orpropertiesinthe custodyof theban/belonging to private individuals,corporations, or any other entity7. ithout a court order de =eon& 1ote that this provision coversonly property in the custody of the ban/other than ban/ deposits. 4or ban/deposits, .D 87:? governs. 1ote also thatthe provision does not state the nature oftheinadmissibility. I submit that it isarule of absolute inadmissibility. 3)RA 1895C :a3 on#ecrec' o( .anBDe+osi!s#ec. 2. All de+osi!s o( 3$a!everna!ure 3i!$ &anBs or &anBin)ins!i!u!ions in !$e P$ili++inesincludin) inves!%en!s in &ondsissued &' !$e Govern%en! o( !$eP$ili++ines" i!s+oli!ical su&divisionsandi!s ins!ru%en!ali!ies" are$ere&'considered as o( an a&solu!el'conden!ial na!ureand%a' no! &ee-a%ined" in?uired or looBed in!o &'an' +erson" )overn%en! o=icial"&ureau or o=ice" e-ce+! u+on 3ri!!en+er%ission o( !$e de+osi!or" or incases o( i%+eac$%en!" or u+on ordero( a co%+e!en! cour! in cases o(&ri&er' or derelic!ion o( du!' o(+u&lic o=icials" or in cases 3$ere !$e%one' de+osi!edor inves!edis !$esu&*ec! %a!!er o( !$e li!i)a!ion.F.& Dll deposits of hatever nature ithban/s or ban/ing institutions in thePhilippines including investments inbondsissuedbytheFovernment of thePhilippines, its political subdivisionsandits instrumentalities, are herebyconsidered as of an absolutelycon5dential nature and may not bee!amined, in$uired or loo/ed into by anyperson, government o,icial, bureau oro,ice. %!ceptions8. ritten permission of the depositor;. impeachment, or 9. order of a competent court in cases of a. bribery or b. dereliction of duty of publico,icials, or 7. here the money deposited orinvestedisthesubject matterof thelitigation.de=eon& I submit that thisisaruleofabsolute inadmissibility. 8)RA 8299C 0ire-!a++in)#ec. 1. I! s$all &e unla3(ul (or an'+erson" no! &ein)au!$ori>ed&' all!$e +ar!ies !o an' +riva!eco%%unica!ion or s+oBen 3ord" !o!a+ an' 3ire or ca&le" or &' usin) an'o!$er device or arran)e%en!" !osecre!l' over$ear" in!erce+!" or recordsuc$ co%%unica!ion or s+oBen 3ord&' usin) a device co%%onl' Bno3n asa dic!a+$one or dic!a)ra+$ orde!ec!a+$one or 3alBie-!alBie or !a+erecorder" or $o3ever o!$er3isedescri&edC I! s$all also&eunla3(ul (or an'+erson" &e $e a +ar!ici+an! or no! in!$e ac! or ac!s +enali>ed in !$e ne-!+recedin) sen!ence" !o Bno3in)l'+ossess an' !a+e record" 3ire record"disc record" or an' o!$er suc$ record"or co+ies !$ereo(" o( an'co%%unica!ion or s+oBen 3ordsecured ei!$er &e(ore or a(!er !$ee=ec!ive da!e o( !$is Ac! in !$e%anner +ro$i&i!ed &' !$is la3D or !ore+la' !$e sa%e (or an' o!$er +ersonor +ersonsD or !o co%%unica!e !$econ!en!s !$ereo(" ei!$er ver&all' or in3ri!in)" or !o(urnis$!ranscri+!ions!$ereo(" 3$e!$er co%+le!e or +ar!ial"!oan'o!$er+ersonC Provided" 2$a!!$e use o( suc$ record or an' co+ies!$ereo( as evidence in an' civil"cri%inal inves!i)a!ion or !rial o(o=enses %en!ioned in sec!ion 3$ereo(" s$all no!&ecovered&'!$is+ro$i&i!ion. Mnlaful acts&8. any person, not being authoriNed by allthe parties to any privatecommunication or spo/en ord, to tapany ire or cable, or by using anyother device or arrangement, tosecretly overhear, intercept, or recordsuchcommunicationor spo/enordby using a device commonly /non asa dictaphone or dictagraph ordectaphone or al/ie"tal/ie or taperecorder, or hoever otherisedescribed& ;. anypersonto/noinglypossessanytape record, ire record, disc record,or any other suchrecord, or copiesthereof, of any communication orspo/enordsecuredinthemannerprohibited by this la# or 9. any person to replaythe same for anyother person or persons7. any person tocommunicate thecontentsthereof, either verbally or inriting, or ?. any person tofurnish transcriptionsthereof, hethercompleteorpartial,to any other person& 'he use of such recordor any copiesthereof as evidence in any civil, criminalinvestigation or trial of o,ensesmentionedinsection9hereof, shall notbe covered by this prohibition. #ec. 2. An' +erson 3$o 3il(ull' orBno3in)l' does or 3$o s$all aid"+er%i!" or cause !o &e done an' o( !$eac!s declared!o&eunla3(ul in!$e+recedin) sec!ion or 3$o viola!es !$e+rovisions o( !$e (ollo3in) sec!ion oro( an' order issued !$ereunder" oraids" +er%i!s" or causes suc$viola!ion s$all" u+on convic!ion!$ereo(" &e +unis$ed ---. #ec. 3. No!$in)con!ainedin!$isAc!" $o3ever" s$all render i! unla3(ulor +unis$a&le(oran'+eaceo=icer"3$o is au!$ori>ed &' a 3ri!!en ordero( !$eCour!" !oe-ecu!ean'o( !$eac!s declared!o&eunla3(ul in!