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2002 3: 387European Union PoliticsSean Carey

Integration?Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European

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Undivided Loyalties

Is National Identity an Obstacle toEuropean Integration?

Sean Carey

University of Oxford, UK

A B S T R A C T

This article posits that national identity is an important

element in explaining attitudes towards the European Union.

A model of support for European integration is developed

that suggests that feelings of national identity are highly

important in an individual’s choice to support the EU. The

impacts of three alternative conceptualizations of national

identity are tested. These relate to national identity as an

intensity of feelings towards one’s country, the level of

attachment to the nation and other territorial entities, and

the fear of other identities and cultures encroaching on the

dominant national culture. The results of ordered logit analy-

ses confirm that stronger feelings of national identity lead

to lower levels of support for the EU.

3 8 7

European Union Politics

[1465-1165(200212)3:4]

Volume 3 (4): 387–413: 028515

Copyright© 2002

SAGE Publications

London, Thousand Oaks CA,

New Delhi

K E Y W O R D S

� European identity� integration� national identity� public opinion

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Introduction

The citizens of the European Union’s member countries have rarely had anydirect involvement in the major political decisions made in their name. Nego-tiations leading up to the six major treaties saw public opinion play only amarginal role at best (McCormick, 1999). The institutions of the EuropeanUnion (EU) are frequently accused of a lack of accountability. However,according to the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992, one of the goals ofEuropean integration is to create ‘an ever closer union among the peoples ofEurope, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen’. Thetreaty goes on to establish the framework of European citizenship: ‘Everyperson holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of theUnion.’ In 2001 the European Commission issued a white paper on EuropeanGovernance, which stressed the reinforcement of ‘European identity and theimportance of shared values within the Union’. Thus the signatories of theMaastricht Treaty and subsequent institutional actions have established thebasis for future integration around reducing the ‘democratic deficit’ withinthe Union and extending the notion of a European citizenship.

Surveys of European public opinion reveal very little evidence of anyEuropean identity or sense of European citizenship. Europeans still appearattached to their national identity. This article posits that national identity isone of the important elements in explaining attitudes towards the EU. Thisresearch develops a model of support for European integration that suggeststhat feelings of national identity are highly important in an individual’s choiceto support the European Union. It is expected that higher feelings of nationalidentity decrease support for the European project because of the conflictsover sovereignty that have developed in this era, such as the creation of asingle European currency, the European Central Bank and the increasedprimacy of European law. The impacts of three alternative conceptualizationsof national identity are tested on individual-level support for the EU. Theserelate to national identity as an intensity of feelings towards one’s country,the level of attachment to the nation in relation to other territorial entities,and the fear of other identities and cultures encroaching on the dominantculture of the nation. An ordered logit model of support for the EU is devel-oped, including the imputation of missing data frequently omitted fromsimilar public opinion research. The results generally support the thesis thatidentity has an important impact on attitudes towards the EU.

This article is structured as follows. First, I review some of the prominenttheories of public support for European integration, concentrating oneconomic and cost–benefit approaches. I then discuss three types of nationalidentity. The first conceptualizes the type and intensity of feelings towards

European Union Politics 3(4)3 8 8

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one’s country, the second is the level of attachment to the nation and otherterritorial entities, and the third is the fear of other identities and culturesencroaching on the dominant national identity. Next, I introduce a model ofpublic support for the EU, which is estimated with a series of ordinal logitregressions. After discussing the results from this analysis, I investigate therelationship between subnational, national and supranational identities inmore detail, using the UK as an example. I conclude by discussing the impli-cations of these results and suggesting avenues for future research.

Public support for the EU

Since the early 1990s, studies of public attitudes towards the European Unionhave been dominated by economic and rational cost–benefit explanations.Recent studies by Matthew Gabel and a number of collaborators have adapteda theory from David Easton’s work, based on a utilitarian cost–benefitapproach to support for European integration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabeland Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998a,b,c). Their research finds that as materialgains within a country increase, through the liberalization of trade in the EU,support for the EU will increase. Citizens who benefit directly from theseeconomic gains, for example farmers, border residents or the highly educated,will exhibit higher levels of support.

These individual-level results are also supported by longitudinal aggre-gate-level evidence. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) examined whether supportis influenced by national economic performance, using macroeconomic vari-ables such as inflation, unemployment and economic growth. They derivetheir hypotheses from economic models of voting that stress the relationshipbetween economic conditions and evaluations of national governments,which they argue can be transferred to support for the European Union.Eichenberg and Dalton recognize that the public’s knowledge of EU affairsmay be limited, but argue that the considerable impact that the EU has oneconomic welfare should be a fact recognized by the European public (1993:512). Other research has built on Eichenberg and Dalton’s macroeconomicapproach (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Duch and Taylor, 1997), but theresults have varied greatly depending on the level of analysis, the use ofcontrol variables and the operationalization of the dependent variable.

Most of the economic explanations of support for the EU assume thatindividuals are able to recognize the implications of European integration andhow it affects them. Anderson (1998) demonstrates that, in virtually allmeasures of knowledge and awareness of basic aspects of the integrationprocess, citizens are not particularly well informed. Without the necessary

Carey Undivided Loyalties 3 8 9

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information that these models assume, Anderson suggests that individualsuse proxies, such as system support or government support, in helping toform attitudes towards the EU. Anderson finds that citizens who are satisfiedwith domestic political institutions are more likely to support European insti-tutions. This is in contrast to research by Sánchez-Cuenca (2000), who findsthat levels of EU support are higher where opinion of the national system islower. For individuals with a low opinion of their national political system,further European integration is seen as preferable to national political corrup-tion or an undeveloped welfare state. In line with this research, it is expectedthat feelings of national identity will also act as a shortcut for individuals informing attitudes towards the EU.

