EVALUATION - ReliefWeb · Final Report Roger Zetter (Team Leader) James Mackie Héloïse Ruaudel Maaria Seppänen Noemi Cascone Consortium composed of: 2019/1 This Evaluation was

2019/1

EVALUATION Evaluation on Forced Displacement and Finnish Development Policy

Evaluation on Finland’s Development Policy and Cooperation

EVALUATION

EVALUATION ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Final Report

Roger Zetter (Team Leader) James Mackie

Héloïse RuaudelMaaria SeppänenNoemi Cascone

Consortium composed of:

2019/1

This Evaluation was commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to Particip GmbH/Indufor. This report is the product of the authors, and responsibility

for the accuracy of the data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not

necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

Lead Company

© Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2019This report can be downloaded through the home page of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs http://formin.finland.fi/developmentpolicy/evaluations

Contact: [email protected]

ISBN 978-952-281-602-3 (pdf) ISSN 2342-8341

Cover design and layout: Innocorp Oy

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................. IX

TIIVISTELMÄ ................................................................................................ 1

REFERAT ....................................................................................................... 2

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................... 3

YHTEENVETO .................................................................................................4

SAMMANFATTNING .........................................................................................9

SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 14

KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................ 18

1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 241.1 Overview and objectives ............................................................................................241.2 Outline of the report ....................................................................................................25

2 APPROACH, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS ......................................... 262.1 Approach ......................................................................................................................262.2 Evaluation questions and matrix ...............................................................................262.3 Methodology ................................................................................................................27

2.3.1 Document analysis .............................................................................................................272.3.2 Key Informant Interviews: Government of Finland and Partners .......................................282.3.3 Country/regional case studies ...........................................................................................292.3.4 Financial Tracking ..............................................................................................................30

2.4 Limitations and mitigation strategies ........................................................................30

3 CONTEXT ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 333.1 Setting the context ......................................................................................................333.2 Core concepts: forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus .......................................................................35

3.2.1 Forced displacement ..........................................................................................................353.2.2 Humanitarian-Development Nexus ....................................................................................433.2.3 FD and the HDN: what are the links?.................................................................................48

3.3. MFA: development and humanitarian context .........................................................483.3.1 Development and humanitarian policy framework ............................................................483.3.2 The HDN, the HPDN and the MFA – Making Connections ...............................................503.3.3 Policy Coherence in Development .....................................................................................51

4 FINDINGS ............................................................................................... 534.1 Finland’s approach to Forced Displacement and the Humanitarian- Development Nexus in the context of its Development Policies ............................534.2 The adequacy of Finland’s approach to and policyinfluenceonFDandHDN(EQ2) ....................................................................664.3 Establishing policy coherence between approaches to FD and the HDN and Finland’s development policies ..................................................704.4 Finland’s development cooperation and humanitarianfinancialdisbursements ......................................................................74

4.4.1 Findings on development cooperation (ODA total) ...........................................................754.4.2 Findings on sectoral distribution in the three case study countries ....................................77

5 CONCLUSIONS .........................................................................................795.1 Finland’s approach to Forced Displacement and the Humanitarian- Development Nexus in the context of its Development Policies (basedonEQ1) ............................................................................................................795.2 AdequacyofFinland’sapproachtoandpolicyinfluenceonFD andtheHDN(basedonEQ2).....................................................................................815.3 Policy coherence between approaches to FD and the HDN/HPDN andFinland’sdevelopmentpolicies(basedonEQ3) .............................................825.4 Transectingconclusions(basedonEQ1,EQ2,EQ3) ...........................................835.5 Concluding Overview on the strengths and weaknesses of Finnish Development Policy ......................................................................................85

6 RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................876.1 Mainstreaming the concepts of the HDN/HPDN and FD (basedonConclusions1–5) ......................................................................................876.2 Enhancingcapacitytoinfluenceandmanagepolicypriorities fortheHDN/HPDNandFD(basedonConclusions1and5) ...................................916.3 Enhancing and promoting PCD for HDN/HPDN and FD (basedonConclusions2,5–8) ..................................................................................926.4 Promotingprotection,fundamentalhumanrightsandhumanitarian principles and values in the context of FD and HDN/HPDN (basedonConclusion9) .............................................................................................936.5 Enhancing advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion inFDandHDN/HPDN(basedonConclusion10) .....................................................946.6 Enhancing advocacy and programming on women and girls intheHDN/HPDNandFD(basedonConclusion11) ...............................................966.7 Promotingtheprivatesector(basedonConclusion12) .........................................976.8 Summary of Recommendations ................................................................................99

REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 101

THE EVALUATION TEAM .............................................................................. 107

Annex 1 Terms of Reference ...............................................................................................110

Annex 2 Evaluation matrix...................................................................................................130

Annex 3 Documents consulted............................................................................................132

Annex 4 People interviewed ...............................................................................................135

Annex 5 Evaluation Question 1 on EQ1 on Finland’s approach to Forced Displacement and the Humanitarian-Development Nexus ...................................144

Annex 6 Evaluation Question 2 on Adequacy of Finland’s approach to FD and HDN ........161

Annex 7 Evaluation Question 3 on Policy Coherence .........................................................170

Annex 8 Case study Afghanistan ........................................................................................185

Annex 9 Case Study Somalia..............................................................................................199

Annex 10 Case Study MENA ................................................................................................212

Annex 11 Theory of Change .................................................................................................221

Annex 12 Methodological explanation of QAB database analysis ........................................225

TABLES

Table 1 Disbursements of Finland for ‘exclusive’ ODA 2012–2017 (in MEUR) ...................75

Table 2 Expenditure on refugee reception in Finland in Millions of Euros (MEUR) .............76

Table 3 Disbursements of humanitarian aid 2012–2017, total (MEUR) ...............................76

Table 4 Disbursements of ODA funding (total) 2012–2017 to the case study countries (including civilian crisis management and humanitarian aid) (MEUR) ....... 76

Table 5 Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2012–Dec 2013 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA. ...............................................................226

Table 6 Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2016–Dec 2017 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA. ...............................................................227

FIGURES

Figure 1 Evaluation process ..................................................................................................25

Figure 2 Disbursements 2012–2017 on development cooperation, ODA total (MEUR) ...................................................................................................75

Figure 3 Funding proposals approved by the QAB 2012–2013 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA, ODA total (MEUR) ........................................................77

Figure 4 Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2016–Dec 2017 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA, ODA total (MEUR) ..................................78

Figure 5 Disbursements extended to Afghanistan by year 2012–2018 ...............................188

Figure 6 Disbursements extended for Afghanistan 2012–2018 by channel .......................189

Figure 7 Disbursed extensions to Afghanistan 2012–2018 .................................................195

Figure 8 Disbursement for Somalia by year 2012–2018. ....................................................205

Figure 9 Disbursements extended to Somalia 2012–2018 according to DAC CRS code. .... 206

Figure 10 Draft Reconstructed ToC from Inception Report ..................................................221

Figure 11 Revised ToC using an HPD Nexus approach to Migration & Forced Displacement ...........................................................................................223

Figure 12 Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2012–Dec 2013 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA. ...............................................................226

Figure 13 Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2016–Dec 2017 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA. ...............................................................228

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACP African,CaribbeanandPacificGroupofStatesAMISOM AfricanUnionMissioninSomaliaARTF AfghanistanReconstructionTrustFundAS AlShabaab(Somalia)AU AfricanUnionCBT CashbasedtransferCCM CivilianCrisisManagementCEAS CommonEuropeanAsylumSystemCIMIC Civilian-MilitaryCooperationCIVMIL CivilianMilitaryCMC CrisisManagementCentreCODEV EUCouncilWorkingPartyonDevelopmentCooperationCRRF ComprehensiveRefugeeResponseFrameworkCRS CommonReportingStandardCSI CommonSpaceInitiativeCSO CivilSocietyOrganisationCSR ConventionontheStatusofRefugees1951andits1967ProtocolDAC DevelopmentAssistanceCommitteeDANIDA DanishInternationalDevelopmentAgencyDEU DevelopmentEvaluationUnitDG DirectorateGeneralDIE DeutscheInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitikDPC DevelopmentPolicyCommitteeDPP DevelopmentPolicyProgrammeDPR DevelopmentPolicyResultsReportDSI DurableSolutionsInitiativeEASO EuropeanAsylumSupportOfficeEBA ExpertgruppenförbiståndsanalysEC EuropeanCommissionECDPM EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyManagementECHO Directorate-GeneralforEuropeanCivilProtectionandHumanitarianAidOperationsEFSD EuropeanFundforSustainableDevelopmentEIB EuropeanInvestmentBankEM EvaluationMatrixEMN EuropeanMigrationNetworkEMS EvaluationManagementServicesEMSA EuropeanMaritimeSafetyAgencyEQ EvaluationQuestionEQAE ExternalQualityAssuranceExpertESRF EconomicandSocialResearchFoundation

EU EuropeanUnionEUCAP EuropeanUnionRegionalMaritimeCapacityBuildingfortheHornofAfrica andtheWesternIndianOceanEUMS EuropeanUnionMemberState/sEUNAVFOR EuropeanUnionNavalForceEUROPOL EuropeanPoliceOfficeEUTF EuropeanUnionEmergencyTrustFundforAfricaEXPO Directorate-GeneralforExternalPoliciesoftheUnionFCA FinnChurchAidFD ForcedDisplacementFDPC FinnishDevelopmentPolicyCommitteeFELM FinnishEvangelicalLutheranMissionFGM FemaleGenitalMutilationFRC FinnishRedCrossFRONTEX EuropeanBorderandCoastGuardAgencyGBV Gender-basedviolenceGCM GlobalCompactforSafe,OrderlyandRegularMigrationGCR GlobalCompactonRefugeesGNI GrossNationalIncomeGRC GlobalCompactonRefugeesGRID GlobalReportonInternalDisplacementHALO HazardousAreaLife-supportOrganizationHD HumanitarianDevelopmentHDN Humanitarian-DevelopmentNexusHDP HumanitarianDevelopmentPolicyHEIG HumanitarianEvaluationInterestGroupHMA HumanitarianMineActionHPD HumanitarianPeaceDevelopmentHPDN HumanitarianPeaceDevelopmentNexusHQ HeadquarterHR HumanRightsHRBA HumanRightsBasedApproachICEI MaastrichtComplutenseInstituteofInternationalStudiesICRC InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossICT InformationandCommunicationTechnologiesIDA InternationalDevelopmentAssociationIDMC InternalDisplacementMonitoringCenterIDP InternallyDisplacedPersonIFRC InternationalFederationofRedCrossSocietiesIGAD IntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopmentIHL InternationalHumanitarianLawILO InternationalLabourOrganisationIOM InternationalOrganisationforMigrationIRL InternationalRefugeeLawISAF InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce

JC JudgementCriteriaJSRP JusticeandSecurityResearchProgramKEO Kehitysyhteistyöosasto(DepartmentforDevelopmentPolicy,inFinnish)KII KeyInformantsInterviewKNOMAD GlobalKnowledgePartnershiponMigrationandDevelopmentLOTFA LawandOrderTrustFundforAfghanistanLRRD LinkingRelief,ReconstructionandDevelopmentLSE LondonSchoolofEconomicsLSV PhysiciansforsocialresponsibilityMAG MineAdvisoryGroupMDG MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsMDN Migration-DevelopmentNexusMDTF Multi-DonorTrustFundMEAE MinistryofEconomicAffairsandEmploymentMEAL Monitoring,Evaluation,AccountabilityandLearningMENA MiddleEastandNorthAfricaMEUR MillionofEurosMFA MinistryforForeignAffairs,FinlandMIDA MigrationforDevelopmentinAfricaMIGRI FinnishImmigrationServiceMJ MinistryofJusticeMOLSAMD MinistryofLabour,SocialAffairs,MartyrdomandtheDisabledMPF Multi-PartnerFundforSomaliaMPI MigrationPolicyInstitute,FinlandMPs MembersofParliamentMS MemberStateMTF TaskForceonMigrationMUSD MillionofUnitedStatedDollarsNATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationNDICI Neighbourhood,DevelopmentandInternationalCooperationInstrumentNDP NewDealPartnershipNGDO Non-GovernmentalDevelopmentOrganisationNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationNSAs Non-StateActorsOCHA OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairsODA OfficialdevelopmentassistanceODI OverseasDevelopmentInstituteOECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentPCD PolicyCoherenceforDevelopmentPCM Finland’smigrationpolicyPCSD PolicyCoherenceforSustainableDevelopmentPDC DevelopmentPolicyCommitteePDSB PolicyDevelopmentandStudiesBranchPIP PolicyandInfluencingPlans

PM PrimeMinisterPMO PrimeMinister’sOfficePPA PolicyPriorityAreasPQAT PerformanceandQualityAssuranceTeamPRT ProvincialReconstructionTeamQA QualityAssuranceQAB QualityAssuranceBoardQMS QualityManagementSystemRBM ResultBasedManagementRDPP RegionalDevelopmentandProtectionProgramme3RP SyrianRegionalRefugeeandResiliencePlanRSC RefugeeStudiesCentreRSD RefugeeStatutDeterminationSALAM SupportAfghanistanLivelihoodsandMobilitySASK TradeUnionSolidarityCentreofFinlandSDGs SustainableDevelopmentGoalsSEZs SpecialEnterpriseZonesSHF SomaliaHumanitarianFundSIDA SwedishInternationalDevelopmentAgencySRHR SexualandReproductiveHealthandRightsSTD SexuallyTransmittedDiseaseSWD StaffWorkingDocumentTWG TemporaryWorkingGroupUN UnitedNationUNAMA UnitedNationsAssistanceMissioninAfghanistanUNCHR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNEG UnitedNationsEvaluationGroupUNESCO UnitedNationsEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganizationUNFPA UnitedNationsPopulationFundUNHCR TheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesUNICEF UnitedNationsInternationalChildren’sEmergencyFundUNRWA UnitedNationsReliefandWorksAgencyUNSC UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilUNSCR UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution(s)USAID USAgencyforInternationalDevelopmentVAT ValueAddedTaxWASH Watern,SanitationandHygieneWB WorldBankWFP WorldFoodProgrammeWHS WorldHumanitarianSummit

1EVALUATIONEVALUATION ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY 1EVALUATION

TIIVISTELMÄ

Evaluointitarkasteleesitä,“mitenjohdonmukaisestiSuomenkehityspolitiikkaajasenpakkomuuttoonliittyviätavoitteitaonpantutoimeenjamitenjohdonmu-kaisuuttavoitaisiinvahvistaa”Suomenkehitysyhteistyössä.

Suomi onmonenvälisten ja kahdenvälisten yhteistyötahojensa arvostama toi-mijajayleisestiottaenSuomenpolitiikkaonhyvinyhteensopivakumppaniensatavoitteidenkanssa.Suomenpoliittinenvaikutuskansainvälisestionmerkittäväerityisestisellaisillapainopistealueillakuinnaistenjatyttöjensekävammaistenoikeudet.

Suomionkuitenkinvainrajoitetussamäärinsitoutunutnousevaankansainväli-seenpyrkimykseennivoasaumattomastiyhteenhumanitaarinenapujakehitys-tavoitteet, japakkomuutonkäsiteontoistaiseksivainrajoitetustitoiminnallis-tettuulkoministeriössä(vaihtoehtoinentermipakkomuutolle:tahdonvastainenmuuttoliike). Suomella on pitkä ja kansainvälisesti tunnustettu politiikkajoh-donmukaisuudentavoittelemisenperinne,muttaseeivieläolerakentanutvah-vaa kehikkoa sille, miten taataan johdonmukaisuus humanitaarisen apupoli-tiikan ja kehityspolitiikan toteuttamisen välillä. Tämäheikentää vuoden2016kehityspoliittisen ohjelman tavoitteiden saavuttamista ja johdonmukaisuuttamuidenläheistenulkopolitiikanlohkojenkanssakutenrauhanrakentamisenjasiviilikriisinhallinnankanssa.

Vuodesta2015alkaenmaahanmuuttojasenhallintaonleimannutSuomenpoli-tiikkaa.Ulkoministeriönsisälläsekäsenjamuidenvaltionhallinnonministeriöi-denvälilläonjännitteitäsiitä,mitenjamissämäärinkehitysyhteistyötätulisijavoisikäyttäämuuttoliikkeenhillitsemiseen,eikänäitäjännitteitäjaniistäseu-raavaajohdonmukaisuudenpuutettaoleratkaistu.

Pakkomuutonkäsitteenkautta tarkasteltunaSuomenkahdenvälisestäkehitys-yhteistyöstäjamulti-bi-avustapaljastuujoitakinmerkittäviäaukkoja,kutentukitietyille haavoittuville ryhmille (sisäiset pakolaiset, pakolaisuus kaupunkiolo-suhteissasekäilmastopakolaisuus).

Evaluointisuositteleemm.,ettäulkoministeriöpaneetoimeensisäisiäuudistuk-sia,joillahumanitaarisenavunjakehityksenvälinensidos,neksus,sekäpakko-muutonhuomioonottaminenajetaansisäänorganisaatioonsekävuoden2020kehityspoliittiseenohjelmaan;vahvistaahumanitaarisenavunjakehitysyhteis-työnvälistäohjelmansuunnitteluajabudjetointia;tarkistaaohjelmiensatavoite-tasoapoliittisenvaikutuksentakaamiseksijasamallavälttääliiallisiintavoittei-siinpyrkimistä;kehittääkorkeantasonvaikuttamistyötähaavoittuvienjanaistenjatyttöjenasemanparantamiseksipakkomuutontilanteissajakaksoissidoksessasekä’kolmois’-sidoksenedistämiseksi(kolmoissidos:humanitaarinenapu-rau-hanrakentaminen-kehitystavoitteet)sekävahvistaaniissäyksityisensektorinjaammattiyhdistystenroolia.

Avainsanat:1 humanitaarinen, 2 kehitysyhteistyö, 3 neksus, kaksois- ja kolmoissidos, 4 pakkomuutto, 5 politiikkajohdonmukaisuus

2 EVALUATION EVALUATION ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

REFERAT

DennautvärderingbedömerkoherenseniFinlandsutvecklingspolitikochdessmålangåendepåtvingadmigration,samthurkoherensenkanförbättras.

Finlandharetthögtanseendeblandsinamultilateralaochbilateralapartners,ochharpolicyersomligger i linjemeddessasamarbetspartners.Finlandsharstortinflytandevadgällerprioriteradeområdensomberörkvinnor,flickor,per-sonermedfunktionsnedsättningarochinkludering.

DäremotharFinlandendastibegränsadutsträckningtagitdelavinternationellaerfarenhetervadgällersamspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveck-ling, samtnärdet gäller ofrivilligmigration.Samtidigt somFinlandhar godaerfarenheter av att främja koherensmellan olika policyområden, saknasmanettbraramverk förkoherensmellanhumanitärapolicyerochutvecklingspoli-cyerochderaskopplingtillutvecklingspolicyprogrammetfrån2016,ochandragrundläggandepolicyområdensåsomfredsbyggandeochcivilkrishantering.

Finlandspolicy-arbeteharsedan2015domineratsavmigrationsfrågor.Detharfunnitsmotsättningarinomutrikesministerietochmellanutrikesministerietochandraministerierom,ochhur,utvecklingssamarbetetskallanvändasförattnåmigrationsmål,vilkettyderpåenbristpåkoherensmellanolikapolicyområden.

Ennärmaregranskningavtvångsmigrationsfrågorvisarattdetfinnsbetydan-de svagheter i Finlandsbilaterala ochmulti-bilaterala bistånd till vissautsat-ta grupper– internflyktingar,migranter i städer ochflyktingar relaterade tillklimatförändringar.

Utrikesministeriet rekommenderasatt inledaett internt förändringsarbete föratt införliva samspeletmellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling ochtvångsmigrationsfrågor inom organisationen och i utvecklingspolicyprogram-met för 2020.Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas även att stärka kopplingar-namellanhumanitärtstödochutvecklingssamarbete ibudgetering,ochattseövermedvilkamedelmankanbehållapolicyinflytandeochskapaettfokusinomprogrammen.Enannanrekommendationärattutvecklapåverkansarbetetvadgällerfunktionsnedsättningar, inkludering,kvinnorochflickorinomramenavpåtvingadmigration,samspeletmellanutvecklingspolicyochhumanitärpolicy,och i skärningspunktenmellanhumanitärt stöd, fredochutveckling.Utrikes- miniterietföreslåsävenattverkaförattnäringslivochfackförbundkanspelaenmeraktivroll.

Nyckelord:1 humanitär, 2 utvecklingssamarbete, 3 samspel, 4 tvångsmigration, 5 koherens

3EVALUATIONEVALUATION ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

ABSTRACT

The evaluation assesses ‘how coherently [Finland’s] development policy anditstargetsrelatingtoforceddisplacementhavebeenimplementedandhowthecoherencecouldbeenhanced’.

Finlandisvaluedbyitsmulti-andbi-lateralpartnerswithwhomitspoliciesaregenerallywellaligned;itspolicyinfluenceinpriorityareassuchaswomenandgirlsanddisabilityandinclusionissignificant.

However,Finlandhasonlylimitedengagementwithbothemerginginternationalexperienceofthehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN),andtheconceptofforceddisplacement(FD).WhilstFinlandhasatrackrecordinpolicycoherence,ithasnotestablishedastrongframeworkforcoherencebetweenitshumanitarian anddevelopment policies, their linkage to the 2016DevelopmentPolicyPro-gramme(DPP)orotherpolicy‘pillars’suchaspeacebuildingandciviliancrisismanagement.

Since2015domesticmigrationagendashavedominatedFinland’spolicymak-ing.TensionwithintheMFAandbetweentheMFAandotherministriesovertheuseofdevelopmentcooperationformigrationobjectiveshighlightsunresolvedincoherenciesbetweenthesepolicies.

A forced displacement lens reveals significant gaps in Finland’s bilateral andmulti-bilateralassistancetosomevulnerablepopulations-internallydisplacedpeople,thosedisplacedtourbanareasandclimatechangeinduceddisplacement.

The MFA is recommended to: deploy internal reform processes to embedtheHDNandFDintheMFAandthe2020DPP;strengtheninternal linkagesbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentprogrammingandbudgeting; reviewthemeanstosustainpolicyinfluenceandavoidprogrammeover-reach;devel-ophighleveladvocacyfordisabilityandinclusion,andwomenandgirlsinthe contextoftheHDNandFD,andthe‘triple’humanitarian–peace-developmentnexus (HPDN); facilitate amoreactive roleof the corporate sector and tradeunions.

Keywords:1 humanitarian, 2 development cooperation, 3 nexus, 4 forced displacement, 5 coherence


YHTEENVETO

JohdantoSuomionkansainvälisestierittäinarvostettukehitysyhteistyönjahumanitaari-senavuntoimijajapuolestapuhuja,jotapidetäänperiaatteellisenaavunantajanajajohtavanakehityksenpolitiikkajohdonmukaisuudenedistäjänä.

Evaluointiontehtyulkoministeriöntoimeksiannostajakattaaajanjaksonvuo-desta2012 vuoteen2018.Evaluoinnin tavoitteenaon toimeksiannonmukaantarkastellasitä,”mitenjohdonmukaisestiSuomenkehityspolitiikkajasenpakko- muuttoonliittyvättavoitteetontoteutettu,jamitenjohdonmukaisuuttavoitai-siinvahvistaaSuomenkehitysyhteistyössä”.Evaluointionkohdistunuterityises-tikolmeenkysymykseen:

• Mitenjamissämäärinulkoministeriöonkehittänytselkeitäpakko-muuttoon(myös:tahdonvastaiseenmuuttoliikkeeseen)kohdistuviajahumanitaarisenavunjakehityspolitiikantavoitteetyhteennivoviatoimintatapojaevaluoinnintarkastelujaksonaikana?

• Missämäärinjamitennämätoimintatavatja-ohjeetovatolleetriittä-vätvälineetvastataniihinhaasteisiin,joitapakkomuuttojahumani-taarisenavunjakehitystavoitteidenyhteensovittaminen(kaksoissidos,neksus)asettaaSuomellekehitysyhteistyönjahumanitaarisenavuntoimijana?

• Missämäärinjamitennämävuosien2012ja2016kehityspoliittisiinohjelmiinperustuvattoimintatavatja-ohjeetedistävätjohdonmukai-suuttaSuomenkehityspolitiikanjamuidenpolitiikkalohkojenvälillä?

Evaluointionformatiivinen,jonkatulostentarkoituksenaonauttaaoppimispro-sessissa.Tavoitteenaonensisijaisestiedistäätietoajaymmärrystähumanitaari-senavunjakehitystavoitteidenkaksoissidoksesta,neksuksesta,japakkomuutonkäsitteestä ulkoministeriössä sekä auttaa näiden toiminnallistamisessa ulko-ministeriönkäytännöissä.TästäkaksoissidoksestaonSuomessatotuttukäyttä-määntermiäjatkumo,vaikkatiedossaon,ettäkyseeiolelineaarisesta”ensin-sitten” prosessista. Kehitysyhteistyön ja humanitaarisen avun tehokkaampiyhteensovittaminen pakkomuuttoon kohdistuvissa toimenpiteissä lisäisi poli-tiikkajohdonmukaisuuttaulkoministeriönsisälläerityisestisuunnitteillaolevas-sa vuoden 2020 kehityspoliittisessa ohjelmassa sekä laajemminkin suhteessayhteistyötahoihin.

Käytetyt menetelmätEvaluoinnissa jasenanalyysissäonkäytettyuseitasekäensikädenettävälilli-sen tiedonkeruunmenetelmiä.Erityisestikäytössäonollutneljämenetelmää: 1)dokumenttianalyysi;2)123avainhenkilöidenhaastatteluaSuomenhallituksenja ulkoministeriön virkailijoiden sekä kansainvälisten kumppaneiden kanssa; 3) kolme tapaustutkimusta: Afganistan, Somalia ja Jordania/Libanon/Syyria


koskienSyyrianpakolaiskriisiä;4)rahavirtojenanalyysiliittyenkehityshankkei-denjahumanitaarisenavunpainotuksiin.

Evaluoinninrajoituksistaepäilemättämerkittävinonollutsenetupainottunei-suus,eliseettäkansainvälisetkäsitteetpakkomuuttojahumanitaarisenavunjakehityksenneksus,kaksoisside,ovatvieläsuhteellisentuntemattomiakäsitteitäulkoministeriössä.

Tausta Evaluoinnin taustana on kaksimerkittäväämaailmanlaajuista kehityskulkua.Ensimmäinen on pakkomuuton (tai tahdonvastaisenmuuttoliikkeen) syiden,muotojen jadynamiikanenenevämonimutkaisuus,historiallisenkorkeakoto-aansiirtymäänjoutuneidenlukumäärä(virallisestinoin68,5miljoonaavuonna2017)jayhäpitemmiksikäyvätpakolaisuudenajanjaksot.Muidenvaikutustenlisäksinämäolosuhteetmuodostavatglobaalillatasollahaasteenrauhallejatur-vallisuudelle,ihmistenhyvinvoinnillesekäkestävänkehityksentavoitteidensaa-vuttamiselle(Agenda2030).

TässätilanteessajaerityisestiEuroopanvuoden2015niinsanotunpakolaiskrii-sinjälkeenSuomionmuidenEuroopanunioninjäsenmaidentavoinsuorittanutkehityspolitiikkansa uudelleenarviointia ja joutunut pohtimaan uusista lähtö-kohdista pitkäaikaista sitoutumistaan kehitysyhteistyöhön ja vähäisemmässämäärinmyöshumanitaariseenapuun.Näitäpolitiikkalohkojaonyhäenenevässämitassaalettukatsoakansallisestamaahanmuutonnäkökulmasta.

Toinentaustatekijäevaluoinnilleonpitkistyneenpakolaisuudenjapakkomuu-ton globaalien käsittelytapojen uudelleenmäärittely.Onmuodostumassa kan-sainvälinenyhteisymmärryssiitä,mitennäitäkoskevaapolitiikkaajastrategioitatulee lähestyä.Sitäkutsutaanhumanitaarisenavunjakehitystavoitteidenkak-soissidokseksijaseonvahvistettukansainvälisessäpakolaispöytäkirjassa(Glo-balCompactonRefugees),jokasuomeksitunnetaanmyösnimelläglobaalikom-pakti.Kyseessäonparadigmanmuutos,jatämänmuutoksenkauttaonhavaittu,ettäpitkittynytpakolaisuustarjoaakehitysyhteistyöllesekähaasteitaettämah-dollisuuksia.Kaksoissidoksen,jatkumonelineksuksen,ytimessäontavoitehel-pottaapakolaisiavastaanottavienmaidenjayhteisöjentilannetta,kunvähitellensiirrytäänpakolaisiinkohdistuvastahumanitaarisestaavustapakolaistenpitem-mäntähtäyksenitsenäistätoimeentuloaedistäviintoimiin.

MyösSuomionväistämättämukananäissämaailmanlaajuisissakehityskuluissa ja haasteissa. Siinämäärin kuin ulkoministeriö saavuttaa johdonmukaisuutta humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysyhteistyön välisessä suhteessa, se vahvistaakyvykkyyttäänsuunnitellajatoteuttaakokonaisvaltaisiatoimenpiteitäjasamallapitääkiinnikansainvälisistävelvoitteistaan.

HavainnotMerkittävinevaluoinninhavaintoon,ettävaikkaulkoministeriöpyrkiisovitta-maan pakkomuuttoon ja humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysvoitteiden kaksoissi-dokseenliittyvätmääritelmänsäjakannanottonsakansainvälistensuuntausten,normienjakäsitteidenmukaisiksi,seeiolekehittänytselkeitäjavakiintuneitapolitiikkaohjauksenjaohjelmoinnintapojakehitysyhteistyönjahumanitaarisenavunnivomiseksiyhteen.MainitutkäsitteeteivätvieläedistäSuomenkehitys-


politiikantavoitteidensaavuttamistajavahvistaniitä.Toisaaltaonselviämerk-kejäsiitä,ettäulkoministeriölläonvalmiusottaanämäkäsitteetsyvällisemminkäyttöön,samoinkuinettäsilläolisikykyätukeaohjelmoinnissaankansainvä-lisesti nousevaa yhteisymmärrystä ”kolmoissidoksen” vahvistamisen tarpeesta(kolmoissidos: humanitaarinen apu-rauhanrakennus-kehitystavoitteet). Silti vaihteleva, epätasainen ote on havaittavissa erityisesti kenttätoiminnassa jaohjelmientasolla.Vuoden2015Euroopanpakolaiskriisinvaikutusonvielänäh-tävissäniin, ettäkehitysyhteistyötäpidetään lisääntyvässämäärinmuuttoliik-keenhallinnankeinona.

Ulkoministeriönkahdenvälisessäjamulti-bi-avussaonmerkittäviäaukkojakak-soissidoksenjapakkomuutonsuhteen:sisäisetpakolaiset,ihmisoikeusperustai-suus,pakolaisuuskaupunkiolosuhteissa,ilmastopakolaisuus,pakolaistenoma-ehtoinentoimeentulo,haavoittuvaisetryhmätsekäyksityisensektorinrooli.

Huolimattapitkästä ja tunnustetustapolitiikkajohdonmukaisuuden tavoittele-misenperinteestäänSuomeneivielävoidakatsoarakentaneenvahvaajohdon-mukaisuuttatukevaakehikkoahumanitaarisenapupolitiikanjakehityspolitiikantavoitteidenvälille,vaikkatarpeellisetmekanismitovatolemassa.

Mitäpoliittiseenvaikuttamiseentulee,Suomeapidetäänluotettavanakumppa-nina, jollaonselkeät,vakiintuneetpainopistealueetkutennaiset ja (tyttö)lap-set,vammaisetjaerityistarpeitaomaavathenkilöt.MuttakokonaisuutenaottaenSuomieioletoiminnallaanvahvastiedistänytkaksoissidokseenjapakkomuut-toonliittyviästrategioitajapolitiikkaakansainvälisilläareenoilla.

EvaluoinnissaonselkeästinoussutesiinSuomenmerkittäväasemanaisten jatyttöjenoikeuksienedistäjänä,jatämänvahvuudeneteenpäinvieminenontaus-tallauseissaevaluoinninsuosituksissa.Suomenmenestyksekäsvaikuttamistyökansainvälisilläareenoillaliittyenvammaistenasemaanpakolaisolosuhteissaonlaajastiarvostettujatunnustettu,muttaulkoministeriönpolitiikkaohjauksenjatoimintatapojentulisiollaparemminlinjassanousevienteemojenkutenkaksois-sidoksen,kolmoissidoksenjapakkomuutonkanssa.

JohtopäätöksetEvaluoinnistaonvedettyseuraavatpääasiallisetjohtopäätökset:

1. Huolimatta edistyksestä pakkomuuton ja kaksoissidoksen huomioonotta-misessa käsitteinä, niiden tarkoituksenmukaisuus (relevanssi) politiikka-ohjauksessa sekä ulkoministeriön ohjelmoinnissa on edelleen kohtuullisenrajoitettu.Näidenkäsitteidenpotentiaaliaeiolevielätäysinkäytettykoko-naisvaltaisten lähestymistapojen vahvistamiseksi siten, että kehitystä jahumanitaaristaapuakoskevapolitiikkaolisivateriyhteyksissäyhtenäisiä.

2. Ulkoministeriö ja laajemminkin Suomen hallitus eivät ole vielä pystyneetsovittamaanyhteenkeskenäänristiriidassaoleviamuuttoliikkeenhallinnantavoitteitajakehitysyhteistyötätilanteessa,jonkavuoden2015Euroopanlaa-juinenpakolaiskriisiaiheutti.

3. Suunnitteillaolevaulkoministeriönsisäinenkehitysyhteistyöntoimintatapo-jenuudistussekätuorehumanitaarisenavunjakehityksenkaksoissidoksenorganisaationlaajuinen toimeenpanosuunnitelma tarjoavat oikea-aikaisen


mahdollisuudenkirkastaakäsitteenmäärittelyäjaluodajohdonmukaisempia,pakkomuuttoonjakaksoissidokseenkohdistuviatoimintamalleja.

4. Suomionhyvinasemoitunutvoidakseenedelleenedistääkansainvälisestinou-sevaakolmoissidosta(humanitaarinenapu-rauhanrakentaminen-kehitys).

5. VaikkaSuomenpolitiikkavaikuttaminenkansainvälisestiontoiminuthyvinsellaisillaperinteisillä, vakiintuneillapainopistealueilla kuinnaisten ja tyt-töjenasemajaoikeudet,useatrakenteelliset, toiminnallisetsekä institutio-naalisettekijätsaavataikaan,ettäulkoministeriönpolitiikkaeioleniinvai-kuttavaakuinsevoisiollapakkomuuttoon jakaksois- jakolmoissidokseenliittyvissäkysymyksissä.

6. Pakkomuutonjakaksois-jakolmoissidoksenrajoittunutkäsitteellistäminenulkoministeriössäonestänytpolitiikkajohdonmukaisuudeneteenpäinviemis-täniihinliittyvissäkysymyksissä.SisäisetjohdonmukaisuudenpuutteeteivätkuitenkaanolevielänäkyneetSuomenkeskustelukumppaneillekansainväli-silläareenoilla.

7. Olemassaolevienkoordinaationmekanismien–kutenmuuttopoliittinentyö-ryhmä–mandaatiteivätoleolleetriittävätratkaisemaanhallituksensisäisiäpolitiikanepäjohdonmukaisuuksia.

8. Suomikunnioittaa yleismaailmallisia arvoja, ihmisoikeuksia jahumanitaa-risiasuojelunperiaatteita,muttaniitäeiolepolitikkaohjauksellakattavastitoiminnallistettupakkomuutontilanteissajakaksois-jakolmoissidoksessa.

9. Ulkoministeriölläolisiedelleentilaalaajentaavaikuttamistyötäänvammais-tenjahaavoittuvaistensekänaistenjatyttöjenasemanedistämisessäpakko-muutonsekäkaksois-jakolmoissidoksenyhteydessä.

10.Yksityisensektorinroolieivieläoleniinvahva,ettäsemerkittävästiedistäisiSuomenasemaakansainvälisesti.

SuosituksetEvaluoinninperusteellatehdäänseitsemänpääasiallistasuositusta,joitarapor-tissatarkennetaan:

1. Suositellaan, että ulkoministeriö panee toimeen olemassa olevat tai suun-nitellut sisäiset aloitteet, jotka liittyvät tiedonhallinnan ja toimintatapojenuudistamiseen.Suositellaanmyös,ettäulkoministeriöottaakäyttöönstrate-gioita jahallinnon tapoja, jotka lisäävätymmärrystäkaksois- jakolmoissi-doksesta ja pakkomuutosta ja auttavat niiden huomioimista suunnitteillaolevassa vuoden 2020 kehityspoliittisessa ohjelmassa. Ohjelmassa tulisihuomioidamyöshavaitutpakkomuuttoonliittyvätkehitysyhteistyönaukot.Humanitaarisenavun jakehityspolitiikan sekäbudjetoinninvälistä linkkiätulisivahvistaatukemallayhteisiäongelma-analyysejätoisiaantäydentävänohjelmoinnin saavuttamiseksi sekä kokeilemalla niiden välillä joustavia budjetoinninmalleja.


2. Suositellaan, ettäulkoministeriö tarkistaapolitiikkavaikuttamisensakeinotja välineet kaksois- ja kolmoissidoksen suhteen samalla välttäen liiallisiintavoitteisiinpyrkimistäsekäniin,ettäaloitteidenseurantaeivaarannu.

3. Politiikkajohdonmukaisuudenlisäämiseksisuositellaan,ettäulkoministeriövaltavirtaistaa kaksoissidoksen, pakkomuuton ja kolmoissidoksen käsitteetkoko organisaation laajuisesti. Ulkoministeriö voisi myös ottaa aktiivisenroolin hallituksen sisäisten, kehityspolitiikan ja maahanmuuttopolitiikanvälistenjännitystenjaepäjohdonmukaisuuksienratkaisemiseksiesimerkiksiministeriöidenvälisenmuuttoliikepoliittisentyöryhmänavulla.Sisäministe-riönjaulkoministeriönyhteisestitilaamattutkimuksetmuuttoliikkeensyistä,malleistajadynamiikastaesimerkiksijoissakinkumppanimaissavoisivattar-jotapohjan jaetulleymmärryksellekehityksen jamuuttoliikkeensuhteesta,jotenneauttaisivattuottamaanparempiapolitiikkalinjauksia.

4. Suositellaan, ettäulkoministeriö vahvistaa sitoutumistaan ihmis- japerus-oikeuksiin sekähumanitaarisiinperiaatteisiin suhteessapakkomuuttoon jakaksois-jakolmoissidokseen.

5. Suosittellaan,ettäulkoministeriö tulee liittääselkeästi ja järjestelmällisestivammaiset jaerityistarpeitaomaavathenkilötpakkomuuttoakoskeviinpit-käntähtäimenkehityspoliittisiintavoitteisiinsekäkaksois-jakolmoissidok-seen.Lisäksiuositellaan,ettätähänliittyenulkoministeriönostaavammai-suuteenliittyvänpoliittisenvaikuttamisensauudelletasollekansainvälisesti.

6. Suositellaan, etttä ulkoministeriö vahvistaa naisten ja tyttöjen oikeuksienedistämistäkansainvälisestikaksois-jakolmoissidoksensuhteensekäyleen-säpakkomuuttoonliittyvissäkysymyksissä.

7. Ulkoministeriötäsuositellaanrohkaisemaanjaedistämäänyksityisensekto-rinyritystenjaammattiyhdistystenrooliakehityspolitiikassajahumanitaari-senavunjakehitysyhteistyönvälisessäsidoksessa.


SAMMANFATTNING

InledningInternationelltsettärFinlandenhögtanseddaktörinomhumanitärabistånd,ochsessomenprincipfastgivaresamtförebildvadgällerpolicy-koherensinomutvecklingsområdet.

Dennautvärderingomfattarperiodenfrån2012tillslutetpå2018ochgjordespåuppdragavFinlandsutrikesministerium.Utvärderingensövergripandemåläratt”bedömahurkonsekventFinlandsutvecklingspolitikochdessmålsättningarangåendepåtvingadmigrationhargenomförts, samthurkoherensenkan för-bättras”.Merspecifiktharutvärderingenriktatinsigpåtrefrågor:

• Hurochivilkenutsträckningharutrikesministeriettagitframtydligaförhållningssätttillpåtvingadmigrationochsamspeletmellanhumani-tärtstödochlångsiktigutvecklingunderutvärderingsperioden?

• HurochivilkenutsträckningharFinlandsförhållningssätttillellertolkningavpåtvingadmigration,ochsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,svaratmotdenutmaningsomFinlandstårinförsomstatligaktörinomutvecklingsfrågorochhumanitärafrågor?

• Hurochivilkenutsträckninghardessaförhållningssätt,somgrundarsigiutvecklingspolicyprogrammenfrån2012och2016,bidragittillattskapapolicy-koherensiFinland?

Dettaärenframåtblickandeutvärderingmedfokuspålärande.Detövergripan-desyftetärattförbättrakunskapenochmedvetenhetenom,ochförverkligandetav,samspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,ochavbegrep-pet ”ofrivilligmigration” inomutrikesministeriet.Genom att åstadkomma enstörresamstämmighetmellanutvecklingssamarbeteochhumanitärtbiståndvadgällerpåtvingadmigration,kommerpolicykoherensenattökainomutrikesmi-nisteriet,särskilt idetkommandeutvecklingspolicyprogrammet för2020,ochförministerietssamarbetspartners.

MetodUtvärderingengenomfördesmedhjälpavfleraolikametoderförinsamlingochanalysavbådeprimärdataochsekundärdata.Fyrametoderanvändes:1)doku-mentanalys,2)intervjuermed123representanterfördenfinskaregeringenochutrikesministerietssamarbetspartners,3) tre fallstudier:Afghanistan,Somaliaoch Jordanien/Libanon/Syrien (med fokuspåden syriskaflyktingkrisen) och4) kostnadsanalys av prioriteringar för utvecklingssamarbete och humanitärtbistånd.

Denstörstabegränsningvarattutvärderingengjordespåetttidigtskedevadgäl-lerutrikesministerietsengagemangifrågorsomberörsamspeletmellanhuma-nitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,samtofrivilligmigration.


KontextUtvärderingengjordesmotbakgrundavtvåviktigaglobalaskeenden.Denförstaärdealltmerkomplexadrivkrafterna,dynamikenochmönstretsomstyrtvångs-migrationen.Antaletflyktingarivärlden,runt68,5miljonerofficielltregistrera-deunder2017,haraldrigvarithögre,ochtvångsflyttningenvararalltidlängretidsperioder.Jämteandraeffekter innebärdetta storaglobalautmaningar förfred,säkerhetochmänskligtvälbefinnandesamtfördeglobalamålenförhållbarutveckling2030.

Idettasammanhangochdensåkalladeeuropeiskamigrations-/flyktingkrisenår2015,harFinland,liksomövrigamedlemsstateriEuropeiskaUnionenomvärde-ratsittlångvarigaengagemangförutvecklingssamarbeteoch,imindreutsträck-ning,humanitärtbistånd.Dessapolicyerprojiceraspånationellnivå iökandeutsträckninggenomen”migrations-lins”.

Det andra globala skeendet är den omstrukturering som ägt rum av globalaåtgärderförlångvarigaflyktingtillståndochtillståndavpåtvingadmigration.Ettinternationellt förhållningssätttillstrategi-ochpolicyutvecklingharväxtfram–samspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,somunderstödsavdetGlobalaAvtaletomFlyktingar.Paradigmskiftettaribeaktandeattlång-varigatillståndavofrivilligmigrationskaparbådeutmaningarochmöjligheterförutveckling.Attlindrakonsekvensernafördemottagandeländernaochsam-hällena,samtidigtsommangårfrånhumanitärtbiståndtillmerlångsiktigochbärkraftigtstödtilltvångsflyttadefolkgrupper,ärhuvudelementidettasamspel.

Finlandäroundvikligenendelavdennaglobalautvecklingochdessaglobalautmaningar.Enmersamstämmigpolitikskullestärkautrikesministeriets för-mågaattformaochgenomföraettintegreratförhållningsätttillsinautvecklings-policyer ochhumanitärapolicyer, samtidigt somat respektera internationellaåtaganden.

ResultatDetmest framträdanderesultatetavutvärderingenäratt, trotsattutrikesmi-nisteriets definitioner och ställningstaganden överensstämmer med globalatrender,normerochkonceptnärdetgällersamspeletmellanhumanitärtstöd,långsiktigutvecklingochofrivilligmigration,finnsdetännuingatydligtdefinie-radeochetablerademetoderförpolicyutvecklingförskärningspunktenmellanutvecklingssamarbeteochdethumanitärabiståndet.DessakonceptbidrarännuintemednågotmervärdevadgällerFinlandspolicyprioriteringar.Däremotfinnsdetettväxandespelrumförattinförlivasådanatillvägagångssätt,samtkapacitetattstödjaettbättresamförståndkringsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstöd,fredochutveckling.TrotsdettaärFinlandsengagemang idenna frågavarierande,vilketmärkssärskilt tydligtpå lokalnivåochprogramnivå.Effekternaavdeneuropeiskamigrations-/flyktingkrisenfrån2015,somharinneburitattutveck-lingssamarbetetanväntsihögregradsomettmedelförattmotverkamigration,görsigfortfarandepåminda.

Det finns betydande brister i omfattning av utrikesministeriets policyer omsamspeletochtvångsmigration:internflyktingar,rättighetsbaseratstöd,tvångs-flyttningenistäder,flyktingarrelateradetillklimatförändring,självförsörjning,utsatthetochdenprivatasektornsdeltagande.


Angåendepolicykoherensiutvecklingssammanhangharutrikesministeriet,trotsfullgodaprocesserochsin långaocherkändaerfarenhet,ännu inte tillräckligtutvecklatramverkförattskapapolicy-koherensmellanutvecklingspolitiskamålochhumanitärtstödikontextavofrivilligmigration.

ÄvenomFinlandsessomentillförlitligsamarbetspartnermedtydligapolicy-pri-oritering,texvadgällerkvinnorochflickor,funktionsnedsättningochinklude-ring,såharman,överlag,intepåettproaktivtsättutövatinflytandepåstrategierochpolicyeriförhållandetillsamspeletochtvångsmigrationpåettinternatio-nelltplan.

Finlandsstyrka–attverkaförochprioriterakvinnorsochflickorsrättigheter–kommerframtydligtpåfleraställeniutvärderingen,ochfleraavrekommenda-tionernafokuserarpåhurdennastyrkakanvidareutvecklas.DeframgångarsomFinlandsinternationellapåverkansarbeteröntifrågaomintegreringavpolicyergällandefunktionsnedsättningochinkluderingihumanitärtbiståndochutveck-lingssamarbete är vida erkända. Finlands policyer och praxis skulle däremotkunnaliggamerilinjemeddegryendekonceptenvadgällersamspeletmellanhumanitärt stödoch långsiktigutveckling, samspeletmellanhumanitärt stöd,fredochutvecklingsamttvångsmigrationsfrågor.

SlutsatserDehuvudsakligaslutsatsernaavutvärderingenärföljande:

1. Trots ett ökandeengagemang för företeelser sompåtvingadmigrationochsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,ärFinlandsrollipolicy-ochprogramutvecklingbegränsad.Detfinnsenstor,ännuinteutnytt-jad,potentialattbidratillmerintegrerademetoderförpolicyutvecklinginomutvecklingssamarbetetochdethumanitärabiståndet.

2. Utrikesministerietochdenfinskaregeringenistortharintelyckatsenamot-stridigatendenser(sompåskyndadesavdeneuropeiska”migrationskrisen”2015)mellanmigrations-ochutvecklingspolicyer.

3. Den pågående reformen av praxis inom utvecklingspolicy och den inter-na handlingsplanen för processer i samspeletmellan humanitärt stöd ochlångsiktigutveckling inomutrikesministerietgermöjlighet tillatt tydliggö-rakonceptochskapaenmersammanhängandepolicy-arbete i förhållandetillofrivilligmigrationochsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling.

4. Finlandbefinnersig iettbra lägeattstärkaengagemanget fördetväxande internationella stödet till samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd, fred ochutveckling.

5. ÄvenomFinlandspolicyinflytandeharvaritstortinomtraditionellapolicy-områdensåsomkvinnorsochflickorsrättigheter,finnsdetflerastrukturella, operationella och institutionella faktorer sompå ettnegativt sätt påverkarutrikesministeriets påverkan på policyer inom tvångsmigration, samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling, och samspelet mellanhumanitärtstöd,fredochutveckling.


6. Enbegränsad tillämpningavvissakonceptharhållit tillbaka framstegvadgällerpolicykoherenspåutvecklingsområdet isambandmedofrivilligmig-ration,samspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,ochsam-speletmellanhumanitärtstöd,fredochutveckling.DessainremotsättningarhardäremotintevaritsynligaförFinlandsexternasamtalspartners.

7. Nuvarande samordningsmekanismer såsom migrationsarbetsgruppen,har inte haft tillräckliga befogenheter att lösa policymotstridigheter inomregeringen.

8. Finlandsbeaktandeav ”universellavärden”,grundläggandemänskliga rät-tigheter, humanitäraprinciper ochhumanitärt beskyddhar inte genomsy-ratpolicyerochvärderingargällandepåtvingadmigration,samspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,ochsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstöd,fredochutveckling.

9. Detfinnsutrymmeförattytterligarestärkapåverkansarbeteochprogramförfunktionsvariationer,inkluderingochkvinnorsochflickorsrättigheterinomramenförtvångsmigration,samspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,ochsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstöd,fredochutveckling.

10.DetprivatanäringslivetsdeltagandeärintetillräckligtstortförattdetpåettmeningsfulltsättskakunnabidratillFinlandsinternationellaroll.

RekommendationerUtvärderingen mynnar ut i sju huvudrekommendationer, som presenteras irapporten:

1. Med hjälp av lämpliga kunskapshanteringsplattformar och det pågåendeförändringsarbetet,rekommenderasutrikesministerietatttaframstrategierochprocesser sombidrar till att förbättra förståelsenoch integreringenavkoncept som samspeletmellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling,samspelet mellan humanitärt stöd, fred och utveckling samt tvångsmig-ration. Dessa koncept bör integreras med utvecklingsprioriteringar inomutvecklingspolicyprogrammetför2020.Internakopplingarmellanprogramochbudgetförhumanitärtbiståndochutvecklingssamarbetebörförstärkasgenomgemensammaanalysersomledertillprogrammedtydligasynergier.Dekanocksåstärkasgenomattexperimentmedmerflexiblafinansierings-metoder som medger stöd till både humanitära ändamål och utveckling. Brister inom de fyra olika policyområdena bör hanteras inom ramen förutvecklingspolicyprogrammetför2020.

2. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att se över sina verktyg och tillväga-gångssättavseendepolicypåverkanochprogramutveckling inomramenförsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstödoch långsiktigutveckling,ochsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstöd,fredochutveckling,förattförsäkrasigomfortsattinflytande,motverkaspridningochtillförsäkraadekvatuppföljning.

3. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att använda och integrera samspeletmellanhumanitärtstödoch långsiktigutveckling,samspeletmellanhuma-nitärt stöd, fred och utveckling och tvångsmigrationsfrågor för att stärkapolicykoherensiutvecklingssammanhang.Utrikesministerietbörocksåspela en aktiv roll i att lösa nuvarande motsättningar inom regeringen mellan


utvecklings- och migrationspolicyer, framförallt med hjälp av den minis-terieöverskridande migrationsarbetsgruppen. Utrikesministeriet och inri-kesministeriet kan till exempel tillsammansbeställa utredningar för att taredapåorsaker,mönsterochprocessergällandemigrationochförflyttningisamarbetsländer.Dettakanbidratillgemensammainsikterochskapabättrepolicyer.

4. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att öka sitt engagemang förmänskliga rättigheter och humanitära principer i samband med samspelet mellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,samspeletmellanhumanitärtstöd,fredochutvecklingochmedtvångsmigrationsfrågor.

5. Utrikesministeriet rekommenderas att på ett tydligare sätt införliva frågoromfunktionsnedsättningochinkluderingisambandmedsamspeletmellan humanitärt stöd och långsiktig utveckling, samspelet mellan humanitärtstöd,fredochutvecklingochmedtvångsmigrationsfrågor.Utrikesministerietrekommenderasävenattutvidgasittglobalapåverkansarbeteförfrågorsomrörfunktionsnedsättningochinkluderingidessasammanhang.

6. Utrikesministerietrekommenderasattstärkasittinternationellapåverkans-arbeteförkvinnorsochflickorsrättigheterisambandmedsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstödochlångsiktigutveckling,ochsamspeletmellanhumanitärtstöd,fredochutveckling.Kopplingarnamellanpolicyerförkvinnorochflickor somflyktingarbörocksåstärkas.

7. Utrikesministerietrekommenderasattuppmuntraochgöradetenklare förnäringsliv och fackförbund att spela enmer aktiv roll i genomförandet avutvecklingspolicyer i sambandmed samspeletmellanhumanitärt stödochlångsiktigutveckling.


SUMMARY

Introduction Internationally, Finland is a highly respected development andhumanitarianactorandadvocate,valuedasaprincipleddonorandasaleadingexponentofpolicycoherencefordevelopment.

Covering the period 2012 until late-2018, the main objective of the evalua-tion,commissionedbytheMinistryforForeignAffairs(MFA)ofFinland,isto‘assesshowcoherentlyFinland’sdevelopmentpolicyanditstargetsrelatingtoforceddisplacementhavebeen implementedandhowthecoherencecouldbeenhanced’.Specifically,theevaluationhasaddressedthreequestions:

• HowandtowhatextenthastheMFAdevelopedclearapproachestoforceddisplacementandthehumanitarian-developmentnexusover theevaluationperiod?

• TowhatextentandhowhasFinland’sevolvingapproachto/interpreta-tionofforceddisplacementandthehumanitarian-developmentnexusbeenanadequateresponsetothechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?

• Towhatextentandhowdotheseapproaches,rootedinthe2012and2016DevelopmentPolicyProgrammeshelpestablishpolicycoherencebetweenFinnishpolicies?

Thisisaformativeevaluation,steeringtheoutputstowardsalearningprocess,themainpurposeofwhichistoincreaseknowledge,awarenessandtheopera-tionalisationofthehumanitarian-developmentnexusandtheconceptofforceddisplacementwithintheMFA.Aligningdevelopmentcooperationandhumani-tarianassistanceprogrammingmoreeffectively in relation to forceddisplace-mentwillenhancepolicycoherencewithintheMFA,notablyintheforthcoming2020DevelopmentPolicyProgramme(DPP),andwithitspartners.

MethodologyTheevaluationdeployedamixedmethodsapproachusingbothprimaryandsec-ondarydatacollectionandanalysis.Fourmethodswereused:1)Documentanal-ysis;2)KeyInformantInterviewswiththeGovernmentofFinlandandtheMFA’smainpartnerscomprising123keyinformants;3)Threecasestudies–Afghani-stan,SomaliaandJordan/Lebanon/Syria (covering theSyrian refugee crisis); 4)Financialtrackinginrelationtodevelopmentandhumanitarianpriorities.

Amongstthelimitationsofthestudy,themostsignificantisitsprematurityinrelationtotheMFA’slimitedengagementtodatewiththeinternationalconceptsofthehumanitarian-developmentnexusandforceddisplacement.


Context Two significant global developments provide the backdrop to this evaluation.The first is the growing complexity of the drivers, dynamics and patterns offorceddisplacement, thehistoricallyhighnumbersof thosedisplaced–some68.5millionofficiallydocumentedworldwidein2017–andtheincreasinglypro-tractednatureofdisplacement.Amongstmanyotherimpacts,theseconditionsconstitutemajorglobalchallengesforpeaceandsecurity,humanwellbeingandthe2030SustainableDevelopmentGoals.

Withinthiscontextandtheso-calledEuropeanmigration/refugeecrisisin2015,Finland,likeallEuropeanUnionMemberStates,hasreassesseditslongstandingcommitment todevelopment co-operationand, toa lesser extent,humanitar-ianassistance.Thesepoliciesareincreasinglyprojectedthroughanationallevel‘migrationlens’.

Reconfiguring global action for protracted refugee and forced displacementsituationsisthesecondcontextualfactor:aninternationalapproachtostrategyandpolicymakingisemerging–thehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN),underpinnedby theGlobalCompact onRefugees (GCR).This paradigm shiftrecognisesthatprotractedconditionsofforceddisplacement(FD)posedevelop-mentchallengesandopportunities.Mediatingtheimpactsonreceivingcountriesandcommunitieswhilst,transitioningfromhumanitarianassistancetolonger-term,sustainableself-reliancefordisplacedpopulationsarecoreelementsofthenexus.

Finland is inevitably engagedwith theseglobaldevelopments and challenges. Achieving policy coherence between these precepts offers the potential tostrengthentheMFA’scapacitytodesignandimplementanintegratedapproachforitsdevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicies,whilstensuringthatitfulfilsitsinternationalcommitments.

FindingsTheprincipalfindingisthatwhilsttheMFAalignsitsdefinitionsandpositionsontheHDNandFDwithcurrentinternationaltrends,normsandconcepts, ithasnotdevelopedclearlyformulatedandwell-establishedapproachesthateffec-tively inform itspolicymakingandprogrammes fordevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistanceinacoherentandcomprehensivefashion.Thecon-ceptsdonotyetaddvalueandstrengthtoFinland’spolicypriorities.However,thereisgrowingmomentumtoembedsuchapproaches,aswellasthecapacitytosupporttheemergingconsensusforthetriplenexusofhumanitarian-peace-development(HPDN).Evenso,engagementisunevenandparticularlynotice-ableatfieldandprogrammelevel.Theimpactsofthe2015Europeanmigration/refugeecrisis,afterwhichdevelopmentcooperationhasbeenincreasinglypro-motedasaninstrumentofmigrationcontrol,arestillbeingexperienced.

TherearesignificantgapsinMFApolicycoverageofthenexusandforceddis-placement:internallydisplacedpersons(IDPs),humanrights-basedapproaches, urban displacement, climate change, self-reliance, vulnerability, and private sectorengagement.


Onpromotingpolicycoherencefordevelopment(PCD),despitehavingadequatemechanismsinplaceandalongtrackrecordacknowledgedamongitspartners,theMFAdoesnotyethaveastrongframeworktohelpestablishpolicycoherencebetweenitscurrentpolicyprioritiesandthenexusandFD.

Onpolicyinfluence,althoughFinlandisperceivedasareliablepartnerwithwell-establishedpolicypriorities–e.g.forwomenandgirls,anddisabilityandinclu-sion–onthewholeithasnotproactivelyinfluencedthedevelopmentofstrate-giesandpoliciesforthenexusorFDininternationalfora.

Finland’sstrengthinpromotingandprioritisingtherightsofwomenandgirlsis apparent inmanyparts of the evaluation and the scope for enhancing thisstrength features across several recommendations. The success of Finland’sinternationaladvocacyfordisabilityandinclusionpoliciesinhumanitariananddevelopmentworkiswidelyrecognised,althoughitspoliciesandpracticescouldbebetteralignedwithemergingdevelopmentsinthecontextofthenexus,thetriplenexusandforceddisplacement.

ConclusionsTheprincipalconclusionsoftheevaluationare:

1. Despiteprogress in engagingwith the concepts ofFDand theHDN, their relevance to policymaking and programming remains somewhat limited;their potential to strengthen integrated approaches to development andhumanitarianpolicymakingindifferentcontextsisnotyetfullydeveloped.

2. TheMFA,andmoregenerallythegovernmentofFinland,havenotyetbeenable to reconcile the contradictory tendencies, (precipitated by the 2015thresholdmomentoftheEuropean‘migrationcrisis’),betweenmigrationanddevelopmentpolicies.

3. TheReformofDevelopmentPolicyPracticesandInternalActionPlanforHDNprocesseswithintheMFAprovideatimelyopportunityforimprovingconcep-tualclarityandcreatingamorecoherencepolicyapparatusrelatedtoforced displacementandthehumanitarian-developmentnexus.

4. Finland is well positioned to further engage with emerging international supportforthetriplenexusofhumanitarian-peace-development.

5. AlthoughFinland’spolicyinfluencehasworkedwellinitslongstandingpolicyareassuchas therightsofwomenandgirls,severalstructural,operationalandinstitutionalfactorsimpairtheinfluencethattheMFAmighthaveforitspoliciesinthecontextofforceddisplacement(FD)andhumanitarian-devel-opmentnexus/humanitarian-peace-developmentnexus(HDN/HPDN).

6. Limited uptake of the concepts has inhibited progress on Policy Coher-enceforDevelopmentinthecontextofFDandtheHDN/HPDN.However,internalincoherencieshavenotyetmanifestedthemselvestoanydegreeto Finland’sexternalinterlocutors.

7. Themandates of current coordinationmechanisms such as theMigrationTaskForce,havenotenabledpolicyincoherencieswithinthegovernmenttobereconciled.


8. Finland’srespectfor‘universalvalues’,humanrightsandhumanitarianprin-ciplesandprotectionhasnotbeeneffectivelytackledinrelationtoitsHDN/HPDNandFDpoliciesandvalues.

9. Thereisscopeforfurtherpromotingadvocacyandprogrammingfordisabil-ityandinclusionpoliciesandfortherightsofwomenandgirlsinthecontextofFDandtheHDN/HPDN.

10.Private sector engagement is not yet sufficiently developed to allow for ameaningfulcontributiontoFinland’sinternationalrole.

RecommendationsTheevaluationmakessevenprincipalrecommendations–elaboratedinthereport:

1. Deploying appropriate knowledgemanagementplatforms and reformpro-cesses currently underway, theMFA is recommended to adopt strategiesandprocesses thatwillenhance theunderstandingandthemainstreamingoftheconceptsofthenexus,thetriplenexusandforceddisplacementinitspolicymaking,aligningtheseconceptswithitsdevelopmentprioritiesintheforthcoming2020DPP.Internallinkagesbetweenhumanitariananddevel-opmentprogrammingandbudgetingshouldbestrengthenedbypromotingjointanalysesleadingtocomplementaryprogramming,andbyexperiment-ingwithmoreflexible fundingprotocols betweenhumanitarian assistanceanddevelopment-orientedpurposes.Significantpolicygapsinthefourpolicypriorityareasshouldbeaddressedinthe2020DPP.

2. TheMFAisrecommendedtoreviewitsinstrumentsandapproachesforpol-icyinfluencingandprogramminginthecontextofHDN/HPDNinordertosustainpolicyinfluence,avoidover-reachandtoensurepropermonitoring.

3. TheMFAisrecommendedtoemploytheroll-outandmainstreamingofthenexus,thetriplenexusandforceddisplacementtoenhancePCD.TheMFAshouldalso takeanactiverole inresolving thecurrent tensionswithin thegovernmentbetweenitsdevelopmentandmigrationpoliciesbyprioritisingtheuseoftheinter-ministerialMigrationTaskForce(MTF).Jointlycommis-sionedMFA/MoI research through theMTF into thedrivers,patternsandprocessesofmigrationanddisplacement,forexampleinsomeofitspartnercountries,couldimprovesharedcomprehensionandpromotebetterpolicies.

4. TheMFA is recommended to strengthen its commitment to fundamentalhumanrightsandhumanitarianprinciplesinrelationtothenexus,thetriplenexusandforceddisplacement.

5. TheMFAisrecommendedtomoreclearlyembeddisabilityandinclusionpol-icies in thecontextof forceddisplacement, thehumanitarian-developmentnexus and the triplenexus.TheMFA is also recommended to scaleup itsglobaladvocacyfordisabilityandinclusionpoliciesinthesecontexts.

6. TheMFAisrecommendedto:enhanceitsinternationaladvocacyforthepro-motionoftherightsofwomenandgirlsintheHDN/HPDN;andstrengthenthelinkagesbetweenpoliciesforwomenandgirlsinsituationsofFD.

7. TheMFAisrecommendedtoencourageandfacilitatetheprivatecorporatesectorandtradeunionstoplayamoreactiveroleinsupportingitsdevelop-mentpoliciesinthecontextofthenexus.


KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Thenumberingoftheentriesinthismatrixconformstothenumericalorderinwhichtheyappearinthemainbodyoftheevaluationreport.However,becausesomeoftheFindingstransectthemainEvaluationQuestions,theyare locatedinthemost logicalorderforthismatrix inrelationtotheConclusionsand Recommendationstowhichtheyrefer.

Findings Conclusions Recommendations

1. Engaging and mainstreaming the concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-developmentnexus(HDN/HPDN)andforceddisplacement(FD)intopolicymakingSummary answer to Evaluation Question 1:

The principal finding is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not developed clearly formulated approaches to the concepts of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus in ways that can effec-tively inform its policy making in a coherent and comprehensive fashion. More recent engagement is visible but uneven. Field and programme level engagement is also limited and uneven. The impacts of the 2015 Euro-pean refugee/migration crisis are still being experienced. Institutional barriers constitute further constraints to progress

1.1: The uptake of forced displacement in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains limited

The 2015 threshold moment significantly shaped the approach to policies on forced displacement by aligning development cooperation, as an instrument to tackle root causes, with domestic agendas for migration deterrence (under the aegis of the MoI). This left little space to comprehend and promote policies related to the complex processes behind people’s movement. Ministry of Foreign Affairs engagement with concept of forced displacement has since accelerated although this has not been systematic and remains in tension with MoI policies which undermines policy coherence.

1.2: The humanitarian-development nexus lacks clarity as a core operational concept for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1: Despite some progress in engaging with the concepts of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus, there still remains some-what limited understanding and know-how overall and, notably, limited shared understanding, of both the concepts of forced displacement and the human-itarian-development nexus in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their relevance to policy making and programming and, above all, their capacity to strengthen integrated approaches to devel-opment and humanitarian policy making in different contexts.

2: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and more generally the government of Finland, have not yet been able to reconcile the contradictory tendencies, (precipitated by the 2015 threshold moment of the European ‘migration crisis’), between migration and develop-ment policies.

3: The Development Policy Practices Reform and the Internal Action Plan processes within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide a timely oppor-tunity for improving conceptual clarity and more coherent policy apparatus related to forced displacement and the humani-tarian-development nexus.

1: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recom-mended to adopt organisational strategies and processes that will further enhance its knowl-edge base and the mainstreaming of the con-cepts of the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace- development nexus and forced displacement in its existing policy making and programming. These concepts should be aligned with its four development policy priority areas and the five policy pillars in the proposed 2020 Development Policy Plan.

1.1: Greater clarity and consensus around the concepts of the humanitarian-development nex-us and forced displacement should be promoted within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by boosting the scope of the current Internal Action Plan on the roll-out of the concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus.

1.2: Using appropriate knowledge manage-ment platforms, at different levels (e.g. senior management and Policy Priority Ambassadors; Unit Managers; Desk Officers), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to promote know-how on development and policy main-streaming of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus (HPDN).

1.3: The MFA is recommended to commission a lessons learned evaluation of its HDN engage-ment in the Syria crisis to consolidate experi-ence and provide guidance on potential future HDN and HPDN involvement.



Although approaches to the humanitarian-development nexus have been more positive than for forced displacement, they are not clearly formulated and do not yet add value and strength to Finland’s development coop-eration and humanitarian assistance.

1.3: Towards a humanitarian-peace-develop-ment nexus

Evidence points to Finland’s capacity to sup-port the emerging consensus for developing a triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-devel-opment programming.

1.4: Gaps in Coverage

Despite increasing attention to forced displacement and the humanitarian-devel-opment nexus, there are significant gaps in Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy coverage (Internally Displaced Persons, a Human Rights Based Approach HRBA, urban displacement, climate change, self-reliance, private sector).

1.5: A positive way forward

There is evidence of growing momentum within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to engage with and embed approaches to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace- development nexus in departmental policies and structures.

Finland’s development cooperation and humanitarianfinancialdisbursements

Summary answer

Whilst humanitarian expenditure has remained relatively immune from budget cuts, there has been a significant reduction in the state budget for development coopera-tion coinciding with the ‘threshold moment’ of 2015. Conversely there has been a greater concentration of expenditure in the three case study countries.

Expenditure on gender equality has increased in the three case study countries but is still surprisingly small proportionately and in total given the profile of this policy area.

There is almost no evidence of the use of humanitarian-development nexus or forced displacement terminology.

4: Finland is well positioned to further engage with emerging international support for the triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development (HPDN).

1.4: Internal linkages between humanitarian and development programming and budget-ing should be strengthened by promoting joint analyses leading to complementary program-ming, and by deploying more flexible funding protocols between humanitarian assistance and development-oriented purposes.

1.5: The Development Policy Programme 2020 review provides a key opportunity for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to fill gaps in forced displacement gaps concerning: Internally Dis-placed Persons, urban displacement, the HRBA, self-reliance, and displacement in the context of climate change

1.6: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is encour-aged to promote and champion international adoption of the ’triple’ humanitarian-peace-development nexus.



2. The adequacy of Finland’s approach to humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-develop-mentnexus(HDN/HPDN)andforceddisplacement(FD)SummaryanswertoEvaluationQuestion2:

Finland aligns itself with current international trends and norms for forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus and is perceived as a reliable partner with well-established policy priorities; but has not proactively influenced the development of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus in international fora.

2.1: Incipient approaches to forced displace-ment and the humanitarian-development nexus.

Evidence of incipient approaches exists but is patchy and lacks strategic vision.

2.2: Policy influence and Policy Priority Areas

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ influence is recognised in the promotion of well-established Development Policy Programme priorities. Nevertheless, forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus elements remain largely absent.

2.3: Pooled funding and policy influence

Finland’s multilateral budgetary contribu-tions, largely channelled through pooled funding or multi-partner trust funds, achieve complementarity and influence, and are valued by its partners; but there is a lack of evidence that this influence has been used to promote forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus thinking and policies.

2.4: Field presence and policy influence

Lack of field presence limits policy influence.

5: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ influence has worked well when it has been related to long standing and familiar policy areas but has proven to be less operationally effective where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finds itself in less familiar and changing organisational and operational contexts. Several structural, operational and institutional factors impair the influence that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might have in regard to its policy aims in the context of forced displacement and humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus.

2: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommend-ed to review its instruments and approaches for policy influencing and programming in humani-tarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus contexts in order to sustain policy influence, avoid over-reach and to ensure proper monitoring.

2.1: To reinforce influence of its Policy Priority Areas and disability and inclusion policies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended: to pay particular attention to the efforts of other donors and look for complementarity with them in HDN contexts; and review its ‘soft-earmark-ing’ instruments (e.g. Policy and Influencing Plans) in order to enhance policy influence with its partners in humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus contexts.

2.2: Where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is engaged in humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace-development nexus or Comprehensive Refugee Response Frame-work settings, it is recommended to maintain a clear programme and project focus to avoid over-reach.

2.3: The MFA should ensure that the forthcom-ing evaluation of country strategies of fragile countries, takes forward and reviews relevant findings, conclusions and recommendations on forced displacement and the humanitarian-peace-development nexus.



3.EnhancingandpromotingPolicyCoherenceforDevelopment(PCD)forhumanitarian-developmentnexus/humanitarian-peace-developmentnexus(HDN/HPDN)andforceddisplacement(FD)SummaryanswertoEvaluationQuestion3:

Despite a long, solid and acknowledged track record in promoting Policy Coherence for Development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policies for forced displacement and humanitarian-development nexus cannot be said to provide, as yet, a strong framework to help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies.

3.1: 2015 and the impact on policy coherence

The 2015 threshold moment precipitated significant and continuing policy incoher-ence within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and across ministries. This has negatively impacted the achievement of policy coher-ence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ approaches to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus.

3.3: The adequacy of mechanisms for Policy Coherence for Development.

Finland has adequate mechanisms in place to promote policy coherence. These are gen-erally used effectively although they have not been effectively mobilised in relation to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus.

3.4: Policy coherence and interlocutors

Despite these findings, Finland’s policies are generally perceived by external interlocutors as being coherent and well-coordinated both within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the Ministry of the Interior. Equally, they are generally well aligned with those of its partners.

6: The absence of a clear and comprehensive understanding and uptake of the concepts have obstructed policy coher-ence and inhibited progress on Policy Coherence for Develop-ment in the context of forced displacement and the human-itarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace- develop-ment nexus.

7: The role that current coor-dination mechanisms such as the Migration Task Force, could play is not sufficiently recog-nised; or that their mandates need to be extended if they are to play this role.

8: Internal incoherencies have not yet manifested themselves to any degree to Finland’s external interlocutors.

3: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is encour-aged to use its increasing engagement with the concept of forced displacement concepts and the humanitarian-development nexus/humani-tarian-peace- development nexus to establish Policy Coherence for Development and rethink inter-ministerial management structures such as the Migration Task Force to improve Policy Coherence for Development

3.1: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is encour-aged to use its increasing engagement with forced displacement concepts and the humanitarian-development nexus and human-itarian-peace-development nexus to establish Policy Coherence for Development and rethink inter-ministerial structures such as the Migra-tion Task Force to improve Policy Coherence for Development.

3.2: Ministry of Foreign Affairs senior manage-ment is encouraged, in partnership with the Ministry of the Interior to: revise the Terms of Reference of the Migration Task Force (jointly-run with the Ministry of the Interior) to promote it as the main internal forum, inter alia, in which to seek to resolve incoherencies in migration and development policies; and elevate membership of the Migration Task Force to senior manage-ment level within both ministries.

3.3: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recom-mended to jointly commission research with the Ministry of the Interior, through the Migra-tion Task Force, into the relationships between development, migration and displacement to promote better policy coherence.



Transecting Issues 4.Promotingprotection,fundamentalhumanrightsandhumanitarianprinciplesandvaluesin thecontextofforceddisplacement(FD)andhumanitarian-developmentnexus/humanitarian-peace- developmentnexus(HDN/HPDN)2.5: Human rights and policy influence

Finland’s position on and influence on human rights is perceived, externally, to be changing in the context of forced displacement.

3.2: Human rights and a Human Rights Based Approach

The absence of a clear and comprehensive understanding of and uptake of the concepts has obstructed policy coherence and inhib-ited progress on Policy Coherence for devel-opment in the context of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-development nexus.

9: Finland’s respect for ‘uni-versal values’, human rights and humanitarian principles and protection has not been effectively tackled in relation to its humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-development nexus and forced displacement policies and values.

4: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommend-ed to strengthen its commitment to a Human Rights Based Approach, fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles in relation to forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-devel-opment nexus.

4.1: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recom-mended to strengthen its adherence to a Human Rights Based Approach, human rights and humanitarian principles in relation to forced dis-placement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-development nexus by ensuring that they are aligned in the 2020 Development Policy Programme.

4.2: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recom-mended to advocate, in its partnerships and in international fora, stronger adherence to the HRBA, human rights and humanitarian principles and values in the context of forced displacement and the humanitarian-develop-ment nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus.

5. Enhancing advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion in FD and HDN/HPDN1.6: Disability and Inclusion

The success of Finland’s international advo-cacy efforts to get the international commu-nity to recognise the importance of disability and inclusion in humanitarian and develop-ment work are widely recognised. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could do more to ensure its own policies and practices align with emerging policy developments in the context of the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus.

10: Advocacy and program-ming for disability and inclusion policies could be further pro-moted in the context of forced displacement, the humanitarian-development-nexus and the humanitarian-peace- develop-ment nexus.

5: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommend-ed to more clearly and systematically embed disability and inclusion policies in the context of forced displacement and in longer-term develop-ment approaches in the humanitarian-develop-ment nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus; and enhance its international advocacy.

5.1: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recom-mended to mainstream disability and inclusion policies in the context of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus.

5.2: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is encour-aged to extend its disability and inclusion policies to take account of forcibly displaced people with psychosocial needs alongside its well-established physical disability and inclusion policies in situations of forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus/ humani-tarian-peace- development nexus.

5.3: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should now scale up advocacy for disability and inclu-sion policies in the specific contexts of forced displacement and humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus to the global level.



6. Enhancing advocacy and programming on women and girls in the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace-developmentnexus(HDN/HPDN)andforceddisplacement(FD)1.7: Rights of women and girls

The evaluation reveals some positive evi-dence of the linkage of the Ministry of For-eign Affairs’ rights of women and girls Priority Policy Area to humanitarian-development nexus approaches, but limited evidence in relation to forced displacement policy.

11. Progress already achieved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in promoting the rights of women and girls in the humanitarian-development nexus provides the grounding for further progress in national policies and at the international level. Less evident progress in forced displacement constitutes an opportunity to promote these rights more meaningfully in national policies and in interna-tional fora.

6: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recom-mended to: enhance its internal policies and international advocacy for the promotion of the rights of women and girls in the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace- devel-opment nexus; and strengthen the linkages between policies for women and girls in situa-tions of forced displacement.

6.1: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is encour-aged to pay particular attention to the review of the Priority Policy Area on women and girls in relation to forced displacement.

6.2: To enhance internal policy development and international advocacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to commission an evaluation of its experience in gender and humanitarian-development nexus and forced displacement programming and a pilot project on a women- and girls- based humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus strategy in partnership with UNHCR and UNDP, taking account of UNSCR 1325.

7. Promoting the private sector1.4: Gaps in Coverage

The evaluation reveals that, despite increas-ing attention to forced displacement and humanitarian-development nexus/ human-itarian-peace- development nexus, there are significant gaps in Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy coverage (Internally Displaced Persons, a Human Rights Based Approach, urban displacement, climate change, self-reliance, private sector).

12: Private sector engage-ment in the context of the humanitarian-development nexus/humanitarian-peace- development nexus is not yet sufficiently developed to allow for a meaningful contribution to Finland’s international role.

7: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of Development in partnership with other relevant departments, ministries and stakeholders is encouraged to set up a task forced to develop a joint strategy to facilitate the corporate sector and trade unions to play a more active role in supporting its development policies in the context of the humanitarian-development nexus/ humanitarian-peace- development nexus.


1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview and objectives

This evaluationhas been commissionedby theDevelopmentEvaluationUnit(DEU) of theMinistry forForeignAffairs (MFA) of Finland. ItwasmanagedthroughtheEvaluationManagementServices(EMS)frameworkcontractimple-mentedbyParticipGmbHandInduforOy.

The evaluationhas followed theTermsofReference (ToR) for the evaluation(Annex1), theoverall guidelinesof theMinistryofForeignAffairsofFinland(MFA) set out in its EvaluationManual of 2018 (MFA 2018), and theMFAreportingrequirements.

The main objective of the evaluation is to: ‘assess how coherently Finland’sdevelopment policy and its targets relating to forceddisplacementhave beenimplementedandhowthecoherencecouldbeenhanced’.

Theevaluationcoverstheperiod2012until late–2018which includesthetwolast Development Policy Programmes (DPPs) of 2012 (MFA 2012) and 2016(MFA2016),withemphasisonthelatterpartoftheperiod.

Thebackdroptothisevaluationisthegrowingcomplexityofthedriversofforceddisplacement,thehistoricallyhighnumbersofthosedisplaced–some68.5mil-lion officially documented worldwide (UNHCR 2018) – and the increasinglyprotracted nature of displacement. These conditions constitute major globalchallenges forpeaceandsecurity,humanwellbeingandthe2030SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)amongstmanyotherimpacts.Asahighlyrespectedinternationaldevelopmentandhumanitarianactorandadvocateontheseissues,Finlandisinevitablyengagedwiththesechallenges.

Newmodalities of action, notably the 2015 Grand Bargain, theWorld BankIDA18(InternationalDevelopmentAssociation)sub-windowforRefugeesandHost Communities, the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GRC), the 2018GlobalCompactforSafeOrderlyandRegularMigration(GCM),andtherollingoutofsustainableresiliencestrategiesintheshapeofthehumanitarian-devel-opmentnexus(HDN),arealsoofkeyinteresttoFinland.ThisisbecausemanyofthecountrieswithwhomFinlandengagesinitsdevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistancearecountriesoforigin(CoO)orrefugefortheforciblydisplaced.Inthiscontext,Finlandretainsastrong internationalprofile for itshumanrights-basedapproachestodevelopmentcooperation,itscommitmenttohumanitarianvaluesinrefugeecrises,anditscommitmenttopolicycoherencefordevelopment(PCD).

AsstatedintheToRthisisaformativeevaluation,steeringtheoutputstowardsalearningprocess,themainpurposeofwhichistoincreaseknowledge,aware-nessandtheoperationalisationofthehumanitariandevelopmentnexus(HDN)andtheconceptofforceddisplacement(FD)withintheMFA.Aligningdevelop-

Main objective of the evaluation is to: ‘assess how coherently Finland’s development policy and its targets relating to forced displacement have been implemented and how the coherence could be enhanced’.


mentcooperationandhumanitarianassistanceprogrammingmoreeffectivelyinrelationtoforceddis-placementexpectedtoenhancePCDwithintheMFAandwithitspartners.Nevertheless,itisimportanttorecognisethatbothintheMFAandinternationally,theseareemergingratherthanfullyworkedoutapproachestothemanydisplacementcrisesglobally.

TheEvaluationalsoserveswiderpolicymakingintentions:itwillcontributesignificantlytotheprepara-tionoftheMFA’s2020DPP,anditwillalsocontributetoincreasedknowledgeonhowtobetterpromotethe2030SDGsAgenda.

Thisisnotaformalaccountabilityorperformanceevaluationassuch.Nevertheless,itprovidessignificantinsights intohowtheMFAhasdevelopedand implemented itsmainpolicypriorities fordevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistance,andtheircoherence.Tothisextent,itprovidesevidenceandfindingsthatcan informstakeholdersand interestedparties–e.g. theDevelopmentPolicyCommittee(DPC),membersofparliamentandthepublic–abouttheeffectivenessoftheMFAanditscapacitytodeliverthegovernment’sobjectivesandpolicies.

ThemainusersoftheevaluationaretheFinnishMFA,otherministrieswithpoliciesrelevanttodevelop-ingcountriesandissuesrelatingtoforceddisplacementandmigrationsuchasthePrimeMinister’sOffice(PMO),MinistryofInterior(MoI),MinistryofDefence(MoD),aswellasFinnishEmbassies,theDPC,theParliament,Non-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)andotherstakeholders.

Theevaluationwasdividedintofivephases,namely:a)Planningphase,b)Start-upphase,c)Inceptionphase,d)Implementationphaseande)Reporting/Disseminationphase.

Figure 1: Evaluation process

1.2 Outline of the report

ThereportcomprisessixchapterswhichcoverthestandardreportingrequirementsforMFAevaluations.

• Chapter1hasintroducedtheevaluation;

• Chapter2elaboratestheapproachtothestudy,themethodologyandthelimitationstotheevaluation;

• Chapter3providesacontextanalysisfortheevaluation;

• Chapter4presentsthefindings;

• Chapter5drawsconclusionsfromtheevaluation;

• Chapter6providesrecommendations.

Anumberofannexesprovidedetailedaccountsoftheevaluationdataandanalysis.

01 02 03 04 05

2. Start-up phaseMarch 2018

4. Implementation phaseJuly – October 2018.

5. Reporting and dissemination phaseNovember 2018 – March 2019

3. Inception phaseApril – June 2018

1. Planning phaseDecember 2017 – March 2018


2 APPROACH, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

2.1 Approach

Thischapterpresentsthemethodologyfortheevaluationanditisintwoparts.ThefirstpartdetailstheEvaluationMatrixdevelopedforthisevaluation,whilstthesecondpartelaboratestheresearchmethods.

2.2 Evaluation questions and matrix

TheEvaluationMatrix(EM)hasbeenthemainbuildingblockforthisevalua-tion.Itwastheprimaryinstrumentforthedocumentanalysisandwasusedina less in-depth formfor thekey informant interviews(KIIs)andcountrycasestudies–discussedinchapter2.3below.TheEMhasthreeEvaluationQuestions(EQs),9JudgementCriteria(JC),and23IndicatorsasshowninAnnex2.

Thethreequestionsseektoascertain:theoverallunderstandingofandapproachtoFDandHDNandhowithasevolvedovertheevaluationperiod2012–2018(EQ1);itsadequacyandthescopeofpolicyinfluenceinthiscontext(EQ2);andtheextentofpolicycoherence(EQ3).

• EQ1.HowandtowhatextenthastheMFAdevelopedclearapproachestoforceddisplacement(FD)andthehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN)overtheevaluationperiod?

• EQ2.TowhatextentandhowhasFinland’sevolvingapproachto/interpretationofFDandHDNbeenanadequateresponseto thechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?

• EQ3.TowhatextentandhowdotheapproachestoFDandHDNrootedintheDPPshelpestablishpolicycoherencebetweenFinnishpolicies?

In all EQswemade an assumption about an emerging ‘approach’ to FD andHDNovertheevaluationperiod.However,giventhatthetermsarerarelyusedinMFApolicydocumentsandunderstandingoftheseconceptsisstilldevelop-ing,weusedtheworkingdefinitionsprovidedinchapter3.3asabenchmarkforinterpretingothersimilarwordsandphrasesusedbytheMFA.

The Evaluation Matrix (EM) has been the main building block for this evaluation.