$e!3o +recedin) sec!ions in casesinvolvin) !$e cri%es o( !reason"es+iona)e" +rovoBin) 3ar anddislo'al!' in case o( 3ar" +irac'"%u!in' in!$e $i)$seas" re&ellion"cons+irac' and +ro+osal !o co%%i!re&ellion" inci!in) !o re&ellion"sedi!ion" cons+irac' !o co%%i!sedi!ion" inci!in) !o sedi!ion"Bidna++in) as dened &' !$e RevisedPenal Code" and viola!ions o(Co%%on3eal!$ Ac! No. 414"+unis$in) es+iona)e and o!$ero=enses a)ains! na!ional securi!'CProvided" 2$a! suc$ 3ri!!en orders$all onl' &e issued or )ran!ed u+on3ri!!en a++lica!ion and !$ee-a%ina!ion under oa!$ ora=ir%a!iono(!$ea++lican!and!$e3i!nesses $e %a' +roduce and as$o3in)C (1) !$a! !$ere arereasona&le )rounds !o &elieve !$a!an' o( !$e cri%es enu%era!ed$ereina&ove $as &een co%%i!!ed or is&ein)co%%i!!edor is a&ou! !o&eco%%i!!edC Provided" $o3ever" 2$a!in cases involvin) !$e o=enses o(re&ellion" cons+irac' and +ro+osal !oco%%i! re&ellion" inci!in) !ore&ellion" sedi!ion" cons+irac' !oco%%i! sedi!ion" and inci!in) !osedi!ion" suc$ au!$ori!' s$all &e)ran!ed onl' u+on +rior +roo( !$a! are&ellionorac!so( sedi!ion" as!$ecase%a'&e" $aveac!uall'&eenorare&ein)co%%i!!edD (2) !$a!!$ereare reasona&le )rounds !o &elieve!$a! evidence 3ill &e o&!ainedessen!ial !o !$e convic!ion o( an'+erson (or" or !o !$e solu!ion o(" or !o!$e +reven!ion o(" an' o( suc$ cri%esDand (3) !$a! !$ere are no o!$er %eansreadil' availa&le(or o&!ainin)suc$evidence. ---+onditions for valid iretapping 8. any peace o,icer;. authoriNedbyarittenorderof the+ourt9. in cases involving the crimes oftreason, espionage, provo/ing ar anddisloyalty in case of ar, piracy,mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,conspiracy and proposal to commitrebellion, inciting to rebellion,sedition, conspiracy to commitsedition, inciting to sedition,/idnapping, espionage and othero,enses against national security& #ec. 8. An' co%%unica!ion ors+oBen 3ord" or !$e e-is!ence"con!en!s" su&s!ance" +ur+or!" e=ec!"or%eanin)o(!$esa%eoran'+ar!!$ereo(" or an' in(or%a!ion!$ereincon!ained o&!ained or secured &' an'+ersoninviola!iono( !$e+recedin)sec!ions o( !$is Ac! s$all no! &ead%issi&le in evidence in an' *udicial"?uasi-*udicial" le)isla!ive orad%inis!ra!ive $earin) orinves!i)a!ion.Informationobtainedinviolationof theanti"iretapping act is absolutelyinadmissible. Ramirez v. CA " 288 #CRA 569(1665) %ven a person privy to a communicationho records his private conversation ithanother ithout the /noledge of thelatter violates the anti"iretappingact.'he recording is inadmissible inevidence. (aanan v. )AC " 185 #CRA 112(1684)Salcedo*rta+ezv. CA " 235#CRA111 (1668)C. 0$a! Need NC9, -anuel Fuerrero,assisted by 4elicisimo Fuerrero, father ofthe defendants Fuerreros, 5led anapplicationforregistrationof land# thatnotithstanding the opposition of theheirs of +ristina Fuerrero, the courtruledthat -anuel Fuerreroonedthelot# that despiteoppositorsG appeal toahigher court, the .egister of 3eedsissued 2riginal +erti5cate of 'itle to theapplicant# that on there as 5led ith the.egister of 3eeds of .iNal a @3eedofDbsolute*ale@ purportedlye!ecutedby-anuel Fuerrero in favor of thedefendantsFuerreros# that the.egisterof 3eeds gave due course to theregistration of that deed# that on thesame day that the deed of sale asregistered, the defendants Fuerreroscausedto be notariNed an@Drticles ofPartnership@ of *t. +lareGs .ealty+ompany, =td., constituting themselvesas partners# that on *eptember ;E8,the defendants Fuerreros sold thedisputed lot in a @3eed of Dbsolute *ale@tothe*t. +lareGs.ealty+ompany, =td.#that by virtue thereof, the .egister of3eeds issued'+'inthenameof saidrealty company.2n 2ctober 8>, 8>E9, =aura +ervantestesti5ed that her mother, +ristinaFuerrero, hadbeensic/for alongtimebefore she died at the age of 7E9, thetrial court granted the motion anddeclared that =aura +ervantes, Iose+ervantes as ell as other itnessessimilarly situated, are dis$uali5ed totestify in the case.'he +D a,irmed the trial courtOsruling.IssueC6hether or not the itnesses=aura +ervantes and Iose +ervantes erecorrectly dis$uali5ed fromtestifying inthe case and their testimonies e!cluded.FeldCMpon the facts and under the la,this +ourt is fully persuaded that thea,irmative rulings of both the trial courtandthe+ourtof Dppealseremadeinerror.'he present case is not a claimordemand against the estate of thedeceased -anuel Fuerrero. 'hedefendants Fuerreros are not thee!ecutors or administrators orrepresentatives of suchdeceased. 