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European elites and the UE in the Intune Project Attitudes towards European integration of political and economic elites
Miguel Jerez Mir (Universidad de Granada)
José Real Dato (Universidad de Almería)
Rafael Vázquez García (Universidad de Granada)
Paper to be presented at the 2009 APSA Annual Meeting (Toronto, ON, Canada)
September 3-6, 2009
(Draft version. Please, so not quote without permission of the authors)
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Abstract Elite perceptions about Europe are a very important point in order to understand the current European integration process, as well as the future perspectives for the continent. Despite the general pro EU positions in public opinion there is an important lack of studies referred to the systematic analysis of political and economic perceptions towards the European integration process. Thus, the main proposal of the article is to present the level of identification with the EU integration of political and economic elites in most of European countries. The first part of the article present significant historical evidences about the support for the EU process by public opinion as well as elites in Europe along time. The analysis begins with some descriptive evidences about the perception of both types of elites towards the three main dimensions of the project: identity, representation and scope of governance. We have added a factor analysis in order to precise and reduce the set of variables in the later explanatory analysis. In a second moment, we propose some kind of statistical exploration about the factors (independent variables), which could explain the attitudes of elites in each dimension (dependent variables). In order to do it, we will run a correlation analysis as well as some multivariable model. The database built thanks to the INTUNE (Integrated and United? A quest for Citizenship in an ¨ever closer Europe¨) Project Survey on European Elites and Masses, funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU [Contract CIT 3-CT-2005-513421] has been used. The questionnaire was applied between February and May 2007, in a sum of 18 European countries. A total of 2145 interviews were carried out with members of the political and economic elite. For the purpose of this research, the first ones (1415 interviews) were defined by being members of the lower chambers- MPs. Related to economic elites, we have obtained 730 interviews among presidents, vice-presidents and general managers of the huge corporations, general managers and presidents of chambers of commerce.
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European elites and the UE in the Intune Project. Attitudes towards European integration of political and economic elites
Miguel Jerez Mir (Universidad de Granada)
José Real Dato (Universidad de Almería)
Rafael Vázquez García (Universidad de Granada)
([email protected]) INTRODUCTION. EUROPEAN ELITES IN EUROPE
European Union integration and the inherent processes of political development
and institution-building are shaped by interactions between elites and masses. In their
initial moments, scholars noted the predominantly intergovernmental, elite-driven
flavour of these processes (Inglehart 1970; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; for a review,
see Haller 2008, p. 35). It is a widely acknowledged and historically well documented
supposition that the contemporary process of European unification has been and still is
steered and driven by the initiative of elites. It has been during the last few years, as the
process of European integration has deepened and the number of “Europeanised” policy
areas has expanded, that national arenas have also been increasingly concerned with EU
affairs, reinforcing the role of national elites and mass public opinion on European
integration (Dalton and Eichenberg 1998). National elites’ perception of Europe is a
significant factor in understanding the current European integration process as well as
the future perspectives for the continent (Slater 1994; Wessels 1999; Holmberg 1999;
Jenny, Pollak and Slominski 2006; Haller 2008). In this sense, the study of political elite
attitudes and values could be very useful for understanding the nature of change
processes within the EU since, as Putnam has argued, “elite composition is more easily
observable than are the underlying patterns of social power, it can serve as kind of
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seismometer for detecting shifts in the foundation of polities and politics’’ (Putnam
1976, p. 166).
While a great deal of empirical evidence is available regarding mass attitudes
and orientations towards processes of European integration and identity-building (see
Eurobarometer Series and, among others: Gabel 1998; McLaren 2002; and Díez 2003).
Conversely, systematic comparative research on national European elites is much less
abundant (Best, Cotta and Verzichelli 2005), although during the last decade the
number of comparative studies has increased, mainly oriented towards party elites
(Aspinwall 2002; De Winter and Gómez-Reino 2002; Evans 1998; Hug and König
2002; Hooghe 2003; Johansson 2002; Jolly 2007; Ladrech 2002; Marks, Wilson, and
Ray 2002; Netjes and Binnema 2007; Ray 1999, 2003).
Starting from this historical background, in this article we aim to analyze the
current attitudes of European political and economic elites towards European integration
emerging from the data of the 2007 INTUNE project survey. Such attitudes are
examined according to the three main dimensions of Europeaness identified in the
project: identity, representation and scope of governance. In the following section, we
present the main descriptive results of the analysis along the two types of elites. Then,
we explore a number of explanatory factors accounting for the observed features.
Finally, we summarize the results in order to give a comprehensive view of European
elites attitudes toward European integration.
The analysis begins with some descriptive evidences about the perception of
both types of elites towards the three main dimensions of the project: identity,
representation and scope of governance. We have added a factor analysis in order to
precise and reduce the set of variables in the later explanatory analysis. In a second
moment, we propose some kind of statistical exploration about the factors (independent
variables), which could explain the attitudes of elites in each dimension (dependent
variables). In order to do it, we will run a correlation analysis as well as some
multivariable model. The database built thanks to the INTUNE (Integrated and United?
A quest for Citizenship in an ¨ever closer Europe¨) Project Survey on European Elites
and Masses, funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU [Contract CIT 3-
CT-2005-513421] has been used. The questionnaire was applied between February and
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May 2007, in a total of 18 European countries (all of them members of the European
Union, except Serbia). A total of 2145 interviews were carried out with members of the
political and economic elite. For the purpose of this research, the first ones (1415
interviews) were defined by being members of the lower chambers- MPs. Related to
economic elites, we have obtained 730 interviews among presidents and vice-presidents
of corporations, general managers and presidents of chambers of commerce. Just for
geographical reasons we distinguished three groups of countries. Southern Europe, with
Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal. Eastern Europe (Post-communist countries):
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia and
Serbia. And Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and United
Kingdom1.
Table 1. Elite interviews by country
COUNTRY Type of elite
Political Elite Economic Elite TOTAL Austria 81 35 116 Belgium 80 44 124 Bulgaria 83 45 128 Czech Republic 80 42 122 Denmark 60 40 100 Estonia 72 40 112 France 81 43 124 Germany 80 43 123 Great Britain 50 21 71 Greece 90 36 126 Hungary 80 42 122 Italy 84 42 126 Lithuania 80 40 120 Poland 80 42 122 Portugal 80 40 120 Serbia 80 40 120 Slovakia 80 40 120 Spain 94 55 149 TOTAL 1415 730 2145
Regarding the dimensions used in this work, identity can be understood both as a
feature (or a set of features) attributed to a group of individuals on the basis of which
1 To find a reasoned and developed explanation of the this geographical division, see Jerez, Ladic, Vuletic and Vázquez, 2010 (forthcoming)
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they can be observed and perceived from the outside as having significant elements of
commonality, and as a feeling -or an array of feelings- shared by individuals, which
defines their belonging to a group of similar people. Identities are multiple in nature.