2.3 Methodology

The evaluation deployed amixedmethods approach using both primary and secondarydatacollectionandanalysisusingfourmethods:

• Documentanalysis;

• KeyInformantInterviews(KIIs);

• Countrycasestudies;

• Financialtracking;

Asfaraspossiblethemethodsfollowedasequence.ThedocumentanalysiswasconductedfirsttoestablishafactualbaselineandbuiltonashorterdocumentanalysisfortheInceptionPhase.ThiswasfollowedbyKIIswiththeGovernmentof Finland (predominantly theMFA) and theMFA’smainpartners, althoughtherewassomeoverlapinthetimetableforthetwosetsofKIIs,andthenthecasestudies.Thesequencingmethodology,togetherwiththemultipleandcom-plementary sources of data, provided a robust evidence base, simultaneouslyensuringtriangulationandalsohighlightinggaps.

TheresultsoftheoverallevaluationforeachEQ(i.e.comprisingdocument,KII,casestudydata,andrelevantfinancialdata)arepresentedinAnnexes5(EQ.1),6(EQ.2),7(EQ.3),whilstthedetailedcasestudyevaluationsarepresentedinAnnexes8,9and10.

2.3.1 Document analysisThedocumentanalysisutilisedtheEMtocloselyinterrogateanextensivecollec-tionofMFApolicydocumentsfrom2012tothepresent.Establishingthefactualsource,basisandextentofengagementwithHDNandFDthroughdocumentreviewconstituted thecoreof thedatacollectionandanalysis:48documentswerereviewed(listedinAnnex3),providedbyDEUatthestartoftheevaluation.

Thedocumentsreviewedcomprisedpoliciesandpolicystatements,evaluationspublishedby theMFA, and a smaller number of similar documents from theMoIandPMO.RelevantdocumentspublishedbytheOrganisationforEconomic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) and the European Commission (EC)werealsoanalysed.Theselectionwasdeterminedby:

• Cross-checkingtheselectionofprioritydocumentsreviewedin theInceptionPhase;

• Identifying‘landmarkdocuments’oncentralthemesoftheevaluationsuchastheDPPs,reportsonHumanRights,FragileStates,WomenPeaceandSecurity;

• Appraisalofalargenumberofotherdocumentsusingkeywordsin thetitleorrapidreviewoftheirlikelyrelevance;

• Coverageacrossthetimeperiodofthereview.

Thedocumentanalysiswascompletedinfourstagesusingastandardisedtem-platetoensuresystematiccollectionofevidenceandcontentassessmentacrossallindicatorsandJCs.ForeachEQ,therelevantindicatorswereusedtosolicit

The evaluation deployed a mixed methods approach.

48 documents were reviewed.


fine-grainedevidence fromthedocumentswhichwas thenaggregated intoanoverallassessmentofeachindicator.Buildingontheindicatorassessment,thekeyfindingsforeachJCwerethenestablishedandusedtoformulatetheoverallresponsetotherelevantEQ.

In addition, other documentswere also reviewed such as relevantPolicy andInfluencingPlans(PIPs),QualityAssuranceBoard(QAB)Minutesandfundingproposals,MigrationTaskForce (MTF)Minutes, andMFA InternalWorkingBriefsonMigrationandDevelopmentPriorities(thesocalled‘One-Pagers).Theformandsubstanceof theseadditionaldocumentsdidnot lendthemselves tothesamedetailedmethodofanalysis.Butbriefassessmentswere fed intothefinalstageofthedocumentanalysiswhichwasa3–4-pagenarrativerationaletoexplainandinterprettheEQandJCfindingsinmoredetail.

2.3.2 Key Informant Interviews: Government of Finland and PartnersThe second method involved primary data collection using Key Informant’sInterviews (KIIs)with:a) selectedFinnishgovernment staff,mainly from theMFAinHelsinkibutalsostaffinmissionsandincludingstafffromtheMoIandMoD;andb)theMFA’smainbilateralandmultilateralhumanitariananddevel-opmentpartners.

TheobjectivesofKIIswere:toderiveindividualinsightsandperceptionsfromgovernmentpolicymakersandtheirpartnersintohowandtowhatextentHDNandFDwerebeingembeddedinMFApolicies;toassesstheperceivedstrengthsandlimitationsoftheseapproaches;tounderstandthechallengesposedforPCDandpolicy influence; toassess themodalitiesofpartnerengagementwith theMFAontheseissues;andtotriangulateandfurtherinterpretthefindingsofthebaselinedocumentanalysis.

Intotal123peoplewereinterviewed:Annex4providesafulllist.Twenty-fourinterviewswereconductedwithGoFstaffand26interviewswithMFApartners.NotincludedinthistotalaretheadditionalKIIsconductedforthecasestudies,discussedinchapter2.3.3.KIIswereselectedasfollows:

• IntheMFAandotherMinistriesoftheGovernmentofFinland(GoF):recommendationsfromtheReferenceGroupintheInceptionPhase;includingdirectoratelevelandseniorstaff(e.g.Ambassadors)intheDepartmentforDevelopmentPolicy,MFA;relevantUnitHeads,SeniorAdvisorsanddeskofficers;andthemembersoftheDPC.Recommen-dationsfromtheseparticipantsalsoextendedtheselectionofKIIs.

• KIIswithMFApartnersinthecorepolicyareasoftheevaluation:recommendationsfromtheReferenceGroupintheInceptionPhase;asampleofFinland’smainmultilateralpartnerssuchastheEuropeanCommission(EC),theOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD),andpartners–UnitedNationsHighCommis-sionerforRefugees(UNHCR),andtheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)/InternationalFederationoftheRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties(IFRC);relevantprincipalCSOsfundedbyMFA,e.g.FinnishRedCross(FRC),FinnishEvangelicalLutheranMission(FELM),FinnChurchAid(FCA).

In total 123 people were interviewed.


TheKIIswereconductedfacetoface,andinsomecasesbyconferencecall,usinganopen-endeddiscussion formatofa standardisedsetof topicsbasedon thecoreevaluationthemesandframedbytheEM:EQ.1–Finland’sevolvingunder-standingandapproachtoFDandHDN;EQ.2–approachandpolicyinfluenc-ing;EQ.3–policycoherence.Inaddition, theKI’sresponsibilities inrelationtothecorethemeswerediscussed,andeachKIwasinvitedtosuggestrecom-mendationstoenhancetheMFA’sapproachtothesepolicyareas.Interviewingprotocolssuchasconfidentialitywerefollowed.Almostalltheinterviewswereconductedbytwoteammembers.Thepairedinterviewingapproachgeneratedricher andmore detailed coverage of topics aswell as allowing the interviewnarrativetobemorefullyandaccuratelycaptured.Jointinterviewingwaspar-ticularlyvaluableforgroupinterviews.Interviewswerewrittenupindetailbyone interviewerusing the interview topic frameworkand thenedited/correct-edbythesecondinterviewer.SummaryfindingswerecompletedforKIIswiththeMFA’smainECpartnersinBrusselsandthemainhumanitarianpartnersinGenevaandtheOECDinParis.

DatafromeachKIIwriteupandthetwosummaryaccountswerethenenteredintoaseparateEM,toJCandEQlevels,nottheindicatorlevel.Asimilarthree3–4-pageoverallnarrativerationalewascompletedtoexplainandinterprettheEQandJCfindings.

TheKIIs provided particularly rich insights into institutional knowledge andthe dynamics of policy development not captured in the document analysis.Itrevealednewdataonthescopeofunderstandingand informalengagementalreadytakingplacewithHDNandFDwithintheMFAandtheextentofpolicyinfluence–factorswhichhadnotbeenapparentinthepolicydocuments.

2.3.3 Country/regional case studies Theevaluationundertookthreecountry/regionalcasestudies:AfghanistanandJordan/Lebanon/Syria (covering the Syrian refugee crisis and termedMENA(MiddleEastandNorthAfricaforshort)),werepre-selectedintheToR;SomaliawasaddedindiscussionwithEVA-11becauseitofferedadditionalfeaturesoftheMFA’sengagementinlong-termdisplacementanddevelopmentcontexts.

Theselectionofthecasestudiesaimedtoprovidearepresentativecross-sectionofcountries,humanitariananddevelopmentconditions,complexstructuralcon-ditionsandpolicyenvironment,forceddisplacementprocesses,andpartnerset-tingswithwhichFinlandisengaged.Additionally,AfghanistanandSomaliaaretwocountrieswhichtypifyFinland’sstrategyoflong-termcommitment,whilsttheMENAcaseismorerecentbutexemplifiestheemergenceoftheinternational HDN approach to protracted displacement crises with which Finland is alsoengaged.

TheobjectivesofthecasestudiesweretoassesshowandtowhatextenttheMFAwasmobilisingHDNandFDpoliciesinthefieldthroughitsmulti-andbi-lateralpartners,andhowpolicyinfluenceandpolicycoherenceweretransmittedfromtheMFAto‘endusers’inthefieldandprogrammesettings.Additionalpurposesof thecase studieswere toassessconstraintsandopportunities forHDNandFDinthefield,andtotriangulatefindingsfromothermethods.ThecasestudiesrepresentacrosssectionofmanydifferentpolicymodalitiesofFinland’spolicy

The evaluation undertook three country/regional case studies: Afghanistan and Jordan/Lebanon/Syria.


engagement–developmentcooperation,humanitarianassistance,crisesman-agement,humanitarian-developmentnexus,andmigration.

Allthecasestudiesfollowedastandardmethod:i)a‘mapping’anddocumenta-tionstageinvolvingdocumentaryreview,consultationandbriefingfromrelevantdeskofficers,preliminaryfinancialtracking;andii)KIIswithdeskofficers,mul-ti-andbi-lateralimplementingpartnersinthecountries–countryprogrammedirectors,programmestaff–usingasimilarsurveyinstrumenttothemainKIIswithopen-ended, standardisedquestionanddiscussion themesandusing thesameprotocols; iii) analysis, evaluationandsynthesisof theevidenceusingaseparateEMsimilartothatfortheKIIstoJCandEQlevels:a3–4pagenarra-tivesynthesis/meta-analysiswascompletedtoexplainandinterprettheEQandJCfindings inmoredetail.All threecasestudieswereconductedwithvariousdegreesof‘remoteness’:AfghanistanandMENAfromdesks,whilsttheSomaliacasestudywasconductedfromNairobiwheremostdevelopmentandhumani-tarianentitiesforSomaliahaveheadquarters,andtheFinnishembassyinNairo-biisresponsibleforcoveringforFinland’sdevelopmentcooperationinSomalia.

2.3.4 Financial TrackingAnalysisofextensivefinancialdataonMFAdevelopmentandhumanitariandis-bursementsovertheevaluationperiod,2012–2018,wasundertakeninorderto:tracksignificantoverallorsectoralshiftsindevelopmentandhumanitariandis-bursementsandwhatthismightindicateaboutpolicyinfluenceandPCDwithrespecttoHDNandFD;andtoprovidesupportinginformationonthecountrycasestudies.The long lead timesbetweenpolicy formationanddisbursementmakecorrelationhardtodiscern,adifficultycompoundedbythe lackofclearMFApoliciesandpolicyobjectivesinthefieldofHDNandFD.

Theresultsarepresented inchapter4.4andthekeyfindings,whererelevant,incorporated into theEQanalysis inAnnexes5,6and7.Anadditionalfinan-cial tracking exercisewas conductedwithdataprovidedby theQAB, and thekeyresultsare includedinchapter4.4.Thefullmethodologicalexplanationis presentedinAnnex12.

2.4 Limitations and mitigation strategies

Thefollowinglimitationstothemethods,andthestrategiesadoptedtomitigatethem,arenowpresented.

In relation to the overall Evaluation:

1. Time period for results:Themostsignificant limitationof theevaluationisitsprematurityinrelationtotheMFA’spolicyengagementwiththecoreconceptsoftheHDNandFD.Normallyfourtofiveyearsaftertheadoptionofpoliciesisrecommendedfortheevaluationofinfluenceandpolicycoherence.As theevaluationmakesclear, theMFAhasonly limitedengagementwithemerging international experience in theHDNanda limitedawarenessofFD.TheseconceptsarenotfullyarticulatedandembeddedinMFApolicies.Accordingly,astandardisedmethodnormallyusedforpolicyevaluationsofthiskindwasnotdeemedappropriate.Thislimitationhasbeenovercomebytriangulatingevidenceacrossthethreemainevaluationmethods–document


analysis, internal and externalKIIs and case studies. This has establishedreasonableconfidencelevelsinthefindings.Approachingtheevaluationasalearningprocesshasalsoguidedouroverallapproach.

2. Complex policy environments: Multilateral and bilateral political andpolicymaking environments ondevelopment andhumanitarian issues areextremelycomplex.Manyactorsandfactorscontributeto the likelyeffectsofMFApolicy influence on its partners, and thus the extent towhich theobjectivesofMFA’spoliciesareachieved.Ourmethodologyasawholeand,inparticular,thesequencingofthemethodstotraceandtriangulatepolicyinfluenceandPCD/PCSD,haveprovidedreasonablyrobust instruments tomitigatethislimitation.

3. Policy coherence:TheToRlimitedtheevaluationtotheMFA.Butaschap-ter3.2explains,andaswillbebecomeclearinotherchaptersofthisevalu-ation,aparticularchallengehasbeentoaddresspolicycoherenceinrespectofdevelopmentco-operationand,toalesserextent,humanitarianassistancesince,aftertheEuropeanmigration/refugeecrisisof2015,thesepoliciesareincreasingly projected through a national level ‘migration lens’ within theremitoftheMoI.Thus,ourapproachwasconstrained,andourrecommenda-tionscouldonlybeformulatedwithinthemandateoftheMFA.

In relation to the evaluation methods:

1. Complex methods:Thestrengthofthemethodology–itsdiverseyetrigor-ousmethods–issimultaneouslyapotentiallimitationbyyieldingrichandlargeamountsofdata tobeanalysedandconcomitant timepressures.Wehavemitigatedtheselimitationsbyoursequencingmethod,debriefingteammeetingsatkeystagesandphasesoftheevaluation,andoursystematicuseoftheEvaluationMatrix.Inaddition,theteamcompositionhascoveredmulti-pleexperienceofthefourmethodswhichhasreinforcedourapproach.

2. KIIs:KIIs relyonpersonalopinionsand interpretationsof theKI,and thepositionoftheinterviewer:bothfactorsintroducesubjectivity.Wehavemiti-gatedtheselimitationsbytheinterviewproceduresandwritingupprotocolswehaveadopted.Usingtwoteammembersformostinterviewsallowedbet-tervalidationandtriangulationofrespondents’opinions.Jointinterviewingandwriting-upenabledtheinterviewerstocrosscheckandvalidatetheirownassumptions,findingsandnotes.

3. Selection of KIIs:The teamreliedontheadviceandrecommendationsofthe ReferenceGroup for the initial identification of GoF and partner KIs.However, as explained in chapter 2.3.2,we adopted a range of criteria tosubstantiallywidenandstratifytheselectionofKIs.Thismitigatedpotentialbiasinselection.InthesmallnumberofinstanceswhereaKIwasnotavail-able,weusedconferencecallsinordertoretainthesamplesizeandcoverage.AnacknowledgedgapinourKIIs,giventhesignificanceofthelackofpolicycoherencebetweenMFAdevelopmentcooperationandMoImigrationpolicywehaveidentified,istheverysmallnumberofinterviewswiththeMoIandnonewiththePMO.Whilstdocumentevaluationhascoveredsomeaspects,clearlymoreextensiveinterviewingwouldhaveallowedustodevelopamorenuancedpicture.

Multilateral and bilateral political and policy making environments on development and humanitarian issues are extremely complex.


4. Case studies:Allthecasestudieswereundertakenwithvariousdegreesofremoteness(chapter2.3.3above),withKIIsbyconferencecallforAfghani-stanandMENA.AlthoughtherewasconcernthatKIIsundertakenbyconfer-encecallmightbeinferior,ourexperiencesuggeststhattheyhavedeliveredverygoodresultsandaveryefficientuseofstaffresourcesandtimegiventheverytighttimetablefortheevaluation.Lackofon-the-groundpresencemayhave limitedadeeperunderstandingofcontextandpossibleattendanceatrelevantdonors’meetingsforexample;butsnowballingmethodsforfindingotherKIsworkedwellandaccesstodocuments,mostofwhichareelectroni-callyavailable,didnotappeartobelimited.

5. Staff rotation and reassignment:KIIswiththeMFAstaffwerehamperedbywhat seems to have been an unusually high degree of staff rotation inautumn2018whenwewereconductingtheinterviewphase.Tomitigatethepotential lossof ‘institutionalmemory’ofkeypolicymakingprocessesanddecisionsweendeavoured,mostlysuccessfully,tointerviewpreviousrelevantpostholders.

6. Financial tracking:Thescopeandvolumeoffinancialdataprovidedtousforanalysiswasenormousandwehaveonlyfocusedoncoreelementsthatsupportthemainobjectivesofthestudy.Asecondconstraintwasthatwhilstfinancial trackingwouldhave informedanunderstandingof changingsec-toralandthematicprioritiesandcoherencewithexistingpolicypriorities,ittoldusverylittle,ifanything,abouttheHDNandFDsincetheselackameas-urablepresence.Thisshortcomingwaspartlymitigatedbyuseof theQABdocumentation.


3 CONTEXT ANALYSIS

Thecontextanalysiscomprisesthreechapters:thefirstsituatestheevaluationwithinthecontextofthechangingdynamicsofmigrationanddisplacementandtheirpoliticalconsequences; thesecondpart thenelaborates thekeyconceptswithwhichtheevaluationisconcerned–FDandtheHDN–andidentifiestheirrelevancetotheMFAandtheevaluation;thethirdchapteroutlinescurrentMFAdevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicies,thescopeofitsprogrammesandopera-tions,andPCD.

3.1 Setting the context

Four contextual factorsdefinethescopeofthisevaluation.

1. Dynamics of international migration

Thefirstkeycontextualfactoristhedynamicsofinternationalmigration,andinparticularthescaleanddynamicsofrefugeeandinternaldisplacement.Theseresult fromacomplex interplayofsocio-economicandpoliticalcircumstancesandexistential threatsthataremanifest indifferentconfigurationsofconflict,violence,persecutionandhumanrightsviolations.Thisisamplifiedinchapter3.2.1.Whilstthesedynamicsarealwaysinflux,thelastdecadeandinparticularthelastfiveyearspresentaperiodofexceptionalturbulence.In2017,displace-ment reached a historic highwith 68.5million forcibly displacedpeople offi-ciallyrecorded(UNCHR2018).ThewidelyacceptedUNHCRbenchmarkdoesnotaccountforpotentiallymillionsmoreforciblydisplacedpeoplewhoarenotrecordedinofficialand/orverifieddatasources.

Underlyingthescaleofdisplacementarerootcauses(discussedinthenextchap-ter – see also Zetter 2014),which appear to bemore complex and intractablethan in earlier erawhich, combinedwithphysicaldestructionand the collapseofeconomies,services,andsocialfabricmakethepreferred‘durablesolution’ofreturn,brokeredbytheinternationalcommunity,largelyunattainable(Harildetal.,2015).Theothertwodurablesolutionsofresettlementandlocal integrationarealso increasinglydifficult toachieve: inaneraofmigrant ‘push-back’, thirdcountriesareresistanttoresettlement,whichinanycasehasalwaysbeenamar-ginalsolution,whilstthemainhostcountries,oftenpoorcountriesstrugglingfordevelopment,deterlocalintegrationoneconomicgroundsandpushforreturntocountriesoforigin.Asaresult,protracteddisplacementisnowthenormwhich,withoutsubstantialandproactiveinternationalresponsibilitysharingforsustain-able responses, produces negative consequences for the displaced populationsthemselves,theirhostcountriesandcommunities,andinternationaldonorswhoallbeartheheavyeconomicandsocialcostsofforceddisplacement(Milner2014).

TheseconditionsbearheavilyonbothhostcountriesanddonorssuchasFin-land.Theyhaveprovided thepolitical impetus for the reframingof the inter-nationalnormsandresponsestorefugeecrises.ThiscommencedattheWorldHumanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2015 (which resulted in theGrand Bargain

The last decade and in particular the last five years present a period of exceptional turbulence. In 2017, displacement reached a historic high with 68.5 million forcibly displaced people.

Protracted displacement is now the norm.


ofwhichFinlandwasafoundingpartner),followedbythe2016UNHigh-levelMeetingonAddressingLargeMovementsofRefugeesandMigrants(conclud-ingwiththeNewYorkDeclaration).Morerecently,the2018GlobalCompactonRefugees(GCR),ofwhichFinlandhasalsobeenverysupportive,the2018GlobalCompactforSafeOrderlyandRegularMigration(GCM),andnewinstrumentssuchas theComprehensiveRefugeeResponseFramework (CRRF),havebeenrolledout.Thiswillbediscussedinchapter3.2.2.

2. Trajectories of displacement

Thesecondcontextualfactoristhetrajectoriesofforciblydisplacedpeopleandmigrants.Mostrefugeedisplacementisstilllargelycontainedinregionsoforigin –estimatedtobeabout85%–and,globally,south-southvoluntarymigrationsubstantiallyexceedssouth-northmigration.Butincreasingly,largenumbersofforciblydisplacedpeople,andthosewhomovevoluntarily,nowtravelin‘mixedflows’andby‘irregular’meansfromthe‘globalsouth’topost-industrialcountriesofthe‘globalnorth’–e.g.CentralandLatinAmericatotheUSA,sub-SaharanAfrica,andtheMENAregiontoEurope.Thescaleofthesemixedflowsandthelargelyspontaneous,ratherthanthesafeandorderly,arrivaloflargenumbersofpeopleposemajorchallenges for thecountriesofdestination–epitomisedinthesocalledEuropean‘refugeeandmigrationcrisis’of2015/2016.TheissueremainshighonthepolicyagendaoftheEuropeanUnion(EU)anditsinstitu-tionsandallEuropeanUnionMemberStates(EUMSs).

3. Recipient countries

Thethirdcontextualfactoristheconsequenceoftheseglobaldynamicsforcoun-tries in the ‘globalnorth’suchasFinland.Thecombinationof thehistoricallyhigh level of forced displacement and irregularmigration combinedwith theimpactsthishasonreceivingcountries,bothinthe‘globalsouth’andthe‘globalnorth’, pose substantial policymaking challenges in respect of humanitarian,developmentandnationaldomesticpriorities.ThesechallengesbearheavilyonFinland,givenitsstronginternationalpoliticalcommitmenttodevelopmentco-operationandhumanrights.Thus the2016DPPcontainedanew theme,notincludedinearlierDPPs,whichemphasisedtheneedtoaddresstheseevolvingrefugeesituationsandmigrationthroughhumanitarianassistance,peacekeep-ingandsecurityaswellasdevelopmentco-operationeffortsinpartnershipwithmultilateralactors–inotherwordsanembryonichumanitarian-peace-develop-mentnexus(HPDN)–discussedinchapter3.2.2.

4. Finnish and EU migration policy

These international policy objectives segue to the fourth contextual factor –national andEUmigration policy– resulting in objectives that seek toman-age the domestic impacts of the global processes of forced displacement andmigration.

Anumberof factorsconverged in2015 tocreatewhatwehavedefinedas thethresholdmoment in policy formulationwith respect to the FinnishGovern-ment’smigrationpoliciesandtheirrelationshiptotheMFA’sdevelopmentco-operationstrategiesandhumanitarianassistancetorefugeesandothercontextsofforceddisplacement.

Increasingly, large numbers of forcibly displaced people, and those who move voluntarily, now travel in ‘mixed flows’ and by ‘irregular’ means from the ‘global south’ to post-industrial countries of the ‘global north’.

Forced displacement and irregular migration pose substantial policy making challenges in respect of humanitarian, development and national domestic priorities.


Atthenational level, thearrivalofsome32,000asylumseekers inFinland in2015putmigrationandforceddisplacementattheforefrontofpolicyagendas.Fromthatpoint,nationalpolicies,implementedbyanewFinnishgovernmentfromMay2015,andEuropeanpoliticalandpolicyagendasconverged.Tighten-ingimmigrationcontrolsathomewereparalleledbypoliciestousedevelopmentco-operationtotacklerootcausesofdisplacementinthecountriesoforiginwiththeaimofpreventingboth initialandsecondarydisplacements fromregionalhostcountries,regardlessofthecomplexfactorscausingthesemigratorymove-ments.Atthesametime,deepcutsinFinland’sOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA) – an almost immediate 43% reduction from 870million EUR p.a. in2015/6–weresymptomaticofareassertionofdomesticprioritiesoverFinland’slongstandinginternationalcommitments.

But the shifting policy focus on migration from 2015 put pressure on MFAdevelopmentpolicieswhichincreasinglytiltedtowardsmigrationcontrolanda‘migration-developmentnexus’(MDN)takingprecedenceovertheHDN.Migra-tionemergedasapolicyissueinthe2016–amajorchangesinceithadneverbeforeappearedinaDPP.However,thesechallengeswerefinessedinthe2016DPPduetotheMFA’seffortstomanagedevelopmentrelatedexpectationsinthecontextofmigration.

Atthesupranationallevel,alignedwithEUpolicy,theFinnishGovernmenthassupportedtheEU’scommitmenttomakedevelopmentaninstrumentofmigra-tioncontrolinpolicymaking.Forexample,FinlandisoneofthefundersoftheEUEmergencyTrustFundforStabilityandAddressingRootCausesofIrregu-larMigrationandDisplacedPersonsinAfrica(EUTF).Inparallel,Finlandhasbecomeincrementallyco-optedintothesecuritised/militarisedEUapproachtofightirregularmigrationandterrorism,includingthroughtheactivesupportofFrontexoperations.

Thesedevelopmentshaveposedsignificant challengesand tensions forpolicycoherencewithrespecttodevelopment,migrationandinparticularforceddis-placement,astheMFAhasattemptedtoreconcilelongstandingpillarsofdevel-opment policy, such as human rights andmainstreaming gender, with shift-ing national political andEU agendas and priorities. These are elaborated in chapter4–theFindings.

3.2 Core concepts: forced displacement and the humanitarian-development nexus

GiventheformativenatureofthisEvaluation,increasingknowledgeanddevel-opingasharedunderstandingofthecoreconceptsandtermsamongsttherel-evant stakeholders isan importantobjective,which this chapterof the reportseekstofulfil.

3.2.1 Forced displacementWhilstmanymillions ofmigrantsmove bothwithin their own countries andinternationally on a largely voluntary basis, millions more people migratebecauseof violence, armed conflict, persecution andhuman rights violations,andstate fragility,aswellasbecauseofnaturaldisasters includingtheeffects

The shifting policy focus on migration from 2015 put pressure on MFA development policies which increasingly tilted towards migration control and a ‘migration-development nexus’.


ofclimatechangeandenvironmentaldegradation.Accordingly,despitethefun-damentalimportanceofthetermrefugeeininternationallaw(the1951UnitedNationsConventionontheStatusofRefugeesand1967Protocol,knownasthe1951GenevaConventionandabbreviated to theacronymCSR1951), it inade-quatelycapturesthissubstantiallygrowingnumberofpeoplewhoareforciblydisplacedlikerefugeesandinneedofprotectionandotherformsofassistance,butwhofalloutsidethedefiningcharacteristicoftheCSR.Tosomeextentthe2018GCRacknowledgesthiswidergrouping,althoughstillstronglyfocusedonthosewhoqualify as ‘conventional’ refugees. Likewise, the 2018GCM,whichdealswithallformsofmigration,alsorecognisesthevulnerabilitytowhichmany‘voluntary’migrants are exposed but lacks amandated international body toaffordeffectiveprotectionandsafeguardingofrights.

Todistinguishbetween refugees and thismuch larger categoryofpeople, theterm ‘forceddisplacement’ isused.Oftenused interchangeablywith the termforcedmigration, forced displacement is the terminology of the ToR and thepreferredtermforthisevaluation.TheWHSnotedthat‘forceddisplacementisnotonlyahumanitarianchallenge,butalsoapolitical,developmentandhumanrightsone’andspecificallyrecordedtheaimof‘reducingforceddisplacement’initscorepledgeto‘leaveno-onebehind’(UnitedNations2016).Forceddisplace-mentisrarelymono-causalorauniquelycause-effectoutcome.Multiplefactors,often in combination, but always context-specific precipitate forced displace-mentrenderingthosewhoareforciblydisplacedhighlyvulnerable(Betts2009,2013;Castles2003;Chimni2009;Colson2003;Hathaway2007;Lindley2014;Richmond1988;Turton2003).

An initialworkingdefinitionof forceddisplacementproduced forthisevaluationcapturesthediscussionwhichfollows:

‘the involuntary movement of people – within or across national borders – as a result of: existential threats caused by state fragility and human insecurity, food insecurity and deprivation of livelihood opportunities; generalised violence and armed conflict; severe human rights violations, repression and discrimination; the effects of climate change and environmental degradation including disasters; or other situations that endanger freedoms or livelihoods.’

Likealldefinitions this isopen todebateand interpretation, and it isofferedhere as a baseline for theMFA to develop and consolidate a shared under-standing.Already intheMFAthere issomerecognitionandunderstandingofthe term forceddisplacement/migration.An internaldiscussionpaperon ter-minologyintroducedtheFinnishequivalentof’pakkomuutto’(forceddisplace-mentorforcedmigration).Althoughnotwithoutproblemsininterpretationandmeaningbeyondimmediateuseamongstprofessionals,ithasbeenapprovedby linguisticauthoritiesastheofficialtranslation.

Two overarching and complementary perspectives – the complex drivers offorceddisplacement,andthepatternsandprocessesofmobilitythatunderpinforceddisplacement–elaboratetheconcept(seealsoZetter2014,2015,2018).

To distinguish between refugees and this much larger category of people, the term ‘forced displacement’ is used.


Drivers of forced displacement Anumberofdistinctivedriversbroadlydefinecontemporaryandemergingsitu-ationsofforceddisplacement.

1.Existentialthreats–frominvoluntarymigrationtoforceddisplacement

Abroadgroupingofdrivers captures structural conditionswhere thedistinc-tion between involuntary displacement and more recognisable drivers, dis-cussedbelow,isblurred(Betts2013;FlahauxanddeHaas2016;Lindley2013,2014;Martin2014).Oftendescribedasrootcauses,theycomprisethreemainconditions:

• Socio-economicvulnerability:impoverishment,lackoflivelihoodopportunities,foodinsecurity,depletionofnaturalresources, contestedlandrights;

• Governancefragility:stateandpoliticalfragility,togetherwithweakpublicinstitutionsandtheerosionofessentialpublicservices;

• Rightsdeficits:religiousorethnicdiscrimination(usuallyagainstminorities),persistenthumanrightsviolationsandlow-level repression,generalisedviolenceandfailureoftheruleoflaw;

Implications for MFA development and humanitarian policies

• TheMFAisengagedindevelopmentcooperationinmanycountries,suchasSomaliaandAfghanistan,wherethesestructuralconditionsmayprecipitateforceddisplacement.

• Womenandgirlshavedistinctiveexperiencesofthesedrivers.Socio-economicmarginalisationofwomenandgirlsusuallyimpactsmostforcefullyonthisgroup,heighteningtheirprecariouspositionandvulnerabilitytoforceddisplacement.

• Finland’s‘triplelock’ofhumanitarianassistance,developmentco-operationandcivilcrisismanagement(CCM)/peaceandsecuritypoliciesoffersscopetomitigatepotentialoractualsituationsofforceddisplacementbearsdirectlyontheexistentialthreatsofsocio-economicvulnerability,andrightsandstatefragilitythatmaydriveforceddisplacement:‘Developmentcooperationisagoodwayofinfluencingthedevelopmentofsocietiesindevelopingcountries….tocreate…peacefullivingconditions….sothatpeopledonothavetoleavetheirnativecountries,ortheycanreturnthere’(MFA2016).

• Policycoherencebetweenhumanitarianassistance,developmentco-operationandciviliancrisismanagementincontextsofFDisamajorchallenge.WithitsPCDexpertiseFinlandiswellplacedtotackleFDsituationsina‘comprehensivemanner’whereexistentialthreatsandvulnerabilities,rightsandprotectioncanbeaddressedthroughdevelopmentpolicies.

A number of distinctive drivers broadly define contemporary and emerging situations of forced displacement.

The distinction between involuntary displacement and more recognisable drivers, discussed below, is blurred.


2. Thenexusof armed conflict, other situationsof violence and severehuman rights violations

Armedconflict–intra-stateconflictinvolvingnon-stateactors(NSAs)suchasinSomalia,Afghanistan,YemenandSouthSudan),andstate-ledforces(suchasinSyria)andthepersecutionoftheRohingyafromMyanmar–playsacrucialroleinforcingpeopletofleeeitherinternallyoracrossnationalborders(Duffield2001;Keen2007;Kaldor2007,Zolberg1993).Armedconflictandothersitua-tionsofviolenceareusuallytheoutcomeof,andexacerbatedby,thestructuralconditionsdiscussedabove.Thisformofforcedmigrationepitomisesthepopu-larconceptionoftherefugee.YettheverylargenumberofAfghan‘refugees’inPakistanandIran(orindeedinFinland)andmanyofthoseintransitarerefu-geesfleeingconflictandviolencebuthavenotbeenrecognisedassuchbythestateswheretheyresideorthroughwhichtheyareintransit.Lackofrecognitionshowsthat,eventhoughthemajorityofrefugeesintheworld(butnotinEurope)attain refugee status via prima facie determination, this status is not easilyattained.Insteadthemillionswithoutrefugeestatusaredesignatedas‘migrant’,‘asylumseeker’, ‘irregularmigrant’,orperson in ‘refugee-likesituations’,withvastlyinferiorornorightsorprotection.


• Promotinghumanrights,CCM,peacebuildinganddevelopment,andpeacekeepinginsituationsofarmedconflict,constitutecoreelementsofMFApolicymaking.Theneedtoensurethattherightsofwomenandgirls,andrecognitionthattheyareactorsanddecisionmakersinthiscontextarecoreissuesinthiscontext.AnalysisofhowthisnexusandstructuralweaknessesprecipitateorsustainprotractedconditionsofFDcouldhelptoidentifycriticalbarrierstopromotingpolicycoherence.

• Giventhe‘political’linkageinFinlandbetweendevelopmentco-operationasthemeansoftacklingrootcausesanddiminishingmigration,suchanalysiswouldhelptobetterdemonstratethecomplexityofthislinkage.

• Armedconflictandviolenceimpactwomenandgirls–oneoftheMFA’s4PPAs–withparticularforce.Rapeandgender-basedviolencearewidelyusedasinstrumentsofwar.Femaleheadedhouseholdsareafeatureofmanywar-tornsocietiesandforciblydisplacedpopulations:theyfaceparticularvulnerabilities.

• Indiscriminateandgeneralisedviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL)andhumanrights(HR)increasinglypropelFD,generatingsevereneeds-andrights-basedvulnerabilitiesandprotectiongaps,anddemandingcoherence inhumanitarian,developmentandCCMinterventions.

Armed conflict plays a crucial role in forcing people to flee either internally or across national borders.


3. Environmental degradation and climate change

Environmental degradation and climate change are an increasingly signifi-cantelementinthecontextofpopulationdisplacement,althoughattributingacause-effect relationship is contested and thepopulist term ‘climate refugees’ismisleading (Zetter2017).Climatic andenvironmental conditionsare rarelyuniquedriversofFD,buttheymayproducea‘tippingpoint’inconjunctionwithstructuralfactorssuchaseconomic,socialandpoliticalconditions,andlinkedto existing vulnerabilities (Barnett and Adger 2007; Forsyth and Schomerus McAdam2010;Piguetetal2011;ZetterandMorrissey2014).


• The2016DPP(MFA2016)drawsattentiontothepotentialmigration/FDeffectsofclimatechange.GivenFinland’sstrongdomesticandinternationalcommitmenttoenvironmentalsustainabilityandmitigatingthecausesandimpactsofclimatechange,tacklingFDinthiscontextshouldconstituteamajorpolicyobjective.However,the2012DPP(MFA2012)gavegreaterprominencetoclimatechangeandclimatesustainabilityanditsrelationshiptodevelopmentthanthe2016DPP(MFA2016).

• ExposuretomostofthehazardswhichunderpinFDinthiscontextisnotrandom.Overwhelmingly,itispre-existingsocio-economicmarginalisationandvulnerabilitiesthatrendersuchgroupsmostexposed.Long-termdevelopmentandresiliencepoliciesrootedinPCSDareessential.

• Goal13ofthe2030Agendaexplicitlypledgescommitmentto’takeurgentactiontocombatclimatechangeanditsimpacts’,whichcouldincludeFDandreinforcesthechallengeforPCSD.

4. Other drivers of forced displacement

This far the typologyhaspresented thedriversofdisplacement thataremostrelevanttotheMFA’sdevelomentandhumanitarianpolicies.Butotherdriversarenowbrieflynotedtoensureacomprehensivepicture.Naturaldisastersareamajordriver,displacingonaverageover25millionpeopleayear(IDMC2016).Mostoftenthedisplacedeventuallyreturnbuttodosousuallyrequiressubstan-tialinternationalassiatanceforreconstruction.TheMFAisanimportantdonorforreconstructioninNepalafterthe2015earthquake.Development–removinginformalsettlements,urbaninfrasatucture,damconstruction,commerciallandgrabbingfromsubsistencefarmingcommunities–isalsoasignificantdisplace-mentdriverperhaps(McDowellandBennett2012),accountingforupto15mil-lionpeopleayear(Oliver-Smith2010).Underlyingthephysicalvulnerabilitiestowhichdisasteranddevelopmentdisplacedpeoplearesusceptible,theirsocio-economicmarginalisationalsomeansthey, likeotherfociblydisplacedgroupsdiscussedabove,havemorelimitedaccesstorightsthatmighthelpprotectthem.

Environmental degradation and climate change are an increasingly significant element in the context of population displacement.

Natural disasters are a major driver displacing on average over 25 million people a year.

Development is also a significant displacement driver.


Patterns and processes of forced displacement The second overarching conceptual characteristic of FD is the processes and patternsofmovementthatforciblydisplacedpeoplefollow.

1. Internal displacement

Mostpeopledonotwillingly leave theirhomesorcountryoforiginandoftenbelieve forced displacementwill only be temporary (Zetter 2014). The globalratioofIDPstorefugeesisapproximately2:1(40millionIDPsand19.9millionrefugees(IDMC2016;UNHCR2018).Butinternaldisplacementcreatesares-ervoir that inexorably spillsacross internationalborders–exemplifiedby the6.6million IDPs inSyria alongside the sustainedflowof6.3million refugees(UNCHR2018).


• DespitetheprimacyofcountrieswithsignificantvolumesofIDPs(Afghanistan1.7mIDPs),Somalia(2.6mIDPs),aswellasSyria(6.2m)andIraq(3.0m),thatFinlandassists,thisFDpopulationconstitutesasignificantgapintheMFA’scurrenthumanitariananddevelopmentpolicies.

• EnsuringpolicycoherencebetweendevelopmentandhumanitarianpoliciesforIDPsisasignificantchallenge.

2. Time-space discontinuities

ContemporarypatternsofFDarecomplex(withinthecountryoforigin,acrossborders,withonwardandsometimesreturnmovement)andepisodic,oscillatingunpredictablybetweentransitorsettledorreturningconditions.Thesetrajecto-riesinvolvedifferentstagesofexposuretorisks,vulnerabilityandhumanitarianandprotectionneeds(Lindley2013).


Finland provides development cooperation and humanitarianassistancetocountriesdisplayingtheseFDcharacteristics–Somalia,Afghanistan,partsofSyria.Thesecomplextrajectoriesposepolicyandprogrammingchallengestohumanitariananddevelopmentactors,notleastinsustainingpolicycoherencethroughtimeandwithpopulationswhoarenotnecessarilyinafixedlocation.

3.Routesandpathways–‘irregularmigration’and‘mixedmovements’

Manyforciblydisplacedpeopleusecomplexand/orunusualroutesandmeansoftravelandlackformaltraveldocumentsandvisas(Crawleyetal2018).Theyincreasinglyrelyonsmugglerstoassistthem.Oftentheterm‘irregularmigration’ isusedtodescribetheinformalprocessesandchannelsforsuchmobility(Mountz2010; Scheel andSquire 2014). Irregularmigration exposes allmigrants, but

Most people do not willingly leave their homes or country of origin.

Contemporary patterns of FD are complex.

Many forcibly displaced people use complex and/or unusual routes and means of travel and lack formal travel documents and visas.

Often the term ‘irregular migration’ is used.


especiallyforcedmigrants,tohighlevelsofvulnerability,especiallywomenandchildren,asjourneyshavebecomemorehazardousandaccesstoterritorymoredifficultbecauseofpushbackpolicies.Again,thesesituationsexposesignificantgapsinprotection.

Complex routes and pathways seguewith a related and distinctive feature offorced displacement – ‘mixedmovements’ of people. Former IDPswho havebecomeputativerefugees,voluntarymigrants,otherforciblydisplacedpeople,andtraffickedandsmuggledpersons,mayoftenbetravellingtogether,alongthesameroutesandusingthesameirregularmeans.Theyarefrequentlyexposedtosituationsthatendangertheirlivesandrightsandlivelihoods:womenandgirlsareparticularlyvulnerable.

Mixedmovements blur the distinctions between different categories of forceddisplacement.This is reflected in theEUMS’ andFinland’s increasingly robustresponsetotheunprecedentedinfluxofrefugees,forciblydisplacedpeople,smug-gledpeopleandmigrants,markedbythe‘thresholdmoment’in2015andtherea-ligningofFinland’sdevelopmentpoliciestomigrationmanagement.Asthe2016DPPemphasised,oneobjectiveofdevelopmentpolicieswasthat ‘peopledonothavetoleavetheirnativecountries,ortheycanreturntherein’(MFA2016).


• Finland’sinternationaldevelopmentco-operationisdemarcatedbylong-termengagementincountriesinconflictorimpactedbydisplacement,butlesswithtransitcountrieswithforciblydisplacedpeopleonthemove.However,thegrowingimportanceofsecuritisationand‘pushback’intheEU’smigrationapparatus(andformanyEUMSssuchasFinland)throwsirregularmigrationandwhathappensintransitcountriesintosharperfocusforthisevaluation.

• Mixedandirregularmovementsdemandamorenuancedunderstandingoftherights,needsandvulnerabilitiesofdifferentcategoriesofforciblydisplacedpeopleonthemoveandtheappropriatedevelopmentandhumanitarianpoliciesandprogrammesrespondingtotheseconditions.

4. From camps to cities

Expressingtheiragency,ingeneralthemajorityofforciblydisplacedpeoplenowresideinurbanareasnotinarchetypalrefugeecamps(Landau2014)–anoutcomeatfirstresistedbutnowacceptedbyhumanitarianagencies.Economicandliveli-hoodopportunitiesaremorediverseandabundant,eventhoughvulnerabilitymaybeaccentuatedby inferior livingconditions,protectionandmaterialassistance.WithnoformalrefugeecampsinLebanon,althoughtherearesomeformalsettle-ments,themajorityofonemillionrefugeesliveinurbanareasorclosebyinfor-malsettlements, inacountrywhichis87%urbanised(UNHabitatn.d.).IntheMENAregionasawhole,lessthan10%ofSyrianrefugeesareencamped(UNHCRn.d.).BothIDPsandreturningrefugeestendtolocateinurbanareasforthesame

Mixed movements blur the distinctions between different categories of forced displacement.

The majority of forcibly displaced people now reside in urban areas not in archetypal refugee camps.


reasons.Approximately70%ofKabul’spopulationmaybereturneesand/orIDPs;IDPsinSyriaarelargelyurban-based(IndexMundi2018).

Urbanlocationsasthedestinationreshapeaconceptualisationofthepatternsandprocessesofforceddisplacementandpolicypriorities.


Urbanlivelihoods,vulnerability,protectionandgender-basedpriorities,andengagementwith local governance structures require specificallytailored joint host-displaced population policies, programmes andmodalities of engagement by development and humanitarian actors.This posesnew challenges for policy coherence.Urbandisplacementconstitutes a significant gap in MFA development co-operation andhumanitarianpoliciesandprogrammes.

5. Protracted displacement

Almostallcontemporarysituationsofforceddisplacement(whetherinternalorcrossborder), areprotracted–e.g.Afghanistan (since 1980s),Somalia (since1990s),Syria (since2011).Almost70%ofUNHCRdocumentedrefugees,13.4million,havebeendisplacedformorethanfiveyearsandthemeandurationofexileisabout10years(Milner2014;UNHCR2018).Sinceprotracteddisplace-ment isdue toseveralcomplex factors,asdescribedabove,most forciblydis-placedpeoplewill not returnhomequickly (Harild et al., 2015).Womenandgirls,ofteninfemaleheadedhouseholdsfaceparticularchallengesinsituationsofprotracteddisplacement–accesstolongtermprotection,healthandrepro-ductivecare,livelihoodresources,educationandchanginggenderroles.

WhilstprotracteddisplacementcanbeadriverofonwardmigrationsuchastheSyrianrefugeesin2015/16,themainconsequenceistheneedtotransitionfromhumanitariantolongtermdevelopmentstrategiesinhostcountries,toreducethe,usually,negativesocialandeconomic impactsofspontaneoussettlement. It also demands long term humanitarian and development interventions incountriesoforigintoenableeventualreturn.Addressingtheselonger-termcon-sequences and impacts of protracteddisplacement is a pressing internationalpriorityandtheentrypointfordevelopmentactorstoworkalongsidehumani-tariancounterparts.Thisisexploredinchapter3.2.2below.


Finland’s predisposition for long-term engagement in crisis-affectedcountries, its expertise in CCM and peace building and security, aswellas itsgenderpriorities,makes itwell-placedtotackleprotracteddisplacement by bridging humanitarian and development needs. Ithaslessbutgrowingexperienceincountrieshostingforciblydisplacedpopulations in protracted displacement. However, policies andprogrammestotackleprotracteddisplacementplaceaspecialburdenontheneedforpolicycoherence.

Almost all contemporary situations of forced displacement (whether internal or cross border), are protracted.


Forced Displacement and the MFA – Making ConnectionsAswell as specific implications, this conceptualisationof forceddisplacementhaswiderimplicationsfortheevaluationandstrengtheningamoreintegratedapproachtoitsdevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicies.

ManyofthecountrieswhereFinlandisengagedasadevelopmentandhumani-tarianactorrevealdifferentcomponentsofthistypologyofdriversandpatternsandprocessesofmobility.Yet,althoughtheterminology‘pakkomuutto’(forceddisplacement),andalso ‘tahdonvastainenmuuttoliike’(involuntarymigration)areusedintheMFA,theyarenotexplicitlydeployedinMFApoliciesandpolicymaking.

SummaryofImplicationsfortheMFA–Strengtheninganintegratedapproach to humanitarian and development policy

Bytranscendingstatus-baseddefinitionssuchasrefugee,thedefinitionof forced displacement and the conceptualisation elaborated here,potentiallyoffersavaluableanalyticaltoolfortheMFA’shumanitarian,development,humanrightsandhumansecuritypolicymakers.Amorenuanced and holistic understanding of the vulnerabilities, and therights-basedandneeds-based conditionsof forciblydisplacedpeoplecanstrengthenamoreintegratedapproachtotheMFA’shumanitariananddevelopmentpoliciesandenhancepolicycoherence.Thispotentialwillbeelaboratedintheconclusionsandrecommendations.

3.2.2 Humanitarian-Development NexusThissubchapterpresents thesecondconceptualbuildingblockof thisevalua-tion,thehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN),aninternationalapproachtostrategyandpolicymakingprocessesthatiscurrentlyunderpinningtherecon-figuringofglobalresponsestoprotractedrefugeeandforceddisplacementcri-ses.Termedthe‘NewWayofWorking’sincetheWHS(OCHA2017),theimpe-tusfortheparadigmshiftanditssignificanceinsituationsoflargescaleforceddisplacementarenowelaborated(seealsoUNEG-HEIG2018);therelevanceoftheseglobalmovementstowardsgreatercoherencefortheMFA’shumanitariananddevelopmentpoliciesisalsodiscussed.

Twopreceptsunderpinhumanitarianassistance.First,assistanceispredicatedon short term and flexible funding, programming and reporting priorities –oftenonanannualbasis–e.g.,totacklethe‘emergency’lifesavingconditionswhichusuallycharacterisetheearlystagesofrefugeecrises.However,aswehaveseenmanysituationsofFDareprotracted.Thesecondpreceptisthathumani-tarian assistance is unconditionally ‘needs-based’ according to humanitarianprinciples.Evenwheredisplacementisprotracted,humanitarianprinciplesstillendurealthoughtheoften-politicalnatureofdisplacementcrisesposeschalleng-esforneutralityandindependence.

Bycontrast,developmentisamediumtolongtermprojectfor,interalia,improving socialandeconomicconditionsandsothesetwopreceptsplayoutratherdiffer-

Transcending status-based definitions such as refugee, the definition of forced displacement and the conceptualisation elaborated here, potentially offers a valuable analytical tool for the MFA’s humanitarian, development, human rights and human security policy makers.

The humanitarian-development nexus (HDN), an international approach to strategy and policy making processes is currently underpinning the reconfiguring of global responses to protracted refugee and forced displacement crises.


entlyandfundingandprogramminghavetoalignwiththesedifferentcircum-stances.Whereashumanitarianassistanceisexplicitlytargetedtocountriesandprojectsonthebasisofneedsandvulnerability–the‘humanitarianimperative’–developmentassistance,particularlyunderOECD-DACguidance,tendstobefocusedonalimitedsetofcountries,overalongertimescaleandmediatedbypoliticalinterestsandobjectives.

Whilst thedisplacementofrefugees, IDPsandother forciblydisplacedpeoplehaspre-eminentlybeenframedasahumanitarianandprotectionchallenge,itisalsoasignificantdevelopmentchallenge,andopportunity.Thisisbecausepro-tractedconditionsofFDrequirelongertermdevelopmenttoprovidesustainablelivelihoodsfordisplacedpeopleandhosts.

Reconcilingthesedifferentprecepts,inotherwordsachievingpolicycoherence,liesattheheartofestablishingtheHDNandtheFindingschapter(Chapter4)willdemonstratethechallengesfacedbytheMFAandindeedbyalldonors.

For many decades, the aim of incorporating development approaches intoresponses to forceddisplacementhasbeenapersistentobjectiveof the inter-nationaldonorcommunity, frustratedby theescalatingcostsofhumanitarianassistance,andbyhostcountriescontestingtheunfairfiscalandsocio-economicburdensthatrefugeesplaceontheircountries(Rossetal.,1994).Moregener-ally, theneedtoensure thathumanitarian interventions tookaccountof theirlonger-termimpacts,and,alsotheneedtoavertthelossorunderutilisationofapotentiallyproductiveeconomicresource–thelabourofrefugees–werealsoconcerns.

Withmanyinstitutionalstakeholders,donorsandgovernmentsinvolved,aswellastheneedtoestablisheffectivefundingmechanisms,thedesignandimplemen-tationofacoherentandcomprehensiveframeworktodeliverthisobjectivehasbeenpersistentlyproblematic.Severalattemptsinthelasttwodecadestopro-moteandco-ordinatedevelopmentalresponsesthatcomplementhumanitarianassistancehavefailedtogaintraction(Mosel.andLevine2014;Zetter2014a).

The impetus for the resurgent interesthas largely comeaboutbecauseof theregional andglobal impactsof large-scale refugeedisplacement in theMENAregionandHornofAfrica(HoA).Significantbuy-infromdevelopmentactors,notablyconcessionaryfundingbytheWorldBank(WorldBank2017)andalsothe European Investment Bank (EIB) has assisted progress. Butmany otheractors are also involved (see e.g. DANIDA 2017; European Parliament 2012;SavetheChildren2018;UNEG-HEIG2018;UNDP2016;UNICEF2016).Thescaleandimpactofthesecurrentcrisestranscendimmediatehumanitariansitu-ationsandhavecrystallisedinpolicyapproachesthatfirmlyswingtowardspro-motingdevelopment-ledresponsesthatcomplement,transitionfromandbuildonhumanitarianassistance.TheSyrianrefugeecrisishasinmanywaysbecomeatestinggroundfortheHDN.

TheHDNapproach aims to tackle two enduring challenges in refugee crises:mediatingtheimpactsofprotractedforceddisplacementonreceivingcountriesandcommunities;andtransitioningfromhumanitarianassistancetoaddressing the longer-term livelihood and other needs of the displaced themselves in sustainable ways. This requires newmodalities of responsibility sharing and

Whilst the displacement of refugees, IDPs and other forcibly displaced people has pre-eminently been framed as a humanitarian and protection challenge, it is also a significant development challenge, and opportunity.

The HDN approach aims to tackle two enduring challenges in refugee crises: mediating the impacts of protracted forced displacement on receiving countries and communities; and transitioning from humanitarian assistance to addressing the longer-term livelihood and other needs of the displaced themselves in sustainable ways.


sustainedcommitment todevelopment-focused, longer-termeconomic strate-giestosupporttheneedsofforciblydisplacedpeople,thecountriesandthecom-munities supporting them.This support isdrivenby theconceptof resiliencebuilding,wellembeddedinthedisastercontextbutnowbeingmainstreamedindisplacementcrises.Equally,development-ledapproachesshouldalsopromotedurablesolutionstosituationsofforceddisplacementandunderpinpoliciesthattacklepreventionandrootcauses.

TheHDNapproachincludes, interalia,thefollowingprincipalconditionsandrequirements:

1. The humanitarian and development interface

• Thehumanitariansystem,anditsnormativeandinternationallegalframeworkofprotectionunderthe1951CSR,isvitalbutinsufficientinitselftoprovidecomprehensiveandsustainableresponsestothecom-plexandprotractedsituationsofforceddisplacement.Moreover,asdis-cussedin3.2.1,largenumbersofforciblydisplacedpeoplefalloutsidetheCSRbutexperiencethesamevulnerabilitiesandneedsasrefugees.

• Thedistinctionbetweenhumanitarianneedsanddevelopmentinter-ventionscanbeartificial–forexamplechildprotection,educationandhealthcare,andallbasicservicesrequirebothmodesofactionandtheymayoverlap.Thismeansthatdevelopmentstrategiesandprogrammesshouldbebuiltinfromthebeginningofacrisis,alignedsimultaneouslywithhumanitarianassistanceandensuringcomplementaritybetweenthetwomodes.

2. Development modalities

• Developmentactorsmayneedtoworkinpartnershipwithgovern-mentsthatmaybeabsent,weakorpartoftheconflictanddonorsmaynothavedevelopmentprogrammesinthecountry.Moreover,thelackofflexibilityofdevelopmentinstrumentsmakesithardtousetheminvolatilecontexts;donorsmighthaverulesthatpreventthemunder-takingdevelopmentprogrammesinrefugeehostingcountries.

• Developmentactorsplayakeyroleinsupportingtheresilienceofrefugeesandaffectedcommunities,andinfosteringself-reliance.Atthesametime,theHDNopensopportunitiesfornewdevelopmentactorssuchasprivateandcorporatesectorsandnewmodesofinvestmentfundingfordevelopmentoperationsatlevelsofeconomicactivity (Zetter2014a).

• New,orreinforced,modalitiesofresponsibilitysharingarerequiredwhichincludethecommitmentoftheinternationalcommunitytolongtermandpredictablecollectivefundingforhostcountries,asenvisagedintheCRRF.

• Thechallengesofstrategicplanning,fundingandprogrammecoordi-nationinamulti-stakeholdersettingexertacriticaldemandforpolicycoherenceateveryleveloftheHDN–donorprecepts,strategicplan-ning,fundingandreportingprotocols,projectdesign,needsassess-ment,localprogrammingandmulti-stakeholdercoordination.

Development actors play a key role in supporting the resilience of refugees and affected communities, and in fostering self-reliance.

Challenges of strategic planning, funding and programme coordination in a multi-stakeholder setting exert a critical demand for policy coherence at every level of the HDN.


• Asignificantfortheprivatesectorisenvisaged,forexampleinemploy-mentgenerationforthedisplacedandtheirhost.Thisisincreasinglypromotedbythemaininternationalactors–WorldBank,UNHCR,UNDP.

3.Theforciblydisplacedandhosts–agencyandsupport

• Forciblydisplacedpeoplehaveresources,skillsandagency,aswellasthepotentialtocontributetoeconomicdemandandsupply;theseshouldbefosteredtoaddtotheproductivecapacityanddevelopmentofimpactedcountriesandregions.

• AnimportantpreceptoftheHDNistoassistforciblydisplacedpeopleandlocallyimpactedcommunities,whoareoftensubjecttopre-existingvulnerabilitiesandwhoselivingstandardsandlivelihoodsareseverelynegativelyimpactedbythelarge-scalearrivalofrefugeesandotherdisplacedpopulations.

• Sustainableinterventionsthatsupportresilienceandself-sufficiencybetterrespectandfosterthedignityofforciblydisplacedpeopleandtheirhosts.

• Innovativemodesofassistancesuchascash-basedtransfers(CBT) forbasicneedsandlivelihoodsforforciblydisplacedpopulations,potentiallyconnecthumanitarianreliefoperationstowidereconomicdevelopmentalobjectivesbyincorporatingthedisplacedintolocaleconomiesasconsumersbutalsopotentiallyasproducers,forexample,withmicro-enterprisestart-upcapital.

4. The wider context

• Insomecontexts,includingmanyofthoseinwhichFinlandisanactor,theHDNshouldalsoembracepeacebuilding,security,ruleoflawandhumanrightspolicies,amongstothers,asthismayplayacrucialroleinlimitingtheconditionsthatprecipitatedisplacementandmayfacilitatereturn.

• Morebroadly,theHDNlinkstothe2030SDGs.

AswithFD,aspecificissueintheMFAhasbeentofindtherightterminology fornexuswheretheFinnishword‘jatkumo’=continuum(verb‘jatkua’meanscontinue) unfortunately gives a false impression of the nexus as a linear concept.Partlyforthisreason,theterminologyusedininternaldocumentshasbeen‘linkingdevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistance’.However,thereisnowgreaterunderstandingthattheconceptisnotlinear.

Forcibly displaced people have resources, skills and agency.

An important precept of the HDN is to assist forcibly displaced people and locally impacted communities.


Drawingthesefactorstogether,aworkingdefinitionofHDN,providedforthisevaluationis:

The HDN approach seeks complementarity between humanitarian and development programming, funding, time scales and priorities, whilst recognising that different principles apply and need to be understood and respected. It aims to achieve coherence between short term emergency assistance and sustainable, resilience-building development for forcibly displaced people and their host communities.

TheHDNisnotyetafullydevelopedpolicymodel;inanycase,itisveryimpor-tant tonote that a standardisedapproach cannotbeapplied indifferent con-textsofdisplacement(Sandie-Lie2017;UNEG-HEIG2018).However,theHDNisbeingrolledoutinareshapedglobalarchitectureofinternationalresponsestoforceddisplacement,underpinnedbythe2018GCR(UNHCR2018a)whichactivelypromotestheHDNanddevelopment-ledapproachesinvolvingbilateral,multilateralandprivatestakeholders.ItisalsobeingrolledoutatanoperationallevelthroughtheComprehensiveRefugeeResponseFramework(CRRF),agreedbyUNMemberStatesinAnnexIofthe2016NewYorkDeclarationonAddress-ingLargeMovementsofRefugeesandMigrants.TheCRRF,adoptedin15coun-triesincludingSomalia(oneofthecasestudiesofthisevaluation)providesforimprovedstrategicplanningandco-ordinationofresponsesinsituationsofpro-tracteddisplacement.

IntheMENAregiontheUNHCR-UNDPCo-ordinatedSyrianRegionalRelianceandResponsePlan(Syrian3RP)hasbeenpromotedasanarchitypeofamoresustainable longertermHDNresponse.Thiscoordinatescountry-drivenresil-ienceplansandfundingprocessesacrosstheregionimpactedbySyrianrefuges.InJordan, anationalCompactbetween internationaldonorsand thegovern-mentaimstopromotedevelopmentwithSpecialEnterpriseZones(SEZs)andproviderefugeesandnationalswithnewemploymentopportunitiesinordertopromotelivelihoods.Therighttoworkforrefugees,akeyinstrumentinachiev-ingsustainablelivelihoodsforthem,butwhichisusuallydeniedorheavilycir-cumscribedinpracticeinmostlow-incomecountries,isbeingpromotedbytheWorldBank,theILOaswellasUNHCRandUNDP(ZetterandRuaudel2016).Turningtheoryintopracticehasnotbeenwithoutnumerousproblemsforexam-ple,theextenttowhichitisaregionalstrategyratherthananassemblyofnon-compatible different country plans; and very substantial underfunding. Forthesereasonsitisoftendescriedasapilotevenafterfiveyearsinexistence.Itiscertainlyevolving.Perhapsthemainachievementhasbeentomainstreamresil-ienceasthecoreobjective.

Self-evidently, the global reframing of responses to forced displacement is acentralconcernoftheevaluation,andtheHDNhascriticalrelevancetoPCD.ThesearethefocalconcernsofChapter4.

The HDN is being rolled out in a reshaped global architecture of international responses to forced displacement.


3.2.3 FD and the HDN: what are the links?EvolvingascoreelementsforMFApolicymaking,FDandtheHDN/HPDNcon-stitutethetwinpillarsoftheevaluation.Theconceptshavebeentreatedsepa-ratelyinthisChapter,notonlytohighlighttheirspecificcharacteristics,butalsobecause theyhaveverydifferentproperties.WhereasFD isananalytical con-ceptdescribingaphenomenon–acomplexcategoryofpeopleonthemove–theHDNisaformulationdescribingaparticulartypeofpolicyapparatus.

Given these different characteristics, the question arises, are the terms inde-pendentofeachother,oralternatively,aretheyrelatedandifsohow?

Theevaluation isbuilton thecontention that the twotermsare inter-related,verymuchsointhepolicymakingcontext.ThisisbecausetherationalefortheHDNisthattheoutcomesofFD(thedrivers,patternsandprocessesdiscussedinchapter3.3.1)demandapolicyapparatuswhichembracesbothhumanitarianresponsestothemanydifferentneeds-andrights-basedassistanceforpeoplewhoareforciblydisplaced,andlonger-termdevelopmentsupportaswell–thehumanitarian-developmentnexus.

3.3. MFA: development and humanitarian context

3.3.1 Development and humanitarian policy framework In2018,886millionMEUR,0.38%ofFinland’sgrossnationalincome(GNI),hadbeenreserved fordevelopmentcooperation.Of this totalofficialdevelop-mentassistance(ODA),554MEURwereprojectedtobeadministeredbyMFAwhilst342MEURwasappropriatedforotherdevelopmentassistance,forexam-pleEUdevelopment cooperation and investmentsmade in the Finnish FundforIndustrialCooperation.Some32MEURwasallocatedforrefugeereceptionin Finland.ODA also included humanitarian assistance allocations discussedbelow.Approximately55%ofODAwasallocatedtobilateralpartnershipsand45%tomultilaterals.CountryprogrammestowhichFinlandallocatedmorethan15MEURwereNepal,Afghanistan,EthiopiaandMozambique.

Thebudgetallocationsfor2018showamarginalreductiononthe2017ODAof935MEURwhichrepresented0.41%ofFinland’sGNIwith565MEURofODAadministered by theMFA.Overall, there is a progressive diminution ofODAfromthehighpointof1,232MEURin2014(chapter4.4providesmoredetails).

Two development policy programmes for 2012 and 2016 (MFA 2012, 2016)definethedevelopmentco-operationcontextforthisevaluation.EmphasisisonthemorerecentDPPwhichsetsoutfourprioritypolicyareas(PPAs)whicharebenchmarksintheevaluation.Theseare:

• Enhancingtherightsandstatusofwomenandgirls;

• Improvingtheeconomiesofdevelopingcountriestoensuremorejobs,livelihoodopportunitiesandwell-being;

• Democraticandbetter-functioningsocieties;

• Increasedfoodsecurityandbetteraccesstowaterandenergyand thesustainabilityofnaturalresources.

In 2018, 886 million MEUR, 0.38% of Finland’s gross national income (GNI), had been reserved for development cooperation.

Two development policy programmes for 2012 and 2016 (MFA 2012, 2016) define the development co-operation context for this evaluation.


AlthoughnotoneofthefourPPAs,theteamhavealsonotedtherisingprofilegiven to disability and inclusion policies in the MFA portfolio, reflecting its successful global advocacy for these policies in the context of internationalhumanitarianresponses.

In addition, the evaluation identified what we have termed ‘policy pillars’: furtherdelineatingtheMFA’sstrategicobjectivesandpolicyactions,theseare:

• Developmentco-operation(includingthefourmainPolicyPriorities) –remitoftheMFA;

• Humanitarianaidpolicy(includingmultilateralpartnershipswithhumanitarianactors,supportfornon-governmentalorganisations(NGOs))–remitoftheMFA;

• HumanrightsandHRBA–remitoftheMFA;

• Crisismanagementpolicy(includingsecurity,peacebuilding,civilianmilitary(CIVMIL)relationsandciviliancrisismanagement(CCM))–remitoftheMFAbutalsooftheMinistryofDefence(MoD)andMoI;

• Migrationpolicy(includingdomesticpoliticalagendas/European politicalagenda/asylumpolicy/labourpolicy)–mainlytheremitof theMoIandPMObutintersectingwithMFAremit.

In2017,Finland’shumanitarianassistance,fundedfromdevelopmentcoopera-tionappropriations,amountedto73.3MEUR,showingareductioninallocationsfrom84MEURin2016and97.8MEURin2015.

Humanitarian funding is provided for country and regional operations. Themain recipients of assistance are countries impacted by the Syria crisis (cur-rentlythemainpriority),SouthSudan,IraqandYemen–andcorefundingforspecialisthumanitarianorganisationsconsideredkeypartnersforFinland’spri-orities.These includeUNHCRand InternationalCommitteeof theRedCrossandtheInternationalRedCrossFederation(ICRCandIFRC),UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA)andtheWorldFoodProgramme (WFP). The MFA prepares ‘policy and influencing plans’ (PIPs)thatdefine thepriorities itwants to ’influence’ in theseagencies’policiesandstrategies.

TheoverallobjectiveofFinland’shumanitarianassistancesetoutin2012(MFA2012:11),‘istosavelives,alleviatehumansufferingandmaintainhumandignity during times of crisis and in their immediate aftermath’. Thismain objectivetranslatesintoanumberofgoalsandpolicies,including:

• Goal1:Finlandisaresponsible,timelyandpredictabledonor;

• Goal2:Promotinganeffective,well-ledandcoordinatedinternationalhumanitarianassistancesystem;

• Goal3:Ensuringsupportischannelledthroughcapableandexperiencednon-governmentalorganisations;

• Goal4:Ensuringthathumanitarianprinciplesareknownandadheredto;

• DevelopmentofFinnishbusinessandexpertiserelatedtonatural disastersisalsopromotedbutisnotagoalassuch.

In 2017, Finland’s humanitarian assistance, funded from development cooperation appropriations, amounted to 73.3 MEUR.


Thesegoalsarefurtherpromotedbypolicyguidelines,whichaimtostrengthentheinternationalhumanitariansystemandensurethatfundingmodalitiessup-portitsprioritiesandprinciplesby:

• FollowingUNconsolidatedappealsasthebasisforcountryselection;

• Channellingsupportthroughexperienced,principledorganisations;supportforEUhumanitarianaction;

• Recognisingprotectionisanintegralpartofhumanitarianassistance;

• Supportinghumanitarianmineaction.

Since the so-calledEuropeanmigration/refugee crisis, Finland, like all Euro-peanUnionMemberStates (EUMSs),hasundergoneaprocessof reassessingthepurposesof,andreframingitslongstandingcommitmenttodevelopmentco-operationand,toalesserextent,humanitarianassistance.Projectedthrougha‘migrationlens’itsdevelopmentcooperationpolicyapparatushasbeensubject-edtointensescrutiny–exploredaboveinchapter3.2andinchapter4.3belowonFindings–andtoanextentisstillinfluxastheMFAseekstoreconciletheinterplaybetweennowprevailingnationalmigrationpoliciesand itsportfolioofinternationaldevelopmentcooperationpolicies.TheintroductionofthenewconceptsofFDandtheHDNoffersbothasetoffurtherchallengesfortheMFAinreshapingitsdevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicyframeworkinthisperiodofflux,butalsoconstructiveopportunitiesforstrengtheningitspolicyapparatusandpolicycoherencebybetteraligningthesetwomajorcomponentsbothwithinthehouseandwithsignificantdevelopmentininternationalpractice.

3.3.2 The HDN, the HPDN and the MFA – Making Connections TheMFAhasbeenactivelyengagedwiththeHDNprocessesataglobal level,througheffectiveadvocacy,andoperationally,forexample,intheSyriaresponseinthefieldanddescribedintheMFA’sStrategyforDevelopmentCooperation:MENA 2017–2020 (MFA 2017). But progress to embed the approach com-prehensively intheMFA’sdevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicies,andat the programmeandprojectlevelhasbeenlimited.Chapter4providesevidenceofthisengagementandthelimitations.

Of potentially great importance to theMFA is that whilst theHDN has beenrolledout incountries impactedbyforceddisplacement,astheSecretaryGen-eral’sReportforthe2016WorldHumanitarianSummitnoted,conflictremains‘thebiggestobstacletohumandevelopment’.Forthesereasons,thereisgrowinginterestinpromotingpeaceandsecurityasthemissinglinkinthenexusbetweenhumanitarianactionandsustainabledevelopment–thesocalled‘triplenexus’ofthehumanitarian-developmentandpeacenexus(Barnett2011;Chandler2014;Uvin2002).Althoughthisorderingoftheprocessesisusedinternationally,thelogicistoconsiderpeaceasatransitionalstagebetweenhumanitariananddevel-opmentinterventionsandforthisreasonhumanitarian-peace-developmentnex-us(HPDN)isusedinthisreport.ThisispreciselythenicheinwhichtheMFAspecialises,prioritising it in itsDPPasahumanitariananddevelopmentactorlinkedtociviliancrisismanagement(CCM),peaceandstabilityprocesses,andgovernanceincountriessuchasAfghanistanandSomaliabutalsoSyria.

The MFA has been actively engaged with the HDN processes at a global level.

Progress to embed the approach comprehensively in the MFA’s development and humanitarian policies, and at the programme and project level has been limited.


SummaryofImplicationsfortheMFA–Strengtheninganintegratedapproach to humanitarian and development policy

Finland’s 2016DPP, which promotes development in the context ofrefugees and forced displacement (although the term migration isactuallyused),resonatespowerfullywiththeambitionsoftheHDNandtheCRRF.TheHDNalsoresonateswithFinland’swidercommitmenttohumanrightsandthedignityofaffectedpopulationsnotedinChapter5 oftheDPP.

The MFA has been closely involved with international processesaddressing forced displacement such as the Global Compact and itsmembershipoftheUNHCRdonors’grouphasenabledittoexertsomeleverage on these developments and align themwith its own policyinterests.

TheglobaltransformationoftheHDNhasaspecialbearingonPCDbothwithintheMFAandinrelationto itshumanitariananddevelopmentpartners.

TheMFAiswellplacedtoadvocate internationalcommitment to theemergingconceptoftheHPDNandtooperationaliseit initscountryandregionalstrategies.

IDPs remain a significant gap in the HDN processes. This hasimportantimplicationsforhowconflictdynamicswithinsuchcountriesbearon thehumanitarian-developmentnexusandpeacebuildingandstabilisationpoliciespromotedbytheMFA.

In sum,mainstreaming thediscussion so far,HDN/HPDNoffersthe potential to strengthen the MFA’s capacity to design and implement an integrated approach for its development and humanitarianpolicies,whilstensuringthatitfulfilsitsinternationalcommitments.Theconclusions(chapter5)andrecommendations(chapter6)furtherelaboratethispotential.

3.3.3 Policy Coherence in DevelopmentTheMFA’sDepartmentforDevelopmentPolicyhasleadresponsibilityforPCD.The relatively small sizeof theministryalsopermits thediscussiononpolicycoherence to takeplace informally.TheDPC,appointedbyeachnewGovern-ment,alsohasamandateto lookatpolicycoherenceandprovidesaplatformfor dialogue on coherencedilemmaswith external stakeholders (MPs,NGOs,privatesector, tradeunions,etc.). In thefieldofhumanitarianassistance, theMFApreparesPIPstoguideitsrelationswithitsmainmultilateralpartners(e.g.UNHCR)wherebyitseekstoextendtheinfluenceof,andthuscoherencewith,itspolicypriorities.

The MFA is well placed to advocate international commitment to the emerging concept of the HPDN and to operationalise it in its country and regional strategies.

HDN/HPDN offers the potential to strengthen the MFA’s capacity to design and implement an integrated approach for its development and humanitarian policies.


Atthesametime, therelativelyweaker frameworkfor ‘state’policycoherencehasbeenhighlightedbythe2015‘thresholdmoment’.Politicalandpolicydebateovertheinterplaybetweendevelopmentandmigration(discussedinmoredetailinchapter3.2)hasbroughttotheforetensionsbetweentheMFAand,princi-pally, theMinistry of Interior (MoI) (responsible formigrationpolicies), andbetweentheMFAandFinland’salignmentwithEUmigrationpolicies.Thecon-tinuinglackofpolicycoherenceinthisareaisaprominentfeatureofthisevalu-ation.AMigrationTaskForce(MTF)wasestablishedby theMFAtopromotecoherence but the lack of inter-ministerial joint committees/task forces andmanagement/leadershipbetweendeskofficersandthepoliticalactorsremains,astheevaluationsubsequentlypointsout–asocalled‘missingmiddle’.

Withtheadoptionofthe2030Agendaanditsreferencetopolicycoherenceforsustainabledevelopment(PCSD),responsibilityforpolicycoherenceshiftedtotheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDG)CoordinationunitinthePrimeMin-ister’soffice.Asaresult,thespecificfocalpointforPCDintheMFAnolonger exists; this implies that the emphasismaybeweakenedby the shift towiderintegrated policymaking. On the other hand, the location in the PM’s officedoesensuretheunit iswellplacedtoencouragepolicycoherencerightacrossgovernment.

Political and policy debate over the interplay between development and migration has brought to the fore tensions.


4 FINDINGS

Thischapterpresentsthefindingsoftheevaluationinfourparts,oneeachdeal-ingwiththethreeevaluationquestionsoftheEMandthefourthprovidinganal-ysis of development cooperation and humanitarian financial disbursements.RecognisingthatMFApolicydevelopmentforFDandtheHDNisstill‘workinprogress’ratherthanextantpolicesbeingformallyevaluated,someoftheJudge-mentCriteria(JC)onthefindingscutacrossthethreeEQs,andothertransect-ingthemesarealsopresentedlaterinthischapter.

4.1 Finland’s approach to Forced Displacement and the Humanitarian-Development Nexus in the context of its Development Policies

EQ1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clearapproaches to forced displacement (FD) and the humanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN)overtheevaluationperiod?

Summary answer to EQ 1

TheMFA has not developed clear approaches to FD and the HDN,especiallyintheearlierperiodcoveredbytheevaluation.Whilstmoreactive,butveryuneven,engagement isvisible in therecentperiodofthe evaluation, theMFA has notmanaged to develop approaches totheconcepts thatareclearly formulatedandwell-established inwaysthat can effectively inform its policy making and programmes in acoherent and comprehensive fashion.Uneven, but generally, limitedengagementisparticularlynoticeableatfieldandprogrammelevel.Thenegative impacts of the 2015moment of transition,whichpromoteddevelopmentcooperationasaninstrumentofmigrationcontrol,arestillbeingexperienced.Institutionalbarriersconstitutefurtherconstraintsonprogress.

On theHDN,most of the documents examined do not engage withthenexus as a tool to link andmutually reinforcehumanitarian anddevelopment work. Policy documents in the later period covered bythe evaluation move away from the more classic complementarity[or continuum] approach to the HDN, towards an emphasis onmigration control that links migration and development which isproblematic. Documentary evidence is supported by KII evidence(withintheMFAandwithpartners)thatFDandtheHDNarenot,asyet,clearlyformulatedandwell-establishedintheMFA’sdevelopmentco-operationandhumanitarianassistancepolicies.However,muchKIIevidence indicates that theHDN(butnotFD) isat least topical,and

The MFA has not developed clear approaches to FD and the HDN, especially in the earlier period covered by the evaluation.


thesubjectofinformaldialogue;andthereisadiscernibleinterestinengagingwiththeconceptanddevelopingrelevantpolicy.

By contrast, of the three case studies, the MENA case shows verypositive engagement with the principles and strategic aspects of theHDN,includingsomeevidenceofpeacebuildinginthetriplenexus;butthisengagementwithHDNisscarcelyevidentattheprogrammelevel.

Extensiveevidenceofprogrammesandprojectsforthe‘rightsofwomenandgirls’PPAisfoundinthecasestudycountriesbutisyettobefullyarticulatedintoanHDNapproach.

The gap in coverage of FD is significant: engagementwith the issueis only partial, mainly focused on refugees [from the humanitarianperspective] or migration [from the domestic perspective]. Thisdichotomybecomesmoreapparentafter2015,whenlargenumbersofasylumseekersarriveinEuropeandFinland,withincreasedevidenceinsubsequentyearsofastrongerfocusonmigrationcontrol.This‘partialnarrative’ fails to address the complexity of drivers, manifestationsandimpactsofmovementpatternswiththerelatedriskofanarrowerpolicyspectrumandscopeintermsofdevelopmentandhumanitarianprogrammeundertaken.Yet,inthemostrecentpartoftheevaluation,someattemptstowidenthedebateandpresentabroaderpictureofFDarenoted.

(JC1.1,1.2,1.3,andcasestudies)

Thereissubstantialandconsistentevidence–documentary,KII(bothGoFandbilateral andmultilateral partners), and case study– underpinning themainfindingsummarisedabove.MFAengagementwiththeemergingconceptsofFDandtheHDN,exploredinchapter3,doesnotasyetyieldsignificantstrengthen-ingofthe4PPAsinthe2016DPPandthefivepolicypillars.SomepartnerKIsgosofarastoindicatethattheyhavenoclearsenseofFinland’sunderstanding/approachonthesematters.Withoneexception,casestudyevidencerevealslim-itedengagementwithHDNattheprogrammelevel.Thisis intheMENAcasewheretheMFAhasbeenapowerfuladvocatefortheHDNstrategyembodiedinthe3RP(UNHCR-UNDP2017),butnotataprogrammelevel.TheSALAMproject forAfghanistan,albeitasingleproject, isengagingwithbothconceptsby addressingFD in all its complexity and is an illustrationofhow theHDNapproachcanfocusonsupportingself-reliance,povertyreduction.

Theevidenceexplainingthisfinding,drawnmainlyfromKIIs,isthatconcernbysomepartsofthepublicaboutmigrationandrefugeeshasbeenthedeterminingfactorofpolicymakingonthesematterssince2015.Atthesametimethereishighpubliccommitmenttointernationaldevelopmentcooperation,contradictedbygovernmentcuts inthedevelopmentbudget;commitmenttohumanitarianpoliciesremainsstrong.Accentuatingthesensethatthe‘developmentside’oftheMFAhasfelt‘sidestepped’bythe2015‘migrationcrisis’,werethedevelopmentbudgetcuts.AttheEUlevel,KIIsreinforcedtheconclusionthat2015marksthedividing line inFinlandas inmanyEUMSs,when thenarrativeonmigration

The MENA case shows very positive engagement with the principles and strategic aspects of the HDN, including some evidence of peace building in the triple nexus.


startedtochangeandtotakeamoreprominentroleinthedebate,notablywiththeintroductionofconditionalityondevelopmentassistancerelatedtomigra-tion.Takentogetherthesefactorshavesignificantlyshapedtheapproachtopoli-cydevelopmentonFDandHDNbypoliticisingthedebateandoversimplifiedtheframingofdevelopmentasamigrationmitigationandasecuritisationmeasure. Consequently,progresson linkingnewpolicyapparatusandconceptssuchasHDNandFDtoexistingPPAsandpolicypillars,hasbeenconstrained.

Despite the lackofevidenceof formalprogress in theMFA, there isevidenceintheevaluationofagrowingmomentumwithintheMFAtoengagewithandembed FD and HDN. Several KIIs observed that many informal discussionsbetweenMFA staff on the subjects have taken place and thiswas helping toembedacommonunderstanding.InstitutionalreformprocessesandanActionPlanrollingoutHDNarefurthersignsofthisprogress.

Theprinciplefindingisnowelaboratedwithfivemoredetailedfindings.

Finding 1.1: The uptake of FD in the MFA remains limited

The threshold moment associated with the 2015 migration crisissignificantly shaped the approach to policies on FD by aligningdevelopmentcooperation,asaninstrumenttotacklerootcauses,withdomesticagendasformigrationdeterrence(undertheaegisoftheMoI).Thisleftlittlespacetocomprehendandpromotepoliciesrelatedtothecomplex processes behind people’smovement. Since that timeMFApolicyengagementwithFDhasacceleratedalthoughthishasnotbeensystematic.Moreover, the dichotomywithMoI approaches remains,underminingpolicycoherence.(JC1.1,1.2,2.3,andcasestudies)

In relation toFD, theuptake in theMFA ismore limited than forHDN.Thetermonlyappears,andthenrathersparsely,from2016–2017indocumentssuchasLives in Dignity(EC2016)andThe National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rights 2017–2019(MinistryofJustice2017)whichusesthetermforcedmigrationonce.Nevertheless,relatedtermsarefoundmorefrequently,especially refugees(themostcommonreference),IDPs(referenceonlyfoundinhumani-tarian documents), asylum-seekers (onlymentioned in documents related todomesticpoliciesaboutasyluminFinland)andmigrants(ormigrationreferredtoalmostexclusively inrelationtodomesticconcerns).Whentheyexist,mostreferencestoFD,inthebroadersense,tendtobebriefandarenotalwaysinthecoreofthetext.

Thus,whilstsomedocumentsidentifyfactorsthatrenderpeoplemorevulnera-bletodisplacement,theyfallshortofmakingexplicitlinkswithFD.Forexample, the2015Review on Finland’s Security Cooperation(MFA2015b)failstolinkcri-sismanagementtoFDinrelationtoIDPsandrefugeesasapotentialsecurityissue.ThelackofreferencetoFDinhumanrightsdocumentsismoststriking;the 2014Human Right Report (MFA 2014a)makes links between the causesofarmedviolenceandinsecurityanditseffectsbutneglectsFD.Asimilargapappearsindocumentsconcernedwithfragilestates,forexampleFinland’s Guide-lines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation(MFA2014b)

There is evidence in the evaluation of a growing momentum within the MFA to engage with and embed FD and HDN.

The threshold moment associated with the 2015 migration crisis significantly shaped the approach to policies on FD by aligning development cooperation, as an instrument to tackle root causes, with domestic agendas for migration deterrence.


and theGuideline Concerning Humanitarian Funding (MFA 2015a) given that displacement is very often a characteristic of these environments and couldthereforebeexpectedtobeakeypolicydimensioninaddressingstatefragility.

Albeitlimited,thisevidenceshowsthatFDoriginallyfellwithinthehumanitar-ianspherewitha strong focuson refugees.However, there is substantialandconsistentevidencebothindocumentsandfromKIIsthatthismodelshiftedfol-lowingthe2015‘thresholdmoment’inEUandFinnishpolicy,a‘shock’thatisotherwisedescribedaswellmanagedinFinlandbyalargemajorityofKIs.TotheextentitislinkedwithFD,thetermmigrationthencametothefore,largelywithinthesphereofdomesticpolicy(mainlyintheMoI).Finland’s Action Plan on Asylum Policy(GoF2015)exemplifiesthestrongemphasisplacedoncorre-latingdevelopmentassistancewithmigrationdeterrenceintacklingrootcauses(despite the lackofempiricalevidence for thiscorrelation).KIIs indicate thatfollowingthethresholdmoment,thislinkagewasreinforced,leavinglittlespacetocomprehendandpromotepoliciesrelated to thecomplexprocessesbehindpeople’smovement,explainedinchapter3.2.1.

TurningtoMFAfinancialevidence,verylimitedindicationisdetectedofbudg-etspendingforconditionsofFDindevelopmentcooperationinthe2016–2017sample period ofQAB decisions. In this latter period therewas spending onmigrationandrefugees.Civiliancrisismanagementincreasedfrom14.5MEURto17.8MEURin2016,and15.6MEURin2017–showingnoobvioustendency.

ThedocumentaryevidenceismoreambivalentabouttheeffectsofthethresholdmomentonMFAengagementwithFD.

Ontheonehand,documentswitha‘domestic’focusfailtomakethelinkwiththewiderpictureofforciblydisplacedpeopleindevelopingcountries.Forinstance,the2017National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human RightsconcentratesonthewayFinlandhadbeenaffectedbytheincreasednumberofasylumseekerswhilstfailingtoaddressthecausesofdisplacementandmakingnoreferencetorefugeesinhostortransitcountries(MoJ2017,18and23).TheNationalActionPlanonWomen,PeaceandSecurity (UNSCR1325)puts theemphasison theEUrefugeedimensionbutnotinthecontextofthehumanitariancrisisinSyria(MFA2018,10).The2017DACPeer ReviewsalsoemphasisesthelinksofthemigrationsituationinEuropetotheinterventionsofFinnishdevelopmentpolicyinfragilestates(OECD2017a).

Ontheotherhand,despitethechangingnationalagenda,thissamemomentoftransitionprecipitatedaproactiveresponseintheMFA.TheinclusionofaChapter onrefugeesandmigration in the2016 DPPfinessedtherelationshipbetweendevelopmentandmigration,providingevidencethatFDhadbeguntomakeitswayintoMFApolicy.Thisopenedthepotential,notyetrealised,fortheMFA’sengagementwiththeconceptincludingbycreatinggreaterlinkagewithitsPPAs.