'heyare being sued as claimants of onershipin their individual capacities of thedisputed lot. 'he lot is not a part of theestateof -anuel Fuerrero. Jence, theinapplicability of dead manGs rule. @It has been held that statutesproviding that a party in interest isincompetent to testify here the adverseparty is dead or insane, must be appliedstrictly inaccordanceiththeire!pressording, irrespectiveoftheirspirit. 'hela uses the ord Gagainst an e!ecutor oradministrator or other representative of adeceased person.G It should be noted thatafter the mention of an e!ecutor oradministrator the ords or otherrepresentative follos, hich means thatthe ord GrepresentativeG includes onlythose ho, li/e the e!ecutor oradministrator, are sued in theirrepresentative, not personal, capacity.Dndthat is emphasiNedby thelabyusing the ords Gagainst the estate ofsuch deceased persons,G hich conveytheideaof anestateactuallyonedbythedeceasedat thetimethecaseasbrought and that, therefore, it is only hisrights that are to be asserted anddefendant in the litigation by the personrepresenting him, not the personal rightsof such representative.@ (-oran, ibid., pp.8C>"8E8)'he plain truth is that:auraCervan!es and Eose Cervan!es are no!+ar!ies in !$e +resen! case" andnei!$er are !$e' assi)nors o( !$e+ar!ies nor G+ersons in 3$ose &e$al(a case is +rosecu!ed.G 2$e' are %ere3i!nessesby hose testimonies theplainti,saimedtoestablishthat it asnot +ristina Fuerrero, but DndresFuerrero, hoonedthedisputedlandat the time of its alleged sale to -anuelFuerrero# that +ristina Fuerrero did notreally sell but merely mortgaged theproperty to -anuel FuerreroAbra'amv. Recto23asten" 8#CRA268 (1642) :14781 31*an Dcross"e!amination of the dis$uali5editness is aaiver of thedeadmanOsprivilege, even if there as a continuingobjection. /ac!sCIuan+. Rsmael, obtainedaloanfrom Dlfonso Dbraham, *r. and e!ecutedapromissorynoteinfavorof thelatterpromising to pay the loan ithin >: daysithinterest. 'henotease!ecutedinthe presence of 4lorenciaT. Dbraham,the creditorGs ife, ho a,i!ed hersignature at the bottomthereof as aitness thereto. Mpon the maturity of thenote, a demand as made for itspayment, but the debtor failed to pay.2n 4ebruary >, 8>7?, DlfonsoDbraham, *r. died. 2ntheother hand,Iuan +. Rsmael died intestate on Dpril ;9,8>?; leaving the note still unpaid.In *pecial Proceedings for thesettlement of the intestate estate of IuanRsmael, 4lorenciaT. Vda. deDbraham,togetherithhersons, 5ledapleadingentitled @.eclamation@ demandingpayment of theamount representedbythe note. Ds soon as Priscilla .ecto"Sasten as appointed administratri!, theclaimants reproduced their @.eclamation@before the loer court and the same as5nally set for hearing. 'he counsel for theadministratri!interposedageneral andcontinuingobjectiontothetestimonyof4lorencia Vda.deDbraham invo/ing theprovisionsof *ection;C(c), .ule8;9ofthe.ules of +ourt.Joever, after theclaimant had testi5ed, he lengthily cross"e!amined her on the very matters againsthich he interposed a general objection.'he trial court issued in 2rder"3ecreealloingtheclaimagainst theintestateestate of Iuan +. Rsmael'he appellate court concluded that@the loer court erred in 5nding that theclaimants have established a just andvalid claim.IssueC6hether or not theifeof thedeceased as dis$uali5ed from testifying.FeldC2$ere 3as a 3aiver o( !$e+ro$i&i!ioncon!ained in #ec!ion24(c)" Rules 123 o( !$e Rules o(Cour!" 3$en !$e counsel (or !$ead%inis!ra!ri- e-!ensivel' cross-e-a%ined !$e 3i!ness on !$e ver'%a!!ers su&*ec! o( !$e +ro$i&i!ion.'he reason for the rule apparently is thata litigant cannot be permitted tospeculate as to hat his e!amination of aitness may bring forth. Javing made hisselection of one of to courses hich hemay pursue, he has noright, after hediscovers that the course selected is notto his advantage, and after he has put theoppositepartytothee!pense, andhasconsumed the time of courts in a trial ofthecaseinaccordanceiththecourseselected, to change his position and ma/eanother and di,erent selection. *uchcourse ould be unfair both to theopposite party and to the court andshould not be countenanced in any courtof justice(IV4rancisco, .ulesof +ourt,77 and special proceeding assubse$uently instituted for the settlementof his estate.Induecoursethesaidcompany5ledaclaimagainst the estate of .ichard '.4itNsimmons. In his anser to theamended claim the administratordeniedthe alleged indebtedness of the deceasedto