Hence, one may have a single identity, but it could be made up of many levels of loyalty
and identification. It often implies an implicit or explicit comparative dimension (one’s
group identity emerges more strongly when compared to another group’s identity).
Identity normally has a positive connotation for those who share it, but it can have a
negative image when attributed to individuals from other groups. (Müller-Härlin 2003,
pp. 269-271). It is an attitude that is often associated with patriotism and indicates a
pride or predisposition to expressing enthusiasm towards symbols of the polity. It
presupposes an intense identification with the community. It is difficult to conceive
patriotism without strong feelings of identity. However, there may be feelings of
identity without patriotism. The discussion in the European Constitutional Convention
about the religious and cultural identity of Europe shows that, even if this topic has
become increasingly relevant, it is not easy to find a strong consensus on the elements
of a European identity. Meanwhile, it is important to note that, according to surveys,
feelings of a common European identity –which coexist with feelings of national
identity– already exist and have a greater or lesser intensity among the populations of
the old continent (Eder 2001; Delanty 2005). It is clear that increasing numbers of
Europeans do identify in one way or another with Europe, and claim to have some kind
of European identity, often alongside a national identity. Moreover, many other scholars
have emphasized how multiple identities –local, regional, national and European–
reinforce, rather than exclude, each other (Bruter 2005). The question of a European
identity and demos must therefore be seen in relation to entrenched national identities
(Fossum 2001). In this sense, studying European identity requires a simultaneous
consideration of other types of territorial identification.
Regarding representation, it can be said that this concept is still the dominant
instrument through which citizens exercise their prerogatives of self-government and by
which political elites of a community are legitimized in their governing role and kept
accountable (Pitkin 1967; Manin 1997; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). In the modern
democratic state, the experience of representation is limited to citizens. Only citizens as
members of the polity are represented. Viewed from the other side of the relationship,
representation has a crucial role in the construction of citizenship. While performing
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such representative roles, elites contribute to the “production” and “reproduction” of
citizenship (both as members of the community and as a system of entitlements) and of
identity. Hence, European elites and institutions play a central role in the construction of
the representative link with European citizenship. In this sense, alignments and
aggregations among MEPs within the European Parliament along ideological rather
than purely territorial lines show that, to some extent, European representation exists
(Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007). In this respect, here we use the degree to which
interviewees trust EU institutions as a proxy for the existence of such a European
representation link.
Finally, when using scope of governance, we refer to two main variables. The
first one refers to the preference about the broad policy scope of the EU to be achieved
in the next ten years. The other one, to the preferred level of decision-making in a series
of specific policy fields as fight against unemployment or health care as examples.
RESULTS Identity
As stated above, the first dimension of Europeaness we analyze is that of
identity. In this dimension, we focus on two groups of variables. The first one includes
variables measuring the degree of attachment to different territorial levels (local,
regional, national, and European) (table 2).
Table 2. Attachment to different communities
Political Elite Economic Elite
Very attached 70.6 39.5
Attachment to town
Somewhat attached 24.3 40.6
Very attached 51.9 28.1 Attachment to region
Somewhat attachec 34.7 39.6
Very attached 75.1 61.3
Attachment to country Somewhat attached 19.6 31.2
Very attached 36 35.6 Attachment to Europe
Somewhat attached 48.2 46.8
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We can see how the attachment to Europe is in accordance with the historical
pro-Europeanism of most of European elites. Nevertheless, for political elites the
attachment to this level is something lower compared with the town and country as
other territorial communities. On the contrary for economic elites, the local and regional
level attract even less support than the European one.
As table 3 shows, there is a clear unanimity among political elites about being
attached to their own cities, with a percentage above 90 points in all cases except
Serbia. Compared with the former territorial level and the regional and national one, the
degree of attachment of political elites to Europe offers a wider range of variation along
countries. The attachment to Europe is always below attachment to national and sub-
national levels, with the exceptions of Belgium (where MPs feel more attached to
Europe than to their county) and Germany (where there is same level of attachment).
Regarding the presence of patterns along geographical areas, there seems to be a certain
degree of geographical coherence for political elites in Southern European countries, as
more than 90 percent of Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish political elites feel identified
with Europe. However, the presence of such hypothetical geographical pattern is
complicated by the case of Greece. In contrast, identification with Europe among
political elites in Post-Communist countries is much more heterogeneous. Thus, in three
Post-Communist nations (Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia) more than 90 percent of MPs
feel identified with Europe, while in Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and the Czech
Republic the percentage is lower. Serbia occupies an extreme position, with only 66.3
percent of the interviewees showing attachment to Europe, which reflects a higher
degree of euroscepticism in this country.
Table 3. Attachment to different levels of political communities (% of very and somewhat attached) Attachment
to their town Attachment
to their region Attachment
to their country Attachment to Europe
Austria 90.9 90.9 97.7 84.1 Belgium 94.7 88.0 73.3 90.7 Bulgaria 96.4 92.8 100 79.5 Czech Republic 97.5 96.3 100 75.0 Denmark 93.3 80.0 98.3 88.3 Estonia 90.9 66.7 100 75.8
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France 96.2 76.9 97.4 85.9 Germany 96.3 81.3 92.5 92.5 Great Britain 95.6 84.4 75.6 46.7 Greece 93.0 93.0 97.7 77.9 Hungary 98.8 76.3 98.8 92.5 Italy 91.7 88.1 94.0 90.5 Lithuania 90.0 68.8 93.8 73.8 Poland 100 98.8 98.8 92.5 Portugal 90.0 93.8 98.8 96.3 Serbia 88.8 62.5 88.8 66.3 Slovakia 97.5 93.8 97.5 91.3 Spain 96.3 95.0 92.5 91.3
Source: IntUne elite interviewing- first wave, 2007. Political and economic elites Question: People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached or not at all attached to the following: your town/village; your ‘region’; your Country; Europe. Answer option: very attached; somewhat attached; not very attached; not at all attached; DK / can’t say (volunteered); Refuse (volunteered). Note: % of elite who is very or somewhat attached. In order to find any underlying dimension, exploratory factor analysis has been
performed. However, for these variables and the whole, just one factor has been found,
and the solution, although statistically valid, is quite weak.2 When analysis is performed
by type of elite, results are consistent for political elites. In contrast, exploratory factor
analysis detects a quite statistically robust model, with two underlying dimensions
concerning territorial attachment for economic elites.3 Factor analysis distinguishes
between sub-national (local and regional) and non sub-national (national and European)
territorial attachments among economic elites. Thus, concerning this aspect of identity,
there is a difference between types of elites.
Table 4. Elements of National and European Identity
National identity European Identity
Political Elite Economic
elite Political Elite Economic
Elite
% 35.7 30.1 30.2 24.3 To be Christian
N 1407 720 1407 723
% 87.8 87.3 83.1 85.8 To share national / European cultural traditions
N 1405 726 1405 726
2 The total explained variance just amounts to a 45 percent. 3 The percentage of total explained variance in this case is 71.3.