National identity

The study of national identity is a major area of research across the socialsciences (for example, Dowley and Silver, 2000; Kriesi et al., 1999; Smith, 1991,1992). One debate revolves around how to conceptualize national identity andhow to measure this abstract concept (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Lilliand Diehl, 1999). Little consensus exists on the theoretical underpinnings ofnational identity or the empirical exposition of the concept. This studyexplores three different conceptualizations of national identity. First, theintensity and type of relationship towards the nation is investigated (Blanket al., 2001). Second, the level of attachment to the nation in relation to othergeographic and governmental entities is considered (Carey and Lebo, 2001).And, finally, the perceived cultural threat that European integration poses tothe existing national culture is analysed (McLaren, 2002).

A number of studies investigate the characteristics and/or benefits of aEuropean identity (Leonard, 1998; Smith, 1992). There are normative sugges-tions that the creation of a European identity will lead to increased publicsupport for integration. How states define themselves culturally, politicallyand economically is important to the dynamics of integration, and someresearch suggests that the prospects for further integration rest on the EU’sability to create a European identity (Laffan, 1996). However, there is littleempirical evidence of a link between feelings of national identity and supportfor European integration. This study argues that, following the increased visi-bility of the political aspects of the EU after the ratification of the Treaty onEuropean Union, the criteria for evaluating the European Community alongeconomic dimensions are combined with symbolic political considerations.Predominant among these considerations is the perception of a loss of sover-eignty brought about by developments towards a common foreign and


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defence policy, the loss of national currencies, the establishment of a CentralEuropean Bank and the European Court of Justice, as well as the har-monization of certain policy areas, such as immigration or sales taxes.

National traditions are used to explain different levels of aggregatesupport for the EU between member nations (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993).The individual-level effects of national identity on European integration area less investigated area of study. Deflem and Pampel (1996) find that countrydifferences in support for European unification are more important than indi-vidual factors, such as income and education. However, their analysis doesnot investigate the influence of individual measures of national identity. Theirconclusions are drawn from an interpretation of variation in the magnitudesof the coefficients of country dummy variables in their analysis. Thesenational traditions also extend to influencing attitudes towards more specificEU policy areas. Another aggregate-level study finds that Europeans who areattached to their national identity are less supportive of the common currency(Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001). One article that does investigate the linkbetween individual-level identity and support for EU is a study by LaurenMcLaren (2002) of attitudes towards minority groups. McLaren finds a signifi-cant negative relationship between the attitude of the dominant nationalgroup towards minorities and support for the EU. She concludes that ‘atti-tudes toward the European Union tend to be based in great part on a generalhostility toward other cultures’ (2002: 564).

For the initial analysis in this paper, national identity is more narrowlydefined as ‘the intensity and the type of the relationship towards the nation’(Blank et al., 2001: 7). More specifically, national identity relates to an indi-vidual’s intensity of positive attachments to his/her nation. This is derivedfrom Tajfel’s classic definition of social identity: ‘that part of an individual’sself-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a socialgroup together with the value and emotional significance attached to thatmembership’ (1978; cited in Tajfel, 1981: 254–5). The stronger the bond thatan individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual willapprove of measures that decrease national influence over economics andpolitics. The growth in the scope of the European Union in the realm of econ-omics, politics and culture, which have previously been under the sole controlof the nation-state, impinges on this view of the nation.

A second conceptualization of national identity stems from the attach-ments of individuals to various territorial entities. People feel an attachmentto their neighbourhood, their town, their region, their country, perhaps eventhe world community. The highest political unit to which individuals feel theyowe allegiance is the terminal community (Deutsch, 1966; Peters and Hunold,1999). For example, people in Scotland may see Scotland, or the United


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Kingdom or the European Union as the terminal community. When theconcept of terminal community is combined with the idea that it is the dutyof the state to represent its citizens, we can see a link between individuals’perceptions of their terminal community and their opinions about the actionsof various government actors. Given that the state makes laws for its nation,individuals’ perceptions of the proper use of government power are depen-dent upon their understanding of which government should represent them,that is, which government represents their terminal community. Therefore,people who believe in a shared European identity see the EU as the terminalcommunity and are more likely to recognize the authority of the EU to makepublic policy. Based on this, they are more likely to view EU membershippositively. On the other hand, people who feel that there is no Europeanidentity will feel that their terminal community is their nation-state – orperhaps even a lower level of organization. Therefore, they will feel that theEU has no place to oversee the rights of its citizens since the very idea ofEuropean citizenship is contrary to their conception of the nation to whichthey belong. Further steps toward integration only take more power awayfrom the true representatives of the terminal community. Thus, they will viewEU membership more negatively.

Related to the terminal community concept is the idea of a doubleallegiance. Van Kersbergen (2000) states that the extent to which individualsare attached to locality, region or country is not directly related to their attach-ment to Europe. He argues that a European allegiance originates in nationalallegiance, and that European integration depends on a primary allegiance tothe nation-state and a secondary or derived allegiance to the EU. This second-ary allegiance exists only to the extent that European integration facilitatesnation-states in the provision of economic and security resources upon whichprimary allegiance depends (Van Kersbergen, 2000: 9). A case could also bemade for a double allegiance based on subnational and European allegiances.The Scottish Nationalist Party, for example, has emphasized closer ties to theEuropean Union as making Scottish independence more feasible. Gary Marks(1999) proposes three types of identity in his study: multiple identity,exclusive identity and ‘unattachment’, with most individuals falling betweenthese three extremes in a triangle-shaped ideological space. He argues thatindividuals may indeed have mutually inclusive territorial identities, and thatthere is no need for identity to be conceived as a ‘trade-off among loyaltiesat different territorial levels’ (Marks, 1999: 86).