the claimant.Itisadmittedthatall theprearboo/sand records of the company erecompletelydestroyedorlost duringthear so testimonies of itnesses ereadmitted.'he claimant called as itnesses -r.Jenry I. Kelden and -r. *amuel FarmeNy,vice"president"treasurer and president,respectively, of the claimant company, totestify on the status of the personalaccount of the deceased 4itNsimmonsith the company# but upon objection oftheadministratorthetrial courtrefusedto admit their testimony on that point onthe ground that said itnesses ereincompetentundersection;C(c) of .ule8;9, they being not only largestoc/holdersandmembersof theboardof directors but also vice"president"treasurerandpresident, respectively, ofthe claimant company.Issue& 6hetherornot theo,icersof acorporation hich is a party to an actionagainst an e!ecutor or administrator of adeceased person are dis$uali5ed fromtestifying as to any matter of factoccurring before the death of suchdeceased person.Feld& 2,icers and directors ofcorporations are not considered to beparties ithinthe meaningof the la.()"y Sav"ngs Ban* vs. +nos)Inasmuch as section ;C(c) of .ule 8;9 ofthe .ules of +ourtdis?ualies onl'+ar!ies or assi)nors o( +ar!ies" !$eo=icers andOor s!ocB$olders o( acor+ora!ion are no! dis?ualied (ro%!es!i('in) (or or a)ains! !$ecor+ora!ion3$ic$is a +ar!' !oanac!ion u+on a clai% or de%anda)ains! !$e es!a!e o( a deceased+erson as !o an' %a!!er o( (ac!occurrin)&e(ore!$edea!$o( suc$deceased +erson.#on/co v. 0ianzon" 59 P$il 468(1627) 27868 29se+Dction must be brought against theestate, notbytheestate, tobecoveredunder the dead manOs statute %scolin& 'hedeadmanOs ruledoes notapply in cadastral cases.%scolin& If there is no instrumentevidencing the claim, it ould be di,icultto prove the claim in the estateproceedingbecause of the deadmanOsstatute. Joever, if there is such aninstrument, itisnotbarredbythe deadmanOs statute (,e"ber v. ,e"ber)/ac!sC-arcelino'ongcoandDnastaciaVianNoncontractedmarriageonIuly?,87. -arcelinodiedleavingDnastaciaas his ido.'he niece of the deceased,Iosefa 'ongco, as named administratri!of the estate. It appears that shortlybefore the death of -arcelino 'ongco, hehad presented claims in a cadastral casein hich he had as/ed for titles to certainproperties inthenameof theconjugalpartnership consisting of himself and hisife, and that corresponding decrees forthese lots ere issued in the name of theconjugal partnershipnot longafter hisdeath. Inthecadastral case, theidobeganaction hen she presented a motion for arevision of certain decrees ithin theone"year period provided by the =and.egistration =a. Issue as joined by theadministratri!of theestate. Ddecisionasrenderedbyorderedthatinlieuofthe issued decrees, ne decrees andcerti5cates of title be issued as thee!clusive properties of DnastaciaVianNon. *ometimelater, amotionforane trial as presented ithaccumulated a,idavits by counsel for thelosing party (administratri!). 'his motionas denied by the trial judge. 'he administratri! of the estate beganaction against Dnastacia VianNon for therecovery of speci5ed property and fordamages. 'he court renders judgmentabsolving the defendant from thecomplaint. 'he motion for a ne trial asdenied by Jis Jonor, the trial judge.4rom both of the judgments hereinbeforementioned, the administratri! of theestate of -arcelino 'ongco had appealed.IssueC6hetherornot thetestimonyofthe ido should be discarded.FeldC+ounsel is eminently correct inemphasiNing that the object and purposeof this statute is to guardagainst thetemptation to give false testimony inregardtothetransactionis$uestiononthe part of the surviving party. Je has,hoever, neglected the e$ually importantrule that the la as designed to aid inarriving at the truth and as notdesigned to suppress the truth. 'he latice ma/es use of the ordGa)ains!.G 2$e ac!ions 3ere no!&rou)$!Ga)ains!G!$ead%inis!ra!ri-o( !$e es!a!e" nor 3ere !$e' &rou)$!u+on clai%s Ga)ains!G !$e es!a!e. Inthe 5rst case at bar, the action is one bythe administratri! to enforce demandG&'G !$e es!a!e. In the second case atbar, the same analogy holds true (or !$eclai% 3as +resen!ed in cadas!ral+roceedin)s 3$ere in one sense !$ereis no +lain!i= and !$ere is node(endan!.,oreover" a 3aiver 3as acco%+lis$ed3$en !$e adverse +ar!' under!ooB !ocross-e-a%ine!$ein!eres!ed+erson3i!$ res+ec! !o !$e +ro$i&i!ed%a!!ers. 'hereason (or !