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The EuthyphroDilemma
The Origin of the
Euthyphro Dilemma
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Plato428-348 BC
The name Euthyphro
comes from the title of a
dialogue written by Plato.
What Is the Dilemma?
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A dilemma is a choice between
two options:
either when both options are desirable but only one can be chosen ...
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either when both options are desirable but only one can be chosen ...
either when both options are desirable but only one can be chosen ...
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or when both options are less than desirable and one must be chosen.
or when both options are less than desirable and one must be chosen.
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or when both options are less than desirable and one must be chosen.
or when both options are less than and one must be chosen.
desirable
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What Is the Euthyphro Dilemma?
In its contemporary version, the Euthyphro Dilemma asks whether
something is good because God wills it or does God will it because it is good.
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First Horn of the
Dilemma
Is something good because God wills it?
This option has come to the known as the
Divine Command Theory.
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Problems with the First Horn
First, if X is good because God wills it, then this would seem to mean that if God willed rape (or racism, or murder, or any other
sin) then it would be good.
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Second, if X is good because God wills it, then this would
make the statement "God's will is good" to be "God's will is what
God wills" which is an empty claim; what philosophers call
"trivially true."
Second Horn of the
Dilemma
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The second option says God wills X because X is good.
Problem with the Second Horn
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This seems to imply a standard of good that is
outside of and above God.
A Third Option: Splitting the Horns of the
Dilemma
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Good is ultimately grounded in the nature of God.
A Challenge with the Third Option
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However, the problem of being trivially true and empty of moral content seems to
remain.
response: There is a difference between "the order of knowing" and "the order of being"
map to SES example
The map is first in the order of knowing.
SES is first in the order of being.
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In other words, one may need to know what "good" means
before one can apply the word to God, but God has to exist before there can be "good."
The "horns" of the dilemma can be "split" by opting for a third alternative, viz., good is
grounded in the nature of God.
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Further, this option can avoid the problem of the "trivially true" (viz., "God is good." amounts to nothing
more that "God is according to God's nature.") by maintaining that one can understand the notion of 'good' apart from understanding of the notion of
'God.' without denying that, metaphysically, the good is grounded
in God.