A third conceptualization of national identity is based on the perceivedthreat from other cultures. McLaren (2002) argues that one factor missing fromprevious research into determinants of EU support is the antipathy towardother cultures stemming from nationalistic attachments. This concept asserts


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that some individuals are more concerned with the degradation of the nation-state than with the personal costs and benefits to their own lives. Nationalcultures and the resources of the national government are seen as being underthreat from European integration. Individuals who fear this encroachmentinto domestic politics and culture are more likely to oppose European inte-gration. This form of national identity research concentrates on the protectionof the in-group (the nation), and the group identity at stake, from the out-group (the EU). Those people who are fearful of the process of European inte-gration leading to their language being used less, or their national identityand culture becoming less distinct, are expected to hold a more negative viewof the European Union.

Data and research design

The data used to test the influence of national identity on attitudes towardsthe EU are taken from the most recently available Eurobarometer survey thatincludes national identity variables – Eurobarometer 54.1 – which wasconducted in November and December 2000.1 This survey was conducted inall 15 EU member countries, including over-sampling in two regions: EastGermany and Northern Ireland. With the exception of Luxembourg, eachcountry sample comprises approximately 1000 randomly selected respon-dents. Descriptive statistics for all of the variables used are shown in Table 6in the Appendix.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable consists of ordered categorical responses to thefollowing question in the Eurobarometer surveys:

Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of theEuropean Union is a good thing, bad thing or neither good nor bad?

The variable is coded as 3 for a ‘good thing’, 2 for ‘neither good nor bad’ and1 for a ‘bad thing’.2 The variable is clearly ordinal. Linear estimation tech-niques are usually inappropriate for an ordered categorical dependentvariable because they make the assumption that the distances betweendifferent responses are identical.3 The overall distribution of the dependentvariable is 52.7% ‘good’, 26.1% ‘neither’, 13.6% ‘bad’ and 7.6% ‘don’t know’.Other variables that occur in Eurobarometer surveys also attempt to garnerattitudes towards the European Union. However, factor analysis on variablesthat occur frequently finds that they all measure the same underlying factor


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(see Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Gabel, 1998a). Other studies have created ascale running from 0 to 100, either using one variable (Gabel, 1998a) or addingvariables together (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997). I applyan ordered logit model in order to use the variable in its original form, andestimate predicted probabilities to evaluate the effects of the explanatoryvariables.

Most studies deal with respondents who answer ‘don’t know’ to EUsupport questions by removing them from their analysis (for example,Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000: 160, removes almost 2000 cases from one section of hisanalysis). With so many cases in the Eurobarometer data, listwise deletion ofcases is understandable. However, for this dependent variable in Euro-barometer 54.1 these responses are unequally distributed across countries,with ‘don’t know’ responses ranging from a low of 2.7% among Danishrespondents to a high of 21.5% among the British sample. To avoid losingthese data, and to avoid the results of the analysis being biased and/or in-efficient (see King et al., 2000), data are imputed to replace the missing valuesusing best-subset regression techniques. Of the 1224 cases recorded as missingvalues, imputation techniques place 88.6% of these in the ‘neither good norbad’ median category, suggesting that ‘don’t knows’ act very similarly tothose who profess ambivalence towards the EU.4 When running analysis onthe overall model separately with imputed data, with listwise-deleted ‘don’tknows’ and with all ‘don’t knows’ coded in the ‘neither good nor bad’category, the statistical and the substantive results are both very similar.However, when running the same models separately for the individual coun-tries, there are differences in both statistical and substantive significance.

National identity

Looking more closely at individuals’ perceptions of their own nationality,responses to the following questions are used:

In the near future do you see yourself as [NATIONALITY] only, [NATIONAL-ITY] and European, European and [NATIONALITY] or European only?

Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not proud atall to be [NATIONALITY]?

For the main explanatory variable of interest, a dummy variable is initiallyconstructed with those who identify themselves as their ‘nationality only’(43% of respondents); all other responses are coded as 0. The national pridequestion is coded to run from 1 for responses of ‘not proud at all’ to 4 for‘very proud’. These two variables are multiplied together to form a measureof national identity that ranges from 0 – meaning an individual sees his/her


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national identity as extending beyond the nation-state – to 4 – where an indi-vidual’s identity is bounded at his/her nationality, to which he/she has anintense positive attachment (‘very proud’ of this identity). A negative relation-ship with support for the EU is expected.

To test the terminal community hypothesis, four variables are used thatmeasure an individual’s attachment to specific territorial communities. Theresponses to the following questions are used:

People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to theirregion, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to yourtown/village; your region; [YOUR COUNTRY]; Europe.

The response categories are ‘not at all attached’, ‘not very attached’, ‘fairlyattached’ and ‘very attached’, which are coded from 1 to 4 for each of the fourvariables. If the terminal community hypothesis applies to support for theEU, the attachment to Europe is expected to be positive and the attachmentto locality, region and country is expected to be negative.

Eurobarometer 54.1 includes a number of questions about respondents’fears concerning European integration. To test the hypothesis that oppositionto the European Union is related to the perceived threat from other cultures,two questions are used that ask directly about identity and culture and aboutlanguage:

Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union.Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one tellme if you – personally – are currently afraid of it or not:

� The loss of our national identity and culture.� Our language being used less and less.

These two variables are dichotomous variables, with ‘currently afraid of it’coded as 1, otherwise 0. Therefore, a negative relationship with support forthe EU is expected.

Control variables

It is expected that respondents use feelings of national identity to form atti-tudes to the EU. However, the effects are likely to apply in addition to thosealready established in previous research. Therefore, a number of other inde-pendent variables are included in the analysis to control for these effects.