$e ruleis that ifpersons having a claim against the estateof thedeceasedor hispropertieserealloed to testify as to the supposedstatements made by him (deceasedperson), many ould be tempted tofalsely impute statements to deceasedpersons as the latter can no longer denyorrefutethem, thusunjustlysubjectingtheir properties or rights to false orunscrupulous claims or demands. 'hepurposeof thelaisto@guardagainstthe temptation to give false testimony inregardtothe transactionin$uestiononthe part of the surviving party.@6eareof theopinionthat theitnessas competent.(o+i v. CA" 188 #CRA 222 (1684) Jeirs of a deceased are (representatives)ithin the ambit of the dead manOsstatute# aivedbydefendant if he5lescounterclaim against plainti,# adverseparty may testify to transactions orcommunications ith deceased hichere made ith an agent of such personif the agents is still alive and can testifyas long as it is con5ned to thetransactionsE. Privile)ed Co%%unica!ionsPrivileged +ommunications8. marital;. attorney"client9. physician"patient7. priest"penitent?. state secrets #ec. 28.%is;, respondent*andiganbayan promulgated the.esolution, herein $uestioned, denyingthe e!clusion of petitioners in P+FF +ase1o. 99, fortheirrefusal tocomplyiththe conditions re$uired by respondentP+FFD++.D layers moved for areconsiderationof the aboveresolutionbut the same as denied by therespondent *andiganbayan. Jence, theD++.D layers 5led the petition forcer"orar".Issue& 6hether or not a layer mayrefuse in giving the identity of his client.Feld& PetitionersG contentions areimpressed ith merit.It is $uite apparent that petitioners ereimpleaded by the P+FF as co"defendantstoforcethemtodisclosetheidentityoftheir clients. +learly, respondent P+FF isnot after petitioners but the @bigger 5sh@as they say in street parlance.'he general rule inour jurisdictionasell as inthe Mnited*tates is that alayer may not invo/e the privilege andrefuse to divulge the name or identity ofthis client. Reasons&/irs!, the court has a right to /no thatthe client hose privileged information issought to be protected is Yesh and blood.#econd, the privilege begins to e!ist onlyaftertheattorney"clientrelationshiphasbeen established. 'he attorney"clientprivilege does not attach until there is aclient.2$ird, the privilege generally pertains tothe sub-ec !aer of the relationship./inall', due process considerationsre$uire that the opposing party should, asageneral rule, /nohis adversary. @Dpartysuingorsuedisentitledto/noho his opponent is.@ Je cannot beobliged to grope in the dar/ againstun/non forces. E-ce+!ions&+lient identity is privileged here astrong probability e!ists that revealingthe clientGs name ouldimplicate thatclient intheveryactivityfor hichhesought the layerGs advice.6heredisclosureouldopentheclientto civil liability# his identity is privileged.6here the governmentGs layers have nocaseagainstanattorneyGsclientunless,byrevealingtheclientGsname, thesaidname ould furnish the only lin/ thatould form the chain of testimonynecessarytoconvict anindividual of acrime, the clientGs name is privileged.*ummariNing these e!ceptions,informationrelatingtotheidentityof aclient mayfall ithintheambit of theprivilege hen the clientGs name itself hasan independent signi5cance, such thatdisclosure ould then reveal clientcon5dences. 6hat these cases unanimously see/ toavoidis thee!ploitationof thegeneralrule in hat may amount to a 5shinge!pedition by the prosecution.'he circumstances involving theengagement of layers in the case atbench, therefore, clearlyreveal thattheinstant case falls under at least toe!ceptions to the general rule. 4irst,disclosure of the allegedclientGs nameould lead to establish said clientGsconnection ith the very fact in issue ofthe case, hich is privileged information,becausetheprivilege, asstatedearlier,protects the subject matter or thesubstance (ithout hich there ould benot attorney"client relationship).'here is no $uestion that the preparationof the aforestateddocuments as partand parcel of petitionersG legal service totheir clients. -ore important, itconstituted an integral part of theirdutiesaslayers. Petitioners, therefore,have a legitimate fear that identifyingtheir clients ould implicate them in theveryactivityforhichlegal advicehadbeen sought,".e., the allegedaccumulationof ill"gottenealthintheaforementioned corporations.4urthermore, under the third maine!ception, revelation of the clientGs nameould obviously provide the necessarylin/ for the prosecution to build its case,here none otherise e!ists. It is thelin/, intheordsof Kaird, @thatouldinevitably formthe chain of testimonynecessary to convict the (client) of a . . .crime.