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% 53.7 50.1 46.9 47 To be born in the national country /Europe
N 1409 725 1408 727
% 60.6 59.8 46.8 48.4 To have national / European national parents
N 1405 724 1405 727
% 94.7 90.3 91.3 93.1 To respect national / European laws and institutions
N 1406 724 1409 725
% 89.9 88 92.1 92.1 To feel national/ European
N 1401 722 1406 724
% 91.5 93.2 90.6 94.1 To master national language / European language
N 1410 725 1409 726
Note: Responses include “very and somewhat important”.
If the previous variable had a ‘quantitative’ component (in the sense that
measured the degree of attachment to Europe’) the second group of variables in this
dimension refers to the qualitative aspect of identity, that is, the elements interviewees
consider important in defining national and European identity (table 4). There is
practically unanimous consensus regarding the answer “respect the laws and
institutions” of national countries and the EU in both types of elites. This can be seen
from the fact that those who consider it either very important or somewhat important
add to more than 90 percent together. Mastery of one of the country’s official languages
or mastery of a European language – depending on the case in point – is another
important criteria in defining both identities, particularly for economic elites.
Concerning the importance of sharing cultural traditions, there are no
important differences between economic and political elites. In contrast, consideration
of being Christian is the least important element of both identities. Although again it
seems to be less relevant for economic elites. Finally, to be born in the country is
notably more important to build a national identity than for an European one. The same
is true for the second ascribed factor, to have national parents. In any case, the fact of
being born in an European country, or having national-European parents seems to be
slightly less relevant than other elements.
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Table 5. Most important aspects to be a truly European citizen (very and somewhat important)
To be
Christian
To share European cultural
traditions To born
in Europe
To have European parents
To respect EU laws and institutions
To feel European
To master an
European language
Austria 21,5 75,9 37,2 35,9 93,7 92,4 96,2
Belgium 10,3 81,3 21,3 26,3 92,5 88,6 91,3
Bulgaria 48,1 91,3 43,8 44,3 97,5 93,8 84,8
Czech Republic 33,3 85,9 46,8 51,9 87,3 92,4 94,9
Denmark 22 66,7 36,2 31,6 93,2 84,5 93,2
Estonia 47,2 95,8 78,3 76,4 97,2 95,8 100 France 23,4 81,1 56,6 52,6 94,7 96,1 92,1
Germany 27,8 84,4 23,8 22,8 90 81,3 91,3
Great Britain 4 70,2 24 18 86 86 94
Greece 32,9 77,4 53,5 50,6 96,5 98,9 90,7
Hungary 36,3 98,8 48,8 57,5 91,1 98,7 96,3
Italy 44 86,7 67,5 56,6 97,6 93,8 92,9
Lithuania 40 82,9 45,9 60 96,1 97,5 90,7
Poland 64,6 92,5 64,6 72,2 85,9 98,7 88,5
Portugal 16,3 87,3 63,8 53,8 86,1 97,5 97,5
Serbia 12.5 91.3 23,8 18,8 86,3 83.8 81,3
Slovakia 43 91,3 59,5 64,6 97,4 97,5 93,7
Spain 15,4 75,5 54,8 48,9 97,9 95,7 87,2
Source: IntUne elite interviewing, first wave 2007. Question: People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your view, how important is each of the following to be a European?: a. To be a Christian; b. To share European cultural traditions ;c. To be born in Europe ; c. To have European parents; e. To respect the European Union’s laws and institutions f. To feel European; g. To master a European language. Answer: very important, somewhat important, not very important, not important at all, DKs, and refusal (V). Note: % of elite who answer very or somewhat important.
In order to find whether there is any underlying structure, we have run an
exploratory factor analysis on these variables. For national identity, three dimensions
are identified cultural identity (to share cultural tradition, to feel national, and to be
Christian); ascribed identity (to be born in the country and to have national parents);
and civic identity (to be a national citizen, to master national language, and to respect
national laws and institutions).4 By reproducing analysis by type of elite, results are
robust for political elites.5 However, for economic elites, three dimensions are also
identified, although they do not follow the previous pattern. Thus, the first dimension
seems to form a more extensive version of ‘ascribed identity’ with civic components, as
it includes being born in the country, to have true national parents, to be a true national
citizen and to master a national language. The second component or dimension is
4 The total explained variance is 61.6 percent. 5 The total explained variance of this factor solution is 63.2 percent.
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formed by pure cultural elements (sharing cultural traditions and being Christian), and
finally, there is a third dimension that could be qualified as ‘acquired identity’, that is,
identity as a choice, as it includes respecting national laws and institutions and feeling
national.6
In contrast with the national identity, and for the whole sample, just two
dimensions appear for European identity, as the separate dimension of ‘cultural identity’
disappears, and get mixed with the other two dimensions identified at the national level.
Those dimensions are: ascribed/confesional identity (encompassing having European
parents, being born in Europe and being Christian as important elements of European
identity); and civic/cultural identity (including feeling European, respecting European
laws and institutions, mastering a European language and sharing European cultural
traditions).7 This pattern is also stable when factor analysis is applied just to the political
elite sub-sample.8 The same occurs for economic elites, although the solution is
statistically quite weak9, maybe due to the decreased explanatory power of being
Christian and sharing European cultural traditions.
Representation
The main group of variables in this dimension considers the level of trust of
European elites in EU institutions (European Parliament, Commission, and Council of
Ministers) (table 6). Here, we can see how there are no very important differences when
comparing trust in European institutions among political and economic elites, although
it seems true that political elites trust more in the EP their economic counterparts prefer
the EC and the ECM. When looking for the underlying dimensions, just one factor
encompassing the three EU trust variables is detected.10 Thus, it is possible to create a
general measure of ‘trust in EU’ institutions to be used in explanatory analysis.
6 The total explained variance is 58.9 percent. 7 The total percentage of explained variance by this factor solution is 52.3. 8 The total explained variance here is 54.9 percent. 9 The total percentage of explained variance is 47.1. 10 Factor analysis total explained variance: 77.5 percent. Results by type of elite also detect just one dimension.
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Table 6. Trust in European institutions (0-10 scale).
Trust in European Parliament
Trust in European Commission
Trust in European Council of Ministers
Mean 6.4 6.1 6.2
N 1402 1407 1401 Political Elite
Std. Deviation 5.937 7.338 6.879
Mean 6.3 6.8 7.1
N 726 726 720 Economic Elite
Std. Deviation 9.320 10.472 12.050
Mean 6.3 6.3 6.5
N 2128 2133 2121 Total Elite
Std. Deviation 7.268 8.539 8.983
Regarding to the same dimension of representation, table 7 shows the
perception of European elites about the role of member states’ interests in EU decision-
making. Economic elites are especially optimistic about the idea that those who make
decisions at the EU level tend to take into consideration the national interests, while a
higher percentage of political elites thinks that they do not take enough into account the
specific interests of the countries. However, both MPs and economic elites broadly
agree, more or less in the same degree, with the idea that the interests of some member
states carry out too much weight at the EU level.