For an individual level of analysis, subjective measures of the economyare more convincing on theoretical and empirical grounds than objectivemeasures of the economy, such as inflation or economic growth. Gabel andWhitten (1997) find that citizens take into account both their personal and the


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national economic situation when evaluating European integration. Includedin this analysis are responses to both sociotropic and egocentric subjectiveeconomic questions.5 In line with previous research, optimistic economicevaluations are expected to be positively related to support for the EU.

A large body of work by Ronald Inglehart (1970, 1971; Inglehart andRabier, 1978) suggests two theories of political culture that influence publicsupport for European integration: cognitive mobilization and post-material-ism, although the latter has largely been dismissed as a factor influencingsupport for integration (see Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a,b;Janssen, 1991). The theory of cognitive mobilization asserts that, as increasesin education and access to information occur, citizens develop a more cosmo-politan outlook, which benefits support for European integration (Inglehartand Rabier, 1978: 86). A high level of cognitive mobilization increases an indi-vidual’s capacity to receive and process messages relating to remote politicalobjects, European integration being one of the many possibilities (Inglehart,1971). Variables for education (four bands) and political interest6 are there-fore included in the model, with the expectation that higher levels in eitherof these variables lead to higher levels of support for integration (see alsoGabel, 1998a).

Gender is also included in the model, on the premise that women areamong the ‘losers’ from market liberalization because of their position in thelabour market (see Gelleny and Anderson, 2000). Nelsen and Guth (2000) testsome explanations to account for the gender gap in EU support, includingthe concept that women tend to be less interested in foreign policy, have morecompassionate and less competitive values and are more economicallyvulnerable to economic integration. The inclusion of gender in the modelcontrols for this effect. This variable is coded with 1 as male and 0 as female;therefore a positive impact is expected.

In line with Gabel’s (1998a) research, income and age are also includedin the analysis. Those on lower incomes are seen as being more adverselyaffected by constrained welfare funding brought about by capital liberaliz-ation (Gabel, 1998a: 47). In turn, wealthier Europeans benefit from increasedinvestment opportunities and low inflation. Therefore, a positive relationshipis expected between support for the EU and higher levels of income,measured in (national) quartiles. Gabel (1998a) also finds that different sectorsof the labour market vary in their support for the EU, depending on theircomparative advantage from market liberalization. These occupations arecontrolled for, with positive effects expected from the professional, executiveand farming sectors, and negative effects expected from manual workers andthe unemployed. The inclusion of age in the model reflects the expectationthat younger citizens have a more cosmopolitan outlook, and thus are more


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likely to be positively disposed towards European integration (Inglehart andRabier, 1978). A negative relationship is therefore expected between age andsupport for the EU.

Explaining support for the EU

To analyse support for the EU, three alternative conceptions of nationalidentity are applied to individual-level data taken from all 15 EU memberstates. Table 1 shows the ordered logit estimates for three models of nationalidentity. The overall fit of all three models can be gauged from the �2 statis-tics, which are all statistically significant (p <.001). The models all correctlypredict just under 60% of cases. Previous research has included dummy vari-ables for countries and reported the differences between them in the averagelevels of support (for example, Deflem and Pampel, 1996). This can be ofsubstantive interest, but there is also a methodological concern ofheteroscedasticity when pooling data from cross-sections as varied as themember countries of the EU. Therefore, dummy variables for countries areincluded in the model, although, because of space restraints, they are notshown.7

The effects of the national identity variables

In the national pride version, shown as Model 1, there is a clear indicationthat a strong national identity leads to a decrease in support for the EU. Thenational pride variable is negatively signed as expected and statisticallysignificant. However, the coefficients for independent variables in an orderedlogit model are difficult to interpret, and the substantive importance of theindependent variables cannot be determined by comparing the size of thecoefficients (Long, 1997). To better interpret the parameter estimates, it ishelpful to estimate the marginal effects that a change in each variable has onthe probability of responding in one of the three categories of the dependentvariable. Table 2 shows the marginal effects of moving from the minimum tothe maximum in the independent variable on the possibility of seeing the EUas a good thing, with all other independent variables held at their mean ormodal values. These figures are more valuable for interpretation. The resultfor the national pride variable demonstrates substantive, as well as statisti-cal, significance in Model 1. A respondent is more than 30 percentage pointsless likely to support European integration if he/she has a strong feeling ofnational identity. The effects of this variable can also be shown graphically.Figure 1 shows the change in the predicted probabilities of support for the


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Table 1 Ordered logit model of support for EU membership in 15 countries

Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

National identity variablesNational pride �0.314**Attachment to town/village 0.038Attachment to region �0.106**Attachment to country �0.103**Attachment to Europe 0.665**Fear of loss of identity and culture �0.668**Fear of less use of language �0.812**

Subjective economic variablesPersonal economic expectations 0.155** 0.085** 0.137**National economic expectations 0.422** 0.378** 0.408**

Political interest variablesDiscuss politics 0.124** 0.174** 0.201**Persuade friends 0.100** 0.086** 0.097**

Demographic variablesEducation 0.179** 0.208** 0.227**High income 0.386** 0.415** 0.399**High–medium income 0.146** 0.154** 0.153**Low income �0.077 �0.086 �0.077Gender (male) 0.160** 0.209** 0.160**Age 0.001 �0.002 0.000

Occupation variablesProfessional 0.131 0.160 0.130Executive 1.042** 1.003** 0.993**Manual worker �0.232** �0.260** �0.236**Farmer �0.061 �0.001 0.007Unemployed �0.196* �0.147 �0.186*Retired 0.016 �0.019 0.022Student �0.038 �0.061 �0.024Small business �0.016 0.028 0.037

τ1 �0.424 0.852 �0.359τ2 1.554 2.834 1.571

% correctly predicted cases 59.5% 59.4% 58.8%χ2 (d.f.) 3579.1(35) 3641.9(38) 3151.8(36)Log likelihood �13027.9 �12996.5 �13241.5N 15,148 15,148 15,148

Notes: Figures are ordered logit coefficients.Country dummies are not shown. Italy is the reference category. ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05.