@ 'he logical ne!us beteen name andnature of transaction is so intimate in thiscasethatit ouldbedi,icult tosimplydissociate one fromthe other. In thissense, the name is as much@communication@ as information revealeddirectly about the transaction in $uestionitself, acommunicationhichisclearlyand distinctly privileged. D layer cannotreveal such communication ithoute!posing himself to charges of violating aprinciple hich forms the bular/ of theentire attorney"client relationship..oss Eoel %ani(es!a!ion& it ispremature to apply the rules on evidencefor there is no case yet, hence, there is nocompulsiononthepartofthelayertodisclose the identity of there client.Barton v. Leyte Asp'alt andineral *il Co." 84 P$il. 638(1628):-21237 22%ar=etter from client to attorney obtained byadverse party, admitted authentic incourt, notprivilegedregardlesshetherlegallyorillegallyobtained(hataboutconstitutional rule of e!clusion onevidence obtained in violation of the rightto privacy of communication andcorrespondenceQ)# one ho overhears thecommunicationithor ithout clientOs/noledge is not privileged./ac!s& 'he plainti,is a citiNenof theMnited *tates, resident in the +ity of-anila, hile the defendant is acorporationorganiNedunder thelaofthePhilippineIslandsithitsprincipalo,ice in the +ity of +ebu. *aid companyappearstobetheonerbyavaluabledeposit of bituminous limestone andotherasphaltproducts, locatedin=eyteand/nonas theLuc"omine. 6illiamDnderson, as president and generalmanager of the defendant company,addressed a letter to the plainti, Karton,authoriNing the latter to sell the productsofthe =ucio mine inthe +ommonealthof Dustralia and 1eWealand upon ascale of prices indicated in said letter. Plainti, alleges that during the life of theagency indicated in %!hibit K, herendered services to the defendantcompanyintheayof advertisinganddemonstrating the products of thedefendant ande!pendedlargesums ofmoney in visiting various parts of theorld for the purpose of carrying on saidadvertising and demonstrations, inshipping to various parts of the orldsamples of the products of the defendant,and in otherise carrying on advertisingor/.Dnderson rote the plainti,, to the e,ectthat the company as behind ithconstructionandas not thenable tohandle big contracts. (%!hibit 44.) 2n-arch8;, Dndersonasin-anilaandthe to had an intervie, in the course ofhich the plainti, informed Dnderson ofthe *an 4rancisco order. Dndersonthereupon said that, oing to lac/ ofcapital, ade$uatefacilitieshadnotbeenprovided by the company for 5lling largeorders andsuggestedthat the plainti,had better hold up in the matter of ta/ingorders. 'he plainti, e!pressed surprise atthisandtoldDndersonthat hehadnotonlythe*an4ranciscoorder(hichhesays he e!hibited to Dnderson) but otherorders for large $uantities of bituminouslimestone to be shipped to Dustralia and*hanghai. In another intervieon thesame Dnderson de5nitely informed theplainti, that the contracts hich beclaimedtohaveprocuredouldnot be5lled. Karton sued for speci5c performance. Inthe course of the trial, the defendanto,eredinevidenceacarboncopyof aletter ritten by the plainti, to hisattorney in hich plainti, states, amongother things, that his pro5t from the *an4ranciscocontract ouldhavebeenatthe rateof eigthy"5vecents (gold) perton. 'he authenticity of this citydocument isadmitted, andhenit aso,eredinevidencebytheattorneyforthe defendant the counsel for the plainti,announcedthat hehadnoobjectiontotheintroductionof this carboncopyinevidence if counsel for the defendantould e!plain here this copy assecured. Mponthistheattorneyforthedefendant informed the court that hereceived the letter from the formerattorneys of the defendant ithoute!planationof themannerinhichthedocument had come into their possession.Mponthis theattorneyfor theplainti,made this announcement& @6e herebygive notice at this time that unless suchane!planationismade, e!plainingfullyho this carbon copy came into thepossession of the defendant company, oranyonerepresentingit, eproposetoobject to its admission on the ground thatit is a con5dential communicationbeteenclient andlayer.