Table 7. Perception of the role member states’ interests in EU decision-making.
Political Elite Economic Elite
Agree strongly
12.6 9.5 Those who make EU decisions at EU level don't take enough account of the interests of NATIONAL states
at stake Agree somewhat
47.3 39.6
Agree strongly
34.3 35.9 The interests of some member states carry too much
weight at the EU level Agree
somewhat 49.1 46.9
Finally, we consider in the representation dimension the positions of European
elites with respect to the distribution of power within EU institutions. Here, it is evident
that the majority of elites agree with two ideas, which could seem opposed but could be
complementary: to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament and to keep the
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maximum power for member states. Besides, economic elites support more than
political ones the idea that the European Commission should become the government of
the EU. However, and at the same time, politicians are economic elites are equal
defenders of an intergovernmental arrangement (keeping the national sovereignty).
Table 8. National-European power sharing
Political elite Economic elite Agree strongly 42.2 36.3 Member states ought to remain the
central actors of EU Agree somewhat 33.5 39.6
Agree strongly 14.6 14.9 European Commission should become the
true government of EU Agree somewhat 36 39.3 Agree strongly 36.3 26.2 Powers of EP ought to be strengthened Agree somewhat 35 41.9
In addition, and meanwhile Western and Southern Europe clearly support,
politically speaking, more power and a more relevant role for the European Parliament,
in Postcommunist area, obviously with Poland, the main objective is focused on
“remaining member states as central actors in the UE”. Political elites along Europe
share the idea of giving less importance to the idea of the European Commission
becoming the true government in the Union. However, in some Western states
(Belgium, France, Italy and Spain) this option got more support than the idea of
maintaining members states as the central actors.
Table 9. National-European power sharing (very and somewhat agree) (by countries)
Member states remain a central actors of EU
EC become the true Government of EU
Powers of EP ought to be strengthened
Austria 72,8 39,5 90,1 Belgium 65 72,2 84,8 Bulgaria 84,6 68 81,8 Czech Republic 88,8 32,5 47,5 Denmark 88,1 16,7 63,8 Estonia 81,9 44,4 43,1 France 40,5 48,8 53,8 Germany 72,7 34,7 92,3 Great Britain 92 4 63,3
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Greece 81,1 61,1 92,2 Hungary 65,8 67,5 72,5 Italy 53,6 70,2 81,0 Lithuania 97,5 48,8 58,8 Poland 87,5 50 58,8 Serbia 68,8 63,8 70,0 Portugal 76,3 42,5 75 Slovakia 88,8 35 46,8 Spain 67,7 77,4 92,5 Western Europe 64,1 44,2 75,1 Eastern Europe 82,6 50,7 61,6 Southern Europe 71,7 55,7 82,4
Source: IntUne elite interviewing- first wave, 2007 Question: How much do you agree with the following statements? a. The member states ought to remain the central actors of the European Union. b. The European Commission ought to become the true government of the European Union c. The powers of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened Options: 1. Agree strongly ; 2. Agree somewhat ; 3. Disagree somewhat; 4. Disagree strongly; 5. Don’t know (V); 6. Refuse (V) Note: % of respondents who are strongly or somewhat agreed. Scope of governance
In relation to the scope of governance, the analysis deals with two main groups
of variables. The first one refers to the preference about the broad policy scope of the
EU to be achieved in the next ten years (whether it should involve a unified tax system,
a common system of social security, a single EU foreign policy and more help for
regions in need). The other one to the preferred level of decision-making in a series of
specific policy fields (fight against unemployment, against crime, health care, taxation,
immigration and environmental issues).
Table 10. Evolution in the next 10 years
Political Elite Economic
Elite
Strongly in favour 24.9 30.5
A unified tax system for EU Somewhat in favour 31.3 31.7
Strongly in favour 31.3 27.7 A common system of social
security Somewhat in favour 34.9 36.9
Strongly in favour 52.5 56.9
A single EU foreign policy Somewhat in favour 32.2 32.4
Strongly in favour 58.4 41 More help for EU regions in
difficulties Somewhat in favour 31.4 42.2
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Regarding the evolution of the UE in the next ten years, an enhanced role in
providing help for EU regions and a single EU foreign policy are the preferred options
for both types of elites. Political elites show more preference for helping poorer regions,
while economic ones focus their attention more on a single foreign policy for all
Europe. They are also somewhat stronger supporters of a common system of social
security system while economic elites support stronger than parliamentarians a unified
tax system.
Table 11. Preferred level of decision-making in various EU policies Political Elite Economic Elite
Regional level11 10.5 13.5
National level 61 61 Fighting unemployment European Union level 3.6 3.6
Regional level 5.1 7.6
National level 57.2 55.2 Fight against crime European Union level 9.5 8
Regional level 13.4 12.9
National level 65.8 67.9 Health care policy European Union level 1.4 2
Regional level 1.8 1.7
National level 71.8 74 Taxation European Union level 5 3.6
Regional level 2 1.2
National level 25.8 24.7 Immigration policy European Union level 43.8 45
Regional level 8.5 4.8
National level 12.4 11.1 Environmental policy European Union level 42.7 49.2
Both political and economic elites –particularly the last ones- agree with the idea
that immigration and environmental policies must be decided at European level, while
fighting unemployment should be better dealt at national level. There is a wide
consensus among elites in other areas. Thus, for taxation policies the national level is
clearly preferred by both types of elites. In the case of health care policy, elites show
more or less the same preference for the state level. With regard to fight against crime,
11 We prefer to maintain the regional level because of the importance of the regional cleavage in some national politics as in Spain, Germany or Italy.
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the political elite in Europe also support the national sphere. The same preference can
be found for economic elites.
Factor analysis is congruent with this description. Two factors, explaining 54.6
percent of the variance) are identified, clearly distinguishing between the two groups of
variables. The first one is formed by those policy areas which a majority prefers to be
dealt with at the national and/or sub national levels (fighting unemployment, health
care, and taxation). The second major cluster is formed by the two policy areas which
interviewees prefer to be Europeanised (immigration and environmental policy) plus
fighting against crime, where a majority of respondents consider that supranational
institutions (with or without sharing competencies with national or sub national
authorities) should play a major role. As we can see, fighting against crime is much
further from their co-members variables, which is explained both by the above
mentioned scattering of opinions along the three levels of government, and also by the
differences between political and economic elites.12 In sum, the underlying structure
seems to distinguish between what could be termed, respectively, internal and
transnational policy issues. The existence of these clusters of variables allows us to use
them to create two summary variables to be entered later in explanatory analysis.13
However, when analysing by type of elite, the patterns just keeps for economic elites14,
while factor analysis for political elites is statistically quite weak, and it only detects one
underlying dimension. Thus, the views of political and economic elites differ again, this
time concerning the existence of differentiated opinion on policy Europeanisation
concerning different policy areas.