Inevitably,documentaryevidenceisslowertomanifestitselfthanengagementwiththeconceptitselfwhich,asMFAKIIssuggest,isprogressing.Nevertheless,documentaryevidenceofcloserarticulationofFDwithitsPPAsisapparent,ifnotoverall,thenatleastinrelationtotherightsofwomenandgirlsPPA,wherethe2018Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan provides an entirepagerelatedto ‘migration’withevidenceof thevocabularyandconceptofFD


(differentdrivers,protracteddisplacement (MFA2018,57)).Themost recentpolicydevelopmentin2018isthepreparationoftheInternalWorkingBriefsonMigrationandDevelopmentPrioritiesbytheMFA’sUnitforSectoralPolicies.Again,migrationisusedinpreferencetoFD,buttheaimistoenrichthediscus-sion(beyondthefocusonmigration),breakdownsomecommonmyths,nota-blyonthelinkbetweenmigrationanddevelopmentandunifythethinkingonthetopic.TheInternalWorkingBriefscoverthefourPPAs,andtwomoreareexpectedonclimatechangeandpopulationgrowth,bothfactorsthatarecom-monly described asmain drivers of futuremigration trends. In addition, theResult Based Management Action Plan(RBM)releasedinNovember2018bytheMFA’sDevelopmentPolicyUnit also contains in its chapter onhumanitarianassistanceachapterwhichprovidesacomprehensiveoverviewofFD,includingasophisticateddepictionofmigrationpatternsanddrivers.

SittingbetweentheMFAandtheMoJ(andtheunresolvedtensionsbetweentheirrespectivepolicypriorities),istheinter-ministerialMigrationTaskForce(MTF).ActivatedinSeptember2015toshareMFAthinkingonmigrationanddevelop-ment,butatthesametimetoaccedetoMoIpoliciestocoordinatethemanage-mentandcontrolthefluxofasylumseekers/refugeesseekingaccesstoFinland,theMTFhasnotenabledasharedunderstandingofFDtotakeholdbetweentheMFAandMoI.Thisissymptomaticofthecontinuingtensionbetweenthesetwoministriesleadingtoalackofpolicycoherencewhichisdiscussedinchapter4.3,onEQ.3.BridgesmadebytheMFA,notablythroughthecreationofnewpostssuchastheSeniorAdvisoronRepatriationandaSeniorAdviseronMigrationhaveyettoyieldabettersharedunderstandingorcommonpurpose.

Thefindings frommultilateralandbilateralpartnerKIIsand thecasestudiesalsoprovideevidenceofthelimitedup-takeofFD,althoughthepartnersaccept-edthattheconceptitselfwasonlylooselyformulated.IntheAfghanistancasestudy,FD,intheshapeofbothIDPsandlargescalerefugeereturn,wasrecog-nisedasasignificantphenomenoninthepolicymixbuthadyettofinditswayintoMFA(and indeedotherdonors’)advocacyorprogrammes; theexceptionis a single project, the Support Afghanistan Livelihoods andMobility project(SALAM)thataimstoaddressthelivelihoodneedsofseveraldisplacedgroups(returneesandIDPs)andhostcommunities.Thattheproject,devisedasapilot,maynotyieldtheresultsinitiallyexpected,isinpartbecauseofitslimitedscopeandunrealistic timescale. In theMENAcasestudy, theregionalstrategydoesindeed recognise this as a FD crisis. The case studies highlight a number of programme(andpolicy)gapswhicharediscussedinaFinding1.4below.

Finding 1.2: The MFA lacks clarity on the HDN as a core operational concept

AlthoughapproachestotheHDNhavebeenmorepositiveandtangiblethan for FD, as yet, they are not clearly formulated and cannot beconstruedasaddingvalueandstrengthtoFinland’spolicyprioritiesindevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistance.However,thereisevidenceofgrowingmomentumwithintheMFAtoengagewithandembedapproachestotheHDNindepartmentalpoliciesandstructures.(JC1.1,1.2,andcasestudies)


Theactualterm,theHDN,israrelyusedindocumentswhichtendtofocusononeortheothercomponentofthenexusratherthanengagingwiththenexusas an instrument to join and mutually reinforce humanitarian and develop-ment work. For instance, in Finland’sDevelopment Policy Programme (MFA2012)whilethereisnodirectreferencetotheHDN,thereisanentirechapteronhumanitarianassistancewithanexplicitdiscussionoflinking relief, rehabilitation and development(LRRD).Arguably,thisisanoldertermforthenexus,suggest-ingthattheterminologyofthenexus,ratherthantheconceptitselfwasnovelintheMFA.The2014Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation(MFA2014b)makearigiddistinctionbetweenhumanitarianassis-tanceanddevelopmentco-operation:‘Differencesinrelationtostartingpoints,approachesandproceduresmayresultinhumanitarianassistanceanddevelop-mentcooperation followingtwoseparate tracks in fragilestates’ (MFA2014b,25).Similarly, theGuidance note on HRBA in Finland’s Development Coopera-tion(MFA2015)makesbroadreferencetodevelopmentandconflictbutwithouttacklingthehumanitarianconsequencesofconflictsandcrises.

Byand large, theneedforcomplementaritybetweenhumanitariananddevel-opmentpoliciesdoesnotseemtobearticulatedinwaysthatsupportuseoftheHDNasacoreoperationalconcept,evenaftertheEU’sexplicitsupportfortheHDN in theLives in Dignity (EU2016a) communication and in theEuropean Council Conclusions(2016).TheTowards a More Just Worldreportdoesnotdis-cusstheHDNperse,butitdoesdiscussthedifferencesbetweenhumanitarianassistanceanddevelopmentandabouttheneedforbothactivitiesinapost-con-flictsituation(MFA2014,53).

However,itisimportanttorecognise,asnotedinchapter3.2.2,thattheHDNisanevolvingconceptdatingbacktothe1990s.Thereisanemerginginternationalconsensus,butnohardandfastagreementontheconcept(chapter3.2.2).Inanycaseasnotedinchapter3.2.2theHDNmustbeseenasacontext-specific,notamonolithicprocess.SignsofthisevolutionarevisiblefromtheMFAdocumentsreview.AlandmarkintheMFA’sapproachwasthepreparationofan internaldiscussionpaper in2018 on the Humanitarian-development Continuum (MFA 2018a) now beingrolledout inanInternalActionPlan.Whencomparingthe2009LRRD paper (MFA2009)withtheHumanitarian-Development Continuum paper(MFA2018a),thereisanevidentchangeoffocus:theearlierdocumentisconcernedmorewithreconstructionrather thanwithdevelopment. It isworthrepeating theobser-vationmadeinchapter3.3.2,thattheproblemoftranslatingtheword ‘nexus’intoFinnishisacknowledgedbyKIs.Thereisevolutionofthinkingfromamodelwheredevelopmentwasconsecutive tohumanitarianassistance toone that ismoreaboutcomplementarityandtransition.

Externalperspectivesalsodepict limitedandsporadicprogressonembeddingtheHDN.SomeKIsinmultilateralorganisationsperceivelittleprogress.WhilstthefirstDAC Peer Reviewsuggestedthat‘theHDNissomehownotyetwellcon-nected,norwellformulated’(OECD2012,22),fiveyearslaterthesecondDAC Peer ReviewstillpointedoutweaknesseswithregardstotheHDNandsuggestedthatmoreworkwasneededtolinkhumanitariananddevelopmentprogramme/ co-operation(OECD2017a).The2018MFAHumanitarian-development continuum paperwaspreparedinresponsetothisfinding.

The need for complementarity between humanitarian and development policies does not seem to be articulated in ways that support use of the HDN as a core operational concept.

Landmark in the MFA’s approach was the preparation of an internal discussion paper in 2018 on the Humanitarian-development Continuum.


However,asnotedabove,documentaryevidenceusuallylagsbehindpractice,withtheexceptionof theDevelopment-humanitarian Continuum paper (MFA2018a);thus, a more positive finding comes from a small number of MFA KIs. Theyexpressenthusiasticinterestintheconcept,whilstacknowledginglimitedprogresssofarindevelopingacommonunderstandingbetween,andapolicyframeworkfor,aligninghumanitariananddevelopmentinterests,despitetheconcretestepsofthe‘continuum’policypaper(MFA2018a)anditsInternalActionPlan.

Likewise,fieldevidenceoffersonepositiveindicatorfromtheMENAcasewheretheMFAhas been commended as a leading advocate for theHDN approachembeddedintheSyrian3RPstrategy;thiscommitmenthasnot,however,beeneffectivelytransferreddowntotheMFA’sprogrammelevel.EvidencefromtheAfghan case study suggests that although the international ‘comprehensiveapproach’topeacebuildinganddevelopmentenablesdevelopmentandhumani-tarianobjectivestocoincide,theHDNhasnotbeeninvokedinadirectfashion.ThesepositivefindingsaresomewhatcounterbalancedbyvirtuallynoevidencefromtheSomaliacasestudy.Programme level involvementhasbeencomple-mentedby theMFA’s international level involvementandcommitment to theframingoftheHDNintheCRRF.

SeveralfactorsexplainthisfindingofthemutedapproachtotheHDNandpointtoimportantconclusionsandrecommendations.

First,thereissomeevidencethatthe2015‘thresholdmoment’inFinnishmigra-tionpolicydivertedattentionfromengagingwiththeHDN,bylinkingrootcauses andmigration control inwhatwe have referred to as themigration-develop-mentnexus(chapter3.3.2).IntwointernalmemosonbilateraldiscussionswithUNHCR(2015and2016),forexample,Finlandstressesthatitsdevelopmentpol-icyincludesaddressingrootcausesofmigration,althoughacknowledgingthatitalsosupportshumanitarianoperations.A2015annotatedagendaonbilateralconsultationwithUNHCRrevealslanguagethatshiftedawayfromamoreclassi-calhumanitarianapproachtoreflectsomeofFinland’smore‘domesticconcerns’aboutmigrationcontrolandthelinkbetweenmigrationanddevelopmentwithdiscussionofirregularmigration,transitcountriesandEUbordercontrolactivi-ties.Neitherdocumentreadsas ‘nexusthinking’.Likewise,the2016DPPOne World, Common Future,initsreferencetorefugeeflowsandmigration,discuss-eschannellingsupporttocountriesoforigin,bothintheformofdevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistance (MFA2016,23).This comesa littleclosertonexusthinkingbutthelinkwasprecipitatedbytheneedtorespondtothemigrationcontrolrhetoric,notaproactiveengagementwiththenexus.

The ‘securitisation narrative’ dominates other documents at this time, forinstanceinthe2015Review of Effectiveness of Finland’s Development Cooperation (Reinikka&Adams2015) and thePrime Minister’s Office Government Report wherelinksaremadebetweencrisesandfragilestatesandmigration,includingtrafficking, irregularmigration,andexploitationofpeople invulnerablesitua-tions(PMO2017,37).PoliticalpressureshavebeenacknowledgedbysomeKIsasaninternalchallengeintheMFAindevelopingafullyarticulatedapproachtotheHDN;butthetensioninpolicyobjectivesbetweentheMFAandtheMoI,asKIsindicate,havebeenevenmorechallengingwhenthepoliticalagendaisgoingintheoppositedirectiontolongheldMFAprinciplesandpolicies.

The 2015 ‘threshold moment’ in Finnish migration policy diverted attention from engaging with the HDN.


Theseverecutsinthedevelopmentcooperationbudgetdecidedin2015,effectivein2016,weretheconcretemanifestationofchangingprioritiestowardsdomesticratherthaninternationalbudgetexpenditure,althoughtheywerelaterreversedtosomeextent.

Second,turningfrompolitical to institutionalexplanationstheteamfindsdif-ferentmandates,principles,fundingregimesandthelackofcommonapproachtosituationanalysis,asanexplanation for the limitedengagementwithHDN–oftentermedthe‘siloapproach’whichisdistinctfeatureoftheMFA.Evolu-tioninthinkingandapplicationoftheHDNintheMFAappearsslowbecauseofthefirmcommitmenttoretainthedistinctionbetweenhumanitariananddevel-opment cooperation on the basis of different principles,mandates and fund-ingregimes.TheHRBAisnotclearlyarticulatedbetweenthedevelopmentandhumanitariansectors: this isa shortcoming.Theexampleof theEvaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action(MFA2015c),highlightstheinabilitytocementapol-icyrelationshipbetweendevelopmentandhumanitarianpriorities.Documentsrelated tohumanitarianpolicy emphasise their humanitarian remit includinglistingactivitiesthatarenotcoveredbyhumanitarianassistancefunds.

Understandably,KIsonthehumanitariansidearestronglycommittedtosup-porting and safeguarding internationalprinciples on internationalprotection,humanrights/refugeelawandtherightsofasylumseekersintheirfieldofopera-tions.Andhere,KIevidencesuggeststhat,overtheyears,theMFA’sapproachhasactuallychangedverylittleinthisregard,underpinnedbyrelativeimmunityfrombudgetcuts.

In short, theMFAhasnot been able to aligndevelopment andhumanitarianinstrumentscloser:thefundingandprogrammingdecisionsaremadeseparate-ly,andthisreflectsthestrength(andimportance)oftheunderlyingmandates.

Thisisnotacritiquestafffortheirgenuinelyheldviewsandprinciples,buttoillustrate the challenges of reconciling how these differences are expressedthrough funding, programming, andmandate responsibilities. Humanitarianassistanceanddevelopmentcooperationapplydifferentprinciples;thisneedstobeunderstoodandrespected,butatthesametimethisunderstandingcouldbethebasisforthendevelopingcomplementarity.Apositivefindinginthisregardisthatacrossthehouse,asmallnumberofKIIsofferedstrongsupportorposi-tiveinterestforengagementwiththeHDN,notleasttohelpresolvewiderten-sionswithintheMFAandwiththeMoI.ThepotentialfortheHDNtoprovideforamoreobjectiveanalysisofthecomplexityofdisplacementcontextsandamoreholisticapproachtohumanitariananddevelopmentpolicymakingwasathemeraisedbyseveralKIs.

AthirdfactorexplainingthemutedapproachtotheHDNisthebreakdownofthe traditional Nordic consensus on principled approaches to humanitarianassistanceanddevelopmentcooperation (e.g. IHL, IRL, theHRBA).Thiswasnoted,andregretted,bysomeKIs.Inthecontextofdisplacement/migrationanddevelopment,thiswasthoughttobeanadditionalconstraintonFinlandbeingabletoarticulateacoherentapproachtotheHDNwhich,inthepast,wouldhavebeen based on the longstanding Nordic approach to principled developmentco-operation.

The team finds different mandates, principles, funding regimes and the lack of common approach to situation analysis, as an explanation for the limited engagement with HDN.

A small number of KIIs offered strong support or positive interest for engagement with the HDN.

A third factor explaining the muted approach to the HDN is the breakdown of the traditional Nordic consensus on principled approaches to humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.


Finding 1.3: Towards a humanitarian-peace-development nexus

EvidencepointstoFinland’scapacitytosupporttheemergingconsensusfor developing a triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-developmentprogramming.(JC2.3,andMENAcasestudy)

Althoughthereisnotwidespreadevidenceintheevaluation,asignificantfindingfromKIIsisthatthestrong‘peacecomponent’inFinland’spolicyframework–alongstandingcomponentofFinland’sdevelopmentandhumanitarianpoliciesintheformofpolicypillarssuchasCCM(includingDefenceCommandtrainingforcrisismanagement),peaceandsecurity,andtheHRBA–offersconsiderablepotentialforengagingwiththeHDN.AlthoughnotyetarticulatedintotheHDNframework,thepeacecomponentcouldaddvalueandstrengthtothenexusandcouldbeanareaofconvergencewithintheMFA.InSyriaandLebanon,andalsoinSomalia,theMFAisalreadysupportingsuchpeaceinitiatives.Commitmentandexpertisearoundthesepillarscouldbethe‘missinglink’whichprovidesforamorebalanced,transitionalapproachwhichcouldstrengthenemergingsup-portforthetriplenexusofHPDnotedinchapter3.3.3.

Documentary and case study evidence from theMENA region, albeit limited,confirmtheKIevidencethatFinlandisalreadysupportingthreeprogrammaticareassimultaneously:alongsidepeacebuildingthereiscontinuinghumanitar-ianassistancewhilst it isalsopursuingdevelopmentgoals.Finland’sbilateralpartnersareworkingwithlocalpopulationsinthehighlycomplexintersticesofpeace, violence anddisplacementby supportingprogrammes to rebuild com-munitycohesionandlocalgovernancestructuresinSyriaandtoreducetensionbetweenrefugeeandhostcommunitiesinLebanon.Theseinitiativessitalong-sideFinland’sstrongadvocacyandfundingsupportforthedevelopmentalaspi-rations of the UNDP-UNHCR Syrian 3RP, and programmes funded throughmultilateralandbilateralhumanitarianpartnerssuchasUNHCR,UNICEFandFELM,andCSIwhoseprogrammesalsotransitiontodevelopmentalobjectives.

TheAfghanistanUNDP-ILOSALAMprojectwasfoundtohaveasolidFDcom-ponent. Two peacebuilding projects implemented by Finnish NGOs (MENA(FELM) and Somalia (FCA)) suggest away forward towards the triple nexusbetweenhumanitarianassistance,peacebuildinganddevelopment(HPDN).

Finding 1.4: Gaps in Coverage

The evaluation reveals that, despite increasing attention to FD and theHDN,therearesignificantgapsinMFApolicycoverage.(JC1.3)

Thelimitedevidenceforclearlyformulatedandwell-establishedFDandHDNpoliciesmeansthat,bydefault, therearegaps,eveninpolicyandprogrammeareas which are long standing constituents of Finland’s development andhumanitarian policies. Significant gaps are identified in embracing, in MFA policymakinganunderstandingofsomeofthedrivers,patternsandprocessesofFDelaboratedinchapter3.2.1.

The evaluation reveals that, despite increasing attention to FD and the HDN, there are significant gaps in MFA policy coverage. (JC 1.3).

The strong ‘peace component’ in Finland’s policy framework offers considerable potential for engaging with the HDN.


Thefirstgaprelatestointernal displacement.Whileinternalforceddisplace-ment is oftena characteristic of fragile states,particularly those inwhich theMFAisinvolved,IDPsdonotfeatureasanissuein,forexample,the2014Guide-lines on Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States(MFA2014b),orin Finland’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security(MFA2018).KIIevidenceonIDPsisalsomuted,andtheAfghanistanandSomaliacasestudiesstronglyreinforcetheexistenceofthisgapatprogrammelevel,althoughtherehasbeenanexploratory,butverysmallscale,programmewithIDPsinSyriaandinAfghanistan.

Asecondgapisthelack of reference to the HRBAortoprotectioninthe,albeitlimited,engagementwithFD.ThisisatoddswithFinland’sstrongcommitmenttoHRBAasoneofitspolicypillars.ThemainexceptionisfoundintheHumani-tarian Policy(MFA2012a,18).Thereisalsoashortreferenceforthe‘protectionofrightsofrefugees,asylumseekersandmigrantsandtheirjusttreatment’ inthe2016DPP(MFA2016,23–24).TheAfghancasestudyrevealedthegeneralimportanceof human rights considerations, especially related towomen’ andgirls’ rights in justifyingFinland’spresenceanddevelopmentprojects.Butnoconsiderationismadeofthespecificsituationandvulnerabilityexperiencedbydisplacedpopulations.

Athirdgapconcernsurban displacement.Thefocus,evenindocumentspub-lished after 2014, remains almost exclusively on refugees in camp settings,despitetheshiftinthewiderpolicyarenatowardsurbandisplacementnotedinchapter3.3.1.Inthefield,howeverthereisevidenceofurbanprogramminginLebanonandJordan,butthisseemstobedrivenbytheMFA’spartners’sectoralinterestsnotaproactivepolicypriorityoftheMFA.

A fourth gap identified, again surprising given Finland’s commitment, is on climate change.Thereisalackofsystematiccoverageofthelinksbetweencli-matechangeanddisplacement inmanyof thedocuments.Exceptionsare the frequentreference toclimatechange in the2016DPP(MFA2016)and in the Government Action Plan on Asylum Policy(GovernmentofFinland2015).Field evidence reinforces this gap, notably in Somaliawhich is a country prone to climatechangerelateddroughtandfoodinsecuritywhichhasconsistentlypre-cipitatedpopulationdisplacementalongsideviolenceandconflict. InAfghani-stan,someKIsnotedthelittleattentionthatclimatechangeanddisplacementreceiveddespiteitsrelevancetothecountry.

A fifth gap concerns the limited documentary reference toself-reliance and access to livelihoods, despite being a key component of theHDN. On theotherhand,fieldandKIevidencefromsomebilateralpartnersprovidesamorepositivepicture.Forexample, inAfghanistan, livelihoodwas listedasaprior-ityissueunderdevelopmentcooperation;andtheSALAMproject,targetingtheforciblydisplacedpopulation, isexplicitlyaimedatenhancing their livelihoodandself-reliance.InSomalia,onlysomeCSO/NGOprojectsfundedbyFinlandaddresslivelihoodsand/orclimateresilience,butthereareanumberofbusiness partnershipprojectsinthepipeline.


Fifth,althoughneitherastronglyemergingfinding,norasobviousapolicygapastheseotherissues,therole of the private sectorasadevelopmentactorinthe contextof theHDN/HPDN isan issueofpotential significance. InvolvingtheprivatesectorasadevelopmentactorhasbeenpromotedintheGCRand,more generally is increasingly recognised as a component of theHDNnotedinchapter3.2.2.Likewise, thegovernmentofFinland iskeentopromotepri-vate sector engagement indevelopment andmore specifically in refugee con-texts.Forexample,apartyofFinnishbusinesspeoplehas touredrefugeeset-tlements in theMENAregionunder theauspicesof theEmbassy inLebanon.In2018,theMinisterforTradeandDevelopmentpartneredUNDPin2018,inaRegionalResilience and Private Sector InnovationWorkshop for Improved CrisisResponse.ThegovernmentisalsoencouragingprivatesectorengagementthroughtheFinnfundandFinnPartnerships;Somaliaisoneofthepilotcoun-triesofFinnPartnershipwithseveralbusinessprojectsinthepipeline.SASK,theTradeUnionSolidarityCentreofFinland, isalreadyworkingwithrefugees inseveralcontexts,

Thepotential synergybetween these twoaxes of interest– theHDNand the privatesector–isnotedasagap.

Finding 1.5: A positive way forward

ThereisevidenceofgrowingmomentumwithintheMFAtoengagewithand embed approaches to FD and theHDN/HPDN in departmentalpoliciesandstructures.(JC1.1,2.1,2.2)

Whilst,asyet,thereis littleconcreteevidenceindocumentsorfromKIsorinthefieldonacomprehensiveuptakeofapproachestoFDandtheHDN,afirmmarkerwasputdowninthe2016DPPwhichstatesthat‘Finland strives to ensure that humanitarian aid, peace mediation, reconstruction and development coopera-tion are mutually supportive and complementary’(MFA2016,27).ThiscouldbereadasacommitmenttotheHPDN.Despitethepreoccupationwithreconcilingdevelopmentandhumanitarianprioritieswithdomesticpoliciesonmigration,thereisstrongevidencefromKIsintheMFAofanacceleratingmomentumforengagementwithFDandtheHDN,andthedesiretoembedapproachesinpoli-ciesanddepartmentstructures.Thispositiveevidencecanbefoundin:

• frequentKIreferencetoandknowledgeoftheMFAinternaldiscussionpaperexploringthehumanitarian-developmentcontinuumwhichputtheissue‘onthetable’forthefirsttime(MFA2017a)(HDN);

• theMFA’sInternalActionPlantoimplementtheprinciplesofthispaper,althoughthefocusoftheplanismorewithoperationaland proceduralratherthansubstantivematters(HDN);

• theInternalWorkingBriefsdirectedmoretowardsaddressingFDinthiscontext(FD);

• ThepotentialofferedbythecurrentDepartmentalReformprocesstopromotefurtherengagement(HDN/HPDNandFD);

There is strong evidence from KIs in the MFA of an accelerating momentum for engagement with FD and the HDN, and the desire to embed approaches in policies and department structures.


• TheevidencefromtheMENAcasestudy,notedinFinding1.3above,thattheMFAhasbeenaninfluentialadvocate,supportedbyitsdonorrole,fortheSyrian3RPstrategywhichisinternationallyrecognisedasthemostfullyoperationalHDNmodel(HDN);

• MFAKIIevidencethat,despitethelackofformalprogress,many informaldiscussionsbetweenMFAstaffontheHDNtakeplace andthisishelpingtoembedacommonunderstanding.Tothisend, asmallgovernmentwithfewhierarchieswasperceivedtobeanasset inenablingprogress.(HDN/HPDN).

Finding 1.6: Disability and Inclusion

The success of Finland’s international advocacy efforts to get theinternational community to recognise the importance of disabilityand inclusion in humanitarian and development work are widelyrecognised.However,theMFAcoulddomoretoensureitsownpoliciesandpracticesalignwithemergingpolicydevelopments inthecontextof theHDN andHPDN. There is a gap in theMFA’s current policyapparatusforpsychosocialdisabilityandexclusion.(JC2.3)

In contrast to the gaps, there is extensive evidence, not just inEQ 1, of Fin-land’ssuccessfulinternationaladvocacyondisabilityandinclusion.WithalongdomestictraditionofsupportingpeoplewithdisabilityandtheCSOs/NGOsthatrepresentthem,Finlandhasbeenwellplacedtobecomealeadinginternationaldonorandabroker forsocialpolicydevelopment inthissector.Major impactwasmadeattheWHS2016andmanyexternalKIIsnotedthatthiswasaland-mark formainstreamingdisabilityandexclusion inhumanitarian (anddevel-opment)policies.SincethenFinlandhasbeenproactiveinsustainingadvocacyin international fora. In the context of this evaluation it has been supportingUNHCRtoaddressdisabilityinclusioninrefugeeoperations,andalsotheIFRC.Inthefield,aswell,Finlandhasbeeninfluencingprogrammeimplementation,forexamplewithUNICEFinJordan.TherecentMFApolicydocumentThe Finn-ish Approach to Addressing the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Development Cooperation and Policy(MFA2018c),setsoutthemainparametersofitspolicy,noting,again,withrelevance to thisevaluation,how ‘personswithdisabilitiesareparticularlyexposedtotargetedviolence,exploitationandabuse,includingsexualandgender-basedviolence.Womenandgirlswithdisabilitiesoftenfacedoublediscrimination.’

However,onefinding,whichisofpotentiallywidersignificancethantheMENAcasewhere itwas identified, is thegap in theMFA’scurrentpolicyapparatusforpsychosocialdisabilityandexclusion.Forceddisplacementisrecognisedasamajorcauseofpsychosocialdisabilityandexclusion,particularlyamongstchil-dren;suchexclusionisusuallyprotractedandthushaslonger-termdevelopmentimplicationsinadditiontoimmediatehumanitarianneeds.

PolicydevelopmentinrelationtoFDandtheHDN/HPDNprovideFinlandwiththeopportunity to take these commendableachievements to thenext levelofinternationalcommitment.

There is extensive evidence of Finland’s successful international advocacy on disability and inclusion.

The gap in the MFA’s current policy apparatus for psychosocial disability and exclusion.


Finding 1.7: Rights of women and girls

The evaluation reveals some positive evidence of the linkage of theMFA’srightsofwomenandgirlsPPAtoHDNapproaches,butlimitedevidenceinrelationtoFDpolicy.(EQ1JC1.3,andcasestudies)

InbothEuropeanandinternational fora,Finlandisperceivedasastrongandconsistentadvocateforgenderequalityandwomen’sempowerment,sexualandreproductivehealthandrights (SRHR).At theEUlevel,aspartof theNordicgroup,Finlandisalsoperceivedtobevocalonvariousdevelopmentissues,butthesetendtobeapproachedratherbroadlywithnospecificlinksmadetoFDorHDN.

Thereissome,butlimited,documentaryevidenceofFDarticulatedtotherightsofwomen and girls PPA,with the exception of the 2018Women, Peace and Security National Action Planwhichprovidesanentirepagerelatedto‘migration’withevidenceofthevocabularyandconceptofFDandHDN(differentdrivers,protracteddisplacement)(MFA2018a,57).Ingeneral,however,despiteampledocumentaryreferenceto‘marginalisedandvulnerablegroups’asawhole,thevulnerabilityormarginalisationofforciblydisplacedpeople, includingwomenandchildrenandthedisabled,remainssomewhatneglected.

Policiesforvulnerablegroups,notablywomenandgirls’,werefrequentlymen-tionedbyKIIs in thecontextof,butnotnecessarilyalignedwithHDNthink-ing,andnotatall inthecontextofFD.Inthiscontext,thereisDefenceCom-mandtrainingforcrisismanagementthatincludestrainingofmilitaryonUNSC1325,pluspeaceandsecurityandhumanrightsforwomenandothervulnerablegroups. In thesameveinthesignificantpresenceofwomen inFinland’sCCMoperationsisexemplary.

Yet,Finlandhas,insomeinstances,alsopusheditsPPAsinrelationtomigra-tionanddisplacementissues:forexample,FinlandhassuccessfullyobtainedadecisionthattheEUTFreportingmechanismincludesacleargenderreportingperspective.GiventheorientationoftheEUTFthiscouldarguablybeconstruedaslinkingthewomenandgirlsPPAtotheFD.

InAfghanistan the dominant priority areas, addressed systematically at bothpolicyandprogrammelevels,relateto issuesaroundwomen,peaceandsecu-rityaswellasgenderequalityandwomen’srights.ButthegapliesintheMFA’sweaknessinforginglinkageswithFDandaddressingtheimpactthatdisplace-menthasonsuchgroups.InSomalia,themainemphasisofFinland’sdevelop-mentcooperationisonreproductiveandmaternalandchildhealth,addressingthevulnerable,butnotspecificallytargetedtoforciblydisplacedpeople–notably IDPs–althoughsome femaleandchild IDPshavebenefitted fromthehealthproject/s. In theMENAcase there is stronger evidenceof connectivity of therightsofwomenandgirlsPPAandFDandHDN.Finlandsupportsmultilateraleducationandtrainingprojectstargetedtowomenandgirlswiththeaimoffacil-itating theiraccess to incomeearningemployment–clearlya transition fromhumanitariantodevelopmentneeds.

Finland is perceived as a strong and consistent advocate for gender equality and women’s empowerment, sexual and reproductive health and rights.


4.2 The adequacy of Finland’s approach to and policy influence on FD and HDN (EQ 2)

EQ2.TowhatextentandhowhasFinland’sevolvingapproachto/interpretation of FD and HDN been an adequate response to the challenge it poses for Finland as an official development andhumanitarianactor?

Summary answer to EQ 2

Finlandaligns itsdefinitionsandpositionswithcurrent internationaltrends and norms and adopts concepts from international actors.Particularlythenorm-settingroleoftheUNsystemisrecognised,andincreasinglyalsooftheEU.IntervieweesperceiveFinlandasareliable,iflowkey,partnerwithwell-establishedpolicypriorities.ButithasnotproactivelyinfluencedthedevelopmentofFDandHDNininternationalforadespiteitsfinancialcontributionsinordertositatthetablewithlarger donors. Indeed, KIIs had only a slight idea about Finland’sapproachtoFDandHDNattheHQlevel,andthesameimpressionwaspresentincasestudycountries.However,atleastinonecaseFinlandhas given significant added value to a multilateral partner, namelythe successful initiative to integrate the rightsof thedisabledamongrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonsintheoperationsofUNHCR;Finlandwasapioneerinthisarea.

There also is a certain degree of complementarity with Finland’smultilateral partners through non-earmarked funding support andsignificant value added in some cases (the case of UNHCR withdisabilityinrefugee/humanitariansituations).

Documentaryreviewdidnotrevealanyexplicitemphasisorapproachto FDwith one exception (Afghanistan SALAMproject/UNDP-ILO).Fromthecasestudycountries,MENA/Syriancrisisistheonlycontextwhere several project proposals were justified in HDN terms in thedocumentationoftheQualityAssuranceBoard.

Two peacebuilding projects (MENA and Somalia) implementedby Finnish NGOs suggest that there is a way forward towards thetriple nexus between humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding anddevelopment(calledHPDN).

ThereisagrowinginterestbyMFAstafftostartelaboratingapproachestoFD.(JC2.1,2.2)

As a relatively small donor in international development cooperation andhumanitarian assistance, and therefore reliant on collective rather than inde-pendentaction,Finlandisheavilydependentonthequalityandchoiceofmulti-lateralpartnershipsinthecontextofpolicyinfluence.Inthiscontext,itpresentsitselfasaneffectivedonorandisperceivedtobeareliableandappreciatedpart-ner,particularlyinitsun-earmarkedfundingpracticesandwithafirmcommit-menttotheUNandtheEU,andinsomecontexts,strongNordiccooperation.

Finland aligns its definitions and positions with current international trends and norms and adopts concepts from international actors.

Interviewees perceive Finland as a reliable, if low key, partner with well-established policy priorities. But it has not proactively influenced the development of FD and HDN in international fora.

Finland is heavily dependent on the quality and choice of multilateral partnerships in the context of policy influence.


Buttheconsequenceisthat,inrelationtotheemerginginternationalpolicychal-lengesofFDandHDNandtheirrollout,theMFAisnotperceivedtohavebeenproactivelyengaged.Insteadinfluenceandinitiativescomefrom‘above’.Finlandisanorm-followernotanorm-setter.Asanexample,ifFDismentionedinthedocumentationofaninternationalorganisationoraprojectproposal,Finland’spolicyandinfluencingplans(PIP)fortheorganisationortheMFA’sjustificationofprojectfundingalsooperatewiththesameterminology.Duetoitstraditionalstressonmultilateralism,Finlandparticularlyrecognisesthenorm-settingroleof theUNsystem, including inrelation toHDNandmigrationandFDand isincreasinglyinfluencedbycollectiveEUpolicieswhereitisalsoperceivedtoplayausefulroleasabrokerinEUdiscussionsonmigrationanddevelopment.Fin-land isperceived tohave less impactandvisibility thansomeothercountriessuchassomeotherNordics,theUKorGermany.Overall,manyofFinland’spart-nersindicatethattheyhavenoclearsenseofFinland’sunderstanding/approachtoforceddisplacementandthe‘nexus’.

Equally,whileinternationalconventions,internationallawandthemultilateralpolitical andnormative framework arepresented as guidingprinciples for itshumanitariananddevelopmentfundingandpartnershipspracticallyinallpolicydocumentsoftheMFA,thereislittleindicationthatFinland’sactionsareexplic-itlyalignedwithFDandHDN.Forthemostpart,FDandtheHDNareindirectlyinvoked,ifatall,andif invoked,theyarenotclearlyformulated(seealsoEQ1abovein4.1).

Overall, Finland’s generally acquiescent relationship with its partners in thedevelopmentof the concepts ofFDandHDN is symptomatic of the lackof acomprehensiveandsystematicapproachidentifiedinFinding2.1.

Finding2.1:Policyinfluenceandprioritypolicyareas

TheMFA’sinfluenceisrecognisedbypartnersasvisibleandeffectiveinthepromotionofFinland’straditional,well-establishedprioritypolicyareasandcross-cuttingobjectives,particularlyinwomen,girlsandthevulnerableanddisabled.Nevertheless,theFDandtheHDNelementsremainlargelyabsent.(JC2.3)

Theevaluationfindsrobustevidencebothfromdocumentaryanalysis,internalreportsofpolicyinfluencingandinterviewswithpartnersthattheMFA’sinflu-enceisrecognised,amonginternationalagencies,inthepromotionofFinland’straditional,well-establishedprioritypolicyareas,whichareperceivedtobecom-patible and complimentarywith its partners’ international goals andpolicies.Twoareas standoutashaving theheaviestweight:womenandgirls, and thedisabled–orvulnerablegroupsmoregenerally.

Nevertheless, the FD and theHDN elements of these policies remain largelyabsentas thefindings inchapter4.1haveconfirmed.Asalreadystatedabove,Finlandisanorm-follower,notanorm-setter,intheadoptionofnewconceptsand norms related to development and humanitarian aid, and this frequent

Finland is a norm-follower not a norm-setter.

Overall, many of Finland’s partners indicate that they have no clear sense of Finland’s understanding/approach to forced displacement and the ‘nexus’.


observationseemstoapply toFDandHDN, too.Uniformlyacross theboard,intheinterviewscarriedoutfortheevaluation,thekeyinformantshadaveryslight,ifany,ideaofFinland’spositionconcerningFDandHDN.

Finding2.2Pooledfundingandpolicyinfluence

Finland’s multilateral budgetary contributions, largely channelledthrough pooled funding or multi-partner trust funds, can increasecomplementarity and influence, and are valued by its partners; butthereisalackofevidencethatthisinfluencehasbeenusedtopromoteFDandtheHDNthinkingandpolicies.(JC2.1,2.2)

Finland’scompliancewiththenormsandinterestsofitsmultilateralpartnersisfurtherreinforcedbythefactthat itshumanitarianfundsare largelyprovidedun-earmarked. InAfghanistanandSomaliaas twoof itsdevelopmentpartnercountries, Finland channels the bulk of development funding throughmulti- donor trust funds. (e.g. in Afghanistan: Law and Order Trust Fund LOTFA,Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ARTF; in Somalia: European Emer-gencyTrustFundforAfricaEUTF,andMulti-PartnerFundforSomaliaMPF).Theuseofmultilateralandmulti-bilateralfundingmechanismsbyFinlandisajustifiedchoiceandpoliticaldecisionforcircumstanceswheretherearenocon-ditionsfornormalbilateraldevelopmentcooperationprojects,asisthecaseinAfghanistanandSomalia.Finlandalsotakesgreatcaretomaintainthethresh-oldofitsfinancialcontributionsattherequisitelevelfortheUNHCR,theICRC/IFRCandtrustfunds(ormulti-partnerfunds)inpartnercountriestoguaranteeprivilegedaccess,andwithit,thepotentialforgreaterpolicyinfluence.Finland’sparticipation in theEUTF isanotherexampleofaconsciousdecision togetaseatontheBoard,althoughitshouldbenotedthatinthiscasetheimpetuscamefromthePMO,andthefundsweredisbursedbytheMinistryofFinance,nottheMFA.

However, beyond acknowledging Finland’s policy priorities, and the obviouscomplementarity of interests between Finland and its preferred multilateralpartners, the study found little evidence from theorganisationsofhoweffec-tivelyandconsistentlyFinlandusesitspositioneithertoinfluencepolicypriori-tiesingeneral,orinrelationtoFDandtheHDNinparticular.Tobemorepre-cise,evidencefrominterviewswasmixedconcerningtheenthusiasmwithwhichFinlandusesitspositiontoexertpolicyinfluence.Accordingtosome,theMFArepresentativeonlysitssilentwhileaccordingtosomeothers,Finlandtakesanactivepositiontopushforwarditspolicypriorities.

Finding2.3:Fieldpresenceandpolicyinfluence

Finlandhasareduced,thinfieldpresence.Lackoffieldpresencelimitspolicyinfluence.(JC2.1,2.2,2.3(ofcasestudycomponent)

The study found little evidence from the organisations of how effectively and consistently Finland uses its position either to influence policy priorities in general, or in relation to FD and the HDN in particular.


OnereasonthatFinlandhasnotbeenasproactivelyengagedinFDandtheHDNasitmightbeisthelackofsufficientcapacitytorespondadequatelyinthefield.LimitedfieldpresencetomanageandoverviewprogrammesandprojectsonthegroundiswidelynotedinKIIsand,particularly, inthefieldcasestudies.Thisfindingalsohassignificantconsequences forpolicy influencesince theconse-quentobligationtoprioritisewhattofollow-upinthefieldseriouslylimitspolicyinfluenceandindeedcoherence.

InthecaseofSomaliaandpartiallyforMENA,limitedfieldpresenceisfurtherexacerbatedbythegeographicallycomplexaidarchitecture.InthecaseofSoma-lia,theEmbassyisnotlocatedinthecountrywhereactivitiestakeplace.IntheMENAregiontheprogrammeisspreadacrossthreecountries(Syria,Lebanon,Jordan–assistancetoTurkeyisseparatelyadministered).Whilstpolicyinflu-enceisstronglyobservedatthestrategy/regionallevel,thisisnotthecaseattheoperationallevel.Acomplexarrayofhumanitarian,peacebuildinganddevelop-mentprojectslackscoherencewithrespecttoHDN,whichastrongerfieldpres-encemighthelptotackle.

WhereasSomaliaandAfghanistanareofficialdevelopmentcooperationpartnercountriesandFinland isboundbynationaldevelopmentplans,Syriaand theneighbouringcountriesimpactedbythecrisisarenotFinland’sofficialdevelop-mentpartners.Inthiscontext,FinlandhasbeenrelativelyefficientinaligningitsinitiativeswithanHDNfocus,andpartiallyalsowithFD.However,Finlandhasnotbeenabletospantheinstitutionaldividebetweenitshumanitarian,peacebuildinganddevelopmentprojects,eachmanagedandcontrolledbydifferentMFAunitsanddepartments.TheEmbassystaff for thewholeregion is three,andthepotential to forgeamorecoherentfield-levelapproachtoHDNisnotpossiblewithminimalstaffcover.

In both Afghanistan and Somalia, Finland’s policy influence is perceived bydonorsas‘notabsent’butlowprofile,‘lowkey’,‘doingitspart’,indicatingrela-tivelyscantknowledgeaboutwhatFinlanddoes.

However,Finlandisnotperceivedtobenon-influentialforitssizeandthesizeofitsfieldpresence.Partnershipwithlike-mindeddonorsdemonstrablyincreas-es influence. In Somalia, Finland co-chairs (with Sweden) the ‘pillarworkinggroup’ofsocialandhumandevelopment intheMPF.InAfghanistan,FinlandincreasesitsinfluencebyteamingwiththeNordiccountriesandotherswhohavesimilargoalssuchasGermany.Inallthreecasestudies,Finlandwasfoundtobeveryactivelypromotingwomen’sandgirls’rights.ThisevidencesuggestssomeengagementwiththeHDN.

However, thefieldstudiesdidnotdiscoveranyspecial influenceofFinlandinFD,withtheexceptionofthepeacebuildingeffortsofFCAinSomaliaandFCA/CSIinSyria.

Finding2.4:Humanrightsandpolicyinfluence

Finland’spositiononandinfluenceonhumanrightsisperceivedtobechanginginthecontextofFD.(JC2.1,3.2)

One reason that Finland has not been as proactively engaged in FD and the HDN as it might be is the lack of sufficient capacity to respond adequately in the field.


Traditionallyastronginternationaldefenderoftheneedtoupholdhumanrightsand HRBA in development, our evidence indicates that Finland is now per-ceivedtohaveadoptedanuanced,andthuslessclear-cutapproach,inthecon-textofEuropeanpoliciesonmigrationandforceddisplacement.Itspositionisdescribedbysomekeyinformantsasrecognisingthatmigrationisnotacrisis,nora short-termphenomenon.At thesame time, someKIevidencereportsaperceivedshiftinFinland’spositiontowardsamorerestrictiveandpro-migra-tion control position in recent years.Overall, Finland is seen to be switchingbetween‘traditional’humanrights-centredpositions(thetraditionallike-mind-edapproach)andmoreanti-migrationpositions(typifiedas‘approachingViseg-radgroup’spositions’),dependingonthesituationandcontext.

ThisdiminishesFinland’sability to influence internationalpolicydebatesandstandardsonhumanrightsinthecontextofpoliciesrelatedtoFDandtheHDN.

4.3 Establishing policy coherence between approaches to FD and the HDN and Finland’s development policies

EQ3.Towhatextentandhowdo theapproaches toFDand theHDN rooted in the DPPs help establish policy coherence between Finnishpolicies?

Summary answer to EQ 3:

Despite a long and solid track record in promoting PCD that isacknowledged both internally and externally among partners, anddespitehavinginplaceaseriesofmechanismstopromotecoherence,theprincipalfindingwithregardtoPCDisthatFDandtheHDNpoliciesoftheMFAcannotbesaidtoprovide,asyet,astrongframeworktohelpestablishpolicycoherencebetweenFinnishpolicies.(JC3.1,3.2,3.3)

Promoting policy coherencewas found to be not as prevalent in thecase studypartner countrieswhereFinland isoperating.AviewalsoemergedfrominterviewsthattheroleofFinlandinadvocatingforPCDwasmorenoticeableinthepast.Atthesametime,itisapparentthatthe promotion of policy coherence also takes place informally at thepersonallevel.

Themajorareaofpolicyincoherencethatemergedrelatedtodivergingviewsonmigrationandontheuseofdevelopmentpoliciestoachievemigration-related outcomes. This divergence exists both within theMFAand acrossministries and especially between theMFAand theMoI. The tensions betweenMFAdevelopment policies anddomesticinterestsandpoliciesonmigrationhavenotbeenfullyresolved.

MFApoliciesaregenerallywellalignedwiththoseofitspartnersbetheynationalNGOsandCSOs,ormulti-lateraldonorswithwhomFinlandworkscloselysuchastheEUandtheUN.

With regard to PCD is that FD and the HDN policies of the MFA cannot be said to provide, as yet, a strong framework to help establish policy coherence between Finnish policies.


Finland’slongexperienceofPCDandmechanismsthatsupportithavenotyetbeenappliedeffectivelytoachievePCDinrelationtoFDandtheHDN.TheyarestillpoorlyconceptualisedintheMFAandhavenotyetcrystallisedinitspoli-cies:accordingly,theydonotprovideanadequateframeworkagainstwhichtohelpestablishpolicycoherencebetweenFinnishpoliciesinrespectofFDandtheHDN.

Atthesametime,Finlandisasmallcountrywheremanypeopleingovernmentknow each other, and so the promotion of policy coherence also takes placeinformally at the personal level through extensive individual contacts acrossministriesanddepartments.ThischaracteristichashelpedtospreadawarenessandmayhelptosupportmoreformalmethodstoexecutePCD.

Finding 3.1: 2015 and the impact on policy coherence

The so-calledmigrationcrisisof2015 resulted inapush forapolicyreorientation to setmigrationpriorities abovedevelopment. Internalresistance to this trend then precipitated significant and continuingpolicy incoherence within the MFA and across ministries. This hasnegativelyimpactedtheachievementofpolicycoherenceintheMFA’sapproachestoFDandtheHDN.(JC3.2)

Themajorareaofpolicyincoherencefoundintheevaluationsurroundsdiverg-ingviewsonmigrationandontheuseofdevelopmentpoliciestoachievemigra-tion-relatedoutcomes.Essentiallydivergencepertains to the implicitassump-tion,inthe2015PMOActionPlan(GovernmentofFinland2015a),thatthereisaninversecausalrelationshipbetweendevelopment(aswellasotherrelatedpol-iciessuchaspeacebuilding,conflictreduction)andmigration,athesiscontestedbymanystaffintheMFA.Thisdivergencewasprecipitatedbyasurgeinimmi-grationratesintotheEUjustastheapproachesonHDNandFDwerebecomingmoreclearlyarticulated intheMFA.ThispolicydivergenceexistsbothwithintheMFAandacrossministriesandespeciallybetweentheMFAandtheMoI.Inessencetheproblemhereisthatthisagendashiftscoherencefordevelopmenttoanotherformofcoherence,coherenceformigration(managementandcontrol).SomeFinnishNGOsandCSOsarealsoincreasinglycriticalofwhattheyseeasatrendtowardssecuritisationofaidandanundueemphasisonreducingmigra-tioncreatingafurthersourceoftensiontowhichtheMinistryispoorlyplacedtorespondaslongasthepolicydifferencesremainunresolved.

AcoredocumentinthiscontextisthePMO’s2015ActionPlanonAsylumPolicy(ibid.).Thisadoptedtheviewthat‘thelarge-scaleentryintoacountryisrelat-edprimarilytotheconditionsprevailingincountriesorareasoforigin…ItisimportantthatFinland,theEUandtheinternationalcommunityinfluencetheseconditions’which implies that some coordination of policy between differentministries (MoIandMFAat thevery least)willbeexpected.TheActionPlanhoweveroffersonlysimplisticassumptionsontherelationshipbetweenmigra-tionanddevelopment(acausalrelationshipchallengedbymanyMFAofficials),rather thananunderstandingof thecomplexityofFD.Equally, theneglectofvulnerablegroups(women,girlsandchildren–oneofthe4PPAs)intheAction

The major area of policy incoherence found in the evaluation surrounds diverging views on migration and on the use of development policies to achieve migration-related outcomes.


PlanfurtherreinforcesthefindingofpolicyincoherencebetweenministriesandthelimitedinfluenceoftheMFAonPMOpolicyinthisarea.

This divergence has negatively impacted policy coherence on the MFA’sapproachestoFDandtheHDN.ContinuingtensionsbetweenMFAdevelopmentpoliciesanddomesticinterestsandpoliciesonmigrationhavenotbeenresolvedandendureasaconstrainttoPCD.

WhilsttheevaluationfindsthatthistensionisparticularlyevidentbetweentheMFAandtheMoI,therearealsosomeofficialsinsidetheMFAwhoarguethattheMinistryshouldadoptadifferentapproachtodevelopmentcooperationthatismorecloselyadjustedtosupportingthegovernment’sinterest-drivenstanceonmigration.ThisgroupofofficialsarguethatdevelopmentcooperationpolicyshouldbemadecoherentwithFinland’smigrationpolicy(‘PCM’),ratherthantheotherwayround(PCD).OtherswouldlikeFinland’sdevelopmentcoopera-tiontocontinue focusingon long-standingcountryprogrammes insupportofFinland’smaingoalofpovertyalleviationandarguethattheevidencesupport-ing the root causesapproach is lacking.The increasingalignmentofdevelop-mentwithmigrationissuesandsecuritisationistoalargeextentincompatiblewiththeobjectivesofdevelopmentcooperation.

IntheAfghancontext,thepolicycoherencegraduallyachievedbytheinclusionofFDandtheHDNwasthenunderminedmainlybecauseofthestrongemphasisondomesticmigrationcontrolobjectivesinFinlandandpressureforrepatria-tion.Thesepoliciesweredrivenbyashort-termdomesticpoliticalagenda,afterthe2015migrationcrisis inEurope, rather than longer-termandmoreholis-ticmeasuresthatwouldberequiredtoaddresstherootcausesofconflictanddisplacement.Conversely,theFinnishMFA’sapproachtoFDandtheHDNinAfghanistanappearstobetoacertainextentcoherentwithitspartnersatthebilateralandmultilaterallevel.

Finding 3.2: Human rights and HRBA

Policycoherence is lacking inrespectofhumanrightsandHRBAsinthecontextofFDandtheHDN/HPDN.(JC3.3)

AsignificantmanifestationofincoherencerelatestohumanrightsandtheHRBA–aguidingprincipleintheMFA.ThisreinforcesFinding2.5aboveinrelationtoFinland’sperceivedchangingpositiononpolicyinfluenceandhumanrights.

For example, in theMFAGuidanceNote onHumanRights Based ApproachinFinland’sDevelopmentCooperation (MFA2015), despite the references tomechanismsthatmayimprovecoherence(generally)inrelationtoHRBA,thereisnoevidencethatFDandtheHDNarelinkedtothesethemes.

Equally,acrossgovernmentthereappearstobeahiatus.TheMinistryofJusticestressestheimportanceofstrengtheningcoordinationonhumanrightswithingovernment.Topromotethis,ithasappointedaGovernmentnetworkoffunda-mentalandhumanrightscontactpersons,whichhaspreparedaNationalActionPlanonFundamentalandHumanRights2017–2019(MinistryofJustice2017).ButthereisnoevidencethatthisnetworkisinvolvedonFDandHDNissues.

Divergence has negatively impacted policy coherence on the MFA’s approaches to FD and the HDN.


Finding 3.3: The adequacy of mechanisms for PCD

Finland has adequate mechanisms in place to promote policycoherence.ThesearegenerallyusedeffectivelyalthoughtheyhavenotbeeneffectivelymobilisedinrelationtoFDandtheHDN.(JC1.2,3.3)

Finlandhas receivedpositive comments onPCDpromotion froma variety ofsourcesincludingOECDPeerReviews(OECD2012,2017).Thisreputationhasbeen achieved partly because of the keymechanisms Finland has in place topromotepolicycoherence.Inthepresentcontexttheseinclude,amongothers,aTaskForceonMigration(MTF),theEUCoordinatingCommittee,theResultBasedManagement(RBM)andtheDevelopmentPolicyResultsReport(DPR)processes, and the externalDevelopmentPolicyCommittee (FDPC). Informalcontactsandlinksbetweenofficialsindifferentdepartmentsandministriespro-videanother levelofmechanism,so thatsomepromotionofpolicycoherencedoesstilltakeplaceatthepersonallevelevenwhenformalmechanismsfalter.

However,theevaluationfindsthatthesemechanismshavenot,asyet,beeneffec-tiveinpromotingPCDinrelationtoFDandtheHDNacrossministries.Theirmandates have been insufficiently strong to forge policy coherence betweenopposingconceptualisationsofthepurposeofdevelopmentcooperation.Specifi-cally,theMigrationTaskForce,setupinSeptember2015toprovideaforumfordiscussionbetweendifferentministriesandstateagenciesonmigrationpolicyand its implementationcanbeseenasamechanismtopromotepolicycoher-ence.Butinpracticeitfunctionsasadeskofficerimplementationandinforma-tionsharinglevelmechanismwithoutamandateforpolicydevelopmentorforg-ingpolicycoherence.Theevaluationfoundthatthereislittleornoindicationofhowmuchthisefforttoexchangeinformationandcoordinateimplementationactuallyaffectspolicy formulationoradaptation toachievegreatercoherence.Co-ordinationthoughessentialdoesnotnecessarilypromotecoherence.

Yet,ongoingeffortswithintheMFAtorolloutFDandtheHDNconceptsandissues, such as the creation of One-page briefing notes, an Action Plan, new Thematic Ambassadorial posts responsible for the 2020 DPP review, are, ineffect,alsopotentialopportunitiesandmechanismsto fosterpolicycoherencewithrespecttoFDandtheHDN.

Finding 3.4: External perceptions of policy coherence

Despite thefindingspresentedabove,Finland’spoliciesaregenerallyperceived by external interlocutors as being coherent and well-coordinatedbothwithintheMFAandwiththeMoI.Equally,theyaregenerallywellalignedwiththoseofitspartners.(JC3.2)

Asidefromthecleartensionsuncoveredabove(Finding3.1)andthebasisofpol-icyincoherencethattheygenerate,thereappearstobehighlevelsofcoherencebetweenmostareasofpolicydealtwithbytheMFA.Thisisconsistentwiththe

Mechanisms have not, as yet, been effective in promoting PCD in relation to FD and the HDN across ministries.


factthattheMinistryhasbeenstronglycommittedtopromotingPCDthrough-outtheperiodoftheevaluation.

Withtheimportantexceptionofpolicyincoherenceinrelationtothemigration-development interface, across government the evaluationfinds ‘good enough’coherencebetweenministriesonmanyissuesrelatedtothisevaluation(Mackie et al. 2018). A good example isFinland’s National Action Plan 2018–2021 on Women, Peace and Securitypublishedin2018,whichwaspreparedjointlybyseveralministries(MFA,MoIMoEd&Culture,MoD,MEAE),aswellasbypar-ties engaged in crisismanagement (CrisisManagementCentreFinland,CMCFinland,andtheFinnishDefenceForces),civilsocietyorganisationsandexpertsworking in research institutions (MFA 2018s). Coherence between the MFAandMoDiseffectiveinrelationtoCCMandotherareasofcommoninterestbutoffersscopeforenhancement:forexample,theMFAEvaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action (MFA2015d)argues that ‘GreatercooperationandprogrammaticcoherenceshouldbeencouragedbetweenMFA,MoDandprivatesectorengage-mentintechnicalassistance,plusaninvolvementwiththoseNGOs…’

Moregenerally,interviewevidenceindicatedthatFinland’sinternationalpart-ners consistently viewed Finnish policies as generally very well aligned withinternationalpolicynormsadvancedbyvariousactors,betheynationalNGOsandCSOs,ormulti-lateraldonorswithwhomFinlandworkscloselysuchastheEUandtheUN.

However,animportantcaveattothisfindingisthatwhilstthereispolicycoher-encewithinternationalnormsinrelationtotheexistingPPAsandpolicypillars,thisdoesnotapplyinthecontextofFDandtheHDN.Itisnotalwaysclearhowfartheexistingpolicyprioritiesandpillarsgo inforgingcoherencewiththeselatterconcepts,whicharecoretotheevaluation.

4.4 Finland’s development cooperation and humanitarian financial disbursements

Finland’s development cooperation and humanitarian financialdisbursements

Summary findings

Analysis of financial disbursements reveals thatwhilst humanitarianexpenditurehasremainedrelatively immune frombudgetcuts, therehasbeen a significant reduction in the state budget for developmentcooperationcoincidingwiththe‘thresholdmoment’of2015.Converselytherehasbeenagreaterconcentrationofexpenditureinthethreecasestudycountries.

Expenditureongenderequalityhas increased inthethreecasestudycountries but is still surprisingly small proportionately and in totalgiventheprofileofthispolicyarea.

ThereisalmostnoevidenceoftheuseofHDNorFDterminology.

With the important exception of policy incoherence in relation to the migration-development interface, across government the evaluation finds ‘good enough’ coherence between ministries on many issues related to this evaluation.


FindingsfromthefinancialtrackingofFinland’sdevelopmentandhumanitarianappropriationsbuttressmanyofthemainfindingssofarpresentedonthethreemainEQs.

4.4.1 Findings on development cooperation (ODA total) Intotal,thedisbursementsforOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA,presentedinFigure2below)increasedfrom1,026.7MEURin2012to1,232MEURin2014andthendecreasedto961.4MEURin2017,representinga25%reductionfromthe2014highpoint.Atthetimethisreportwaswritten,nocompletefiguresfor2018wereavailablebut886MEURhadbeenreservedfordisbursement,afur-therreductionof8%in2017.

Figure 2: Disbursements 2012–2017 on development cooperation, ODA total (MEUR)

Source:MFAstatistics

A breakdown of the total development cooperation expenditure confirms thefindingthat indeedtherewasalsoa ‘thresholdmoment’ in2015 inrelationtoODAdisbursements.The analysis shows a significantdecrease in state budg-et fordevelopment cooperation for2016and2017,although the tendency fordeclinehadalreadycommencedin2015.From991.3MEURin2014,thehighestyear,thedisbursementsdeclinedby43%to565MEURin2017.Thebudgetcutsin‘exclusive’ODAinoneyearonlydeclinedfrom926.6MEUREURin2015to605.2MEURin2016(about35%)(Table1).‘ExclusiveODA’refers,accordingtoOECD-DAC’sdefinition,tothebilateral,multilateral,EUdevelopmentfunding,humanitarianaidandsupport toNGOs that isdirectlyunder the controlandmanagementoftheMFA.

Table 1: Disbursements of Finland for ‘exclusive’ ODA 2012–2017 (in MEUR)

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017Disbursement 788.9 861.9 991.3 926.6 605.2 565.0


Conversely,governmental‘other’ODAdisbursements,channelledthroughotherministriesthantheMFAincludingdevelopmentfinanceforFinnfund,Finland’sshareofEUdevelopmentcooperationbudget, civiliancrisismanagementandexpensesofthereceptionofrefugeesinFinland(seeTable2below)andother

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

201720162015201420132012

MFA

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

The analysis shows a significant decrease in state budget for development cooperation for 2016 and 2017.


itemscountedasODAbyOECD,actuallyincreasedfrom237.8MEURin2012to396.4MEURin2017–anincreaseof66%.Countedtogether,‘exclusive’and‘other’ODA,thereforerepresent‘only’a25%declineintotalODA.

Specifically, disbursement for refugees arriving in Finland, emphasising theimpactoftheEuropeanrefugeeandmigrationcrisis,grewalmostten-foldfrom12.1MEUREURin2014to117.7MEURin2016,reducingagainin2017asthenumberofarrivingasylumseekersdiminishedsignificantly(Table2).ProjecteddisbursementforrefugeesinFinlandfor2018wasreducedfurtherto32MEUR.

Table 2: Expenditure on refugee reception in Finland in Millions of Euros (MEUR)

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017Disbursement 17.8 15.7 12.1 35.2 117.7 68.7

% of ODA 1.7 1.45 0.98 3.0 12.3 7.38


Disbursementsforhumanitarianaid(whichisincludedinthetotalODA),revealamorenuancedfinding.Here, there isa similar trendwitha significant20%increaseindisbursementsfrom2012onwardspeakingat105.7MEURin2014(Table3).Comparedwiththe43%reductioninoverall‘exclusive’ODA,however,thereisonlyamodestreductionofabout14%from84.4MEURin2014to73.3MEURin2017.ThesefindingsseemtoconfirmFinland’sstrongandenduringcommitment to ‘non-political’humanitarianmatters,whilst the totaldevelop-mentcooperationbudgetwasseverelyreduced.

Table 3: Disbursements of humanitarian aid 2012–2017, total (MEUR)

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017Disbursement 84.4 96.4 105.7 97.8 84 73.3


Turning to findings on the three case study countries, Afghanistan has beenthelargestrecipientcountryofODA:over30MEURin2015(Table4).Itwastheonlyoneofthethreetoexperienceanincreaseinfundingin2016,probablyreflectingthearrivalofAfghanrefugeesinFinland.Curiously,thesamedidnothappenwithSomalianorSyria(NB:Table4presentsfiguresfortheSyrianArabRepubliconly,notMENA).Theevaluationhasnotfoundanexplanationforthisdifference,but itcannotbeexcludedthat thenumberofSomalianandSyrianrefugeesarrivinginFinlandwasnotparticularlyhighin2015,andinanycase,refugeestatuswasautomaticallyhandedtoSyriansfleeingthearmedconflict.

Table 4: Disbursements of ODA funding (total) 2012–2017 to the case study countries (including civilian crisis management and humanitarian aid) (MEUR)

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017Afghanistan 26.23 25.92 28.47 26.37 30.31 18.07

Somalia 8.57 9.23 20.71 16.00 12.69 11.61

Syria 2.23 8.63 11.69 10.28 9.28


Conversely, governmental ‘other’ ODA disbursements actually increased from 237.8 MEUR in 2012 to 396.4 MEUR in 2017 – an increase of 66%.

Afghanistan has been the largest recipient country of ODA: over 30 MEUR in 2015.


4.4.2 Findings on sectoral distribution in the three case study countriesDatafromtheQualityAssuranceBoard(QAB)oftheMFAwasanalysedforthethreecasestudycountriesinordertodetectpossiblesectoralchangesinODAbetween2012and2017(Annex12explainsthefullmethodologyandattentionisdrawntotheimportantcaveatthatthefigurespresentedareindicativeonlyandthereforemaynotcoincidewiththeofficialstatisticsofMFA).

In the first period (June 2012–December 2013) for Afghanistan, Somalia andSyria/MENA,theDPP2012hadobviousimpactonthesectorsoftheproposalsapprovedbytheQAB.Justover50%(roughly57%ifhumanrightsareaddedtothesamecategory)ofthe29.692MEURtotalhasbeeninthefieldofdemocracyandruleoflaw(Figure2).Conversely,migrationand/orrefugeesaretotallyabsentfromthebodyofproposedprojects.Theoverallproportionforthethreecountriesrepresents4.7%ofallQAB-approvedfundingproposalsduringthisperiod.

Figure 3: Funding proposals approved by the QAB 2012–2013 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA, ODA total (MEUR)

Source:ElaborationbasedonMFAQABmeetingminutesJune2012-December2013

Forthefollowingsampleperiod(June2016-December2017)(Figure3),overallQABapprovedexpenditureforthethreecasestudycountriesincreasedsharply,morethandoublingto64.680MEUR.Furthermore,thesectoralbreakdownofexpenditure shows somemarked changes.Whereas approved expenditure ondemocracyandruleoflawreducedbyhalfabsolutelyandtoonly10%propor-tionately of the substantially increased overall disbursement, QAB approvedexpenditure on human development/education/health increased more thaneightfoldto18.5MEUR,andproportionatelydoubledfromabout9.0%to18.5%of the total.Likewise,genderequalityshowedanevenmoremarked increase,from1.05MEUR(orabout4%ofthetotal)to10.6MEUR(almost17%).

Other / multisector

Human dev. / Health educ.

Gender equality

Human rights

Economy employment

Democracy rule of law

22%

3%

9% 52%

Other / multisector


Gender equality

Human rights

Economy employment


4%

10%


Economy employment

Human rights

Gender equality

Human dev. Health educ.

Other/ multisector


Figure 4: Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2016–Dec 2017 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA, ODA total (MEUR)

Source:ElaborationbasedonMFAQABmeetingminutes2016-2017

Thesectoraldistributionofapprovedproposalsisalsonotablywiderthaninthepreviousperiod.Refugeeandmigration-relatedprojectsareincluded,totallingalmost10MEUR(about16%ofthetotalof64.68MEUR)andapprovedhumani-tarianmineclearingexpenditure(separate fromhumanitarianaidwhichdoesnotgothroughQAB)nowtotals12.4MEUR,comprising18%.Overall,at12%ofallQAB-approvedfundingproposals,theshareofAfghanistan,SomaliaandSyria/MENAisalmosttreblethe2012–2013period.

Theconclusionthatcanbedrawnfromthisanalysisisthatthethresholdmoment(plusthenewDPP2016,aspartofthesameprocess)hassignificantlychangedthedestinationofQAB-approvedfundingproposals,andwhiletherehadbeenaradicalcutindevelopmentfunding(particularlyinexclusiveODA),thebudgets forAfghanistan, Somalia andMENA related to the Syrian crisis had sufferedmuchlessthanotherpartnercountries.

Also significant is the relatively small total and proportion of QAB-approvedexpenditureforgenderequality,andthisdespitethetenfoldincrease(inabsolute figures) inapprovedprojectbudgetsbetweenthetwoperiods.This isperhapssurprisinggiventhehighprofileforthewomenandgirlspolicypriorityareainFinland’sDPPsandinternationally.

In the second phase of the QAB analysis, the documentation concerning theapproved proposals was scrutinised in terms of FD and HDN. While manyproposalswere justifiedbydeskofficersand/oradvisorsbyhumanitarianandhumanrightsconcerns,theevaluationfoundonlyoneproposaldirectlyusingtheterminologyandthinkingofFD:theAfghanistanSALAMprojectimplemented byUNDPandILO.

Refugees migration

Humanitarian mineclearing


Gender equality

Human rights

Economy employment


17%

2%

10%

12%

2%

34%


Economy employment

Human rights

Gender equality

Human dev. educ. health

Humanit. Mineclearing

Refugees migration

23%

Refugees migration

Humanitarian mineclearing


Gender equality

Human rights

Economy employment


While there had been a radical cut in development funding (particularly in exclusive ODA), the budgets for Afghanistan, Somalia and MENA related to the Syrian crisis had suffered much less than other partner countries.


5 CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Finland’s approach to Forced Displacement and the Humanitarian-Development Nexus in the context of its Development Policies (based on EQ1)

Conclusion 1

Despite some progress in engagingwith the concepts of FD and theHDN,thereremainslimitedunderstandingandknow-howoveralland,notably, limitedsharedunderstanding,oftheconceptsofFDandtheHDNintheMFA,theirrelevancetopolicymakingandprogramming,and above all their capacity to strengthen integrated approaches todevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicymakingindifferentcontexts.

Thelackofaclearandsystematicconceptualisationhasresultedinalackofcon-sistency inHDNandFDpolicymakingandprogrammingacross theMFA.Inadditionthecore4PPAsandthefivepolicypillarshavenotthereforebeenlocat-edwithinawideranalyticalandprogrammingframework.Remedyingthissitu-ationwould,ontheonehand,sharpentherelevanceandfocusofMFAhumani-tariananddevelopmentpoliciesinthecountriesitsupports.Ontheotherhand,it would better connect theMFA to wider international developments in thesector.Insum,therehasbeenlimitedimpetusforcapitalisingonthepotentialcapacitytostrengthenintegratedapproachestodevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicies,asdescribedinchapter3.2.2.

ThelackofanFDlensresultsinanotherchallenge:thatistheneedtoensurethatsignificantpopulationsofconcerntotheMFA,suchasIDPsandthosedis-placedtourbanareas,notedinFinding1.4,arebroughtwithintheremitofitshumanitariananddevelopmentpolicies.Atthesametime,thelackofanFDlenshighlights thenarrowapplicationof theHRBA inhumanitariananddevelop-mentpolicies.

Inaddition,likemanyorganisations,theMFAhasmanyspecialiseddepartments–forexample,theUnitforHumanitarianAssistanceandPolicy,theCSOUnit,theDepartment forDevelopmentPolicy,anddeskofficerspecialisationundertheMinisterofTradeandDevelopmentof theMFAand thePoliticalDepart-ment, including e.g. theUnit for Security Policy andCrisisManagement andUnitforHumanRightsundertheMinisterforForeignAffairs.ButasFinding1.2notedthisconstrainsthecreationofinternal‘horizontal’linkagesthroughpro-grammingandbudgetinginstrumentswhichwouldbeconducivetotheHDN/HPDNandFD.

Despite some progress in engaging with the concepts of FD and the HDN, there remains limited understanding and know-how overall and, notably, limited shared understanding, of the concepts of FD and the HDN in the MFA, their relevance to policy making and programming.


LimitedexplicitengagementonFDandtheHDNisalsoevidentintheanalysisoffinancialdisbursementsinchapter4.4.

Conclusion 2

TheMFA,andmoregenerallytheGovernmentofFinland,havenotyetbeenabletoreconcilethecontradictorytendencies,precipitatedbythe2015 thresholdmoment of the European ‘migration crisis’, betweenmigrationanddevelopmentpolicies.

ThisdeepstructuralconstraintremainsamajorlimitationontheMFA’sFDandHDN policy development. Resolving this deep-seated contradiction betweenpromotingdevelopmentcooperationasaninstrumentof‘short-term’migrationcontrolandthemoretraditionalpreceptsofdevelopmentcooperationwhicharetoalleviatepoverty–thecoregoalcitedinFinland’s2016DPP–andpromotinglong-termdevelopmentmustbeamajorpriority.Thesituationcreatedbythe2015thresholdmomenthasleftlittlepoliticalspacetoengagewithandpromotepoliciesrelatedtothecomplexprocessesbehindpeople’smovement–thedrivers, patternsandprocessesofforceddisplacementexplainedinchapter3.2.1.

Conclusion 3

TheDevelopmentPolicyPracticeReformandtheInternalActionPlanprocesseswithintheMFAprovideatimelyopportunityforimprovingconceptual clarity andmore coherent policy apparatus related toFDandtheHDN.

ThereisevidenceofagrowingmomentumwithintheMFA–e.g.theInternalActionPlan roll-out of theDevelopmentPolicy PracticeReform, the InternalWorkingBriefs,theRBMprocess,TheoryofChange(ToC)preparationforthe4PPAs–toengagewithandembedapproachestoFDandtheHDNindepart-mentalpoliciesandstructures.Togetherwiththereviewprocess for the2020DPP,theseconstituteanopportunemomenttodevelopasystematicandcom-prehensiveapproachtopromotethedevelopmentandmainstreamingofFDandtheHDNconceptsandpolicyapparatus.Inthiscontext,strategicleadershipandvision from the seniormanagement teamare important toensureprogress isachievedinacomprehensiveandsystematicmanner.

Conclusion 4

Finlandiswellpositionedtofurtherengagewithemerginginternationalsupport for the triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development(HPDN).

The 2015 threshold moment has left little political space to engage with and promote policies related to the complex processes behind people’s movement.

Strategic leadership and vision from the senior management team are important to ensure progress is achieved in a comprehensive and systematic manner.


Thispotentialexistsatseverallevels.Attheinternationallevel,Finland’scapacityandexpertiseinpeaceandstabilisationpolicies,CCManditslongexperienceinworkinginfragilestatesenableittoplayaleadingadvocacyroleininternationalforatopromotethetriplenexusofhumanitarian-peace-development.WithintheGovernmentofFinland,thetriplenexusofferssomepossibilityforovercomingthecurrentdichotomybetweentheMFAandtheMoIbyfurthernuancingthecomplexrelationshipbetweenmigration/FDanddevelopment.Finally,withintheMFA,thetriplenexuscouldconstitutethemeanstotranscendsomeofthebarriers(institutionalandprecepts)betweenthehumanitariananddevelopmentsectors.Althoughconcernmight exist thatpolitical interests inpeacemakingcouldunderminehumanitarianprinciples,policymakingonacommonconcernthattranscendsbothsectorsbutdoesnotnecessarilyhaveaclearhomeineither,couldyieldsignificantbenefits.

5.2 Adequacy of Finland’s approach to and policy influence on FD and the HDN (based on EQ 2)

Conclusion 5

The MFA’s influence has worked well when it has been related tolong-standing and familiar policy areas but has proven to be lessoperationallyeffectivewheretheMFAfinds itself in less familiarandchanging organisational and operational contexts. Several structural,operationalandinstitutionalfactorsimpairtheinfluencethattheMFAmighthave in regard to its policy aims in the context ofFDand theHDN/HPDN.

TheMFAhasgenerallyfollowednorms,conceptsandpracticesonFDandtheHDN set by other,mainly internationalmultilateral, actors. It has, neverthe-less,playedanimportantadvocacyroleatastrategic level, forexample intheUNHCR-UNDPSyrianreginalresponsestrategy.But it isnot, ingeneral,per-ceivedtohavebeenproactivelyengagedorinfluentialinFDandtheHDNattheoperationallevel.

Ofthestructuralconstraints,themostsignificantthatneedstobeaddressedisthelackofacomprehensiveunderstandingofconceptsandthusalackofabilitytobeinfluentialatalllevelsinaconsistentfashion.

Inrelationtooperationalandorganisationalfactors,theMFAprojectsandpro-grammesare,onthewhole,toowidelydispersed,andsomewhatdisjointed.ThisleadstolimitedhorizontalcoherenceinrelationtotheHDN;therearealsogapsinFDcoverage.ThesefactorsimpairtheinfluencethattheMFAmighthaveforitspolicyaimsinthecontextofFDandtheHDN/HPDN.

Understaffing means theMFA lacks field presence to sustain both influenceandoversightoverthediversityandscopeofitsprogrammesandprojects.ThisimpairsamoreintegratedapproachthattheMFAcouldadoptinrelationtoFDandtheHDN/HPDN.

Finland’s capacity and expertise in peace and stabilisation policies, CCM and its long experience in working in fragile states enable it to play a leading advocacy role in international fora to promote the triple nexus of humanitarian-peace-development.


Conversely,changingpriorities,forexamplesomeapplicationofFDthinkinginthecaseofAfghanistan,andfocusedadvocacy,or inthecaseofdisabilityandinclusion,canalsoplayapartinpromotingpolicyinfluence.

WhilstFinlandhasrecognisablepolicyinfluenceinkeyprioritypolicies,ithasyettomobilisethisexperiencetoexertsimilarpolicyinfluenceinthearenaofFDand,toalesserextentHDN/HPDN.

Overall,theproblematicbalancebetweenpolicyandprogrammespreadorfocusposeschallengestheMFAinhowbesttodeployitspolicyinfluence.ItiscrucialfortheMFAtohaveaneffectivepolicystatementsinlinkingits4PPAstoFDandHDN/HPDNwhichcanguide itspolicy influence.This includesFinland’scountrystrategiesandtheirinfluencingplans,andPIPs.Jointevaluationswithimplementingpartnerorganisationsisapossibility.

5.3 Policy coherence between approaches to FD and the HDN/HPDN and Finland’s development policies (based on EQ 3)

Conclusion 6

Theabsenceofaclearandcomprehensiveunderstanding,anduptake,oftheconceptshaveobstructedpolicycoherenceandinhibitedprogressonPCDinthecontextofFDandtheHDN/HPDN.

WhilsttheevaluationrecognisesthatFDandtheHDN/HPDNarerelativelynewconceptsintheMFA,theabsenceofaclearandcomprehensiveunderstandingof,andengagementwith,theconceptshaveobstructedpolicycoherence.

In particular, theMFA has not been able to establish a strong coherent linebetweenthecurrentgovernment’spoliciesonmigrationandonitsown‘tradi-tional’developmentcooperationpolicies.Thecurrenttensionthatexistsbetweenthegovernment’sdevelopmentandmigrationpoliciesisstartingtoundermineFinland’slongstandingtrackrecordonPCDandhasseverelyinhibitedprogressonPCDinthecontextofFDandtheHDN/HPDN.Whilethismisalignmentcanbefinessedforawhile,MFAstaffarefindingitincreasinglydifficulttomanageand,intime,ithasthepotentialtoseriouslyundermineFinland’strackrecordasaneffectivedonor.This isbecause theGovernmentand the twoMinistriesneed toberealisticabout the impact thatdevelopmentcooperationcanreallyhaveonreducingmigrationandbalancethisagainsttheMFA’shighprofileasan effectiveandtrustedhumanitariananddevelopmentactor.

Conclusion 7

Therolethatcurrentcoordinationmechanisms,suchastheMigrationTask Force, could play is not sufficiently recognised; or that theirmandatesneedtobeextendediftheyaretoplaythisrole.

Whilst Finland has recognisable policy influence in key priority policies, it has yet to mobilise this experience to exert similar policy influence in the arena of FD and, to a lesser extent HDN/HPDN.

The absence of a clear and comprehensive understanding of, and engagement with, the concepts have obstructed policy coherence.

The role that current coordination mechanisms, such as the Migration Task Force, could play is not sufficiently recognised.


There is lackofclarityonwhether thecoordinationmechanismsthatdoexistindifferentareas(e.g.MTFortheDPC)haveamandatethatgoesbeyondcoor-dinationandinformationexchangeandextendstopromotingpolicycoherencewithinthegovernmentorwithexternalpartners.Itwouldseemthattherolethatthesecouldplayinresolvingtheincoherenciesthathaveemerged,isnotneces-sarilysufficientlyrecognised.

Conclusion 8

Internal incoherencies have not yet manifested themselves to anydegreetoFinland’sexternalinterlocutors.

Paradoxically,inrelationtothe4PPAs,Finland’sdevelopmentandhumanitar-ianpoliciesare,forthetimebeing,stillgenerallyperceivedbyexternalinterlocu-torsasbeingcoherentandwell-coordinatedbothwithintheMFAandwiththeMoI.Equallytheyaregenerallywellalignedwiththoseofitspartners.Thissug-geststhat,intermsofPCD,theMFAdisplaysastrongwillingnesstolearnfromexternalactorsandadjustnationalpolicytointernationalexperienceandnorms.

5.4 Transecting conclusions (based on EQ 1, EQ 2, EQ 3)

InadditiontotheseconclusionsdirectlyoriginatingfromthefindingsontheEQsinchapter4,theteamhasidentifiedfourotherconclusionsthatemanatefrom,but cut across, themainEQfindings.These arenowpresented and lead intorelatedrecommendationinChapter6.

Conclusion 9

Finland’srespectfor‘universalvalues’,humanrightsandhumanitarianprinciplesandprotectionhasnotbeeneffectivelytackledinrelationtoitsHDN/HPDNandFDpoliciesandvalues.

Promotingprotection,fundamentalhumanrightsandhumanitarianprinciplesand values have been core and enduring precepts of Finland’s developmentandhumanitarianpolicies.However, thepoliticaldiscourseonmigrationandespeciallymigrationcontrolinFinlandandmoregenerallyinEurope,increas-inglyconflictwithbasichumanrightsandhumanitarianprinciples.Prioritisingrespectfor‘universalvalues’,humanrights,humanitarianprinciplesandprotec-tionatthecoreofitsHDN/HPDNandFDpolicies,wouldhelptoreinforceFin-land’swidelyrecognisedadherencetothesevalues.

Similarly, the diminishing presence of the reference group of Nordic coun-tries,traditionallyablocthatstronglychampionedhumanrightsanduniversalhumanitarianprinciplesintheinternationalarena,meansthatFinlandislosinga toolbywhich it couldgainpolicy influence in theFDand theHDN/HPDNarena.

The MFA displays a strong willingness to learn from external actors and adjust national policy to international experience and norms.

The political discourse on migration and especially migration control in Finland and more generally in Europe, increasingly conflict with basic human rights and humanitarian principles.


Conclusion 10

Advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion policies aregenerallyFinland’snicheareas,andcouldbefurtherpromotedalsointhecontextofFDandtheHDNandHPDN.

Finlandhasshownitscapacitytopromotekeyissuesinternationallywithcon-certed,coordinatedeffortwhenthepoliticalwillisthere–notablyinthefieldofdisabilityandinclusioninrefugee/IDPsituations.However,theMFAhasnotyetreflectedonhowtheseprioritiescouldbefurtherpromotedandincorporatedtostrengthensocialprotectioninthecontextofFD(wherethedisabledarehighlyvulnerable)andtheHDN/HPDN.PsychosocialdisabilityandexclusionisagapincurrentMFApolicymakingandprogramming.

Moreover,theMFAhasnotyetdevelopeditsthinkingonhowitsinternationaladvocacycouldnowbetakentothenextlevelinthecontextofFDandtheHDN/HPDNandtheinternationaldividendsthatthiscouldyield.

Conclusion 11

ProgressalreadyachievedbytheMFAinpromotingtherightsofwomenandgirls in theHDNprovides the foundation for furtherprogress innationalpoliciesandattheinternationallevel.LessevidentprogressinFDconstitutestheopportunitytodevelopamoremeaningfulpromotionoftheserightsintheMFA’snationalpoliciesandininternationalfora.

The strengthandcommendable effectivenessofFinland’s commitment to therights ofwomenand girls in its development andhumanitarianpolicies, andinternationally,hasbeenevidentinthefindingsforallthreeEQs.However,thespecificlinkagetoHDNhasnotbeensystematicallyestablished.Buildingonitsexperienceandachievements,theMFAhasaplatformtoreinforcethisprioritypolicyareainnationalpolicymakingandininternationalforainthecontextoftheHDN,andtopromotesimilarpotentialintheHPDN.

OnpromotingtherightsofwomenandgirlsinsituationsofFD,forexampleinrelation to security and vulnerability, progress is lessmarked. Therefore, thelinkagesinpolicymakingandprogramminginsituationsofFDwithintheMFAneed to be strengthened. There is also potential to communicate thismuch-neededexperienceattheinternationallevel.

Conclusion 12

Private sector engagement in the context of the HDN/HPDN is notyet sufficiently developed to allow for a meaningful contribution toFinland’sinternationalrole.

Advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion policies are generally Finland’s niche areas, and could be further promoted also in the context of FD and the HDN and HPDN.

Progress already achieved by the MFA in promoting the rights of women and girls in the HDN provides the foundation for further progress in national policies and at the international level.

Private sector engagement in the context of the HDN/HPDN is not yet sufficiently developed to allow for a meaningful contribution to Finland’s international role.


Despitethehighfinancialrisks,engagingtheprivatesector–asinvestors,entre-preneurs,partnerswithlocalbusinesspeople incounties impactedbyFD–isoneofthepillarsoftheGCRandisincreasinglypromotedasanessentialcompo-nentoftheHDN.

TheMFA’s involvementofthecorporatesectorasadevelopmentactor, inthecontextoftheHDNandpromotedbytheGCR,islimitedandpragmatic.ThereissomeawarenessofthispotentialintheMFA,thereispoliticalcommitmenttotheengagementoftheprivatesectorindevelopmentcooperation,andtherehasbeensomeFinnishprivatecorporateinterestexpressedinthepotentialofferedbytheHDNe.g.inMENAregion.

GivenFinland’ssocialwelfaremodel,promotingtradeunioninvolvementinthissectorinconjunctionwithcorporatestakeholderscouldaddvaluetoPCDinthispolicyarea,andalsoenableFinlandtoinfluenceinternationalaction.

5.5 Concluding Overview on the strengths and weaknesses of Finnish Development Policy

Drawing together the findings and conclusion of the evaluation, this chaptersummarise of the strengths and weaknesses of Finnish Development Policy,fromtheperspectiveofthemainthemesofFDandtheHDN/HPDN.

Strengths

Finland is acknowledged as a valued, trusted, professional andprincipled donor and development and humanitarian partner. Itswillingnesstoworkincollaborationwithotheractorsandopennesstodifferentviews,ideasandinnovationindevelopmentandhumanitarianpoliciesisrecognised;andinthiscontextitscommitmenttoEuropean-levelsolutionsandjointapproachesandabilitytobrokercompromiseswithin the EU group is also recognised. It also enjoys a recognisedcommitmenttoandexpertiseinpromotingPCD.

Finland has a strong framework of development policies articulatedaround a small number ofwellworked out PPAs and also includingdisability and inclusion. For a small donor, this guides generallysuccessful implementation, ensures focused partnerships, andestablishesafirmbasis foradvocacyandarecognisable internationalprofile.Finland’sexpertiseinpromotingtherightsofwomenandgirlsandtheinclusionofdisabledpersonsinhumanitariananddevelopmentpoliciesiswidelycommended.

Its strong commitment to peace building, security, CCM andHRBA in its development policies bodes well for contributingto the emerging international engagement with the triple nexus–humanitarian-peace-development.