@ 1ofurtherinformation as then given by theattorney for the defendant as to themannerin hich the letterhad come tohishandsandthetrial judgethereupone!cludedthe document, onthe groundthat it as aprivilegedcommunicationbeteen client and attorney.Issue& 6hetherornotthelettershouldbe considered as privilegedcommunication bet. Dtty L client.Feld& 6e are of the opinionthat thisruling as erroneous# for even supposingthat theletter asithintheprivilegehichprotectscommunicationsbeteenattorney and client, this privilege as losthen the letter came to the hands of theadverse party. Dnd it ma/es no di,erencehotheadversaryac$uiredpossession.'he la protects the client fromthee,ect of disclosuresmade by him to hisattorney inthecon5denceof thelegalrelation, but hen such a document,containing admissions of the client,comestothehandofathirdparty, andreaches the adversary, it is admissible inevidence. In this connection -r. 6igmoresays& 'he la provides subjectivefreedomfortheclientbyassuringhim of e!emption from its processesof disclosure against himself or theattorney or their agents ofcommunication. 'his much, but notahit more, isnecessaryfor themaintenance of the privilege. *incethe means of preserving secrecy ofcommunicationareentirelyintheclientGs hands, and since theprivilegeisaderogationfromthegeneral testimonial duty and shouldbestrictlyconstrued, it ouldbeimproper toe!tenditsprohibitionto third persons ho obtain/noledgeof thecommunications.2ne ho overhears thecommunication, hether ith orithout theclientGs /noledge, isnot ithin the protection of theprivilege. 'hesameruleought toapply to one ho surreptitiouslyreads or obtains possession of adocument in original or copy.*rient )nsurance v. Revilla " 58 P$il.616 (1639) 38968 17se+Introductioninevidenceof apart of apaper by one party aives privilege as toother parts ofthe same riting# henapartyinvo/es K%., it isthepartyhoproducestheoriginal hoisdeemedtohaveintroduceditinevidence# contractfor attorneyOs fees is not privileged# thereis no partial aiver of privilege./ac!s& 'herespondent 'eal -otor +o.,Inc. is plainti, in a civil action institutedinthe+4Iof -anilaforthepurposeofrecovering upon to 5re insurancepolicies issuedbythe2rient Insurance+ompany, upon merchandise destroyedbya5re. Inoneof theclauses of thepolicies sued upon is a stipulation to thee,ect that all bene5t under the policyould be forfeited if, in case of loss, theclaimshouldberejectedbytheinsurerand action or suit should not becommenced ithin three months aftersuch rejection. In the anser of the2rient Insurance +ompany, interposed inthe case mentioned, it is alleged, by ayof defense, that the company rejected theclaimonDpril 8?, 8>;>, that noticeofsuchrejectionasgiventotheplainti,byletteronthesameday,andthatsuitas not instituted on the policy untilDugust 9, 8>;>, hichas more thanthreemonths after therejectionof theclaim. In the +ourse of the trial the itness %.-. Kachrach, president of the 'eal -otor+o., Inc., hilebeinge!aminedinchiefby the attorneys for the plainti,, andspea/ing of the circumstancessurrounding the institution of the action,said that he had reported certainconversations to plainti,Gs attorneys, andheadded& heaitedfor about aee/longer and not having heard anythingabout it, in the meantime, on the 89th ofIuly, he (Kachrach) received a letter fromtheirattorneysurginghimto5lethesecases. 'he attorney for the defendant,2rient Insurance +ompany, thereuponinterposed, as/ing that the itness bere$uired to produce the letter referred tofrom -r. Fuevara, or else his anser bestric/en out. 'he itness replied that hehad the letter ith him and that he hadno objection to shothat part of theletter in hich Fuevara urged himtoproceed ith the cases. Mpon beingas/ed aboutthe other partof the letter,the itness said that the other partcontainedprivate matter, @beteentheattorney and ourselves. 'hereupon theattorney for the defendant, 2rientInsurance +ompany, said he ould li/e tosee the letter, in$uiring as to its date. 'heitnessrepliedthatitboredateof Iuly89, 8>;># anduponthecourt in$uiringhether the itness had any objection tothe reading of the letter by the attorneyfor the defendant, the itness repliedthat he ished to consult ith hisattorney. Mponthistheattorneyfortheadversary party, the 2rient Insurance+ompany, suggested that he ould li/e tohave the letter mar/ed ithout hisreading it and it as accordingly mar/edas %!hibit 7>. 'he attorney then said& @Invieof the productionof the letter, Iithdratheobjectiontothestatementof the itness as to its contents,@ and headded& @I noas/ the permission of thecourt to read the letter for myinformation.