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EU as values in the national identity variable change, while holding all otherindependent variables at their means. As can be seen from the steep declinein the predicted probability of ‘good’, an increase in national identity has asignificant effect on decreasing positive attitudes towards the EU.8

There is also evidence to support the terminal community hypothesis,which is tested in Model 2. According to the terminal community hypothesis,a positive relationship is expected between attachment to Europe and supportfor the European Union, and a negative relationship is expected betweenstrong attachments to closer territorial entities in the absence of attachment toEurope. Table 1 shows that the coefficient for attachment to Europe is positiveand statistically significant. Also, the results for attachment to country andregion are significant and negative, although the local attachment variable isnot statistically significant. The marginal effects of these attachment variablescan be seen graphically in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows the expected largeincrease in the probability of positive attitudes towards the EU as feelings ofattachment to Europe increase, and the simultaneous decline in probability ofholding negative and ambivalent attitudes. Figure 3 shows only the curvesfor the response category ‘good’ in the dependent variable, but for all four of


Pro

babi

lity

Changing values of national identity

Good Bad Neither good nor bad

0 1 2 3 4

0

.25

.50

.75

1

Figure 1 Predicted probabilities of support for the EU for changing values ofnational identity (from Model 1, Table 1).

Notes: 0 = individual who does not see him/herself as [NATIONALITY] only1 = [NATIONALITY] only, and not at all proud to be [NATIONALITY]2 = [NATIONALITY] only, and not very proud to be [NATIONALITY]3 = [NATIONALITY] only, and fairly proud to be [NATIONALITY]4 = [NATIONALITY] only, and very proud to be [NATIONALITY]

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the attachment variables: town/village, region, country and Europe. Asobserved in Figure 2, increases in attachment to Europe lead to increases insupport for the EU. However, the marginal effects on support for the EUfrom changes in the other levels of attachment are much less than those forattachment to Europe. Only gradual decreases in support for the EU occur


Table 2 Predicted probabilities of ordered logit models shown in Table 1

Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

National identity variablesNational pride �0.304Attachment to town/village 0.029Attachment to region �0.078Attachment to country �0.076Attachment to Europe 0.461Fear of loss of identity and culture �0.165Fear of less use of language �0.045

Subjective economic variablesPersonal economic expectations 0.077 0.042 0.068National economic expectations 0.207 0.185 0.200

Political interest variablesDiscuss politics 0.061 0.085 0.099Persuade friends 0.025 0.043 0.072

Demographic variablesEducation 0.132 0.153 0.166High income 0.094 0.101 0.097High–medium income 0.036 0.038 0.038Low income �0.019 �0.021 �0.019Gender (male) 0.040 0.052 0.040Age 0.017 �0.042 �0.001

Occupation variablesProfessional 0.032 0.039 0.032Executive 0.229 0.222 0.220Manual worker �0.058 �0.065 �0.059Farmer �0.015 �0.0002 0.002Unemployed �0.049 �0.037 �0.046Retired 0.004 �0.005 0.006Student �0.010 �0.015 �0.006Small business 0.004 0.007 0.009

Base probability of ‘good’ 0.542 0.543 0.542

Notes: Figures are the predicted probabilities of a change from the minimum to the maximum ina given independent variable (keeping all other independent variables at their means) on anindividual seeing his/her country’s membership of the EU as a ‘good thing’.

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Pro

babi

lity

Changing values of attachment to Europe

Good Bad Neither good nor bad

1 2 3 4

0

.25

.50

.75

1

Figure 2 Predicted probabilities of support for the EU for changing values ofattachment to Europe (from Model 2, Table 1).

Changing values of attachment to territorial units

Attachment to Europe Attachment to country Attachment to region Attachment to town

None Not very Fairly Very

0

.25

.50

.75

1

Pro

babi

lity

(cat

egor

y =

goo

d)

Figure 3 Predicted probabilities of identifying membership of the EU as a ‘goodthing’ for changing values of attachment to Europe, country, region and village/town(from Model 2, Table 1).

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when attachment to region and country strengthens, and a gradual increasein support occurs as attachment to village/town increases.

However, we cannot infer support for the terminal community hypoth-esis from the results presented in Table 1. It is possible that some individualshave strong attachments to both Europe and the nation-state, and others tojust one of these. This hypothesis can be tested by calculating the predictedprobabilities of the model given a particular set of characteristics (see Longand Freese, 2001). The predicted probabilities of supporting the EU,conditional on set responses to the terminal attachment variables, aredisplayed in Table 3. The figures in Table 3 denote the probability of supportfor the EU, when setting specific values of the country and Europe attach-ment variables while keeping all other variables at their means. These resultshave interesting implications for the link between national identity andsupport for the EU. According to Model 2, when an individual has no feelingof attachment to Europe but a strong attachment to the nation, with all othervariables held at their means, the likelihood of that individual supporting theEU is just 26.4%. Conversely, when attachment to Europe is high and there isno feeling of attachment to the nation, the likelihood of supporting the EU is78.2%. However, when attachment to both the nation and Europe is high, theprobability of supporting the EU is 72.5%. This result certainly appears tosupport the terminal community hypothesis. It also suggests that a strongnational identity is not necessarily a negative predictor of support for the EUif the individual also has a strong attachment to Europe.


