European ecosystems in alternative future worlds · Aim of this presentation To illustrate four common steps in the development of scenarios, namely: 1. Devise the focal questions

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2008

ALTER-Net Summer School 2008European Ecosystems: Managing Biodiversity

September 2-14 2008, Peyresq, France

European ecosystems in alternative future worlds

Tim Carter

Finnish Environment Institute, SYKE

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2008



Aim of this presentationTo illustrate four common steps in the

development of scenarios, namely:

1. Devise the focal questions of the scenarios2. Construct scenario storylines3. Quantify scenario elements4. Regionalise scenarios (optional)



1. Focal questions: Contrasting objectives; contrasting scenarios

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Regional

PrescriptiveEU policy-makersSpatial planningESPON/FARO

ExploratoryResearchEcosystemsATEAM/ALARM

Global

PrecautionaryPolicyWaterWWV

AbstractBusinessEnvironmentShell/WBCSD

Multi-scaleAwareness raising/policy

Ecosystem servicesMA

PervasiveResearch/policyClimate changeSRES

IllustrativePolicySustainable development

GEO-3/GEO-4

Path-settingResearchAcademicGSG

Notable featureTarget audienceOrientationScenarios

Examples of global and regional scenarios

Illustration only, not to be cited

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Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Scenarios

Focus: plausible future changes in ecosystems, in the supply of and demand for ecosystem services, and in the consequent changes in human well-beingKey concerns: identified through a survey of user needs and interviews with decision-makers and leaders. Included:• globalization• leadership• poverty and inequality• technology• local flexibility• surprises

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Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: conceptual framework

Source: MEA, 2003



2. Storylines:Narrative descriptions of future worlds

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Adapting Mosaic

Global Orchestration Order from Strength

TechnoGarden

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) storylines

Nelson et al., 2005

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The Global Orchestration scenario depicts a worldwide connected society in which global markets are well developed. Supra-national institutions are well placed to deal with global environmental problems, such as climate change and fisheries. However, their reactive approach to ecosystem management makes them vulnerable to surprises arising from delayed action or unexpected regional changes.

Global Orchestration

Nelson et al., 2005

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The Order from Strength scenario represents a regionalized and fragmented world concerned with security and protection, emphasizing primarily regional markets, and paying little attention to the common goods, and with an individualistic attitude toward ecosystem management.

Order from Strength

Nelson et al., 2005

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The Adapting Mosaic scenario depicts a fragmented world resulting from discredited global institutions. It sees the rise of local ecosystem management strategies and the strengthening of local institutions. Investments in human and social capital are geared toward improving knowledge about ecosystem functioning and management, resulting in a better understanding of the importance of resilience, fragility, and local flexibility of ecosystems.

Adapting Mosaic

Nelson et al., 2005

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The TechnoGarden scenario depicts a globally connected world relying strongly on technology and on highly managed and often-engineered ecosystems to deliver needed goods and services. Overall, eco-efficiency improves, but it is shadowed by the risks inherent in large-scale humanmade solutions.

TechnoGarden

Nelson et al., 2005



Some other storylines

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Global Scenarios Group (GSG): Three archetypal scenarios of the future

Conventional Worlds: current trends play out without major discontinuity and surprise in the evolution of institutions, environmental systems and human values.

Barbarization: fundamental social change occurs, but is unwelcome, bringing great human misery and collapse of civilized norms.

Great Transitions: fundamental social transformation but to a new and arguably higher stage of human civilization.

Gallopin et al., 1997

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Scenarios structure with illustrative patterns of change

Barbarization

Great Transitions

Eco-communalism

Policy Reform

Reference

Breakdown

Fortress world

New sustainability paradigm

Conventional Worlds

Gallopin et al., 1997

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Source: UNEP, 2007

UNEP’s Global Environmental Outlook

Four storylines (GEO-3 and GEO-4):

Markets FirstPolicy FirstSecurity FirstSustainability First

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The dominant characteristic of this scenario is the assumption that actors at all levels – local, national, regional and international, and from all sectors, including government, private and civil – actually follow through on the pledges made to date to address environmental and social concerns. This implies behaviour that honours not only the letter, but also the spirit of these promises.