12 Running hierarchical clustering by type of elites, we find that for political elites fighting against crime remains in the same cluster than fighting unemployment, health care and taxation, although it is by large the furthest variable of the cluster. For economic elites, fighting against crime is included in the same cluster than immigration and environmental policies, being also relatively far from these variables. 13In fact, these variables could be elaborated in two ways. Firstly, by directly using factor scores obtained from factor analysis (through the Anderson-Rubin’s method). The second, by simply computing the respondents’ average values at each cluster, which permits to maintain the 1-3 scale. Both variables correlate above 95%. 14 Total explained variance is equal to 56 percent.
18
WHAT DOES EXPLAIN SPANISH ELITES’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION? In this section we explore the relationships between the attitudes of European
elites in each of the three dimensions and a number of variables (table 12) in order to
find out possible explanatory links among them. Just some of the dependent variables
dealt in the previous pages are dealt with. For the identity dimension, the variables used
represent the two factors detected in the descriptive analysis (civic/cultural, and
ascribed/confessional European identities), and they are constructed by calculating the
average scores of the variables included in every factor. For the representation
dimension, the chosen variable are trust in EU institutions (constructed as the average of
the trust scores for European Parliament, European Commission, and European Council
of Ministers), and the agreement with the assertion that the European Commission
should become the government of the EU (dummy variable). Finally, concerning the
scope of governance dimension, the variables used are those corresponding to the two
factors detected in the descriptive analysis (transnational and internal policy issues),
calculated as the previous factor variables. In all cases, continuous variables are centred
to the mean, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the models.
Table 12. Independent variables in the analysis
Individual level Explanatory dimensions Variables in analysis Operationalization Socio-demographic
characteristics Gender Dichotomic variable: 0 =
Female, 1 = Male Age Self-reported number (centred
to the mean) (**) Human capital Education Highest educational level (0 =
none to 7 = PhD) (centred) Languages Number of EU official
country languages spoken (apart from one’s own) (centred to the mean)
Type of elite Political elite Dichotomic variable: 0 = Economic elite, 1 = Political elite
Individual ideology Self-positioning in left-right scale (0-10)
Variables in models: Left [0-4), Right (6-10] (*) Reference category: Centre [4-6]
Extremism Absolute distance from ideological centre (5 in 0-10 scale)
EU main goal: market vs. welfare
EU main goal should be more competitive vs. better social security
1 = More competitive, 0 = Other
Territorial attachment(***) EU Attachment Attachment to the European Union (0-3 scale)
Country Attachment to one’s country
19
(0-3 scale)
Region Attachment to one’s region (0-3 scale)
Evaluative attitude toward EU (***) Trust in EU institution
Average trust in EU institutions (centred to the mean)
EU has benefited Country has benefited from EU (dummy)
Group level variables Operating Budgetary Balance EU OBB
Operating Budgetary Balance (OBB) as a percentage of GNI in 2007
Year of membership in EU (***) Memb 1973-1981
Year of membership in EU: 1973-1981 (dummy)
Memb 1986-1995 Year of membership in EU: 1986-1995 (dummy)
Memb 2004-2007 Year of membership in EU: 2004-2007 (dummy)
Notes: (*) We would rather prefer to measure ideology in these intervals than using the scale as we do not assume that ideology exerts a linear influence on the explained variables (that is, a individual is not more or less pro-EU whether her ideological self-positioning is 1 or 3.5). Besides, it allows us to better assess the specific behaviour within these ideological groups). However, due to the asymmetric distribution of cases (most of them concentrated on the centre-left of the ideological spectrum –see the following table). (**) We center continuous variables to the sample mean in order to offer a clearer interpretation of random intercepts and coefficients in multilevel models. (***) These variables are used only in some of the models.
Our previous analysis has shown that there are important country differences,
and that this higher level of aggregation may influence lower level (individual)
positions.15 Statistically, an adequate treatment of such kind of data requires a
multilevel approach (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). In this sense, our explanatory
variables will be at both individual and group (country) levels. At the individual level,
as it is in our interest to check whether being a member of the political or economic elite
is important in explaining individual preferences, we include the type of elite as a main
explanatory variable in our analysis. In addition, we also pay attention to ideology as a
major explanatory factor pointed out in the literature (see, for instance Hix and Lord
1997, Gabel 1998, Hix 1999, Tsebelis and Garrett 2000, Aspinwall 2002, Hooghe,
Marks and Wilson 2002). Hypotheses have been, however, diverse. According to Marks
and Steenbergen (2002) some authors (i.e. Hix and Lord 1997) have claimed that
ideology and positions concerning European integration are unrelated, so partisan
competence at the national level would remain dominated by the ideological cleavage
while European integration issues affecting a sovereignty dimension would be difficult
to assimilate into the left-right dimension. In this context, national parties would try to
control competition on issues on European integration. As a consequence, majority
(more centrist) parties would adopt a pro-European stance, leaving anti-European
positions to minor parties at the ideological extremes. A second approach – proposed by
15 ANOVA run on the dependent variables confirms this assertion (data not shown).
20
Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) – contends that European integration may be subsumed into
the left-right dimension, where European integration would collapse into domestic
politics under the form of favourable (left) or unfavourable (right) stances toward EU
regulatory interventionism. Finally, a third view, proposed by Hooghe and Marks (1999,
2001) argues that both dimensions may be related, but do not merge. Thus, for instance,
left parties (here, individual ideological positions) would be more pro-European if
European integration focuses on market regulation while adopting euro-sceptical
stances if European integration implies an emphasis on neo-liberalism. For rightist
positions the direction of preferences would be reversed. Our questions do not reflect
the interviewees opinion on “what is” the main orientation of the EU (market vs.
welfare) but “what should be” this orientation, so we cannot directly check the
relationship between ideology and EU goal. However, we introduce the market vs.
welfare variable, in order to check the influence of this belief on interviewees’
preferences. We also include an interaction with ideology in case both variables could
be related. Besides, as extremist have usually been associated with a more Eurosceptic
stance (Aspinwall 2002), we also introduce a measurement for this factor in order to
check whether, in fact, this feature is important to our subject of study.
We also have considered other individual level variables, such socio-
demographic characteristics in order to avoid confounding effects (Gabel 1998). This is
the case of age – that could act as a proxy for generational effects – and gender. In
addition, we also introduce two human capital measures (level of education and number
of languages spoken), in order to ascertain the influence of formal education and other
socializing experiences at the international level on the view of the different dimensions
of European integration, in order to check what could be called as the ‘cosmopolitism’
hypothesis (higher education levels and higher international experience are more
supportive for European integration and civic views of European identity).