Table 3 Predicted probabilities of support for the EU depending on assigned levelsof attachment to territorial entities

Category of EU membership

Independent variables Pr(y = Bad|x) Pr(y = Neither|x) Pr(y = Good|x)

Very attached to [COUNTRY]Not at all attached to Europe 0.278 0.458 0.264

Not at all attached to [COUNTRY]Very attached to Europe 0.037 0.181 0.782

Very attached to [COUNTRY]Very attached to Europe 0.050 0.226 0.725

Notes: Marginal effects are calculated while holding all other independent variables (from Model2 in Table 1) at their means.

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The third model presented in Table 1 incorporates the variables thatmeasure the perceived threat to national identity from the process ofEuropean integration. As expected, the variables that measure people’s fearthat the EU threatens their language and their national identity and cultureare negatively related to support for the EU. The marginal effects of thechanges in the values of these variables show that there are significant differ-ences between those who perceive a threat to their identity and those whodo not. One example of the effects of the threat to identity variables onsupport for the EU in this model is that the predicted probabilities for indi-viduals who fear a loss of both language and identity are 43% ‘good’, 16%‘bad’ and 41% ‘neither’. In contrast, when individuals do not perceive thesethreats, the predicted probabilities are 64% ‘good’, 8% ‘bad’ and 28% ‘neither’.

The effects of the economic and utilitarian variables

The other variables in the models also have some significant effects. Theeconomic and utilitarian variables have very similar effects over the threemodels.9 Of particular interest are the substantive comparisons between thenational identity effects and the effects of the other variables. Clearly, EUcitizens’ support, or not, for the European Union is far more likely to dependon their subjective expectations of their country’s economy than on theirpersonal financial expectations. Although statistically significant in Model 1,the substantive implication of respondents moving from a negative to apositive assessment of their future personal economic situation is a 7.7percentage point increase in the predicted probability of supporting the EU.In contrast, when respondents move from a negative to a positive expectationfor their national economy, with everything else held constant, they are 20.7percentage points more likely to support the EU.

The demographic controls of education, upper levels of income andgender are also statistically significant. Women are less enthusiastic than menin supporting the EU, and are, all else being equal, 2.6 percentage points lesslikely to support the EU than men. Age, however, is not a statistically signifi-cant predictor of support for the EU. There are contradictory explanations ofhow age will affect support for integration, which may account for the lackof effect of this variable. One view asserts that younger people are morecosmopolitan and more open to ideas such as European integration (Ingle-hart and Rabier, 1978). An alternative hypothesis is that older people whoremember the Second World War and the subsequent economic hardships aremore supportive of any process that promotes peace and prosperity in Europe(Gabel, 1998a). Both political interest variables are statistically significant,although the substantive implications of these variables are relatively weak.


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Eu

rop

ea

n U

nio

n P

olitic

s 3

(4)

40

4

Table 4 Ordered logit model of support for EU membership in individual countries

Model 1

Model 2 Model 3

National

Attachment to:

Loss of ID LanguageCountry pride Town Region Country Europe & culture used less N

Belgium �0.417** �0.104 �0.206 �0.067 0.867** �0.928** �0.234 990Netherlands �0.238** 0.160 �0.199 0.022 0.494** �0.591** 0.051 954Luxembourg �0.301** 0.118 �0.126 �0.330 0.755** �0.137 �0.079 574France �0.451** 0.244 �0.361** �0.195 1.170** �1.167** 0.007 932Italy �0.523** �0.042 �0.010 �0.046 0.950** �0.648** �0.174 932West Germany �0.476** 0.065 0.022 �0.610** 0.980** �0.540** �0.612** 908East Germany �0.309** 0.039 �0.031 �0.181 0.622** �0.547** �0.217 946Denmark �0.356** �0.161 �0.034 �0.237 0.693** �1.251** �0.286 978Great Britain �0.399** 0.146 �0.121 �0.304** 0.939** �0.554** �0.423** 992Northern Ireland �0.351** 0.535 �0.515 �0.413 0.710** 0.227 �0.239 285Ireland �0.137** 0.092 �0.041 0.284 0.247** �0.231 �0.080 943Greece �0.232** 0.090 �0.163 0.099 0.465** 0.045 �0.276 975Spain �0.374** 0.029 0.074 0.366** 0.622** �0.018 �0.338 971Portugal �0.256** �0.372 0.122 0.319* 0.321** �0.456** 0.039 939Finland �0.266** 0.163 �0.326** 0.054 0.631** �1.182** 0.552** 936Sweden �0.289** �0.037 �0.161 �0.102 0.527** �0.959** �0.429** 962Austria �0.216** �0.059 �0.059 0.006 0.596** �1.257** �0.593** 931

Notes: Figures are ordered logit coefficients.Analysis refers to three separate regressions conducted separately for all 15 countries (plus Northern Ireland and East/West Germany). Thus, results are asummary of 51 regressions. All economic and utilitarian variables included in Table 1 were also included in this analysis, but are not shown in the interests ofspace. ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05.

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For example, an individual who is very interested in discussing politics is 6.1percentage points more likely to support the EU than an individual with nointerest.

Country-specific models

The analysis of the EU-wide models indicates that there is a strong relation-ship between feelings of national identity and a citizen’s likelihood of support-ing the EU. However, the diverse nature of national identity across the EUsuggests that it is just as important to investigate differences in these effectsbetween countries. Therefore the analysis is also conducted at the country leveland these results are shown in Table 4. The national pride variable opera-tionalized in Model 1 is statistically significant when the analysis is conductedon each country-specific subset of the data. In fact, it is one of only two vari-ables in Model 1 that achieves statistical significance in more than half of thecountries analysed – the other is national economic expectations. However,when looking more closely at the marginal effects of the national identityvariable, there is a wide range of effects. The change from having no boundednational identity to a very strong national identity increases the probability ofsupport for the EU by just 7.6 percentage points in Ireland, but by 47.5 percent-age points in Italy. Ireland is also the only country where the substantive effectsof the subjective economic evaluations are greater than the effects of nationalidentity in predicting support for the EU.