Sustainability FirstGEO-4

Source: UNEP, 2007

IPCC* Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES): Scenario framework and change drivers

A2 storyline

World: differentiatedEconomy: regionally oriented; lowest per capita growthPopulation: continuously increasing Governance: Self-reliance with preservation of local identitiesTechnology: slowest and most fragmented development

A1 storyline:

World: market-orientedEconomy: fastest per capita growthPopulation: 2050 peak, then declineGovernance: strong regional interactions; income convergenceTechnology: three scenario groups:

A1FI: fossil intensiveA1T:non-fossil energy sourcesA1B: balanced across all sources

B1 storyline

World: convergentEconomy: service and information based; lower growth than A1Population: same as A1Governance: global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainabilityTechnology: clean and resource-efficient

B2 storyline

World: local solutionsEconomy: intermediate growthPopulation: continuously increasing at lower rate than A2Governance: local and regional solutions to environmental protection and social equityTechnology: More rapid than A2; less rapid, more diverse than A1/B1R

egional emphasis

Economic emphasis

Glo

bal I

nteg

ratio

n

Environmental emphasis

Based on Nakicenovic et al., 2000*Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

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Low Trust GlobalisationA legalistic “prove it to me” world.

Open DoorsA pragmatic “know me” world.

FlagsA dogmatic “follow me” world.

Shell Global Scenarios to 2025

Shell International Limited, 2005



Some common elements of storylines: mixing and matching



Comparison of selected global scenarios

Raskin et al., 2005




Modified and updated from Raskin et al., 2005

MA /4

GlobalOrchestration

TechnoGarden

Order fromStrength

AdaptingMosaic

GEO-4 Global Environmental Outlook, MA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment




3. Quantified scenario elements

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How can we quantify scenarios?Define exogenously (e.g. from published projections – often indirect drivers)

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Global Population Projections, 2005–2100

Nelson et al., 2005

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How can we quantify scenarios?Define exogenously (e.g. from published projections – often indirect drivers)Extrapolate past trends

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Alcamo et al., 2005

Global trends of technological efficiencies in MA scenarios

current trends extrapolation

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How can we quantify scenarios?Define exogenously (e.g. from published projections – often indirect drivers)Extrapolate past trendsExpert elicitation

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Results of the 1st ALTER-Netscenarios questionnaire on

Europe in the 2050s

The ALTER-Net Summer School Participants, 2006

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Population of Europe: 2050

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

< 405 405-430 430-455 455-480 480-505 505-530 530-555 555-580 580-605 > 605

Population (million)

Prob

abili

ty

Greater than presentLess than present

A1, B1B2 A2SRES

ALTER-Net, Peyresq, 2005Sample size: 32

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How can we quantify scenarios?Define exogenously (e.g. from published projections – often indirect drivers)Extrapolate past trendsExpert elicitationModelling:• Deterministic models• Optimization approaches• Stochastic models• Semi-quantitative approaches

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Framework of the Integrated Assessment

Model IMAGE 2.4

MNP, 2006

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Developing quantitative scenarios for the MA:linkages between models

Alcamo et al., 2005



Some examples of quantification in scenarios

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The SRES illustrative scenarios: primary driving forces

Family A1 A2 B1 B2Scenario group 1990 A1FI A1B A1T A2 B1 B2Population (billion) 5.32020 7.6 7.5 7.6 8.2 7.6 7.62050 8.7 8.7 8.7 11.3 8.7 9.32100 7.1 7.1 7.0 15.1 7.0 10.4World GDP (1012 1990 US$/yr) 212020 53 56 57 41 53 512050 164 181 187 82 136 1102100 525 529 550 243 328 235Per capita income ratio 16.12020 7.5 6.4 6.2 9.4 8.4 7.72050 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.6 4.02100 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 3.0

Nakicenovic et al., 2000

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CO2 concentrations projected for the 21st century

IPCC, 2001

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IPCC, 2007

Multi-model global averages and uncertainties of surface warming (w.r.t. 1980–1999) for the scenarios A2, A1B and B1.