Weaknesses

The MFA retains a strong distinction between humanitarian anddevelopment cooperation.This isdemarcatedbydifferentprinciples,mandates and funding regimes. Working across the ‘divide’ doesnotreadilyhappen.Thissituation iscompoundedbya lackofclarityontheHDNandFDascoreoperationalconcepts.Moreover, there islittleconcreteevidence,asyet,oftheuptakeofapproachestoFDandtheHDNinpolicymaking.However,momentumisacceleratingwithsomeevidenceof thewish toengagenewapproaches inpoliciesanddepartmentstructures,albeitunsystematicforthepresent.

The HRBA, although strong, is not clearly articulated between thedevelopmentandhumanitariansectorsinthecontextoftheHDNandFD.Inadditiontherearesignificantgaps incurrentpolicyapparatusaround FD impacts on different groups and settings: IDPs, urbandisplacement,livelihoods,climatechangeanddisplacement.

A very limited commitment to engage the corporate sector or tradeunions in development strategies or as a development partnerconstitutesasignificantgapinthecontextoftheHDN.

CommunicationbyMFAofficialsininternationalforacomesacrossastoodiscreteandtoacertainextentpredictable.TheMFAisperceivedasanormfollowerbutisinsufficientlystronginpromotingthewiderspectrumofitsinterestsandexpertise.


6 RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents seven ‘headline’ recommendations, supported bymorespecific recommendations for implementation. Country case study specific recommendationsarepresentedinAnnexes8,9,and10.

Chapter 3.2.4 concluded that an important objective of the evaluation is toconsolidate the synergybetweenhumanitarian anddevelopmentpolicies thataddressdifferentgroupsofforciblydisplacedpeopleinwaysthatwillstrengthenMFApolicy-makingandPCD.Thus,therecommendationsaddressbothFDandtheHDN/HPDNalthough,whereappropriateinafewcases,theyaretargetedtooneorotheroftheseelements.ThegeneralprincipleisthatrecommendationsforadvancingtheHDN/HPDNcanbeseenascontributingto,promotingandadvancingengagementwithcontext-specificFDchallenges,andviceversa.

The recommendations are underpinned by a Theory of Change elaborated inAnnex 11which seeks to capture the logic of how all theMFA interventions,basedonasharedunderstandingofkeyconceptsofFDandtheHDN,canexpecttoachievetheirexpectedoutputs,outcomesandimpactsinrelationtothe2016DPP.InthiswaytheToCwillhelptostrengthentheMFA’spolicycoherenceinrespectofforciblydisplacedpopulationsinbothcountriesoforiginandimpacted/ host countries. Itwill alsoactasa learning toolbyhelping toclarifyhow the differentmodalities, implementation channels of delivery, and target groupsadoptedby theMFAmay ormaynot fitwith the general overall direction ofchangecapturedinthegenericToC.

6.1 Mainstreaming the concepts of the HDN/HPDN and FD (based on Conclusions 1–5)

Recommendation 1

The MFA is recommended to adopt organisational strategies and processes that will further enhance its knowledge base and the mainstreaming of the concepts of the HDN/HPDN and FD in its existing policy making and programming. These concepts should be alignedwith its four PPAs and the five policy pillars for theproposed 2020 Development Policy Programme.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA – mainly Department for Development Policy but also Political Department

Priority: High

This recommendation harnesses the growingmomentumwithin theMFA toengagewithandembedapproaches toFDandtheHDN/HPDNin itspoliciesandorganisational structures.To this end, the four-yearly reviewof theDPP,


directed to the 2020DPP, provides the strategic opportunity, and theDevel-opmentPolicyPracticeReformanimplementationprocess,forharnessingthismomentum.Theassumptionismadethatthe4PPAsandthefivepolicypillarswillberetained.

Five implementation recommendations detail the strategies and processesbywhich theMFAwillbeable toovercomesomeof the internal institutional barriers,enhanceitsknowledgedevelopment,andmainstreamtheseconceptsinitspolicymakingandprogramming.

Given the evolvingnature of the concepts and the orientation of this evalua-tionasalearningprocess,theserecommendationsarecomplementaryandself-reinforcingratherthan‘linear’.Theimminenceofthe2020DPPreview,alreadyunderway,andtheelectionofanewgovernmentwithanewmandateafterApril2019,placeheavydemandsonMFAstaffiftheconceptsaretobesuccessfullymainstreamedintopolicywithinayear.Withlimitedtimeavailabletoachievethisoutcome,aco-ordinatedplanwillbeneeded.

Sub-recommendation 1.1: Greater clarity and consensus around the con-cepts of the HDN and FD should be promoted within the MFA by boosting the scope of the current Internal Action Plan on the roll-out of the concepts of the HDN. (Priority: High)

Thisrecommendationestablishesasystematicframeworkforknowledgedevel-opment, using the internalHDNAction Plan (annex ofMFA 2018b) and, byengagingMFAprofessionalstaffintheDepartmentforDevelopmentPolicyinthisprocess,encouragesacommitmenttoseekingconsensusontheinterpreta-tionoftheconcepts.

BoostthescopeoftheinternalHDNActionPlanroll-outtoencouragerelevantDepartmentsandUnitstoworktogethertoreview,refineandshareworkingdef-initionsoftheconceptssetoutinchapters3.2.1and3.2.2,ofthisevaluationandtheHumanitarianDevelopment‘Continuum’Paper(2018).

Sub-recommendation 1.2: Using appropriate knowledge management platforms,atdifferentlevels(e.g.seniormanagementandPolicyPriorityAmbassadors;UnitManagers;DeskOfficers),theMFAisrecommendedtopromote know-how on development and policy mainstreaming of FD and the HDN/HPDN.(Priority: High overall but see specifics)

ComplementingRecommendation1.1,thisoperationalrecommendationproposes twospecificstrategicinitiatives.

1. Knowledge development, led by Deputy Director General Department forDevelopmentPolicyaspartofDevelopmentPolicyPracticeReformprocess,interalia:

a) Seminars/workshopsprogrammeforDepartmentofDevelopmentPolicyprofessionalstaffandQABfacilitatedbyexternalexpertson theHDN/HPDNandFD(high priority);


b) Simulationworkshopsbasedon(i)applyinglessonslearnedfromMFAengagementintheSyrianrefugeeresponse/HDN;and(ii)developing anintegratedHDP/HPDNapproachforthecountrystrategiesinAfghanistanandSomalia(inclusionaregionaldimensioninthiscase) (medium to low priority);

c) PilotanexusapproachinonePPAinacountryprogramme(e.g. economicempowermentandlivelihoodslinkedtotheSalamprojectinAfghanistan)todevelopandtestintegrativeinstrumentsforanHDN/HPDNapproachthatare:complementary(humanitarianinterven-tionsmeetingshort-termneedswhiledevelopmentactorsputinplacelonger-termarrangements);sequenced(shorttermtolongerterm);andlayered(humanitariananddevelopmentactorsprovidingdifferentformsofassistanceorassistancetodifferentgroupsinthesame geographicalarea)(seeScottetal.,2016forfurtherexplanation)(medium priority).

d) InvolveDevelopmentPolicyCommitteeininitiativesa)andb)

2. Mainstreamingconceptsintopolicy,interalia:

a) MakeanAmbassador-levelappointmentwithintheMFA’sDepartmentforDevelopmentPolicywithoverallresponsibilityasThematicSpecialAdviserfortheHDN/HPDNandFD(high priority);

b) EnsurethattheThematicAmbassadors,taskedwithreviewingFin-land’s4PPAsintheDevelopmentPolicyReform(DPR)forthe2020DevelopmentPlan,promotethemainstreamingofmigration/FDandtheHDN/HPDNintheseprioritypolicies,includingintherelevantTheoriesofChange(high priority);

c) CommissionrelevantUnitHeadstoundertakeaparallelprocesstoreviewthefivepolicypillarsanddisabilityandinclusionpolicies (onthelatterseeRecommendation5.1),toensurecoherencewith theHDN/HPDNandFDperspectives(medium priority).

Sub-recommendation 1.3: The MFA is recommended to commission a lessons learned evaluation of its HDN engagement in the Syria crisis to consolidate experience and provide guidance on potential future HDN and HPDN involvement. (Priority: Medium to High)

SincetheSyrianrefugeecrisisresponsehasemergedasanarchetype(theonly?)HDN programme the MFA will have gained significant strategic, policy andimplementationexperience,aftereightyears: it isessentialthattheMFAcon-solidatesthisinanevaluation.Theevaluationshouldbecomprehensivecoveringi)all levels–HQ,regional level (the3RP), implementation(programmesandpartnerships); ii)managementprocesses–e.g.strategydevelopment,applica-tionofpolicyinstruments(e.g.the4PPAs),staffing,funding,PCD.

Sub-recommendation 1.4: Internal linkages between humanitarian and development programming and budgeting should be strengthened by promotingjointanalysesleadingtocomplementaryprogramming,andbydeployingmore flexible funding protocols between humanitarian assis-tance and development-oriented purposes.(Priority: Medium to High)


UnitsforDevelopmentPolicyandHumanitarianAssistancearerecommendedtotrialjointpilotanalysesofprogrammesforAfghanistanandLebanon/Syria,includinganalysisoftheimplicationsforthecomplementarityofdevelopmentand humanitarian financing. The pilots could then be extended into comple-mentary,sequencedand layeredprogramming(seeRecommendation1.2).Onanexperimentalbasis,a trancheofhumanitariananddevelopmentassistancefunds(e.g.upto20%p.a.ineachcaseasanindicativeamount)shouldbecom-mittedtoinitiativesthatexplicitlylinkhumanitarianandlonger-termdevelop-mentprojects/programmesinthesetwopilots.

Sub-recommendation 1.5: The DPP 2020 review provides a key opportunity fortheMFAtofillFDgapsconcerning:IDPs,urbandisplacement,theHRBA, self-reliance, and displacement in the context of climate change. (Priority: High)

GapsinengagingwiththeconceptofFDinhibitthetractionofcurrentMFApoli-ciesinthreeofthe4PPAs,whicharecoretoFD:enhancingtherightsandstatusofwomenandgirls;improvingtheeconomiesofdevelopingcountriestoensuremorejobs,livelihoodopportunitiesandwell-being;democraticandbetter-func-tioningsocieties.

Implementingtherecommendationwouldalsorequireappointingasmalltaskforceforjointworkingbyrelevantdeskandthematicofficerstoreviewgapsanddevelopappropriatepolicyapparatus.

Sub-recommendation 1.6: The MFA is encouraged to promote and champion international adoption of the ’triple’ humanitarian-peace-development nexus (HPDN).(Priority: Low to medium)

Finland’s ‘peace component’ experience in the context of development andhumanitarianpoliciesofferspotentialforengagingwiththeHPDN.WithintheMFA,harnessingthestrongcommitmenttothe‘peacecomponent’inthereviewoftheDPP2020providesacohesiveprocessforconceptualisingandimplement-ingtheHPDN.Internationally,the‘missingmiddle’ofpeaceintheHPDNisapolicynichewhere,as theevaluationhasshown,Finlandhasexpertiseand iswellplacedtopromote.ActionsbytheDepartmentforDevelopmentPolicyandthePoliticalDepartmentwouldinclude:

a) StrengthenthepromotionofpeacebuildinginthecontextofFDandtheHDN/HPDNintheDPP2020(medium priority);

b) Engageininternationalstabilisation/peacebuildingadvocacyandpolicyinfluence(includingthroughPIPs)withitsUNpartnerorgani-sations(notablyUNHCR,UNDP,UNICEF),itsotherinternationalpartnerorganisations(notablyOECD,EU-CODEV),anditsbilateralhumanitariananddevelopmentpartners(medium priority);

c) Developjointadvocacywith‘NordicGroup’countriesbyresurrectingthestrongreputationwhichtheNordicGroupofcountrieshaveenjoyed(low priority);

d) DemonstrateatangiblecommitmentbypledginggreateruseofTrustFundsforpeacebuilding.Cautionwouldbeneededtoensurethis commitmentdeliveredtheMFA’sobjectives(low priority).

Total funds

Decisions (2016)


6.2 Enhancing capacity to influence and manage policy priorities for the HDN/HPDN and FD (based on Conclusions 1 and 5)

Recommendation 2

The MFA is recommended to review its instruments and approachesforpolicyinfluencingandprogramminginHDN/HPDNcontextsinordertosustainpolicyinfluence,avoidover-reachandto ensure proper monitoring.

Mainimplementationresponsibility:MFADepartmentforDevelopmentPolicyandPoliticalDepartment

Priority: Medium to high

This recommendation aims at enhancingMFA policy influence at themulti-country programme/ implementation level characteristic of HDN situations,typicallydominatedbymuchlargerdonorsandstakeholdersoperatinginmulti-plepartnershipsandwheretheMFAhasinsufficientstaffontheground.

Sub-recommendation2.1:ToreinforceinfluenceofitsPPAsanddisabilityandinclusionpolicies,theMFAisrecommended:topayparticularatten-tion to the efforts of other donors and look for complementarity with them inHDNcontexts;andreviewits‘soft-earmarking’instruments(e.g.PIPs)inordertoenhancepolicyinfluencewithitspartnersinHDN/HPDNcontexts. (Priority: Medium to high).

Themainactionswouldinclude:

a) Embassiestoensurethatarapidauditoflikemindeddonorsis preparedatearlystagesofbecomingengagedinanemergingHDNcontext(e.g.HornofAfrica)oraCRRFcountryprogrammetoensurecomplementaryandenhanceinfluencee.g.atregionalorcountry programmeleveldonors’meetings;

b) ReviewHDNregional/countryandCRRFcountrystrategiesin thecontextofMFAmultilateralpolicydialogueplansandinfluencingplanstomaximiseinfluenceforPPAsanddisabilityandinclusion;

c) Consideranadvocacyprogrammeforinternationaldonors/OECD-DACcountriestodevelopprotocolstoharmonisethedivisionoflabourandfundinginHDN/HPDNcontextssimilartotheEUMSs’2007CodeofConductonDivisionofLabour.

Sub-recommendation 2.2: Where the MFA is engaged in HDN/HPDN or CRRF settings it is recommended to maintain a clear programme and project focus to avoid over-reach.(Priority: Medium)

This sub-recommendation is proposed to safeguard against the overreachwhichsmalldonorsmayfaceinmulti-countryprogrammestypicaloftheHDNapproachorCRRFcountryprogrammes.ItwouldrequireCountryorregional


desk to prepare, and keep under review, context specific,medium-term pro-grammeandfundingstrategies(alongsidethepolicystrategy)toguideengage-ment inHDN or CRRF settings. These strategies should assess/evaluate if asmallvolumeof(moregenerouslyfunded)projects,concentratedonfewerpart-ners initscountriesofoperationcouldbetterenabletheMFAtoretainpolicyinfluenceandmonitoringcapacityinrelationtoFDandtheHDN/HPDN.

Sub-recommendation 2.3: The MFA should ensure that the forthcoming evaluation of country strategies of fragile countries takes forward and reviewsrelevantfindings,conclusionsandrecommendationsonFDandHPDN.(Priority: Medium)

MFA-EVAshouldconsiderthatinparticular,findings,conclusionsandrecom-mendationsonPCD,policy influenceandtherecommendationsonHPDNaretakenintoaccount.

6.3 Enhancing and promoting PCD for HDN/HPDN and FD (based on Conclusions 2, 5–8)

Recommendation 3

The MFA is encouraged to use its increasing engagement with FD and the HDN/HPDN to establish PCD and rethink inter-ministerial management structures such as the Migration Task Force to improve Policy Coherence for Development.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA Department forDevelopmentPolicywithcollaborationofMoIandalsoDevelopmentPolicyCommittee

Priority: High

TheMFAhasnotbeenabletoestablishpolicycoherenceinrespectofFDandtheHDN/HPDNlargelybecauseoftheunresolvedtensionbetweendevelopmentandmigrationpolicies(i.e.betweenMFAandMoI).Theroll-outofFDconceptsand theHDN/HPDN, and the review of the DPP 2020 provide the strategicopportunity.

Sub-recommendation 3.1: The MFA is encouraged to use the opportunity provided by the roll-out and mainstreaming of FD concepts and the HDN/HPDN to establish PCD in relation to development and migration policies. (Priority: High)

The roll-out processes in Recommendation 1.2 provide themeans to achievePCDinrelationtoFDandtheHDN/HPDNwithintheMFA.TherolloutalsoprovidesanopportunitytoinvolvetheDevelopmentPolicyCommitteeindevel-opingasharedunderstanding.


Sub-recommendation3.2:MFAseniormanagementisencouraged,inpart-nershipwith theMoI, to: revise theToRof theMTF (jointly-runwith theMoI)topromoteitasthemaininternalforum,interalia,inwhichtoseektoresolve incoherencies in migration and development policies; and elevate membership of the MTF to senior management level within both ministries. (Priority: High)

Thiswouldinclude:

a) ReviseToR,statusandfunctionofMTF;

b) TheMTFshouldhaveToR,explicitlyrecognisedbybothministries,designatingitastheprimeforuminwhichtheywillworktogethertoresolveincoherencies,buildsynergiesandidentifytrade-offstobemadebyseniormanagementoratthepoliticallevel;

c) RevisemembershipoftheMTFasadecisionmaking,ratherthaninfor-mationexchange,committee.AfirsttaskfortherevisedMTFwouldbeforthetwoMinistries(MFAandMoI)todeveloparealisticapprecia-tionoftheimpactthatdevelopmentcooperationcanreallyhaveonreducingmigrationandweighthisupagainstthepossiblenegativecon-sequencesofreorientingtriedandtrusteddevelopmentprogrammes.

Sub-recommendation 3.3: The MFA is recommended to jointly commission researchwithMoI,throughtheMTF,intotherelationshipsbetweendevel-opment,migrationanddisplacementtopromotebetterpolicycoherence. (Priority: Medium)

Thiswouldincluderesearchintothedrivers,patternsandprocessofmigrationanddisplacementandrelationshiptodevelopment,forexampleinselectedpart-nercountries.TheobjectiveistoimprovesharedcomprehensionandpromotebetterpoliciesandPCD.

6.4 Promoting protection, fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles and values in the context of FD and HDN/HPDN (based on Conclusion 9)

Recommendation 4

TheMFAisrecommendedtostrengthenitscommitmenttoHRBA,fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles in relation to FD and the HDN/HPDN.

Main implementation responsibility:MFA Political Department andDepartmentforDevelopmentPolicy

Priority: Low to Medium


AdheringtoHRBAandhumanitarianprinciplesiscriticaltomeetingtheneedsofdisplacedandothercrisis-affectedpeopleinawaythatrespectstheirdignityandrightsandisalsoeffective.ThisRecommendationwillreinforceFinland’swidelyrecognisedrespectfortheseprinciplesandvalues.

Sub-recommendation 4.1: The MFA is recommended to strengthen its adherence to the HRBA, human rights and humanitarian principles inrelation to FD and the HDN/HPDN by ensuring that they are aligned in the revised 2020 DPP.(Priority: Medium)

Thereviewforthe2020DPPisatimelyopportunitytoreconfirmandstrengthenFinland’scommitment to fundamentalprinciplesunderpinning theHRBA,byensuringthat theyalignwiththeevolvingcontextofFDandtheHDN/HPDNappliedtothefourPPAs.

Sub-recommendation 4.2: TheMFA is recommended to advocate, in itspartnershipsand in international fora,strongeradherence to theHRBA,human rights and humanitarian principles and values in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN.(Priority: Low)

Implementingthisrecommendationwouldrequire:

a) AugmentthecommitmenttothefundamentalprinciplesunderpinningtheHRBAbyfurther‘soft-earmarking’HRBA,humanrights,and humanitarianprinciplesandvaluesintheMFA’spartnership agreementsandPIPs;

b) ThroughtheNordicalliance,promoteNordicgroupactionand advocacyforupholdingtheprinciplesofinternationalprotection,respectforhumanitarianprinciplesandhumanrightstosituations ofFDandtheHDN/HPDN.

6.5 Enhancing advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion in FD and HDN/HPDN (based on Conclusion 10)

Recommendation 5

The MFA is recommended to: more clearly and systematically embed disability and inclusion policies in the context of FD and in its approaches in the HDN/HPDN; and enhance its international advocacy.

Mainimplementationresponsibility:MFADepartmentforDevelopmentPolicyandPoliticalDepartment,DevelopmentPolicyCommittee,andspecialistCSOsandprofessionals

Priority: Medium to Low


FinlandhaswithintheMFAandamonghumanitariananddevelopmentactors.ThisrecommendationencouragestheMFAtoreflectonhowitssuccessfulpro-motionofdisabilityandinclusionpoliciescouldbefurtherpromotedandincor-poratedtostrengthensocialprotectioninthecontextofFD(wherethedisabledarehighlyvulnerable)andtheHDN/HPDN.

Sub-recommendation 5.1: The MFA is recommended to mainstream disability and inclusion policies in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN. (Priority: Medium)

Theroll-outprocessesinRecommendation1.2wouldprovidethemeanstomain-streamdisabilityandinclusionpolicesinrelationtoFDandtheHDN/HPDNintheDPPunderreviewfor2020.

Sub-recommendation 5.2: The MFA is encouraged to extend its disability and inclusion policies to take account of forcibly displaced people with psychosocial needs in situations of FD and the HDN/HPDN.(Priority: Low)

Thereasonforthisrecommendation is that forceddisplacement isrecognised asamajorcauseofpsychosocialdisabilityandexclusion,particularlyamongstchildren;suchexclusionusuallycontinuesintolonger-termdevelopmentcontexts. ThisconstitutesagapintheMFA’scurrentpolicyapparatus.

For this, theMFAwould need to engagewith specialist representative CSOs(DPOs), experts and professional bodies to develop policies to mainstream disabilityandinclusionpolicesinrelationtoFDandtheHDN/HPDNintheDPPunderreviewfor2020.

Recommendation 5.3: The MFA should now scale up advocacy for disability andinclusionpoliciesinthespecificcontextofFDandHDN/HPDNtotheglobal level.(Priority: Medium)

BuildingonFinland’ssuccessfulpromotionofdisabilityandinclusionamongsthumanitariananddevelopmentactors,theMFAshouldnowdevelopitsthink-ing on how its international advocacy could be taken to the next level in the contextofFDandHDN/HPDNandtheinternationaldividendsthiscouldyield,forexampleinrelationtotheSDGs.

Actionscouldinclude:

a) Usefurther‘soft-earmarking’inpartnershipagreementsandPIPstopromotefurtheruptakeamongstmultilateralpartners;

b) Commissionanevaluationonwhetherthispolicyondisabilityandinclusioniseffectiveinencouragingdevelopingcountrypartnerstoaccepttheprincipleandadapttheirpolicies.


6.6 Enhancing advocacy and programming on women and girls in the HDN/HPDN and FD (based on Conclusion 11)

Recommendation 6

The MFA is recommended to: enhance its internal policies and international advocacy for the promotion of the rights of women and girls in the HDN/HPDN; and strengthen the linkages between policies for women and girls in situations of FD.

Mainimplementationresponsibility:MFADepartmentforDevelopmentPolicy,PoliticalDepartment,andDevelopmentPolicyCommittee

Priority: Medium to High

Finlandhasverysuccessfullypromotedgenderequalitypolicies– thewomenandgirlsPolicyPriorityArea–initsDPPsandinternationallyamonghumani-tariananddevelopmentactors.ButmoreworkisneededinrelationtoFDandinternationaladvocacy.

Sub-recommendation 6.1: The MFA is encouraged to pay particular attention to the review of the PPA on women and girls in relation to FD. (Priority: High)

Theroll-outprocessesinRecommendation1.2providethemeanstostrengthenMFApolicies(e.g.National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325)) that promote the rights of women and girls in situations of FD. Thereviewcouldalsoserveasthebasisforhighleveladvocacyininternationalfora,anchoredintheMFA’salreadyrecognisedexpertiseonwomenandgirls’rights.

Sub-recommendation 6.2: To enhance internal policy development and internationaladvocacy,theMFAisrecommendedtocommissionanevalu-ation of its experience in gender and HDN and FD programming and a pilot project on a women- and girls- based HPDN strategy in partnership with UNHCR and UNDP and taking account of UNSCR 1325.(Priority: Medium)

These studies would signal ways forward for theMFA’s support for strongeradvocacyandpolicyinfluencewithitspartners,andwideradvocacyinhigh-levelinternationalfora.

Activitieswouldinclude:

a) CommissionalessonslearnedevaluationontheintersectionofgenderprogrammeswiththenexusandinFDcontexts,drawingonMFA programmeexperiencewithitspartnersinallthecasestudy(andother)countries.


b) InpartnershipwithUNHCRandUNDPand/orabilateralpartner,commissionapilotprojectexplicitlyfocusedondevelopingawomen-andgirls-basedHPDNstrategy.Itcouldtakeintoaccount,interalia,UNSCR1325,genderandCCM/peacebuildinginsituationsattheintersectionofhumanitariananddevelopmentprogrammes.Lessonslearnedderivedfromthestudycould:

• StrengthenMFApolicymakinginthisarea;

• Provideexpertisetoenhancepolicyinfluenceandadvocacy (e.g.throughPIPs)withitspartners;

• StrengthentheMFA’spositionasaleadinginternationaladvocateinadvancinggenderdimensionsoftheHPDN;

• Formthebasisforinternationaladvocacyinhighlevelfora.

6.7 Promoting the private sector (based on Conclusion 12)

Recommendation 7

The MFA’s Department for Development Policy in partnership with other relevant departments,ministries and stakeholders isencouraged to set up a task force to develop a joint strategy to facilitate the corporate sector and trade unions to play a more active role in supporting its development policies in the context of the HDN/HPDN, notably employment provision for forciblydisplaced people and their hosts.

Main implementation responsibility: MFA in partnership withDepartment of External Economic Relations, Ministry of EconomicAffairsandEmployment,CabinetoftheMinisterforForeignTradeandDevelopmentwithintheMFA,FinnishNationalBusinessOrganisationsandSASK.InvolvementofDevelopmentPolicyCommittee

Priority: Low to Medium

TheMFAhasnotasyetestablishedaco-ordinationframeworkoraneffectivestrategy that brings together different stakeholders (corporate sector, tradeunions, and otherministries) to promote private sector and labour organisa-tion involvement in theHDN. This recommendation remedies that situationandcouldyieldsignificantaddedvaluetoFinland’sHDNpoliciesandestablishapioneeringrole forFinlandin internationalprogresson implementingHDNstrategies.BringingtradeunionsonboardwouldbeasignificantinnovationthatFinlandwouldcontributetointernationalprogressontheHDNsincetheyhavenotsofarbeeninvolved.


TheMFAwouldneedto:

EstablishanMFAtaskforce(jointlyledbyDepartmentforDevelopmentPolicyandDepartmentforExternalEconomicRelations)toworkwithotherrelevantministries,(e.g.MinistryofEconomicAffairsandEmployment),representativeFinnishcorporate sectororganisationsand labourorganisations/tradeunionsto develop a strategy for their involvement inHDN-type projects in countryprogrammes.

Undertakeapilotprojecte.g. inMENAregion linked to theJordanCompact,involvingpartnershipofthesestakeholdersandUNDP/UNHCRRegionalofficestodevelopexpertise.


6.8 Summary of Recommendations

The following chapter, a quick access overview to the recommendations, portrays themain thematic characteristicsoftheserecommendationsplusarecapitulationoftheprioritiesdescribedabove.

Knowledge development

Policy develop-ment / PCD

Programming / Management PolicyInfluence General

Advocacy Evaluation / Pilot Studies

R1: Mainstreaming the concepts of the HDN/HPDN and FD 1.1: Boost Action Plan roll-our - encourage Depart-ments and Units to review, refine, share working definitions of FD and HDN/HPDN concepts

1.2: Ambassador-level Thematic spe-cial adviser HDN/HPDN and FD

Mainstreaming FD and HDN/HPDN in 4PPAs for 2020 DPP

Unit Heads to review 5 policy pillars plus D&I for coherence with HDN/HPDN and FD

1.5: Tackle FD policy gaps for DPP 2020: IDPs, urban displace-ment, HRBA, self-reliance, climate change displacement

1.4: Explore flexible funding protocols between humanitarian assis-tance and develop-ment budgets

1.6: Champion international adop-tion of the ’triple’ nexus (HPDN)

1.3: Lessons learned evalua-tion of MFA HDN engagement in Syria crisis

1.2: Use knowl-edge manage-ment platforms/ different levels to promote know-how on develop-ment and policy mainstreaming

R2:EnhancingcapacitytoinfluenceandmanagepolicyprioritiesfortheHDN/HPDNandFD2.2: Create medium-term programme and funding strategies in HDN/HPDN or CRRF settings to maintain pro-gramme project focus and avoid over-reach

2.1: Reinforce influ-ence for PPAs by audit of likeminded donors at early stages emerging HND context or CRRF

Review regional/ country and CRRF strategies in con-text of multilateral PIPs/ influencing plans

2.1: Advocate for international donors protocol on funding in HDN/HPDN contexts

2.3: Ensure evalu-ation of country strategies of fragile countries, takes forward and reviews relevant findings, conclu-sions and recom-mendations on FD and HPDN

R3: Enhancing and promoting PCD for HDN/HPDN and FD 3.3: MFA-MoI joint research through the MTF into devel-opment- migration-displacement relationships to promote better policy coherence

3.1: Ensure roll-out/ mainstreaming of FD and HDN/HPDN establishes PCD for develop-ment and migration policies

3.2: MFA/MoI revise ToR and membership of MTF to promote as internal decision-making forum on development and migration


Knowledge development

Policy develop-ment / PCD

Programming / Management PolicyInfluence General

Advocacy Evaluation / Pilot Studies

R4:Promotingprotection,fundamentalhumanrightsandhumanitarianprinciplesandvaluesin the context of FD and HDN/HPDN

4.1:Ensure HRBA, HR, humanitarian principles aligned in 2020 DPP in relation to FD and HDN/HPDN

4.2: Enhance ‘soft earmarking’ for stronger adher-ence to HRBA, HR, humanitar-ian principles in context of FD and HDN/HPDN

4.2: Advocate stronger adher-ence to HRBA, HR and humanitarian principles in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN

Scale up Nordic Alliance advocacy

R5: Enhancing advocacy and programming for disability and inclusion in FD and HDN/HPDN5.1: Mainstream D & I policies in the context of FD and the HDN/HPDN

5.3: Scale up glob-al level advocacy for D & I policies in context of FD and HDN/HPDN

5.2: Extend dis-ability and inclusion policies for forcibly displaced people with psychosocial needs in FD and HDN/HPDN

R6: Enhancing advocacy and programming on women and girls in the HDN/HPDN and FD6.1: Special focus on reviewing PPA on rights of women and girls in relation to FD

6.2: Evaluate of experience in gen-der and HDN and FD programming

Pilot project on W & Gs- based HPDN strategy in partner-ship with UNHCR and UNDP, taking account of UNSCR 1325

R7: Promoting the private sectorDept. of Develop-ment task force [with relevant departments/minis-tries/ corporate and trade union stake-holders] for private sector engagement in development in HDN/HPDN contexts

Task Force pilot project on private sector e.g. in MENA region with stakeholders’ part-nership and UNDP/UNHCR

Priority

High Medium Low


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Scheel,SandSquire,V.(2014).‘ForcedMigrantsasIllegalMigrants’,Chapter15,pps.188-199,inFiddian-Qasmiyeh,E.,Loescher,G.,Sigona,N.,Long,C.,(eds),Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies,Oxford:OUP.

Scott,L.,Garloch,A.,andShepherd,A.(2016).Resilience and Sustainable Poverty Escapes: Implications for programming.USAID,LeveragingEconomicOpportunitiesandChronicPovertyAdvisoryNetwork.

Turton,D.(2003).‘ConceptualisingForcedMigration’,RSC Working PaperNo.12,October2003, RefugeeStudiesCentre,UniversityofOxford.

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UNEG-HEIG.(2018)TheHumanitarian-DevelopmentNexus–Whatdoevaluationshavetosay? MappingandSynthesisofEvaluations,Workingpaper.

UNHCR.(2018).GlobalTrends:ForcedDisplacementin2017,Geneva.

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https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5b3295167/official-version-final-draft-global-compact-refugees.html

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UNICEF.(2016).UNICEFstudyonlinkingdevelopmentandhumanitarianprogramming(FinalReport),UNICEF.

Uvin,P.(2002)‘TheDevelopment/PeacebuildingNexus:ATypologyandHistoryofChanging Paradigms’,Journal of Peacebuilding & Development,1:1,5-24

WorldBank.(2017).Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts.Washington:WorldBank.

Zetter,R.(2014).Protecting Forced Migrants: A State of the Art Report of Concepts, Challenges and Ways Forward.Bern:BBL,Bundespublikationen.

Zetter,R.(2014a).ReframingDisplacementCrisesasDevelopmentOpportunities.PolicyBriefpreparedfortheGlobalInitiativeonSolutions,CopenhagenRoundtable,2–3April,2014.

Zetter,R.(2015).Protection in Crisis: Forced Migration and Protection in a Global Era.Washington, DC:MigrationPolicyInstitute.

Zetter,R.(2017).‘WhytheyarenotRefugees–ClimateChange,EnvironmentalDegradationand PopulationDisplacement’,Siirtolaisuus-Migration Quarterly,44:1,Spring2017,pps.23–28.

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Zetter,R.,andRuaudel,H.(2016).Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment.Washington:WorldBank.KNOMADStudy.

Zolberg,A.,Suhrke,A.,andAguayo,S.(1993).Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.


THE EVALUATION TEAM

Thispageprovidesabriefintroductionoftheevaluationteam(e.g.composition,thebackgroundandskillsofteammembers,divisionofworketc.)thatenhancesthecredibilityofthereport.

TheEvaluationManagement Team is responsible for theoverall coordinationof theEvaluation.TheDEUEvaluationmanager,theTeamLeaderandtheEMSCoordinatorformtheManagementTeamoftheEvaluation.TheTeamLeaderandtheEMSCoordinatorarerepresentingtheEvaluationteaminmajorcoordinationmeetingsandmajoreventspresentingtheEvaluationresults.

ThecompositionoftheEvaluationteam,includingqualityassurance(QA),isasfollows:

• TeamLeader:RogerZetter

• SeniorEvaluator:JamesMackie

• SeniorEvaluator:HeloiseRuaudel

• SeniorEvaluator:MaariaSeppanen

• ExternalEvaluationQualityAssuranceExpert/Advisortotheteam:TasneemMowjee

ThefollowingandsummarisetheareasofexpertiseoftheEvaluationteammembers.

Roger Zetter:isanEmeritusProfessorattheRefugeeStudiesCentreattheUniversityofOxford,UK,andwastheCentre’sDirectorfrom2006–2011.HehasBAandMAdegreesfromCambridgeUniversityandcompletedhisDPhilattheInstituteofDevelopmentStudies,theUniversityofSussex.Hehasextensiveexperienceandspecialistcapability inresearch,teaching,consultancy,evaluationandprojectmanage-mentinthefieldsofforceddisplacement,refugees,andhumanitariananddevelopmentstrategyandpoli-cy,includingrelatedtotherefugeecrisisintheMENAregion.Hisprojectsfocusonstrategy,policydevel-opment,analysis,projectandprogrammeevaluation,bestpracticeguidanceinrefugeeandasylumpolicy,migrationandurbansectorprogrammesinthedevelopingworld.Hehasactedasconsultanttomanygov-ernmentsandinternationalorganisationsincluding:ICRC,IFRC,UNHCR,UNDP,UNFPA,UNHabitat,IOM,ILO,EC,WorldBank,GovernmentsofUK,NZ,Norway,Switzerland,Denmark,andSwissAgencyforInternationalDevelopment,Oxfam,Brookings-BernProject,MPI.

James Mackie:isECDPM’sQualityandLearningSupportUnit.Dr.MackieholdsaPhDinGeographyfromtheSchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,London,andaBachelorinTown&CountryPlanningfromtheHeriot-WattUniversity&EdinburghCollegeofArt,Scotland.Hehasmore than30yearsofexperience in the internationaldevelopmentsectorparticularlywithpolicy institutesandnon-govern-mentalorganisations,onpolicyadvice,policyadvocacyandprojectimplementation.Thisincludesexten-siveexperienceofworkinginrelationtoorganisationsatalllevelsfromlocal,national,regionalandcon-tinental.Dr.MackieisalsoaVisitingProfessorattheInternationalRelationsandDiplomacyDepartmentof theCollegeofEuropeinBrugeswhereheteachesaMasters levelcourseontheEU&InternationalDevelopment.


Heloise Ruaudel:hasseventeenyearsofexperienceonhumanitarianassistanceandprotectionactivities,includinginfragileandpost-conflictcontextsShehasexpertiseinrefugees,forceddisplacement,humani-tariananddevelopmentpolicies.Sheservedaspolicyanalyst,evaluator,researcher,andprojectmanagerforawiderangeofinternationalorganisations,governmentministries,non-governmentalorganisationsandacademicinstitutions,includingtheOECD,theWorldBank,theILO,OCHA,theDanishandSwissMinistriesofForeignAffairs, theStartNetwork,theNorwegianRefugeeCouncil,GenevaCall,andtheRefugeeStudiesCentre(UniversityofOxford).ShehasalsoworkedbothforandwithUNHCR,inthefieldaswellasatheadquarters.SheholdsaMasterofEconomicandSocialStudiesinInternationalPoliticsfromAberystwythUniversityinWalesandaMaster(Hons)inPublicLawfromtheFacultyofLawandPoliticalSciencesofRennesinFrance.

Maaria Seppanen: PhD (Development Geography) and E.MA (EuropeanMaster’s inHuman RightsandDemocratisation),basedinLuxembourg,hasalonghistoryofworkinthethreeaspectsofdevelop-mentcooperation:academicworkandresearch,officialgovernmentaldevelopmentcooperationandfree-lanceconsultantinEvaluation.Shehasworkedlong-terminLatinAmerica(CentralAndesandCentralAmerica)inresearch,internationalUNorganisation(UNESCO,Peru)andheldanembassypositionasCounsellorforDevelopmentCooperationattheEmbassyofFinlandinManagua,Nicaragua.Afteralonguniversitycareer,shestartedasaconsultant,andhasdoneEvaluationsmainlyofFinnishdevelopmentcooperationandtheoreticallyandpracticallyorientedstudiesforMFAandFinnishNGOs.FortheEU,shehasbeenengagedinresearchandstudiesconcerningtheCotonouPartnershipAgreement.SheregularlyteachescoursesondevelopmentcooperationandLatinAmericandevelopmentgeographyattheUniver-sityofHelsinkiasAdjunctProfessor.

Tasneem Mowjee(ExternalQA/Advisor)hasextensiveEvaluationexperience,includingofdonorstrate-giesandhumanitarian fundingmechanisms.Shehasundertakenanumberofstudieson thehumani-tarian-developmentnexus,includingastudyon‘CoherenceinConflict’fortheDanishMFAin2015andareviewofSwissDevelopmentCooperation’seffortstolinkhumanitariananddevelopmentassistance.She iscurrentlyworkingonaWhitePaper forUSAIDonhumanitarian-developmentcoherence intheeducationsector.TasneemhasusedherconsiderableexperiencetoprovidequalityassuranceforEvalu-ations,includingaDanish-commissionedEvaluationoftheRegionalDevelopmentandProtectionPro-gramme(RDPP) forSyrianrefugeesandGlobalAffairsCanada’sEvaluationof itshumanitarianassis-tanceprogramme.

ThenucleusofthecoreEvaluationteamiscomposedoftheTeamLeaderwhoisphysicallypresentinallmeetingswiththeMFAinHelsinki.

Inaddition,theteamreceivedinputsfromNoemi Cascone(EvaluationTrainee).

Insum,allteammembershaveextensiveEvaluationandgeographicalexperiencecombinedwithin-depthunderstandingofvariousaspectsofforceddisplacementaswellassectoralexpertise.Theteammemberspossessalsolong-termexperienceonworkingwiththeEvaluationkeystakeholdergroups;themultilat-eralorganisations,governments,CSOsaswellasFinnishstakeholders.

Thequality management system(QMS)ofParticip-InduforconsortiumcomprisesofQualityManage-mentSystemManual,Processdescriptions,Guidelines,andRecords.ParticipQMScoversalloperationsexceptforbanking,accountingandinvoicing,whichfallunderfinancialauditing.Thesystemisappliedinallprojects,forwhichInduforprovidesservicesastheleadcompany,andinthiscase,astheEvaluationManager.


A PerformanceandQualityAssuranceTeam(PQAT)wasestablishedfortheassignmenttosecurethequalityoftheservicedeliveryandtomakesurethatthereportsproducedfulfiltheConsortiumrequire-mentswhilemeetingtheClient’sexpectations.ThePQATiscomposedofthefollowingmembers:

• PirkkoPoutiainen,EMSCoordinator,internalqualityassurance

• TasneemMowjee,ExternalQualityAssuranceExpert/Advisortotheteam

• GeorgLadj,DirectorofEvaluations,ParticipGmbH

• DominikaSocha,InternalEvaluationManager,qualityassurance,ParticipGmbH

• JuliaSchwarz,permanentemployeeofParticip,theleadcontractoroftheEvaluationManage-mentServices(EMS)frameworkcontract,providebackstoppingservicesifandwhenrequired,aswellasoverallqualityassurance

TheinternalQASystemputinplaceaimsatensuringthattheEvaluationactivitiesareimplementedinatimelymanner,withrigorandimpartiality,andfullyrespectingMFA’sEvaluationprinciplesandstandards, includingethicalstandards.


ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND

EVA-11

9.3.2018

V 1.0

UH2018-008120

UHA2017-005317, 89892845

Terms of Reference

Evaluation on Forced Displacement and Finnish Development Policy

1. INTRODUCTION

Attheendof2016,displacementreachedahistorichighwith65.6millionindividualsforciblydisplacedduemostlytoconflict,violence,persecutionandhumanrightsviolations.Thenumberofrefugeesreached22.5millionpersonsmeaningthatthegreatmajorityofforciblydisplacedpeoplewereinternallydisplaced.

Giventhatdisplacement isatahistoricallyhigh levelandhavingnegativeeffectsondevelopmentandhumanrights,the2016developmentpolicyofFinlandemphasizestheneedtoaddressrefugeesituationsandmigration.Largescaleandprotracteddisplacementhasalsoresultedinsignificantincreaseinneedforhumanitarianassistanceaswellasdevelopmentefforts.Theaiminthedevelopmentpolicyistoensurethatpeopleareabletoleadsafeandsecurelivesandgetsufficientincomeintheirhomecountries.Finlandsupportstheeffortsinacomprehensivemannerthroughdevelopmentcooperation,humanitarianassis-tance,policydialogueintheEuropeanUnion(EU)andinternationalforandcrisesmanagement.

TheAnnex2ofthisToRillustrateswhereFinlandisactiveprovidingfundingthroughdevelopmentcoop-erationandhumanitarianassistanceaswellascrisismanagement.AlthoughthefiguresinAnnex2areestimates,itstillrevealsthatFinnishsupportinmanycountriesconsistsofdevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistanceandalsocrisismanagement(fundsandpersons).Thefiguresdonotcoveronlycooperationrelatingtorefugees.Crisismanagementreferstocivilianandmilitaryinterventionsthatseektocontributetoimprovedruleoflawinacomprehensiveandintegratedmanner.

PolicyCoherence forDevelopment (PCD)has been central part of Finland’s development policy. TheDevelopmentPolicyProgramme(DPP)of2012emphasizedthePCDasoneof thepriority targetsandsetfivekeythemesinwhichpolicycoherencewillbestrengthened:foodsecurity,trade,tax,migrationandsecurity.Thecurrentdevelopmentpolicyisguidedbythe2030Agenda.Withthe2030Agendatheprincipleofpolicycoherencehasbeenextendedtocoverthewholescopeofsustainabledevelopment.TheglobalandnationalworkonPCDhasbeenpraised internationally forexample inOECDDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee’s(DAC)peerreviews.

TheOECDdefinitionforthePCDhighlightstheimportanceofensuringthatpoliciesdonotharmandwherepossiblecontributetointernationaldevelopmentobjectives.TheDPPof2016clearlyoutlinesthatFinlandsupportseffortstorespondtoforceddisplacementinacomprehensivemanner.ThisEvaluationathandwillcombinethetwothemes(forceddisplacementandPCD/PCSD)andwillassesshowcoher-


entlyFinlandhasimplementedonecentraltheme(forceddisplacement)thathasbeenhighlightedinthedevelopmentpolicy.

TheEvaluationwillcoverdevelopmentcooperation,humanitarianassistance,policydialogue in inter-nationalforatosomeextent,crisismanagementandotherpoliciesrelatingtoforceddisplacement.TheEvaluationwillcovertheperiodfrom2012tomid-2018,withemphasisontheimplementationofthecur-rentdevelopmentpolicy.

TheEvaluationwillbeformativeevaluatingprocessesinternallywithintheMFAandexternallywithotherstakeholders(e.g.otherministries).OtherministrieswillnotbeassessedforinternalEvaluationoftheirpolicycoherenceandimplementationbutonlytotheextenttheirpoliciescoherewiththeMFA’sforceddisplacementanddevelopmentpolicyframe.TheEvaluationwillalsoconsiderhowFinlandengagesitsprincipalmultilateralpartners(initiallyUNHCR,EU,UNICEF)inpolicydialogueinrelationtoitscom-mitmenttoPCDinthecontextofforceddisplacement.

2. CONTEXT

2.1. Terminology

TheEvaluationwillrefertoanumberoftermsandconceptsintheareaonforceddisplacement,refugeesanddevelopmentpolicy/cooperation.SomebasicexplanationforthepurposeofreadingtheToRispro-videdbelowbutafullerelaborationoftheconceptsandpolicyimplicationsofforceddisplacement/migra-tionwillbeundertakenaspartoftheinceptionphase.

Refugeesarepersonsfleeingconflictorpersecution.Theyaredefinedandprotectedininternationallaw.The1951GenevaConventionontheProtectionofRefugeesandits1967Protocolremainthecornerstoneoftheinternationalrefugeeprotectionregime.The1951Conventiondefineswhoisarefugeeandoutlinesthebasicrightswhichstatesshouldaffordtorefugees.Oneofthemostfundamentalprincipleslaiddownininternationallawisthatrefugeesshouldnotbeexpelledorreturnedtosituationswheretheirlifeandfreedomwouldbeunderthreat.TheOfficeofUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)isthemandatedUNorganizationresponsiblefortheprotectionandassistanceofrefugees.

InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)definesamigrantasanypersonwhoismovingorhasmovedacrossan internationalborderorwithinastateaway fromhis/herhabitualplaceof residence,regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2)whether themovement is voluntary or involuntary; (3)what the causes for themovement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is. (https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant)

Forceddisplacementreferstosituationsofpersonswholeaveorfleetheirhomesduetoconflict,violence,persecutionand/orhumanrightsviolations.Forciblydisplacedpeopleincluderefugees,asylum-seekersandinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs).

Forcedmigrationcanbedefinedasamigratorymovementinwhichanelementofcoercionexists,includ-ingthreatstolifeandlivelihood,whetherarisingfromnaturalorman-madecauses(e.g.movementsofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersonsaswellaspeopledisplacedbynaturalorenvironmentaldisas-ters,chemicalornucleardisasters,orfamine).

2.2. Global context

At the end of 2016, displacement reached a historic high with 65.6million individuals forcibly dis-placedduemostlytoconflict,violence,persecutionandhumanrightsviolations.Thenumberofrefugeesreached22.5millionpersonsmeaningthatthegreatmajorityofforciblydisplacedpeoplewereinternally displaced.While the current crisis is global, it affects some countries and regions disproportionately withhighlevelsofdisplacementseeninAfrica,theMiddleEastandSouthAsia.55%oftheworld’sref-

https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant

https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant


ugees came from three countries: Syria, Afghanistan and South-Sudan. Syrians comprise the largest displaced population. In 2016, barely 3% of refugees globally achieved any of the durable solutions (http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html).

Internationalhumanrightsapplytoallandthedivisionbetweendifferentcategories(refugee/migrants/displacedpersons)isnotclear.TheformerSpecialRepresentativeonMigration,Mr.PeterSutherland,statedinhisreportinFebruary2017that‘Realityisfarfrombeingsoclear-cutandthereisalargegreyareabetweenthosewhofleeliterallyatgunpointandthosewhosemovementisentirelyvoluntaryandthesituationisnotoftenblackandwhite.’(http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/coordination/15/documents/Report %20of%20SRSG%20on%20Migration%20-%20A.71.728_ADVANCE.pdf)

The2030Agendaemphasizesthatpeace,development,humanrightsandhumanitarianresponsesareinextricablylinkedandmutuallyreinforcing.The2030Agendaconsistingof17SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)and169associatedtargetsseekstoensurethatallnationsandallpeopleeverywherearereachedandincludedinachievingtheSDGs.The2030Agendaasawholeaddressesvariousrootcausesofrefugeeandmigrationsituations.Itoffersauniversal,integrated,transformativeandhumanrights-basedvisionforsustainabledevelopment,peaceandsecuritywhichisapplicabletoallpeopleandallcountries.Inaworldincreasinglyshapedbyclimatechange,povertyandconflict,theSDGscannotbeachievedwith-outtakingintoaccounttherightsandneedsofrefugees, internallydisplacedandstatelesspeople.Theprinciplesthatunderpinthe2030Agenda,notablyleavingnoonebehindandensuringhumanrightsforall,provideapowerfulbasisforinclusion.

TheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations(UN)convenedthefirsteverWordHumanitarianSummitinIstanbulin2016togeneratecommitmentstoreducesufferinganddeliverbetterforpeoplearoundtheglobeandtodemonstratesupportfornewAgendaforHumanity.AttheSummitgloballeadersdiscussedhowtoeffectivelyrespondandtobebetterpreparedformajorhumanitarianchallenges.Oneoftheprior-ityissueswasanewglobalapproachtomanageforceddisplacement,withanemphasisonensuringhopeanddignity for refugeesor internallydisplacedpersonsandsupporthost countriesandcommunities;empoweringwomenandgirls;andadaptingnewapproachestorespondtoprotractedcrisesandrecurrentdisasters,reducevulnerabilityandmanageriskbybridgingthedividebetweendevelopmentandhumani-tarianpartners.(www.agendaforhumanity.org)).

TheNew York Declaration for Refugees andMigrants adopted on 19 September 2016 expressed the political will of world leaders to save lives, protect rights and share responsibility on a global scale.(http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration and the full text http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1).TheNewYorkDeclaration setout aComprehensiveRefugeeResponseFramework(CRRF),withspecificactionsneededtoeasepressureonhostcountries,enhancerefugeeself-reliance,expandaccesstothird-countrysolutions,andsupportconditionsincountriesoforiginforreturninsafetyanddignity.TheHighCommissionerforRefugeeswasrequestedtoproposeaGlobalCompactonRefugeestotheGeneralAssemblyin2018.TheworktowardstheGlobalCompactistakingplaceincoor-dinationandconsultationwithMemberStatesandotherrelevantstakeholders.TheGlobalCompactforRefugeeswillconsistofboththealreadyadoptedCRRFrameworkandaProgrammeofActiontosupporttheimplementationofthenewcomprehensiveapproach.Inaddition,thereissimultaneousprocessongo-ingtodevelopGlobalCompactforMigration.Theplanistoadoptthiscompactinanintergovernmentalconferenceoninternationalmigrationin2018.

AstheMemberStateoftheEuropeanUnion,theEUsetsthecommongroundforFinlandforherpoli-ciesandactions.TheEuropeanCommission(EC)hasrecentlypublisheditsprogressreportonmigra-tion (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20171114_progress_report_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf).

http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/coordination/15/documents/Report %20of%20SRSG%20on%20Migration%20-%20A.71.728_ADVANCE.pdf



http://www.agendaforhumanity.org

http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1

http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda- migration/20171114_progress_report_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda- migration/20171114_progress_report_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf


In April 2016 the EC gave communication ‘Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance’ (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/refugees- idp/Communication_Forced_Displacement_Devel-opment_2016.pdf)andadoptedanewdevelopment-ledapproachtoforceddisplacement,aimedathar-nessingandstrengtheningtheresilienceandself-relianceofboththe forciblydisplacedandtheirhostcommunities. The new approach stipulates that political, economic, development and humanitarianactorsshouldengagefromtheoutsetofadisplacementcrisis,andworkwiththirdcountriestowardsthegradualsocio-economicinclusionoftheforciblydisplaced.Theobjectiveistomakepeople’slivesmoredignifiedduringdisplacement;andultimately,toendforceddisplacement

(http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/refugees_en.pdf).

The OECD is also relevant actor for Finland and it has recently published Development Policy Tools to address forced displacement. The guidance provides a clear and practical introduc-tion to the challenges faced in working in situations of forced displacement, as well as some prac-tical recommendations for donor staff seeking to mainstream responses to forced displacementinto their development planning and co-operation. (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/addressing-forced-displacement-through-development-planning-and-assistance_9789264285590-en)

The2030AgendatransitionedPCDtoPCSD

The OECD has defined policy coherence as ‘the systematic promotion ofmutually reinforcing policyactionsacrossgovernmentdepartmentsandagencies creating synergies towardsachieving theagreedobjectives’andPCDas‘ensuringthatpoliciesdonotharmandwherepossiblecontributetointernationaldevelopmentobjectives’.TheOECDhasprovidedguidanceandtoolsonPCD,knownas ‘PCDBuildingBlocks’andtheseinclude1)politicalcommitmentsandpolicystatementstotranslatepolicyintoaction,2)policycoordination,and3)systemsformonitoring,analysisandreporting.(BuildingBlocksforPolicyCoherenceforDevelopment2009:http://www.oecd.org/pcd/44704030.pdf).

TheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDG)hadpolicycoherencefordevelopmentinthegoal#8con-cerning global partnership. With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld)and theAddisAbabaActionAgenda(http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf),allUNmem-bershavecommittedto‘pursuepolicycoherenceandanenablingenvironmentforsustainabledevelop-mentatalllevelsandbyallactors’.TheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)includeatarget(17:14)onthemeansofimplementationto‘enhancepolicycoherenceforsustainabledevelopment’

(http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/).

The2030AgendatransitionedPCDtoPCSD.Theimplementationofthe2030Agendacallsforwhole-of-governmentapproachesandstrengthenedinstitutionalcoordinationandcoherenceatalllevelsofpolicy-makingtoensuremoreintegratedpolicyframeworksforsustainabledevelopment.TheOECDdefinesthePCSDinthefollowingway:‘PCSDisanapproachandpolicytooltointegratetheeconomic,social,envi-ronmentalandgovernancedimensionsofsustainabledevelopmentatallstagesofdomesticandinterna-tionalpolicymaking.Itaimstoincreasegovernments’capacitiestoachievethefollowingobjectives:1)Fostersynergiesacrosseconomic,socialandenvironmentalpolicyareas;2)Identifytrade-offsandrec-onciledomesticpolicyobjectiveswithinternationallyagreedobjectives;and3)Addressthespilloversofdomesticpolicies.’

TheOECDhas introducedeightbuildingblocks forPCSD:1)politicalcommitmentand leadership,2)integratedapproachestoimplementation,3)intergenerationaltimeframe,4)analysesandassessmentsofpotentialpolicyeffects,5)policyandinstitutionalcoordination,6)localinvolvement,7)stakeholderparticipationand8)monitoring&reporting.(http://www.oecd.org/development/policy-coherence-for-sustainable-development-2017-9789264272576-en.htm)

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/refugees- idp/Communication_Forced_Displacement_Development_2016.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/refugees- idp/Communication_Forced_Displacement_Development_2016.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/refugees_en.pdf

http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/addressing-forced-displacement-through-development-planning-and-assistance_9789264285590-en

http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/addressing-forced-displacement-through-development-planning-and-assistance_9789264285590-en

http://www.oecd.org/pcd/44704030.pdf

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld

http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf

http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/

http://www.oecd.org/development/policy-coherence-for-sustainable-development-2017-9789264272576-en.htm

http://www.oecd.org/development/policy-coherence-for-sustainable-development-2017-9789264272576-en.htm


TheEUcontextisalsoimportanttoguideFinnishpoliciesandpracticeonPCD/PCSD.TheLisbonTreatyobligestoPCD,andthesameprinciplewasalreadyincludedintheMaastrictTreaty.Thepoliticalcom-mitmenttoPCDwasembeddedintheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopment(2006)andthiscommit-mentwasreaffirmedintheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopment(2017)thatdefinedPCDasanimpor-tant contribution to PCSD. The Consensus guides efforts in applying PCD across all policies and allareascoveredbythe2030Agenda,seekingsynergiesnotablyontrade,finance,environmentandclimatechange, foodsecurity,migrationandsecurity.TheConsensusputs inplacea requirement foraholis-ticandcross-sectorpolicyapproachtobepursued inpartnershipwithall stakeholdersandonall lev-els.TheConsensuscallsforpromotionofwhole-of-governmentapproachesandensuringpoliticalover-sight and coordination efforts at all levels for SDG implementation. (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future_en)

2.3. Policy context in Finland

ThecoregoalofFinland’sdevelopmentpolicyistoeradicateextremepovertyandtoreducepovertyandinequality.IntheDPPof2016FinlandiscommittedtopursuedevelopmentpolicycoherentlytoensurethattheindividualpolicygoalslistedintheGovernmentProgrammesupporttheachievementofsustain-abledevelopment.Finlandhasaspecialfocusonfourpriorityareas:1)enhancingtherightsandstatusofwomenandgirls;2)improvingtheeconomiesofdevelopingcountriestoensuremorejobs,livelihoodopportunitiesandwell-being;3)democraticandbetter-functioningsocieties;4)increasedfoodsecurityandbetteraccesstowaterandenergyandthesustainabilityofnaturalresources.Furthermore,thecur-rentdevelopmentpolicyemphasizestheneedtoaddressrefugeesituationsandmigrationwhichisanewtheme thathasnotbeen included in theearlierDPPs.ViolentconflictsandprotractedcrisesandalsothelackoffutureprospectshaveresultedinmassivemigrationespeciallyfromSyria,Iraq,manyAfricancountriesaswellasAfghanistan.

ForthisEvaluation,itisalsorelevantthatFinlandhasemphasizedthemainstreamingofgenderequal-ityinalldevelopmentpolicy.ProtectionandrightsofwomenshouldbesecuredinconflictsituationsandtheirparticipationinresolutionofconflictsinaccordancewithinternationalconventionsandtreatiesandUNdecisions, includingResolution1325.Furthermore, therealizationofhumanrightshasbeenakeygoalinFinland’sdevelopmentpolicy.

AsregardsPCD,ithasbeenhighonpoliticalagenda(e.g.includedintheGovernmentProgrammesof20112015,http://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/government/history/government-programmes-since-1917-new).Ithasalsobeenhighlighted inFinland’sdevelopmentpolicies since theDPPof2004.Central government’shigh-levelPCDnetworkwasestablishedduringthegovernmentperiod2007-2011,andPCDhasbeenpro-motedalsointernationally(e.g.duringtheEUpresidencyin2006).ThetwomostrecentDPPs(2012and2016)haveconfirmedFinland’scommitmenttopromotePCD/PCSDbyenhancingstrategicmanagementandcooperationbetweenministries.TheDPPof2012includedfiveprioritythemestopromotePCD:foodsecurityandrighttofood,trade,tax,migrationandsecurity.ThecurrentDPPof2016includesreferencetothe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment.DevelopmentpolicyispursuedcoherentlytoensurethattheindividualpolicygoalslistedintheGovernmentProgrammesupporttheachievementofsustain-abledevelopment.TheDPP2016alsoclearlyindicatesensuringthathumanitarianaid,peacemediation,reconstructionanddevelopmentcooperationaremutuallysupportiveandcomplementary.

(http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=251855&nodeid=49542&contentlan=2&culture=en-US;andhttp://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=341918&nodeid=49313&contentlan=2&culture=en-US)

Asregards reportingonPCDtheGovernmentprepareda report ’TowardsAMoreJustWorldFreeof Poverty’totheParliamentinMay2014(http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=307138&nodeid=49542&contentlan=2&culture=en-US).

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future_en

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future_en

http://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/government/history/government-programmes-since-1917-new

http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=251855&nodeid=49542&contentlan=2&culture=en-US







PCD/PCSDistargetontheonehand,andapproachandmeansontheotherhand.Thewideimplemen-tationofthe2030AgendahasraisedawarenessandgivesthusmomentumtopromotePCD/PCSD.TheEvaluationathandistimelyandcanprovideinformationbothinternationallyandnationallytoenhancepolicycoherence.Aspartof theNationalAgenda2030 implementationplan, theMinistry forForeignAffairs(MFA)incooperationwiththePrimeMinister’sOffice(PMO)willcommissionareportoncompre-hensiveassessmentoftheAgenda2030implementation,includingonhowFinland’sforeignpolicycancontributetotheachievementofSDGsacrossalladministrativebranchesandhowcoherencecanbedevel-oped.Inaddition,theMinistryofFinance(MoF)ispromotingbudgetingforsustainabledevelopment.

2.4. Description of the Evaluation

Giventhatdisplacementisatahistoricallyhighlevelandhasnegativeeffectsintermsofdevelopmentandhumanrights,the2016DPPemphasizestheneedtoaddressrefugeesituationsandmigration.ViolentconflictsandalsothelackoffutureprospectshaveresultedinmassivedisplacementespeciallyfromSyria,Iraq,manyAfricancountriesaswellasAfghanistan.Itisestimatedthatsignificantpopulationgrowthincertaincountries,especiallyinAfrica,andclimatechangewillfurtherincreaseriskofforcedmigrationanddisplacementwithtime.

SecuringthatpeopleareabletoleadsafeandsecurelivesandgetsufficientincomeintheirhomeandhostcountriesisanimportantgoalintheDPPof2016.Developmentcooperationisseenasagoodwayofinfluencingthedevelopmentofsocietiesindevelopingcountriestohavethecapacitytocreatesourcesofincomeandpeacefullivingconditionsfortheircitizens.Supporttothecountriesoforigin,transitcoun-triesandcountriesthathavereceivedgreatestnumbersofrefugeeswillbegivenintheformofhumanitar-ianaidanddevelopmentcooperation.Effortsaresupportedincomprehensivemanner,notonlythroughdevelopmentcooperationbutalsobyothermeans.FinlandalsohaspolicydialoguewiththeEUandinter-nationalpartners.ThemaintargetregionsandcountriesareMiddle-Easterncountries,HornofAfricaregionandAfghanistan.

ThisEvaluationathandwillcombinethetwothemes,forceddisplacementandPCD/PCSD,andwillassesshowcoherentlyFinlandhasimplementedtheDPP.ThePCDwillbeevaluatedinareasofFinnishdevel-opmentcooperation,humanitarianaid,EUcoordinationinFinland,Finland’spolicydialogueininterna-tionalfora(initiallyUNHCR,UNICEF,EU),crisismanagementandotherpoliciesrelatingtoforceddis-placement.TheEvaluationwilltakeintoaccountthedevelopmentoftheactionsduringtheperiodfrom2012tomid-2018,withemphasisontheimplementationofthecurrentdevelopmentpolicy.

Asdescribedinchapter2.3PCDhasbeencentralpartofFinland’sdevelopmentpolicyforlongtimePCDhasbeenincludedintheGovernmentsProgrammesmakingwholegovernmentresponsibleofdevelop-mentpolicy.Policycoherencehasbeenensuredthroughdifferentstructures:partlythroughtheEUpolicycoordinationprocessesinmattersfallingunderEUcompetence,andpartlythroughthehigh-levelinter-ministerialPCDnetworkchairedbytheUnder-SecretaryofStateforDevelopmentPolicyandCooperationaswellasbilateralcontactsbetweentheMFA’sDepartmentforDevelopmentPolicyandotherauthorities.Until2015thehigh-levelinter-ministerialPCDnetworkconvenedbiannuallyanditservedasamecha-nismforinformation,awareness-raising,andfeedbackwithinthegovernment.Themainresponsibilityforpreparingandpromotingdevelopmentpolicy,includingPCD,liedwithintheDepartmentforDevelop-mentPolicyattheMFAwherethenationalfocalpointforPCDwaslocated.

Finlandhashadanissues-basedapproachinaddressingPCD.OECD’stoolforpolicycoherencewaspilot-edonthefoodsecurityandthepilotwascompletedin2013.FinlandalsosupportedaPilotStudyontheImpactsofOCEDCountries’PoliciesonFoodSecurityinTanzaniawhichwascarriedoutbytheECDPMandEconomicandSocialResearchFoundation(ESRF).(http://ecdpm.org/publications/assessing-poli-cy-coherence-development/).AstudyoffoodsecuritypolicyareaisusefulasitwasapilotonPCDanditisthemostsystematicallyexploredpolicyforPCD/PCSD.Thestudyisusefultoassessconnectivitywith

http://ecdpm.org/publications/assessing-policy-coherence- development/

http://ecdpm.org/publications/assessing-policy-coherence- development/


forceddisplacement/refugees/migration/developmentaspartofthecontextanalysis.Inadditiontofoodsecurity,in2016FinlandlaunchedActionProgrammeforTaxandDevelopment(2016–2019)whichisacross-governmentefforttoreducetaxevasion,taxavoidanceandcorruptionandtoraiseawarenessofthelinksbetweentaxationandpublicservicesindevelopingcountries.

Althoughnoofficialstructureshaveexisted,therehasbeencooperationbetweentheMFAandtheMoIonmigrationanddevelopment.BothministrieshaveparticipatedintheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopment.In2015theMFAformedthetaskforceformigrationespeciallyforcoordinationintheMFAbutalsobetweenotherrelevantministries.ThistaskforcehasrepresentativesfromdifferentMFAdepart-mentsaswellasfromMoIandPrimeMinister’sOffice(PMO).Thetaskforceisnotadecisionmakingbodybutcoordinatingandsharinginformation.

The2030AgendabroughtchangestotheinstitutionalsetuponPCD/PCSDdemonstratingstrongpoliti-calcommitment topromotingsustainabledevelopment inFinland.Inthebeginningof2016thePMOassumed responsibility for the coordination of thenational implementation of the 2030Agenda.ThePrimeMinisterchairstheNationalCommissiononSustainableDevelopmentwhichbringstogetherkeyactorsinFinnishsociety.TheGovernmentReportontheimplementationofthe2030AgendaforSustain-ableDevelopment(SustainableDevelopmentinFinland–Long-term,CoherentandAction)wasapprovedin February 2017 (http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/79455/VNK_J1117_Gov-ernment_Report_2030Agenda_KANSILLA_netti.pdf?sequence=1).

TheothermostrelevantbodiesaretheCoordinationSecretariatfunctioningunderthePMO,aCoordi-nationNetworkconsistingofrepresentativesfromallministries,anexpertpanelforsustainabledevel-opmentcomprisingofeightprofessorsfromvariousministriesaswellastheDevelopmentPolicyCom-mittee(PDC)thatmonitorsandreviewstheimplementationofFinland’sdevelopmentpolicyguidelinesandinternationalcommitments.Moreinformationisavailable:http://kestavakehitys.fi/en/agenda2030/implementation-finland

As saidearlier, another important coordinationmechanism toensurePCD is theEUpolicy coordina-tionprocess.Mainresponsibilityforthepreparation,monitoringanddeterminationofFinland’spositionrestswiththerelevantministries.Thesystemconsistsofrelevantministries,sub-committees,theCom-mittee forEUAffairsandtheMinisterialCommitteeonEuropeanUnionAffairs.Finland’sPermanentRepresentationtotheEuropeanUnioninBrusselstakesalsopartinthepreparationofEUaffairs.Moreinformationisavailable:http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tietoa/eu-asioiden-kasittely?p_p_id=56_INSTANCE_KaV9fmbioUg3&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column2&p_p_col_count=1&_56_INSTANCE_KaV9fmbioUg3_languageId=en_US

TheestablishedcoordinationwithregardtoFinland’srelationshipwiththeUNHCRisbasedonthefol-lowingdivisionoflabour:MFAisresponsiblefortheoverallorganisationalpolicyandsupport(funding),andMoIisresponsibleformattersrelatingtotheresettlementprogramme.MFAinformsandconsultsasappropriatetheMoIongeneralpolicymatters,andMoIinformsandconsultsMFA(amongotherstake-holders)onissuesofresettlementthatisdoneincooperationwithUNHCR.

TheOECDdefinitionforthePCDhighlightstheimportanceofensuringthatpoliciesdonotharmandwhere possible contribute to international development objectives. In addition to development policytherearenumberofotherpoliciesandstrategiesthatareconnectedtoforceddisplacement,e.g.:

• Foreign and security policy:

http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=327345&nodeid=49298&contentlan=2&culture=en-US;

InJuly2016,theGovernmentapprovedaForeignandSecurityPolicyReport:http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=348060

http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/79455/VNK_J1117_Government_Report_2030Agenda_KANSILLA_netti.pdf?sequence=1

http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/79455/VNK_J1117_Government_Report_2030Agenda_KANSILLA_netti.pdf?sequence=1

http://kestavakehitys.fi/en/agenda2030/implementation-finland

http://kestavakehitys.fi/en/agenda2030/implementation-finland

http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tietoa/eu-asioiden- kasittely?p_p_id=56_INSTANCE_KaV9fmbioUg3&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column2&p_p_col_count=1&_56_INSTANCE_KaV9fmbioUg3_languageId=en_US





http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=348060

http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=348060


InSeptember2014,theFuturesOutlookoftheMinistryforForeignAffairswaspublished. http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=325839&nodeid=49298&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

• International Human Rights Policy:

http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=49583&culture=en-US&contentlan=2

• Crisis Management:http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=49302&culture=en-US&contentlan=2

• Policies, strategies and operational plans relating to migration,e.g.Valtioneuvostonperiaatepäätös:Maahanmuutontulevaisuus2020-strategiasta,2013(http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/han-dle/10024/80057/Maahanmuuton_tulevaisuus_2020_fi.pdf ) and Government’s operational plan onimmigrationpolicy,2015http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10616/334517/Hallituksen+maahanmuuttopoliittiset+toimenpiteet/186046e8-46c7-450c-98cf-45b2e2d19c2c

• Policies, strategies and operational plans relating to asylum,e.g.Government’soperationalplanonasylum,2015

ForthisEvaluationthemostrelevantministriesaretheMFA(responsible fordevelopmentpolicyandcooperation), theMoI(responsible forasylumpolicy),MinistryofEconomicAffairsandEmployment,MoEAE(responsibleforintegrationpolicy),thePMOandtheMinistryofFinance(MoF).Otherministriesandagenciesaswell as theirduties canbe found:http://intermin.fi/en/areas-of-expertise/migration/agencies-and-responsibilities.OtherministriesthantheMFAarenotincludedforinternalEvaluationoftheirpolicycoherenceandimplementationbutonlytoextenttheirpoliciescoherewiththeMFA’sforceddisplacementanddevelopmentpolicyframe.NeverthelessitisimportanttonotethattheremitfortheEvaluationincludesPCDwithrespecttodomesticpoliciesforforceddisplacementwithinFinland,aswellasthemainfocusonmassimpactedcountries,bearinginmindthatMFAdoesnothaveamandatetoassesspolicyimplementationofotherministriesbutonlytoevaluatepolicycoherence.

3. RATIONALE, PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

ThemainobjectiveofthisEvaluationistoassesshowcoherentlythedevelopmentpolicyanditstargetsrelatingtoforceddisplacementhavebeenimplementedandhowthecoherencecouldbeenhanced.Themainobjectiveisinitiallydividedtothefollowingpriorities/sub-objectives:

1. Policy coherence efforts

- Map,analyzeandassess thesuccessesandchallenges toensurePCD/PCSD in issues relatedtoforceddisplacement internally intheMFAandexternallywithotherministriesrelevantto Finland’spoliciesonforceddisplacement.

- HowthepolicycoherenceintheMFAistranslatedintoitsengagementwithitsmaininterna-tionalpartnersinthistopic(initiallyEU,UNHCR,UNICEF).

2. Development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and crisis management

- AssesswhatconsequencestheemphasissetinDPPof2016onrefugeesandmigrationhashadonthefinancialvolumeandorientationofdevelopmentcooperation,humanitarianassistanceandcrisismanagement?

- Assesswhatarethestrengthsandweaknessesinpromotingintegratedapproach/wholeofgov-ernmentapproach, includingthenexusofhumanitarianassistanceanddevelopmentcooper-ation,andprovidepracticalsolutionshowthesedilemmascanbeovercomefortheMFAandmoregenerallyfortheengagementofMFAwithitspartners.


http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=49583&culture=en-US&contentlan=2

http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/80057/Maahanmuuton_tulevaisuus_2020_fi.pdf

http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/80057/Maahanmuuton_tulevaisuus_2020_fi.pdf

http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10616/334517/Hallituksen+maahanmuuttopoliittiset+toimenpite et/186046e8-46c7-450c-98cf-45b2e2d19c2c

http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10616/334517/Hallituksen+maahanmuuttopoliittiset+toimenpite et/186046e8-46c7-450c-98cf-45b2e2d19c2c

http://intermin.fi/en/areas-of-expertise/migration/agencies-and- responsibilities

http://intermin.fi/en/areas-of-expertise/migration/agencies-and- responsibilities


TheMFAisconstantlyseekingmoreeffectiveapproachesforimplementingdevelopmentpolicypriorities.ThemainpurposeoftheEvaluationistoincreaseknowledgeandawarenessofthemainactorsdealingwithissuesrelatingtoforceddisplacementonthecoherenceoftheiroperations.Thiswouldleadtobet-terPCD/PCSDpracticesamongthestakeholdersaswellasmoreeffectivedevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistanceprogramminginrelationwithforceddisplacement.TheEvaluationresultsarealsointendedtoinformthedevelopmentofthenextdevelopmentpolicy.

TheEvaluationwill also contribute to increasedknowledgeonhow to evaluate the2030Agendaandthemescoveringandlinkingmanydifferentpolicyareas.

ThemainusersoftheEvaluationaretheMFAandotherministrieswithpoliciesrelevanttodevelopingcountriesandissuesrelatingtoforceddisplacement,FinnishEmbassies,theDevelopmentPolicyCom-mittee,theParliament,NGOsandotherstakeholders.TheEvaluationmayalsocontributetothedebateonforceddisplacementandpolicycoherenceingeneral.

4. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

TheEvaluationwillbeformative,processEvaluationservingbothaccountabilityandlearning.

ThisEvaluationwillcovertheactivitiesunderthetwolastdevelopmentpolicyprogrammes(withempha-sisonthelatter)from2012untilthemid-2018.Inaddition,theEvaluationwilltakeintoaccountthefol-lowingpoliciesandguidelines:GuidelineConcerningHumanitarianFundingGrantedbytheMFA(2015),Finland’sHumanitarianPolicy(2013),Finland’sDevelopmentPolicyandDevelopmentCooperationinFragileStates(2014),Resultsbasedmanagement(RBM)inFinland’sDevelopmentCooperation(2015),HumanRightsBasedApproachinFinland’sDevelopmentCooperation(2015),MFA’sDemocracySup-portPolicy(2014),GuidelinesforCivilSocietyinDevelopmentPolicy(2017and2010)aswellasMFA’sDemocracySupportPolicy(linkstotheseandotherpoliciescanbefoundintheannex1).

TheEvaluation’s focuswill beon conditions a) outsideEurope (i.e. countries impactedby large scaleforceddisplacement)andb)withinFinland,internallywithintheMFAandexternallyrelatedtopolicycoherenceoftherelevantministries.

TheEvaluationwillnotevaluatetheresultsandimpactofotherthandevelopmentpolicybuttheeffective-nessandimpactofMFA’sinfluenceontherealizationofPCD/PCSDtakingintoconsiderationinternalcoherenceintheMFAandexternalcoherenceinrelationwithotherministries.ThereforeinordertobeabletoassessthePCD/PCSDitwillbeimportanttoanalyzedevelopmentpolicybutalsootherpoliciesthatareconnectedto forceddisplacement,e.g. foreignandsecuritypolicy, internationalhumanrightspolicy,crisismanagementandothergovernmentspolicies,strategiesandoperationalplansrelatingtoforceddisplacement.Thesepolicieswillbetakenintoaccountfromthepointofviewofdevelopmentpol-icyandthePCD/PCSDbuttheireffectivenesswillnotbeassessed.ThiswillalsorespectthemandateofEVA-11toevaluatedevelopmentpolicyandcooperation.

TheEvaluationwillnotexplorerefugee/asylumpoliciesandconditionswithintheEUitself(forexampletheCommonEuropeanAsylumSystem(CEAS)),butwilltakenoteoftherelevanceofEUpoliciestoFin-land’sdomesticpolicyframeworkwithrespecttoPCD/PCSD.TheEvaluationwillnotassesstheeffective-nessandimpactofFinland’spolicydialogueintheEUorinthemultilateralorganizationsbuttheprocesstoensurePCD/PCSDin the issuesrelating to forceddisplacement.ThemultilateralorganizationswilltentativelyincludeUNHCRandUNICEFaswellasEU.

Afullerelaborationoftheconceptsandpolicyimplicationsofrefugees/forcedmigration/forceddisplace-mentwillbeundertakenintheinceptionphase.ThisanalysisneedstobeinformativeandwillsupportdevelopmentpolicydiscussionsinFinland.


Thereframingofthehumanitarianparadigmaroundthehumanitarian/developmentnexusanddevelop-ment–ledresponsestoprotracteddisplacementisaprofoundchangeinstrategiestoaddresssituationsofdisplacement.ThesedynamicshaveparticularsalienceforFinland’sPCD/PCSDapproachtoitsdevelop-mentpolicyandwillbefullytakenintoaccountintheEvaluation.

It isessential that theEvaluation isusefulandprovidesadded-value forpolicy-makers. Itneeds tobeframedinthecurrentglobalcontextofpolicydevelopment,inordertobetterrespondtoforceddisplace-ment.Thisincludes–amongothers–theUN-ledprocesstoformulateaGlobalCompactonRefugees.TheEvaluationwill take fullaccountof therelevanceof the forthcomingGlobalCompactonRefugees(andtheassociatedCRRF),andalsotheGlobalCompactonMigrationtothePCD/PCSDframeworkofFinland’sdevelopmentpolicy.TheEvaluationwillincludeanalysisandproposalsofalternativesandtheirfeasibilitytotheMFAonhowtocontributetotheimplementationofcommitmentsmadeatgloballevel.

TheEvaluationwillcoverFinland’sbilateral,multilateral,multi-bicooperation,(I)NGOandhumanitarian assistance.

5. ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

ThemainEvaluationquestionisfollowing:

WhatarethestrengthsandweaknessesoftheFinnishDevelopmentPolicy, includingitstarget-settinganditsimplementation,withregardtoaddressingforceddisplacementandpromotingpolicycoherence?

Themainquestionisinitiallydividedtothefollowingsub-setofquestions:

1. Policy coherence efforts

- WhatarethestrengthsandweaknessesofapproachesandcoordinationmechanismstopromotecoherentimplementationofdevelopmentpolicyandcooperationandPCD/PCSDwithFinland’sotherpoliciesthatarerelevanttoaddressingforceddisplacement?

- HowcoordinationinFinlandhasguidedFinland’sactionsintheEUinthistopic?

- HowcoordinationinFinlandhasguidedFinland’sactionsinthemainmultilateralfora(initiallyUNHCRandUNICEF)?

- HowcanFinlandstrengthenitsDevelopmentPolicy,itstarget-settingandimplementation, withregardtoaddressingforceddisplacementandinacoherentmanner?

2. Development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and crises management

- Towhatextenthasthefocusonforceddisplacementaffectedthefinancialvolumeandorienta-tionofdevelopmentcooperation,humanitarianassistanceandcrisismanagement(e.g.changesincountries,modalitiesofcooperation,sectors)?

- HasFinlandfollowedinternationallyagreedprinciplesondevelopmentcooperationandhuman-itarianassistanceconcerningforceddisplacementaslaidoutinthedevelopmentpolicy?

- HowtheemphasisonforceddisplacementhasbeentakenintoaccountinthetheoriesofchangedevelopedforfourpriorityareasofDPPof2016?

- AretheregoodpracticesofwaysinwhichFinlandhasensuredtherespectandrealizationoftherightsofwomenandgirlsandeasilymarginalizedand/ordiscriminatedpersons,e.g.personswithdisabilitieshavebeenensured?


- Whatarethestrengthsandweaknessesofthepromotionofanintegratedapproachofdifferent cooperationmodalities/wholeofgovernmentapproach,includingthenexusofhumanitarian assistanceanddevelopmentcooperation?Whatarepracticalsolutionstoovercomethedilemmas?

- HowcanFinlandmosteffectivelystrengthenitsDevelopmentPolicy,itstarget-settingandimplementation,withregardtofulfillingitsinternationalcommitments?

6. GENERAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The Evaluationmust be gender and culturally sensitive and respect the confidentiality, protection ofsourceanddignityofthoseinterviewed.Particularattentionmustbepaidtotheinclusionofwomen,girlsandindividuals/groupsthataremarginalizedand/ordiscriminatedagainstintheanalysis.

AlthoughtheEvaluationwillserveaccountability,itwillalsotrytoensureparticipatoryapproachbypro-motinglearningoftheMFA,staffandpartnerstotheextentpossibleanddevelopinggoodpracticesforthefuture.

AllpartsoftheEvaluationshalladheretorecognizedEvaluationprinciplesandtheOECDDAC’squalitystandardsfordevelopmentEvaluation.TheEvaluationwillbeEvaluationquestion-basedbutwilltakeOECDDACEvaluationcriteriaasaguide.

TheEvaluationwillreconstructthetheoryofchange(ToC)onthebasisoftheinitialToCinAnnex3whichwasdoneonthebaseofthechapter5inthe2016DPP.ThereisaseparateprocesstodevelopToCsforfourpriorityareasoftheDPPof2016,andtheseToCswillbefinalizedbytheendMarch2018.

AnEvaluationmatrixwillbedevelopedandfinalizedintheinceptionphase.Broadlythematrixwillcover the three main elements of the Evaluation (policy coherence efforts; development co-operation andhumanitarianassistance)andtheuseofprocessandsubstantivemetricsappliedonabenchmarkingscale(met/partiallymet/unmet).Thematrixwillenhancethelinkagebetweenthedocumentary,keyinform-ant (KI) interviews,andfieldcasestudycomponentsandwillbedevelopedon the linesofEvaluationquestions-matrix-structureofreport.

A fully-fledged process tracing approach is unlikely to be used, rather, a process tracing ‘framework’usingsomeelementsadjustedtofittheneedsoftheEvaluation.Aharvestingofinformationandevidence perhapscapturestheapproach.Thisprinciplewillbecarriedforwardtodetaileddevelopmentofmethod-ologyintheinceptionphase.

Adetailedmethodology,workplanandEvaluationmatrixwillbedevelopedduringtheinceptionphase.Insummarythemethodologycomprisesfourcomponents:

i. Documentaryanalysis(sample)includingquantitativeanalysesoffinancialflowsandpossiblysomestatistics–in-depthdeskstudybasedonthepolicydocuments,existingEvaluations, studies,project/programmerelatedmaterialandothermaterial,

ii. KIinterviews,Finland;

iii. KIinterviewspartners–multilateral(UNHCR,UNICEF,EU)andsampleofbilateralandotherpartners;

iv. Country/regionalfield-basedcasestudies.

TheEvaluationshouldutilizemixedmethodsfordatacollectionandanalysis(bothqualitativeandquan-titativebutrelyingmainlyonqualitativemethods).TheEvaluationshalldemonstratehowtriangulationofmethodsandmultipleinformationsourcesareusedtosubstantiatefindingsandassessments.Documen-


taryevidencewillbetestedagainstKIresponsesandfieldcasestudyevidence;conversely,KIandcasestudyevidencewillbetriangulatedagainstthedocumentarybaseline.

Therewill be in-depthdesk studybasedon the existingEvaluations, studies andothermaterial.Thisphasewillalsoincludeportfolioanalysis.Inadditiontherewillbethreefieldcasestudiesandvisittotheheadquartersofthemulti-lateralorganizations.ForUNHCRvisittoregionalofficeinStockholmmightbeworthwhiletointerviewrelevantstakeholdersonFinnishpoliciesandtheircoherence.AlthoughtheEvaluationislimitedtothreefieldcasestudies,theEvaluationwilltrytoidentifylessonslearnedthatcanalsobeusefulfordifferentsituationsandcontextselsewhere.TheEvaluationwillalsohavetosecuresuf-ficienttimeforinterviewsinFinlandinordertocaptureevidenceonPCD/PCSD.

Asregardssampling, theEvaluationwilldefine themethodology fordetermining forceddisplacementrelevantprojectsandODA.TheinceptionstudywillpayparticularattentiontotheserequirementsandwillworkverycloselywiththeMFAtodeveloptheseelementsoftheEvaluation.TheInceptionreportwillincludethefinalsamplingprinciplesanddatacollectionandanalysismethodsandanassessmentoftheireffecttoreliabilityandvalidityoftheEvaluation.TheEvaluationshouldbeopenandtransparentwhatisincludedinthesampleandalsoifsomethingisleftoutonpurpose.

Intermsofmultilateralselection,theEvaluationteamwilldefinethemethodologyforselectingmainmul-tilateralorganizations(possiblyUNHCRandUNICEF)andpossiblyEU.GiventhesmallsamplingsizetheEvaluationwillensuretocoverthemostrelevantorganizationstakingintoconsiderationFinland’spolicydialoguewiththeorganizationsanddevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistanceinthefieldcasestudycountries/region.TheEvaluationteamshoulddedicatesufficienttimetovisittheofficesandmeetwithrelevantstakeholdersandFinnishEmbassy.