Subnational identities

The results from the analysis of the Eurobarometer data demonstrate thatfeelings of national identity play an important role in understanding indi-vidual attitudes towards European integration. However, the analysis so fardoes not allow for the effects of identities below that of the nation-state. TheEurobarometer surveys do not ask about attitudes to specific regional iden-tities that could influence the relationship between national and Europeanidentities. Moreover, the questions asking about the attachment to territoryare likely to be interpreted differently by different people. This would beparticularly evident with the questions regarding attachment to region, andeven to country.

To explore the relationship between subnational identities and support forEuropean integration, a more in-depth analysis is made of the UK. The UK isa particularly interesting case study for investigating the link between nationalidentity and support for the EU for a number of reasons. The UK has a


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relatively clearly defined, although complex, set of regional identities. Forexample, of the four distinct regions that make up the UK (England, Scotland,Wales and Northern Ireland), only England does not have its own politicalparty with representation in the national parliament. This separation has hadgreater salience in recent years with the devolution referenda in Scotland andWales and the consequent establishing of the Scottish and Welsh assemblies.

Data for this analysis are taken from wave 9 of the British HouseholdPanel Study (BHPS) from Spring 2000. The BHPS survey asked respondentsthe following question:

Please say which, if any, of the words on this card describes the way you thinkof yourself? Please choose as many or as few as apply:

British, English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Northern Irish, European.10

From this question, seven dummy variables are created for respondents whoclaim that particular identity. Other variables are added to the analysis ofsupport for the EU, shown in Table 5, which are as close an approximationto the models in Table 1 as possible (descriptive statistics for all of the vari-ables used are shown in Table 7 in the Appendix). The most interesting resultin Table 5 is the direction of the relationship of these identity variables. It isno surprise that people who think of themselves as European support the EU.There is also a positive and statistically significant relationship for individualswho identify themselves as Scottish, Welsh, Irish, or Northern Irish. However,individuals who identify themselves as English are significantly less likely tosupport the EU. Individuals who think of themselves as only English have a31% probability of supporting the EU, whereas individuals who see them-selves as British, but not as English, have a 45% probability of seeing the EUas a good thing. The evidence from the UK case suggests that there is animportant dynamic between regional, national and European identities.Those identifying themselves as English, the dominant nationality, in the UKare less supportive of the EU than those identifying with the minority iden-tities. This suggests that the English resist the threat the EU poses to theiridentity, whereas the Scottish, Welsh and Irish perhaps see the EU as a positiveforce for the expression of theirs.

Conclusion

In an era when the European Union is facing important developments regard-ing the expansion of its membership and the extent of integration, it is vitalthat policy leaders understand what drives support for the Union. The results


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of this analysis demonstrate not only that feelings of national identity are astrong influence on individuals’ evaluations of European integration, but thatperhaps the effects are at least as significant as utilitarian explanations, suchas income, education and subjective economic evaluations.

The research reinforces some of the existing theories that explain indi-vidual-level support for European integration. Factors such as education,gender and political interest are all found to be useful predictors of support forthe EU, and the inclusion of these controls in the model further reinforces thesignificance of national identity. However, this analysis offers only a snapshotfrom 2000. Future research might investigate the dynamic implications of


Table 5 Ordered logit model of support for EU membership in the UK (data fromBHPS wave 9)

Independent variables Coefficients Marginal effects

National identity variablesBritish 0.050 0.012English �0.345** �0.083Scottish 0.275** 0.068Welsh 0.112* 0.027Irish 0.597** 0.148Northern Irish 0.999** 0.243European 1.430** 0.337

Subjective economic variablesPersonal economic expectations 0.040 0.019

Demographic variablesEducation: College 0.502** 0.123No qualifications �0.145** �0.035High income 0.349** 0.086High–medium income 0.031 0.008Low income 0.148** 0.036Gender (male) 0.080* 0.019Age �0.008** �0.165

τ1 �1.310τ2 0.471

% correctly predicted cases 48.0%χ2 (d.f.) 1338.4(15)Log likelihood �13337.7N 13,214

Notes: Coefficients are ordered logit coefficients.Marginal effects are calculated for a change from the minimum to the maximum in a givenindependent variable (holding all others at their means) on the likelihood of selecting EUmembership as ‘good’. ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05.

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national identity for support for European integration. Changes in nationalidentity over time may provide more comprehensive evidence of its effect onEU support. However, without an EU-wide panel study, aggregated time-seriesanalysis would lose the important individual-level analysis sought in this study.

The results of the analysis in this study also demonstrate that the relation-ship between national, subnational and supranational identities is complex.Clearly there are similarities between countries, but differences are alsoevident. Further research might investigate the complex relationship betweenthese identities, and possibly explore whether the relationship found in theUK is similar to that in other European states.

Appendix


Table 6 Descriptive statistics: Eurobarometer 54.1, Autumn 2000

Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.