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GEO-4 Population and GDP per capita

Source: UNEP, 2007

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GEO-4 Global mean temperature change

Source: UNEP, 2007

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Source: UNEP, 2007

GEO-4 Mean species abundance



4. Regionalisation of scenarios

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Options for regionalising

Global scenario data already disaggregated to regions

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GEO-4 Europe: population and GDP/capita

Source: UNEP, 2007

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GEO-4 Europe: land use change and water stress

Source: UNEP, 2007

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GEO-4 Europe: carbon and sulphur emissions

Source: UNEP, 2007

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GEO-4 Europe: wastewater and species decline

Source: UNEP, 2007

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Global scenario data already disaggregated to regionsRegional scenarios constructed bottom-up

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Regional



Global







GEO-3/GEO-4


DescriptionTarget audienceOrientationScenarios


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ESPON Territorial Futures: Trend Scenario

ESPON, 2007

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ESPON Territorial Futures: Competitiveness-oriented Scenario

ESPON, 2007

Attraction and polarisation in PentagonRural marginalisation. Industrial decline External immigration flowsSevere rural population ageingIntensified impacts of natural hazards (drought, fires, and floods)

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ESPON Territorial Futures: Cohesion-oriented Scenario

ESPON, 2007

Attraction and polarisation more diffuseUrban polycentricity Peripheral high-performing zonesReduced regional marginalizationModerate rural population ageing Limited impacts of natural hazards (drought, fires, and floods)

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Global scenario data already disaggregated to regionsRegional scenarios constructed bottom-upRegional storylines developed by interpreting global storylines

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Interpretations of climate policy in the Netherlands according to four SRES-based world views

Source: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2008

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Global scenario data already disaggregated to regionsRegional scenarios constructed bottom-upRegional storylines developed by interpreting global storylinesRegional scenarios downscaled from global scenarios

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Regional



Global







GEO-3/GEO-4


DescriptionTarget audienceOrientationScenarios


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GRAS & GRAS-CUT

BAMBU

SEDG

IPCC (2001)

Scenarios Forcing CO2 Climate models (2001-2100) SRES NCAR-PCM

AOGCM CSIRO2 AOGCM

HadCM3 AOGCM

Rossby Centre RCM

GRAS A1FI X X* GRAS-CUT A1FI X X* BAMBU A2 X X X X X SEDG B1 X X*

Climate and CO2 scenarios adopted in ALARM

GRASGRowth Applied

Strategy

BAMBUBusiness As

Might BeUsual

SEDGSustainableEuropean

DevelopmentGoal

Narrativestorylines

GRAS-CUTCooling UnderThermohaline

collapse

Socio-economicshocks

Climateshock

IPCC (2001)

HadCM3 CSIRO2 PCMBAMBU

JAN

OCT

JUL

APR

Change in temperature by 2071-2100 (Mitchell, 2002)HadCM3 CSIRO2 PCM

Change in precipitation by 2071-2100 (Mitchell, 2002)BAMBU

JAN

OCT

JUL

APR

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ALARM scenarios, grid cell at Banchory, UKJanuary mean temperature (°C)

GRAS-CUT shock scenario(THC shutdown)

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Change in cropland area (for food production) by 2080 compared to baseline (%) for the 4 SRES storylines and HADCM3

After: Schröter et al. (2005). Ecosystem service supply and vulnerability to global change in Europe. Science, 310 (5752), 1333-1337

Change in cropland area (for food production) by 2080 compared to baseline (%) for the 4 SRES storylines and HADCM3

After: Schröter et al. (2005). Ecosystem service supply and vulnerability to global change in Europe. Science, 310 (5752), 1333-1337



More mixing and matching ....




Modified and updated from Raskin et al., 2005

MA ATEAM ALARM ESPON /4

GlobalOrchestration

TechnoGarden

Order fromStrength

AdaptingMosaic

A1

B1

A2

B2

GRAS

SEDG

BAMBU

Competitiveness?

Coherence?

GEO-4 Global Environmental Outlook, MA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

Regional scenarios for Europe


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2008



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Documents

European ecosystems in alternative future worlds · Aim of this presentation To illustrate four common steps in the development of scenarios, namely: 1. Devise the focal questions