In termsof bilateral andmulti-bilateral development cooperation andhumanitarian assistance, threecountries/regionswillbesampledfortheEvaluation.GiventhesmallsamplingsizetheEvaluationwillensuretocovercountryoforiginofrefugees,transitcountryandcountryhostinglargenumberofrefu-gees.SincetheEvaluationwillassessPCD/PCSDitisimportantthatthefieldcasestudycountries/regionscovermanycooperationmodalities(developmentcooperation,humanitarianassistanceandcrisesman-agement). Initially, Afghanistan and Syria (including the neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey andEgyptsufferingdirectlyfromthespill-overeffectsoftheconflict)areselectedasfieldcasestudies.

Itwillbe importantfortheEvaluationteamtoplansufficientlytimetomapandinterviewallrelevantstakeholdersbothinHelsinkiandinfieldcasestudycountries/regions.

Thefinalplanforthefieldphase,includinghowrelevantbeneficiaries/stakeholderswillbeselectedforparticipationingroupsandhowgroupswillbeorganized,willbefinalizedintheinceptionreport.Theteammembersforthefieldvisitshavetobeidentifiedthewaythattheydonothaveanypersonalrestric-tionstotraveltothepossiblefieldvisitcountries.

ThefinalEvaluationplanwillbeincludedintheinceptionreport.Theinceptionreportwillthenincludethedeskstudyontheevaluand,theoryofchange,furtherspecificationofthemethodologyandthefinal-izedEvaluationmatrix,planforthefieldmissionsandreportingoftheEvaluation.

ThemaindocumentsourcesofinformationareearlierEvaluationsandstudies,policyinfluencingplansformultilateralorganizations,meetingdocuments,MFAreportsandproject/programmerelatedmate-rial.Thedocumentswillbeidentifiedinthedeskstudyduringtheinceptionphase.ItisimportanttonotethatlargepartofthematerialprovidedbyMFAisavailableonlyinFinnish(e.g.meetingdocumentsandinfluencingplansformultilateralorganizations).OnlinetranslatorscannotbeusedwithMFAdocumentmaterialsclassifiedasrestricteduse(classifiedasIVlevelsofprotectionintheMFAorconfidentialinanyotherorganization).


Asregardslimitations,onelimitationintheEvaluationistofinddataonactionsinpolicycoherenceandonewaytoovercomethislimitationistomapwellallrelevantstakeholdersinHelsinkiandtohavesuf-ficienttimeforinterviews.

Thesecuritysituationinfieldcasestudycountriesisalsoalimitation.Themitigationmeasureistoplanproperlybutalsoincludeflexibilityintheimplementationofthefieldvisits.Inseverecasesandinordertohaveaccesstowiderangeofstakeholdersremoteinterviews(skypeetc.)arealsopossible.Anothermitiga-tionmeasureistohavenational,seniorlevelevaluatorsintheEvaluationteam.

Furthermore,anotherlimitationisthatbigpartofdocuments,e.g.policydocumentsandmeetingmemos,areavailableonlyinFinnish.ThemitigationmeasureistohaveatleastoneseniorteammemberfluentinFinnishwithsufficientnumberofworkingdays.

7. MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

EVA-11willberesponsiblefortheoverallmanagementoftheEvaluationprocess.EVA-11willworkcloselywithotherunits/departmentsoftheMFAandotherstakeholdersinFinlandandabroad.

AreferencegroupfortheEvaluationwillbeestablishedandchairedbyEVA-11.ThereferencegroupisconstitutedtofacilitatetheparticipationofrelevantstakeholdersinthedesignandscopeoftheEvalua-tion,raisingawarenessofthedifferentinformationneeds,qualityassurancethroughouttheprocessandindisseminatingtheEvaluationresults.Themandateofthereferencegroupistoprovidequalityassur-ance,advisorysupportandinputstotheEvaluation,e.g.throughparticipatingintheplanningoftheEval-uationandcommentingdeliverablesoftheconsultant.

Theuseofareferencegroupisakeystepinguaranteeingthetransparency,accountabilityandcredibilityofanEvaluationprocessandinvalidatingthefindings.

Themembersofthereferencegroupwillinclude:

• Developmentpolicyadvisoronhumanrights,UnitforSectoralPolicy,Departmentfor DevelopmentPolicy

• Developmentpolicyadvisoronconflictandfragility,UnitforSectoralPolicy,Departmentfor

DevelopmentPolicy

• DeskofficerforUNHCR,UnitforHumanitarianAssistance,DepartmentforDevelopmentPolicy

• DeskofficerforAfghanistan,UnitforSouthAsia,DepartmentfortheAmericasandAsia

• DeskofficerforSyria,UnitMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,DepartmentforAfricaandMiddleEast

• DeskofficerforPCSD,UnitforSustainableDevelopmentandClimatePolicy,Departmentfor

DevelopmentPolicy

• Deskofficerfordevelopmentpolicy,UnitforDevelopmentPolicy,DepartmentforDevelopmentPolicy

• Deskofficerforciviliancrisesmanagement,UnitforSecurityPolicyandCrisesManagement,PoliticalDepartment

OthermembersmaybeaddedduringtheEvaluationifneeded.

Thetasksofthereferencegroupareto:

• actassourceofknowledgefortheEvaluation;

• actasaninformantoftheEvaluationprocess;


• participateintheplanningoftheEvaluation(providinginputstotheToR,identifyingkey externalstakeholderstobeconsultedduringtheprocessetc.);

• assistinidentifyingexternalstakeholderstobeconsultedduringtheprocess;

• participateintherelevantmeetings(e.g.start-upmeeting,meetingtodiscusstheEvaluationplan,debriefingandvalidationmeetingsafterthefieldvisits);

• commentonthedeliverablesoftheconsultant(i.e.inceptionreport,draftfinalreport)toensurethattheEvaluationisbasedonfactualknowledgeaboutthesubjectoftheEvaluationand

• playakeyroleindisseminatingthefindingsoftheEvaluationandsupporttheimplementation,disseminationandfollow-upontheagreedEvaluationrecommendations.

8. EVALUATION PROCESS, TIMELINES AND DELIVERABLES

TheEvaluationwilltentativelystartinMarch2018andendinFebruary2019.TheEvaluationconsistsofthefollowingphasesandwillproducetherespectivedeliverables.Duringtheprocessparticularattentionshouldbepaidtostronginter-teamcoordinationandinformationsharingwithintheteam.Communica-tionbetweenEVA-11andTeamLeaderandEvaluationManagementService(EMS)Coordinatoriscrucial.ItishighlightedthatanewphaseisinitiatedonlywhenthedeliverablesofthepreviousphasehavebeenapprovedbyEVA-11.Therevisedreportshavetobeaccompaniedbyatableofreceivedcommentsandresponsestothem.

TheEvaluationisdividedintofivephases.Asummaryofthedeliverablesdefiningeachphaseis listedhere,withmoredetailsbelow:

• PhaseA:Planningphase(December2017–February2018):SubmissionofTeamLeader’s commentsonToRanddiscussionwiththeMFA

• PhaseB:Start-upphase(March2018):StartupmeetinginHelsinki

• PhaseC:Inceptionphase(March–May2018):SubmissionofDraftInceptionReportandFinalInceptionReport

• PhaseD:Implementationphase(June–October2018):Implementationoffieldvisitsand interviewsinFinland

• PhaseE:Reporting/DisseminationPhase(November–January2019):DraftFinalReport submissionbytheendofNovember2018;FinalReportbymid-January2019;Findings PresentationinFebruary2019.

ItshouldbenotedthatinternationallyrecognisedexpertsmaybecontractedbyEVA-11asexternalpeerreviewer(s)forthewholeEvaluationprocessorforsomephases/deliverablesoftheEvaluationprocess,e.g.finalanddraftreports(inceptionreport,draftfinalandfinalreports).Incaseofpeerreview,theviewsofthepeerreviewerswillbemadeavailabletotheConsultant.

ThelanguageofallreportsandpossibleotherdocumentsisEnglish.Timeneededforthecommentingofdifferentreportsis3weeks.Thetimetablesaretentative,exceptforthefinalreports.

A. PLANNING PHASE

EVA-11willfinalizetheToRoftheEvaluationinconsultationswiththeteamleader.Therefore,theEMSwillprovidetheTeamLeaderoftheEvaluationalreadyinplanningphase.Serviceorder1willdescribetherequiredservicesoftheEMSfortheplanningphaseindetail.


Thefollowingmeetingswillbeorganizedduringtheplanningphase.Meetingscanbeface-to-faceorvideomeetings.

• AplanningmeetingwiththeEMScoordinatoronrequiredservices,especiallythequalificationsandskillsoftheteamleader.

• AplanningmeetingwiththeteamleaderonEvaluationapproachandmethodological requirements(withTLandEMScoordinator)

• AmeetingforfinalizingtheToRandidentifyingtheskillsandqualificationsoftherestof theteam(withTLandEMSCoordinator,liaisonwiththereferencegroup)

Deliverable:TLsuggestionsonhowtofinalizetheToR(anissuepaperandrevisionstotheToRastrackchanges)

B. START-UP PHASE

Theserviceorder2willdescribetherequiredEMSservicesindetail.Thefollowingmeetingswillbeorgan-izedduringthestart-upphase:

1.TheadministrativemeetingwillbeheldwiththeEMSconsultantinHelsinkiinMarch2018.Thepur-poseofthemeetingistogothroughtheEvaluationprocess,relatedpracticalitiesandtobuildcommonunderstandingon theToRand administrative arrangements.Agreedminuteswill bepreparedby theconsultant.

ParticipantsintheadministrativemeetinginHelsinki:EVA-11andtheTeamLeaderandtheEMScoordi-natoroftheConsultantinperson.OtherTeamMemberscanparticipateinpersonorviaelectronicmeans.

2.Thestart-upmeetingwiththereferencegroupwillbeheldrightbeforetheadministrativemeetinganditspurposeistoestablishacommunitytoenabledialogueandlearningtogetheraswellastogettoknowtheEvaluationteamandthereferencegroup.ThepurposeisalsotoprovidetheEvaluationteamwithageneralpictureofthesubjectoftheEvaluation.TheTeamLeader/Evaluationteamwillpresentitsunder-standingoftheEvaluation,theinitialapproachoftheEvaluationandtheEvaluationquestions.

Participants in the start-up meeting: EVA-11 (responsible for inviting and chairing the session), referencegroup,TeamLeaderandEMScoordinatoroftheConsultantinperson.

Deliverables:PresentationoftheapproachandmethodologybytheTeamLeader,Agreedminutesofthetwomeetingsbytheconsultant.

C. INCEPTION PHASE

The inceptionphase includes in-depthdesk analysis andpreparationofdetailedEvaluationplan (seethecurrentEvaluationmanualp.56and96;Newmanualwillbereadyinspring2018.).ThedeskstudyincludesacomprehensivecontextanddocumentanalysisbasedonexistingEvaluations,studiesandother materialaswellasprojectdocumentationofthefieldcasecountries/regionsandrelevantinfluencingplansformultilateralorganizations. Itwill also includemappingofprogrammesand theirdifferent sources offunding.

Aspartoftheinceptionphaseconcepts(refugees/forcedmigration/displacementaswellasPCD/PCSD)willbeelaboratedandincludedintheinceptionreport(eitherinmainreportorannexes).Thisinforma-tionwillalsobeincludedinthefinalEvaluationreportascontextualinformation(eitherinmainreportorannexes).

BeforethefullinceptionreportisdraftedtherewillaconsultativeprocesstoagreeonthecoreEvaluationteammembers.Other teammemberscanalsobepresented if feasible. Inaddition theconsultantwill presentadraftworkplanandarefinedbudget.


TheinceptionreportconsistsoftheEvaluationdeskstudyandEvaluationplanwhichincludethefollowing

• contextanalysis

• briefelaborationoftheconceptandpolicyimplicationsofforcedmigration/displacement

• briefelaborationofthereframingofthehumanitarianparadigmaroundthehumanitarian/developmentnexusanddevelopment-ledresponsestoprotracteddisplacement

• briefelaborationoftheconceptforPCD/PCSD

• initialfindingsandconclusionsofthedeskstudy,includinghypotheses

• constructedtheoryofchange

• finalizationofthemethodologyandsummarizedinanEvaluationmatrixincludingEvaluationquestions,indicators,methodsfordatacollectionandanalysis

• finalworkplananddivisionofworkbetweenteammembers

• tentativetableofcontentsoffinalreport

• datagaps

• detailedimplementationplanforfieldvisitswithcleardivisionofwork(participation,interviewquestions/guides/notes,preliminarylistofstakeholdersandorganizationstobecontacted)

• budget.

Theinceptionreportwillbepresented,discussedandtheneededchangesagreedintheinceptionmeetinginApril2018.TheinceptionreportmustbesubmittedtoEVA-11twoweekspriortotheinceptionmeeting.

Plansforthefieldwork,preliminarylistofpeopleandorganizationstobecontacted,participativemethods, interviews,workshops,groupinterviews,questions,quantitativedatatobecollectedetc.mustbeapprovedbyEVA-11atleastthreeweeksbeforegoingtothefield.

Participants to the inception meeting:EVA-11,referencegroupandtheTeamLeader(responsibleforchairingthesession),andtheEMSCoordinatorinperson.Otherteammembersmayparticipateinpersonorviaelectronicmeans.

Venue:MFA,Kirkkokatu12,Helsinki.

Deliverables:InceptionreportincludingtheEvaluationplan,deskstudyandtheminutesoftheinceptionmeetingbytheConsultant

D. IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

TheimplementationphasewilltakeplaceinJune–October2018.Itincludesthefieldvisitstoarepre-sentativesampleofprojectsanddebriefing/validationworkshops.Duringthefieldworkparticularatten-tionshouldbepaidtohumanrights-basedapproach,andtoensurethatwomen,girls,childrenandeasilymarginalisedgroupswillalsoparticipate(seeUNEGguidelines).Attentionhastobepaidalsototheade-quatelengthofthefieldvisitstoenabletherealparticipationaswellassufficientcollectionofinformationalsofromothersourcesoutsidetheimmediatestakeholders(e.g.statisticsandcomparisonmaterial).Theteamisencouragedtousestatisticalevidencewheneverpossible.

Thefieldworkinonecountryshouldlastatleast2–3weeksbutcanbedoneinparallel.AdequateamountoftimeshouldalsobeallocatedfortheinterviewsconductedwiththestakeholdersinFinland.Thepur-poseofthefieldvisitsistotriangulateandvalidatetheresultsandassessmentsofthedocumentanalysis.ItshouldbenotedthatarepresentativeofEVA-11mayparticipateinsomeofthefieldvisitsasanobserverforlearningpurposes.


Direct quotes from interviewees and stakeholdersmay be used in the reports, but only anonymouslyensuringthattheintervieweecannotbeidentifiedfromthequote.

Theconsultantwillorganiseadebriefing/validationworkshopattheendofeachcountryvisit.Adebrief-ing/validationmeetingoftheinitialfindings(notyetconclusionsorrecommendations)willbearrangedinHelsinkiinNovember.Analternativemeetingcouldbeaworkshoponinitialfindings,conclusionsandrecommendationswhenthedraftEvaluationreportisavailable.Thepurposeoftheseminaristoshareinitialfindingsandalsovalidatethem.

Afterthefieldvisitsandworkshops,itislikelythatfurtherinterviewsanddocumentstudyinFinlandwillstillbeneededtocomplementtheinformationcollectedduringtheearlierphases.

TheEvaluation team is responsible for identifying relevant stakeholders tobe interviewedandorgan-izingthe interviews.TheMFAandembassieswillnotorganize these interviewsormeetingsonbehalfoftheEvaluationteam,butwillassistinidentificationofpeopleandorganizationstobeincludedintheEvaluation.

Deliverables/meetings:Atleastonedebriefing/validationworkshopsupportedbyPowerPointpresenta-tionsonthepreliminaryresultsineachofthecountriesvisitedoninitialfindingsandinadditiondebriefing workshoponinitialfindingsorvalidationworkshoponfindings,conclusionsandrecommendationsinHelsinki

Participants in the country workshops:TheteammembersoftheConsultantparticipatinginthecoun-tryvisit(responsible for invitingandchairingthesession)andtherelevantstakeholders/beneficiaries,includingfromtheEmbassyofFinlandandrelevantrepresentativesofthelocalgovernment.

Participants in the MFA workshops:EVA-11, referencegroup,other relevant staff/stakeholders, theTeam

Leader(responsibleforchairingthesession),teammembersandtheEMSCoordinator

E. REPORTING AND DISSEMINATION PHASE

ThereportinganddisseminationphasewilltakeplaceinNovember2018–February2019andproducetheFinalreport.Disseminationoftheresultsisorganizedduringthisphase.

Thereportshouldbekeptclear,conciseandconsistent.ThereportmustfollowwritinginstructionsandtemplateprovidedbyEVA-11and itshouldcontain interalia theEvaluationfindings,conclusionsand recommendations.Thelogicbetweenthoseshouldbeclearandbasedonevidence.

Thefinaldraftreportwillbesentforaroundofcommentsbythepartiesconcerned.Thepurposeofthecommentsisonlytocorrectanymisunderstandingsorfactualerrors.Thetimeneededforcommentingis3weeks.

The final draft report must include abstract and summaries (including the table on main findings, conclusionsandrecommendations).Itmustbeofhighandpublishablequality.Itmustbeensuredthatthetranslationsusecommonlyusedtermsindevelopmentcooperation.Theconsultantisresponsiblefortheediting,proof-readingandqualitycontrolofthecontentandlanguage.

Thereportwillbefinalisedbasedoncommentsreceivedandmustbereadybymid-January2019.Thefinalreportmustincludeabstractandsummaries(includingthetableonmainfindings,conclusionsandrecommendations)inFinnish,SwedishandEnglish.TheFinnishspeakingseniorevaluatorwillberespon-sibleforFinnishtranslationsofgoodquality.ThefinalreportwillbedeliveredinWord-format(MicrosoftWord2010)withallthetablesandpicturesalsoseparatelyintheiroriginalformats.

Aspartofreportingprocess,theConsultantwillsubmitamethodologicalnoteexplaininghowthequalitycontrolhasbeenaddressedduringtheEvaluation.


Inaddition,theMFArequiresaccesstotheEvaluationteam’sinterimevidencedocuments,e.g.completedmatrices,althoughit isnotexpectedthattheseshouldbeofpublishablequality.TheMFAtreatsthesedocumentsasconfidentialifneeded.

Deliverables:Final report (draftfinal reportandfinal report)andmethodologicalnoteby thequalityassuranceexpert.

AmanagementmeetingonthefinalresultswillbeorganizedinHelsinkitentativelyinFebruary2019andtheTeamLeaderandtheEMSCoordinatormustbepresentinperson.

Apublicpresentationontheresultswillbeorganizedonthesamevisitasthefinalmanagementmeeting.ItisexpectedthatatleasttheTeamleaderispresent.Itwillbeagreedlaterwhichotherteammemberswillparticipate.

ApublicWebinarwill be organizedbyEVA-11. Team leader andother teammemberswill give short presentationof thefindings inapublicWebinar.Presentationcanbedelivered fromdistance.Onlya sufficientinternetconnectionisrequired.

TheMFAwillprepareamanagementresponsetotherecommendations.

9. EXPERTISE REQUIRED

TherewillbeoneManagementTeam,responsibleforoverallcoordinationoftheEvaluation.TheEVA-11EvaluationManager,TeamLeaderandtheEMScoordinatorwillformtheManagementTeam.TheTeamLeaderandEMSCoordinatorwillrepresenttheteaminmajorcoordinationmeetingsandmajoreventspresentingtheEvaluationresults.

OneTeamLeaderlevelexpertwillbeidentifiedastheTeamLeaderofthewholeEvaluation.TheTeamLeaderwill leadtheworkandwillbeultimatelyresponsible for thedeliverables.TheEvaluationteamwillworkundertheleadershipoftheTeamLeaderwhocarriesthefinalresponsibilityofcompletingtheEvaluation.

TheminimumcriteriaoftheteammembersisdefinedintheEMSConsultant’stenderwhichisannexedtotheEMSContract.TherequiredexpertiseandcategoryoftheEvaluationteamwillbeasfollows:

Seniorevaluator1-n.withthefollowingspecializations:Evaluator1-n.withthefollowingspecializations:

The team should consist of limited number of experts covering the a balanced coverage os followingknowledge/expertiseareas:

- Strongthematicexpertiseinrefugeeissuesandhumanitarianpolicies

- Thematicexpertiseinhumanitarian-developmentnexus

- ThematicexpertiseinPCD/PCSD

- Evaluationofhumanitarianassistance

- Evaluationinfragilecontext

- GenderexpertiseandgenderEvaluationexpertise

- Evaluationofmultilateralorganizations

- Evaluationofbilateralcooperation

- Participatorymethods

- Interviewingexpertise


Fieldcasestudycountries/regionswillbeselectedaccordingtocertaincriteria inthebeginningof theEvaluation.TheEMSCoordinatorwillproposeevaluatorsfromtheselectedcasestudycountriestoincludethemintotheEvaluationteam,becauseitisimportanttohavewithintheteampeopleunderstandingwellthe localcultureandsociety.Theskillsandexperienceof theproposedexpertshave tocorrespondorexceedheminimumrequirementsoftheEvaluationteammembers.TheEVA-11willapprovetheexperts.

Thecompetenciesoftheteammembersshallbecomplementary.AllteammembersshallhavefluencyinEnglishandatleastoneseniorevaluatormusthavefluencyinFinnish,becausepartofthedocumentationisavailableonlyinFinnish.MFAdocumentmaterialclassifiedasrestricteduse(classifiedasIVlevelsintheMFA,orconfidentialinotherorganizations)cannotbesaved,processedortransmittedbyanycloudservicesorunsecuredemailsandgoogletranslatorsorotheranyotherwebbasedtranslatorscannotbeusedtotranslatethesedocuments.

TheTeamLeaderandtheteamhavetobeavailableuntilthereportshavebeenapprovedbytheEVA-11,evenwhenthetimetableschange.

QualityassuranceoftheConsultant

TheTeamLeaderandtheEMSCoordinator,withsupportfromtheRepresentativeoftheEvaluationMan-ager,playakeyrole inmakingsure that the internalQualityAssurancesystem isadequatelyapplied,especiallyforeachdeliverablepreparedbytheteam.Ifrequired,correctivemeasureswillbeinitiatedbytheEMSCoordinatoratanearliestpossiblestagetoavoidtheaccumulationofqualitydeficienciesthatmaybehardtoremedyatalaterstage.Asastandardmeasure,theEMSCoordinatorwillcarryoutthefirstQAtoallEvaluationdeliverables.

TocomplementtheinternalQA,andExternalQualityAssuranceExpert(EQAE)willberecruited.TheEQAEwillcarryoutanindependentreviewofthedeliverables.Ifdeemedfeasible,theEQAEcouldbeengaged in theEvaluationprocess early-on rather thanonly commenting completeddocuments.ThisapproachensuresthattheEvaluationisabletobenefitfromhisexpertiseandguidancegiventhecomplexnatureof theassignment.He isalso inchargeof the formalqualityassuranceof theEvaluationdeliv-erables,andsubmitcommentsinawrittenformbyusingapeerreviewtemplate(EVA-11).EQAEwillbe presentedaspartoftheEvaluationteamfortheapprovalbytheEVA-11.

10. BUDGET

TheEvaluationwillnotcostmorethanEuros(VATexcluded).

11. MANDATE


TheEvaluationteamisentitledandexpectedtodiscussmattersrelevanttothisEvaluationwithperti-nentpersonsandorganizations.However,itisnotauthorizedtomakeanycommitmentsonbehalfoftheGovernmentofFinlandortheMinistry.TheEvaluationteamdoesnotrepresenttheMinistryforForeignAffairsofFinlandinanycapacity.

AllintellectualpropertyrightstotheresultoftheServicereferredtointheContractwillbeexclusiveprop-ertyoftheMinistry,includingtherighttomakemodificationsandhandovermaterialtoathirdparty.TheMinistrymaypublishtheendresultunderCreativeCommonslicenseinordertopromoteopennessandpublicuseofEvaluationresults.

12. AUTHORISATION

Helsinki,9.3.2018

JyrkiPulkkinen

Director

DevelopmentEvaluationUnit

MinistryforForeignAffairsofFinland


ANNEX 2: EVALUATION MATRIX

EQ1 on Finland’s approach to Forced Displacement and the Humanitarian- Development Nexus in the context of its Development Policies*

EQ1.HowandtowhatextenthastheMFAdevelopedclearapproachestoforceddisplacement(FD) andthehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN)overtheEvaluationperiod?JC1.1 The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established 1.1.1 There is evidence that MFA policies with respect to FD are clearly formulated and well-established

1.1.2 There is evidence that MFA policies with respect to HDN are clearly formulated and well-established

1.1.3 There is evidence of the evolution of MFA policies with respect to FD and HDN from 2012 to 2018 with evidence of a threshold moment in policy formulation occurring in 2015

1.1.4 There is evidence that linkages between FD and HDN are recognised

JC1.2 The manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented.1.2.1 There is evidence that the MFA’s use of FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs are implemented

1.2.2 There is evidence that the MFA’s use of FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Four PPAs are implemented

JC1.3 The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN policies without gaps orweaknesses(e.g.inrelationtoFinland’shumanrightscommitments,crisismanagement,IDPs, climatechange,andvulnerablegroups)1.3.1 There is no evidence of any gaps in coverage, weaknesses or unnecessary complexity in the MFA approaches to FD and to HDN

1.3.2 There is evidence that rights of particularly vulnerable groups of displaced persons (e.g. women, children, and other easily marginalized and/or discriminated persons or groups etc.) are ensured in MFA policies on FD and HDN

*FivePolicyPillars(FivePPs)developmentco-operation,humanitarianaid,crisismanagement,migrationpolicyand humanrightspolicy

FourPolicyPriorityAreas(PPAs)(I.therightsandstatusofwomenandgirlshavestrengthened; II.developingcountries’owneconomieshavegeneratedjobs,livelihoodopportunitiesandwell-being;III.societieshavebecomemoredemocraticandbetter-functioning;IV.foodsecurityand accesstowaterandenergyhaveimproved,andnaturalresourcesareusedsustainably)


EQ 2 on the adequacy of Finland’s approach to FD and HDN

EQ2.TowhatextentandhowhasFinland’sevolvingapproachto/interpretationofFDandHDN beenanadequateresponsetothechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?JC2.1Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning(externalandinternal):TheapproachestoFDandHDNreflectthe‘stateoftheart’/currentunderstanding,praxisandnorms.Therehasbeenalearningprocesswithin the MFA2.1.1 There is evidence that the MFA approaches to FD and HDN reflect the thinking and policies advocated by norm setters (e.g. UNHCR, World Bank, OECD, EU, other UN agencies, etc.) and by relevant independent research and knowledge institutions (e.g. MPI, RSC, …)

2.1.2 There is evidence that the MFA approaches to FD and HDN respect relevant international commitments, conventions and principles (e.g. humanitarian principles) in this area

2.1.3 There is evidence that the MFA has systems in place to encourage external and internal learning and of their regular use

JC2.2 Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of the other actors theMFAseekstoworkwith,thatismultilateralsandbilaterals(e.g.EU/UN,‘guidedactionsinEU,UNHCR’)andCSOs2.2.1 There is evidence that the MFA approaches to FD and HDN mesh well with that of these institutions

2.2.2 There is evidence that the MFA approaches to FD and HDN provide added value relative to the work of these institutions

JC2.3Influence:MFA’spolicyinfluenceonFDandHDNtowardsbilateralandmultilateralpartnershasbeen sustained and effective 2.3.1 There is evidence that policy influencing steps on FD and HDN have been taken over the Evaluation period towards bilateral and multilateral partners (UN, EU and CSOs)

2.3.2 There is evidence that bilateral and multilateral development partners have influenced the MFA’s policy on FD and HDN

2.3.3 There is evidence of effects of MFA policy influencing positions on FD and HDN in bilateral, multilateral and CSO partners’ policies and programmes and in the field

EQ 3 on the approach to Policy Coherence

EQ3.TowhatextentandhowdotheapproachestoFDandHDNrootedintheDPPshelpestablishpolicycoherencebetweenFinnishpolicies?JC3.1 Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively3.1.1 There is evidence of mechanisms to promote policy coherence having been established

3.1.2 There is evidence of a record of these mechanisms being used over time

JC3.2 There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other GovernmentMinistries/Departments(e.g.MoIandPMO,MoD)andtheMFA’spartners(bilateralandmultilateraldevelopmentco-operationpartners(UN,EUandCSOs))3.2.1 There is evidence of policy coherence between the MFA’s FD and HDN policies and those of other Government Ministries/ Departments

3.2.2 There is evidence of policy coherence between the MFA’s FD and HDN policies and those of its bilateral and multilateral development partners (UN, EU and CSOs)

3.2.3 There is field evidence that FD and HDN policies are seen as coherent with the MFA’s development policies

JC3.3 The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN3.3.1 There is evidence that the level of policy coherence achieved is adequate and any remaining areas of incoherence are not having too great a detrimental effect on the implementation of FD and HDN policy

3.3.2 There is evidence that constraints on pushing for further policy coherence with policies of other departments and ministries exists, but this is not a serious problem in terms of its impact on FD and HDN work


ANNEX 3: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

EuropeanCommission.(2007).EUReportonPolicyCoherenceforDevelopment2007. StaffWorkingPaperSEC(2007)1202final,(Chapter2,p.27).



EuropeanCommission.(2015).EU2015ReportonPolicyCoherenceforDevelopment. SWD(2015)159final.

EuropeanCommission.(2016).LivesinDignity:fromAid-dependencetoSelf-reliance,CommunicationfromTheCommissiontoTheEuropeanParliament,TheCouncil,TheEuropeanEconomicAndSocialCommitteeAndTheCommitteeOfTheRegions,Brussels,26.4.2016COM(2016)234final.

EuropeanCommission.(2017).BetterMigrationManagementProgrammeAnnualProgressReport.

EuropeanCommission.(2017).EvaluationoftheEuropeanUnion’sPolicyCoherenceforDevelopmentFrameworkContractCOM2015–Lot1:EvaluationSpecificContractN°2016/376519.

EuropeanCommission.(2017).NewEuropeanConsensusonDevelopment–’Ourworld,ourdignity, ourfuture’.

GovernmentofFinland.(2015).GovernmentActionPlanonAsylumPolicy.8.12.2015.Helsinki:PMO

GovernmentofFinland.(2015).Government’soperationalPlanonImmigrationPolicy.11.9.2015

EuropeanMigrationNetwork.(2014).AnnualReportonMigrationandAsylumPolicy.

MFA.PolicyandInfluencingPlans,memosandresultsreports:ICRC,UNGCR,UNICEF,WFP,2012–2017.

MFA.QualityAssuranceBoardagendas,minutesJune2012-December2013,andJune2016–December2017,andstatementsonprojectproposalswrittenbydeskofficersand/orsectoradvisorsonfundingproposalsforAfghanistan,Syria/MENAandSomalia.

MFA.(2007).DevelopmentPolicyProgramme:TowardsaSustainableandJustWorldCommunity. GovernmentDecision-in-Principle.Helsinki,MFA.

MFA.(2007).FinnishAidtoAfghanistan.EvaluationReport2007:1.Helsinki,MFA.

MFA(2010).HumanRightsandCrisisManagement,AhandbookformembersofCSDPmissions. Helsinki,MFA.

MFA.(2012).Finland’sDevelopmentPolicyProgramme2012.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2012).Finland’sHumanitarianPolicy.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2013).ComplementarityinFinland’sPolicyandDevelopmentCooperation:NGOinstruments.EvaluationReport2013:3.Helsinki

MFA.(2013).HumanRightsActionPlanoftheForeignServiceofFinland2013–2015.Helsinki:MFA.


MFA.(2014).CoherentlyTowardsEqualOpportunities:StateofFinland’sDevelopmentPolicies2014.Helsinki:DevelopmentPolicyCommittee.

MFA.(2014).EvaluationofPeaceandDevelopmentinFinland’sDevelopment:MFA

MFA.(2014).Finland’sDevelopmentPolicyandDevelopmentCooperationinFragileStates-GuidelinesforStrengtheningImplementationofDevelopmentCooperation.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2014).GovernmentofFinlandHumanRightsReport2014.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2014).GovernmentReportontheImpactandCoherenceofDevelopmentPolicy:TowardsaMoreJustWorldFreeofPoverty.VNS5/2014VP.

MFA.(2014).ProtectingandSupportingHumanRightsDefenders.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2015).EvaluationofFinland’sHumanitarianMineAction:MFA

MFA.(2015).GuidanceNoteonHumanRightsBasedApproachinFinland’sDevelopmentCooperation.GuidanceNote2015.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2015).GuidelineConcerningHumanitarianFundingGrantedbytheMinistryforForeignAffairsofFinland.Helsinki:MFA

MFA.(2015).GuidanceNoteonHumanRightsBasedApproachinFinland’sDevelopmentCooperation.GuidanceNote2015.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2015).GuidelineConcerningHumanitarianFundingGrantedbytheMinistryforForeignAffairsofFinland.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA(2015).ResultsBasedManagement(RBM)inFinland’sDevelopmentCooperation,ConceptandGuidingPrinciples.

MFA.(2015).ReviewofEffectivenessofFinland’sDevelopmentCooperation

MFA.(2015).ReviewofFinland’sSecurityCo-operation.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2016).EvaluationofFinland’sDevelopmentCo-operationCountryStrategiesandCountry StrategyModalities.SynthesisReport2016/3.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2016).GovernmentReportonDevelopmentPolicy:OneWorld,CommonFuture–Toward sustainabledevelopment.Helsinki:MFA.

MFA.(2016).Listakansalaisyhteiskuntayksikönmyöntämienvaltionavustuksensaajista22.12.2016.

MFA.(2017).EvaluationoftheProgramme-BasedSupportthroughFinnishCivilSocietyOrganisations2:SynthesisReport.Helsinki:MFA.

MinistryofJustice.(2017).NationalActionPlanonFundamentalandHumanRights2017-2019. Helsinki:MinistryofJustice

MFA.(2018).HumanitaarisenavunjakehitysyhteistyönyhteensovittaminenSuomenkehityspolitii-kassajatoimenpiteetjatkumonvahvistamiseksi.Internalmemoandactionplan.14.8.2018.DocumentHEL7M1526-1.

MFA.(2018).StatisticsofODAextensionsandcommitments,withCRSpurposecodes,implementingorganisationandprojecttitles2012-2018(uptoSeptember2018).

MoI.(2013).GovernmentResolutionontheFutureofMigrationStrategy2020.Helsinki:Ministryof theInterior.Helsinki:MinistryoftheInterior.

MoI.(2018).WorkinFinland–GovernmentMigrationPolicyProgrammetoStrengthenLabour Migration.Helsinki:MinistryoftheInterior.


OECD.(2012).Finland–DACPeerReviewofDevelopmentCo-operation.Paris:OECD-DAC.

OECD.(2017).DevelopmentPolicyToolsAddressingForcedDisplacementthroughDevelopment PlanningandCo-operationGuidanceforDonorPolicyMakersandPractitioners.Paris:OECD-DAC.

OECD.(2017).Finland-DACPeerReviewofDevelopmentCo-operation.Paris:OECD-DAC.

OECD.(2017).RespondingtoRefugeeCrisesinDevelopingCountries:WhatCanWeLearnfrom Evaluations?Paris:OECD-DAC.

PrimeMinister’sOffice.(2017).GovernmentReportontheImplementationofthe2030Agendafor SustainableDevelopment:SustainableDevelopmentinFinland–Long-term,CoherentandInclusiveAction.Helsinki:PrimerMinister’sOffice.


ANNEX 4: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

N.B.Titlesandpositionsreflectthesituationthatprevailedatthetimeoftheinterviewsin2018.

FINLAND

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

MattiAnttonen,PermanentSecretary,MinistryofForeignAffairs

Department for Development Policy

SatuSantala,DirectorGeneral

RiittaOksanen,DeputyDirectorGeneral

AnnaGebremedhin,SeniorAdvisor,DevelopmentPolicyOfficeoftheDirectorGeneral

SatuLassila,formerAdvisorforDevelopmentPolicy,attheUnitforHumanitarianAssistanceandPolicy,PermanentRepresentativeofFinlandforUNagenciesinRome

Unit for General Development Policy, Department for Development Policy

KatjaAhlfors,Head

KatjaKarppinen-Njock,DeskOfficerforinternationaldevelopmentpolicyandpolicycoherence

JohannaRasimus,DeskOfficer,EUDevelopmentpolicy

SuviTurja,DeskOfficer

SuviVirkkunen,SeniorAdvisor,DevelopmentPolicy

Unit for Sectoral Policy, Department for Development Policy

DavidKorpela,SeniorAdviser,DevelopmentPolicy,conflictsanddevelopmentofsocieties

TiinaMarkkinen,Advisor,Developmentpolicy,ruleoflawandhumanrights

OlliRuohomäki,SeniorAdvisor,Conflictanddevelopment

Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Policy, Department for Development Policy

ClausLindroos,Director

RenneKlinge,SeniorAdvisor,GlobalMigration

AnnaKokko,DeskOfficer,RefugeeIssues,UNHCR,UNRWA

NooraRikalainen,DeskOfficer,UNrefugeeorganisations,theMiddleEast,mineaction


Unit for Sustainable Development and Climate Change, Department for Development Policy

KaarinaAiras,DeskOfficer,SustainableDevelopment

MariaForslund,DeskOfficer,UNEnvironmentalPolicy

Unit for Security Policy and Crises Management, Political Department

HeliLehto,DeskOfficer,CommonsecurityanddefencepolicyoftheEU(formerHumanitarianAffairsCouncilloratthePermanentMissioninGeneva)

PekkaMarttila,DeskOfficer,Civiliancrisesmanagement

Unit for Common EU Affairs and Coordination, Department for Europe

PekkaHyvönen,Ambassador,SpecialAdvisoronMigration

Unit for UN and General Global Affairs, Political Department

SirpaMäenpää,Ambassador,SeniorAdvisorforMediation

Eeva-LiisaMyllymäki,DeskOfficer,Specialquestions

Unit for Human Rights Policy, Political Department

MattiKeppo,DeskOfficerforrefugee,asylumandmigrationpolicy

Unit for South Asia, Department for the Americas and Asia

NikoHeimola,DeskOfficerforAfghanistan

ElinaLeväniemi,DeskOfficerforAfghanistan

AnneMeskanen,DeskOfficer,specialassignments(formerAmbassadorinKabul)

SinikkaKoski,formerHeadofCooperationattheEmbassyinKabul

Department for Africa and the Middle East

OliviaPackalén-Peltola,Advisor,Pan-AfricanTeam

Unit for Middle East and North Africa, Department for Africa and Middle East

PerttiAnttinen,SeniorAdviser

RiikkaEela,SeniorAdvisor,Repatriationissues

JussiNummelin,FirstSecretarySyrianTransitionandReconstruction

SuviSipilä,ProgrammeOfficer


Unit for the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa, Department for Africa and Middle East

PirjoVirtanen,TeamLeader,Africapolicy

SaraKarlsson,DeskOfficer,Somalia,Eritrea,Sudan,SouthSudan

Finland’s Permanent Mission in Geneva

SariLehtiranta,DeputyRepresentative(formerDirector,UnitforDevelopmentPolicy)

KimmoLaukkanen,Councillor,HumanitarianAffairs

Finland’s Permanent Mission for OECD

PekkaPuustinen,Ambassador,PermanentRepresentative

SuviTuominen,RepresentativeforOECD-DAC

Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union

KaisaHeikkilä,CODEVandNDICIDelegate

Embassy of Finland in Beirut

AnnaSavolainen,DeputyHeadofMission

Embassy of Finland in Kabul

LottaValtonen,Counsellor,HeadofDevelopmentCooperation

Embassy of Finland in Nairobi

ToniSandell,FirstSecretary,SomaliaTeamLeader

KaritaLaisi,HeadofCooperation,Somalia

Embassy of Finland in Lusaka

MattiVäänänen,Chargéd’Affaires(FormerConsellor,genderandhumanrightsattheEmbassyinKabul)

Development Policy Committee

MarikkiStocchetti,SecretaryGeneral

RilliLappalainen,MemberandSecretaryGeneralofKehysry,FinnishPlatformofNGDOfortheEU

KatjaKandolin,Administrator


Ministry of Defence

Defence Policy Unit

MattiKemppilä,SeniorStaffOfficer

Training Department, Defence Command of Finland

EsaJanatuinen,SpecialPlanner

Ministry of the Interior

Policy Unit, Department of Migration

AnnikkiVanamo-Alho,SeniorCounsellor

EeroKoskenniemi,SeniorCounsellor

Crisis Management Centre

KirsiHenriksson,Director

FinnChurchAid

JouniHemberg,ExecutiveDirector

MikaJokiranta,CountryDirector,KenyaandSomalia

SaraLinnoinen,FocalPointforNetworkofReligiousandTraditionalPeacemakers,SectionPeaceandReconciliation

AlexandreAvramenko,RegionalDevelopmentManager,MiddleEastRegionalOffice

JehanZaben,JordanProgrammeManager

Finnish Red Cross

KristiinaKumpula,SecretaryGeneral

Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission

RolfStefansson,ExecutiveDirector

TeroNorjanen,DirectorofDevelopmentCooperation

KristiinaRintakoski,Director,PeacebuildingandAdvocacy

Somalia Network

AnnaDiallo,ExecutiveDirector

AbdulkadirAbdi,Chair


European Union

Council of the European Union

Yves-MarieLeonet,SecretarytoCODEV,CouncilSecretariat

European Commission, Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development

EnricoMollica,Coordinator,EUTrustFundforAfrica.InternationalAid/CooperationOfficer– Programming,monitoring,reporting,DirD—EU-AUrelations,WestandEastAfrica,1.WesternAfrica

IgnacioBurrull,TeamLeader,DeputyEUTrustFundManagerfortheHornofAfricaWindow,DirD—EU-AUrelations,WestandEastAfrica,2.EasternAfrica,HornofAfrica

FionaRamsey,TeamLeader–WorkingBetterTogether.DirA—InternationalCooperationand DevelopmentPolicy2.DevelopmentFinancingEffectiveness,RelationswithMemberStates

SantoshPersaud,FormerInternationalAidandCooperationOfficer,DirB—PeopleandPeace3. MigrationandEmployment

European Commission, Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations (ECHO)

AliceSoukupova,ProgrammeOfficer,DirB—Europe,EasternNeighbourhoodandMiddleEast1. PolicyDevelopmentandRegionalStrategyI

European External Action Service

Marie-LaureDeBergh,DeputyHeadofDivision,ServiceofDeputySecretaryGeneralforeconomicandglobalissuesGLOBAL—Humanrights,globalandmultilateralissues5.Developmentcooperationcoordination

European Union Delegation to the Federal Republic of Somalia in Nairobi

AndersG.Djurfeldt,ProgrammeManager,MigrationandDurableSolutions,EuropeanEmergencyFundforAfrica,windowHornofAfrica

BELGIUM

Permanent Representation of Belgium to the European Union

LeenVestraelen,DelegateforDevelopmentCooperation,RepresentativeatCODEVCommittee

DENMARK

Permanent Mission of Denmark to the European Union

JørgenPedersen,Counsellor,CODEV,NDICIandAgenda2013Delegate


Embassy of Denmark in Nairobi

KimSchoultzPetersen,Counsellor,DevelopmentCooperation

LUXEMBOURG

Permanent Representation of Luxembourg to the European Union

FlorenceEnsch,DeputyDirectorofHumanitarianAffairs,DepartmentofHumanitarianAffairs

LATVIA

Permanent Representation of Latvia to the European Union

SintijaRupjā,HeadoftheGeneralandInstitutionalAffairsDivision(formerCODEVand ACPCommitteeRepresentativeatPermanentRepresentationofLatviatotheEU)

NETHERLANDS

Embassy of the Netherlands in Nairobi

MareikeDenissen,RegionalHumanitarianCoordinator

SWEDEN

Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union

HelenaLagerlöf,MinisterCounsellor,ForeignandSecurityPolicyDepartment

KristinaKühnel,Counsellor,SIDAcoordinator

Embassy of Sweden in Nairobi

BilanOsmanJama,Coordinator,humanitarianassistanceandresilience

SWITZERLAND

Embassy of Switzerland in Nairobi

SéverineWeber,DeputyRegionalDirector,SwissCooperationOffice,HornofAfrica


Geneva Call

Ann-KirstinSjöberg,ProgrammeManagerandDesk,CoordinationforNearandMiddleEast,Geneva

KatherineKramer,MEALAdvisor,Geneva

HibaMikhail,ProgrammeCoordinatorforLebanon,Beirut

TANZANIA

Uongozi Institute for African Leadership for Sustainable Development, Dar-es-Salaam

MauriStarckman,ChiefPartnershipAdvisor(formerHeadofCooperation,Somalia,EmbassyofFinlandinNairobi)

IFRC

SylvieChevalley,SeniorOfficer,PartnershipandResourceDepartment,Geneva

FinnjarleRode,Actingdirector,PartnershipandResourceDepartment,Geneva

ICRC

CarolinePutmanCramer,CountryManagerforScandinavia,DonorRelationsandFundraising,Geneva

AngelaCotroneo,IDPAdvisor,ProtectionDivision,Geneva

GwenaëlleFontana,MigrationAdvisor,Geneva

CatherineLuneGrayson-Courtemanche,PolicyAdvisor,IDPsandMigration,Geneva

DanielO’Malley,DeputyHeadofDelegation,SomaliaDelegation,Nairobi

BenjaminWahren,DeputyHeadofDelegation,AfghanistanDelegation,Kabul

OECD

LisaAndersson,DevelopmentCentre,MigrationTeam

RachelScott,HeadofCrisisandFragility,DevelopmentCooperationDirectorate

EbbaDohlman,SeniorAdvisor,Head,PolicyCoherenceforSustainableDevelopmentUnit,DirectorateforPublicGovernance

ErnestoSoriaMorales,SeniorPolicyAnalyst,PolicyCoherenceforSustainableDevelopmentUnit, DirectorateforPublicGovernance

CarinaLindberg,PolicyAnalyst,PolicyCoherenceforSustainableDevelopmentUnit,DirectorateforPublicGovernance


UNITED NATIONS

UNDP

MichaelMoroz,Co-ordinatorUNDPSub-RegionalResponseFacility,Amman

LauraRio,ChiefofSection,LivelihoodandResilienceUnit,Kabul

PaulPartner,TechnicalAdviser,SALAMproject,Kabul

UNHCR

DanielEnders,Director,DivisionofResilienceandSolution,Geneva

EwanMacleod,DeputyDirector,DivisionofResilienceandSolution,Geneva

EllenHansen,SeniorpolicyAdvisoronprotection,Geneva

DariaRuoholammi,AssociatedonorrelationsOfficer,Geneva

PaulStromberg,Head,DonorRelationsandResourceMobilisationService,Geneva

BenFarrell,AssociateDonorRelationsOfficer,Geneva(interviewedtwice)

RyanMarshall,SeniorExternalRelationsOfficer,MENA

KarolinaLinholm-Billing,DeputyRepresentative,Beirut

LisavanHogerlinden,ExternalRelationsUnit,Beirut

AurvasiPatel,DeputyRepresentative,Kabul

UNESCO

PatriciaMcPhilips,CountryRepresentative,Kabul

UNICEF

JessicaChaix,EducationOfficer,Jordan

AdeleKhodr,CountryRepresentative,Kabul

EttieHiggins,DeputyRepresentative,Jordan

SaleneMartiAlvarez,HeadofPartnerships,Jordan

UN Women

Dr.AnaLakatelaHead,ResilienceandEmpowermentUnit,JordanCountryOffice.

NiinaTenhio,Monitoring,ReportingandPartnershipsDevelopmentOfficer,Kabul(formercounsellor,HeadofDevelopmentCooperationattheEmbassyofFinlandinKabul)


UN OCHA

MatijaKovac,SHFManager,DeputyHeadofMission,Mogadishu

IOM

MirkkaHenttonen,Head,LabourMobilityandDevelopmentDivision,NairobiandMogadishu

Common Space International

HannesSiebert,Lebanonproject


ANNEX 5: EVALUATION QUESTION 1 ON EQ1 ON FINLAND’S APPROACH TO FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND THE HUMANITARIAN-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Synthesis of findings and key issues for the EQ

Answer to EQ

EQ1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forceddisplacement (FD)andthehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN)overtheEvaluationperiod?

HowandtowhatextenthastheMFAdevelopedclearapproachestoforceddisplacement(FD)andthehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN)overtheEvaluationperiod?

TheMFAapproaches toFDandHDNhavebeenvery limited,especially in theearlierperiodcoveredbytheevaluation.Thearrivalofrefugeesandmigrantsin2015isidentifiedbyamajorityofKIIsasthemomentofpolicytransitionfromwhichdevelopmentcooperationisincreasinglyframedasaninstrumentofmigrationcontrol,undertheimpetusoftheMoIandinalignmentwithpoliciesattheEUlevel.FromthereonpolicydevelopmentonFDandHDNhasbeenmarkedby thepoliticisingof thedebate thatoversimplified the framingofdevelopmentasmigrationmitigation and a securitisationmeasure and leaves little space to comprehend and promotepoliciesrelatedtothecomplexprocessesbehindpeople’smovement.

Whilst more active, but very uneven, engagement is visible in the recent period of theevaluation,bothinpoliciesandatprogrammaticlevel,especiallyintheMENAregionwherethe‘operationalisation’ofHDNhasbeentestedandreceivedsupport,theMFAhasyettodevelopapproaches to the concepts that are clearly formulatedandwell-established inways that caneffectivelyinformitspolicymakingandprogrammesinacoherentandcomprehensivefashion.

WhilethereisevidenceofgrowingmomentumwithintheMFAtoengageandembedapproachestoHDNespeciallyindepartmentalpoliciesandstructures,thesehavenotyetbeenformulatedandconstruedasaddingvalueandstrengthtoFinland’sfourpolicyprioritiesandthefivepolicypillars.

However, evidenceofFinland’s capacity to support the emerging consensus fordeveloping atriplenexusofhumanitarian-peace-developmentprogrammingcouldprovidetheopportunitytomoveforwardonconceptualisationmovingbeyondthecurrentdichotomyandovercometheinstitutionalbarriersthatconstraintprogresstowardsHDN.


Theevaluationalsorevealsthat,despiteincreasingattentiontoFDandHDN,therearesignificantgapsinMFApolicycoverage.Thegapsandweaknessesidentifiedinpolicydocumentsaswellasatfield levelandconfirmedby interviewswith theMFAandpartnersrelate to thedrivers,patternsandprocessesofFDandconcerninternaldisplacement,HRBAandprotection,urbandisplacement,climatechangeandself-relianceandaccesstolivelihood.

Key findings on the Judgement CriteriaJC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established

WhileFinland’spresenceinbothSomaliaandAfghanisoldandwellestablished,thereisnoevidenceofpolicyengagementwiththeconceptsofFDandHDNintheearlierperiodoftheevaluationasthepres-encewasframedaroundthetraditionalpolicypillarsoftheMFAfocusedoncrisismanagement,notablypeace-building,humanitarianresponseanddevelopmentresponse.Despiteveryhighlevelsanddiversemanifestations of displacement (internal, cross-border and returnmovements) over several decades, Finland’sengagementwiththeconceptsinbothcountriesonlytakesplaceinpost2015Europe’srefugeecrisisperiodandisalsotriggeredbymassivereturnsofAfghansattheregionallevelin2016.

Finland’spresence intheMENAregionismorerecentandmarkedlydifferent,characterised–almostfromtheinception–especiallyafter2014whenthenumberofIDPsandrefugeesexplodedasanFDcri-sis,onewherethebulkofmovementhastakenplaceintheregionbutalsoreachedEuropepromptingapolicyresponseframedaroundmigrationcontrol.Differentfromtheothertwocontexts, intheMENAregionHDNisatthecoreoftheinternationalresponse(3RP)whichFinland.hasstronglysupportedbutparadoxicallyalmostbydefaultnotdesign’.BycontrastintheSomaliaandAfghanistancasesithasgradu-allybeentakenintoconsideration.InallthreecountriesHPDNmighthaveevenmoreresonance,withthesupportofpeaceinitiativeslikeinSomaliaandLebanonandonasmallscaleinSyriaalongsidedevel-opmentalprojects,andtheoverallpeacebuildingaimofmanyprojectsinAfghanistan.Butultimately,becauseFinland’sengagementwiththeconceptsisjustattheinception,itspartners(exceptinMENA)havesofarlittleknowledgeofthelevelandnatureoftheMFA’suptakeofFDandalsoHDNtoalesserextent.

JC 1.2: The manner manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented

InSomaliaandAfghanistandevelopmentcooperationprogrammeshavebeenlong-established,aroundthePPAs,especiallyovertheenhancementoftherightsofwomenandgirls,athemeattheforefrontofFinland’sprioritiesinAfghanistan.Despitetheprevalenceofthephenomenon,FDisnottakenintocon-siderationatpolicylevelwhiletheuseofHDNisincipient,ifatallpresent,alsoduetotheapplicationinbothcountriesofthecomprehensiveapproachthatisbroaderthanHDNandthusalsolink-upwithFin-land’sPPs.TheconceptofHPDNhasmoreresonanceinthetwocountriesgiventheimportanceofpeaceandstatebuildingcomponentsinthetwopolicyprogrammes.

ThegreaterfocusonFDandHDNinthetwocountries–andevenmoreexplicitlyintheMENAregion–howeverhasonlyhadalimitedimpactonthePPsandPPAsgiventhatthedominantattentiontomigra-tionfailstoengagewiththewidercomplexityoftheconceptbutalsofailstousethemasentrypointstopurpuetheobjectivesFinlandsetsitselfintheDPP.Therearetwopossibleexceptions.Oneisaroundtheengagementon livelihoodand jobcreation inAfghanistanwhichhasbeendirectly target towardsdis-placementpopulationsandtheirhost,buttheprojectistoolimited(intermoftimeframe,scaleandgeo-graphicalfocustohaveanysignificantimpact).Butthecontrarydirectionofcausalitymightbetrueand


thedifferentfieldsofactivityinwhichFinlandparticipatesinfivepolicypillarsanddevelopmentcoopera-tionpriorityareasmayaddvaluetohowFDandHDN/HPDNcouldbeoperationalised,atleastinthelongrun.ThesecondcaseisinMENAregionwhereagainFinlandhaspromotedits4PPAsandtoalesserextent thepolicypillars.Butparadoxically thisengagementhas takenplacealmost ‘outwith’ theHDNfocusithasadoptedattheregionalstrategiclevel.

JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN policies without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups)

WhileFinland’sPPAsare translated intoprogrammesandprojectsatfield level in thethreecountriescoveredbythisevaluation,theincreasedattentionoverFDandHDNhasnotyetbeenextensivelytrans-latedintoprogrammes.Therearethusweaknessesandgapsthatarecommontoallthreecasestudies.Whilethereisaclearfocuson‘marginalised and vulnerable groups’invariousprojectsimplementedinthethreecountries,especiallyfocusingonwomenandgirlsandtoalesserextentthedisabled–inalignmentwiththePPAs–thisapproachhasnotbeenextendedtoconsideringthespecificvulnerabilitiestriggeredbydisplacement.Intermsofgaps,amainoneconcernsinternaldisplacement:whilesomedevelopmentprojectactivitieshavebenefittedIDPpopulations,notablyinSomaliaandAfghanistan,theneedsandvul-nerabilityofthesepopulationshavenotbeenacknowledgedandtheyhavenotbeentargetedassuchwiththeexceptionofasmallscaleprojectinAfghanistandedicatedtoaddressinglivelihoodneedsofdifferentdisplacedpopulations,includingIDPsandsmallscaleexploratoryprogrammewithIDPsinSyria.Thenurbandisplacement–despitebeingacharacteristicofthedisplacementinthethreecountriestovaryingdegrees,especiallyprevalentintheMENAregion–islargelyabsentfromFinnishfundingandadvocacy.InMENAtherehasbeensomeengagementwithurbanpopulations,sincethisformsthemajorityofthedisplaced,butagainthisseemsbydefaultratherthanasanexplicitpolicyobjective.Thereisalsolimitedfocusonclimatechangedespitetheimportantcausallinkwithdisplacementasseenthroughhistorical(droughtandfamineinSomaliain2011)andcontemporaryevidence(droughtinAfghanistan)thattheseeventshaveprecipitatedpopulationdisplacement.

Document analysis

Answer to EQ 1

EQ1.HowandtowhatextenthastheMFAdevelopedclearapproachestoforceddisplacement(FD)andthehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN)overtheEvaluationperiod?

Thereislimitedevidence,especiallyintheearlierperiodcoveredbytheevaluationthattheMFAhasdevelopedclearapproachestoFDandHDNbutmoreactiveengagementwiththeconceptisneverthelessvisibleinthemostrecentperiodoftheevaluation.

InrelationtoFD,theexacttermsonlyappearinthelatestpartoftheevaluationandtheuseofrelatedtermsisalsosporadicandconfinedtothespecificpolicyinterestscoveredbydocumentswithnotablya surprising lackof reference toFD indocumentsaddressinghumanrightsandstatefragility.ThegapincoverageofFDissignificantandtheengagementwiththeissueisonlypartialwithmainlyafocusonrefugees[fromthehumanitarianperspective]ormigration[fromthedomesticperspective].Thisbinaryapproachshiftsfurtherafter2015whenlargenumbersofasylumseekersarriveinEuropeandFinlandwithincreasedevidenceinsubsequentyearsofastrongerfocusonmigrationcontrol.This’partialnarrative’failstoaddressthecomplexityof


drivers,manifestationsandimpactsofmovementpatternswiththerelatedriskofanarrowerpolicyspectrumandscopeintermsofdevelopmentandhumanitarianprogrammeundertaken.Yet,inthemostrecentpartoftheevaluation,someattemptstowidenthedebateandpresentabroaderpictureofFDarenoted.

AsforHDN,mostofthedocumentsfailtoengagewiththenexusasatooltojoinandmutuallyreinforcehumanitariananddevelopmentworkexceptwhenanintegratedapproachisadvocated.Thelanguageusedinsomeofthepolicydocumentsinthelaterpartoftheevaluationmoveawayfrom themore classic complementarily [or continuum]approach toHDN toan emphasis onmigrationcontrolthatlinksbetweenmigrationanddevelopment.


Thereislimitedevidence,especiallyintheearlierperiodoftheevaluation,thatFDandHDNareclearlyformulatedorwell-establishedinMFA’sdevelopmentpolicies.

TheactualuseoftheexacttermsislimitedandonlyconcernsthelatestphaseoftheevaluationevenifsomeengagementwiththeconceptofFDisfoundearlierasindicatedbytheuseofrelatedterms.Regard-ingFD,thechoiceoftheterminologyisalsocloselyrelatedtothenatureofthedocumentsconcerned(i.e.terms likerefugeesandIDPsarealmostexclusively found inhumanitariandocumentswhile the termasylum-seekersandmigrantsaremainlyusedindocumentsrelatedtodomesticpolicies).Anumberofpolicydocuments,especiallythosepertainingtohumanrightsandstatefragilityfallshortofmakinganyexplicitlinkwithFDeveniftheyengagewiththeunderlyingfactors.

ThedocumentanalysisshowssomeinconsistenciesinthepolicyformulationofHDNandalackofacom-prehensiveapproachinthewayHDNisimplemented.Furthermore,whileveryfewdocumentsengagedwithHDNinthecontextofFD,inthesecondperiodoftheevaluationmoreconnectionsaremadethroughtherecognitionthatbothdevelopmentandhumanitarianassistancearerequiredtoaddressnotonlytherefugeeandmigrationflowsbutalsotoaddresstherootcausesofmigration.However,inanumberofdocumentsa‘securitisationnarrative’prevails.


Thedocumentsreviewedcontainmultiplereferencestothefourpolicyprioritiesofthe2016DPP,andthefivepolicypillarsbutthesecitationsarenotclearlylinkedtoawellformulatedMFAapproachtoFDandHDN.Althoughframedindifferentvocabulary,morerecentdocuments(fromabout2016onwards)pro-videsomeevidenceofengagementwiththeconcepts.However,overalltheconceptscannotbeconceivedasaddingstrengthtothewaythePPAandPPsareimplemented.


Thereviewofdocumentshasunrevealedanumberofcontradictions,gapsandweaknesses.

One contradiction relates to the fact that whilemost documents are concerned with conflict related displacementoncethefocusshiftstoEuropeandFinlandtheemphasisismainlyonmigrationcontrol.

IntermsofthethematiccoverageofFD,fourmaingapshavebeenidentified.Thefirstnotablegaprelatestointernaldisplacement,absentfromrecentpolicydocumentsdespitetheemphasisplacedontheissue


atthebeginningoftheevaluationperiod.ThesubsequentgapsconcernlackofreferencetoHRBAortoprotection,urbandisplacement,climatechangeandtosomelessextentalsoself-relianceandaccesstolivelihood.

WhileFinnishdevelopmentpoliciesareoftencoveringrightsandneedsofvulnerableandmarginalisedgroups,theymainlyfailtoexplicitlyconsiderdisplacementpeopleasvulnerableandthereforetounder-standandaddressthespecificvulnerabilitylinkedtotheircondition.

Evidence

OverallthereislimitedreferencetoFDinthedocumentsreviewedaspartoftheevaluation.Intheear-lierperiod,hardlyanyofthepolicydocumentsmentiontheactualtermwhichonlystartstoappearfrom2016-2017indocumentslikeintheLives in Dignity (EC 2016a) while The National Action Plan on Funda-mental and Human Rights 2017–2019(MinistryofJustice2017)usesthetermforcedmigrationonce.

Nevertheless,relatedtermsarefoundmorefrequently,especiallyrefugees(themostcommonreference),IDPs(referenceonlyfoundinhumanitariandocuments),asylum-seekers(onlymentionedindocumentsrelatedtodomesticpoliciesaboutthoseseekingasyluminFinland)andmigrants[ormigration](referredtoalmostexclusivelyinrelationtodomesticconcerns).

Whentheyexist,mostreferencestoFD[inthebroadersense]tendtobebriefandarenotalwaysinthecoreofthetext,especiallyintheearlierperiodoftheevaluation.ItisthecasefortheHuman Rights Report 2014(MFA2014a)whichonlyreferstotheConventionRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees(1951),thePro-tocolRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees(1967),andtorelateddomesticlegislationintheannexwithoutanyotherreferencetodisplacementintherestofthereport.

Somedocumentshave identified factors that renderspeoplemorevulnerable todisplacementbut fallshorttomakeanexplicitlinkwithFD.Whilethe2015Review on Finland’s Security Cooperation(MFA2015b)hasalinktocrisismanagement,itfailstodiscussFDwhichisagapasIDPs(andrefugees)arepotentiallyamajorsecurityissueinthecontextofconflictandconflictresolution.Documentspertainingtohumanrightspoliciesarethosewherethelackofreferencetoforceddisplacementisthemoststrik-ing.Thisgapissurprisinggiventhatsomeofthesedocuments,likethe2014 Human Right Report(MFA2014a)domakethelinkbetweencommoncausesofarmedviolenceandinsecurityanditseffects.AlsosurprisingistheomissionofclearreferencetoFDinpolicydocumentsconcernedwithfragilestateslikeinFinland’s Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation(MFA2014b)andtheGuideline Concerning Humanitarian Funding(MFA2015a)giventhatdisplacementisveryoftenacharac-teristicoftheseenvironmentsandcouldthereforebeexpectedtobeakeypolicydimensioninaddressingstatefragility.

The impactatpolicy levelof the increasedarrivalofasylumseekersandmigrants inEuropegenerallyandalsoinFinlandin2015isnotimmediately‘visible’inpolicydocumentswiththeexceptionofFinlandActionPlanonAsylumPolicyadoptedattheendof2015whichidentifyrootcausesofFDandproposesasetofmeasurestodealwiththesituationatdifferentlevel(GovernmentofFinland2015).Governmentactionplanonasylumpolicy.Evidenceofa ‘threshold’moment, i.e. theshift inpolicy ismoreevidentfrom2016and2017;thiscorrespondstothedelayithastakenforthethreshold‘factual’momenttobetranslatedintopolicies.ThisthanmeansthatingeneralmorerecentdocumentstendtoengagewithFDmoresubstantially,notnecessarilyusingthetermpersebutcoveringthedriversbehindrefugeeflowsandmigration.The2016Development Policy Programmehasanadditionalchapteron‘Theeffectsofrefu-geeflowsandincreasedmigrationondevelopmentpolicy’andinthe2018Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan thathasanentirepage related to ‘migration’, there is evidenceof thevocabularyandconceptofFD(differentdrivers,protracteddisplacement...MFA2018,57).Aspartofamostrecentpolicydevelopment,in2018theMFA’sUnitforSectoralPoliciesdevelopedsome‘one-pagersonmigra-tion’toenrichthediscussion(beyondthefocusonmigration),breakdownsomecommonmyths,notably


onthelinkbetweenmigrationanddevelopmentandunifythethinkingonthetopic.Theseone-pagersarecurrentlycoveringthefourPPAsfocusedthemes(‘womenandgirls’rightsandmigration’,‘economicdevelopment,employmentandmigration’and‘democraticandwell-functioningsocietiesandmigration’andfoodsecurity,waterandenergy,andmigration’).Twomoreareexpectedtobewrittenonclimatechangeanddemographicgrowth.Inaddition,theResultBasedManagement(RBM)ActionPlanreleasedinNovember2018bytheMFA’sDevelopmentPolicyUnitalsocontainsinitschapteronhumanitarianassistanceachapterwhichprovidesacomprehensiveoverviewofFD,includingasophisticateddepictionofmigrationpatternsanddrivers.However,notallrecentdocumentscovertheissueandforinstancetheGuidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy(MFA2017d)aresurprisinglytotallysilentinFDandHDN.

Intermsofsubstance,theidentificationofthethresholdmomentcoincideswithastronger[domestic]focusonmigrationandevidencethattheimpact[ofdisplacement]inEuropeandFinlandisacorecon-cern.Thisismostobviousindocumentsthathavemainlya‘domestic’focustostartwithastheymoreeasilyfailtomakethelinkwiththe‘widerpicture’(i.e.thesituationofthemajorityofthedisplacedindevelopingcountrieseitherinrelationtointernaldisplacementorcross-bordermovement).Forinstancethe2017National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rightstakesnoteoftheshiftingoperatingenvi-ronmentincludingregardingforcedmigrationbutitfocusesonthewayFinlandhasbeenaffectedbytheincreasednumberofasylumseekersinthecountry;itdoesnotaddressthecausesofdisplacementandmakesnoreference to refugees inhostor transit countries (MinistryofJustice2017, 18and23).TheNational Action Plan on Women, Peace and SecurityputstheemphasisontheEUrefugeedimensionbutnotinthecontextofthehumanitariancrisisinSyria(MFA2018,10).The2017 DAC Peer Reviewsalsoemphasisesthe linksofthemigrationsituationinEuropetothe interventionsofFinnishdevelopmentpolicyinfragilestates(OECD(2017a).AtthecountrylevelthisapproachwasmaterialisedbythecreationoftheMigrationTaskForcesetupinSeptember2015tocoordinatethemanagementandcontrolthefluxofasylumseekers/refugees,andtorestrictthenumberofpeopleflowingintoFinland.

InrelationtoHDN,likewithFD,theactualtermisrarelyusedassuchanddocumentstendtofocusononeortheothercomponentof thenexusthusnotreallyengagingwiththenexusasatool to joinandmutuallyreinforcehumanitariananddevelopmentwork.Forinstance, inFinland’s Development Policy Programme(MFA2012)whilethereisnodirectreferencetotheHDN,ithasanentirechapteronhumani-tarianassistancewithanexplicitdiscussionofLRRD.Ontheotherhand,theGuidance note on HRBA in Finland’s Development Cooperation(MFA2015),makebroadreferencetodevelopmentandconflictbutwithouttacklingthehumanitarianconsequencesofconflictsandcrises.

Whilesomedocumentsfocusontheneedforcloselinksbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentpolicies,thisdoesnotseemtobearticulatedasclearsupportinFinlandforusingtheHDNasacoreoperationalconcept(evenafteranddespitetheEU’sexplicitsupportforHDNintheLives in Dignity(2016a)com-municationandintheEuropean Council conclusions(2016).TheTowards a More Just World ReportdoesnotdiscussHDNpersebutitdoestalkaboutthedifferencesbetweenhumanitarianassistancedevelop-mentandabout theneed forboth inapost-conflict situation (MFA2014,53). In the2014Guidelines for Strengthening Implementation of Development Cooperation, there is clearlya rigiddistinctionmadebetweenhumanitarianassistanceanddevelopmentco-operation:‘Differences in relation to starting points, approaches and procedures may result in humanitarian assistance and development cooperation following two separate tracks in fragile states’(MFA2014b,25).Moregenerallydocumentsrelatedtohumanitarianpolicyseemtopayattentiontodrawingthelimitsoftheirhumanitarianremitincludingbylistingactivi-tiesthatarenotcoveredbyhumanitarianassistancefunds.The‘silo’approachisnotedasproblematicinrelationtotheHMAportfoliowhichisdescribedasnotfittingclearlybetweenoroutsidethedevel-opmentandhumanitariansectorsandtheHMA Evaluationhighlights the lackofpolicyrelationshiptoeitherdevelopmentorhumanitarianpriorities(MFA2015e).Whilethefirst DAC Peer Reviewsuggeststhat‘theHDNissomehownotyetwellconnected,norwellformulated’(OECD2012,22)thesecondDAC


PeerReviewalsopointouttoweaknesseswithregardstoHDNandsuggeststhatmoreworkisneededtolinkhumanitariananddevelopmentprogramme/co-operation(OECD2017a).Toaddressthisgap,theMFAhasdevelopedapaper(MFA2018b)whichisdirectedveryspecificallytothehumanitariandevelop-mentnexusandajointactionplanto’implementit’.Butonreflexion,itiswhenFinlandadvocatedforanintegratedapproachthatpotentialtensionsbetweenthecomponentsofthenexusaremostlikelytoberesolved:Finland strives to ensure that humanitarian aid, peace mediation, reconstruction and development cooperation are mutually supportive and complementary(MFA2016,27).

InveryfewofthedocumentsreviewedthereisaclearandexplicitlinkmadebetweenFDandHDNwhichcanbepartlyexplainedbythelimitedreferencetoFDingeneralaswellasthelimitedinvocationofHDNinalargepartofthedocumentsreviewed.Nevertheless,theGuideline Concerning Humanitarian Funding engageswiththeissuemainlybyreintegratingthedistinctionbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentaidmentionedabove:‘humanitarian assistance is not generally allocated to the reconstruction of hospitals, schools and housing in regions where returning refugees arrive. Reconstruction must be financed through other instruments’(MFA2015a,8).ItisnotexplainedwhetherthiscomplementaryfunctionneedstobefulfilledbydevelopmentaidwiththeinherentriskofnotincludinghostcommunitiesinrefugeeresponsewhichisakeycomponentoftheHDNappliedinrefugeecontexts.The2016One World, Common Future comesclosertoprovidingevidencewhenitreferstothechannellingofsupportbothintheformofdevel-opmentandhumanitarianassistancetocountriesoforigintoaddressrefugeeandmigrationflow,evenifHDNasanoperationalconceptisnotexplicitlymentioned(MFA2016,23).A2015MFA- UNHCR internal memo on discussion in the annual bilateral consultationgoesabitfurtherinachievingHDNinthecon-textofFD.In thisdocument,UNHCRputs forwardhowpreservingahumanitarianrefugeespacecanbeachievedinbringingindevelopmentcooperationprogrammesforthebenefitsofboththedisplacedandlocal(non-refugee)population,especiallyinborderareaswhereneedsarethegreatest.InthesamedocumenttheMFAhighlights[whatweassumeisFinland’sefforts]tobringalongtheaspectofdevelop-mentintheearlyphasesofcrisis,notonlytopromotetheHDN.A2015annotated agenda of the bilateral consultation with UNHCRhighlightshowallpossibilitiestoactincoordinatedmannersandallocatefinan-cialmeanstoaddresschallengesrelatedtoirregularandforcedmigrationshouldbeexplored,includingstrengtheningsynergiesandthenexusbetweenhumanitarianaidanddevelopmentcooperation.The2017Evaluation of the Finnish Red CrossismostlikelythedocumentthatcontainstheclearestindicatorsofthelinkageandinterplayofFDandHDNandprogrammestransitioningfromonetotheother,highlightingnotablytheobjectivesof‘improving the capacity[ofthedisplaced]to be self-reliant and to participate more actively in decision-making and development activities in the [host]communities’ (MFA2017c,42).Therefugee/IDP-hostinterplayisanimportantmarkerofprogressivethinking.Whilethelanguageinthispublicationseemsmore‘progressive’thanthatfoundinMFAdocuments,thisisanevaluationofaMFApartnernottheMFAitself.

IdentifyingathresholdmomentorsignsofashiftinpolicyinrelationtoHDNismorechallengingthanforFD.HDNasaconceptdatesbacktothe1990syetitisalsoanevolvingoneandsignsofthisevolutionarevisiblefromthedocumentsreview.WhencomparingonpreviousMFApaperonthelinkagesofrelief,rehabilitationanddevelopment(MFA2009)withtherecentone(MFA2018b,thereisanevidentchangeoffocuswiththeearlierdocumentconcernedmorewithreconstructionratherthanwithdevelopment.ButevolutionovertheHDNappearsslowforreasonsrelatedtothestrongwilltopreservethedistinctionbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentcooperation.

Indocumentsthatmakeconnectionswithdevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance,thefocusisonrootcauses.IntwoUNHCR memos(2015and2016)onbilateraldiscussionswithUNHCR,FinlandstressesthatFinland’sdevelopmentpolicyincludesaddressingrootcausesofmigrationatthesametimeas(sup-porting)humanitarianoperations.Likewise,the2016One World, Common Futureinitsreferencetorefu-geeflowsandmigrationtalksaboutchannellingsupporttocountriesoforigin,bothintheformofdevel-opmentcooperationandhumanitarianassistance(MFA2016,23).A2015annotatedagendaonbilateral


consultationwithUNHCRstressesthebenefitsofwellmanagedandsafemigrationandemphasisestheneedtostrengthenthemigrationcapacityofcountriesoforiginandtransit [throughcooperationwiththirdcountries];thefighttowardsirregularmigrationwhichfeedscriminalnetworksandthatisarisktomigrantsandcompromisestherightofsovereignstatestocontrolentry,materializedintheEuropeancontextinthesupportoftheactivitiesofFrontex,EASO,EuropolandEMSAandputforwardamilita-rizedapproach(e.g.emphasisontheEU’sCommonSecurityandDefensePolicytofindsolutionstothe‘on-goingcrisisintheMediterranean’.ThislanguageisshiftingawayfromamoreclassicalhumanitarianapproachtoreflectsomeofFinland’smore‘domesticconcerns’aboutmigrationcontrolandonthelinkbetweenmigrationanddevelopmentwhatwehavereferredtoasthemigration-developmentnexus.IntheEvaluation of the Finnish Refugee CounciltheabsenceofcorrelationbetweenthecountrieswheretheFRCinterveneandthenationalitiesofthemigrantpopulationsseemtoevenbepresentedasaweakness:‘FRC has no presence in or around the ‘hot spots’ where most refugees come from or are hosted: none of the countries where FRC is working are major sources of refugees for Europe in general or Finland in particular’ (MFA2017c,26). Insomedocumentsa ‘securitisationnarrative’dominates.For instance, in the2015Review of Effectiveness of Finland’s Development Cooperationconnectionsarefoundbetweenglobalsecu-rity/crisis/conflict/statefragilityandotherphenomenarelatedtoFDlikehumantraffickingandillegalmigrationwithsomespecificreferencemadetosituationsinAfghanistan,Somalia,LibyaandSyria(MFA2015c,35).Equally, thePrime Minister’s Office Government Reportmentionsa linkbetweencrisisandfragileStatesandnegativephenomenaassociatedwithmigration,includinghumantraffickingandsmug-gling,irregularmigration,andexploitationofpeopleinavulnerableposition(PMO2017,37).

ThedocumentanalysishasalsorevealedseveralsignificantgapsinthecoverageofFDandHDN.

IntermsofthethematiccoverageofFD,whatemergesisthatdespitetheincreasingattentiontoFD[andmigrationespecially]overtime,thegapslistedbelowhaveremainedthroughouttheentireperiodoftheevaluation[andevenaccentuatedinrelationtoprotectionandinternaldisplacement].

• Thefirstnotablegaprelatestointernaldisplacement.Whileinternalforceddisplacementisoftenacharacteristicofmanyfragilestates,particularlythoseinwhichtheMFAhasinvolvement,especiallyAfghanistanandSomalia,IDPsdonotfeatureasanissueanywherein2014Guidelines on Policy and Development Cooperation in Fragile States(MFA2014b).ItisworthaddingthattheGuidelinesaresilentaswellonrefugees,alsoaproductofstatefragilitywhilerefugeereturnshavesubstantialimplicationsforpost-conflictpeacebuilding.InternaldisplacementdoesnotfeatureeitherasanissueanywhereinthemorerecentFinland’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.Thislackofreferencetointernaldisplacementshowsalackofcoherencewiththe2012Humanitarian PolicywhichdidputtheemphasisontheincreasednumberofIDPsandtheirspecificplight,includingthefactthat‘economic and legal position of IDPs is often even weaker than that of refugees’(MFA2012a,7).

• AsecondgapisthelackofreferencetoHRBAortoprotectionwhenreferringtoforciblydis-placedpeople.Thisisatoddwiththerights-basedapproachthatunderpinsrefugeelawandinstitutionsaswellaspoliciesonIDPs.ThemainexceptionisagainfoundintheHumanitarian PolicythatputsforwardtheimportanceofimportanceofprotectingciviliansinconflictincludingthosedisplacedandemphasisesontheprotectionmandateofglobalactorssuchastheUNandtheroleofpolicyandnormativeinstruments(MFA2012a,18).ThereisalsoashortreferenceaboutFinland’ssupportinhostandtransitcountries‘thus improving refugee protection and pre-venting human trade and trafficking’andonFinland’sadvocacy[ininternationalorganisationandfora]forthe‘protection of rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants and their just treatment’ inthe2016DevelopmentPolicyProgramme(MFA2016,23–24).


• Athirdgapconcernsurbandisplacement.Thefocusevenindocumentspublishedafter2014remainsalmostexclusivelyonrefugeesincampset-updespitetheshiftinthewiderpolicyarenatowardsurbandisplacement.

• Afourthgapidentifiedisonclimatechangewhichoverallischaracterisedbyalackofsystematiccoverageofitslinktodisplacementinmanyofthedocuments,includingthemorerecentones.Forinstance,the2015Guidance Note on HRBAmentionsthat‘climate change directly affects the enjoyment of many human rights such as right to food, water and health’butomitstomentionthatdisplacementcanbeaconsequenceofthedepravationofsuchrights.Theexceptiontothatisthefrequentreferencetoclimatechangeinthe2016DPPdescribedas‘one of mankind’s greatest challenges’andbothanobstacletodevelopmentandacauseofmigration(MFA2016,5and 23).TheotheristheforecastmadeintheGovernment Action Plan on Asylum Policy that ‘ Migration to Europe will increase in the coming decades significantly from present levels if no successful response if found [notably] to the problems posed by climate change’.

• Afifthgapconcernsthelimitedreferencetoself-relianceandaccesstolivelihoodwhichtendstobeviewedonlyintermsofsupportforreturneesdespitebeingakeycomponentoftheHDNthathasbeengivengreateremphasisinthepolicy[andprogrammaticarena]toaddressprotracteddisplacement.OnepossibleexplanationisthelimitedsupportforlivelihoodprogrammesasillustratedintheGuideline Concerning Humanitarian Funding: ‘development-oriented measures, which aim at greater self-sufficiency and improved livelihood opportunities for refugees can be supported on a case-by-case basis’(MFA2015a,5).

Manyofthedocumentsreviewedplacespecificattentionon‘marginalised and vulnerable groups’.The2015HRBAGuidanceNotenotablymentionstheoverallobjectiveofreducinginequalitiesbetween individuals, groups and societies(MFA2015,21)whilethe2014Human Rights Reportreiteratesthatnon-discrimina-tionis ‘an important objective of the Government’s fundamental and human rights activities’(MFA2014a,10).Notalldocumentsspecifywhothemarginalisedandvulnerablegroupsarebutthosethatdomostoftenputforwardthespecificvulnerabilitiesofnotablywomen(withafocusongenderequalityandthepreventionandeliminationofviolence)andchildrenlikein2014Finland’s Guidelines on Fragile States.The2014Towards a More Just World Free of Poverty Reportstatesthat‘within the sphere of humanitarian actors Finland promotes an increasingly greater consideration of persons with disabilities’(MFA2014,22).Thiscouldbeidentifiedasoneoftheinitialreferencestodisabilitywhichgraduallydevelopedintoaprior-ityareainsubsequentyears.

Whatisimportanttohighlightinthecontextofthisevaluationisthatveryfewofthedocumentsreviewedmakespecificreferencetothevulnerabilityormarginalisationofdisplacedpeople[despitethearrayofliteraturethathasdocumentedthis link].Similarly, inmostof thedocuments,discussionsonwomen,childrenanddisabledisincontextofdevelopmentco-operationbutnotincontextofFDandHDN.Thisissurprisinggiventheglobalpolicyfocus(andrelatedresearch)onthespecificvulnerabilityofthesegroups(e.g.greaterexposure tosexualabuses,childrendisproportionallyoutof schoolandengaging inchildlabour,additionalchallenges forpersonswithdisabilitiesduringflight, indisplacementandreturn...).Oneexceptionisthereferencemadeinthe2015Evaluation of Humanitarian Mine ActiontoSC’sResolution1325whichaddressthesituationofwomenrefugeesandinternallydisplacedwomen(MFA2015d,85).Theotheristhespecificreferencetoyoungasylum-seekersandthesupportenvisagedforyouthcentresandmoregenerallytotheintentiontoaccess‘hardtoreach’populationwhethermen,womenorchildrenmadeintheNational Action Plan on Fundamental Human Rights(MFA,2017).


KIIS – GoF and Partners Combined

Answer to EQ 1


EvaluatingKIIevidence,theMFAhasyettodevelopclearapproachestoFDandHDN.

TraditionallyFD(althoughthetermitselfisstillnotcommonlyusedinFinland)hasessentiallyfallen within the humanitarian sphere with a strong focus on refugees whilemigration wasdealtwithbothasadomesticmatter(mainlyintheMoI)andalsolinkedtodevelopment.KIIsrecognisethatthismodelshiftedinFinland(butalsoattheEUlevel)followingthe‘2015crisis’withstrongeremphasisputonmigrationcontrolmainlyundertheaegisoftheMoI,correlatingdevelopment assistancewith the root causesnarrative andmigrationdeterrence (despite thelackofevidenceforthiscorrelation).Thishasleftlittlespacetounderstandcomplexprocessesbehindpeople’smovement.However,theinclusionofaChapteronrefugeesandmigrationinthe2016DPPprovidesevidenceofthefactthatFDmadeitswayintopolicyandopenedupthewayforMFA’sengagementwiththeconceptincludingbycreatinggreaterlinkedwithitsPPAs.

KIIevidenceindicatesthatthereframingofdevelopmentpolicytoservenationalinterestshasbeenequallyproblematicforengagingwiththeconceptofHDN.WhilstKIIsexpressenthusiasticinterest in the concept, they acknowledge limited progress so far in developing a commonunderstanding between humanitarian and development interests in the MFA and a policyframeworkdespiteconcretestepshavingbeentakenthroughtheproductionofapolicypaperandtheInternalActionPlan.

ButKIIevidencealsoshowsthatbeefingupFinland’scommitmentandexpertisearoundpeacebuildingcouldbethe‘missinglink’toovercomethechallengesaroundthebinaryHandDnexusmodelandalsoidentifyaconvergentobjectiveintacklingtherootcausesofFD.


ThereisverylittleKIIevidence(withintheMFAandwithpartners)thatthemannerinwhichFDandHDNareaddressedinMFA’sdevelopmentco-operationandhumanitarianassistancepoliciesis,asyet,clearlyformulatedandwell-established.However,muchKIIevidenceindicatesthatHDN(butnotFD)isatleasttopical,andthesubjectofinformaldialogue,andthereisadiscernibleinterestinengagingwiththeconceptanddevelopingrelevantpolicy.ThepotentialforHDNtoprovideforamoreobjectiveanalysisofthecomplexityofdevelopmentanddisplacementcontextsandamoreholisticapproachtopolicymak-ingwasathemeraisedbyseveralKIs.ButKIsalsomentionedthatthepeacecomponentcouldaddvalueandsensetothenexusandcouldbeanareaofconvergence.

ThereisKIIevidencethatthe2015‘migrationcrisis’significantlyaffectedtheapproachtopolicydevelop-mentinHDNandFD.TherewasalsoaclearsensefrompartnersthatFinland’spositionregardingmigra-tioninthebroadersensewasalignedtotheapproachofmanyotherEuropeancountries(i.e.orientatedfundingtowardsmigrationcontrol;usedevelopmentasameantodeteronwardsmovementsofmigrants


andtowardsreturnobjectives).ButtheEUalsoengageswiththewiderissueofFDsincethetermemergedasaresultoftheCouncilconclusionsfrom2016.