Concerning which variables to use as explanatory factors in the analysis, a
problem of endogeneity arises, as theoretically, it could be assumed that to explain some
of the dimensions it could be used other variables pertaining to other dimensions. Thus,
preferences on the national-European power distribution pertaining to the representation
dimension, and those referred to the Europeanization of certain policy areas (‘scope of
governance dimension’) could be explained by more general attitudes, such as the
21
general level of attachment to Europe, the overall evaluation of the effect of the EU in
one’s country or the degree of trust individual have on European institutions. Statistical
analysis of the relationships between these variables shows that, despite there is
significant correlation between dimensions such correlations are quite low. 16 So for the
variables concerning power sharing in the EU and policy preferences we use these
evaluative variables (the interviewees’ average degree of trust on European institutions
and the effect that EU membership has in their respective countries), as well as the level
of attachment to Europe.
Finally, in order to evaluate the influence of contextual factors, we use as
explanatory group level variables, firstly, the net benefit countries receive from their EU
membership, we consider the 2007 operative budgetary balance (defined as the
difference between allocated operating expenditure – i.e. excluding administration – to
EU member states and their own resources payments, excluding traditional own
resources) (European Commission 2008, 80).17 18 A second group of variables measures
the length of EU membership, as a factor that could influence country perceptions of the
functioning of the EU.
European identity
Table 13 shows the multivariate models for the variables chosen in this
dimension. Concerning the civic/cultural identity, the model shows how just individual
factors seem to have significant effects. More precisely, it is evident the effect of
ideology (compared with centrist positions – the reference category – the more to the
right, the more supportive for the elements in this dimension as important constituent
elements of European identity; conversely, the more extremist, the less an interviewee
think this dimension is important). In contrast, the type of elite is not an important
16 For instance, attachment to Europe is significant (p <= .05) and negatively correlated with average trust in European institutions (Pearson’s R square = -.175), increasing the powers of European Parliament (-.179) and European Commission (-.121), and with preferences on the Europeanization of transnational (-.116) and internal policy issues (-.125); and positively correlated with keeping national governments as central actors (.102). Average trust in EU institutions is significant and positively correlated with increasing the powers of the European Parliament (.154) and the European Commission (.198), and negatively correlated with keeping national governments as central actors (-.093), and the Europeanization of internal policy issues (.173). 17 In the exploratory analysis we tried other variables, such as previous regime, GDP, population, or percentage of public expenses in social policy, but they were not significant. 18 European Commission (2008) EU budget 2007. Financial Report. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
22
explanatory factor. Besides, human capital variables are also significant in the model
(both with positive coefficients). Thus, the cosmopolitism hypothesis seems to be
supported by the data. Finally, there is also a generational effect – as interviewees’ age
further from the average, agreement with this dimension as an important element of
European identity increases.
Table 13. Identity dimension (models)
Civic/cultural
identity Ascribed/confesional
identity
Level 1 Units 1721 1741
Level 2 Units (Country) 17 17
Condition number 123.741 113.464
Log-likelihood -933.621 -1774.37
Coeff Std.Err Coeff Std.Err
Political elite -0.020 0.023 0.106 0.066
Male 0.008 0.041 0.011 0.050
Age 0.005 0.001 *** 0.006 0.002 **
Languages 0.029 0.008 *** 0.007 0.021
Education 0.023 0.006 *** 0.002 0.016
Extremism -0.040 0.015 ** -0.040 0.024
Left -0.081 0.061 -0.255 0.068 ***
Right 0.180 0.053 *** 0.337 0.074 ***
EU more competitive -0.020 0.027 -0.053 0.044
Right*EU competitive -0.073 0.053 -0.094 0.056
EU_OBB07 (percent) 0.038 0.037 0.132 0.038 ***
EU memb 1973-1981 -0.034 0.085 -0.252 0.144
EU memb 1986-1995 -0.028 0.076 -0.047 0.122
EU memb 2004-2007 0.024 0.079 0.063 0.131
_cons 0.025 0.095 -0.086 0.128
Level 1 variance 0.170 -0.013
Level 2 variance (Country) 0.008 0.002 0.016 0.008
Note: Robust standard errors; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.5%.
With respect to the ascribed/confessional identity factor, the corresponding
model also shows the significant effect of ideology. Here, leftist and rightist positions
appear opposed to each other, the former having a negative effect in the degree of
support to the variables in this dimension as important components of European
identity, while the effect of the later runs in the opposite direction. Concerning the type
of elite, once again it is not important as an explanatory factor. In addition, there is not
significant influence of human capital variables, while a generational effect is also
found in the same (positive) direction than for the civic/cultural identity dimension.
23
Finally, for this factor it appears a significant country effect, as being national of
countries that have an economic positive net benefit from their EU membership implies
a higher support of the importance of ascribed/confessional elements in European
identity. Here the causal mechanism is not evident, so it is possible that the explanatory
variable is hiding the effect of other group variables.
Representation Concerning the degree of trust in EU institutions, we use as dependent
variables the factor scores of the only dimension previously derived from exploratory
factor analysis of trust variables.
Table 14. Representation dimension: trust in EU institutions and perception of the role of Spain’s and other member states’ interests in EU decision-making
Trust in EU institutions (0-10 scale) Statements about country interests in EU decision-making (agree/disagree)
All Political Economic elite All Political elite Economic
Eur
o-P
arlia
men
t
Eur
o-P
arlia
men
t
Tru
st in
EU
in
stitu
tions
(f
acto
r)
Eur
opea
n C
omm
isió
n
EU
don
't ta
ke
into
acc
ount
S
pain
’s
inte
rest
s
Som
e co
untr
ies
carr
y m
uch
wei
ght
EU
don
't ta
ke
into
acc
ount
S
pain
’s
inte
rest
s
Som
e co
untr
ies
carr
y m
uch
wei
ght
Som
e co
untr
ies
carr
y m
uch
wei
ght
Gender (male) .109** .108**
Age -.134** -.178**
Highest education level -.058** -077* -.100** -078*
Type of elite (political)
-.160**
Party family (socialist,
conservatives, ethnic)
-.102**
Ideology (left, centre, right)
-.067**
.156** -.098** -.165**
Ideology (scale) -.138** -.137** .122**
EU more Competitive_vs_
better social security
.157**
.116**
.094*
Note: Two-tailed bivariate correlations (Pearson’s and Spearman’s Rho, when appropriate). In italics, nominal association measures (Kramer’s V); (*) significant at 5%; (**) significant at 1%.
The results show how the option for a more competitive economy in contrast
to a better social security is positively correlated with trust in the EP for both types of
elites. In the case of political elites gender also presents a positive relationship, in the
24
sense that the older the MP, the more prone to trust the EP. Meanwhile, leftist political
parties tend to put more confidence in the European legislative power. For economic
elites, education is also significantly related to the level of trust in the EP, but in a
negative sense, and the same is true about the European Commission for this later type
of elite.