@ 'he court thereuponin$uired of the attorney for the 'eal-otor +o., Inc., hether he had anyobjection, and the attorney observed thathe ould have no objection to thedisclosing of that part of the letter hichreferred e!actly to the point of the urgingof the5lingof thecomplaints, andheadded& @Mnfortunately, theotherpart ofthe letter being a communicationbeteen a client and attorney, I donGtthin/, if your Jonor please, it canbedisclosed ithout the consent of both.@Issue& 6hetherornotacommunicationmay be presented only in part, e!cludingother parts for being privilegedcommunication.Feld&'he introduction in evidence ofpart of a paper riting by one partyaives privilege as to other parts of thesame riting. 6hen part of a riting is introduced inevidence by one litigant, his adversary isentitledtouseotherpartsof thesameriting, so far as relevant to the issues inthe case# and to this end the attorney ofthe latter has a right to inspect theritingandtore$uireitsproductionincourt.Ditnessfortheplainti,madeanoralstatement as to the substance of part of aletter hichhadbeenreceivedby theplainti,fromitsattorney, andhenthefact as revealed that the communicationhad been made by letter, the attorney forthe defendant re$uested that the itnessbe re$uired to produce the letter in court,and if not, that his anser should bestric/enout. 'his inlegal e,ect asademandfortheproductionof @thebestevidence,@itbeingaell"/nonruleofla that a itness cannot be permitted togive oral testimony as to the contents of apaper riting hich canbeproduced incourt. Inresponse tothis re$uest thatportion of the letter to hich the itnesshadsupposedly referredas readintothe record. It as stated in the court by the attorneyfor the plainti,, in opposing theintroduction of other portions of theletter in proof, that the other parts ereprivileged, because they relatedtotheterms of employment beteenattorneyand client, or to the fee to be paid to theattorney. 6ithrespecttothispointitisdi,icult toseehoacontract for feescould be considered privileged. Irrelevantit might, under certain circumstances,certainly be, but not privileged. 2f coursecontractsbeteenattorneysandclientsare inherently personal and privatematters, but they are a constant subjectof litigation, and contracts relating tofees are essentially not of privilegednature. Privilege primarily refers tocommunicationsfromclient toattorney,an idea hich of course includescommunications fromattorneytoclientrelative to privileged matters. Kut, even supposing that the mattercontained in the letter and ithheld fromthe inspection of the adversary asoriginally of a privileged nature, theprivilege as aived by the introductionin evidence of part of the letter. 'heprovisioninsection;79, the tug GI. -.'aylorG san/ hile engaged in helping totoacarYoatoftheKaltimoreL2hio.ailroad across the 3elaare .iver atPhiladelphia. 'he accident asapparentlyunusual innature, thecauseof it still being un/non. 4ive of the ninecre members ere droned. 'hree dayslater the tug oners and theunderriters employed a la 5rm, ofhich respondent 4ortenbaugh is amember, to defend them against potentialsuitsbyrepresentativesofthedeceasedcre members and to sue the railroad fordamages to the tug. Dpublichearingasheldon-arch7,8>79, before the Mnited *tates*teamboatInspectors,athichthefoursurvivors ere e!amined. 'his testimonyasrecordedandmadeavailabletoallinterested parties. *hortly thereafter,4ortenbaugh privately intervieed thesurvivors and too/ statements from themith an eye toard the anticipatedlitigation# the survivors signed thesestatementson-arch;>./or!en&au)$also in!ervie3ed o!$er +ersons&elieved !o $ave so%e in(or%a!ionrela!in) !o !$e acciden! and in so%ecases $e%ade%e%orandao( 3$a!!$e' !old $i%.Dt the time hen4ortenbaughsecuredthe statements ofthesurvivors, representativesof toofthe deceased cre members had been incommunication ith him. 'he 5fthclaimant, petitionerherein, brought suitin a federal court under the Iones Dct on1ovember ;C, 8>79, naming asdefendants the to tug oners,individually and as partners, and therailroad. 2ne year later, petitioner 5led 9>interrogatories directed to the tugoners.2$e38!$in!erro)a!or'readCI#!a!e 3$e!$er an' s!a!e%en!s o( !$e%e%&ers o( !$e cre3s o( !$e 2u)s IE.,. 2a'lorI and IP$iladel+$iaI or o( an'o!$er vessel 3ere !aBen in connec!ion3i!$!$e!o3in)o(!$ecarPoa!and!$e sinBin) o( !$e 2u) IEo$n ,.2a'lorI.'he tug oners, through 4ortenbaugh,ansered all of the interrogatories e!cept1o. 9