Evidence

AllKIIs,bothwithinGoFandFinland’sbilateralandmultilateralpartnersconveythefirmimpressionthattheMFAhasnotproactivelyengagedindepthwiththeemergingpolicyareasofFDandthecurrentformulationofHDN.Butwhile,overall,externalKIsindicatethattheyhavenoclearsenseofFinland’sunderstanding/approachtoforceddisplacementandthe‘nexus’,theyacknowledgethatthisimpressionmustbenuancedbythefactthattheconceptshavenotyet‘completelymatured’andthatdifferentactorsmayengageindifferentways.

Ontheotherhand,theMFApaperonthehumanitarian-development‘continuum’(MFA2018b)isclearlyasignificantlandmarkinMFAthinkingonHDN–evidencedinanumberofKIIswhoendorseditsroleinhelpingtodevelopaclearerformulationandtomakeprogressinestablishingtheconceptintheMFA’spolicyapparatus.AccordingtooneKIFinlandacknowledgedtheevolutionfromamodelwheredevelop-mentwassubsequenttohumanitarianaidtoonethatismoreaboutintegration–recognisingthatbothmayberequiredatthesametimeandattheinceptionofacrisisandthathumanitariansupportcannotcoverdevelopmentneeds.However,beyondtheseobjectivesFinlandwillneedtoaddresstensionsandobstaclesonHDNfortheimplementationtheRefugeeCompact.Itwashowevernotedthatthewordcon-tinuumthatisstillbeingusedbothintheHDNpaper(MFA2018b)andtheMFA’sInternalActionPlan(annexofMFA2018b)maynotaccuratelycaptureon-goingthinkingaboutHDN.KIIsagreedthatthereisnotyetafullunderstandingoftheconceptandthatithasnotyetbecomeamainpriorityintheMFA.OneKIwentfurtherbyacknowledgingthatthereisnorealpushtowardsthenexusandbothstreamsremain-ingindependentfromeachotherwitheachsidecommittedtoitscausehighlightingthat‘this is an institu-tional challenge as much as a conceptual issue’.

ThereissubstantialandconsistentKIIevidencethatthe2015’migrationcrisis’shock(otherwisedescribedaswellmanagedinFinlandbyalargemajorityofKIs)andthecutinthedevelopmentbudgetsignificantlyshapedtheapproachtopolicydevelopmentonFDandHDNbypoliticisingthedebateandoversimplifiedtheframingofdevelopmentasamigrationmitigationandasecuritisationmeasure.AttheEUlevel,KIIsreinforcedtheconclusionthat2015marksthedividinglinewhenthenarrativeonmigrationstartedtochangeandtotakeamoreprominentroleinthedebate,notablywiththeintroductionofconditionalityondevelopmentassistancerelatedtomigration.From2017withtheadoptionofanewConsensusandtheEuropeanFundforSustainableDevelopment(EFSD),migrationmadeitevenhigherindevelopmentdebates,rightuptothelevelofheadsofStates.OneKIobservedthatinFinland,thewiderpoliticalandpublicfocusonmigrationandrefugeescontributedtothesensethatthe‘developmentside’oftheMFAhadfelt ‘sidestepped’althoughcommitmenttohumanitarianpolicieshadbeenretained.KIssuggestedtwoconsequences.ItdeniedscopeforunderstandingcomplexprocessessuchasFDbysimplyfocusingonthemigrationimpactsonFinland.AndKIsnotehowthecrisischallengedtheMFAbothtoretainthe‘integrityofdevelopmentpolicy’anditstraditionalsupportforhumanrightsvisavistheconflictingpolicystanceoffollowingtheEUmainstreamofsecuritypolicy.AnotherKIhighlightedthatFinlandisincreas-ingcooperationwithcertaincountries(e.g.SomaliaandIraq)becauseofmigration.

Withmigration the determining factor, international development and humanitarian assistance havebeen‘tolerated’butprogressonlinkingthesetonewpolicyapparatusandconceptssuchasHDNandFDwasnotpossible.Oneexternalpartnerraisedthepointthatpressurehadbeenappliedbydonors,includ-ingFinland,tousedevelopmentco-operationformigrationcontrolobjectivesandhowinsuchanenvi-ronmentitishardfororganisationstomaintainaprincipledapproach.


KIIsalsonotedhowthemigrationemphasisrevealeddifficultiesforMFAandMoItodevelopacommonapproachevenifbridgesweremade,notablythroughthecreationofnewpositionswithintheMFA,suchasaSeniorAdvisoronrepatriationissuesandaSeniorAdviseronMigration.

Thebreakdownof the traditionalNordic consensusondisplacement/migrationanddevelopmentwasnotedasanadditionalconstraintbyoneKIonFinlandbeingabletoarticulateacoherentapproachtoHDNbasedonthelongstandingNordicapproachtoprinciples-baseddevelopmentco-operation.SomeKIsnotedthatchapter5of2016DPP(MFA2016,onrefugeesandmigration)hadbeenaveryimportantentrypointintoengagingthecontextofFDandHDNfollowedupbytheMFApaper(MFA2018b).

At theEU level,Finland ismainlyseenhashavinganuancedapproach, recognising thatmigration isnotacrisis(althoughitreactedinthiswayin2015),norashort-termphenomenon.PartnerKIIslargelyconcur thatFinlandhasalignedwith thesechangesalthough itdoesnotpubliclyadvocate itspositionstrongly.SomewhatdivergentapproachesamongMSarenotablyvisibleinrelationtotheEUEmergencyTrustFundforAfrica(EUTF)withsomestatespushingtouseitasamigrationmanagementtoolwhileothers,includingFinland,tendtoseetheEUTFasawaytoaddresstherootcausesofirregularmigrationandinstability.SomeKIsatEUlevelneverthelessnotedashiftamongFinnishdelegatestowardsamorerestrictiveandpro-migrationmanagementstancethatcoincidedwiththeemergenceofmoreright-wingpoliticiansintheFinnishpoliticalscene.

ObservingthatFDdoesnotexplicitlyappearinthe‘continuum’paper(MFA2018b)anddoesonlysuc-cinctlyinotherrecentMFApolicies/papers,althoughitisdiscussedinothertermsinawiderrangeofpolicies,drawsattentiontothefactthatKIsmuchlessreadilyengagedwiththeconceptofFD.AlthoughtheMFAparticipationintheIFRC’sMigrationTaskForceandintheDAC Temporary Working Group on Refugee and Migration,canbeconstruedassomecommitmenttoawiderconceptualisationofmigration/displacementconceptsandpolicies.Butthisengagementhasbeenmorecircumstantial[thanproactive]andtheirparticipationespeciallyintheOECDTWGwasmorecentredonthein-donorrefugeecoststhantowardstheproductionofapolicyguidanceonFD.AttheEUlevel,KIIsnotedFinland’scontributiontoboththeEUEmergencyTrustFundforAfrica(EUTF)andtheEURegionalTrustFundinResponsetotheSyrianCrisis(the’MadadFund’)asapositivesignasthelattertrustfundisanattempttoaddressforceddisplacementissueswithacommonEUapproach,pullingresourcesfromdifferentsources.

OneKI interestinglyput forwardtheviewthat ‘the Finns tend to interpret FD/refugees as humanitarian issues while migration is seen as a development issue to be addressed mainly thought poverty alleviation’ (therootcauseslink).ThishelpstoexplainwhyFDdidnotappearinpreviousFinnishdevelopmentdocu-mentsoftheMFA.AKIconfirmedhowattheEUlevel,too,FDusedtobeinthehandsofhumanitariancolleaguesandhownow(post2015)FDandirregularmigrationaretackledtogether.

MoregenerallyFinlandisnotperceivedexternallytohavehadastrongimpactonthepolicyformulationprocessonHDNcomparedtocountriessuchasDenmark,theUK,GermanyandSwitzerland,possiblybecauseFinlandisperceivedasstillhavinga‘powerful humanitarian’disposition.TheMFAhas,however,beeninvolvedandcommittedatamoregenerallevelintheframingofHDNintheCRRF,especiallyinUganda,oneofthepilotcountriesandthroughitssupporttoUNDPforthe3RPintheMENAregion.Fin-land’sroleinpromotingprivatesectorengagementindisplacementsituations,andinitssupportforcashtransfershasalsobeenhighlightedinpartnerKIIs.

IntermsofadvancinganunderstandingandengagementwithHDNandFD,GoFKIIsofferedarangeofviews.Acceptingthelimitedprogresstodate,therewasconsiderablevariationexpressedbyGoFKIIsabouthowtoprioritiseandmakeprogressonHDNuptake.KIIsoffereddifferentopinions–asmallnum-berofKIIswantedamorepragmaticapproach,forexampletryingtomainstreamHDNthinkingbytheendof2019,mainlythroughRegionalDepartments.AnotherviewwasthattheaimshouldbetoprepareaWhitepaperin2020whichsuggeststhatHDNmaynotfeatureinarevised2020DPP.Thatastrategyis


not,forexample,inthe3+1DirectorGeneral’sstrategicplanfortheDepartmentwasnotedasalimitationalthough‘it is getting there’.

On the otherhand, despite the lack of formalMFAdocumentaryprogress and evidence, severalKIIsobservedthatmanyinformaldiscussionsbetweenMFAstaffonthesubjecttookplaceandthiswashelp-ingtoembedacommonunderstanding.WhilsttherewaslessKIengagementwithFD,conversely,asmallnumberofKIIsrevealedstrongsupportorpositiveinterestforengagementwithHDN.Tothisendasmallgovernmentwithfewhierarchieswasperceivedtobeanasset inenablingprogress.SeveralKIIsmen-tionedtheimportanceof‘personal’linksinthiscontextinenablingprogress.

EquallysomeKIIsrecognisedtherewasalsotheperceptionthatstrongdevelopmentandhumanitarianidentitiesneedtobeovercometoreachacommonunderstandingforpolicydevelopmentandbreakingoutof‘silos’whichwerereinforced,tothedetrimentofengagingwithHDNandFD,bydifferentprogrammingandbudgetingprocessesforhumanitarianassistanceanddevelopmentco-operation–giventherelativelyhighdegreeoffundingflexibilityonthehumanitarianside–andbyverydifferentmethodsofengagementwithgovernments andpartners.Needs- and rights-basedprinciples and impartiality, theKIIsnoted,drivehumanitarianinterventionswhereasdevelopmentisamuchmorepoliticalprocess.SomeKIsalsorecognisedthatachievinglongtermdevelopmentgoalswithoutcompromisinghumanrightsprincipleswasamajorchallengeinthecontextofHDNespeciallywheretheMFAisincreasinglyengagedinfragilestatesandsituationsofFD.Thesedifferencesneedtobereconciled.

Inshort,asoneKIobserved, ‘space is needed for a common understanding of the concepts to develop and be embedded’andthiswasnotedtobe‘the challenge for senior managers’.TheMFA’sDevelopmentPolicyreformprocess,notedbyoneKI,providesapotentiallyimportantvehicleforpromotingtheuptakeofHDNandFD.Inthisrespect,anotherKInotedthatengagingwithHDNandFDwouldneed‘significant buy-in at higher political levels’.AndbeyondtheMFA,anotherKInotedthatafullydevelopedHDNstrat-egy,whichimplicitlyrequireslongtermprogrammingandcommitment,couldfurtherisolateMFAandMoIfromeachothersincetheMoIopposelong-standingcountryprogrammesandfavourgivingprioritytocountriesoforiginandtransitofmigrantscomingtoFinland.

ButotherKIIshighlightedhowinmanyinstancesFinlandissupportingthreeprogrammaticareassimul-taneouslyandhowpeacebuildingalongsidecontinuinghumanitarianassistancewhilepursuingdevelop-mentgoalscouldstrengthenthenexus.Thiswouldstillinvolveaddressingconstraintsandlackofflexibil-itytorespondtoevolvingrealitiesandneeds.


GiventhelimiteduptakeofHDandFDnotedinJC1itishardlysurprisingthatthereisvirtuallynoKIIevidencethatMFA’suseofFDandHDNaddsvaluetoandstrengthensthewaytheFivePPsandPPAsareimplemented.Yet,from2016onwards,FDissuesaregraduallytakingamoreprominentplaceinFinn-ishmigration,developmentandhumanitarianpolicies.ThereissomescepticisismovertheMFA’spolicyapparatusfordevelopmentco-operationandhumanitarianassistance,andcritisimsoverthereluctanceoftheMFAtoengageinrethinkingitspoliciesinwaysthatreflectthedebatesonmigration.OntheotherhandothersKIs,includingsomeofFinland’spartnerswerecriticalof‘aid tied to politics’arguingthatthefocusonmigration(includingthroughtheprioritisationofreturnpolicies)affectsandlimitsthescopeofsomeofFinland’sotherPPs,widerdevelopment,humanitarianandhumanrightspolicies.

Evidence

AlthoughthereissomelimiteddocumentaryevidencethatFDandHDNaddvaluetoandstrengthentheimplementationofthePPAsandthepolicypillars,KIIevidenceisverymuted.OneKInotesthatalthoughtheMFAhasbeen involved in theGrandBargainand is seeking tobringHandD together, ithasno


specificpoliciesorstrategiesthatit isspecificallyactivatingorpushing.Thissuggestsat leastalackofawarenessacrosstheMFAofsomeoftheinitiativessuchasthe‘one-pagers’andthe‘continuum’paper(MFA2018b)andInternalActionPlan.

ButthereismaybemoreevidencethatFinland’sprioritiesprovideusefulelementstoaddressFD.Asmen-tionedbyoneKI,theworkonpeacebuilding,securityrelatedissues,increasingeconomicopportunities,includingthroughtheengagementoftheprivatesectorcontributetoaddressingrootcauses.Atthesametime,thereisarealisationthattheseissuesarebestalsotackledfromthe‘grassroots’;hencetheimpor-tanceofengagementwithcivilsocietyespeciallyaroundpeacebuilding.

Trenchant criticism fromMoImainly of currentMFAdevelopment policies as outdated geographicalfocusincountrieswhereFinlandhasnoinherentinterest(i.e.theyarenotCoOofrefugees)andofpoli-ciesfocusedonpovertyreductionthatdonotinfactcreatedevelopmentortackletherootcauses.ViewalsoexpressedthatECpoliciescouldforcegreaterrealismforFinland’sdevelopmentpolicies.Thiscon-tributionisaoneoffbutessentiallychallengessomeofthepremisesoftheDPP2016andthefivepillars.InsteadoneKIpromotestheDinHDNasafocusontacklingrootcausesincountrieswhichareCoO(andtransitcountries)forFinlandorwhereFinlandhasacommercialinterest.

InbothEuropeanandinternationalfora,Finlandisseenasastrongandconsistentadvocateforhumanrights,humanitarianprinciples, gender equality andwomen’s empowerment, sexual and reproductivehealthandrights(SRHR)anddisability.IntheEUlevel,aspartoftheNordicgroup,Finlandisalsoper-ceivedasvocalon issuesrelatedtostimulating localeconomies indevelopingcountries,creating jobs,promotingdemocracy,governanceandtheruleoflaw,aswellassupportingactionsfosteringfoodsecuri-ty.WhiletheseissuestendtobeapproachedmorebroadlywithnospecificlinkmadetoFD,FinlandhasinsomeinstancesalsopushedtheirPPAsinrelationtomigrationanddisplacementissues(e.g.FinlandhassuccessfulobtainedthattheEUTFreportingmechanismincludesapropergenderreportingperspective).


ThelimitedKIIevidenceforclearlyformulatedandwell-establishedFDandHDNpoliciesmeansthat,bydefault(i.e.norraisedbyKIs)therearegapsbuttherearealsopolicyareaswhereevidencefromKIIsindicatethatthedevelopmentpoliciescontain‘useful’elements.

Significantgapspertaintoclimatechange,urbandisplacementandIDPs.Conversely,humanrights,crisismanagement,andvulnerablegroups(notablywomenandgirls’policies),werefrequentlymentionedbyKIsalthoughnotnecessarilyinthecontextofHDN–andnotinthecontextofFD.

Evidence

ThelimitedKIIevidenceforclearlyformulatedandwell-establishedFDandHDNpoliciesmeansthat,bydefaulttherearegaps.AlthoughsomeKIsnoteditasagap,onlyoneKIexplicitlymentionedclimatechangepointingtothelimitedevidenceandvisibilityforclimatechange(e.g. impactonfoodsecurity/drought)asapotentialdriverofdisplacementinpresentpolicyformulation.Likewise,thelackofdiscus-sionbyKIsoninternaldisplacementwasalsonoticeable.Finland’spartnersnotedsimilargapsonIDPs(whereFinlandhas ‘not been a visible donor’inrelevantmeetingsas ‘it is not on their radar’despitetheimportanceofinternaldisplacementinFinland’spartnercountriessuchasAfghanistan,andalsoSoma-lia).ThegapinIDPpolicyinthiscontextcomparestotheproactiveengagementofotherNordiccountries,notedbypartnerKIIs,whoareseenas‘championstates’ontheissue.Thereisalsoagaponurbandis-placementpolicy,notedbyoneKI,however,as‘a gap for every donor’.

Bycontrast,humanrights, crisismanagement,andvulnerablegroups (notablywomenandgirls’poli-cies),werefrequentlymentionedbyKIIsinthecontextofbutnotnecessarilyalignedwithHDNthinking,


butnotatallinthecontextofFD.Inthesamevein,DefenceCommandtrainingforcrisismanagementincludestrainingofmilitaryonUNSC1325,pluspeaceandsecurityandhumanrightsforwomenandothervulnerablegroups.Nevertheless,GoFKIIsacceptedthatbecauseofthelimitedtractionsofarforHDN,thesepolicypillarsremainaslong-standingconstituentsofFinland’sdevelopmentandhumanitar-ianpoliciesratherthanarticulatedintotheHDNframework.

Althoughnotconceivedinthiscontextatpresent,KIIsrecognisethatHDNcouldpotentiallybecomeanimportantvehicletodevelopandembracetheselongstandingpolicypriorities(PPAs)andpolicypillars.Forexample,oneKIsuggestedthattheHDNcouldhelptore-establishtheprominenceofhumanrightsatthecoreofFinland’sdevelopmentcooperationprogrammingwhichhadbeencapturedbyanagendatosecuritisemigration.

The roleof theprivate sector inHDN,highlighted in theGlobalCompactonRefugees (GCR),andbytheWorldBankina2018Evaluation,forexample,wasonlymentionedbyoneKIwhosawitaskeytoenhance the economicdynamic ofmajor hosting countries and ensure the success of a development-basedapproachtodisplacement.ThisemergesasagapincurrentMFAthinkingonHND,whichwiththe currentpoliticalprominencegiventotheprivatesectorindevelopmentneedstobeaddressed.

Case studies

Answer to EQ 1


ThethreecasestudiesillustratethetrendobservedinthedocumentsanalysisandconfirmedintheinterviewsthattheMFAhasnotyetdevelopedclearapproachestoFDandHDN,especiallyin the earlierperiod coveredby the evaluation.There ishowever evidenceofmoreproactiveengagementwiththeconceptsinthepost2015period,triggeredbyFinnishandmorewidelyEUpolicyresponsestothesocalled ‘Europeanrefugeecrisis’andtodisplacementpatternsattheregionalleveltoo.Butthisgreaterengagementishowevermarkedbyafocusonmigrationandtheuseofdevelopmentasaninstrumentofmigrationcontrol.

Eachcasestudiespresentcommonalities intheirapproaches[or lackthereof]totheconceptsbutalsosmalldifferencesinthewaythatengagementistakingplacenotablybecauseofalaterengagementasinthecaseoftheMENAregionwithaninitialstrongsupportforHDNorbecauseother frameworkshavebeen established for longerperiods aswith the concept of integratedapproachinAfghanistanandSomalia.

JC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established

WhileFinland’spresenceinbothSomaliaandAfghanisoldandwellestablished,thereisnoevidenceofpolicyengagementwiththeconceptsofFDandHDNintheearlierperiodoftheevaluationasthepres-encewasframedaroundthetraditionalpolicypillarsoftheMFAfocusedoncrisismanagement,notablypeace-building,humanitarianresponseanddevelopmentresponse.Despiteveryhighlevelsanddiversemanifestationsofdisplacement(internal,cross-borderandreturnmovements)overseveraldecades,Fin-land’sengagementwith theconcepts inbothcountriesonly takesplace inpost2015Europe’s refugee crisisperiodandisalsotriggeredbymassivereturnsofAfghansattheregionallevelin2016.


Finland’spresence intheMENAregionismorerecentandmarkedlydifferent,characterised–almostfromtheinception–especiallyafter2014whenthenumberofIDPsandrefugeesexplodedasanFDcrisis, onewherethebulkofmovementhastakenplaceintheregionbutalsoreachedEuropepromptingapolicyresponseframedaroundmigrationcontrol.Differentfromtheothertwocontexts,intheMENAregionHDNisatthecoreoftheinternationalresponse(3RP)whichFinland.hasstronglysupportedbutpara-doxicallyalmostbydefaultnotdesign’.BycontrastintheSomaliaandAfghanistancasesithasgraduallybeentakenintoconsideration.InallthreecountriesHPDNmighthaveevenmoreresonance,withthesupportofpeaceinitiativeslikeinSomaliaandLebanonandonasmallscaleinSyriaalongsidedevel-opmentalprojects,andtheoverallpeacebuildingaimofmanyprojectsinAfghanistan.Butultimately,becauseFinland’sengagementwiththeconceptsisjustattheinception,itspartners(exceptinMENA)havesofarlittleknowledgeofthelevelandnatureoftheMFA’suptakeofFDandalsoHDNtoalesserextent.


InSomaliaandAfghanistandevelopmentcooperationprogrammeshavebeenlong-established,aroundthePPAs,especiallyovertheenhancementoftherightsofwomenandgirls,athemeattheforefrontofFinland’sprioritiesinAfghanistan.Despitetheprevalenceofthephenomenon,FDisnottakenintocon-siderationatpolicylevelwhiletheuseofHDNisincipient,ifatallpresent,alsoduetotheapplicationinbothcountriesofthecomprehensiveapproachthatisbroaderthanHDNandthusalsolink-upwithFin-land’sPPs.TheconceptofHPDNhasmoreresonanceinthetwocountriesgiventheimportanceofpeaceandstatebuildingcomponentsinthetwopolicyprogrammes.

ThegreaterfocusonFDandHDNinthetwocountries–andevenmoreexplicitlyintheMENAregion–howeverhasonlyhadalimitedimpactonthePPsandPPAsgiventhatthedominantattentiontomigra-tionfailstoengagewiththewidercomplexityoftheconceptbutalsofailstousethemasentrypointstopursuetheobjectivesFinlandsetsitselfintheDPP.Therearetwopossibleexceptions.Oneisaroundtheengagementon livelihoodand jobcreation inAfghanistanwhichhasbeendirectly target towardsdis-placementpopulationsandtheirhost,buttheprojectistoolimited(intermoftimeframe,scaleandgeo-graphicalfocustohaveanysignificantimpact).ButthecontrarydirectionofcausalitymightbetrueandthedifferentfieldsofactivityinwhichFinlandparticipatesinfivepolicypillarsanddevelopmentcoopera-tionpriorityareasmayaddvaluetohowFDandHDN/HPDNcouldbeoperationalised,atleastinthelongrun.ThesecondcaseisinMENAregionwhereagainFinlandhaspromotedits4PPAsandtoalesserextent thepolicypillars.Butparadoxically thisengagementhas takenplacealmost ‘outwith’ theHDNfocusithasadoptedattheregionalstrategiclevel.


WhileFinland’sPPAsare translated intoprogrammesandprojectsatfield level in thethreecountriescoveredbythisevaluation,theincreasedattentionoverFDandHDNhasnotyetbeenextensivelytrans-latedintoprogrammes.Therearethusweaknessesandgapsthatarecommontoallthreecasestudies.Whilethereisaclearfocuson‘marginalised and vulnerable groups’invariousprojectsimplementedinthethreecountries,especiallyfocusingonwomenandgirlsandtoalesserextentthedisabled–inalignmentwiththePPAs–thisapproachhasnotbeenextendedtoconsideringthespecificvulnerabilitiestriggeredbydisplacement.Intermsofgaps,amainoneconcernsinternaldisplacement:whilesomedevelopmentprojectactivitieshavebenefittedIDPpopulations,notablyinSomaliaandAfghanistan,theneedsandvul-nerabilityofthesepopulationshavenotbeenacknowledgedandtheyhavenotbeentargetedassuchwiththeexceptionofasmallscaleprojectinAfghanistandedicatedtoaddressinglivelihoodneedsofdifferentdisplacedpopulations,includingIDPsandsmallscaleexploratoryprogrammewithIDPsinSyria.Then


urbandisplacement–despitebeingacharacteristicofthedisplacementinthethreecountriestovaryingdegrees,especiallyprevalentintheMENAregion–islargelyabsentfromFinnishfundingandadvocacy.InMENAtherehasbeensomeengagementwithurbanpopulations,sincethisformsthemajorityofthedisplaced,butagainthisseemsbydefaultratherthanasanexplicitpolicyobjective.Thereisalsolimitedfocusonclimatechangedespitetheimportantcausallinkwithdisplacementasseenthroughhistorical(droughtandfamineinSomaliain2011)andcontemporaryevidence(droughtinAfghanistan)thattheseeventshaveprecipitatedpopulationdisplacement.


ANNEX 6: EVALUATION QUESTION 2 ON ADEQUACY OF FINLAND’S APPROACH TO FD AND HDN


Answer to EQ

EQ2. Towhat extent andhowhasFinland’s evolving approach to/interpretationof FDandHDNbeenanadequateresponsetothechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?

Aggregate response to EQ2

ConcerningtheadequacyandcomplementarityofFinland’sapproachestowardsFDandHDNand policy influence, the evaluation found a relatively homogeneous and conclusive answerto theEvaluationQuestion.Thedocumentary evidence clearly shows thatFinland alignsherdefinitionsandpositionsaccording to current international trendsandadopts concepts frominternational actors. ParticularlyFinland recognises thenorm-setting role of theUN system,andincreasinglyalsooftheEU.Insomecontexts,Nordiccooperationisemphasisedbutlatelywithlessfrequency.TherealsoisacertaindegreeofcomplementaritywithFinland’smultilateralpartners.AtleastinonecaseFinlandhasgivensignificantaddedvaluetoamultilateralpartner,namelythesuccessfulinitiativetointegratetherightsofthedisabledamongrefugeesandIDPsintheoperationsofUNHCR;Finlandwasaprecursorinthetopic.

Finlandalsopaysmuchattentiontofinancialcontributionsinordertositatthetablesoflargerdonors,foundininternaldocumentationasexplicitpurposeoffundingdecisionandinKIIsinpartnerorganisations.

Finlandisperceivedasareliable,non-nonsensepartneranddonorandappreciatedassuch.Yet,Finlandisalsoconsideredalowkey,lowprofilecountrythatdoes‘notspeaktoomuch’butgetsto thepointwhen ithassomething tosay.The interviewedpartnershadaveryslight idea, ifany,aboutwhatwouldbeFinland’sapproach toFDandHDNat theHQ level,and thesameimpressionwaspresentincasestudycountries.Therealsoisacertaindegreeofcomplementaritywith Finland’smultilateral partners through non-earmarked funding support and significantvalue added in some cases (disability in refugee/humanitarian situations). In developmentcooperation partner countries Finland aligns its support according to national developmentplans,andCSOcooperationishighlycomplementarywithGoFsupport,particularlyinSomalia.

ButthedocumentaryreviewdidnotrevealanyexplicitemphasisorapproachtoFDwithoneexception (Afghanistan SALAMproject/UNDP-ILO). From the case study countries,MENA/SyriancrisisintheonlycontextwhereseveralprojectswerejustifiedinHDNtermsininternaldocumentation (QAB memos). There is, however, a growing interest by MFA staff to startelaboratingapproachestoFD,asrevealedininterviews.


Summingup,Finland’s approach to and interpretation of FD/HDN is incipient, and thisFDevaluationispartoftheprocess.Twopeacebuildingprojects(MENAandSomalia)implementedby Finnish NGOs suggest that there is a way forward towards the triple nexus betweenhumanitarianassistance,peacebuildinganddevelopment(HPDN).

Document analysis

Answer to EQ 2

EQ2. Towhat extent andhowhasFinland’s evolving approach to/interpretationof FDandHDNbeenanadequateresponsetothechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?

Answer to EQ 2

The documentary evidence clearly shows that Finland aligns her definitions and positionsaccording to current international trends and adopts concepts from international actors.International conventions, international law and the multilateral political and normativeframeworkarepresentedasguidingprinciplesofpolicypapersandinternaldocuments.Policypapers of the administration, evaluations and internal documents, all claim being under theumbrella of and support to international conventions and multilateral initiatives in humanrights, crisismanagement, humanitarian action and development cooperation. Based on therevieweddocuments,Finlandpresents itselfasateamplayer intheinternationalcommunity,andthiscorrespondstothetraditionalFinnishpositionasfirmsupporterofmultilateralismthatcomesfromherdelicategeopoliticalsituationduringtheColdWar.

Butthen,thedocumentaryreviewdidnotrevealanyexplicitemphasisorapproachtoFD,nortothenexusbetweenFDanddevelopment,ortheindicatorsaretangentialatmostorattheendofa longchainof imagination.Finland’sresponsehasnotbeenadequateas therehardlyhasbeenanyresponseatallasconcernsFD,slightlymoreinrelationtoHDN,suchasinthecaseofseveralprojectsforMENAintheQABdatabase.OneprojectfundedbyFinlandinAfghanistanwasjustifiedbyFDterms/terminologyininternaldocumentation.Theverysignificantexceptionistheveryrecentinternalpolicypaperandactionplanoforganisation-wideinternaltraininginHDNthatwillbestartedin2018,althoughthisactionplanismoreconcernedaboutproceduresthancontentsandconcepts.

Key findings on the Judgement CriteriaJC 2.1: Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art’/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA.

ThereiswideandsoliddocumentaryevidencethatFinlandalignsherdefinitionsandpositionsaccordingtothecurrentinternationaltrendsandadoptsconceptsfrominternationalactors.Internationalconven-tions,internationallawandthemultilateralpoliticalandnormativeframeworkarepresentedasguidingprinciplesofallpolicypapers.ParticularlyFinlandrecognisesthenorm-settingroleoftheUNsystem,and


increasinglyalsooftheEU.Ininternaldocumentation,Finlandsupportsandalignswithseveralinitia-tivesofmultilateralorganisations.AfurtherproofofcomplianceisthefactthatFinland’shumanitarianfundsarelargelygivenunearmarked,aswellastheparticipationinseveralmulti-donortrustfundsthatdonotallowearmarking.FinlandrespondstoideasandinitiativesfromtheUNsystemandtheEUandalignsherargumentsaccordinglybutinternalhorizontallearning(fromunittounit,orfromdeskofficertodeskofficer)hasnotyethappenedascanbeobservedfrommostPIPsandfundingproposalspresent-edtotheQABwherethetopicisalmosttotallyabsent,andinitiativesjustifiedmainlyonhumanrightsordevelopmentarguments(exceptseveralprojectsforMENA).Theonlycaseswherethelinkbetweenmigration/refugeesanddevelopmentexplicitlycameupinthedocumentreviewwasintworecentinter-naldocuments,inbothcasesinresponsetotheterminologyandconceptsofUNagencies(QABmemosontheSALAMprojectinAfghanistan,andPIPsforUNHCR).

Theevaluationfunctionisanexpressionofinternallearninganditshouldnotbeoverlookedthatthecur-rentevaluationonFDanddevelopmentpolicy,initsnatureasformativeevaluation,ispartofinternallearning,too.Sinceadecade,FinlandhastriedtoapplyRBMtoitsprojects,whichisachannelofinternallearning.ThemainexceptiontotherelativelackofFDandHDNisanorganisation-wideactionplanforHDNthatwillbestartedin2018(MFA2018bwithannex).

ButthedocumentaryreviewdidnotrevealanyparticularemphasisorapproachtoFDbutyestoaslightlyhigherdegreetoHDN.

JC 2.2: Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions’ in EU, UNHCR) and CSOs

Basedontherevieweddocuments,Finlandpresentsitselfasateamplayerintheinternationalcommu-nity,withfirmcommitmentwiththeUNandtheEU,andinsomecontexts,strongNordiccooperation.ThisisthetraditionalFinnishpositionthatcomesfromherdelicategeopoliticalpositionduringtheColdWar,withstrongemphasisonmultilateralism.Therevieweddocuments,includingpolicypapersoftheadministration,evaluationsandinternaldocuments,allclaimbeingundertheumbrellaofandsupporttointernationalconventionsandmultilateralinitiativesinhumanrights,crisismanagement,humanitarianactionanddevelopmentcooperation,particularlyinciviliancrisismanagementwhereFinlandpuncheswellaboveitsweight.

TheapproachFinlandtakesisderivedfromtheDevelopmentPolicyProgrammes(MFA2012,MFA2016).FinlandgiveshumanitarianaidfundingonlythroughCSOs/NGOsregisteredwithECHO,buttheguide-linesforCSOfundingfrom2017aretotallysilentaboutanyFDorHDN.OneadditionalfactortoincreasecoherenceisthatFinlandgivesmostofitshumanitarianaidasnon-earmarkedfundingtointernationalorganisations,andchannelspartofitsODAthroughmulti-donortrustfundsthatdonotallowearmarking(esp.inAfghanistanandSomalia).Inthisway,itcanbesaidthatFinland’sactioniscomplementaryandalignedwithitsmultilateralandbilateralpartners;it‘meshes’wellwiththem

However,verylittlehasbeenfoundconcerningFDandHDN.Themostexplicitandelaborated(clear-lyformulated)referencestoFD(inthesenseofthenexusbetweenforceddisplacement/migrationanddevelopment)arefoundinrelativelyrecentinternaldocuments:oneprojectfundinginitiative(UNDP-ILOinAfghanistan,SALAM)fromthesecondhalfof2017inthepapersoftheQABforFD,andaninternalactionplanforHDN(MFA2018b),inadditiontothePIPsforUNHCRwhereFinland’spositionincludesthenexusofdevelopmentandFD.InbothcaseswheretheFD-developmentnexusistakenintoaccount,the initiativecomesfrom‘above’, that is fromtheUNsystem,andFinlandrespondstoexisting ideas/propositionsandusestheargumentstoformulateherownposition.Forthegreatmajorityofthedocu-ments,FD-developmentnexusandHDNareindirect,notclearlyformulatedand/orattheendofalongchainofimagination.


JC 2.3: Influence: MFA policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral and multilateral partners has been sustained and effective

ConcerningFinland’s influence towardspartners and added value relative to thework ofmultilateralinstitutions, it isnon-negligible,significantinsomecases.Finlandisconsideredasaloyalteamplayerthatbringsforthissuescompatibleandcomplimentarywithitsmultilateralpartners(thebodyofdocu-mentsrevieweddidnotincludeanypapersrelatingtobilateralpartners).ThetopicsFinlandpromotescomefromDPPswhoseprioritypolicyareascomplementandarenotcontradictorywithanyinternationaldevelopmentgoals.

PerhapsthemostsignificantachievementinthefieldofFinland’saddedvalueistheinclusionoftherightsofpeoplewithdisabilitiesinrefugee/IDPsituationsthatUNHCRhasadoptedattheinitiativeofFinlandastheonlydonorstressingthistopic(laterjoinedbyothers)andfundedapilotprojectwhoselessonswillbeadoptedintheworkingsoftheinstitution.Finlandalsotakesgreatcaretomaintainherfinancialcon-tributionsataleveltositatthetableofdecisionmakersininternationalorganisations;thiscommitmentisconfirmedby internalandsomeexternaldocumentswithrobustevidence.The interviewswillbringmorelightonwhetherFinlandactivelyandeffectivelyusesthispositionwithinthelargerdonors’‘goldentable’group.

Butagain,FDandtoaslightlylesserdegreeHDNareabsentfromtherevieweddocuments.


Answer to EQ 2

To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN beenanadequateresponsetothechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?

Answer to EQ 2

The results of the documentary analysis coincide with the perception multilateral, externalpartnersofFinlandhave,mainlyat theheadquarters’ level.Finlandisperceivedasareliable,non-nonsensepartneranddonorandappreciatedassuch.ParticularlyhumanitarianagenciesappreciatethefactthatFinlandgivesitsfinancialsupportasnon-earmarked(orearmarkedonlyforacertaincountry,notpurpose).Yet,Finlandisalsoconsideredalowkey,lowprofilecountrythatdoes‘notspeaktoomuch’butgetstothepointwhenithassomethingtosay.(Infact,thiscorrespondsperfectlytotheimageFinnshaveofthemselves.)Theinterviewedpartnershadaveryslightidea,ifany,aboutwhatwouldbeFinland’sapproachtoFDandHDN.TheexceptionistheMENAregion(fieldlevel)whereFinlandisperceivedasastrongdonorpromotingHDN.

Internally in Finland, the interviews revealed growing interest and intense personalcommunicationonFDandHDNwithinMFA,althoughatthegovernmentallevel,formanyKIIsForcedDisplacementwasanewterm.



Among internationalhumanitarianagencies,MFA isnotperceived tohaveproactivelyengaged in theemergingpolicyissuesFDandHDNandtheirrollout,whilsttheMFA’sinfluenceisrecognisedinthepro-motionofmoretraditional,well-establishedpoliciesandpolicyprioritiessuchaswomen,girlsandgenderequality.FinlandisperceivedtohavelessimpactandvisibilitythansomeothercountriessuchasDen-mark,theUK,GermanyandSwitzerland.Overall,keyinformantsindicatethattheyhavenoclearsenseofFinland’sunderstanding/approachtoforceddisplacementandthe‘nexus’.Atthesametime,throughFinland’s engagement in promoting cash transfers and the private sector in humanitarian situations,MFAisshowingsomedegreeofhumanitarianinnovation.ForKIsinterviewedinEUinstitutions,Finnsare recognisedby interviewedEUmember states representativesaswell asEUofficialsas strongandconsistentadvocatesofthehumanrights-basedapproach,humanitarianprinciples,genderequalityand women’sempowerment,andsexualreproductivehealthrights,whileFinlandisperceivedtohaveadoptedanuancedapproachtomigrationandforceddisplacement,recognisingthatmigrationisnotacrisis,norashort-termphenomenon.Atthesametime,someKIsinBrusselsreportedhavingperceivedashiftinFinland’spositiontowardsamorerestrictiveandpro-migrationcontrolpositioninrecentyears.Overall,Finlandisseentobeswitchingbetween‘traditional’humanrights-centredpositions(thetraditionalLike-mindedapproach)andmoreanti-migrationpositions(approachingVisegradgroup’spositions),depend-ingonoccasions(andprobablyofthepersonrepresentingFinland).

Thegapsidentifiedbynon-FinnishKIswereurbandisplacementandIDPsingeneralinwhichFinlandismostpassive.MFAinformantsalsopointoutthesmallnumberoffundingandprojectsforcombatingclimatechangeandinfavourofclimateresilience,andthelackofattentiontoclimatechange-inducedFD.

TheinterviewsinFinlandwere,naturally,moredivergingdependingontheposition,institutionandper-sonalopinionsoftheinterviewee.Allagree,however,thatthe2015refugee‘crisis’changedthetermsofthedebate,makingFDanissueinthedevelopmentagenda.Ononehandthereare–insideandoutside–MFAthosewhowouldliketoseedevelopmentcooperationadaptedtothemigrationcontrolandman-agementagenda(andnottheotherwayround);ontheothertherearethosewhoresistthisorevenfeelthreatenedintheirprofessionalintegrity.Thedevelopment-migrationnexushasbeenpoliticisedwiththeresultthatlittlerationaldebateonitispossible(atleastuntiltheelectionsofApril2019);thedebateis‘stuck’indivergenciesbetweenMFAandMoI/Migri.ConcerningHDN,mostintervieweesdidnotraisetheorganisation-wideActionPlanonHDNasanissue.ThemostadvancedinapplyingHDNprinciplesarethelargeFinnishnon-governmentalorganisations.Ingeneral,mostintervieweesadmitthatFDisanewconceptforthemorevenatotallyunknownapproach.

JC 2.2: Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions in EU, UNHCR) and CSOs

ThereisverylittleintheKIinterviewsoncomplementarityofFinland’sFDandHDNpositionswithitspartners,probablybecausethisissuewasnotincludedintheinterviewquestionsformat.However,someinsightscanbededucedfromtheinterviews.Finlandisseenasateamplayerintheinternationalfora,adonorwithnopronouncedhiddenagendaandareliable‘youseewhatyouget’donorbutnotparticu-larlyinnovativeandslowtoadoptnewtrends.Finlandisperceivedassupportiveofpartnerorganisations’thinkingandpolicies.SeenfromBrussels,Finnsareknowledgeable‘strictlybusiness’peoplewhoareabletomediatebetweendifferentpositionsandproposesolutionsthatsatisfyallparties.AllKIIspointouttheeffortofFinlandtopromotethepositionandrightsofwomenandgirlsinallpartnerorganisations.


Therealso isacertaindegreeofcomplementaritywithFinland’smultilateralpartners.At least inonecaseFinlandhasgivensignificantaddedvaluetoamultilateralpartner,namelythesuccessfulinitiativetointegratetherightsofthedisabledamongrefugeesandIDPsintheoperationsofUNHCR;Finlandwasaprecursorinthetopic,andtheprincipleswerelateradoptedbytheWorldHumanitarianSummit(2016).ThisachievementwascommendedatHQlevelininternationalorganisationsandbyMFAstaff.


ConcerningFinland’s influence towardspartners and added value relative to thework ofmultilateralinstitutions, it isnon-negligible,significantinsomecases.Finlandisconsideredasaloyalteamplayerthatbringsforthissuescompatibleandcomplementarywithitspartners.ThetopicsFinlandpromotescomefromDPPswhoseprioritypolicyareascomplementandarenotcontradictorywithanyinternationaldevelopmentgoals.

Allintervieweesinvolvedinhumanitarianaidanddevelopmentcooperation,bothinternallyinHelsinkiandexternallyinHQsofinternational/multilateralorganisationspointedoutFinland’sinfluenceingen-derequality,thepositionandrightsofwomen(andgirls).Thisapplieseventopoliciesthatinappearancedonothavemuchtodowithdevelopmentorhumanitarianaid,suchassomejointEUpolicieswherebehindthesceneFinlandhaskeptthisissueintheairandnegotiateditsinclusioninpoliciesandagree-ments.Thiswasreportedtohavehappenedalso,insomecases,againsttheexpressedwillofsomeotherdonorssittingontheboardofahumanitarianorganisation.

Onsingleissues,themostconsistentlycitedbykeyinformantsisFinland’sproactiverole(joinedbyAus-traliaandlaterattheEUlevelLuxembourg)inpromotingDisabilityandInclusionpolicyinhumanitar-ian/refugeesituations,lateradoptedbytheWHSin2016andmainstreamedintheoperationsofUNHCR.ThishasbeenhighlightedastheonepolicyareainwhichFinlandraiseditsprofiletoa‘championcountry’insteadof its traditional ‘lowkey’actor,providingagoodexampleofhowtheMFAcan,whenthere ispoliticalwill,introduceanewpolicywithrelativelysmallinvestment,combiningadvocacy,keepingthetopic‘intheair’andmakingalliances,andfundingapilotprojectwhoselessonslearnedwereintegratedinthepolicy.

While practically all KIIs found Finland a solid promotor of human rights, especially women’s and children’srights,fewpointedoutanyparticularproactivenessinquestionsrelatedtoFDandHDN.How-ever, inthecasestudies,Finland’ssupport forMENA/SyriancrisisFinlandwasperceivedasanactivedonorinsupportingHDN,whileinAfghanistanandSomaliaFinland’sapproachisonlyimplicit.

ThegapsininfluencereportedbyinterviewsarethesameasinJC2.1.above:IDPsandurbandisplace-mentordisplacementduetoclimatechange-relatedreasonshavenotbeenaddressedbyFinland.

Case studies

Answer to EQ 2

To what extent and how has Finland’s evolving approach to/interpretation of FD and HDN beenanadequateresponsetothechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?

Answer to EQ 2

FinlanddirectlyaddressesFDonlyinonecase,throughaproject implementedbyUNDPandILO inAfghanistan (SALAM). InSomalia,and the restof support toAfghanistan, is targeted


mainlytowomen,girlsandchildrenespecially inthesectorofhealth(reproductive,maternaland childhealth) andgirls’ education (inAfghanistan)under theheadingof (human) rights,and state-building in these two fragile states.All inall,Finland’s response to the situation iscomprehensive,includingcivilianandmilitarycrisismanagement,peacebuildingbyanNGOinSomaliaandanotherinMENA,buttheapproachisnotdirectlyrelatedtodisplacement.Finlandaligns its support with national development plans, but none of the projects/programmesbeyond SALAM operates in terms of HDN. In Afghanistan, however, Finland is involved in(forced)returnsoffailedasylumseekersfromFinland.Syria/MENAisadifferentsituation,andthereFinland isactivelypromotingHDN,and the involvementof theUnit forHumanitarianAssistanceindecision-makingisimportant.

An emerging issue is worth a remark: two Finnish large NGOs (FCA and FELM) carry outpeacebuildingprojectsinMENA(FELM)andSomalia(FCA).Theseinitiativescouldcontributetotheformingofabridgetowardsthethinkingofatriplenexus:humanitarian-peace-developmentnexus.But overall, Finland’s response is not adequatenor sufficient despite somepromisingemerginginitiatives.


Thereseemstoexistsufficientevidencethat,inthetwodevelopmentpartnercountriesoftheevaluation,AfghanistanandSomalia,HDN(andFDalthoughatlesserdegree)areonlynowmakingtheirwayslowlyintoprogrammingwhilenomajorchangesafter2015(orevensince2012)havetakenplaceinthebulkofdevelopmentcooperationinterventionsfundedbyFinland(theonlyexceptionbeingtheSALAM‘employ-mentagainstmigration’projectinAfghanistan).

Ontheotherhand, inSyria/MENAFinland isat the forefrontofpushingforHDNinacontextwherethereisno‘weight’(inertia)ofpreviousdevelopmentprogrammes.Syria/MENAisaspecialcase,differ-entfromthetwoothersthatareofficialdevelopmentcooperationpartnercountries,inthatinSyriathereisanactivecivilwarwheretheSyrianArabRepublicanditsGovernmentareonepart.ThereFinland’scontributionismainlyhumanitarian,andcontrarytowhathappensinAfghanistanandSomalia,Finlandisnotboundtoanynationaldevelopmentplan.Thesefactorscombinedmake,itcanbehypothesised,thatFinlandisastrongpromotorofHDN.

Thisfindingmaysuggestthatthe‘clash’betweentraditionaldevelopmentcooperation(previouslyabsentinMENAbutwithimportantbudgetaryexpensesinAfghanistanandSomalia)andthemorerecentideaofusingdevelopmentcooperationasdeterrentagainstmigrationislessacuteinthecaseoftheSyriancon-flict/MENA,forwhichtheUnitforHumanitarianAssistanceparticipatesinthedraftingofjustificationsofprojectproposals(QABmemos).

Concerning organisational mainstreaming of HDN, Finland’s missions/delegations in the case studycountriesseemtobeunawareoftheHDNactionplanontrainingandmainstreamingofHDNlaunchedintheAutumn2018.WhileinAfghanistantheFDagendaseemstoorientmoretowardsreturns,inSomaliathetopicofdiscussionamongdonors,Finlandincluded,isontheDurableSolutionsInitiativeoftheUN(andIGAD)asthewayforwardinHDNintheHornofAfrica,aninitiativewhereFinlanddoesnotpartici-patethroughanychannel.


InthecaseofSomaliaandMENA,two largeFinnishNGOs(FELM,FCA)work inpeacebuilding.Thisexperience could be further integrated into the thinking on FD, as a bridge towards the triple nexus(humanitarian-peace-developmentnexus).

JC 2.2: Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions in EU, UNHCR) and CSOs

InAfghanistanandSomalia, theFinnishapproach is called ‘comprehensive’, includingcrisismanage-ment (civilianand/ormilitary,humanitarianaidanddevelopment)but it isnotalwaysclear if this isbychoice (resultof consciouschoicewhichmaybemore thecase inAfghanistan thanks to theWhitePapersapprovedbytheParliament)orresultsfromseparate,independentdecisions(MFA,MoD,MFA-EUdepartment,PMO,whichislikelythecaseinSomalia).Inanycase,the‘comprehensiveness’oftheapproachdoesnotexcludeworkinginsilos,oneinstance(e.g.MFAunit)notinforming/coordinatingwiththeothers.

InAfghanistanandSomalia,Finland’sdevelopmentcooperationisalignedandcomplementarywiththerespectivenationaldevelopmentplans.

Concerninginternalcomplementarity,inAfghanistanandSomaliathecrisismanagement(civilianandmilitary)operations inwhichFinlandparticipatesarecomplementaryandcoherentwithdevelopmentcooperationbypursuing the strengtheningof the security situation. InAfghanistan thedebate circlesaroundsecuritywhileinSomaliapeace-buildingplaysasignificantroleinawaythatcouldeasilybedevel-opedtowardsa full-fledgedapproachunder the ‘triplenexus’betweenstabilisation/peace-humanitari-an-development.CSO/NGOsupportwasfoundtobecomplementaryparticularlyinthecaseofSomaliawheretheshareoffundingchannelledthroughCSOsis37%.

Inallthreecasestudycountries,Finland’slargestbudgetarycontributionsarechannelledthroughpooledfunding or multi-partner trust funds (Afghanistan: Law and Order Trust Fund LOFTA, AfghanistanReconstructionTrustFundARTF;Somalia:EUEmergencyFundforAfricaEUTF,Multi-PartnerFundforSomaliaMPF;ormulti-bilaterallythroughUNDP,ILO,IOMetc.),principallyduetosecuritysituationsinthecountries(KabulandMogadishuarenon-familyposts).Whiletheuseofpooledfundingortrustfunds(asinAfghanistanandSomaliaorEUandUNfundingforSyrianrefugeesinTurkeyandLebanon)inawayguaranteescomplementarity(andalignmentandharmonisation),therearetrade-offs:thelackofstaffresourcesreducesthepossibilitiesofoverviewofuseofthosefundsandthevisibilityofFinland.


Lackofstaffandtheconsequentobligationtoprioritisewhattofollow-upseriouslylimitpolicyinfluence.In thecaseofSomaliaandpartially forMENA, this is furtherexacerbatedby thegeographicallycom-plexaidarchitecturewheretheEmbassyisnotlocatedinthecountrywhereactivitiestakeplace.InbothAfghanistanandSomalia,Finland’spolicyinfluenceisperceivedbydonors‘notabsent’butlowprofile,‘lowkey’,‘doitspart’,indicatingrelativelyscantknowledgeaboutwhatFinlanddoes.However,Finlandisnotperceivednon-influentialforitssizeandthesizeofitsfieldpresence.InSomalia,Finlandco-chairs(withSweden)the‘pillarworkinggroup’ofsocialandhumandevelopmentintheMDTF.ParticularlyinAfghanistan,FinlandincreasesitsinfluencebyteamingwiththeNordiccountriesandsomeotherswhohavesimilargoals(Germany)toappearasalargerdonor.Inallthreecases,Finlandisveryactivelypro-motingwomen’sandgirls’rights,inAfghanistaningirls’educationandinreproductivehealth,whichisoneofthemainsectorsfundedbyFinlandinSomalia.However, thefieldstudiesdidnotdiscoverany specialinfluenceofFinlandinFD,withtheexceptionofthepeacebuildingeffortsofFCAinSomalia.


Syria/MENA isa special case,different from the twoothers thatareofficialdevelopment cooperationpartnercountries,andinthatinSyriathereisanactivecivilwarwheretheSyrianArabRepublicanditsGovernmentareonepart.ThereFinland’scontributionismainlyhumanitarian,andtheUnitforHumani-tarianAssistanceparticipates in thedraftingofproject justifications,andcontrary towhathappens inAfghanistanandSomalia,Finlandisnotboundtoanynationaldevelopmentplan.Furthermore,SyriaandtheneighbouringcountriesimpactedbythecrisisarenotFinland’sofficialdevelopmentpartners.Thesefactorscombinedmake,itcanbehypothesised,thatFinlandisastrongpromotorofHDN.


ANNEX 7: EVALUATION QUESTION 3 ON POLICY COHERENCE


Answer to EQ 3

EQ3.TowhatextentandhowdotheapproachestoFDandHDNrootedintheDPPshelpestablishpolicycoherencebetweenFinnishpolicies?

Aggregate Response to EQ 3

Policycoherenceis,andhasbeenforsometime,amajorfeatureofFinnishexternalpolicyandeffortstopromoteitacrossministriesareanestablishedpractice.TheMFAhasinplaceaseriesofmechanismstopromotecoherenceandiswidelyrecognisedexternallyasastrongproponentofpolicycoherence.However,thesemechanismsarenotalwayseffective,andtheyexistmostlyatHQlevel.PromotingpolicycoherencewasthusfoundtobenotasprevalentinthecasestudypartnercountrieswhereFinlandisoperating.AviewalsoemergedfrominterviewsthattheroleofFinlandinadvocatingforPCDwasmorenoticeableinthepast.Atthesametime,asFinlandisasmallcountrywheremanypeople ingovernmentknoweachother, it isapparentthatthepromotionofpolicycoherencealsotakesplaceinformallyatthepersonallevelthroughextensiveindividualcontactsacrossministriesanddepartments.

Themajorareaofpolicyincoherencethatemergedwasondivergingviewsonmigrationandontheuseofdevelopmentpoliciestoachievemigration-relatedoutcomes.ThisdivergenceexistsbothwithintheMFAandacrossministriesandespeciallybetweentheMFAandtheMoI.ThetensionsbetweenMFAdevelopmentpoliciesanddomesticinterestsandpoliciesonmigrationhavenotbeenfullyresolved.

ItwasfoundthatFDandHDNarerelativelynewconceptsamongFinnishMFAofficialswhichhavegraduallyevolvedinFinnishpoliciesovertheperiodoftheevaluation.TheythusdonotyetprovideastrongframeworktohelpestablishpolicycoherencebetweenFinnishpolicies.Thisisparticularlyvisibleinthecasestudiesreviewedintheframeworkofthisevaluation.Yet,itdoesseemthatthereareinitialeffortstofosterpolicycoherencearoundFDandHDNissues.

MFApoliciesaregenerallywellalignedwith thoseof itspartnersbe theynationalNGOsandCSOs,ormulti-lateraldonorswithwhomFinlandworkscloselysuchastheEUandtheUN.

ForquiteanumberofyearsFinlandhasreceivedpositivecommentsonPCDpromotionfromavarietyofsourcesincludingOECDPeerReviews.However,theroleofFinlandinadvocatingforPCDwasmorenoticeable in thepast.Someof thekeymechanismsFinlandhas inplace topromotepolicycoherenceidentifiedinclude,amongothers,aTask Force on Migration(MTF),theEU Coordinating Committee,theResult Based Management(RBM)andtheDevelopment Policy Results Report(DPR)processesandtheexternalDevelopment Policy Committee (FDPC).Yet, there isalsosomeevidencesuggestingthat thesemechanismsarenotalwaysaseffectiveasonemighthope.AtthesametimeasFinlandisasmallcountry


informalcontactsandlinksbetweenofficialsindifferentdepartmentsandministriesprovideanotherlevelofmechanism,sothatsomepromotionofpolicycoherencedoesstilltakeplaceatthepersonallevelevenwhenformalmechanismsfalter.

InterviewsconductedwithFinnishGovernmentofficials,civilservantsinpartnercountries,andrepre-sentativesofFinnishbilateralandmultilateralpartnersconfirmthatFDandHDNarenewconceptsthathavenotyetcrystallisedinthepoliciesoftheFinnishMFA.Theythereforedonotyetprovideasolidbasisforassessingpolicycoherence.TheFinnishresponsetotherecentso-calledmigrationcrisishaspromptedsomepolicyincoherencewithintheMFAandacrossministries.Thisnegativelyimpactedpolicycoher-enceon theMFA’sapproaches toFDandHDN.The tension isparticularly evidentbetween theMFAandtheMoI,buttherearealsosomeofficialsinsidetheMFAwhoarguethattheMinistryshouldadoptadifferentapproachtodevelopmentcooperationthatismorecloselyadjustedtosupportingthegovern-ment’s interest-drivenstanceonmigration.ThisgroupofofficialsarguethatdevelopmentcooperationpolicyshouldbemadecoherentwithFinland’smigrationpolicy(‘PCM’),ratherthantheotherwayround(PCD).OtherswouldlikeFinland’sdevelopmentcooperationtocontinuefocusingonlong-standingcoun-tryprogrammesandarguethattheevidencesupportingtherootcausesapproachislacking.Theincreas-ingalignmentofdevelopmentwithmigrationissuesandsecuritisationissomewhatincompatiblewiththeobjectivesofdevelopmentcooperation.

This is themostapparentareaof incoherenceuncovered, asaside from this thereappears tobehigh levelsofcoherencebetweenmostareasofpolicydealtwithbytheMFA.Thisisconsistentwiththefactthatevidenceshowsthat theMinistryhasbeenstronglycommittedtopromotingPCDthroughout theperiodoftheevaluation.

Yet,thereappearstobeongoingeffortsbytheMFAtofostercoherenceonFDandHDNissueswiththecreationofone-pagebriefingnotes,anActionPlan,newadvisors for theDevelopmentPolicySteeringCommitteeandtheHumanitarianAidunitetc.

Finland’spoliciesaregenerallyviewedbyexternalinterlocutorsascoherentandconsistent.EvidencealsoshowsthatMFApoliciesaregenerallywellalignedwiththoseofitspartnersbetheynationalNGOsandCSOs,ormultilateraldonorswithwhomFinlandworkscloselysuchastheEUandtheUN.Thissuggestsastrongwillingnesstolearnfromexternalactorsandadjustnationalpolicytointernationalexperienceandnorms,thoughthereislikelytoalsobeareverseeffectwithFinlandalsoimpactingonthesenorms.

Document analysis

Answer to EQ 3


Response to EQ 3

ThefactthattheFDandHDNpoliciesoftheMFAhaveevolvedovertheperiodoftheevaluationmeansthatformuchofthesesixyearsitwouldseem,fromdocumentaryevidenceatleast,thattheycannotbesaidtoprovideastrongframeworktohelpestablishpolicycoherencebetweenFinnishpolicies.Moreover,towardstheendoftheperiodandparticularlyafterthe2015surgein immigrationrates intotheEUandjustas theapproachesonHDNandFDwerebecomingmore clearly articulated,Finnishmigrationpolicyhas alsobeen toughened.This coincidencehasmeantthattheevidencedoesshowatensionexistingintheselatteryearsbetweentheMFA


policiesandthedomesticpoliciesonmigration.Inotherwords,incoherenciesbetweenthetwosetsofpolicieshavenotbeenfullyresolved.

Thisisthemostapparentareaofincoherenceuncovered,asasidefromthisthereappeartobehighlevelsofcoherencebetweenmostareasofpolicydealtwithbytheMFA.ThisisconsistentwiththefactthatevidenceshowsthattheMinistryhasbeenstronglycommittedtopromotingPCDthroughouttheperiodoftheevaluation,hasinplaceaseriesofmechanismstodosoandisrecognisedexternallybyauthoritativegroupssuchastheOECDasastrongproponentofpolicycoherence.OnlyoneexampleofapparentincoherencewithintheMFAremitemergedandthatwasbetweenitshumanitarianmineactionpolicyanditsfragilestatesguidelines.

EvidencealsoshowsthatMFApoliciesaregenerallywellalignedwiththoseofitspartnersbetheynationalNGOsandCSOs,ormulti-lateraldonorswithwhomFinlandworkscloselysuchastheEUandtheUN.Thissuggestsastrongwillingnesstolearnfromexternalactorsandadjustnationalpolicytointernationalexperienceandnorms,thoughthereislikelytoalsobeareverseeffectwithFinlandalsoimpactingonthesenorms.

While theMFAcommitment topolicy coherencedoes emerge strongly and there is evidencetosuggest thatawholeofgovernmentapproach ispromotedbythePMO, it is lessclearhowcommitted otherministries are overall to the policy coherence per se and how willing theyare to achieve synergies and make policy trade-offs. Clearly inter-ministerial coordinationand information exchange mechanisms do exist and are used. But it is not clear from thedocumentationjusthowmuchtheyarereallyusedtopromotepolicycoherenceeffectively.Theirvery existence is an importantfirst step towards this endbut doesnot guarantee that policycoherencewillreallybepromoted.

Key findings on judgement criteriaJC 3.1: Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively

ThereisstrongindependentevidencetoshowthattheMFAhasinplacemechanismstopromotepolicycoherenceandthattheseoperateeffectivelyovertime.

WhentheanalysisistakenfurthertootherMinistriesitislessclearhowwelltheconceptofpolicycoher-enceisunderstoodandwhetherthecoordinationmechanismsthatdoexistindifferentareashaveaman-datethatgoesbeyondcoordinationandinformationexchangeandextendstopromotingpolicycoher-ence.Theirveryexistencehoweverdoessuggestthatsomeeffortstopromotegreaterpolicycoherencearetakingplaceatleastinformally.Evidenceonsomeofthesecoordinationmechanisms(e.g.theMTF)doesshowclearlythattheydooperateovertime.

Thereisalsoalackofclarityonthethematicscopeofthesemechanisms.MigrationandRightsissuesareclearlywellcovered.ButtheconceptsofFDandHDNlargelydonotappearinthedocumentssurveyed

JC 3.2: There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/Departments (eg, MoI, MoD, PMO) and the MFA’s partners – bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs)

PolicycoherenceisamajorfeatureofFinnishexternalpolicyandeffortstopromoteitacrossgovernmentandbetweenspecificministriesareclearlyveryprevalent.Policycoherencethereforeseemstobewidelyacceptedasadesirableobjectiveacrossgovernment.ThesamecanbesaidaboutcoherencebetweenthepoliciesofFinlandwiththoseofitspartners,betheybilateralormultilateralandofficialorcivilsociety.AtthesametimeFinlandisnotimmunetosomeofthecontradictionsthatemergeininternationalfora(EUandUN)betweendifferentpolicies,notleastinthisareaofdevelopmentpolicyandmigrationmanage-mentpolicy.


However,whilethisstatementholdsatagenerallevelitishardertolinkitspecificallytoFDandHDNpoliciesasthesedonotfigureprominentlyinthedocumentsreviewed.

JC 3.3: The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN

Thereisevidencetosuggestthatthelevelofpolicycoherenceincertainareasisnotadequateandthatthetensionsbetweendifferentareasofpolicyarenotalwaysresolved.OnetensionidentifiedisbetweenAsylumpolicysince2015andtheMFA’spolicyonmigrationanddevelopmentandHDNinthecontextofFD.Theimplicitassumptioninthe2015PMOActionPlanisthatthereisaninversecausalrelationshipbetweendevelopment(aswellasotherrelatedpoliciessuchaspeacebuilding,conflict reduction)andmigration,althoughthisthesisisnotelaborated.EquallytheAction PlandoesnotadequatelycovertheneedsofvulnerablegroupsinamannerconsistentwithMFApolicy.

Goingfurtherbackto2014thereisfurtherevidenceofincoherencebetweenthedomesticpolicyonmigra-tionissuesandtheMFA’spolicyonFD.Otherevidencesuggeststhatthishasbecomemoreacuteinrecentyears,forinstancewiththeMigrationServicereceivingpoliticalinstructionstointerpretlawsinafairlytoughandrestrictivemanner.

PCD Mechanisms and the use made of themMFAdocumentsshowthattheMinistrydoeshavearangeofmechanismstopromotepolicycoherenceacrosstheirdifferentpolicyareasandagoodunderstandingofthePCconcept.TheOECDPeerReviewsfor2012and2017alsoindicatethatFinlanddoesmakeuseofitsPCDmechanismsovertimeinaconsist-entfashion.MFAdocumentsreviewedsuggestthatthereisafairdegreeofcoordinationwithotherminis-tries,especiallyMoI.

Movingtodocumentsfromotherministries(MoI,MJ)thereisarecognitionoftheimportanceofcoordi-nationandliaisonwithotherministriesandthereisevidenceofmechanismsbeingestablishedtopromotesuchexchanges.However,thereislittleornoindicationofhowmuchthisefforttoexchangeinformationandcoordinateimplementationactuallyaffectspolicyformulationoradaptationtoachievegreatercoher-ence.Sectorcoveragealsoappearstovarywithcoordinationandpolicycoherencepromotiononfunda-mentalandhumanrightsandonoverallmigrationpolicyfairlystrongerwhereasthereislittleindicationofdebateonFDandHDNpolicy.

NumerousmechanismstopromotecoherencehavebeenidentifiedinvariousdocumentsfromtheMFAandinOECDreports.Thesemechanismsincludenationalcoordinationsystems,ad-hocworkinggroups,an inter-ministerial committee and theDevelopment Policy Committee. Since 2017 responsibility forcoordinationontheSDGshasbeentransferredtothePMO.Otherdocuments,alsofromtheMFA,recog-nisetheneedforpolicycoherenceandastatedintentiontopromoteit,butaresilentonthemechanismsthroughwhichthisisdone.

AMigrationTaskForcewassetupinSeptember2015(taskforcemeetingminutes),toprovideaforumfordiscussionbetweendifferentministriesandstateagenciesonmigrationpolicyanditsimplementa-tion.Amongotherthingsitistaskedwithcoordinatingthemanagementandcontroloftheflowsofasy-lumseekers/refugees,andultimatelytotryandrestrictnumbers.WithinthistheMFAwaschargedwithemergencycommunicationthroughembassiesanddiplomaticrepresentationstopresentanegativeviewofchancestoobtainasyluminFinland.TheMTFassuchcanbeseenasamechanismtopromotepolicycoherence,atthedeskofficerlevel,nothigherpolicylevel(MTFisanimplementationandinformationsharinglevelmechanism).

TheMoI reporton InternationalMigration (2016–2017)doesnot talkaboutpolicy coherencemecha-nismsbutdoesrecognisetheimportanceofcoordinationandsuggeststhatthereiscloseliaisonbetweentheMoIandtheMFA.


TheMinistryofJusticestressestheimportanceofstrengtheningcoordinationinhumanrightswithingov-ernment.Topromotethis,ithasappointedaGovernmentnetworkoffundamentalandhumanrightscon-tactpersonswhichhasprepareda‘NationalActionPlanonFundamentalandHumanRights2017-2019’(2017).ButthereisnoevidencethatthisnetworkisinvolvedonFDandHDNissues.Someministriesalsohaveinternalnetworksofcontactpersonsonfundamentalandhumanrights.

Someofthegovernmentcoordinationmechanismsidentified,whichmayormaynotgobeyondcoordi-nationtopromotingpolicycoherence,wereestablishedfairlylateintheevaluationperiod.Forinstance,theMoJ’sGovernmentnetworkoffundamentalandhumanrightswasestablishedinOctober2015withamandatethroughto31December2019.Evidencecollecteddoessuggestitcontinuestooperate.Equal-lyminutesoftheMigrationTaskForcemeetingsalsoindicatecontinuedoperationofthiscoordinationmechanismfromitsestablishmentinSeptember2015upto2018.

AtthefieldleveltheMFA’s(2015c)ReviewofEffectivenessofFinland’sDevelopmentCooperationthereviewersreportedthat“During the field visits an important disconnect was observed between MFA poli-cies and reality on the ground. Specifically, while there is considerable emphasis on ‘results focus’ in vari-ous policy statements … it did not emerge as a theme in the field.”ThisdoesnotrelatespecificallytoFDandHDNpoliciesbutrathertothe‘resultsfocus’however,itmaybethatsuchadisconnectalsoexistsbetweenthesepoliciesandissuesontheground.

PC with other government departmentsThereisconsiderableevidenceofdifferentgovernmentdepartmentsrecognisingtheneedforjoinedupapproachesandgoodpolicycoherencebetweenministriesandofeffortsbeingmadetoputthisinprac-tice.However,itisnotalwaysclearhowfarthesegobothintermsofthepolicyareasthatarebroughttogether,andthedepthofthecoherenceachieved.InparticulartheconceptsofFDorHDNarerarelymentionedasaframeworkforcoherencepromotionefforts.Equallyitisdifficulttoreadintotheevidencehowbalancedthecoherencesolutionsfoundactuallyare,thoughinsomeplacesitdoeslookasiftheMFAhashadtoadaptitspositionsquiteabittoaccommodatethoseofotherministries.

Forexample,thePMOinits2015ActionPlanonAsylumPolicyadoptedtheviewthat ‘The large-scale entry into a country is related primarily to the conditions prevailing in countries or areas of origin … It is impor-tant that Finland, the EU and the international community influence these conditions’which implies thatsomecoordinationofpolicybetweendifferentministries(MoIandMFAattheveryleast)willbeexpect-ed.Theplangoesontodescribeboththehumanitarianandthedevelopmentworkthatwillberequiredtoimplementit.Equallyittalksabouttheneedtoaligntradepolicy.Indicators(notablythevocabularyandterminologywhichisMFAlanguage)suggestthatthereissomeresonancebetweenPMOpolicyandMFAwiththelatterhavingsomeinfluenceonthepolicystanceofPMOatleastintermsofrecognisingthediversityofdriversofFD;thisinfluencedoesnotextendtoHDN,basedontheindicatorevidence.TheActionPlanhoweveroffersonlysimplisticassumptionsontherelationshipbetweenmigrationanddevelopment(acausalrelationshipchallengedbymanyMFAofficials)inthecontextofFD,ratherthananunderstandingofthecomplexityofthesubjectmatter.NotealsothatotherMinistriessuchasMoIhaveheavily influencedthisActionPlanwith the focuson ‘development-migrationnexus’.Overall thissug-geststhattheMFAhasfoundittoughtoinfluencePMOthinkinginrelationtothedriversofmigration.Moreover,despitethehardeningdomesticpolicytowhichtheActionPlan isprimarilyaddressed,andelaborates,itiscarefulnottoparticulariseasyluminFinlandonlytoRSD.

TheStrategicProgrammeofPrimeMinisterJuhaSipilä’sGovernmentpublishedbythePMO(2015a)andentitled’Finland, a land of solutions’spellsouthowpoliciesindifferentareaswillbeusedtotackleinterna-tionalcrisismanagementandmanagemigration.

Inotherareastoo,thereisevidenceofahighlevelof joinedupthinkingonhowdifferentpolicyareasneedtointerrelatetotacklespecificissuesandevidenceofeffortsofjoinplanningonparticularissues.


Forexample,‘Finland’s National Action Plan 2018–2021 on Women, Peace and Security’publishedin2018,waspreparedjointlybyseveralministries(MFA,MoIMoEd&Culture,MoD,MEAE),aswellasbypar-tiesengagedincrisismanagement(CrisisManagementCentreFinland,CMCFinland,andtheFinnishDefenceForces),civilsocietyorganisationsandexpertsworkinginresearchinstitutions.

IntheMoI(2013)GovernmentResolutionontheFutureofMigration2020StrategythereisextensiveevidenceofpolicycoherencebetweenMFAandMoIpoliciesandevidenceofMFAinputusingsomeofthevocabularyofFDandHDNwhich,curiously,itwasnotusinginitsowndocumentsatthattime(seeegMFA2012aMFA2014b).Notethestatement‘so that international migration decisions are made through choice and not necessity’almostanexactrecitationoftheMFAstatementtwoyearslaterinDPP2016.

IntheMoI’s(2017)paperonInternationalMigration2016-2017,thereisevidenceofPCalthoughwiththeusualcaveat,onwhetherthisisreallyinthecontextofFDandHDN.Thereareindirectindicatorsofcoherence,e.g.Trade(MoEAE),crisismanagement(MoD)resettlement(MoI)Climatechange(MoE)2030Agenda,acrossgovernment.But it couldalsobeargued that returnarrangements (page56)areinconsistent.

AnotherMFAdocument(2015d)Evaluation of Humanitarian Mine Action) talksabouttheneedfor ‘Greater cooperation and programmatic coherence should be encouraged between MFA, MoD and private sector engagement in technical assistance, plus an involvement with those NGOs like HALO and MAG that have existing weapons and ammunition disposal programmes.’

IntheMFA(2015)GuidanceNoteonHumanRightsBasedApproachinFinland’sDevelopmentCoop-erationanddespitethereferencestomechanismsthatmayimprovecoherence[generally]inrelationtoHRBA,thereisnoevidenceofcoverageofFDandHDNgiventheoveralllackoflinkstothesethemesinthedocument.EquallyintheMFA.(2015d)noteonEvaluationofHumanitarianMineAction,althoughthereissomereferencetothepolicycoherence(andcollaboration)withotherministriesitisframedmorebroadlyinrelationtomineaction(ratherthanspecificallyonFDandHDN).

Inbilateralhigh-levelconsultationsbetweenFinlandandinternationalhumanitarianorganisations,theFinnishdelegationincludedrepresentativesofotherministries(MoIandMEAE).Sofar,thehypothesisseemsvalidthattheMFAwouldliketogoonwithbusinessasusualbutischallengedbythegovernment’sefforts(2015onwards)tochangeitspolicies.

Ontheotherhand,theveryexistenceoftheMigrationTaskForceiscertainproofthatsomedegreeofcoherencehasbeenattempted,specifically,betweenMoIandMFA(andotherministries/agencies).MoIandMFAproducejointdraftsonregionalmigrationprocesses(2018).Thetaskforceassuchisamecha-nismforpromotingpolicycoherence(atthebeginninginSept2015,policycoherenceformanagingandcontrollingflowsofasylumseekers/migrantsandreducingtheattractivenessofFinlandasdestination).ButitshouldbenotedthattheMTFisacoordinationbodyatthedeskofficerlevel,andtheminutesdonotindicateanydiscrepanciesbetweenMoIandMFAasconcernspolicyapproaches

Alignment with other partnersThereisstrongevidencethatFinland’sonmigrationandhumanitariananddevelopmentpoliciesarewellalignedandcoherentwithitspartners,especiallywiththeEUandtheUN.SpecificreferencestoFDandHDNarenotsocommonandalthoughpolicythinkingonthesetwoconceptshasevolvedintheseinterna-tionalforaitisnotthatapparentthatFinlandhasadjusteditsownpolicytoaccommodatethenewthink-ing.Inotherwords,theshiftdoesnotseemtohaveoccurredtilltheveryendoftheevaluationperiodinFinlandthoughitisobservableacoupleofyearsearlierininternationalfora.Thislaggedeffectwouldtendtoconfirmthat,inthisrespectatleast,theinfluencehasbeenfrominternationalcirclestoFinland.

Onhumanrightsspecifically,theMFA’s2014GuidanceNoteonHRBAclearlystatesthatitis ‘inspired by the documents of other donors such as Denmark, Germany, the EU and the UN Statement of Common


Understanding on Human Rights based Approaches to Development Cooperation and Programming adopted by the United Nations Development Group’.

TheMTFminutesalsoindicateacontinuedefforttoalignwithEUpolicyandtoseektoinfluenceit.

Good enough coherence?Whileinmanywaysitseemsthatagoodlevelofpolicycoherenceisachieved,afewexamplesofincoher-encedoemergefromtheevidencecollected.

IntheareaofasylumpolicyevidencefromPMO(2015)GovernmentActionPlanonAsylumPolicyDecem-bersuggest that the levelofpolicycoherence isnotadequate.There is someresonancebetweenPMOpolicylanguageandthatoftheMFA–whichmayhavehadsomeinfluenceonthepolicystanceofPMOatleastintermsofrecognisingthediversityofdriversofFD.ThePMOActionPlan,however,offersonlysimplisticassumptionsontherelationshipbetweenmigrationanddevelopmentandHDNinthecontextofFD(suggestingMoIwouldhavehadheavyinput intothisActionPan),notanunderstandingofthecomplexityofthesubjectmatter.

TheimplicitassumptioninthePMOActionPlanisthatthereisaninversecausalrelationshipbetweendevelopment(aswellasotherrelatedpoliciessuchaspeacebuilding,conflictreduction)andmigration,althoughthisthesisisnotelaborated(asadomesticpolicydocumentthisisnotsurprising).ThissuggeststhatsomeGoFstakeholdersbelievethereisinter-ministrycoherence,assumingthatthedomesticchal-lengesoflarge-scalespontaneousasylum-seekingandirregularmigrationcanbetackledbydevelopment.However,weknowfromotherevidencetheMFApolicyagendadoesnotsupportthisassumption–e.g.KIinterviews–thattheMFAisscepticalofthisthesis.ThissuggeststhattherearepotentiallydetrimentaleffectsoninterpretingandimplementingFDandHDNacrossGoF.

Theevidencedrawn fromthisActionPlan thusconfirmthat there issome incoherencebetweenPMOActionPlanandMFA.Equallywhilsttheneglectofvulnerablegroups(women,girlsandchildren)intheActionPlandoesnotindicatepolicyincoherencebetweenministries,itdoessuggestthatMFAinfluenceonPMOpolicyinthisareahasbeenlimited.

TheEuropeanMigrationNetwork(2014)AnnualReportonMigrationandAsylumPolicyFinlandalsosuggestsincoherencewiththeviewsoftheMFA.Thisreportdealswithdomesticmigrationissues–labourmigration,familyreunification,citizenshipetc.Oneshortchapter–No.7,page50–isonMigrationandDevelopmentPolicybutdoesnotengageatallwithMFAthinkingorFD/HDNconcepts.ThechapteronIrregularMigrationonlydealswiththisfromadomesticperspectivenottiedintocausesofFD.Thissug-gestsincoherencebetweentheEMNreadingoftheissuesandtheMFA.

Inmostreportsreviewedthereisnoevidenceonwhethercoherencelevelsareadequateornot.ButasFDandHDNarerarelymentionedthisdoessuggestapotentialblindspotforpolicycoherence.

ThereportoftheMFA’sEvaluationofHumanitarianMineAction(MFA,2015d)alsoprovidesevidenceofincoherencebetweentheMFA’smineactionstrategyanditsFragileStatesagenda.ApartfromAfghani-stanandSomaliathechoiceofcountriesfortheHMAdonotmatchtheguidelinesonFragileStates.TheHMAistreatedastoomuchofastand-alonesectorwithinadequateeffortsmadetodefinesynergieswithotherelementsofdevelopmentcooperation.

Constraints on pushing PCDAcoupleofcasesofseriousincoherenceemergefromtheevidencecollected.

Thus,theevidencecitedaboveforthePMO’sGovernmentActionPlanonAsylumPolicyDecember2015pointstotheexistenceofconstraintsonpushingpolicycoherence.ThedisjuncturebetweenministriesintheunderstandingofrelationshipbetweendevelopmentandmigrationinthecontextofFDandHDNmaybecomeincreasinglyproblematic.


EquallyevidenceoncontradictionsbetweentheviewsofdifferentMFAdeskofficerswhilethereisseem-ingagreementoninternationalhumanitarianandhumanrightsprinciples,differentviewsontheimpor-tanceofrootcausesinlimitingmigration(thetraditionalFinnishposition)etc.,andthewaytheGovern-mentisactinginotherareaspointstoincoherencereachingproblematiclevels.Thus,politicalordersareissuedtotheMigrationServicetointerpretlawsandrulesinaveryrestrictivewayevenincaseswhenlawshavenotchanged(restrictionstofamilyreunification,definitionofAfghanistanandIraqassafecoun-tries),andthereareincreasingdeportations/forcedrepatriationswheremanyoftherepatriatedpersonshavebeenkilled (orcommittedsuicide)uponarrival.This is somuch thecase thatFrenchcourtsarerefusingtoreturnasylumseekerstoFinlandbecauseFinlandisnotconsideredtorespectinternationalconventionsetc.TheMinisterof Interiorhasorderedan investigationon the legalityofdeportations/repatriationsduringsummer2018.


Answer to EQ 3


Response to EQ 3

TheinterviewevidenceconfirmsthatFDandHDNarerelativelynewconceptsamongFinnishMFA officials and therefore do not yet provide a solid basis for assessing policy coherence.Officialsrathertalkintermsofthecoherencebetweenpoliciesondevelopmentcooperationandthoseonmigration.

Consistentlyamongallinterviewees,bothFinnishofficialsandothersinterviewed,seeFinlandasacountrythatisstrongonPCDandpolicycoherencemoregenerally.Finnishrepresentativesareknown internationallyasadvocatesofPCDwhowill regularlybringup the issue if ithasbeen neglected in officialmeetings. But equally Finland is known for presenting a coherentand consistent position itself in international fora, notably in the EU and in UN settings.This orientation in favour of PCD goes back a good number of years and is built on somewell-established and effective mechanisms to promote PCD within the Finnish governmentadministrationanditsrelationswithcivilsocietyinFinland.

AtthesametimeinterviewinginFinlandrevealeddespitetheexistenceofthesetraditionsandwell-establishedpracticestherearesomelimitstowhattheycanachieve.Inparticularitbecameapparentthattensionsexistedbetweenthegovernment’spoliciesondevelopmentcooperationandthoseonmigrationthathavenotyetbeenresolved.Thistensionhasemergedintheyearssince2015andtheinfluxofrefugeesinthatyear.ThetensionisparticularlyevidentbetweentheMFAandtheMoI,buttherearealsosomeofficialsinsidetheMFAwhoarguethattheMinistryshouldadoptadifferentapproachtodevelopmentcooperationthatismorecloselyadjustedtosupportingthegovernment’sstanceonmigration.Developmentcooperationpolicyshouldthusbemade coherentwith Finland’smigration policy (‘PCM’), rather than the otherway round(PCD).OthersarguethattherelationshipbetweenODAspendingandmigrationisnotdirectandtheadjustmentsproposedwillnotresultinlessmigration.Sofarthishasnotbeenresolvedandofficialsagreethatthisneedstoberesolvedatthepoliticallevel,thoughsomealsosuggestthistensionmayresolveitselfdependingontheoutcomeofthenextelections.



ThereisgoodagreementamongintervieweesthatFinlandiscommittedtopromotingpolicycoherence.Finlandhas some long-standingmechanisms (e.g.DevelopmentPolicyCommittee) topromotepolicycoherence andhas establishednewmechanisms,which appear tobe functioning and frequentlyused(MTF,PCSDbeingelevatedtoPMOlevelofresponsibility,elaborationofaToCforhumanitarianassis-tance…).Yet,thereisalsosomeevidencesuggestingthatthesemechanismsarenotalwaysaseffectiveasonemighthope.AsFinlandisasmallcountryinformallinksbetweenofficialsindifferentdepartmentsandministriesprovideanotherlevelofmechanism,andaccordingtointervieweesthepromotionofpolicycoherencedoesstilltakeplaceatthepersonallevelthroughtheseindividualcontacts.TheMFAhasinparticularexperiencedsomedifficultiesinestablishingacoherentresponsetotheso-calledmigrationcri-sisduetodivergingviewsontheuseofdevelopment.


WhilepolicycoherenceisstillanimportantfeatureofFinnishexternalpolicy,therehasbeeninthelasttenyearsasignificantdecreaseintheemphasisgivenbytheMFAtoPCD.EquallywhileFinlandhasstart-edtopromotePCSDwithawhole-of-governmentapproachcoordinatedbythePMOthereisstillsomewaytogobeforethisiswidelyfollowed.

DivergingviewsamongFinnishofficialsbothwithintheMinistryofForeignAffairs(MFA)andandwiththeMinistryofInterior(MoI)onthedirectionofdevelopmentcooperationinresponsetorecentmigra-tionpressurehavechallengedthepolicycoherenceoftheFinnishapproachtomigrationanddevelopmentcooperation.Ineffect,thequestionofforceddisplacementhasseparatedratherthanuniteddifferentmin-istries.BetweentheMFAandtheMinistryofDefencethereappearstobeastrongerlevelofpolicycoher-ence.WithintheMFAthereareafewvoicesadvocatingaradicalrethinkoftheFinland’sdevelopmentcooperationpolicytouseitasatooltoreducemigrationthoughothersresistthischange.Yet,despitetheseinternaldifferences,ontheinternationalscenetheFinnsarestillperceivedbypartners(e.g.EU,UN,otherEuropeanstates,OECD)aswellcoordinatedbothwithintheMFAandwiththeMoI.Finland’spoliciesaregenerallyviewedbyexternal interlocutorsascoherentandconsistent.Finland isgenerallyknownforraisingtheissueofpolicycoherenceindifferentfora.However,theroleofFinlandinadvocat-ingforPCDwasmorenoticeableinthepast.


ThereisevidencetosuggestthatthelevelofpolicycoherenceisnotadequatetosupporttheapproachestoFDandHDN.EvidenceshowthatthereisacertaindegreeofincoherencewithintheMFAduetodiverg-ingviewsonmigration,andontheuseofdevelopmentpoliciestoachievemigration-relatedoutcomes.Yet,itseemsthatthereareongoingeffortstofostercoherenceonFDandHDNissues(one-pagebriefingnotes,anActionPlan,newadvisorsfortheDevelopmentPolicySteeringCommitteeandtheHumanitar-ianAidunit).