When talking about the perception of the role of member states’ interests in
EU decision-making (table 15), results are not much clearer than for trust. Once again,
ideology is the most relevant explanatory variable. For the whole sample and political
elites, the more respondents self-position themselves to the right of the ideological
spectrum, the more they tend to think that EU decisions do not take enough into account
countries’ interests, and the less they consider that some countries carry too much
weight in European decision-making. This latter opinion is also significant for political
elites, consistently with party family – social-democrats MPs are more likely to think
some countries have an excessive leverage on EU decisions than conservative ones.
Besides, it is interesting the fact that level of education and age are negatively related
with the opinion that some countries carry too much weight on EU decision-making for
the whole sample and economic elites.
Table 15. National-European power sharing All Political elites Economic elites Member
states remain central actors
European Commission become true government
Stronger European Parliament
Member states remain central actors
European Commission become true government
Stronger European Parliament
Member states remain central actors
European Commission become true government
Stronger European Parliament
Gender (male) age Languages Highest education level -,120** Type of elite (political) -110** Party family (socialist, conservatives, ethnic) ,157 ** Ideology (left, centre, right) -.093** Ideology (scale) -,189** ,122** -,198** Extremism EU more Competitive
25
_vs_better social security
Note: Two-tailed bivariate correlations (Pearson’s and Spearman’s Rho, when appropriate). In italics, nominal association measures (Kramer’s V); (*) significant at 5%; (**) significant at 1%.
Regarding the opinions on the role of member states and EU institutions
(Commission and European Parliament) in the governance of the EU (table 13), it is
interesting to notice the influence of ideology in the views of political elites about the
role of member states and European Commission. Thus, the more to the right, the more
they favour a strong role of states and, consequently, the less the view of the
Commission as a true EU government. Regarding the European Parliament, the only
explanatory factor that appears for the whole sample is the type of elite, with political
elites being more prone to agree in strengthening this institution.
Table 16 presents the multivariate model accounting for the average level of
trust in EU institutions. This time, the type of elite is significant – the degree of trust is,
on average, higher for political elites than for economic elites. Concerning the rest of
the individual explanatory variables, just ideology has a significant effect – again,
extremist positions reduce the level of trust, while rightist positions increase it in
comparison with centrist ones. Concerning country level variables, it also appears that
living in countries with an economic positive net benefit from their EU membership
implies, on average, a higher level of trust in European institutions.
Table 16. Representation dimension (models)
Trust in EU institutions
EU Comission should be EU government (multilevel binary
logistic regression) Level 1 Units 1750 1625
Level 2 Units (Country) 17 17
Condition number 125.815 161.463
Log-likelihood -3349.04 -954.432
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Political elite 0.322 0.129 * -0.254 0.127 *
Male -0.100 0.094 0.513 0.192 **
Age 0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.006
Languages 0.059 0.055 0.027 0.070
Education 0.020 0.029 0.026 0.035
Extremism -0.173 0.065 ** -0.042 0.070
Left 0.183 0.189 0.066 0.249
Right 0.474 0.198 * -0.219 0.306
26
EU more competitive -0.047 0.085 -0.280 0.152
Right*EU competitive -0.286 0.206 -0.071 0.295
Trust in EU institutions 0.302 0.033 ***
Country benefited from EU 0.537 0.480
Attachment Europe -0.305 0.136 *
Attachment country -0.288 0.090 ***
Attachment region 0.015 0.080
EU_OBB07 (percent) 0.298 0.104 *** 0.483 0.251
EU memb 1973-1981 -0.238 0.436 -1.966 0.670 ***
EU memb 1986-1995 -0.075 0.227 -0.658 0.625
EU memb 2004-2007 -0.459 0.265 -1.009 0.604
_cons 0.102 0.192 0.979 0.658
Level 1 variance 2.644 0.136
Level 2 variance (Country) 0.127 0.048 0.446 0.139 Note: Robust standard errors; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.5%.
The second model in Table 14 refers to the degree of agreement among
European elites on the need that European Commission becomes a real government of
the European Union. Remember that, as this is a specific preference, more general
variables considered as dependent ones in this paper are introduced here as independent
ones. What this model shows is that the type of elite is significant to explain preferences
concerning the role of the European Commission – economic elites are more prone to
favour a more relevant executive role than political ones. In contrast, the effect of
ideology disappears, and neither human capital nor socio-demographic variables show
any significant relationship. It also appears – the only case of all analysed here – a
significant positive effect of gender, as males are more likely to favour a stronger
Commission. Concerning the new explanatory variables introduced, as it could be
expected, there is a highly positive significant effect of the general trust in European
institutions. Quite expected too, the relationship is also highly significant and negative
in the case of the attachment to one’s country variable. In contrast, and in a quite
counterintuitive way, this significant relationship reverses in the case of the degree of
attachment to Europe (the more attached, the less likely to support a stronger role of the
European Commission). A possible explanation is that this is just a statistical artefact as
a consequence of the concentration of cases in the lower levels of attachment. Finally,
among the country level variables, the effect on the dependent variable is significant just
for the interviewees in those countries that became members of the European Union
(then European Economic Community) in 1973-1981. Here the effect is negative, that
is, elites in these countries – among which it is United Kingdom, where its elites’ Euro-
27
skepticism is widely acknowledged – are, on average, more likely to be contrary to the
European Commission become some kind of supranational executive.
Scope of governance
Results of the exploratory analysis regarding the scope of governance are even
poorer than for the representation dimension, with no meaningful multivariate accounts.
In the bivariate analysis, from the underlying factors uncovered for the variables on
preferred level of policy-making just the opinions of political elites on domestic issues
(fighting unemployment, health care, and taxation) are positively and significantly
related with ideology and extremism for the whole sample and both types of elites.
Turning to the original variables, for political elites, extremism shows the same pattern
for immigration issues. Besides, here we have the only case where gender is
significantly related to a target variable (health-care policy, where women are more
likely to maintain a more pro-European stance). For economic elites, the only
significant negative relationship is between age and levels of strong agreement with
respect to the Europeanization of health care and taxation issues. Finally, for the other
variables considered in this dimension (Europeanization in 10 years of taxation, social
security, and foreign policy) we only detect significant bivariate relationships for social
security (positive for extremism, negative for human capital variables) and foreign
policy (negative for human capital variables) in the economic elites subsample.
The type of elite is again significant in the models in this dimension (Table 15).
Being a member of the political elites implies, on average, a lower support for policy
Europeanisation for both transnational and internal policy issues. In the case of the
former, along with the type of elite, just trust in EU institutions and the degree of
attachment to Europe appear to be significantly related among individual level
variables. In the first case, the effect follows the expected direction, as higher average
levels of trust in EU institutions are associated to a higher support to the
Europeanisation of transnational policy areas. In contrast, the relationship is again quite
counterintuitive for the case of the attachment to Europe as, according to the model
results, lower levels of attachment imply a higher support for Europeanisation. Again,
the statistical artefact above mentioned may be at work. With respect to the country
level variables, compared with founding countries, elites in countries that became
28
members in 1973, 1981, 2004 and 2007 (in the later two cases, all of them in the sample
are post-communist countries) are, on average, less supportive for the option of
Europeanising transnational policy issues.
Table 17. Scope of governance (models)
Europeanisation of transnational policy
issues Europeanisation of internal
policy issues
Level 1 Units 1635 1627
Level 2 Units (Country) 17 17
Condition number 126.276 125.323
Log-likelihood -1399.26 -1097.13
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Political elite -0.097 0.041 * -0.222 0.024 ***
Male 0.047 0.033 0.034 0.027
Age 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.002
Languages 0.017 0.016 -0.006 0.009
Education -0.003 0.014 -0.001 0.013
Extremism 0.023 0.027 -0.009 0.019
Left 0.031 0.072 0.127 0.047 **
Right -0.083 0.075 -0.066 0.051
EU more competitive -0.030 0.040 -0.131 0.038 ***
Right*EU competitive 0.000 0.073 0.035 0.051
Trust in EU institutions 0.032 0.010 *** 0.024 0.009 *
Country benefited from EU 0.111 0.099 -0.072 0.071
Attachment Europe -0.067 0.020 *** -0.047 0.021 *
Attachment country -0.041 0.030 -0.029 0.023
Attachment region -0.041 0.023 -0.017 0.013
EU_OBB07 (percent) -0.037 0.035 0.107 0.026 ***
EU memb 1973-1981 -0.176 0.083 * -0.286 0.077 ***
EU memb 1986-1995 0.024 0.092 -0.090 0.101
EU memb 2004-2007 -0.237 0.108 * -0.370 0.105 ***
_cons 0.335 0.129 0.540 0.120
Level 1 variance 0.318 0.023 0.221 0.017
Level 2 variance (Country) 0.015 0.006 0.010 0.003 Note: Robust standard errors; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.5%. Concerning the Europeanisation of the so called internal policy issues, along
with the above mentioned significant effect of the type of elite, ideology seems to play
an important role in explaining preferences of European elites. Here there is a contrast
between Europeanisation of transnational policy issues, where it was indifferent the
ideological positioning of the interviewees and opinions are generally more favourable -
possibly due to the transnational nature of the problems – and the more contested nature
of this internal policy issues, referring to consolidated policy areas where vested
interests are more likely to act as friction elements against transferring power to
supranational institutions and where the need to do so in light of the type of problems is
29
less evident. Thus, ideology plays here a significant explanatory role in defining the
positions of the interviewees – more leftist positions appear more supportive for
Europeanisation. Besides, this is the only model where welfare-neoliberal attitudes
seem to be significant – interviewees thinking EU should promote basically economic
competitiveness are, on average, more contrary to support Europeanisation of internal
policy issues. The effect of trust in EU institutions and attachment to Europe detected
for transnational policy issues also appear here, with the same signs. Finally, concerning
country variables, the negative significant effect for countries that became members in
1973, 1981, 2004 and 2007 is repeated. Besides, there is also a positive significant
effect for the country net economic benefit variable – that is, on average, interviewees in
countries with positive operative budget balance are more supportive to Europeanising
internal policy issues.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
After the analysis, we have seen how the attachment to Europe is in accordance
with the historical pro-Europeanism of most of European elites. Nevertheless, for
political elites the attachment to this level is something lower compared with the town
and country as other territorial communities. Regarding the ingredients in order to be a
genuine European citizen, there is an important consensus regarding the idea of “respect
the laws and institutions”. Mastery of one of the country’s official languages or mastery
of a European language – depending on the case in point – is another important criteria
in defining national and European identities, while there are no significant differences
between the elites concerning the importance of sharing cultural traditions. At the same
time, and respect to the representation dimension, it is clear that there are no very
relevant differences when comparing trust in European institutions among political and
economic elites, although it seems true that political elites trust more in the EP their
economic counterparts prefer the EC and the ECM. In addition, both MPs and economic
elites broadly agree, more or ougly in the same degree, with the idea that the interests of
some member states carry out too much weight at the EU level. It is also evident that
the majority of elites agree with two ideas: to strengthen the powers of the European
Parliament and to keep the maximum power for member states. Finally, the descriptive
analysis has shown that both political and economic elites agree with the idea that
30
immigration and environmental policies must be decided at European level, while
fighting unemployment should be better dealt at national level while there is a wide
consensus among elites in other areas.
Concerning the multivariate analysis, we can conclude that the type of elite plays
a significant role in explaining the representation and the scope of governance
dimensions. Here seems to appear some kind of contradiction, since although political
elites seems to show, on average, higher level of trust in European institutions than
economic elites, when turning to specific preferences (strengthening the European
Commission or Europeanising policy areas) they are less supportive. It is also
outstanding the explanatory role of ideology, as it is important in all but two models -
those referring to Europeanisation of transnational policy issues and the role of the
European Commission. Here, data seem to support both the independence and the
bidimensional views of ideology. Firstly, where there is a general agreement on the
functional need to Europeanise (i.e. transnational policy issues) or that powers of the
European Commission remain limited, ideology remains aside the debate. However, in
those areas that still need to be further definition and clarification (such as what is
important in European identity or the Europeanisation of consolidated State policy
competences), ideology helps to delimitate the debate and define positions. And this
happens basically along the left-right continuum.
Human capital variables are significant as explanatory factors for the
‘civic/cultural’ identity. Here, model results confirm what has been called the
‘cosmopolitism hypothesis’, that is, that interviewees with higher levels of formal
education and experience abroad are, on average, more supportive of this view of
European identity. Concerning the evaluative and territorial identity explanatory
variables, when used, they seem to play a crucial explanatory role of specific
preferences concerning the role of the European Commission and the Europeanisation
of both transnational and internal policy issues. In the case of the variables categorised
as evaluative attitudes, just trust in EU institutions is significant, while more direct
evaluation (if one’s country has benefited or not) has not significant effect.
31
Finally, regarding the group variables included in the analysis, if the country has
a net positive economic balance from its membership in the EU is important in
explaining ascribed/confessional identity (in this case, maybe hiding the effect of other
variables), the level of trust in European institutions (the higher the net benefit in a
country, the higher the degree of trust among its elites) and the degree of support to the
Europeanisation of internal policy issues (here, also a positive relationship). Concerning
the antiquity as members of the EU, it appears the Euro-skeptic positions in specific
preference on the role of the European Commission and Europeanisation of policy areas
of members that joined the EU in 1972-1981 – maybe due to the highly skeptic
positions in United Kingdom. Besides, countries that joined in 2004-2007 – all of which
are former communist regimes in our sample – are also, on average, more reticent to
transfer policy competencies to the European level, both for transnational and internal
policy issues.
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