Support for EU membership 15,148 2.39 0.72 1 3National pride 15,148 1.38 1.71 0 4Attachment to town/village 15,148 3.32 0.80 1 4Attachment to region 15,148 3.29 0.79 1 4Attachment to country 15,148 3.42 0.70 1 4Attachment to Europe 15,148 2.71 0.88 1 4Fear of loss of identity and culture 15,148 0.48 0.50 0 1Fear of less use of language 15,148 0.44 0.50 0 1Personal economic expectations 15,148 2.16 0.61 1 3National economic expectations 15,148 2.01 0.69 1 3Discuss politics 15,148 1.84 0.64 1 3Persuade friends 15,148 2.44 0.96 1 4Age 15,148 44.46 17.85 15 99Education 15,148 2.19 0.94 1 4Gender 15,148 0.49 0.50 0 1High income 15,148 0.18 0.38 0 1High–medium income 15,148 0.18 0.38 0 1Low–medium income 15,148 0.18 0.39 0 1Low income 15,148 0.16 0.36 0 1Farmer 15,148 0.01 0.12 0 1Professional 15,148 0.03 0.17 0 1Executive 15,148 0.01 0.10 0 1Unemployed 15,148 0.05 0.23 0 1Manual 15,148 0.23 0.42 0 1Retired 15,148 0.21 0.41 0 1Student 15,148 0.10 0.30 0 1Houseperson 15,148 0.11 0.32 0 1

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Matthew Lebo for his contributions to earlier versions ofthis article. I am grateful to participants at the 2001 European Consortium forPolitical Research Joint Sessions of Workshops in Grenoble, in particular HaroldClarke, Marianne Stewart and Thomas Christin. Thanks are also due to the anony-mous reviewers who provided a wealth of insightful suggestions. Much of theresearch for this article was conducted at the Harvard-MIT Data Center, where Iwas a Research Fellow in 2001–2.

Notes

1 Eurobarometer 54.1 was obtained from the Inter-University Consortium forPolitical and Social Research (ICPSR), study number 3209.

2 ‘Don’t know’ responses are also recorded for this variable. Data for these casesare imputed rather than removed from the analysis, which is discussed below.

3 For a discussion of the substantive and theoretical consequences of poormodel choice for ordered and categorical dependent variables, see Whittenand Palmer (1996). It could also be argued that a multinomial approach couldbe used for this variable (see Gelleny and Anderson, 2000, with a similarly


Table 7 Descriptive statistics: British Household Panel Study, wave 9, Spring 2000

Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.

Support for EU membership 13,214 2.21 0.76 1 3British 13,214 0.58 0.49 0 1English 13,214 0.33 0.47 0 1Scottish 13,214 0.19 0.39 0 1Welsh 13,214 0.13 0.34 0 1Irish 13,214 0.02 0.13 0 1Northern Irish 13,214 0.01 0.09 0 1European 13,214 0.07 0.26 0 1Personal economic expectations 13,214 2.20 0.59 1 3Age 13,214 45.14 18.26 15 98Education: College 13,214 0.35 0.48 0 1School qualifications (no college) 13,214 0.40 0.49 0 1No qualifications 13,214 0.24 0.43 0 1Gender 13,214 0.48 0.50 0 1High income 13,214 0.27 0.44 0 1High–medium income 13,214 0.26 0.44 0 1Low–medium income 13,214 0.24 0.43 0 1Low income 13,214 0.24 0.44 0 1

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coded dependent variable). Statistically, however, there is little difference inthe results of the two approaches for this research.

4 This evidence is supported when running models using four categories inthe dependent variable, including ‘don’t knows’. Multinomial logit estimatesfor the ‘neither’ and ‘don’t know’ categories, with ‘good’ as the referencecategory, are very similar.

5 The wording of these questions is as follows: What are your expectations forthe year to come: Will it be better (3), worse (1) or the same (2) when it comesto . . .?

. . . the economic situation in [YOUR COUNTRY]

. . . the financial situation of your household

There is some concern about the possibility of multicollinearity between thesetwo variables; there is a correlation of .43. However, when running the modelsomitting each of these variables, the overall results were not significantlydifferent.

6 These are responses to the questions:

When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political mattersfrequently (3), occasionally (2), or never (1)?

When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading yourfriends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? Does this happen often(4), from time to time (3), rarely (2), never (1)?

7 A Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is applied to Model 1 that compares theconstrained model – no country dummies – with the unconstrained model –one that includes dummies for the cross-section units. An LR test distributedas �2 = 1291.4 (p >.001) indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis thatthe error variances are homoscedastic; therefore the unconstrained modelincluding dummy variables for the various countries is appropriate. Analternative model specification would be an ordered heteroscedastic choicemodel (see Alvarez and Brehm, 1998). When Models 1–3 are run using thisspecification there are no significant differences with the principal variablesof interest. However, the effects of the variables measuring age and retireesdo become statistically significant, although the substantive effects remainsmall. These results are available from the author upon request.

8 It might well be expected that an individual’s support for the EU could inturn affect his/her national identity. Kaplan (2001), however, using similardata from Eurobarometer 47.2, conducted in 1997, investigates the relation-ship between support for the EU and fear of integration and concludes that‘fear and support do not have a simultaneous relationship’ (21). These results,however, are indicative only of females in that survey. The problem of endo-geneity between support for the EU and national identity, along with anumber of other ‘causal’ variables, is certainly an avenue of research thatrequires further study.

9 In line with the results of Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) and Anderson (1998), avariable that taps into attitudes towards the domestic political system is likely


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to be a useful addition to a model of support for European integration. Whena satisfaction with democracy variable is included in Model 1 it is positiveand significant, as Anderson finds. However, as Sánchez-Cuenca states, thisvariable is picking up general pessimism and optimism about politics.Alternatively, when a variable on corruption (using Transparency Inter-national data for 2000) is added to Model 1, it is negative and significant. Butthere are theoretical problems with including systemic variables to such indi-vidual-level research. Therefore, I do not include either of these variables andsuggest future research develop a better individual-level measure for atti-tudes to the national political system.

10 There was also an option on the BHPS survey of ‘other nationality’ and ‘noneof these’. However, no responses were recorded for either of these categories.

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About the author

Sean Carey is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Politics andInternational Relations, University of Oxford, George Street, Oxford,OX1 2RL, UK.Tel: 01865 278714E-mail: [email protected]


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