Onmigration,Finland’spositionisregardedbyinterlocutorsinGenevaandattheEUasin-linewiththeEUandmanyotherEuropeancountries:ittiltstowardsstrongermigrationcontrolandcorrelatesgreaterdevelopmentassistancewithmigrationdeterrence.Yet,oncetheFinnshardenedtheirlinesonmigration,theyremainedconsistentacrossfora.ThereisevidencesuggestingthattheFinnishapproachtomigrationisnotalwayscoherentwithaprincipledhumanitarianapproach.InterlocutorscitescarcelyanyevidenceofcoherenceinrelationtoFDandHDN,indicatingthattheMFAisnotyetseriouslyengagingwiththeseconcepts,moreparticularlyHDN,comprehensivelyorcoherently.


EvidenceGoFofficials interviewedviewpolicycoherenceasan important featureofFinnishexternalpolicyandnotedseveralmechanismswhichFinlandusestoestablishcoherence.TheDepartmentofDevelopmentPolicyhastraditionallybeeninchargeofPCD,butthatrolehasbeenreducedwiththedecisiontomovecoordinationforthe2030Agendaandresponsibility forPCSDtothePMO.Thatsaid,theMFAisstillinvolvedasitsDepartmentofUNAffairsisdoingmuchoftheworkonthe2030Agenda,buttheyarefocussingmoreonPCSDratherthanPCD.

However,keymechanismstopromotepolicycoherenceidentifiedinclude,amongothers:

• TheDevelopment Policy Committee(FDPC):animportantpartofitsmandateistopromotecoherence.

• TheTask Force on Migration(MTF),runbytheMFAandattendedbythedifferentMFAdepart-ments,thePMOandtheMoI,isseenasnewforumpromotingcoherencebyenablingexchangesandbrainstormingonthornyissuesrelatedtomigration.TheFinnishcontributiontotheEUEmergencyTrustFundforAfricais,forinstance,discussedintheMTF.

• TheEU Coordinating Committee,whichhelpspromotecoherencebetweendifferentFinnishposi-tionsinpreparationfordiscussionsattheEUlevel.TheinfluenceFinnishrepresentativescanhaveinexternalforaispartlydependentonthelevelofcoherenceachievedintheEUCoordinat-ingCommitteeandontheTaskForceonMigrationforissuestouchinguponmigration,HDNandFD.TheResult Based Management(RBM)approachisseenbyaMFAofficialasatoolwhichcanhelpfacilitatethemeasurementandpromotionofcoherence.

• Thecivilian crisis managementapproachoftheCrisisManagementCentreFinland(CMCFin-land),whichfallundertheresponsibilityofboththeMoIandtheMFA,isperceivedasyet anotheravenuetoreinforcepolicycoherence.AninterviewwithCMCsuggestedthatstabilisa-tionhelpstounderpinthesustainabilityofMFAinvestmentinmainstreamdevelopmentpro-jectsandprogrammesbydeployingdifferentactorsandinstrumentsworkingcooperatively.

• TheDevelopment Policy Results Report(DPR)processisalsoanimportantvehicleforPCDandisbeingrolledoutintwo-stages.Networkscometogethertosetobjectivesand‘bringthesilostogether’andfacilitatepolicydevelopment.Thesecondphaseisimplementationandmonitoringinwhichsharedanalysisisanimportantpartofthelearningprocessanalysingthechallengestogetherincludingvirtualplatformswithembassies.

Yet,thereisalsosomeevidencesuggestingthatthesemechanismsarenotalwayseffective.AccordingtoarepresentativeoftheMoI,policycoherencedoesnotalwaysworkoptimallyataninstitutionallevel.TherehasbeeninthelasttenyearsasignificantdecreaseintheemphasisgivenbytheMFAtoPCD.Responsi-bilityforthe2030AgendaandtheuseoftheconceptPCSDhasbeenmovedtothePMO,whichtakesawhole-of-governmentapproach,ensuringacertaingovernmentwidecoherence,alsoattheEUlevel,butdoesnotfocussospecificallyonPCD.InearlyNovember2017forinstancethePMissuedapolicystate-mentthattherewouldbea‘whole-of-government’approachtomigrationinvolvingtrade,developmentandreturneepolicy.OneresulthoweveristhattheMFAisnolongertakingasstrongalineonPCDspecif-icallyandithasyettobeseenwhatimpacttheseshiftsinthemechanismsusedwillhaveontheeffectivepromotionofpolicycoherence.CSOvoicessuggestthattheMFAstillhastocreatemechanismstopro-motePCSD.However,asFinlandisasmallcountry,informallinksbetweenofficialsindifferentdepart-mentsandministriesprovideanotherlevelofmechanism,andaccordingtointervieweesthepromotionofpolicycoherencedoesstilltakeplaceatthepersonallevelthroughtheseindividualcontacts.


TheMFAhas inparticularexperiencedsomedifficulties inestablishingacoherentresponsetotheso-calledmigrationcrisisduetodivergingviewsontheuseofdevelopmentcooperationfundsformigrationobjectivesbothwithintheMFAandacrossministries,especiallywiththeMoI.ThisnegativelyimpactedpolicycoherenceontheMFA’sapproachestoFDandHDN.Ineffect,thequestionofforceddisplacementhasseparatedratherthanunitedofficialsanddifferentministries,bringingoutclearlytheexistenceofdifferentperspectives.Inbroadterms,twogroupsaretakingshape.First,therearethosewhothinkthatthefocusofFinnishaidshouldbedirectedtowardsthecountriesoforiginortransitofmigrationtoFin-land.WithintheMFAtherearethusseveralvoicesadvocatingaradicalrethinkofFinland’sdevelopmentcooperationpolicytowardsnewtypesofcooperationaddressingtherootcausesofmigrationinfewer,migration-relevant,developingcountries,focussedmoreonbusiness,privatesectorcooperation,trade,andjobcreation.However,thereisalsoconsiderableresistancetosuchachangeasmanyMFAofficialsfeelthisisbasedonfalsepremises.Someintervieweeseventalkaboutthespacegiventosuchargumentsasgoingagainsttheirsenseofprofessionalintegrity.Thus,asecondgroupofstaff,mainlyintheMFA,sharemoretraditionalideasaboutdevelopmentcooperationandwouldlikeFinlandtocontinueitslong-standingprogrammeswithestablishedpartnercountries.Thissecondgroupwouldlikemigrationtotakelessspaceinthedevelopmentcooperationrhetoric.BetweentheMFAandtheMoD,thereappearstobeastrongerlevelofpolicycoherencelargelybecausethelattertaketheirpolicylinefromtheMFA.OfficialsinboththeMFAandtheMoIareawareandincreasinglyconcernedthattheMFA’semphasisonpromotingpolicycoherenceisnotasstrongasitusedtobe.

Theincreasingalignmentofdevelopmentwithmigrationissuesandsecuritisationisnoteasilycompatiblewiththelong-termapproachthatcharacterisesdevelopmentwork.Inotherwords,theFinnishinternalpoliticalagendaandthedevelopmentalaspirationcollide,suggestingacertainfailureofpolicycoherence.Equallythereappearstobenoeasytrade-off,soitisrecognisedthisisessentiallyapoliticaldecisionthathastobetakenatahigherlevel,thoughfornowthesignalsofficialslowerdowntheranksreceiveonthisarenotthatclear.Someintervieweessuggestedthattheoutcomeofthenextelectionsandapossiblenewgovernmentcoalition,maywellresolvetheissueandgiventhatpublicattentionhasshiftedawayfrommigrationatpresentthereisnotmuchneedtoresolvetheissuebeforethen.

Nevertheless,itseemsthatthereareongoingeffortstofostercoherenceonFDandHDNissues:anActionPlan was created, the Development Policy Steering Committee and the Humanitarian Aid unit bothappointednewadvisors,adraftTheoryofChange(ToC)hasbeenpreparedforhumanitarianassistancetopromotePCDetc.Additionally,one-pagebriefingnoteswererecentlydraftedandwidelysharedinter-nally.ThesetextsondifferenttopicsrelatingtomigrationandFinnishdevelopmentpolicyaremeantforinternaluseasinformationpackagesandtoprovideguidance.Theirpurposeistounifythinkingandtoencouragediscussiontohelpformulateamoreconsistentphilosophicalapproach.Toachievegreaterpol-icycoherenceonFDandHDNissues,someGoFintervieweesseeaneedtobridgethetwovisionsthatemergedinpost-2015ofthelong-termdevelopmentobjectivesandthefasttrackaction.OneMFAofficialsuggestedthecreationofaToConthe tenuousrelationshipbetweenmigrationanddevelopment,andthepracticeofhowtoaddresstherootcausesofmigrationviadevelopmentcooperationgivenexistingresearchshowinganinvertedUcurverelationshipbetweendevelopmentandmigrationlevels.ThiswouldthenfeedthecoherenceofFinnishdevelopmentpracticesrelatedtomigration.

Yet,despitetheseinternaldifferences,ontheinternationalscenetheFinnsareperceivedbypartners(e.g.EU,UN,otherEuropeanstates,OECD)aswellcoordinatedbothwithintheMFAandwiththeMoI.Fin-land’spoliciesaregenerallyviewedbyexternal interlocutorsascoherentandconsistent.According tointerviewswithEUofficialsandEUMSrepresentatives,FinlandiswidelyknownforraisingtheissueofpolicycoherenceinEUfora.Finnishofficialsalsofeelthat,inEUcircles,Finlandcanstilldemonstrateitscommitmenttopolicycoherencewithestablishedmechanisms,whichgenerallyfunctionwellandarefrequentlyused.Thismayalsobeduetothegovernment’sEUCoordinationCommittee,whichisusedtoworkoutFinland’spositionsbeforeeachEUCouncilmeeting.ThistoolisseenbyGoFofficialsasfunc-


tionalanduseful,althoughrecentlycoordinationappearstohavealsotakenplaceincreasinglyinwritingviaemails.TherearealsooccasionallyjointMFA-MoIdelegationstotheEUCouncilandothermeetings.

However,interlocutorsconfirmthatthelevelsofcoherenceachievedmainlyresonatewithexistingpolicyprioritiesinthe2016DPPandother‘policypillars’suchascrisismanagement,humanitarianassistanceandmigrationpolicies.OnthemethodologiesofPCDandPCSD,Finlandisconsideredbycertainpartnerstobeexemplaryandisgenerallyknownforraisingtheissueofpolicycoherenceindifferentfora.However, theroleofFinlandinadvocatingforPCDwasmorenoticeable inthepast.Finland’sCSOpartnersaremoreawareofthechangingfaceofFinnishdevelopmentcooperationandtheinternaltensionsandwhattheyperceiveasaworryingtrendtowardsgreatersecuritisationofFinnishaid.

The2016cutsinFinnishODAhavehadprobablymoreofanimpactonFinland’sinternationalstanding,at leastamongUNfamilypartnersandhavemadeitharderforFinlandtomakeitsvoiceheardinthehumanitariansectorinparticular.TheMFAseekstocounterthisbybeinga‘gooddonor’forinstancebyhonouringitscommitments,payingontimeandaligningwithcountrysystems.

Onmigration,Finland’spositionisregardedbyinterlocutorsinGenevaasin-linewiththeEUandmanyother European countries: it tilts towards strongermigration control and correlates greater develop-mentassistancewithmigrationdeterrence.Yet,oncetheFinnshardenedtheirlinesonmigration,theyremainedconsistentacross fora.TheFinnishapproach tomigration isnot coherentwithaprincipledhumanitarianapproach,observed,forexample,inFinland’sAfghanrefugeereturnpoliciesinrelationtowiderdevelopmentandhumanrightspolicies.Theinconsistencyof‘aidtiedtopolitics’wascriticisedbysomekeyinformants.

InterlocutorscitescarcelyanyevidenceofcoherenceinrelationtoFDandHDN,confirmingthattheMFAisnotyetseriouslyengagingwiththeseconcepts,moreparticularlyHDN,comprehensivelyorcoherently.Gaps,forexample,inIDPpolicyandprogrammingarenoted,despitesomereferenceinthe2012policyandalsotourbandisplacementandintheeducationsectorwherethereistheneedtoaddressmoresys-tematicallytheeducationneedsofdisplacedpersons,especiallyinaccessto2ndand3rdleveleducation.Ontheotherhand,muchofthediscussionontheHDNdoesequallyappeartoberelevanttopolicycoher-enceandtheprocessesandstructuresthatcouldsupportitspromotion.

Case studies

Answer to EQ 3


Response to EQ 3

In partner countries, case study evidence suggest that Finland does not have sufficientmechanismsinplacetoensurecoherenceonFDandHDNapproaches.Asaresult,thelevelofpolicycoherenceisnotyetadequatetosupporttheapproachestoFDandHDN.EvidencefromtheMENAcasestudysuggestthatFinland’sinterventionsintheregionwerefoundtoalignandcoherewithsomePPAsandpolicypillars,butnotsomuchinHDNframe.InSomalia,theFinnishhumanitarianapproachappearstooperateinsilosandisfurtheraccentuatedbythelong-termhumanitarianprinciplesapproachinplacetoassistSomalirefugeesincampsinKenya.IntheAfghan context, the gradual inclusion of FD andHDNundermined policy coherencemainlybecauseofthestrongemphasisonmigrationcontrolobjectives.Thelatteraredrivenbyashort-


termpoliticalagendaratherthanlongertermandmoreholisticmeasuresthatwouldberequiredtoaddresstherootcausesofconflictanddisplacement.However,theFinnishMFA’sapproachtoFDandHDNappearstobetoacertainextentcoherentwithitspartnersatthebilateralandmultilaterallevel.


InthecontextofSomaliaandtheMENAregion,thereseemstobeanabsenceofclearmechanismstopro-motepolicycoherence.InthecaseofSomalia,interviewsuncoveredsomeincoherenceintheoperation-alisationofthehumanitariananddevelopmentnexusduetoasiloapproachbeingtakentotheirimple-mentationandthelackofconsultationsandcoordinationbetweenthedifferentunitsdealingwithHDNandFDattheEmbassyofFinland.

Unlike the other two case studies that have country/ region strategies, development cooperation inAfghanistanislinked,since2012,totheexistenceofwhitepapersthatareproducedevery4yearsthatensurecoherenceandalignmentbetweenpoliciesandactualoperations.FDandHDNwerenotreferredtointhefirsttwowhitepapers,but,whilethelatestwhitepaperof2018doesengagewithFD,itdoessowithaclearemphasistowards’sustainable’returns(i.e.preventingnewdisplacements).Otherwise,whilethemodusoperandi of the comprehensive approach intends tobring togetherdifferentpolicypillars,inpracticethisdoesnotguaranteecoherencebetweenthedifferentpolicypillars,especiallyasinternalmechanisms-notablyaroundfunding-preventratherthanpromotecoherence.


AstheMFAdoesnothaveclearorstrongpoliciesonFDorHDN,thereisaninherentlimitationtoassesshowcoherentthesemaybe inrelationtothepoliciesofotheractorsonthesametopics.Finnishpoli-ciesonAfghanistanandtheMENAregionhavegenerallybeenperceivedasbeingcoherentandnotablyalignedtheFinland’sPPAs.However,intheAfghancasethegradualinclusionofFDandHDNinthewid-erpoliciesunderminedpolicycoherence.TheMoI’semphasisonmigrationcontrolhashadaclearimpactoncountryprogrammewiththeprioritisationgivensince2016tothereturnoffailedasylumseekerstoAfghanistan,apolicythatwasmetwitheitherindifferenceorcriticismbytheMFA.TheMFA’spoliciesonFDandHDNaremoreeasilyalignedwiththatofmultilateralpartnerswiththecaveatthatthesepartnersmayhavediverseopinionsandprioritiesonhowtotackletheissue.

TheFinnishcountrystrategyforSomaliaisalignedwiththeSomaliNationalDevelopmentPlan.EUlevelsupport(EUEmergencyTrustFundwiththeoriginalmandateofpreventingmigration,militaryandcivil-iancrisismanagementetc)basicallyaimsatcreatingconditionsforefficientdevelopmentcooperation.AlargepartofFinland’shumanitarianaidtointernationalorganisationsisnon-earmarkedthusincreasingthechanceforcoherence–butreducingFinland’svisibilityatthetableswheredecisionsabouttheuseofthefundsaremade.CSOfundingiscoherentwiththeDPPandwiththeSomaliacountrystrategy.


ThecasestudiesindicatethatthelevelofpolicycoherenceisnotyetadequatetosupporttheapproachestoFDandHDN.IntheAfghancontext,thereisasharedrealisationoftheimportanceofFDbothintermsofitsscaleandimpactinthecountry.Yet,thereisnounifiedorcoherentwaytoaddressit.Finland’spushtowardsreturnsofAfghanswiththeensuingimplicationsofreturningtoafragilestateandconflictcon-textdoesnotalwayssitcomfortablywithFinland’sotherdevelopmentcooperationpriorities.


InSomalia,whileEUlevelfundingisinpartdirectlytargetedtoreducingoutwardsmigrationfromSoma-lia(EUTF),humanitarianaidcontinuesbeingspentonhumanitarianpurposesevenafter20–30yearsofexistenceofrefugeecamps(noHDNapproachmaterialised).Morerecentinitiativesonrootcausessuchasbusinesspartnerships(foremploymentcreation)andtheplannedparticipationintheconstructionofamigrationauthority(tobeabletoreceivereturnees,includingforciblyreturned)mayincreasecoherenceiftheobjectiveistousedevelopmentcooperationasdeterrenttomigration.

IntheMENAregion,policycoherencehasbeentestedbythescaleanddiversityofoftheFinn’sengage-ment. Interventions in theMENA regionwere found to align and coherewith somePPAs andpolicy pillars,butnotsomuchinHDNframe.

The Somali Case StudyTheinterviewsprovidedsomeinsightsintothereasonsforthelowvisibilityofFinlandamongdevelopmentdonors.Thesehintatsomecoherenceissuessuchasthelackofresources,andunderstaffing,leadingtoalackofbalancebetweenthebudgetsforSomaliaandthenumberofstaffdedicatedtomonitoringandfol-low-uponhowthefundsareused.InterviewsuncoveredsomeincoherenceintheoperationalisationofthehumanitariananddevelopmentnexusduetoasiloapproachandthelackofconsultationsandcoordinationbetweenthedifferentunitsdealingwithHDNandFDattheEmbassyofFinland.TheUnitforHumanitarian AidactsintotalindependencefromtheregionalunitandSomaliastrategy,andlittleifanycoordinationandcomplementaritywasfound.ThesameindependenceappliestotheCivilSocietyUnitbutinthiscase,thefundedprojectsarealignedandsupporttheoverallFinnishstrategyforSomalia.Thepeace-makingprojectsfundedbythePoliticalDepartmentsupporttherestofFinnishinitiativesinSomalia.

Anadditionalfactor,worthpraisingononehand,isthefactthatFinlandgivesun-earmarkedhumanitar-ianfunding(orearmarkedonlyforacertaincountry),withthepracticalconsequencethatFinlanddoesnotparticipateinthedecision-makingprocessofthehumanitarianaiditgives.ThisisoneexpressionofworkinginsilostypicalinMFA,furtheraccentuatedbyyetanadditionalfactorinthecaseofFD/HDNandIDPsinSomalia:thestrongreluctanceofUNHCRtoapplytheDurableSolutionsapproachforSoma-lianrefugeesincampsinKenya,leadingtostrongrelianceoveralong-termhumanitarianapproachandprinciples,ratherthanevolvingtowardsanHDNapproach.

The Afghan Case StudyMostKIs supported the ‘comprehensive approach’whichby combiningpolitical, civilian andmilitaryinterventionsasamodusoperandiencouragespolicycoherence.Theyconfirmeditsadequacyandrele-vancetotheAfghancontextwheretherestillisanactiveconflict.AKInotedasespeciallyvaluabletohavedevelopmentcooperationspecialistsworkingalongsidepoliticalexperts.Yet,furthereffortsareneededtoovercometheremainingtendencytoworkinsilos.TheHDNnexusmayhowevernotbeasrelevantasinpostconflictcontexts,whicharemoreconducivetodevelopment.

OnedimensionofFinland’spolicy towardsAfghanistanofpreventing furtherarrivalsofmigrantsandreducingthecurrentcaseloadhasbeentoprioritisereturnsbothvoluntaryandinvoluntary.TheMoItooktheleadroleinnegotiatingthereturnagreementbecausethemigrationmanagementportfolioisownedbytheMoI.ThispushforreturnscreatedsomefrictionswiththeMFA’sprioritiesandreflectedacertainlackofcoherencewithitsdevelopmentcooperationobjectivessinceconcurrentlythesecuritysituationonthegroundworsenedandtheincreasednumbersofbothreturneesandIDPsfurtherinflatedthehumani-tariancrisisinthecountry.ThehighhumanrisksassociatedwithreturnsofAfghanslettoatemporaryhaltonsuchpracticeinSeptember2018,followingthereleaseofnewUNHCRGuidelines.Yet,thatsus-pensiononlylastedaweekandtheFinnishmigrationofficethenissuednewguidelineswhichinprincipleauthorisedtheresumptionofreturns.SomeKIsexpresseddoubtsregardingthecoherenceandefficiencyofsuchpolicyinthecontextoffragilestates,asitislikelytoleadtomoremigrationoutofAfghanistan.


The MENA Case StudyEvidencefromtheMENAcasestudysuggestthatpolicycoherencehasbeentestedbythescaleanddiver-sityofFinland’sengagement.Onechallengeisthespreadoftheprogramme.Fundingisfiniteandifitisspreadtoothinlyitisdifficulttoretaincoherence.Attheprogrammaticlevel,Finland’sinterventionsintheMENAregionwerefoundtoalignandcoherewithsomePPAsandpolicypillars,butnotsomuchintheHDNframe.Projects towhichFinlandcontributesseemto lackstrategyanddirectconnectionstoHDNandFD.Donors includingFinlandhavebeenexperiencing fundingchallenges,placingstressonpolicycoherence,whileHDNrequirespredictable,non-earmarked,multi-yearfunding.

Therehavealsobeenchallengesinsynchronisingmessagingbetweentheheadquartersandthefield.Yet,whileheadquartershavethemoneyandmakethedecisions, itseemstobetakingmessagingfromthefieldintoaccount.TheMFAisalsoviewedbyseveralKIsasverystrongongenderequalityandwomenandgirlsatthefieldlevel.Finlandappearstohaveinternalisedthegenderissuesandpolicymakingfromheadquartersdowntothefield.ItsengagementisfullyconsistentandcoherentwiththewomenandgirlsPPAof2016DPPandalsobearsstronglyonthepeaceandsecurityPPA.Finland iscoherentonmostsubstantive issuesbutwhereit lackscoherenceisaroundadministrativeprocedures–namelyfundingprocedures–todeliveritspolicies.

TheMFAiscloselyalignedwithadvocacyonpeacebuildingandfacilitatingcoherenceandco-ordinatingInternationalNGOstheyhavefundedintheSyrianpeaceprocessinvolvingtheSyriangovernment,oppo-sitionandKurdishgroup.ThisactivityiscoherentwithpeaceandciviliancrisismanagementpolicypillarsalthoughnotexplicitlyinanHDNframe.AnotherexampleofcoherenceisincontextoftheUNHabitat/FELM-CSI(CommonSpaceInitiative)Syriapeacebuildingprocess.MFAisnotfundingtheUNHabitatProgramme,buttheyareimportantpartnerforCSI.


ANNEX 8: CASE STUDY AFGHANISTAN

Answer to EQ 1


There isno evidence that theMFAdeveloped clear approaches toFDandHDN, especially inthe earlier period covered by the evaluation.While forced displacement is without contest akeyfeatureoftheAfghancontextandhasbeenforyears,Finland’semergingengagementwiththeconceptcanmoreevidentlybelinkedtothearrival inFinlandin2015of largenumbersofmigrantsandrefugees,includingofAfghansanditsresponse,alignedwithadomesticpoliticalshifthasbeentogivegreateremphasisonreturnpolicies.WiththemassivereturnsofAfghans,thefollowingyearfromIranandPakistanwhothenaddedthemselvestothelargenumbersofIDPsthatcountthecountry,Finlandstaredtoconsiderwithmoreinterestsomeoftheimplicationstothesepopulationmovementsandtosupporttheir’integration’,aspartofawidereffort[includingatEUlevel]topreventmigration.TherearealsosignsofincreasedknowledgeandengagementbutlimitedasthebroaderintegratedapproachistheestablishedframeworkinAfghanistan.

Key findings on judgement criteriaJC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s development policies is clearly formulated and well-established

AlthoughFDhasbeenakeyfeatureoftheAfghancontextfordecadesitismainlyabsentfromMFA’spolicy formulation inrelation toAfghanistan.Policydocumentsdevelopedaround2013–2014donotengagewiththeconceptbutmoresurprisinglynotevenwiththerelatedconceptsofrefugeesandinternaldis-placement.ThisgapisconfirmedbyKIsworkinginAfghanistanduringthisperiod.The2015‘Europeanrefugeecrisis’andatadifferentlevelthereturncampaignsbyPakistanandIranactedasagamechangerwithamuchcleareremphasisputnotsomuchonFDbutonmigrationcontrolandreturn.Bothwrittenpoliciesandtheirprogrammatictranslationshavenotablyfocussedonreturn,includingthroughgreatersupportforreturnees.

TheengagementwiththeHDNconceptinAfghanistantakesawiderstancethroughthecomprehensiveapproachthatistheframeworkadoptedbyFinlandinAfghanistan.

JC 1.2: The manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented

ThemannerinwhichtheMFAhasengagedwithFDinAfghanistanhashadsomeimpactoverFinland’son-goingcomittmenttowardsthe5PPsandPPAs.ForsomeoftheKIs,theemphasisonmigrationcontrol inaconflictand fragilecontext likeAfghanistan isnotalwayseasilycompatiblewith theemphasisonhumanrights.


ThecomprehensiveapproachiswelldevelopedinAfghanistanandisdescribedbymostKIsasagoodmodelwherebydevelopmentandhumanitarianobjectivescoincide,althoughitdoesnotentirelypreventthesiloapproach.

ThepolicyprioritiesforAfghanistanarecloselyalignedwiththePPAsasdescribedinthe2016DPPwithaclearemphasisonthefirstPPAabouttherightsofwomenandgirlswhichhasbeendescribedbynearlyallKIsasakeyfocusareas.Thereisalsoanemphasisonlivelihoodandsupporttotheruleoflaw.


AsnotedaboveinAfghanistan,therehasbeenaclearemphasisonwomenandgirlsbutthisapproachhasnotbeenextendedtoconsideringthespecificvulnerabilitiestriggeredbydisplacement.Amongtheweak-nessesandgapsnotedinthecasestudyfeature internaldisplacement:evenifsomedevelopmentpro-jectactivitieshavebenefittedIDPpopulations,theirneedsandvulnerabilityhavenotbeenacknowledgedandtheyhavenotbeentargetedassuchwiththeexceptionofasmallscaleexploratoryprojectaddress-inglivelihoodneedsofdifferentdisplacedpopulations,includingIDPs.UrbandisplacementisalsoagapdespitebeingacharacteristicofthedisplacementforbothIDPsandreturnees.ClimatechangeisseenasakeyissueintheAfghancontext,butonethathasreceivedinsufficientconsiderationbyFinlanddespiterecentevidence(droughtcurrentlyaffectingAfghanistan)thatclimaterelatedeventsprecipitatepopula-tiondisplacement.

Answer to EQ 2

EQ2.TowhatextentandhowhasFinland’sevolvingapproach to/interpretationofFDandHDNbeenanadequateresponsetothechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?

The’evolvingapproachandinterpretationofFD’[andtolesserextendHDN]canbeobservedinthecontextofAfghanistanbuttheprogrammatictranslationofthisgreaterattentiontowardsthephenomenonremainslimitedinintensityandscaleincomparisontotheotherareas,especiallyaroundgenderandwomen’sempowermentwhereFinland’sinfluenceismostwidelyrecognised.

Key findings on judgement criteriaJC2.1 Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art’/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA

Finland’sinitialengagementinAfghanistanlikemuchoftherestoftheinternationalcommunityhasbeenfocusedonthesecurityandstabilisationofthecountrywithstatebuildinganddevelopmentgoalsgradu-allyfeaturingmoreprominently.TheengagementhasmostlyleftoutanyconsiderationoranalysisofFDuntilrecently,lesssoonHDNasAfghanistaniswherethecomprehensiveapproachmodelemergedandwasfirsttested[byFinlandandothers].

JC2.2 Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of the other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions in EU, UNHCR’) and CSOs

Finland’sengagementwithotheractorshasbeendescribedinpositivetermsasindeedeitheralignedorcomplementarytothatofotheractors.Finlandishoweveracknowledgedasleadingontheissueofgender


parityandwomen,peaceandsecurityandwhilethereisevidenceofthecountry’sinfluenceinthisdomain,thelinkswithFDhavenotbeenexplored.

JC2.3 Influence: MFA policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral and multilateral partners has been sustained and effective

Finland’sroletowardsFDandHDNhasbeenquitelimitedonaverageanditsinterestcircumscribedandfairlyrecent(whilethephenomenonofFDitselfhasalwaysbeenthere)toidentifyanypolicyinfluencetowardsbilateralandmultilateralpartners.Finland’sinfluencehasmoreobviouslybeensignificantandsystematicongenderparityandonwomenpeaceandsecuritybuteveninrelationtothesethecountrymainlyfailedtoconnectittoFDandconsiderthespecificvulnerabilityofdisplacedwomen.

Answer to EQ 3


FinnishpoliciesonAfghanistanhavegenerallybeenperceivedasbeingcoherentandnotablyalignedtheFinland’sPPAs.However,whilethegradualinclusionofFDandHDNinthewiderpoliciesdidnothelpbutratherunderminedpolicycoherence,thesameisobservedintheAfghancontext.Themainreasonforwhichcoherencemaybeweakenedratherthanstrengthenedrelatetothestrongemphasisonmigrationcontrolobjectivesthataredrivenbyashort-termpoliticalagendaratherthanlongertermandmoreholisticmeasuresthatwouldberequiredtoaddresstherootcausesofconflictanddisplacement.

Key findings on judgement criteriaJC3.1 Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively

Unlike the other two case studies that have country/ region strategies, development cooperation inAfghanistan is linkedto theexistencesince2012ofwhitepapers thatareproducedevery4years thatensurecoherenceandalignmentbetweenpoliciesandactualoperations.FDandHDNhavebeenabsentofthefirsttwowhitepapersbutwhilethelatestwhitepaperof2018engageswithFD,itdoessowithaclearemphasisestowards’sustainable’returns(i.e.preventingnewdisplacements).Otherwise,whilethemodusoperandiofthecomprehensiveapproachintendstobringtogetherdifferentpolicypillars,inprac-ticethisdoesnotguaranteecoherencebetweenthedifferentpolicypillars,especiallyasinternalmecha-nisms-notablyaroundfunding-preventratherthanpromotecoherence.

JC3.2 There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Govern-ment Ministries/ Departments (e.g. MoI and PMO MoD) and the MFA’s partners bilateral and multilat-eral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs)

AstheMFAdoesnothaveclearorstrongpoliciesonFDorHDN,thereisaninherentlimitationtoassesshowcoherentthesemaybeinrelationtothepoliciesofotheractorsonthesametopics.WhathowevertranspiresmoreclearlyisthattheMoI’semphasisonmigrationcontrolhashadaclearimpactoncountryprogrammewiththeprioritisationgivensince2016tothereturnoffailedasylumseekerstoAfghanistan,apositionthatwasmeetwitheitherindifferenceorcriticismbytheMFA.MFA’spoliciesonFDandHDNaremoreeasilyalignedwiththatofothermulti-lateralpartnerswiththecaveatthatthesepartnersmayhavediverseopinionsandprioritiesonhowtotackletheissue.


JC3.3 The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN

ThelevelofpolicycoherenceisprobablyinsufficientorinadequatetoachieveacommonapproachtoFDandHDN.InrelationtoFDwhilethereisasharedrealisationoftheimportanceofthephenomenonbothintermsofitsscaleandimpactinAfghanistan,thereisnounifiedorcoherentwaytoaddressitandFin-land’spushtowardsreturnsofAfghanswiththeensuingimplicationsofreturningtoafragilestateandconflictcontextdoesnotalwayssitcomfortablywithFinland’sotherdevelopmentcooperation’spriorities.

Introduction: Context and overview of Finland’s engagement in the countryWhileFinland’scontributiontowardsAfghanistanissmallcomparedtootherdonors,itissignificantifonelookattheaidper capitaandAfghanistancontinuestobethebiggestrecipientofFinnishaidwithanannualbudgetofapproximately30MEURperyear,evenifactualdisbursementsperyearcanbelower.

Figure 5: Disbursements extended to Afghanistan by year 2012–2018

Note:1-2012;2-2013;3-2014;4-2015;5-2016;6-1017;7-2018

Finland’slevelofengagementinAfghanistanhasalsoremainedconstantovertheyearsandithasestab-lishedalong-term(over17years)relationthathasseveralphases.Finland’sinvolvementinAfghanistandatesbackto2002andwasinitiallyconceivedasashort-termCivil-MilitaryCo-operation(CIMIC)pro-ject. In2004Finland reinforced itspresence though its involvement in theProvincialReconstructionTeam(PRT)inthenorthofthecountryincooperationwithNorway,aninterventionfocusedoncivilianhumanitarianactivitiesandthesecuritysectorreform.In2007,Finland’sdeployedinMazar-i-SharifonaSweden-leadCIMICoperationpartoftheISAFmissionthatwasterminatedattheendof2014.In2009developmentcooperationwithAfghanistanincreasedwhenFinland’spresenceinKabulwasupgradedtoEmbassystatus.Since2015FinlandmaintaineditspresencepursuingatthemilitarylevelanadvisoryandtrainingroletotheAfghanmilitary.

Finland’s development cooperation support to Afghanistan ismainly channelled throughmultilateralactorssuchas theWorldBank thatmanaged theAfghanistanReconstructionTrustFund(ARPF)andtheUNagencies.ThisincludeshumanitarianassistanceandsupporttocivilsocietyorganisationsaswellasthefundingofciviliancrisismanagementthatmeetstheOECDcriteriafordevelopmentcooperation.HumanitarianfundingishoweverchannelledseparatelyandhandleddirectlyfromHelsinkiwithmorelimitedinvolvementfromMFAstaffdeployedinKabul.

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Figure 6: Disbursements extended for Afghanistan 2012–2018 by channel

Note:1:Donorgovernment(fundsforlocalcooperation,etc.),2:NGO/CSOs(10%);3:Multilateralorganisations(76%);4:Other

Duringtheinterviews,Afghanistanwasdescribedas‘a complex environment with lots of different parallel dynamics’,whileothersKIshighlightedhow‘in Afghanistan everything is politically motivated’.AmajorityofKIsgaveableakviewofthesituationinAfghanistan,oneKIdescribinga‘sliding slope since 2003’ and expresseddoubtswhethertheinvolvementoftheinternationalcommunityhasreallybenefitedAfghans.AnotherKI,referringtotheconferenceheldaboutAfghanistaninGenevainNovember2019mentionedthe‘disconnect between politics and reality’.InparallelotherKIIsconfirmingtheimportanceofFinland’spresence[togetherwiththerestoftheinternationalcommunity]:‘what would happen if we are not there?’ andthatitisimportantto ‘ensure that at least things are maintain at the same level’(thatthesituationdoesn’tgetworst).Whilealsoacknowledgingthechallenges,twoKIs,bothhavingbeeninvolvedoveralongperiod,offeredamoreoptimisticvisionaboutthecountry’sfutureandhopethatthegenerationalshiftthatisunderwaywouldbringpositivechange.

The2014Evaluation on Peace and Development in Finland’s Development CooperationhighlightedhowinAfghanistan ‘productivity and growth in the labour market are inhibited by corruption, weak government capacity and poor public infrastructure’.Itfurthernotedthatlivingstandardsandinfantmortalityratesarerankedamongthelowestintheworld,evendespitethesignificantincreaseoffunctioninghealthfacilitieswithqualifiedhealthworkersfrom2002(MFA2014,107).Fouryearslater,thesecurity,economicandpoliticalsituationsremainveryunsettledandwide-spreadcorruptionisstillaplaguethathampersstatebuildingmeasureandprojects.AccordingtoUNAMA,thenumberofciviliandeathsreachedarecordhighin2017afternearlyadecadeofrisingcasualtiesandwhilethehighestnumberofciviliancasualtieseffect-ingchildrenmainlyhasbeenintheKabulprovincethegeographicalspreadindicatesthecountry-widecharacterofthewar(UNAMA2017,5)Theinternationalcommunityalsopaidahightributewithnotablyover100aidworkerskilledin2017,thehighestnumberintheworldfollowedbyahightollaswell inSouthSudanandSyria.

AllKIsacknowledgedthatthecountrystillhashugeneeds.Severalfactorswereputforwardtoexplainthechallengingenvironment,includingtheworseningofthesecuritysituation,themultiplicityofactorsandthelackofcoordinationinacontextinwhich‘too much money was poured in too fast’.

Policy Mapping/Documentation Findings DespitetherelevanceofFDbothinscaleandinthevariousformsittakesintheAfghancontext(internaldisplacement,cross-bordermovement,returns)thereisasurprisinglackofreferencetoFDinearlieroffi-cialpoliciesrelatedtoAfghanistan.OneexplanationputforwardbyaKIisrelatedtothedominanceofthemilitaryandpoliticalprioritiesatthetimewhileFDwasrelegatedtothehumanitarianremit.

Other

Multilateral organisation (76%)

NGO/CSO (10%)

Donor government (Fund for Local Cooperation etc)1.

2. 1. Donor government (Fund for Local Cooperation etc)

2. NGO/CSO (10%)

3. Multilateral organisation (76%)

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Multilateral organisation (76%)

NGO/CSO (10%)

Donor government (Fund for Local Cooperation etc)

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Thedocumentsanalysisclearlyshowsthatpriorto2015,FDisverymuchabsentfrompolicy.The2013PartnershipAgreementwithAfghanistanisaholisticdocumentcoveringpoliticalissues,aid,andsecurity.Itcontainsasmallreferencetoreturneesbutonethatisframedasastatementofintentionnotasanactu-alpolicylikeinthe2018WhitePaper(seebelow).The2014WhitePaperonAfghanistangivesanover-viewofthecontextbutwhileseveralconsequencesoftheconflict/postconflictsituationarementioned(e.g.on-goinginstability,destructionofthecountry’ssocialandtechnicalinfrastructureanditseconomy)thereisnotasinglereferencetodisplacementofcivilianswhetherrefugeesorIDPs(orabouttheirreturntoAfghanistan).ThisgapisverysurprisingconsideringthehighlevelofdisplacementinAfghanistan(atall time). Interestingly there isasmall referenceto theAfghandiaspora[inFinland]at theendof thedocument:‘The over 3,000 people of Afghan origin who currently live in Finland can be counted as a major resource for the further development of Finno-Afghan relations in the spheres of economy and trade and also more generally’(MFA2014,30).ThereareothergapsintheWhitePaper,especiallynoreferencetoclimatechange.

Thisgapisevenmoresurprisingthatthe2014Evaluation on Peace and Development in Finland’s Develop-ment Cooperationwhichpredatesandinformedthe2014WhitePaperdidacknowledgedthekeyroleofFD:‘four decades of conflict in Afghanistan have been one of the key drivers of displacement, creating sub-stantial refugee populations requiring support’(MFA2014,107)

The2018 White Papercontrarilytothe2014versionengageswithFDbutalmostentirelyandexclusivelywithafocusonreturns,mentioningFinland’spromotionofvoluntaryreturns(concerned144Afghansin2016)anditsobjectivestowardsnon-voluntaryreturnstoothroughtheEUJointWayForward(signedinOctober2016)anditsbilateralagreementonreturnsonasimilarmodelalsodevelopedbyGermanyandSweden(some18Afghanswerereturnedbythepolicein2016whilethenumberreached54byNovem-ber2017).Thepaperalsoacknowledgesthelarge-scalereturnsofrefugeesandundocumentedmigrantsfrombothPakistanandIranandFinland’ssupporttowardemploymentopportunitiesofreturnees(i.e.theinter-agencySALAMproject)andthroughhumanitarianassistanceprovidedthroughUNHCRandtheRedCross.ThenewWhitePaperalsohasaclearfocusonmigration,inalignmenttotheEUframeworkaroundmemberstatescooperationinsupportingthepeaceprocess,regionalcooperationandcontrolledmigration.

AninternalMFAreportonresultsofcooperationwithAfghanistanfrom2018alsofocusedextensivelyonreturns(bothfromFinlandandtheregion).YetitalsomentionedthestaggeringhighnumberofIDPsinthecountry,ofwhichamajorityarewomenanditisthefirstFMAdocumentthataddressedtherelatedvulnerabilitiesthatthesewomenfaceasaresultofdisplacementandthelackofidentificationdocuments,especiallytheimpossibilitytoaccessessentialservices.

HDNisnotoftenmentionedindocumentsrelatedtoAfghanistanmainlybecausethebroadercomprehen-sivecrisismanagementconceptistheoperatingframeworkinAfghanistan.The2014Evaluation Peace and Development in Finland’s Development Cooperation Synthesis- Afghanistan highlights that ‘rather than being a conventional country programme evaluation, it focuses on the peace, security and development nexus’(MFA2014,102).Itthenclarifieshowinsuchcontext,‘development cooperation includes a wide range of interven-tions supporting conflict prevention and mitigation indirectly, with development cooperation being implemented in parallel with diplomacy, crisis management and humanitarian assistance’(MFA2014,03).The2014White Papersimilarlyrefersto ‘the cross-cutting objectives of Finland’s development efforts for Afghanistan (i.e. human rights, women’s rights, equality, good governance and anti-corruption activities)’(ibid.,16).

KIIs Findings MostKIsintheMFAweresupportiveoftheso-called‘comprehensiveapproach’whichcombinespolitical,civilianandmilitaryinterventionsasamodusoperandi,andtheyconfirmeditsadequacyandrelevancetotheAfghancontextwheretherestillisanactiveconflict(‘it is the only possible approach’).AKInotedas


especiallyvaluabletohavedevelopmentcooperationspecialistsworkingalongsidepoliticalexperts.Itwasacknowledgedthatthecomprehensiveapproachhadevolvedovertimewithamoredominantmilitaryinvolvementatthebeginningwhiletheciviliancomponentsubsequentlyincreasedinimportance.PartnerKIshadmoremixedviewsaboutthecomprehensiveapproach;oneKIhighlightedthat‘there are certainly a number of challenges and possible contradictions in relation to the comprehensive approach’ and added that‘it is good to be at least conscious about them’.

WhileoneKIacknowledgedthatbringingindevelopmentobjectivesfromthebeginningisimportant,inpracticeapostconflictcontextismoreconducive–andinthecontextofAfghanistanwhichisanactiveconflictagain–thenexusisjustlessrelevant.

AllMFAKIsacknowledgedthatFDispartandparceloftheAfghancontextbutalsothatitwasinitiallyjustnotfeaturinginthepoliticalagendaofFinlandandevenifsomeprojectswouldhavetargeteddis-placedpopulationtheissuewasjustnotvisible;it‘was a side note’(otherthanforhumanitarianexperts).Instead,Finland’sinitialinvolvementinAfghanistanwasdrivenbysecurityconsiderations(linkedtothefightagainstterrorism)aswellaspoliticalinterests(linkedtotheNATOpartnership).Humanrightscon-siderations,especiallythewillingnesstoaddressthesituationofwomenalsocameintotheequationwhilethedevelopmentcomponentonlycamesubsequently.

TherearetwoparalleldimensionsthatexplaintherisingprofileofFDinrelationtoAfghanistan.Thefirstrelatestothearrivalof30,000asylumseekerstoFinland(‘eyes started to open when the refugees started to come to Finland’)asamongthemwerealargeportionofAfghans(alongSyrianandIraqinationals).TheotherislinkedtothemassivereturnsofAfghansfromIranespeciallyandPakistantriggeredbyamixedofpullandpushfactorswhichmobilisedtheeffortsofpartnersbasedinthecountryto‘prevent an infold-ing humanitarian situation’.Themassivereturnsmainlyaffectedthe3citiesofKabul,Mazar-e-SharifandHeratwhichontopwitnessedanincreasednumberofIDPsduetotheseveredrought.

TheotherdimensionofFinland’spolicytowardsAfghanistantopreventfurtherarrivalsandreducethecurrentcaseloadhasbeentoprioritisereturnsbothvoluntaryandnon-voluntary.OneMFAKIinsistedonthefactthatmigrationmanagementportfolio[andthepushforreturns]is‘owned by the MoI, it is their responsibility’.TheMoItooktheleadroleinnegotiatingthereturnagreement(signedinOctober2016,alongthe‘JointWayForward’signedattheEUlevel).ThereturnofsomeAfghansfromFinland(about10,000fromEurope)wasa ‘political statement’.AnotherKIsawitlessasasignalatdomesticlevelbutbelievedthemotivationforthatagreementwasto‘push Afghanistan to take some responsibility’.

Eveniftheactualnumbersofreturneeshavebeensosmall,severalMFApersonnelnotedhowitwasadifficultpositiontoholdasatthetimewhenastrongfocuswasplacedonreturnbyHelsinki,thesecuritysituationonthegroundworsenedandtheincreasednumbersofbothreturneesandIDPsinflatedfurtherthehumanitariancrisisinthecountry.AKInotedhowthis‘idée fixe about wanting returns’isnoteasilycompatiblewiththedeterioratingsituationinAfghanistan(‘the push for Afghanistan to take back those not eligible for refugee status should be considered within the bigger picture of the situation in Afghanistan’).AnotherKIfoundthereturnpolicytobeproblematicasthereareveryfewplaceswherepeoplecanactu-allysafelyreturnto,implyingthattherearehighrisksforthereturnees,puttingintoquestionthatpolicy:‘not sure this policy is human’ and ‘that it is fair to put people in great danger’(evenifitishardtotracewhatactuallyhappenstothesereturnees,whethersomehavelosttheirlives...).ThisviewwasillustratedbythefactthatinSeptember2018,thereturnsofAfghanswasputonholdinFinlandfollowingthereleaseofnewUNHCRGuidelines(UNHCR2018b)butthatsuspensiononlylastedaweekandtheFinnishmigra-tionofficeissuednewguidelineswhichinprincipleauthorisedtheresumptionofreturns(followingthepracticeinothercountries,notablyGermany).Thatepisode(suspensionfollowedbytheresumptionofreturnscanbeexplainedbyFinland’sconcernofcreatingpull factors forprospectiveasylum-seekers).Evenmorepragmaticviewsdonotfindthelogicofthispolicy: ‘it is crazy to consider return when most people will leave again’ but also that ‘there is not much point to adopt this strategy [return] for fragile states’.


ButanotherKIreflectedthat,‘if the return of some was the price to pay for maintaining Finland’s presence in Afghanistan, then it was probably worth paying that price’.AtthesametimethecomplexityofthequestionwasacknowledgedaswellastheneedtoconsiderFinland’sconcernsabouttheimpactofhavingincreasednumberofmigrants/refugees.AndanotherKIwondered‘how much of that emphasis on preventing migra-tion is part of a change of rhetoric rather than actual work?’

In2017thenumbersofAfghanasylumseekersarrivingtoFinlandwentdownasaresultofFinnishandEuropeanpoliciesmorebroadly,andthereturninfluxtoAfghanistanfromIranandPakistanalsosloweddownmainlydue tonegotiationsbetween thehosts and return countries.But, althoughno longer an‘emergencysituation’,beyondthis‘crisis’FinlandbecameawarethatFDasaphenomenonisforecastedtoacceleratewithmorepeoplecomingfromfragilestatecontextsandfromplacesexperiencingasignificantpopulationgrowthandsufferingfromtheeffectsofclimatechange/watershortage,allthreecharacteris-ticsoftheAfghancontext.

Theabovedevelopmentandnewpolicyenvironmentexplainwhytherhetoricthatlinksdevelopmentandmigration,whichtoanextentsurpassedtheonelinkingsecurityanddevelopmentthatjustifieddevelop-mentcooperationintheearlierphase,wasappliedintheAfghancontext;andsotopreventthecontinuousarrivalsofAfghanstoEurope,thegovernmentconcededtocontinuefundingdevelopmentinthecountry.AsputbyoneKI, ‘the large arrival of Afghan asylum-seekers to Finland triggered the need to change the content of the development package’.

SupportAfghanistanLivelihoodsandMobility(SALAM)project

At a programmatic level, since 2017 Finland is supporting a new project, called SALAM inNangarhar province [across the border with Pakistan] that clearly addresses FD in all itscomplexity anddimensions and that also engageswith thenexus. Its aim is to offerdurablesolutions to displaced people, including returnees and IDPs and to the host community byprovidingvocationalandskillstraining,matchingpotentialemployeeswithprivatebusinesses,and developing policies formanagedmigration. The project, ran jointly by UNDP and ILO,supportedbyUNHCR,inpartnershipwiththeMinistryofLabour,SocialAffairs,MartyrdomandtheDisabled(MOLSAMD),focusesonsupportingself-reliance,povertyreductionofthedifferentdisplacedgroupswhichisatthecoreofwhatHDNisabout.

The project while considered relevant, innovative, ‘concrete and tangible’, holding a greatpotentialandbeingagoodillustrationofcooperation.Butthereareanumberofchallengesanddrawbacksto theproject.First, theprojecthasaveryshort timeframe1year-andevenwiththeone-yearnocostextensiongrantedthis isnotseenasrealistic.Mostcrucially, thisshort-termtimeframe isseencontrary to the longer-termvision inherent to theproject-asa resultthe focus has been on the delivery rather than the longer-term objectives (‘the project hasbecometheendratherthanthemean’).Asecondchallengerelatestothemanagementoflabourmigrationpillaroftheproject(whichessentiallymeanstheexportationoflabourforcetoArabStates).HerethefocushasbeenoninstitutionalcapacitydevelopmentoftheAfghanMinistryofInterior,andthistaskhasprovedquitechallengingbecauseitisa‘supplydrivenprocess’aboutexporting lowskilledworkers.However,abenefitof thisprojecthasbeen in termsof lessonslearnedandreferredespecially to thepartnershipwith theWB in termsof labourmigration-so this ‘pilotproject’mayhavehelp theWBtoestablisha solidengagementwith theAfghanMinistryofInterior.Thirdly,thenarrowgeographicfocusonNangarharprovinceisseenanother‘in-built’limitation:indeed,thehighnumberofreturneesandIDPsfindthemselvesinasituationofmarketsaturation. Itappears that theSALAMprojectwas initiallyconceivedasanationalframework–andthismuchbroaderremit(thanwhatitisnow)wouldhavebeenadequate/more


appropriate(wouldhaveenablepeopletomoveacrossregionsinareaswheretheemploymentmarketmaybemoredynamic).Asforthechallengingsecuritysituationis‘justthepriceofdoinganybusinessinAfghanistan’.

In terms of drawbacks, because government premises were not available for the projectimplementation–thenumberofbeneficiarieshadtobereducedastheprojecthadtorelyontheprivatesectortoprovidefacilities(whichwascostlier).Partnersnowseetheroleoftheprivatesectorisanecessity.

FewKIsattheMFAengagedwiththeissuerelatedtoHDN,possiblybecausetheconceptappliedmoreexplicitly[andmaybepromoted]inotheroperationalcontextsliketheMiddleEastandalsobecausethecomprehensiveapproachisthedominantoperatingframeworkthatappliesinAfghanistan.OneKIwasdoubtfulaboutthetraditionalwayofconsideringhumanitarianaidbecauseofthe‘inherent risk of render-ing people passive’butacknowledgethestruggletochangetheapproachasitisclearlystillimportanttoaddressbasicvitalneeds.AnotherKIneverthelesshighlightedhowhumanitarianneedsinAfghanistanaremuchgreaternow,andcurrentlyunder-estimated,andmentionedpopulationgrowth,foodinsecurityandtheimpactofthedroughtasamongthekeyreasonsandhowtheseneedsarecurrentlyunder-estimat-ed.Thereisatendency,moreprevalentinthemannerthatthingsworkatHQratherthaninAfghanistan,tofocusonnarrowtasksandfollowthesiloapproachwhenhavingawiderviewiswhatisneeded.

MostpartnerKIshadlittleclueaboutFinland’spositiononFDandHDNwiththeexceptionofthosemoredirectlyinvolvedwiththeSALAMproject(mentionedabove)butnotwithstandingofFinland’spositiononthesethemes,formanyofthebilateralpartnersthesewereissuesthattheyhadthemselvesintegratedandprioritised.OnepartnerKIconfirmedthepointoftheMFAaboveaboutthefactthatmostprojectsthatFinlandsupportarenotespeciallytargetingforciblydisplacedpopulations,addingthatthisdoesnotmeanthattheyareexcludedeithersuspectingthatahighrateofreturneeswereamongthebeneficiaries(thesameKIanecdotallynotedthatamongthenationalstaff(educatedandyoung–mainlyunder40)possiblyupto80%didn’tgrowupinAfghanistanbutratherinPakistanorIran).

Bridgingthenexusandfocusingonbuildingresiliencewasdescribedasapriorityforanumberoforgani-sationsandasputbyoneKI,‘for every penny in humanitarian work, there should be a seed for development work’,addingthathumanitarianworktakingplacealongsidedevelopmentoffersabetterscenariointhelongrun.TheconceptofHPDNseemstogetevengreatertractionandtoresonatewithamajorityofpart-nerKIswhohighlightedthatallactivitiesaredoneunderabroader‘peace building umbrella’.OneKIfeltthatthe(triple)nexusisasustainableway(morethanHDN)ofthinking,‘it is the way to go’.

PartnerKIsacknowledgedhowbigofachallenge internaldisplacementwhichis increasing,becomingprotractedandaffectingurbanareasmainly.SeveralKIsfeltthatthegovernmentofAfghanistanhaddoneverylittletoaddressthequestionofinternaldisplacementandoneKIactuallywonderedwhetherdonors‘had given-up on the government on this’,withtheexceptionoftheEUthatwasseenashavingafirmerpositionabouttheneedforthegovernmenttotakeownershipandresponsibilityontheissue.PartnerKIswereallclearthatprioritisingreturninacountrywithsuchhighlevelofinsecurity,povertyandpoororinexistentbasicserviceswasproblematic.OneKIevenwentfurthersayingthat‘anybody pretending that there are safe areas to the returned to in Afghanistan is not credible’.AnotherKIalsoindicatedthatthefocusshouldnotbeaboutpreventingpeopletomigrate.Effortstofacilitateintegrationoncereturnshadtakenplacewereontheotherhandseenasalignedwiththewiderpeacebuildingeffortsandimportantasthecurrentrealityisthatmainlyreturneesremaininsituationofdisplacementbeingaddedtotheincreas-ingnumbersofIDPs.OneKIinsistedontheneedtogivetopeopleasenseofbelonging,whichtobeeffec-tiveimplieshavingagreatersenseofsecurityandbeingabletoaccessjobsandlivelihood.


There is certainly a ‘willingness from Finland to be influential’ but because of its limited presence andresourcesthereisalsoasexpressedbyaKIattheMFA ‘a need to think strategically about how to profile ourselves, to be in different places...’Whiletheinfluenceexerteddependsonthepersonalityofindividualpostholders,Finlandgenerallybenefits fromthe ‘reputation of not being empty but an evidence-based donor’.OneMFAKIalsohighlightedatwo-prongedstrategytoachievegreaterimpactby‘being an active participant in discussions as well as finding ‘like-minded allies’ – most often the Nordic states and Germany who had similar objectives’.The ‘need to cooperate, to share responsibilities with others’,notablywiththeEUandtheNordic+group(thatincludestheNordiccountries,Finland,Denmark,NorwayandSwedenand3otherlike-mindeddonors,theUK,theNetherlandsandCanada)wassupportedbyothersKIsattheMFA,whileFinland’sinvolvementintheNordic+groupwasnotedas‘strategic to be a bigger player’.

KIsfrompartnerorganisationsdescribedFinlandas‘an active donor’andasbeing‘influential’ eveniftheyhadlessmoneythansomeoftheotherdonors.OneKIdescribedFinlandasbeing ‘very approachable’, mentioningthat ‘not everything appears set’andthat ‘they are open to dialogue and are flexible’ even if obviouslytheyhavetheirownpoliticallymotivatedpriorities.MostKIssawFinland’spolicyinterestsasbeinggenerallyalignedwith thatof theotherNordic countriesandalsowithvaluesandprinciplesofmulti-lateralorganisations.

ThebiggestchunkofitsfundinghasbeentowardstheARTFandFinlandisamongthe10largestcontribu-torsoftheFundbutoneKIacknowledgedthatwhenprojectsaresmaller(3donorsinvolvedinaprojectsupporttoUNESCO)orwhenFinlandgoessoloinsupportingbilateralprojects,itgivesgreatervisibilitytoFinlandeveniftheseprojectsaremoredemanding.

AnotherKIexplainedthattomeettime-managementconstraintsFinlandhashadtoprioritisea‘hand-off approach’,channellingaidinsuchawaythatitdoesnotrequireactiveengagementasisthecasefortheWBFundswherethestartingpointisthatFinlanddotrusttheseorganisations.

WhileKIs fromtheMFAwereable todescribe thevariousmeansandchannelsused to influence, forpartnerorganisations thiswas lessobvious:oneKIput forwardasanexplanation the fact thatseveremovementrestrictionsformembersoftheInternationalcommunityinAfghanistanlimitedoccasionsforinteractionbecauseofthelimitednumberofcoordinationandconsultationmeetings.

Finlandhasbeenconsistentintermsofitsthematicfocusandmanyhighlightedthestrongemphasisongender,women,peaceandsecurity,girls’educationwhiletheotherNordiccountrieshadtheirownthe-maticniches(i.e.corruptionforDenmark,thefreedomofthepressforSweden).TwoKIsfoundthathav-ingsuchafocusedagendaenabledFinlandtostandoutagainstbiggerdonors.

PartnerKIsalleasilyidentifiedFinlandwithitspolicypriorities(asmentionedabove),interestinlong-termsustainabledevelopment,andhighlightedhowthatsupportwasbroadwithnospecificemphasisonpeopleinsituationofdisplacement.

ItishoweverworthhighlightingaswasmentionedbyaKI,thatthe‘money doesn’t always follow policies’ andthatinfinancialterms,thefocusonwomen’sequalityandendingGBVisverylimited.


Figure 7: Disbursed extensions to Afghanistan 2012–2018

1Education,teachertrainingandbasiclifeskills;2Vocationalandhighereducation;3Health,medicaleducation,basichealthcare,controlofinfectiousdiseases;4Reproductivehealth,controlofSTD,incl.HIV/AIDS;5DrinkingwaterandWASHeducation;6Pub-licpoliciesandlegalandjudicialsystem;7Democraticparticipationandfreeinformation;8Humanrights;9Women’sequalityandendinggender-basedviolence;10Civilianpeace-buildingandsecurity;11Removaloflandmines;12Social/welfareservices,basicsocialservices;13Mining,naturalresources(including10MEURforagriculturalpolicyforARTF);14Environmentalpolicy;15Mul-tisectoraid,drugcontrol;16Reliefassistance,reconstruction,emergencyfoodaid;17Administrativecosts;18Sectornon-specified

ItwasnotedbyKIsfromtheFMAthatwhilesomeeffortshavebeenmadetoincludetheissueofdisabilityandinclusionnotablyintheARTFchairedbytheWB,therealityisthatithasbeenlessofapriorityintheAfghancontext(wheretherearesomanyotherpriorities).Finland’sintentiontobringmoreattentiontodisabilityandinclusionwasnotedfrompartnerKIswhoconfirmed‘a willingness to give space to the issue at policy level, but with little translation on the ground given the large number of priorities’.AnotherKImen-tionedthattheissueisconfrontedwithastrongculturalbarrierofexclusionandthatgreaterengagementwouldrequiremoreattentionandtheworkofall-butasputbyoneKI‘culture can change’.

KIsattheMFAalsoidentifiedsomegaps,bothatpolicyandoperationallevel,namelyrelatedtoWASH(withtheforthcomingendtotheUNICEFprogramme),agriculture(whichisnotgettingenoughatten-tiondespitereceivingsomesupportundertheARPF),forestry(althoughpossiblylessrelevantgiventhatAfghanistanonlyhas2%offorestleft)andclimatechangewhichhasintrinsiclinkswiththeriskofhigherpopulationmovements.

Synthesis/Meta-AnalysisAwareof itssmallsize(comparedtootherdonors)FinlandhastriedtoensurecohesioninitsworkinAfghanistanandasputbyoneKIithasbeen‘a small team but with one common denominator’.

ThedocumentsanalysisandKIIsconfirmedanoverallcoherence‘between what is on paper and the pro-gramme’, i.e. a general alignment betweenwrittenpolicies, guidanceprovidedbyHelsinki and actualoperations.Allprogrammes funded inAfghanistanarebroadly in linewith thePPAseven if therearesomegaps,notablyinrelatedtoclimatechange.

However,inrelationtoFDthereisaclearevolutionintermsofwhereitfeaturesinFinland’spolicytowardsAfghanistanfrombeingan‘invisibleissue’toasignificantone.WhatalsoclearlyemergesisachangeintermsofwhatspecificaspectsofFDareconsidered,fromarelatively‘lowprofile’focusonAfghans(asref-ugeesintheregionandarelativelycontainedAfghancommunityinFinland)atthebeginningtoamuchstrongeremphasisonmigrationcontrolandreturn(bothreturneesfromFinlandandthosereturnedfrom

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IranandPakistan).Thishasgivenrisetosomeperceivedchallenges/tensions,especiallybetweenmigra-tioncontrolconcernsandon-goingdevelopmentsupportasitisnowclearerthatFinland’spresenceinAfghanistanispartlymotivatedbythe‘migration agenda’.AsputinthewordsofaKI,‘what has been an internal debate in Finland triggered by the arrival of asylum seekers has conflated with the long-term develop-ment activities in Afghanistan’.ItisworthnotingthatviewsarenotunanimousandinaKI’sopinionthedifferentapproaches(MFA,MIGRI,MoI)towardsFD/migration‘rather than revealing a lack of coherence could instead by interpreted as different but complementary approaches to tackle a same issue’.

Itisworthnotingthestrongexpectationthattheforthcomingevaluationwillgivesomeanswersandbeaguidetoformulaterecommendationsandwillgenerate‘fresh thinking and fresh methods’(althoughakeyquestionremainswhetherthiswillbea‘wholepresence’evaluationoranevaluationofdevelopmentcoop-erationasthiswouldproducedifferentoutcomes).Althoughthelatterseemstobewhatisenvisaged,theformerwouldenableFinlandtoundertakeamorefundamentalreflectionaboutitscontinuousinvolve-mentinAfghanistan(i.e.forhowmuchlonger?Inwhatform?Towardswhattypeoftransition?)

RecommendationsFromthecasestudyandtheinterventionofKIIsespeciallyanumberofrecurrentissuesdeservingfurtherattentionandactionemerged;theyinclude:

• Theneedtoincreasetheknowledgebaseortakeknowledgeintoconsiderationmoresystemati-cally.ThiswouldenableFinlandtohaveprogrammesthatarebetteralignedwiththeevolvingsituationinthecountryandthecurrentneedsoftheAfghanpopulation;

– Itwasnotablymentionedtobetterdocumentimpactofjointhumanitariananddevelopmentwork.

– Thisalsoinvolvestakingintoconsiderationthecomplexcauses,manifestationandeffectsofdisplacement.

– AbetterunderstandingofthesituationinAfghanistanalsoimpliestakinga‘holisticperspec-tive’andtogivegreaterconsiderationoftheregionaldynamics,notablytheroleofPakistanbutalsoofotherkeyplayersintheregionincludingtheUSA,ChinaandRussia.

• Becausepeaceandstabilityhasnotyetbeenachievedandprogressinotherareaswillbe compromiseduntilitis,thereisaneedtofocuseffortstowardsreducingviolence.Thereisalso aneedfordonorstoputmorepressureonthegovernment,notablywithanemphasisonfourmainthemesandrelatedactionstobridgethegapbetweenshort-andlong-termobjectives:

– Topushforlong-termandsustainablesolutionsforIDPs.

– Givegreateremphasistoaccountability.

– Prioritisetheruleoflawandinstitutionalbuilding.

– Greaterfocustowardseducation,notablythecurriculum,seenasavectorforpeacetransition.

• Thenthethinkingshouldnotbesomuchaboutdiminishingaidpersebutratherhowtoensuremoreeffectivecontinuity,includingbyenvisagingmoreco-fundingwiththeNordiccountries(especiallyworthconsideringthat‘if peace was to be achieved more resources would be needed for Afghanistan’).


• Forthecomprehensiveapproachtobe[more]successful,furthereffortswereneededtoover-cometheremainingtendencytoworkinsilosby‘focusing on understanding each other role while looking at achieving a common goal, the very reason for the presence in the country’.

• Also,worthnotingageneralsupporttomaintainthefocusongenderequalityandwomen’srightstopursuetheprogressachievedinthisdomaininwhichFinlandhastakenaleadroleandmoregenerallyasupporttokeepdevelopmentassistancetargetedatafewchosenareasratherthanitbeingtoobroad(dispersed).

• InrelationtoFD,thereisaconsensustogivegreaterconsiderationtothetheme,‘as it is not an issue likely to go away’andthereisatangibleriskofmoredisplacementduetoclimatechangenotably.SeveralintervieweesmentionedasthemostpressingconcerninrelationtoFDthefactthatconflictdisplacementisbeingmingledwithdroughtdisplacement;anadequateresponsewillrequiremoreattentiontothelinkageswithdisplacementcausedbydrought/climatechange.ItmorebroadlyemergedthatFinlandneededtothinkthroughthenatureofitsengagementwithFD(especiallyoverwhatFinlandspecificexpertiseandaddedvaluecouldbe).

– First itwould be important to place the issue of FD at the level of a right-based interven-tion [within a human rights framework] putting greater emphasis on the issue of internaldisplacement.

– BuildingonexistingengagementwithFD(i.e.theSALAMproject),developedfurthermeansandchannelstoaddresstheneedsofreturneesbyfocusingontheirintegration[sothattheycanreconnecttotheircountryandcommunities]byforinstanceputtingmoreemphasisontheeducationandemploymentsector(e.g.onliteracy,vocationaltrainingandjobcreation),sec-torsthatFinlandisalreadysupportingthoughttheWBandUNESCOnotablyandoverwhichithasknowledgeandexpertise.

– InrelationtotheSALAMprojectspecifically,toreallybeanexemplarofwhataprojectaddress-ingFDwithinaHDNframeshouldbe,itfirstneedstolearnfromwhathaspreventeditsrapidandefficientimplementation;itthenwouldrequiregreateradvocacyonthepartoftheMFAtostimulatetheinterestofotherdonors;andoffermoreflexibility,especiallyintermsofthetimeframeandgeographicalfocusaswellagreater(andexclusivefocus)onjobcreation.

References MFA‘Finland’sdevelopmentcooperationinAfghanistan’,www.finland.org.af/public/default.aspx?nodeid=44017&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

GovernmentofFinlandandtheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistan(2013)ThePartnershipAgreementBetweentheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistanandFinland

MFA(2014)GovernmentWhitePapertoParliamentontheSituationinAfghanistanandonFinland’sOverallSupporttoAfghanistan,IncludingParticipationinthe‘ResoluteSupportMission’MilitaryCrisisManagementOperation(2014)

MFA(2014a)EvaluationonPeaceandDevelopmentinFinland’sDevelopmentCooperation,CaseStudyonPeaceandDevelopmentinFinland’sCountryProgrammeinAfghanistan

http://www.finland.org.af/public/default.aspx?nodeid=44017&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

http://www.finland.org.af/public/default.aspx?nodeid=44017&contentlan=2&culture=en-US


Documents consultedEuropeanUnion.(2014).TheEUStrategyinAfghanistan2014-16.

FinnishDefenceForcesInternationalCentre(2012).ThinkingbeyondAfghanistan,theFutureProspectofCrisisManagement.

MFA.(2007).TheEvaluationofFinnishAidtoAfghanistan.

MFA.(2018).AnnualResultsReportonCountryStrategyforDevelopmentCooperationforAfghanistan.

Morrison-Métois,S.(2017).RespondingtoRefugeeCrises,LessonsfromEvaluationsinAfghanistanas acountryofOrigin,OECD.

UNAMAandUNHCR.(2017).‘AfghanistanProtectionofciviliansinArmedConflict’,Mid-yearReport2017.

TheInstituteforInclusiveSecurity.(2016).AssessmentofFinland’sNationalActionPlanforthe ImplementationofUNSecurityCouncilResolution1325Women,Peace,andSecurity2012–2016.


ANNEX 9: CASE STUDY SOMALIA

Answer to EQ 1


TheapproachtoFDandHDNinthe2017Somaliacountrystrategyisnotclearandmaysufferfromproblemsofcausality in the implicit theoryofchange inhowrootcausesareaddressed(example:towhichdegreedohealthservicesforwomenandgirlshaveanimpactonmigration?).However,themostimportantobjectiveforSomaliamustbestate-buildingandstrengtheningoftheincipientfederalstatestructure,inordertolaterbeabletoaddressFDandtherootcauses.

Key findings on the Judgement CriteriaJC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in MFA’s Somalia country strategy (and other relevant documents) is clearly formulated and well-established.

ThemostdirectpracticalandtheoreticallinktoFDintheSomaliacountrystrategyistheroleofFCAinpromotingpeace-makingandreconciliationthatcanhaveanimmediateimpactonforceddisplacementsofpopulation.Forthelargerhealth-relatedprojects,totallyjustifiedbyhumanrightsandthePPAofgen-derequalityandtherightsofwomenandgirls,thelinkislessimmediateandlong-termthroughstate-buildingandtheprovisionofbasicsafetynets.ThestrengtheningofthestatestructureinSomaliaismorethanindispensableinthelong-run.

JC 1.2: The manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented.

Grossomodo,Finlanddoesnot ‘use’FDinSomalia,andtheuseofHDNis incipient, ifatallpresent.However,theSomaliandiasporainFinland(andfromothercountries)isactivelyusedfordevelopmentcooperationinthehealthsector,bringinginanaspectofmigration/refugees-developmentnexus.Butthecontrarydirectionofcausalitymightbetrue:thedifferentfieldsofactivityinwhichFinlandparticipatesinfivepolicypillarsanddevelopmentcooperationpriorityareas(civilianandmilitarycrisismanagement,peacebuilding,rights-basedserviceprovisionetc)mayaddvaluetohowFDcouldbeoperationalised,atleastinthelongrun.However,thisoverallfindingmaybechangingasfutureFinnishbusinessfundingprojectsandFinland’ssupporttothecreationofaSomalianmigrationoffice,currentlyinthepipeline,materialise.

JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN in the case of Somalia, without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups).

ThebulkofdevelopmentfundingbyMFAforSomaliadoesnotdirectlyaddress‘rootcauses’ofdisplace-ment(maternalandchildhealthcare,gender-basedviolence(GBV)andfemalegenitalmutilation(FGM)rarelyarecausesofforceddisplacement),butratherare(human)rightsbased.Forclimatechange,onlysomesmalldiasporaCSOprojectsworkinthatfield/sector.Developmentcooperationfundsarenotused


forhumanitariansituations(e.g. for initiativesofDurableSolutions),andhumanitarian fundsarenotusedfordevelopmenteffortsofinternallyorexternallydisplacedpersons.UrbandisplacementistotallyabsentfromFinnishfunding.However,somedevelopmentprojectactivitieshavebenefittedalsoIDPpop-ulations(notablyinsectorofsexualandreproductiverightsandhealth).

Answer to EQ 2

EQ2.TowhatextentandhowhasFinland’sevolvingapproachto/interpretationofFDandHDNbeenanadequateresponsetothechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?

Finland’sapproachtotheSomaliasituationhaselementsofadequacy.State-buildingisa‘must’inthecaseofSomalia,andthisisthemainobjectiveofthewholecountrystrategy.HDNdoesnotshowonthegroundexceptinsomesmallerCSOprojects.FundingforEU,includingmilitaryciviliancrisismanagement,contributes to thecreationofconditions fordevelopment,aswellasCSOfunding forpeace-making.But the totality isnotclearly formulatednor targeted.Theapproachhasnotevolvedsignificantlysince2012;thesame(larger)projectscontinueduringthewholeevaluationperiod.


ThenewActionPlanonHDNpreparedasorganisation-widelearningexercisein2018(MFA2018b)doesnotyetshowontheground.Finland’sdevelopmentcooperation forSomaliadoesnothavethe instru-mentstosupportHDNthrough,e.g.,theDurableSolutionsInitiative,launchedbytheUN.

JC 2.2: Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of the other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, guided actions in EU, UNHCR) and CSOs.

Thereisacertaincomplementaritybetweenmilitaryandciviliancrisismanagement(mainlyEU),multi-bi-lateralfundingforprojectsmainlyonmaternalandchildhealthandpeace-makinginitiativescarriedoutbyCSOs.Yet,thepartofhumanitarianaidchannelledforSomalianrefugeesinKenya(andEthiopia)doesnotconsiderHDNbutratherremainsonthelevelofhumanitarianaidinprotracteddisplacementsituations,thusisnotcomplementarywiththerestofFinland’scontributionsintheHornofAfrica(HoA)region.EachcountrystrategyinHoAisdesignedintotalseparationfromeachother.

JC 2.3: Influence: MFA Policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral, multilateral and CSO partners has been sustained and effective.

NoevidenceofpolicyinfluenceonFDandHDN.Ontheotherhand,thereisevidenceofFinlandexercising policyinfluenceon(human)rights-basedreproductiveandmaternalandchildhealth(Finlandco-chairswith Sweden the social and human development pillar working group in the implementation of theNationalDevelopmentPlan).


Answer to EQ 3


Tostartwith, there ispracticallyno ‘approach’ toFDandHDN.Thereareelementsofpolicycoherencebetweencrisismanagement,EUTF,CSOpeacebuildinganddevelopmentcooperation,butthisis,inthecaseofSomalia,possiblytheresultofseparateandindependentdecisionsindifferentMFAunitsworkinginsilos,PMOandMoI(thereisnoWhitePaperforSomalia).

Key findings on the Judgement CriteriaJC 3.1: Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively.

No,thereseemnottobemechanismstopromotepolicycoherence.TheUnitforHumanitarianAidactsintotalindependencefromtheregionalunitandSomaliastrategy,andlittleifanycoordinationandcom-plementaritywasfound.ThemainmissingissueisHDNinrefugee/IDPcampswhichcontinueoperatingonpure, traditionalhumanitarianprinciplesevenafteralmost threedecades.Thesame independenceappliestotheCivilSocietyUnitbutinthiscase,thefundedprojectsarealignedandsupporttheoverallFinnishstrategyforSomalia.Thepeace-makingprojectsfundedbythePoliticalDepartmentsupporttherestofFinnishinitiativesinSomalia.

JC 3.2: There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/Departments (eg, MoI, MoD, PMO) and the MFA’s partners – bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs).

TheFinnishcountrystrategyforSomaliaisalignedwiththeSomalianNationalDevelopmentPlan.EUlevelsupport(EUEmergencyTrustFundwiththeoriginalmandateofpreventingmigration,militaryandciviliancrisismanagementetc.)basicallyaimsatcreatingconditionsforefficientdevelopmentcooper-ation,but it isnotclear if this isresultofpoliticalchoice(theEUTFfundscomefromtheMinistryofFinance,decidedbyPMO).AlargepartofFinland’shumanitarianaidtointernationalorganisationsisgivennon-earmarkedthus increasingcoherence–butreducingFinland’svisibilityat the tableswheredecisionsabouttheuseofthefundsaremade.CSOfundingiscoherentwiththeDPPsandwiththeSoma-liacountrystrategy.

JC 3.3: The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN.

ThelevelofpolicycoherenceisnotyetadequatetosupporttheapproachestoFDandHDN.WhileEUlevelfundingisinpartdirectlytargetedtoreducingoutwardsmigrationfromSomalia(EUTF),humani-tarianaidcontinuesbeingspentonhumanitarianpurposesevenafter20–30yearsofexistenceofrefugeecamps(noHDNmaterialised).Morerecentinitiativesonrootcausessuchasbusinesspartnerships(foremploymentcreation)andtheplannedparticipationintheconstructionofamigrationauthority(tobeabletoreceivereturnees,includingforciblyreturned)mayincreasecoherenceinaddressingFD.

SynthesisSomaliaisanolddevelopmentcooperationpartnercountryofFinland.Theprojectsthatstartedintheearlyyearsof1980weretotallyinterruptedanddestroyedin1990-1991duetoacivilwarandthecollapseofMajor-GeneralSiadBarre’sregime–andatthesametimethecollapseoftheSomalianstate.Thecoop-erationwasrenewedin2012whenanewstatestructure,theFederalStateofSomalia,wasfounded,andinternationaldonorssignedaNewDealagreementtosupportthenewstate.


Duringtheperiodnowunderevaluation,FinlandhasparticipatedinSomalia’sreconstruction,peaceanddevelopmentonvariousfronts:theEU-leadcrisismanagementoperations(civilianandmilitary)andEUEmergencyTrustFundforAfrica,civil societyorganisations’ (CSO)projectsandmultiparty(ormulti-bilateral) funding tomultilateral organisations. Finland (MFA) as suchdoesnot fund and implementbilateralprojects inSomalia.Thematically, thefocus isonwomen’sandchildren’srights,especially inmaternalandchildhealth,andoverall,onthestrengtheningofthefederalstatestructure.

WhentalkingaboutFinlandinSomalia,onemusttakeintoaccountthataCSO,FinnChurchAid(FCA),isalargeactorinSomaliaandhasamuchwiderandmorepermanentpresenceinthecountrythanMFA.Bythesametoken,whentalkingaboutSomaliainFinland,onemustnotethat,contrarytotheothercasestudycountriesof theevaluation, there isawell-established, relativelywell integrated,20,000-stronglong-termSomaliandiasporainFinland.FCAispartof‘Finland’intheSomaliancontext,andabout40%of its fundingcomes fromMFA(threechannels:humanitarianaid,development fundingandpoliticalfundingforpeace-building).

Finland’sresponsetotheinternalandexternaldisplacementandmigrationsituation–oringeneralthesecuritysituationinthecountry–hasnotbeenincoherent.Policetrainingandothercrisismanagementinitiativeswork(orhaveworked)atthebackgroundtocontributetothecreationofconditionsallowingfordevelopmentprojectstooperate.Statebuildingissupportedbypoliticaldialogueandhealthcareser-vicesareimprovedbyfundingUNagenciesandWorldBankmulti-partnerbudgetsupporttotheFederalandRegionalgovernments.FCAspecialisesinpeace-buildingandmediation,inthiswayofferingalinkinthetriplenexus(humanitarian-peace/stabilisation-developmentnexus).Yet,theresponseofFinlandtoforceddisplacement(FD)andthehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN)inSomaliahasnotbeenclearlytargetednorsufficient.

Severalreasons leadtothisconclusion:theSomaliansituationaffectsthewholeHornofAfrica(HoA)regionwhileMFAunitspreparecountrystrategiesfortheregion’scountriesinsilos,exclusivelydepart-ingfromeachcountry’s internalsituation(Ethiopia,Kenya,andSomalia)–as if therewerenotaboutamillionSomalians inKenya, for instance.Second,FinlanddoesnothaveadevelopmentcooperationinstrumenttointegratetheDurableSolutionsapproachpromotedbytheUN(SpecialRepresentativeofUNSecretaryGeneralforSomalia)tobridgetheexistinggapbetweenhumanitarianaidanddevelopmentprojects.Inaddition,thefactthatthereisverylittle–ifatall–coordinationbetweenregionalunits/coun-tryteamsinchargeofdevelopmentcooperation(andEmbassyinNairobi),andthehumanitarianaidunit,makesthatHDNisnoteffectivelyoperationalisedontheground.AnadditionalobstacletoHDNseemstobethereluctanceandstrongresistanceofalargeUNhumanitarianorganisationactiveintheHoAregiontoadopttheDurableSolutionsprinciples.

Ontheotherhand,aproject (or lately,projects,MIDAFinnSomforHealth inSomaliland,andMIDAFinnSomforHealthandEducationinPuntlandandSouth-CentralSomalia)offersanexampleofahigh-erlevelofnexus:thatbetweenmigrationanddevelopment.IntheMIDAproject,implementedbyIOM, diasporamemberswithmedicaltrainingareusedtosupportthecapacitiesofhealthfacilitiesandhealthsectortraininginSomalia.

Country ContextSomaliaisonethepoorestcountriesintheworld,somuchsothatitisnotincludedintheUNDPHumanDevelopmentIndexandranking(thelatestdatesfrom2016,withstatisticalupdatefrom2018),andtheonlyinformationgivenislifeexpectancyof55.7years,andannualpercapitaGNIunder300USD(aboutonehalfoftheGNIofthelastintherankinglist,Number188,CentralAfricanRepublic).Thecountryhasabout15millioninhabitantsaccordingtoUNestimatesinNovember2018,althoughstatisticsasrecentasfrom2016ratherindicateabout10millioninhabitants.Ofthem,about2.6millionareinternallydis-placedpersons(IDP)accordingtheseveralhigh-levelsourcesinNovember2018,andaboutonemillion


liveinrefugeecampsinneighbouringcountries,mainlyinKenyabutalsoinEthiopia.WhenincludingthediasporasinNorthAmericaandEurope,thisrepresentsaboutaquarterorathirdofthetotalpopulation(DanishRefugeeCouncil2013,17).SeveralinterviewedpersonsforthisevaluationinNairobiindicatedthatSomaliaisoneofthemostrapidlyurbanisingcountriesintheworldwiththeestimatethatby2030,80%ofthepopulationwillbelivingincities,andtherural-to-urbanmigrantswhoelsewhereintheworldwouldjustbecalledmigrants,areconsideredIDPsinSomalia.Whilenotbeingtheonlyreasonforthishighdegreeofurbanisation,climatechangecausingdraughtsonaregularbasisisanimportantfactorinthepopulationdynamicsinSomalia:theexceptionalclimaticphenomenahavebecomethenewnormality.

Somaliabecamea ‘countryinexile’(DanishRefugeeCouncil2013,17),orthe ‘epicentreoftheworld’slargesthumanitariananddisplacementcrisis’(MFA2017,6)afterclan-basedinternalconflictsbetweenregionsinthelate1980’sandthecollapseoftheSomalianstatein1991atthefallofMajor-GeneralSiadBarre’sregime.Massivemigration/exilewavesfollowedthechaoscreatedbythenewsituation,anditwasalsointhiscontextthattheoriginalSomalianasylumseekersarrivedinFinland.Itwasonlyovertenyearslater,in2012,thatanewseriousattempttoestablishaSomalianstateandgovernmentwasmade.Inthisyear,theSomalianFederalStatewasfounded,electionswereheld,andin2013apartnershipcalledtheNewDealprocess(andSomaliCompact,2012–2016;replacedin2017bytheNationalDevelopmentPlan,NDP)between the SomalianFederalGovernment and the international community anddevelopmentdonorswassigned,Finlandamongthem.TheNewDeal,andthefollowingNDPdesignedin2017afterparliamentaryelectionslate2016andpresidentialelectionsinearly2017,providethebasicframeworkforstatebuildinginSomalia.

Despite relatively encouragingprogress in somebasic state functions (e.g.national revenuecollectionincreasedfromabout113MUSDto142MUSDbetween2016and2017),andthesuccessfulelectoralpro-cessesin2016–2017,thesituationcontinuesbeingfragile.TheFederationconsistsofstatesofwhichsome(SomalilandandPuntlandinthenorth)arerelativelywell-establishedandcapableofcarryingoutmostbasicstatefunctionswhilethenewlycreatedstatesinSouth-CentralSomaliaareonlytakingthefirststepsofstatehood.Additionally,thereseemsnottobeaclearvisionaboutwhatafederalstatestructuremeans,and– particularly– Somaliland, until independence in 1960 aBritish protectorate, practices passiveresistanceagainstbeingconsideredanautonomousstatewithinSomalia.

Securitysituationisanotherconcern.AnIslamistterroristgroupcalledAlShabab(AS)isactiveinmostoftheSouth-Centralterritoryoutsideurbancentres,anddespiterelativelyunimportantnumbers(estimatedaround5.000fighters),AlShababiscapableofcarryingoutattackseveninthecapital,Mogadishu(thelatestmassiveonetookplaceinOctober2017,withtheestimateofover500dead).TheAfricanUnionpeaceenforcementforce,AMISOM,hastakenoversometownsandcitiesbutAlShababhasacertainsup-portamongthepopulation.OnereasonforthissupportistheinefficientfunctioningoftheofficialjusticesystemwhileAlShababisinthepositiontomediateandpracticeIslamiclawincommunities,theASjus-ticebeingconsideredmoreexpediteandlesscorruptthantheofficialcourtsofjustice.(EASO2017,51).Furthermore,ASis‘clan-blind’,contrarytotherestoftheSomalisocialstructurewhereaccesstoservices,toremittancesfromdiasporaandjobsisbasedonclanaffiliation,andASrecruitsmassivelyinmarginalandminorityclansandthe‘clan-less’nonethnicSomalians(locallycalled‘bantus’)(Botha&Abdil2016,7).Additionally,(youth)unemploymentisamainreasonforenrolmentintheviolentgroup(EASO2017,52);27%ofAl-Shababmembersjoinedforeconomicreasonsandadditional25%forbotheconomicandreligiousreasonswhileonly15%forreligiousreasonsonly(Botha&Abdil2016,5).Becauseofthesus-tainedpresenceofAlShababinSouth-CentralSomalia,mostoftheterritoryisnotsafeforrepatriationsandreturns.

AccordingtoanonymoushumanitariansourcesreportedbyDanishRefugeeCouncil(2016),clanmilitiasandclanviolenceisanevenhigherriskforciviliansthanAl-Shabab.ItishighlyprobablethatapartofattacksanddisputesbetweenclansarefalselyorwronglyattributedtoAS(ibid.,9–10).Accordingtotwo


interviewscarriedoutfortheevaluation,clanviolenceandproblemsinclanaffiliationareasignificantrootcauseofemigrationand,ultimately,ofendingupasasylumseekerinEurope.

AnimportantbutoftenneglectedcharacteristicoftheprotractedSomalianphenomenonofIDPsisthattheyrepresentmarginalclansandSomali-Bantu(non-ethnicSomalian)minorities,discriminatedagainstbythemajorityclans,andtherearesignificantlyhighernumbersofsinglemothersandchildrenamongthemthanintheaveragepopulation;thepoorestofthepoorwhodonothaveanypossibilitiesofmigrat-ingfromthecountryasrefugees.Theyhavebeenintheinternalrefugeecampssinceearly1990’sandthefallofSiadBarre’sregime,latertobejoinedbyethnicSomaliansfleeingAlShababviolenceanddraughts(thelatestin2016–2017).Thisethnicandclan-based(andclan-less)populationisanobstaclefromthedonorpointofviewtouniversalcitizenshipandelections,becausemajorityclansandpoliticalelitesarereluctanttogivetherighttovotetonon-ethnicSomaliBantusandmarginalclanmembers.InplacessuchasKismayoorBaidoawithimportantinternalrefugeecamps,theseminoritiesareinfactthemajority,ifgiventherighttovote.

Anadditional factormustbeconsideredwhenanalysingdevelopmentcooperationin/forSomalia: ‘aidarchitectureiscomplexandfragmentedlargelyduetothecross-borderdimensionofaidcoordination’(TransparencyInternational2016,10).Untilveryrecentlyandduetothesecuritysituation,mostdonorsoperatinginSomaliahavebeenlocatedinNairobiinsteadofMogadishu,andwhilethiscontinuesbeingthecase,thereisavisiblemovementof,inthefirstplace,multilateraldonororganisationstogroundingworkinSomalia’scapitalinsteadofNairobi.

Finland’s activities in SomaliaOfthethreecasestudycountriesoftheevaluation,Somaliais the one with the longest involvement with FinlandandFinnishdevelopmentcooperation.Infact,SomaliawasanimportantpartnercountryforFinlandintheearly1980s,particularlyinthehealthsector.Theoriginofcooperationcamefromper-sonalconnections.TheformerdirectoroftheNationalBoardofHealth,thenworkingforWHO,wassenttoSomaliatowardtheendof1970tostudypossibilitiesofbasichealthprojects,andtheFinnmettheonlytrainedhaematologistofthecountry,whoaskedaboutwaysofsupportinthefieldofbloodservices(Lei-kola2017,20).ThisinitiativewasthenpresentedtoFinnishRedCross(FRC)BloodServiceinSeptember1980,andtheBloodServicesentarepresentativetoSomaliainNovember-December1980.Athree-yearfundingfromMFAdevelopmentaidwasachieved.(ibid.).

ThestatusofSomaliaasofficialdevelopmentcooperationpartnercountrywasdecidedbytheParliamentin1982,atthesametimeaseightothernewcountries(Koponen2018).TheMFAstartedtosupportpro-jectsinSomalia1983,includingthebloodserviceprojectandalargetuberculosisproject(asacuriosityitcanbementionedthataFinnishNGO,PhysiciansforSocialResponsibility(LSV,kindofmini‘Finnishdoctors’),stillimplementsasmalltuberculosisprojectinSomalia).Othersectorsfollowed,mostlyinfra-structureinvestments(diesel-poweredgenerators,grainsilos)(ibid.).Butalreadyin1989,aidtoSomaliastartedbeingphasedout(decisionofficiallysignedinearlyAutumn1990),duetoincreasingarmedcon-flictsaroundthecountry,andthethreateningchaos,withtheconsequencethatallaidinvestmentwaslostandtheabout70residentFinnsrepatriatedinextremis(Koponen,ibid.).

ThecurrentSomaliacountrystrategy(MFA2017),definesFinnishdevelopmentcooperationandpolicydialogue inSomaliaascontributingtoa ‘stabilisation,economicrecoveryandsocialdevelopment’andmorestableandsecureSomalia(andHornofAfrica,HoA),whereFinlandsupportsthecountry’s‘effortstoaddresstherootcausesofsocialexclusion,radicalisation,andirregularmigrationtocountriesintheregionandoverseas’(MFA2017,11).Accordingtothestrategy,thekeypriority(‘akeypriority’inoriginal)forFinland’sengagementinSomaliaistosupporttherealisationofwomen’sandgirls’rights,particularlyinthehealthsector.Theoverarchingsecondkeypriorityisstate-building,supportingthebuildingand


strengtheningofthecorefunctionsoftheSomalistate(p.12),includingruleoflaw,transparentandwell-functioningpublicsector,revenuecollectionandservicedelivery.

FinlanddoesnotfundbilateralintergovernmentalprojectsinSomalia,butthefundingischannelledeitherthroughCSOsormultilateralorganisations’pooled funds(trust funds)and inmulti-bi-lateralprojects(‘programmablebilateralsupportthroughmultilateralchannels’,MFA2017,9).ThelargestCSOactiveinSomalia isFCA;othersignificantonesareSolidarity(active inSomaliland),SavetheChildren,FRC(mainlyinhumanitarianaid)andseveralsmallerlocalordiaspora-basedCSOs.Intotaldisbursements,CSO/NGOprojectsmadeup37%ofallFinnishcontributionstoSomalia(32MEURoutof87MEUR),anexceptionallyhighpercentage.Themostimportantmulti-bi-lateralinitiativesconcernUNFPA(reproduc-tive,maternalandneonatalhealth), theMIDAFinnSomhealthexpertiseandtrainingproject throughIOM.FinlandparticipatesintheWorldBank-runMulti-PartnerFundforSomalia(MPF).AttheEUlevel,Finlandhasparticipated inEUCAPSomalia (maritime lawenforcement),EUNAVFORAtalanta (anti-piracy),andcontributes to theEUEmergencyFundforAfrica(EUTF),andtheseexpendituresdonotshowinMFAstatistics.

Theaidstatisticsshowthat thebudgetcutsofdevelopmentcooperationgreatlyaffected thedisburse-mentsalsoforSomalia,althoughaloweringtrendwasalreadyseeninthedisbursementsof2015,thatis,beforetheradicalcutsweredecided.Thetrendisupwardagainbutfundinghasnotreachedthelevelsof2015.Itshouldbenotedthatthe2018figurescompriseonlydisbursementsmadebySeptember2018.(Figurebelow.)

Figure 8: Disbursement for Somalia by year 2012–2018.

Source:OwnelaborationbasedonMFAstatistics

Thedistributionofaidbetween2012and2018accordingtoOECD-DACCRSpurposecodesisthefollowing (Figurebelow).Twosectorsstandout:healthandhumanitarianaid,bothover30MEUR(72%outofthetotalaidof87MEUR),therestrepresentingrelativelyminorextensions.Thelargeproportionforbasichealthcare(ascontrastedagainst thesmaller total for reproductivehealthandmaternalmortality,5.2MEUR)isexplainedbyabout15MEURextensionstotheUNICEFhealthandnutritionprogrammeplusalmost10MEURfortheMIDAFinnSommedicaltrainingdiasporaprojects2012–2018(thefirstMIDAFinnSomstartedinSomalilandin2008).

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1Basiceducation,teachereducation,educationalfacilitiesandpolicy;2Secondaryeducation,vocationaleducationandhigheredu-cation;3Health, includinghealtheducation,diseasecontrol,healthpersonnel;4Reproductivehealth,maternalmortality,STDcontrolincl.HIV/AIDS;5Basicdrinkingwatersupply;6Domesticrevenuemobilisation;7Democraticparticipation,freeflowofinformation;8HumanRights;9Women’sequality,endingviolenceagainstwomen;10Securityandcivilianpeace-building,clearingoflandmines,armscontrol;11Socialandwelfareservices,employmentpolicy,basicsocialservicesandnarcoticscontrol;12ICTandenergy;13Agriculture,livestock,cooperativesandagroindustry;14Environmentalpolicy,biodiversity,environmentaleduca-tion;15Humanitarianaid,materialrelief,emergencyfoodaid,reliefreconstruction;16Purposenotspecified;17Administration

Source:OwnelaborationbasedonMFAstatistics.

Whenobservingthesector-specificdistributionaccordingtoyear,itappearsthathealthandreproduc-tivehealthprojectscontinueallovertheperiod;thereisstrongcontinuityinwhatFinlandfundsbetweenpre-andpost-2015.Theso-calledrefugeecrisisinEuropein2015doesnotseemtohavehadasignificantimpactonthesectorssupportedbyFinland.Theonlyvisiblenoveltywhich,however,doesnotyetshowindisbursements,arehalfadozensmall(max65.000EUR)ODA-eligibleprivatesectorprojectstowhichfundinghasbeencommittedbutnotyetdisbursed(bySeptember2018)withtheapproximatetotalfund-ingof250.000EUR.Theprivatesectorandbusinesspromotionwerethenewtopicsraisedinthe2016DPP,andSomaliaisapilotcountryforFinnishBusinessPartnershipSupport(FinnPartnership)withthesecondlargestnumberofsupportedbusinessesafterVietnam.(FinnPartnershipisa‘match-making’andtrainingorganisationforFinnishcompaniesthatwanttocarryoutlong-termcommercialbusinessthathaveadevelopmentimpactindevelopingcountries,andinthesepartnershipstheFinnishSomalidias-porahasaroletoplay.)

The implicit working hypothesis in this design is that public service delivery decreases or prevents‘exclusion, radicalisationand irregularmigration’.Thishypothesismaynotprove tobe thevalid logicchainifthestrategyreallyistoaddresstherootcausesoftheseproblems.Rather,theprioritiesareclearlyrights-based(women’sandgirls’ rights, reproductiverights, ruleof lawetc.ashumanand fundamen-talrights),andinconditionssuchasSomalia, itwouldbegreatnegligencetonottodirectallpossibleresourcesforstate-building.

Thisconclusionisbynomeansclaimingthatthereisnologicalconnectionbetweenexclusion,radicalisa-tion,e.g.thesecuritysituation,andawell-functioningpublicsector.Asseenabove,oneofthereasonsofthelongevityofAlShababintheSomalianruralareasisthefailingjusticesystem.Anotheronementionedwasunemploymentof(mainly)youngmen;thisaspectisonlyaddressedinsomesmallerCSOprojectsfundedbyFinlandand,morerecently,theprivatesectorbusinessfundingmentionedabove.Inthelastinstance,thefundamentalchallengeinstate-buildinginSomaliaishowtosupport(andachieve)thetran-

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sitionfromclan-basedauthority(FCA2017,24)andclan-facilitatedaccesstoservicestouniversal(andfederal, that is,multi-layered)authoritybasedoncitizenship.But there isno immediateorclear logicbetweenthemeansandtheobjectivesthatwouldguaranteeanimpactonradicalisationsandemigration/refugeesintheSomaliacountrystrategy2017,withtheexceptionofbusinessandemploymentcreationthatseemstobeagrowingalthoughstillmodestsectorofFinnishODAextensions.Additionally,thereareplansthatFinlandhelpfundingtheSomalianmigrationagencybuildingtoimprovepopulationmove-ments’management,andbeabletoreceivereturnees,includingforciblyreturnednationalsfromEurope.

Assuch,Finland’sintergovernmentalcooperationwithSomaliaismakingadifferencewithinitsownsys-temoflogic.Whenanobjectiveisthattherightsofwomenandgirlsareincreasinglyrealised,asignificantincreaseofelectedwomenintheParliamentthroughFinnishpolicydialogueandadvocacy,orthe30%increaseintheuseofreproductivehealthservicesinareascoveredbytheprojectsbetween2016and2017,issynonymousofgreatsuccess.Finnishsupporthasalsocontributedtotheincreaseininternalrevenuecollection.AnadditionaladvantageofoperatinginthesectorofmaternalandchildhealthcareisalsothatAlShababseemstobemorelenienttowardsexternalcooperationinthissectorthantowardsothersectors(TransparencyInternational2016,25),moreclearlyidentifiedasanti-Islamicinterferenceofinfidels.

SomaliaisthecasestudycountryofthisevaluationwheretheCSO/NGOsectormustbeaddressedwithspecial interest.Asmentionedabove,37%ofallFinnishODAdisbursementtoSomaliaarechannelledthroughCSOs/NGOs,withalmost280differentextensions(disbursements)totalintheyears2012–2018.Thebudgetsrangefromjustover20,000EURtoacoupleofmillionsofEurosforhumanitarianaidinthecaseofFRC;thesefiguresincludeallpurposes(accordingtoOECD-DACCRSpurposecodes).

Inadditiontothenumbers(4thlargestlinguisticgroupofimmigrantsinFinland,20,000persons)oftheSomaliandiaspora,itsparticularityisthehighdegreeoforganisation.IntheFinnishNGOregister,thereareover100NGOs/CSOsrunbySomalians,althoughapartof themare inactive.Abouttwentyactivedevelopment-orienteddiasporaNGOsareorganisedintheSomaliaNetwork,acoalitionofandsupportorganisation forCSOs/NGOs implementingprojects inSomaliaand theHornofAfrica.Themember-ship includesalsopurelyFinnishnon-governmentalorganisationssuchasSolidarityandFCA,but theSomaliandiasporaassociationsarethemajority.Inthelatestroundofapplicationsofprojectsupportin2017,about20diasporaprojectsgotfundingfromtheCivilSocietyUnitofMFA.AlthoughFDandHDNareabsentfromboththeguidanceofCSOfunding(MFA2017a)andinmostapproval justificationsoffunding,thefactthattheFinnishSomalidiasporaisactiveindevelopmentprojects(andnotonlyinthegovernment-fundedhealthprojectMIDAFinnSomashealthprofessionalsofSomalianorigin),addsadimensionofmigration-developmentnexustoFinland’spoliciestowardsSomalia.

WhileSolidaritywithitsanti-FGMandlivelihoodsplusclimatechangeresilienceprojectsiswellknownand ‘embedded’ regionally inSomaliland,oneFinnishnon-governmentalactor standsout inSomalia:FCAthathasawideranddeeperpresenceinSomaliathantheFinnishgovernment.FCAhasfivefieldofficesinSomalia,withstaffof31persons(ofwhich26Finns).Roughly60%ofFCA’sfundingforSomaliaisfromexternal,thatis,non-Finnishsources(ECHO,EU,SomaliaStabilisationFund,USAIDetc.)whichcanbetakenasaproofofconfidence,andindeed,ofeffectiveness.FinlandsupportsFCAthroughthreechannels:humanitarianaid,programme-basedsupportfordevelopment,andsupportfromthePoliticaldepartmentforpeace-making/peacebuilding.

ThemainactivityofFCAinSomaliaispeacebuilding.FCAisoneofthehubsoftheinternationalNet-workofReligiousandTraditionalPeacemakersandworkslocallyinfacilitatinglocalpeaceagreementsandreconciliationinitiativesbytrainingandadvocacyandmaintainsexcellentworkingrelationswiththeSomalianFederalGovernment–despitetheword‘church’initsname.Atthefederalandstatelevels,FCAassistsUNDPindevelopingandstrengtheninglocalandprovincialadministrationstructuresandmecha-nisms.–Asviolenceandthepoorsecuritysituationareoneofthereasonsofinternaldisplacementandpossiblyofmigration,too,thepeace-makingactivitiesofFCAhaveadirectconnectiontoFD.


Field EvidenceAlthoughintervieweesinNairobiagreedthatFinland‘isnotabsent’and‘keepslowprofile’,noneofthenon-Finnish informantshadaclear ideaaboutFinland’spolicy influenceorevolvingapproachtoFD/HDNinSomalia.TheinterviewsthereforedidnothelptoanswerthequestionsintheEvaluationMatrix.Ontheotherhand,thisempiricalfindingoffersafertileopeningforanalysingthereasonsofthisrelativelylowvisibilityofFinlandamongdevelopmentdonors,exacerbatednodoubtbythegeographically‘complexaidarchitecture’ofSomaliabetweenNairobiandMogadishu.

First,thereisalackofresources,andunderstaffing.ThisphenomenondoesnotonlyaffectFinlandbutsev-eralbilateraldonors,too,broughtuptheissueintheinterviews.Therestartstobea‘disbalance’betweenthebudgetsforSomaliaandthenumberofstaffsdedicatedtomonitoringandtofollowing-uphowthefundsareused.ParticularlyFinland, ‘seenasNordicdonorbutwithresourcesrather thoseofaBalticstate’.Onlyacoupleofprojects/initiativescanbeactivelymonitoredbythestaffbasedintheSomalia SectionoftheNairobiEmbassy,whodonotassistmeetingsofUNagenciesinNairobibecauseFinlanddoesnotfundtheUNinKenya(excepthumanitarianaidtoUNHCRforSomalianrefugeecampsbutasthisisnon-earmarkedsupportfromtheUnitforHumanitarianAid,Finlanddoesnotparticipateinmak-ingdecisionsaboutitsuse).

Second,theEmbassyundertheRegionalUnitisofficiallynotinchargeofmonitoringhumanitarianaidwhichfallsunderthemandateoftheDepartmentforDevelopmentPolicy,UnitforHumanitarianAidandPolicy(KEO-70),norofCSO/NGOprojects,undertheresponsibilityofCivilSocietyUnit(KEO-30)thatdonotusuallycoordinatewithorconsulttheregionalunitandtheEmbassy.Anadditionalfactoralreadymentionedabove,worthpraisingononehand,isthefactthatFinlandgiveshumanitarianfundingnon-earmarked(orearmarkedonlyforacertaincountry),withthepracticalconsequencethatFinlanddoesnotparticipateinthedecision-makingprocessofthehumanitarianaiditgives.ThisisoneexpressionofworkinginsilostypicalinMFA,furtheraccentuatedbyyetanadditionalfactorinthecaseofFD/HDNandSomalianrefugeesandIDPs.

Thisfactoristhestrongreluctance,evenhostility,ofUNHCRtoapplytheDurableSolutionsapproachforSomalianrefugees incamps inKenya.TheDurableSolutionsInitiative ispromotedby theSpecialRepresentativeforSomaliaoftheUNSecretaryGeneralandwasofficialisedintheNairobiDeclarationonDurableSolutions(March2017)byHeadsofStatesofIGAD(Inter-GovernmentalAuthorityforDevel-opment,IGAD2017).Therewasunanimityamongtheintervieweesthat1)humanitarianfundingistoolong–almost30yearsinthecaseoftherefugeecampsforSomaliansinKenya–anddevelopmentsolu-tions,nothumanitarianaid,shouldbeofferedimmediatelyafterstabilisationofarefugee/IDPsituation,2)theSomalianrefugeeswillnot,accordingtoexperience,returntowheretheycamefrom,and3)thathumanitarianfundsshouldbeusedtobuildpermanentinfrastructures(wells,schools)insteadoftempo-raryones,and4)governments(local,national)shouldbetheoneswhorunschoolsandhospitals,andnotthehumanitarianorganisations.FinlandisnotfundingtheDurableSolutionsInitiative(DSI)duetolackofsuitableinstruments:itdoesnotfallunderhumanitarianaidnorunderprogrammablebilateralaidasthesearecurrentlyunderstoodandmanaged,althoughtherenofundamentalreasonswhytheDSIcouldnotbeincludedinCSOfundingorasbilateralaid–althoughinthiscasethefundingshouldprobablybechannelledasaidtoKenyabecausethecampsareonKenyanterritory.

Asaside-linetothisobservationaboutUNHCR’sstronglynegativeattitudetowardstheDSIcommentedbyallKenya-basedinterviewees,somealsolaunchedhypothesisforexplainingwhyUNHCRhasadoptedthisattitude.ThefirstconcernsthepoliticalsituationinKenyawherepoliticalcandidatestendtowavetheclosureoftheDadaabandKakumarefugeecampsascampaignslogansbeforeelections.Thesecond,relatedexplanationwasthatthesectionofUNHCRrunningthosecampsmaybetakingveryseriouslytheabsoluteneutralityandindependenceofhumanitarianaidfromanygovernmentorpoliticalarrange-ments.(ThisdoesnotpreventSwitzerlandfromimplementinganHDN-compatiblevocationaltraining


andemploymentprojectforbothrefugeesandlocalpeopleintheKakumarefugeecamp.)AndthethirdexplanationwasthatUNHCRisdefending its ‘turf’andwantstocontinueprovidinghumanitarianaideveninveryprotractedrefugeesituations.

Third,FinlandchannelsfundingthroughFinnishnon-governmentalorganisations(FCAandFRC)insteadof, e.g., pooled humanitarian funds apt for small donors. Thismeans that the representatives of the GovernmentofFinlandarenotpresent inmeetingswherehumanitarian funding isdecided,asNGOs cannotrepresenttheGovernment.

Ontheotherhand,thetopicofthe‘doublenexus’–usedlocallyamongNairobidonorsforHDN–waspre-sentineachinterview.HDNistakenseriouslyandsomebilateraldonorsarecurrentlyrecruiting(orhaverecruited)specialstaffmemberswithexperienceinbothdevelopmentandhumanitarianaid,toincarnateandpromoteHDN.Anewtopicisenteringthedebate:the‘triplenexus’inthemeaningofstabilisation/humanitarianphase–>peace/reconciliation–>developmentnexus.ThiscouldbeanichewhereFinlandwouldbewellpositionedtobeachampionbasingontheexperienceinallaspectsofthetriplenexus.

Recommendations1. FD:ForMFAregionalunitsandcountryteams:TheHornofAfricacountryteamsandHeadofUnitfor

HoAandEasternAfrica,particularlythoseinchargeofKenya,EthiopiaandSomaliaarestronglyrec-ommendedtodiscussajointregionalstrategyforHoAthatwouldtakeintoconsiderationFD(internaldisplacementandrefugeecamps),andthesituationofSomalianrefugeesshouldbeconsideredinthethreecountrystrategies,whichnowisnotthecase.Thetimingisright,asnewcountrystrategieswillsoonbedesigned,andtheSomalianstrategyformspartofapilotself-evaluationofthecurrentcountrystrategy.

2. HDN:Thecountryteamsoftheregion(HoA)shouldincludepilotprojectsonlivelihoodsandvoca-tionaltrainingtargetedforrefugeecampsandlocalpeopleintheircountryplans.TheSwissprojectinKakumacouldbetakenasanexample.

3. FD and HDN/HPDN: The Somalia Team should discuss with the Unit for Civil Society, PoliticalDepartment,FCA,FRCandotherlargerFinnishCSOs,andFinnPartnershiponhowto‘package’Fin-land’sbilateralinterventionsinSomaliaintoatotallycoherentprogrammetargetedtowardsthetriplenexus:humanitarian-peace-making/stabilisation-development.All the elements are therenow,butthetotalityisnotcoherentlytargetedandcoordinatedbutratherresultingfromseparatedecisions.Inasecondphase,otherministriesandMFAdepartmentsshouldbetakenonboardbyMFAleadershiptocoordinatehowFinland’sEUfundingandcrisismanagementinitiativescouldbealignedinanationalstrategyforSomalia.This‘packaging’couldgivegreataddedvaluetotheotherFinnishcontributionsinSomaliaandtheprioritypolicyareas.

4. ClimatechangeismuchtoolittleconsideredinoverallinfundingdecisionsofFinland,destinedforSomalia.ClimateresilienceandfightagainstdesertificationshouldbeguidingprinciplesofallaidtoSomalia,alsobecauseclimatechangehasdirectimpactonforceddisplacement.

Therearealsosomeadditionalbutlessurgent,orlessimportant,recommendations.

5. Therehavebeenfluctuations,duringthelatestyears,inthepositionabouttowhichdegreetheEmbassy ofFinlandinNairobiissupposedtomonitorCSOprojects,basicallyundertheresponsibilityoftheUnitforCivilSociety,andhumanitarianaidtorefugeecampsinKenya,undertheresponsibilityoftheUnitforHumanitarianAid.Itisabsolutelynecessarytogatherthosethreetogetheranddefinehowtheresponsibilitybetweenthemwillbestbedivided,tooptimisetheuseofmeagrestaff(andfinancial)resources.Atthesametime,informationsharingbetweenthosethreeshouldgreatlybeincreasedandstrengthened.


6. TheMIDAFinnSomdiasporaprojectisamodeltofollow,andground-breakinginFinnishdevelop-mentcooperation.TheMFAregionaldepartmentsshouldreflectwhetherthereareotherdiasporasinFinland(withpossibleinputsfromdiasporasfromothercountries)thatcouldbeusedinfavourofthedevelopmentoftheircountriesoforigin.

7. TheUnitforHumanitarianAidandPolicyshoulddiscusswithUNHCRthestrongreluctance–reported in all interviews inNairobi– of the organisation to apply theUNand IGAD initiative onDurable Solutionsandtryandfindthereasonsandsolutionsforthesituation.ThesituationintheDadaabandKakumarefugeecampsisnotsatisfactory,withpeoplestayingidlefordecadesinthem.

8. TheSomaliaTeamisrecommendedtostudytheWorldBankinitiatedprojectsonurbandisplacementinSomalia,andseeif,andpossiblyhow,Finlandcouldsupportthem.

ReferencesBotha,AnneliandMahdiAbdile(2016).Radicalisation and al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia. TheNetworkofReligiousandTraditionalPeacemakersPublication2.ISSPaper226.

DanishRefugeeCouncil.(2013).DurableSolutions:Perspectives of Somali Refugees Living in Kenyan and Ethiopian Camps and Selected Communities of Return.Copenhagen/Nairobi:DanishRefugeeCouncil.

DanishRefugeeCouncil.(2016).South-Central Somalia: Security Situation, al-Shabaab presence, and Target Groups.Copenhagen:DanishRefugeeCouncilandDanishImmigrationService.March2017.

EASO.(2017).Country of Origin Information Report. Somalia: Security Situation.EuropeanAsylumSupportOfficewithDanishRefugeeCouncil.EuropeanUnionPublicationsOffice.

FCA.(2016).Finn Church Aid Global Programme 2016.AnnualReport.Helsinki:FCA.

IGAD.(2017).NairobiDeclarationonDurableSolutionsforSomaliRefugeesandReintegrationofReturneesinSomalia.Nairobi,Kenya,25thMarch2017.

Koponen,Juhani.(2018).Personalcommunication.E-mails30.10.–11.11.2018.Advanceextractsfrom aforthcomingresearchonthehistoryofFinnishdevelopmentcooperation.

Leikola,Juhani.(2017).Tarinoita matkoiltani.Helsinki:Grano.

MFA.(2017).Country Strategy for Development Cooperation: Somalia 2017–2020.Helsinki:MinistryforForeignAffairs.

MFA.(2017a).Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy 2017.Helsinki:MFA.

TransparencyInternational.(2016).Collective Resolution to Enhance Accountability and Transparency in Emergencies (CREATE): Southern Somalia Report.TransparencyInternational2016.


Documents consultedDANIDA.(2014).Somalia Country Programme. New Deal Compact Support. Country Programme Document 2015–2018.Copenhagen:MinistryofForeignAffairsofDenmark.

DanishRefugeeCouncil.(2018).‘Listen to Our Voices’: What Does It Take to Improve Refugee Participation in Durable Solutions Processes.DanishRefugeeCouncilandHERE-Geneva.

IGAD.(2016).IGAD State of the Region Report. Popular Version. Formulation of IGAD Strategy and Medium-Term Implementation Plan.AddisAbaba:IntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment.

MFA.(2018).AnnualResultsReportonCountryStrategyforDevelopmentCooperation:Somalia.6.4.2018.

MinistryofForeignAffairsofDenmark.(2018).Peace and Stabilisation Programme. Horn of Africa 2018–2022.Copenhagen:MinistryofForeignAffairsofDenmarkandDanishMinistryofDefence.

OCHA.(2017).Breaking the Impasse: Reducing Protracted Internal Displacement as a Collective Outcome. NewYork:UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs.OCHAPolicyandStudiesSeries.

Regeringskansliet.(2018).Strategi för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Somalia 2018–2022. Stockholm:Utrikesdepartementet.

RiftValleyInstitute.(2018).Remittances and Vulnerability in Somalia,byNisarMajidetal. Nairobi:RiftValleyInstitute.

Switzerland.(2018).Swiss Cooperation Strategy: Horn of Africa 2018–2021.Bern:SwissDevelopmentCooperation.

WorldBank.(2018).SomaliaUrbanResilienceProjectP163857:ResettlementPolicyFramework. Washington:WorldBank.

WorldBankGroup.(2018).FederalRepublicofSomalia–SystematicCountryDiagnostic. September2018.Washington:WorldBank.


ANNEX 10: CASE STUDY MENA

Answer to EQ 1

EQ 1. How and to what extent has the MFA developed clear approaches to forceddisplacement (FD)andthehumanitarian-developmentnexus(HDN)overtheEvaluationperiod?

TheMENAcasestudy(definedinthisevaluationasLebanon,JordanandSyria)isnewterritoryfortheMFAbothgeographicallyandinrelationtothemodalitiesofitsengagement.AssuchinaddressingthisEQ,Finland’sresponsepresentssomethingofaparadoxanda‘disconnect’.AtapolicylevelFinlandnowhasawell-developedstrategy,broadlyinlinewiththeHDNthinking,and its role in supporting the strategic, regional level international response has been veryconsistentwith theHDNapproachthroughtheSubregionalresponse facility–note that theinternationalmodalitiesoftheHDNresponsehavebeenpioneeredintheSyriarefugeecrisis.Finland’ssupportforthehostcommunitiesandtheinvolvementoftheprivatesectorarealsoconsistentwithHDNprecepts.

Ontheotherhand,attheprogrammelevel,theMFApartnershipsrevealmoreacaseas‘businessasusual’.TheMFAhascertainlypursuedits4PPAs,andtosomeextentthepolicypillars,andhastriedtoadaptitsprogrammesandprojectstotherequirementsoflonger-termsustainabledevelopmentbuthasyettoadequatelyadopttheflexibilityneeded.

TherearesignalsthattheMFAhasrecognisedtheemergingHPDNtriplenexus.

OnFDthereislittleevidencethattheMFAhasdevelopedclearapproaches,althoughtherehasbeensomesmallinvolvementwithdisplacedpopulationsinSyria.

Key findings on judgement criteriaJC 1.1: The overall manner in which FD and HDN are addressed in the MENA case study is clearly formulated and well-established.

Thereislittle,althoughnonethelessconvincingdocumentaryevidence,andsomecompellingKIIevidence(fromtheregionbutnotpartnersatHQs)toconcurthattheoverallmannerinwhichHDNisaddressedisclearlyformulatedandisincreasinglywellestablishedatapolicylevelandatastrategicoperationallevel.Inmanywaysthishasbeenexemplary.ThereisalsoevidencethattheMFAhasidentifiedtheemergingtriplenexusoftheHPDNandthepotentialcontributionitcanmake.Lessclearishowwelltheformula-tionhastranslatedintopracticeinthefieldatprogrammelevel-notedinsubsequentJCsandEQs.

DominatedbythescaleofthecrisisanditscommitmenttotheHDNapproach,theoverallmanneroftheMFA’s(andindeedmostdonors’)responsetoFDislessconvincing.

Evidence

Until2017–i.e. forthefirstsixyearsof theSyriancrisis–therewasnoexplicitpolicy/strategy/pro-grammemanagementapparatusinplace.Theapproachwasframedbyrelevantoverarchingpolicydocu-ments–2016DPP(MFA2016), thepolicyguidanceforFragileStates(MFA2014b)andtheHumani-


tarianAssistanceandPolicy(MFA2015a).Nonetheless,theevidenceshowsthat,althoughitspolicyfortheregionwasnot‘clearlyformulated’,theMFAcopedsatisfactorilyina‘policyvacuum’butwithintheframeofextentgenericpolicies,andquicklyengagedthemainparametersoftheemerginginternationalresponseinwhichitcametoplayanactiverole.

TheMFAnowhasaclearlyformulatedpolicystrategyforitsinvolvementintheMENAregion,(Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian aid in response to the conflicts Syria and Iraq 2017–2020, MFA2017).ThismanifestlybuildsontheMFA’sexperienceaccumulateduptothistimeandpresentsaclearlyformulatedpolicyapparatusinwhatcould,insomerespects,beconstruedasanexemplaryHDNformula.ItframestheMFA’sresponseintermsofFinland’sglobalcommitmentsandvaluescomplement-edataprogrammelevelwithpolicyobjectivesandprioritiesconsistentwithFinland’s4PPAs–e.g.sig-nificantprofileforWomenandGirls–anditsPolicyPillars–e.g.significantprofileforpeaceandstability.Significantly,itstates(page10)that‘the challenge cannot be viewed through a traditional develop-ment lensduetothehighlypoliticalnatureofboththeconflictsandthe response…’and(page11)‘….takestheviewthatthetraditional‘relieffirstanddevelopmentlater’approachisnottenableinthekindofprotractedhumanitarianandrefugeecrises.’(emphasesadded).

Atastrategiclevelintheregionitself,theMFAhasbeenanearly(since2015)andconsistentadvocateofthe‘resilience’and‘nexus’responseembodiedintheSyrianRegionalRefugeeandResiliencePlan(3RP),althoughthesetermsarenotexplicitlystatedinthe2017–2020Strategy.KIIevidencestronglyconfirmstheMFA’scomprehensionof(andcommitmentto)theHDNapproach(seeEQ2below).

OtherevidenceofthescopeofMFA’sformulationoftheHDNispresent.Forexample,supportingthesocialandeconomicneedsofbothdisplacedandhostcommunities isan importantpillarof theHDNapproach(notedinchapter3.3.2ofthemainevaluationreport).Finlandhasbeenheavilycommittedtoadvocacyforandassistanceanddevelopmentcooperationwithhostcommunities.OneKIIstatedthattheMFA’ssplitoffundingwasbetween60:40and50:50hostsandrefugees.InthiscontextinLebanonithassupportedcommunitydialogueforsocialcohesionwhichwasamajorgapashost/refugeecohesionandsolidaritywasundergreatstressinthatcountry.InJordan,similarly,theMFAinpartnershipwithotherdonors,wasfirstinthefieldtosupportpublicinfrastructureprojects–solidwastemanagementandgreywaterrecycling–whichhadthetwinobjectivesofimprovingenvironmentalhealthconditionsandbuild-ingcommunitycohesionbetweenrefugeesandhosts,inthiscasewithastronggendercomponentaswell.SupportfortheWorldBank2015SyrianCrisisTrustFundwasforunderpinningpublicsectorcapacityinJordan,criticalatthattimeasitwasunderenormouspressure.

Thus,inadditiontofulfillingHDNapproaches,theseprojectsarealsoconsistentwithMFApolicypillarsandthe4DPPsillustrating,verysignificantly,thattheselongstandingpolicycommitmentscanbeadaptedtonewoperationalcontexts.

Onprivatesectorengagement,anotheremergingpillaroftheHDNapproach,the2017strategynotesthat‘thepromotionofFinnishknow-howandopportunitiesforFinnishcompaniestooffersolutionstopro-jectsisnotedaswillbestrengthenedduringimplementationofthestrategy.’OntheselinestheMFAhasbeenactivebutpragmaticallyso.Forexample,theMinistryofForeignTradeandDevelopmentpartneredtheUNDPin2018inaRegionalResilienceandPrivateSectorInnovationWorkshopforImprovedCrisisResponse.AnearliervisitbyFinnishbusinesspeopletorefugeecamosintheregionwasbrokeredbytheembassyinBeirut.However,thereisnoevidenceasyetthatthisactivityhasbeenstrengthenedinlinewiththeproposalsofthe2017Strategy.

Thereissomeevidenceofthepotentialofthetriplenexus,observedas‘Finlandifanybodycoulddothis’inthecontextofpeaceandstabilisationpolicies.Forexample,theMFAhassupportedFELMPeacebuild-ingandAdvocacyprogrammeinSyria–2.5MEURmulti-yearprogramme–inlinewiththeGenevaTrack1andTrack2peaceprocess.FELMandCommonSpaceInitiativeworkacrossallthepartiesintheconflict


andisfocusedonpeacethroughdevelopmentactivity,nottheusualpeacebuildingactors/mediatorsincommunities.

By contrast the programmes and projects themselves displaymuchweaker alignmentwith theHDN precepts.The local level provides the granular evidenceof the ‘disconnect’ betweendevelopment andhumanitarianpoliciesdespitethepersuasiveframingoftheoverallpolicyandthecommitmenttostrategic levelHDN.ThisisdiscussedinJC2below.

JC 1.2: The manner in which the MFA uses FD and HDN adds value to and strengthens the way the Five PPs and PPAs are implemented.

The4PPAsand thefivepillarsareamplypresent inFinland’sprogrammes in the regionandareveryconsistentwiththeMFA’spriorities–e.g.womenandgirls,peacebuildingandsecurity,communitycohe-sion,resiliencebuilding.KIIsrecognisedtheseattributesperse,andcommendedMFAforsomeoftherisksittookforfunding‘outsidetheconventional.SomeoftheseprojectsservemultiplePPAobjectives.But,whilstmanyoftheprojectscouldbeconstruedashavinganHDN‘orientation’,withoneexception,thereisonlylimitedevidencethattheHDNaddsvaluetoorstrengthensthewaythesepoliciesareimple-mented,orviceversa.

Evidence

ExamplesofMFAprogrammesthatalignwiththe4PPAs,thefive‘pillars’andhaveelementsoftheHDNarenumerous,viz

• HDNdevelopment strategy:–resilience-buildingsupportforUNDPsub-regionalfacility3RP–seeEQ2below.

• HPDNtriple nexus:–PeaceBuildingwiththeCSI(CommonSpaceInitiative)/FELM/EuropeanInstituteforPeacewhichisthebiggestpeacebuildingprojectofMFA.

• HDNhumanitarian assistance:–mostlynowinSyriaUNHCR-ICRC/IFRC-FCAc.6MEURp.a.,plusSyriaRecoveryTrustFundinareascontrolledbyopposition,butnowdiminishingasonlyonearealeft–Ibil.MFAisalsoworkingwithUNDPinsideSyriaonlivelihoodsincludingfordisabledandaUNICEFknowledgegenerationc.2.5MEURin2017.

• HDN:–humanitarian and development:–AUNICEFsupportedprojectinJordan,Makani(“MySpace”inArabic)isaverygoodexampleofanintegratedprogrammethatfulfilsmanyoftheMFA’sDPPprioritiesand,exceptionally,seemstotiltstronglytowardsamoreintegratedHDNmethodologyandobjectives.Thisisacomprehensive/integratedapproachtoserviceprovisionlinkinginterventionsineducation–learningsupportservices;childprotection–community-basedchildprotectionservices;earlychildhooddevelopment,adolescentandyouthparticipa-tion–lifeskillsandinnovationlabs;aswellasintegrationofhealthandnutritionandwater,sanitationandhygiene(WASH)services.Theprogrammeaimstopromoteandcontributetochildren’s,youthandparents’fulldevelopmentandwell-being–physical,cognitive,socialandemotional.Itbuttressesthemainstreameducationprogrammeforrefugeesandhosts.Thepro-jectfocusesoninformalsettlements(47interventionsfromtotalof147)wherethemostvulner-ablechildrenarefound,plusurbanareas(78projects)and22inthetwocamps.KIIsobservedthatthisproject‘speakswellofMFA’scommitmenttoinnovation(averynon-standardeduca-tionprogramme)andnexusprincipleswhetherintentionallyorunintentionally’.

However,atthisprogrammelevelunderlyingconstraintsindicatethattheHDNdidnotfullystrengthentheimplementationoftheDPPsandpillars,oratleastdidsonotdosoinasystematicwaythatcouldmaximise the impacts and outcomes. Amongst the identified constraints, the following are themostsignificant.


Theso-calledhumanitariananddevelopment‘silos’intheMFA’sapproachwerenotedbymostinterlocu-tors,withthecaveatthatthesesiloswereendemictothesector,notaspecificMFAissue.Theydescribedhow the silos are reflected in different precepts and concepts, in different programming and fundingarrangementsand indifferent reportingprotocols.Exemplifying thedifficulties thiscreates for imple-mentingpartnerswasaparticularcoupnotedbyonepartnerthathadmanaged‘levering[MFA]humani-tarianfundsfor‘development’,sothetwo-yeargrantwasseenasabitofasuccess.’

Thisbeggedthequestion,forexampleis‘educationinemergenciesorchildprotection,orsocialcohesionhumanitarianorisitdevelopmental?‘Itisnotazero-sumgame…theyhavetooverlap’.Inotherwords,despitethecommitmentofMFA,therearefundamentalissuesofoperatingpreceptsandprotocolsintheMFA(andindeedinalldonorsworkingacrosstheHDN)thathavenotbeenresolved.

AnotherchallengeidentifiedinthiscasestudyinrelationtotheHDN,concernsthebasisforprincipledneeds-basedhumanitarianassistance.ButitwaspointedoutthattheMENAcontextmakesdramaticallyclearthat‘humanitarianassistanceisnotnon-political’forexampleinprovidingassistanceinsideSyriaitself.TheviewwasexpressedthatwhilstthiswasunderstoodbytheMFA(andotherdonors)inthefield,closerdialoguewithdonorcountries’HQs,suchasforFinland,wasneededsothat‘theycanunderstandthathumanitarianassistanceisapoliticalprojectinacountrylikeSyria’.Itwasstated‘theyneedtoknowthis,buttheybelieveitisnon-political’.

JC 1.3: The development policies contain all the elements useful for FD and HDN in the case of MENA, without gaps or weaknesses (e.g. in relation to Finland’s human rights commitments, crisis management, IDPs, climate change, and vulnerable groups).

Thedevelopmentpoliciescontain‘useful’elements,forexampleurbanprojects,crisismanagement,andtheHRBA;butitisnotclearifthisistheresultofdeliberate‘policysteer’orbydefaultinthattheMFA’spartnersimplementprojectsintheselocations/sectors.Althoughtherehasbeenoneproject(nowtermi-nated)inSyriathatdidsupportIDPs,thisremainsasignificantgap.Climatechangedoesnotfeaturebutthenitisalsoverylowontheprioritiesofallinternationalagenciesandthe3RP.

Evidence

TherewasevidencethatMFAprojectsdidcontainrelevantelementsusefultoHDN,butnotsomuchFD.Forexample,theUNICEFsupportedMakaniprojectinJordan,discussedabove,isfocusedoninformalurbansettlements;notethisasoneofthe‘new‘patternsofFDmovementidentifiedinthemainreportinchapter3.3.2).AFELMprojecthasalsobeensupportingIDPsaspartofitspeacebuildingworkinSyria.However,theimpressiongivenbyKIswasthattheselocations/sectorswereinevitablypartoftheprojectdesignintheregion,giventhecharacteristicsofthedisplacement,andnotadeliberatepolicysteer.

Answer to EQ 2

EQ2.TowhatextentandhowhasFinland’sevolvingapproach to/interpretationofFDandHDNbeenanadequateresponsetothechallengeitposesforFinlandasanofficialdevelopmentandhumanitarianactor?

Overall, Finland’s approach toHDN in theMENAcasehasbeenvery adequate as anofficialdevelopment and humanitarian actor. Finland has been very actively engaged in advocatingandpromoting theHDNapproach through theSubregional response facility–note that theinternationalmodalitiesoftheHDNresponsehavebeenpioneeredintheSyriarefugeecrisis.Inthiswayithasalignedwiththenormssetbyinternationalagencies,notablyUNDP,UNHCR(thejointconvenersofthesub-regionalfacilityandthe3RP)andUNICEF,butalsotheWorldBank(SyrianCrisisTrustFund).Equallyitcanbeconsideredaninfluential,norm-setter,oratleasta


verystrongadvocateoftheHDN.AsnotedinJC1.2thisalignmentislessclearatprogrammelevel.

There is some evidence of reflexivity in the field but given the extent of its engagement andinnovationatbothstrategicandprogramme levels, ithasnot taken full stockof the learningexperiencetodate.

On the other hand, capacity limitations to cover the range and the geographic spread of itsprogrammesmayhaveunderminedsomeofthepotentialinfluencethatitmighthaveachievedandhaslimitedprogrammemonitoringandcoherenceatthefieldlevel.

TherearesignalsthattheMFAhasrecognisedtheemergingHPDNtriplenexus.

Key findings on judgement criteriaJC 2.1: Reflexivity/Compliance/Learning (external and internal): The approaches to FD and HDN reflect the ‘state of the art’/current understanding, praxis and norms. There has been a learning process within the MFA.

Thereissomeevidenceofreflexivityandlearning,forexamplethe2017–2020strategydocumentdemon-stratestheaccumulationandaggregationoftheprecedingfiveyears’experience.However,itisnotclearthatthisvaluableexperiencehasbeenmorewidelyembeddedinpolicydevelopmentforHDNandFDwithintheMFAforexampleinthe2018rolloutoftheinternalActionPlanonHDN

SomeKIsalsogavetheimpressionthatthatMFAcompliancewithHDPinthefieldhappenedbyaccidentratherthandesign

Evidence

ThemostobviousexampleofreflexivityliesintheadoptionoftheStrategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian aid in response to the conflicts Syria and Iraq 2017–2020(MFA2017).AsnotedinJC1.1thisisexemplaryinmanyrespectsandconstitutesaclearlyformulatedpolicystrategyforitsinvolvementintheMENAregion.TheMFA’sspeedyengagementwiththerolloutofHDNinthe3RPintheregionshowsthatthe‘MFAwasquicklyintonexusthinkingandlanguage’ascitedbyoneKI.

Yet,ataprogrammeandprojectlevelasnotedinJC1.3,MFAseemstohaveadoptedHDNapproachessomewhatbydefaultandthusmaynothavethoughtthroughtheimplications.

However,averysignificantobservationbysomeKIsisthereflectionthattherehasbeenlimitedspacededicated to taking sock and institutional learning from the last seven- or eight-years’ experience ofinnovativepolicymakingandprogramming.Asanevaluatoralsoreflectingonthis,thisevaluationand theprocessesunderwayintheMFA–theInternalActionPlanroll-out,theDepartmentalPolicyReformprocess,interalia,providetheopportunityandsomespaceforthislearning.

JC 2.2: Complementarity: The approaches to FD and HDN are complementary to that of the other actors the MFA seeks to work with, that is bilaterals and multilaterals (e.g. EU/UN, ‘guided actions in EU, UNHCR’) and CSOs

Finland’sdisposition in theMENAregion is fully complementarywith theother actors. Ithasplayed asignificantandverysupportiverolegiventheconstraintsthatitisarelativelysmalldonorwithinacom-plexandlargescale–volumeandgeographicspread–programme.


Evidence

KIIevidencestronglyacknowledgesFinland’ssignificantrolebothinadvocating‘nexusthinking’anditspracticalembodimentthroughdonorsupportforthejointUNHCR-UNDPSub-regionalresponsefacilitysecretariat.KIIevidencedescribesFinlandasa‘trailblazerforHDN,’and‘hashelpedUNDPandUNHCRtospearheadtherecovery-reliance-developmentstrategy’.TheMFAhasworkedwithinthe3RPmachinery (i.eoneofthedonorsfundingthesecretariatandalsoscaling-upresearchfocusingondevelopingliveli-hoodsandsocialcohesiontoolkits(NBconsistencywithconsistent4PPAsandpolicypillars)),andexter-nallywith strong advocacywithotherdonors tomaintain themomentum for the3RP.TheMFAwasalsonotedforits‘verystrongsupportforthehostcommunitycomponent’,akeycomponentoftheHDNapproachnotedinchapter3.3.2ofthisEvaluation.

OneverysalientindicatorofFinland’scomplementarityisthataKInotedhowitwasveryeffectiveinback-grounddialogue,‘itwatches,thencampaigns’.Forexample,itisnotinthetopregionaldonors’group(100MUSDclub)butitattendsandhasbeenaverystrongadvocate‘promotingresiliencewhenotherdonorswere less interested’.TheMFAwasalsodeemed tobeveryhelpful inbackgroundadvocacy–seeking commongroundtobringtogetherUNDPandUNHCR–ironicallybridgingdifferentoperatingpreceptsandprinciplesthatexistwiththeMFAaswell–tosupporttheregionalresilienceprogrammebycom-mendingworkableapproaches.

Finlandhasalignedwithotherinternationalactors,forexampleallocating3MUSDtotheWorldBank:2015SyrianCrisisTrustFund,ensuringthatunusedfundswerecycled forward:supportpublicsectorcapacityinJordanwhichwascriticalatthattimeasunderenormouspressure.ThiswasthemainchannelwhichMFAfoundtofundpublicsector.

Of particular note was Finland’s support for the 2017 Donor Conference bringing together the 3RP2017/18andHumanitarianResponsePrioritiesJanuary2017(theHumanitarianResiliencePlan).OneKInotedthatthedonorconferencewas‘rescuedandsuccessfullyhostedbyMFAinHelsinkiwithsupportalsofromotherNordics.

Linkedtothis,MFA(plusthegovernmentofCanada)partneredUNDPin2017forreport‘Never too early to Plan: lessons learned for post agreement reconstruction in Syria’.FinlandwascommendedbyoneKIforitsforward-lookingattitudeandwillingnesstotakepoliticalrisksinthinkingaheadonSyria,andthechallengesforsocialcohesionanddevelopmentandIDPs(araremention)whenotherdonorsweresayingwhyinvestinsolidaritybuildinginSyria?

AtthesametimetheMFAhasrecognisedthatdifferentoperatingconditionsrequiredifferentoperatingmodalities.Forexample,itwasnotedthatFinlandtriestosupportallthecountrieswitharangeofpro-tectioninterventions–childprotection,education,socialcohesionvulnerability,especiallyinLebanonwheretheprotectionatmosphereis‘verysour’.Alsonotedwastheneedtoadaptthe‘nexus’todifferentcountrycircumstances.Thenexuswasdescribedas‘trickyincountrieslikeLebanonwhere[untilrecently]there[hasbeen]nocoherentnationallevelco-ordinationornationalprogramme/strategyandnosectorworkinggroupsandsomanystakeholders’.Accordingly, theMFAhashad tooperatemorepragmati-cally.BycontrastinJordandonors,suchastheMFA,canalignwiththegovernment’sprogramme–theNationalJordanianResponsePlan.

JC 2.3: Influence: MFA Policy influence on FD and HDN towards bilateral, multilateral and CSO partners has been sustained and effective.

ThereisstrongevidenceofsustainedMFApolicyinfluenceintheMENAregionthroughadvocacyandfundingfortheregionalstrategicresponseintheHDN.ThereisnoevidenceofparallelinfluenceonFD.


Capacity limitationstocovertherangeandthegeographicspreadof itsprogrammesmayhaveunder-minedsomeof thepotential influence that theMFAmighthaveachievedandhas limitedprogrammemonitoringandcoherenceatthefieldlevel.

Evidence

ThemaindimensionsandsuccessesofMFAinfluencehavebeendiscussedinJC2.2above.InmanywaysthisisaremarkableachievementgiventhatMFAcoverageonthegroundissothintocoverthreecoun-tries–anambassador,adeputyheadofmission,andonelocalstaffworkingmainlyonCSOprogrammes.

KIIindicatorssuggestthatwhilstthemaindimensionsofthestrategyhavebeenwellcoveredbytheMFA,whatislackingisdetailedoversightandinfluenceonimplementationandprogrammecoherence–seeEQ3.Whereasitwasnotedthathumanitarianassistance,beingmoreneedsandprinciplesbased,develop-mentcooperationrequiressustaineddialoguewithpartners,andthisisnottakingplacesufficiently.Stra-tegicdialoguewithpartnersisimportant.ThismixedportfolioofprojectsacrossthecountriesdescribedaboveleadKIstoperceivethataligningthe4PPAstotheHDNwasbecomingmoredifficultfortheMFA.Notbeingabletoattenddonorco-ordinationmeetings,becauseofstaffshortageshas implications forcoherence,influenceandmonitoring.KIscomparedtheFinnishMFAunfavourablyinthisrespectcom-paredwithotherNordics.

Ontheotherhand,KIIsnotedthattheMFAwasquitehandsoffbutequallyvaluedwhattheysawwastrustbytheMFAintheircapacityandprinciplesandawillingnessnotto‘micromanage’anduseun-orsoft-earmarkedfunding.TheMFAwaswelcomedinitsopennessofapproachcaricaturedas‘whatareyoudoing,howcanweassist?’and‘werespectwhatyoudo’approach.

OneKIsummedupFinland’spredicament,‘withsmallmissionsliketheMFA,theydon’thavethestaffandthislowpresenceisnotdoingjusticetotheircommitments’.

Answer to EQ 3


PoliciesrootedintheDPPshavestronglyinfluencedtheestablishmentofpolicycoherence,atleastintherecentpastoftheevaluationtimeframe.Thisisreflectedinthe2017–2020Strategy.TheprogrammeintheregionalignswellwiththeDPPs.Theyprovideagood‘backstop’giventhat coherence on the ground is constrained by the wide spread of the programme and theshortfallofstafftomonitorandprovideoversight.

PoorcoherencebetweenMFAHQandthefieldwasnoted

Key findings on judgement criteriaJC 3.1: Mechanisms to promote policy coherence within the MFA are in place and operate effectively.

NooperationalmechanismswereidentifiedasbeinginplacetopromotepolicycoherenceatHQorintheregion.The2017–2020Strategyprovidesagoodbackstopforcoherenceondevelopmentpoliciesandprogrammes.However,theUnitforHumanitarianAidactssomewhatindependently,giventhedifferentoperatingpreceptsandprinciples,andthuslittlecoordinationandcomplementaritywasfound.ThisissomewhatofaparadoxgiventhestrongadvocacyandsupportfortheconceptoftheHDPwhichtheMFAhaspromoted.


Evidence

The lack of directmechanisms, except for the 2017–2020 strategy, is surprising. The ‘One-pagers onmigration’seemtangentialandtheTheoriesofChangeforthefourPPAsdonotreallyprovideamecha-nismtosupportcoherenceforHDNintheregion.

SymptomaticofthelackofmechanismsistheindicationbyasmallnumberofKIsthattheyperceivedadisconnectbetweenHQandtheEmbassyinBeirut.Thiswasnotedasachallengeinsynchronisingmes-sagesandensuringconsistencyandwhatwasperceivedtobethemoredominantroleoftheMFAatHQcomparedwithNorway,forexample,whichwassaidtodelegatemoretotheembassylevel.Finlandwasperceivedtobemorecentralised,thecorollary,perhaps,ofhavingsofewstaffinthefield.ThequestionwasalsoraisedthatthismightbebecauseODAprojectsaremorepoliticallysensitiveandthustheMFAkeepstightercontrol.

JC 3.2: There is coherence between relevant MFA policies on FD and HDN and those of other Government Ministries/Departments (eg, MoI, MoD, PMO) and the MFA’s partners – bilateral and multilateral development co-operation partners (UN, EU and CSOs).

There isevidenceofstrongcoherencewithexternalpartners–closealignmentwithmultilateralsandCSOsforexample–butlesscoherenceacrossthegovernment

Evidence

EarlierJCshaveunderscoredthegenerallygoodlevelsofcoherencewithexternalpartners,albeit thatcontactinthefieldislimited.TheimpressionfromKIsisthatcoherenceisundertakenatHQlevelintheMFAandHQlevelofitsmultilateralpartners;butthiscouldalsobetakenagainassymptomaticoftheweakfieldpresence.Nevertheless,KIsspokeofverygoodrelationshipswithMFAacrossseveraldesksandlevelsofstaff,valuedannualprogrammemeetings.ItwasnotedthatconnectingaspectrumofMFAstakeholdersalsoinvolvedclosefollow-upbytheMFAstaff:‘dialoguewasgood,tight,strong,sharingofpoliticalassessmentsandknowledge’.InthiscontextitwasalsonotedbyKIsthattheyappreciatedthehighdegreeoftrustandtransparencywithwhichMFAengageditspartners.However,inthiscontextKIsalsonotedtheirappreciationforthehighdegreeoftrustandtransparencywithwhichMFAengageditspartners,indicatingthevalueofinformalmechanismsinpromotingpolicycoherence.

Externally,asignificantgapincoherenceisengagementwiththeprivatesector

JC 3.3: The level of policy coherence achieved is adequate to support the approaches to FD and HDN.

Therearegood levelsofpolicycoherencearoundexistingpolicies.Lessclear is theadequacyof theseapproachinthecontextofHDNandFD.

Evidence

EarlierJCshavehighlightedthemainlimitationstopolicycoherence.Theseare:

• AdegreeofdisconnectbetweentheMFA’sthinkingandoperationalengagementat theHDNstrategylevelcomparedwithprogrammelevel

• AdegreeofdisconnectbetweenHQandthefield.


RecommendationsSincetheSyriancrisisresponseisthemain(only?)HDNtypeprogrammeglobally,thereisasignificantbodyofstrategic,policyandimplementationexperience,aftereightyears,foralldonorsnotjustFinlandwhichpromptsthefollowingrecommendations.

• First,andmostimportant,theMFAisrecommendedtocommissionanevaluationofitsengage-mentintheregion,lessonslearned,strengthsandweaknessesand,mostimportant,guidanceonpotentialfutureHDNandHPDNengagementrecognisingthatthiswillalwaysbecontextspecific.Theevaluationshouldbecomprehensivecoveringi)alllevels–HQ,regionallevel(the3RP),implementation(programmesandpartnerships);ii)managementprocesses–e.g.strategydevelopment,applicationofpolicyinstruments(e.g.the4PPAs),staffing,funding,PCDetc;iii)focusonthetriplenexuswhichisevident,insomerespectsintheMFAsresponse.

• Moreimmediaterecommendationsare:

– Reviewtheneedtoscaleupstaffingrequirementsforamulti-country,multi-partnerprogramme;

– ReviewcommunicationanddistributionofresponsibilitiesbetweenHQ-Embassywithmoredelegationtotheregiontoimproveprogrammeflexibility.

– Reviewstrengthsandweaknesses(e.g.policyinfluence,monitoring,andespeciallyPCD)ofcurrentprogrammespreadandcountryspreadwithaviewitconsideringstreamliningandsharperfocus.

– ReviewPCD

References MFA(2017)Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian aid in response to the conflicts Syria and Iraq 2017–2020,MFA.

MFA,Canada,UNDP(2017)‘Never too early to Plan: lessons learned for post agreement reconstruction in Syria’.http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/SyriaResponse/UN%20%20Lessons%20Learnt%20plain%20V3.pdf

http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/SyriaResponse/UN%20%20Lessons%20Learnt%20plain%20V3.pdf

http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/SyriaResponse/UN%20%20Lessons%20Learnt%20plain%20V3.pdf


ANNEX 11: THEORY OF CHANGE

TheInceptionReportpresenteda‘reconstructed’ToC(Figurebelow)wasbasedlargelyontheDPP2016andcommittedtheteamtopresentinganewToCinthisFinalReport.ThiswouldseekstocapturethelogicofhowalltheMFAinterventions,basedonasharedunderstandingofkeyconceptsofforceddis-placementandthehumanitarian-developmentnexus,canexpecttoachievetheirexpectedoutputs,out-comesandimpactsinrelationtothe2016DPP.InthiswaytheToCwillhelptostrengthentheMFA’spolicycoherenceinrespectofforciblydisplacedpopulationsinbothcountriesoforiginandimpacted/hostcountries.Itwillalsoactasalearningtoolbyhelpingtoclarifyhowthedifferentmodalities,imple-mentationchannelsofdelivery,andtargetgroupsadoptedbytheMFAmayormaynotfitwiththegeneraloveralldirectionofchangecapturedinthegenericToC.AspartofthisreflectiontheevaluationteamalsoexaminedtheMFA’sfourindividualToCsforitsfourPolicyPriorityAreas(PPAs).

The Reconstructed ToCIntheInceptionReportthereconstructedToCproposedthatHumanitarianAssistanceandDevelopmentCo-operationshouldsitalongsideeachotherasthetwinaxesofMFApoliciesandthatPCD/PCSDcoveralltheinputsmadebytheMFAinboththesepolicyareasandthoseofotherministriesthatimpactonthem.FundingandPolicyInfluencingareinputsapplyingtoboth.

Figure 10: Draft Reconstructed ToC from Inception Report


Inaddition, thereconstructedToCidentifiedthe inputsandthemeans,keyactivitiesandtheiropera-tionalisationprovidingaguidetochecktheseduringouranalysisofthedeskstudy,KIIsandcountrycasestudies.

ItalsoidentifiedthefourpolicypriorityareasasthemainareasinwhichtofindoutputsthatwouldleadtosixgenericoutcomesthatweregleanedfromthetextoftheDPP.

Ministry ToCs for the Policy Priority AreasTheMinistry’sownToCsforthefourPriorityAreaswerestudied.Threeoverallcommentscanbemade.First,itwasnotedthatthesedetailedToCs,thoughagooddealmorespecific,fittedwellwiththeoverallToCproducedbytheevaluationteam.Second,itwasfoundthatonlyoneofthefourPPAToCs(No4onFoodSecurity)hadspecificreferencestomigrationandthenonlyinthelistof‘AssumptionsandImplica-tions’attheend.Theotherthreemadenoreferencetomigrationorrefugeesatall.Finally,perhapsnotsurprisinglyconsideringtheyweredraftedbefore2015,theseToCsmakenouseoftheconceptsofforceddisplacementorthehumanitarian-developmentnexus,norevenless,thelatestconceptofthehumanitar-ian-peace-developmentnexus.

AttheindividualPPAlevelthemainfindingsemergingfromthisanalysiswere:

PPA 1: Gender

WhiletheOutcomesandOutputsarewrittenatagenericlevelthatdoesnotfocusonwomeninparticu-larcircumstancessuchasmigration,theActivitiesaremuchmorespecificreferringtopartnercountriesandevenprogrammes.Forinstance,mentionismadeofworkingwithwomenandgirls infragilecon-textsandeventothecountriescoveredinthecasestudiesforthisevaluation(Afghanistan,SomaliaandMENA).However,nomentionismadeofcateringtothespecialneedsofwomenorgirlswhoarerefugeesormigrantsmoregenerallyeventhoughthisisanimportantaspectofFinland’sworkinthesesettings.

PPA 2: Livelihoods

AswiththePPA1TheoryofChangethissecondonedoesnotmentionmigrationorrefugeesatall,andtheOutcomesandOutputstextiswrittenatagenericlevelthatwouldnoteasilyaccommodatelanguageonsuchspecificconcernsunlessitwasaprimaryconcern.Equally,thetextonActivitiesdoesnotrefertomigrationandrefugees,eventhoughtherewouldbescopetodosohere,ifsowished.Ofcourse,thequestionthenarisesas tohowmuch livelihoods isaspecificconcernwithinFinland’sworkonmigra-tionandrefugees,thoughadoptinganHDNapproachwouldsuggestitmightwellbeimportantintheseprogrammes.

PPA 3: Ending Poverty

Similarly, this thirdToCdoesnotrefertomigrationorrefugeesevenatthe levelofActivitieswhere itmightbeappropriate.Thereismentionofoneofthecasestudycountries,Afghanistan,however,whichsuggestsitmightbeappropriatetorefertoprogrammesformigrantsandrefugeesinthisToCatthelevelofActivities.

PPA 4: Food Security

MigrationismentionedintheAssumptionsandImplicationsrelatedtoFoodSecurityandNutritionandamongthoseforForestsandNaturalResourcesofthisTheoryofChange.Ontheotherhand,migrationandrefugeesarenotmentionedintheassumptionsfortheWatersectionofthediagram.So,whilemigra-tionisrecognisedinplaces,thislackofconsistenttreatmentsuggeststhatnospecificattentionwaspaidtotheseissueswhenthediagramwasdrafted.

AswiththeotherPPAToCs,neithermigrationnorrefugeesarerecognisedinthemainpartsofthedia-gram.While it isunderstoodthatthegenericpitchofthetext fortheOutcomesandOutputsdoesnot


reallyallow foramentionof specific circumstances, there is scope for thisat the levelofActivities in thediagram.

Revised ToCTherevisedToCdraftedaftertheevaluationwascompletedispresentedinFigurebelow.Thebasiclogicandstructuralelementsremain largely thesame.Themainchangesareat thebottomof thediagram,whichdealswiththemainstakeholders.Movingfromthebottomupwardstheyare:

• Anotherkeygovernmentalactorhasbeenincluded:notablythePMO.Tradepolicy,althoughitisundertheMFA,hasalsobeenhighlightedseparatelyasanotherimportantareaforpolicycoherence.

• Thefivemainpolicy‘pillars’oftheMFAidentifiedinthestudyarenowmoreclearlylistedin theboxatthebottomcentreofthediagram.

Figure 11: Revised ToC using an HPD Nexus approach to Migration & Forced Displacement

• ThenumberofmaininputshasalsobeenexpandedtoincludethefundinggoingintoPeace-buildingefforts.ThisisalsoportrayedonthesamelineasHumanitarianAssistanceandDevel-opmentCooperationtodenotethethreemainelementsoftheHPDNexusthatprovidesthemostusefulconceptualframeworkfortheMFAtoadopt.Themainevaluationreportmakesthecaseforthisandincludesarecommendation.


• ThepartnersidentifiednowalsoincludeFELM(FinnishEvangelicalLutheranMission)in thegreen‘OtherPartners’boxinthecentreofthediagram.

• IntheUNbox,thewordsmigrationandrefugeeshavebeenadded.

• Thecoverageexpectedforpolicycoherence,representedbythelargedottedareainsideadashedlineatthebottomofthediagram,hasnotbeenchanged.Evidencecollectedduringtheevalua-tiondoesshowthatthiscoverageisinpracticenotasgoodasexpectedinallareasbutgiventhatthediagramrepresentsthe‘theory’ofchangeratherthanthe‘practice’,thediagramdoesnotshowanysuchexistinggaps.

• Nearthetopofthediagram,atthelevelofOutcomessomeregroupinghasbeendonesoastobringoutmoreclearlythepeaceandsecurityOutcomes.OtherwisetheOutcomes,Outputsandthe‘destinations’fortheOutputsareleftunchanged.

• Theoverallobjectiveatthetopofthediagramhasbeenslightlyrewordedusingtheword ‘Ensuring’insteadof‘Securing’

Otherwise,theevaluationsuggestedthatthereconstructedToCdiagramdesignedbytheteamatthestartoftheevaluationcoveredtheMinistry’sexistingtheoryofchangewell.

ConclusionsTheoverallToCpreparedbytheevaluationteamatthestartofthestudydidnotrequiremuchupdatingasaresultofthefindingsoftheevaluationthoughitwasconsideredusefultodosomefine-tuninginordertobetterrepresentthefindingfromthestudy.Equally,anattemptwasmadetofitintheHPDNexustoshowhowthiscanfurtherbringtogethertheMFA’sworkonforceddisplacement.

TheMFA’sindividualToCsforthefourPolicyPriorityAreasfitwellwiththeoverallToConforceddis-placementproposedbytheevaluationteamexceptforthefactthatthereisavirtualtotallackofrefer-encesinthemtomigrationandrefugees.Thisisperhapsnotsurprisingfortheperiodinwhichtheyweredrafted,butasaresultrewritingtheseToCstoincorporatetheMinistry’sobjectivesonforceddisplace-mentandHPDNexusapproach,wouldbeagoodopportunitytodrawgreaterattentiontothiswork.


ANNEX 12: METHODOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF QAB DATABASE ANALYSIS

Methodological explanation: First phaseTheEvaluationTeamconsideredthatthematerialproducedbyandfortheQualityAssuranceBoard(QAB)ofdevelopmentcooperationwasapotentialsourcetotesttheimpactofthe‘thresholdmoment’infund-ingdecisionsintheMFAandseeuptowhichdegreeFDisusedasargumentindecision-makinginsidetheorganisation.Thisisthemethodologicalexplanationonhowthematerialwasassembledandanalysed.

TheEvaluationTeamaskedtohavethecompletesetofQABagendasandmeetingminutesintwoperiodsoftime:fromJune2012toDecember2013,andfromJune2016toDecember2017,asasamplesubmittedtocloseranalysis.Thepurposewastodetectpossiblechangesinthecorpusofdevelopmentcooperationprojects/programmesbetweenthetwoDPPs.TheapprovalofeachDPPinFinlandalwaystakesplaceinFebruarythefollowingyearofparliamentaryelectionswhenthenewgovernmentdefinesitsprioritiesfordevelopmentcooperation,anditwasconsideredthatsomemonthswereneededsoastobeabletoseepossiblechangesinorientationofprioritiesaftertheapprovalofaDPP.

Basedontheagendasandminutes,afulllistofallfundinginitiativesrelatingtothethreecasestudycoun-tries,Afghanistan,SomaliaandSyria/MENAwerepickedoutfromtheagendasandmeetingminutes,andfulldocumentationofthoseprojects/programmeswasaskedfor,tobeanalysedinasecondphase.Eachfundinginitiativeconsistsofaproposal,normallydraftedbythedeskofficerandsubmittedtotheQAB,andanopinion,herecalledstatement,writtenbythethematic/sectoradvisor.Insomecases,the‘package’ofeachfundingproposalalsoincludedastatementwrittenbythediplomaticrepresentation/embassyofthecountryorregionwheretheprojectwouldbeimplemented.

Toanalysethechangesinfundinginitiativesbetweenthe2012and2016DPPs,atablewasdrawnbyclus-teringthepolicypriorityareasandcross-cuttingobjectivesofbothinlargerthematicareas.Thethematicpriorities,independentlywhethercross-cuttingorspecificpriorityarea,foundinbothDPPswereseven,insomecasesphrasedslightlydifferentlyintheDPP2012fromthe2016DPP,andaneightinDPP2016.Yet,bothDPPshaveahighdegreeofthematiccontinuity.Thecategoriesfoundwere:

1. Democracyandruleoflaw;2. Economyandemployment;3. Humanrights;4. Genderequality;5. Humandevelopment,includinghealthandeducation;6. Humanitarianpurposes,and7. Refugeesandmigration-relatedinitiatives.8. The‘larger’environment;climatechange,sustainableuseofnaturalresources

The categorieswere then inserted in thehorizontal axis of anExcel table, and the funding initiativesapprovedbyQABontheverticalaxis,indicatingeachapprovedfundinginitiativeanditsbudgetinthecorrespondingcell.Table1belowindicatesthedistributionofFinnishfundsaccordingtothematicpriori-tiesasapprovedbytheQABbetweenJune2012andDecember2013.


Ithastobeunderlinedthattheapprovedfundinginitiativesandtheirbudgets(thataftertheapprovalbytheQABaresenttotheMinisterofDevelopmentCooperationforsignature,afterwhichtheybecomefund-ingdecisions,legallybindingcommitments)shouldbetakenwithextremecareandasindicativeonlytoillustratechangingpolicypriorities,notasactualdisbursements.TheevaluationhasnotcheckedwhethertheMinistereffectivelysignedthem,andinanycasethefinancialflowsgoingthroughthescrutinyoftheQABareonlyapartoffundsgoingtoacertaincountry(namely,fundstotheEUandhumanitarianaidareexcludedfromthem).Inaddition,asthe2017approvalsshow,thesumsapprovedforcertainprojects/ini-tiativescanchange,withposteriorincreasesorcutsinrelationtowhatwasoriginallyapproved.Inafewwords,thefiguresbelowonlyindicateprojects/programmesdeemedbytheQABofbeingofsufficientlygoodqualityandalignedwithFinnishdevelopmentpoliciesthattheywouldmeritbeingfunded.

Table 5: Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2012–Dec 2013 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA.

June2012–Dec 2013


Economy employment

Human rights

Gender equality


Other / multisector Total

Afghanistan 50,000Afghanistan 11,350,000

Afghanistan 500,000

Afghanistan 1,500,000




MENA 800,000

MENA 50,000

MENA 710,000

MENA 50,000

MENA 2,340,000

MENA/Syria 552,582

MENA/Syria 3,000,000

Somalia 1,000,000

Somalia 190,000

Somalia 2,400,000Total June 2012–Dec2013 15,350,000 3,000,000 1,200,000 1,052,585 2,590,000 6,500,000 29,692,585

Source:OwnelaborationbasedonMFA-QABmeetingminutes2012–2013.

Forinstance,whatTable5tellsusisthatover50%ofapprovedfundingproposalsconcernstopicsrelatedtodemocracyandruleoflaw,androughly57%ifhumanrightsareaddedtothesamecategory.Migrationand/orrefugeesaretotallyabsentfromthebodyofproposedprojects.Thetotalrepresents4.7%ofall QAB-approvedfundingproposalsduringthesameperiod.Inapiechartformat,thetablegivesthefollowing figurebelow:

Figure 12: Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2012–Dec 2013 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA.

Source:OwnelaborationbasedonMFA-QABmeetingminutes2012–2013.Other / multisector


Gender equality

Human rights

Economy employment


Other / multisector


Gender equality

Human rights

Economy employment

Democracy rule of lawDemocracy rule of law (MEUR 15,350,000)

Economy employment (MEUR 3,000,000)

Human rights (MEUR 1,200,000)

Gender equality (MEUR 1,052,585)

Human dev. Health educ. (MEUR 2,590,000)

Other/ multisector (MEUR 6,500,000)


Thefollowingtable(Table6)givesthefiguresforfundingproposalsjudgedeligibleforFinnishfundingbytheQABbetweenJune2016andDecember2017.Thetotalrepresentsroughly12%ofallQAB-approvedfundingproposalsduringthesameperiod;thatis,abouttwoandahalftimeshigherinproportionthanbetweenJune2012andDecember2013.

Table 6: Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2016–Dec 2017 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA.

June2016–Dec 2017


Economy employment

Human rights

Gender equality


HumanitarianRefugees + migration

Total

Afghanistan 0 0 0 0 0 2,500,000 0

Afghanistan 0 0 0 0 0 500,000 0


Afghanistan 0 0 0 600,000 0 0 0

Afghanistan 0 0 0 0 4,000,000 0 0

Afghanistan 0 0 1,000,000 0 0 0 0

Afghanistan 0 0 0 2,000,000 0

MENA 50,000 0 0 0 0 0 0

MENA/Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,000,000

MENA/Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,500,000

MENA/Syria 0 0 0 0 0 4,000,000 0

MENA/Syrian refugees 5,000,000

MENA/Syrian crises 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,600,000

Somalia 0 0 0 0 3,000,000 0 0

Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 1,000,000 0

Somalia 0 0 0 8,000,000 0 0 0

Somalia 0 0 0 0 4,300,000 0 0

Somalia 0 0 0 0 220,000 0 0

Somalia 200,000 0 0 0 0 0 0

Somalia 0 0 0 2,000,000 0 0 0

Syria 0 0 0 0 0 3,000,000 0

Syria 0 0 0 0 0 500,000 0

Syria 0 0 0 0 0 963,000 0

Syria 800,000 0 0 0 0 0 0

Syria 0 1,000,000 0 0 0 0 0

Syria 970,197 0 0 0 0 0 0

Syria 1,000,000 0 0 0 0 0 0

Syria 3,900,000 0 0 0 0 0

Syria/Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 576,968Total June 2016–Dec2017 6,920,197 5,500,000 1,000,000 10,600,000 18,520,000 12,463,000 9,676,968 64,680,165

Thereareapprovedbudgetsineachthematiccategory,andtheoverallamountismorethandouble(64.68MEUR)comparedwiththeprevioussample;andindeed,theshare(percentage)ofAfghanistan,SomaliaandSyria/MENAinallfundingproposalsapprovedbytheQABismorethandouble(12%)thaninthepreviousperiod.FigurebelowgivesthesamedistributionofapprovedfundingproposalsfortheperiodbetweenJune2016andDecember2017.


Figure 13: Funding proposals approved by QAB Jun 2016–Dec 2017 for Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria/MENA.

Source:OwnelaborationbasedonMFA-QABmeetingminutes2016-2017.

Methodological explanation: Second phaseThesecondphaseintheanalyticaluseoftheQABmaterialdatabasewastocarryoutaqualitativeanaly-sisonthecoreissueoftheevaluation:connectionbetweendevelopmentpolicyandforceddisplacement,inotherwords,howcoherenthasFinland(MFA)beeninaddressingforceddisplacement,andtherootcausesthereof,throughdevelopmentcooperationandpolicy.Thisphasewasbased,notontheagendasandminutesofQABmeetings,butontheproposalsdraftedbydeskofficers,andthestatementswrittenbythematic/sectoradvisors,andbyembassiesinsomecases.

Theproposalsaswellasthestatementshaveacertainstandardformat,includingfollowingelementsoftheproposedproject: abstract, resultsmonitoringmechanismand indicators,ODAeligibility, lessonslearnedfromearlierphases,countrycontext,complianceandcomplementaritywithFinnishdevelopmentpolicy,riskmanagementandotheraspects,e.g.administrativestructureoftheproposedinterventionetc.Someproposalshaveonlyacoupleofpagesoftext,butsomeothersareupto15pageslong.Thethematicadvisor’sopiniongivesajustificationforapprovingtheproposal,orinthecontrarycase,demandsfurtherclarificationaboutcertainaspects(managementstructure,indicators,fundmanagementstructureetc.).Severalproposalsaresentbacktothedeskofficerforclarifications,correctionsandfurtherinformationwhichcanbeseenintheproposalsmentioning“correctedafterQAB’srecommendationsfromXdate”).

Allproposalsandstatementswerethensubmittedtoasearchwithkeywords,orrather,theirequivalentsinFinnish:migr*(‘muutt*’),refug*(‘pakol*’),camp(‘leir*’),andakeyword,perhapsslightlyoutdatedbutstillusedinthedocuments,correspondingtowhatinEnglishwouldbe‘immigrantworker’whichinFinn-ishdoesnotcomefromthesamerootasmigrant(‘siirtol*’).

Thesampleofdocumentsfromtheearlierperiod(June2012–December2013)wasrelativelysmall.Onlyfourproposals(outof16)werefoundintheMFAelectronicarchivesofwhichonlythreeturnedouttobefullyrelevantfortheSyriancrisis/MENA,andonlyoneadvisorstatement.Oneofthereasonsforthisscant‘harvest’canbethefactthatatthattime,theproposalsandstatementswereproducedmanually,onpaper,andsignedinperson,thenphotocopiedbutnotnecessarilyscannedandsenttothearchivesinelectronicformat.Innoneofthedocumentswasmigration,refugees,work-relatedpopulationmovementsorsimilarmentioned/addressed.IntheeyesofFinnishdevelopmentcooperation,thetopicdidnotexist.

Thesecondsampleperiodprovedtobemoreabundant,probablyareflectionofbetterandfullyelectronicarchivalmethods.Twenty-fourprojectproposalshadbeenhandledbytheQABbetweenJune2016andDecember2017;inaddition,therewerethreeextraprojectsofhumanitarianmineclearancethathadbeentendered,withoutdeskofficerproposalsandthereforeleftoutfromthequalitativesecondphaseanalysis.Withtheexceptionofoneproject,allproposalswerefound(23),and21advisororembassystatements.

Refugees migration



Gender equality

Human rights

Economy employment

Democracy rule of lawDemocracy rule of law

Economy employment

Human rights

Gender equality



Refugees migration

9.68%

1.00%

12.46%

6.92%

18.52%

5.50%

Refugees migration



Gender equality

Human rights

Economy employment


1.05%


Ingeneraltermsitcanbesaidthataboutonehalfoftheprojectsconcernrefugeesormentionmigrationinthedocumentation.All fundinginitiativesfortheMENAregionwithSyriaareeminentlyrefugeeorIDP-related.ThisislogicalconsideringthehumanitariansituationintheregionbutalsowhentakingintoaccountthatSyriaandtheMENAregionisnotapartnercountryfortheFinnishdevelopmentcoopera-tion,contrarytoAfghanistanandSomalia,forwhichclearlynon-migrationorrefugeerelatedprojectsarefunded(waterandsanitation,reproductivehealthetc.).

Ingeneral,thefocusunderwhichtheprojectsrelatedtoAfghanistanandSomaliaareproposedisemi-nentlyhumanrightsoriented,and, toa lesserextent,concernedaboutstate-building.Asexamples forAfghanistan can be presented theUNICEFWASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) project andMarieStopesInternationalreproductivehealthproject.ForSomalia,theapprovedprojectsmanageargumenta-tiononprovisionofservicesinthehealthsector,particularlyforwomenandgirls(maternal,childandreproductivehealth).Migrationispresentonlymarginallyinmostoftheproposalsand/orstatements;oneexamplecouldbethataninternationalnon-governmentalorganisationcomplainsabouttheirprofes-sionalstaffmigratingoutofthecountryamongriskmanagementarrangementsorthatsomehealthser-vicesprovidedwillbenefitalsoIDPs.Incaseslikethis,theproposalwasconsiderednotFDrelatedinthesenseoftheevaluation.None of the proposals for Afghanistan or Somalia used the terms or logics of FD or the HDN,withoneexceptiononAfghanistan.

ForMENA/Syria, thefinding is totallydifferent.Thehumanitarian-developmentnexus (HDN) iswelldevelopedintheargumentationofaresiliencebuildingprojectforlocalcommunitiesinSyriaandneigh-bouringcountries(UNDP),inaprojectforeconomicempowermentofwomeninJordanianrefugeecampsandintheargumentationconcerningtheNoLostGenerationinitiativeofUNICEFinSyriaandJordan.ItiseasytoseethatthetopichasbeenelaboratedwithintheMFAandtheofficialsunderstandthecomplexi-tiesofthenexus,andindeed,theUnitforHumanitarianAssistancehasparticipatedindraftingthestate-mentsofproposalsforSyria/MENA.

OnlyoneproposalrelatedtoMENAmigrationandtransitcountries(ILOwomen’shealthintransitcoun-tries)doesnotoperatewiththeHDNconcept(nexusorcontinuum).TherestoftheQAB-approvedpro-jectsforSyria/MENAfallunderthefirstPolicyPriorityArea(PPA),democraticandwell-functioningsoci-eties,closelyrelatedtopeaceandpoliticaldialoguetoresolvetheSyrianarmedconflict.

Only one project,theUNDP-runemploymentandvocationaltrainingprojectSALAMinAfghanistanincooperationwithILOandUNHCR,addressesdirectlythepreventionofFDthroughjobcreation,indicat-ingunderstandingofthedevelopment-migrationnexus.Inthecaseofthisproject,boththeproposalandtheadvisor’sstatementindicateaclearorientationtoFD,probablyduetothefactthattheproblemtree(andtheToC)oftheprojectitselfaddresseslackofemploymentandofemployabilityskillsasoneoftherootcausesofFD(herephrased‘irregularmigration’internallyandexternally).

Toillustratetheargumentation,fragmentsoftheproposalandstatementaretranslatedhere(p.2,deskofficer’sproposal14November2016):TheToC’slogicisthatwhentherearelegalandregularchannelsfor(e)migration,thereisanofferofvocationaltrainingandjobopportunitiesexitsandAfghanwomenandmenareawareaboutoptionsopenforthem,wellbeingisenhanced,andirregularmigrationreduced.AndtheadvisorsconfirmintheirstatementthattheprojectiscompliantwithFinnishpolicesbecauseitaddressesrootcausesofFDbyprovidingservicestorefugees,IDPs,migrantsandreturneesbutexpressdoubtsabouttheToC(thatincreasedjobopportunitieswouldautomaticallyreduceirregularmigration).Althoughdatingfrom2016,theargumentationrevealsclearunderstandingoftheconnectionofeconomicdevelopmentandmigration(inversedU-curve)thathaslaterbeenelaboratedininternalmemosatMFAin2018.

Inoneprojectproposaltheadvisor’sstatementreferredtotheproject’s(UNICEFWASHinAfghanistan)complementaritywithAgenda2030,inadditiontohumanrightsconcerns.


ConclusionsTherehasbeenabreakintheapproachtowardsFDandmigrationbetweentheperiodprecedingtheDPPof2016andposterior.Thebreak(orthresholdmomentof2015–2016)ismanifestintheselectionofthe-maticsectorsfunded,forinstancethemovefromdemocracyandruleoflaworientedprojectstowardsmorefundingforrefugeeandmigrationrelatedprojects,andinthequantityoffundstowardsthethreecasestudycountriesAfghanistan,SomaliaandSyria/MENA,thetotalbudgetoverdoublebetweenJune2016andDecember2017comparedwiththeperiodbetweenJune2012andDecember2013,andthisinspiteofanoverallreductionofabout43%ofavailablefundsintheMFA-controlledandmanagedFinnishdevelopmentcooperation.

Whereasthehumanitarian-developmentnexusislargelyunderstoodbyMFAofficials,accordingtotheQABdocumentsdatabase,especiallyinthecaseofprojectproposalsfortheSyriancrisis,thesamedoesnotapplytothedevelopment-migrationnexusinthecaseofFD.Manyofthehandledprojectsinthedata-basecouldhavemeritedanargumentationaboutFDandtheroleofdevelopmentpolicyinitsprevention,butthefocusgivenbyMFAofficialstotheprojectsindevelopmentcooperationpartnercountriesisemi-nentlyhumanitarianandhumanrightsbased.However,theIOMMIDAFinnSomprogrammeofdiasporahealthprofessional’ssupportforSomalia’shealthsectorelevatesthediscussiontowardsthemigration-developmentnexus.

EVALUATION ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY