Europe And The Regions How Regional Representation Can Improve The EU Decision-

Making Process

Preface Thisbachelor‐thesisisaresultofmycombinedinterestinbothEuropeangovernanceandlocalgovernance.Usingmypersonalexperiencesinlocalgovernanceasastartingpoint,IhavetriedtofindouthowlocalandregionalgovernancefitintothelargergovernanceschemeoftheEuropeanUnion.Europeismuchmorethanonlyacollectionofstates,asIhaveresearchedforthisandpreviousstudies.IwouldliketopresentmyspecialthankstoProf.Dr.N.S.Groenendijkforsupervisionandsupport,aswellasininterestingmeinthesubjectofEuropeangovernanceinthefirstplace,throughthecourseEuropeanEconomicGovernance.Inaddition,IwouldliketothankMsCBreuerforbeingtheco‐readerofthisstudy.Andofcourse,IwouldliketospeciallythankBertineKruiskampformoralandtechnicalsupportduringthislongsummer.

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Contents1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 31.1 Multi‐levelgovernance..........................................................................................................................................31.2 Systemeffectivenessanddemocraticlegitimacy.......................................................................................51.3 TheEuropeanUnionasamulti‐levelgovernancepolity........................................................................61.4 Studyset‐up................................................................................................................................................................6

2 Regions......................................................................................................................... 82.1 Theconceptofregion.............................................................................................................................................82.2 Distinctivetypesofregions .................................................................................................................................92.2.1 Economicregions..................................................................................................................................................92.2.2 Historical/ethnicalregions ...........................................................................................................................102.2.3 Administrative/planningregion .................................................................................................................102.2.4 Politicalregion....................................................................................................................................................10

2.3 Regionalism,regionalisationandthecreationofregions................................................................... 112.4 RegionsinEurope................................................................................................................................................. 122.4.1 Executiveregions:ThemostpowerfulregionsinEurope................................................................14

2.5 Definingtheregionforthisstudy .................................................................................................................. 142.6 Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................ 15

3 RegionalrepresentationintheEuropeanUnion ......................................................... 163.1 ‘EuropeoftheRegions’andthestructuralfunds.................................................................................... 163.2 ThePrincipleofSubsidiarity ........................................................................................................................... 173.3 AccesstotheCouncilofMinisters ................................................................................................................. 183.4 TheCommitteeoftheRegions ........................................................................................................................ 183.5 Theregionsandtheconstitutionaldebate ................................................................................................ 203.6 InformalmeansofaccesstotheEU .............................................................................................................. 213.7 Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................ 21

4 Thebenefitsofregionalparticipation ......................................................................... 234.1 Competencesanddiplomacy ........................................................................................................................... 234.2 Implementation ..................................................................................................................................................... 244.3 GoodGovernance.................................................................................................................................................. 254.4 Legitimacyandtheregions............................................................................................................................... 254.4.1 Democraticlegitimacy.....................................................................................................................................264.4.2 Sociallegitimacy ................................................................................................................................................264.4.3 Performancelegitimacy..................................................................................................................................27

4.5 Towardsaframeworkofanalysisofregionalparticipation.............................................................. 284.5.1 .........................................................................................................................................................................................294.5.1 Criteria ...................................................................................................................................................................294.5.2 Scale.........................................................................................................................................................................30

4.6 Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................ 31

5 Evaluatingformalregionalparticipation ..................................................................... 325.1 AlternativeA:Councilsplit‐vote .................................................................................................................... 335.1.1 Analysis...................................................................................................................................................................335.1.2 Finalscoring.........................................................................................................................................................34

5.2 ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 355.2 AlternativeB:RegionsandtheEarlyWarningSystem ........................................................................ 355.2.1 Analysis...................................................................................................................................................................355.2.2 Finalscoring.........................................................................................................................................................36

5.3 AlternativeC:ReformoftheCommitteeoftheRegions ...................................................................... 365.3.1 Analysis...................................................................................................................................................................375.3.2 Finalscoring.........................................................................................................................................................38

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5.4 AlternativeD:A“ThirdChamber”ofRegions .......................................................................................... 385.4.1 Analysis...................................................................................................................................................................395.4.2 Finalscoring.........................................................................................................................................................39

5.5 Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................ 406 Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 41

7 Discussion .................................................................................................................. 437.1 Areflectionontheframeworkutilised ....................................................................................................... 437.2 RegionsandtheEU:Afieldofresearch ...................................................................................................... 44

8 Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 45

9 Samenvatting ............................................................................................................. 48

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1 IntroductionThelastfewdecadesofthetwentiethcenturyaswellasthefirstofthetwenty‐first,haveshownimportantandsignificantchangesinhowourworldisfunctioningandinhowitisbeingperceived.Throughrapidchangesintelecommunicationandtransportation,theworldisnowsmallerthaniteverwas.Distanceisincreasinglybeingreducedthroughtheaccesstocheapflightsaswellastheinformationhighway.Inthisglobalisedworld,thenation‐stateistryingtoadapttothenewcircumstancesandchallenges.Whereasthenation‐statewasdominantthroughoutthe19thandthe20thcentury,themonopolyofthenation‐stateisultimatelyabouttoend.AstheAmericansociologistDanielBellstatedasearlyas1987,thenationhasbecomenotonlytoosmalltosolvethebigproblems,butalsotoolargetosolvethesmallones(ascitedinGiddens,1999,p.13).Theissueofglobalwarmingforinstance,aswellasmanyotherrelatedenvironmentalissues,cannotbesolvedbyonenationsingle‐handedly,howeverlargethatnationmaybe.Ontheotherhand,providingdecentwaste‐disposalsolutionsforexampleisverydependantonlocalcircumstancesandhencewouldbenefitfromadecreaseofscale.Globalisationnotonlypullsupwards,butalsopushesdownwardsandindoingso,createsnewpressuresforlocalautonomy.Inaddition,asaresultofglobalisation,arevivaloflocalculturehastakenplaceinresponse(Giddens,1999,p.13).ThisseeminglyparadoxaltendencyRosenauterms“fragmegration”:Theclashbetweenglobalisation,centralisationandintegrationontheonehandandlocalisation,decentralisationandfragmentationontheother(Rosenau,2004,p.34).Manyothertermshavebeenvoiced,buteachpaysrespecttothetwinpressuresarisingfromincreasedglobalisation.Thenation‐statehastorespondbychangingthearenainwhichpolicyisbeingmade:Itdelegatesresponsibilitybothupwardanddownward.Wecanperceivethesimultaneousdispersionofauthoritybetweenlevelsgreaterthanaswellassmallerthanthenation‐state.Thisdispersiongreatlyaffectsthefunctioningofgovernments,empoweringbothsupra‐nationalentitiesaswellassub‐nationalgovernments.Flexibilityofscaleishassubsequentlybecomeacoreconceptingovernance.

1.1 Multi‐levelgovernanceBuildingontheflexibilityofscale,Marks(1993)hascomeupwiththedescriptiveframeworkof“multi‐levelgovernance”.Multi‐levelgovernancecanbedefinedas:“Asystemofcontinuousnegotiationamongnestedgovernmentsatseveralterritorialtiers–supranational,national,regionalandlocal–astheresultofabroadprocessofinstitutionalcreationanddecisionalre­allocation”(Marks,1993,p.392).

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Thetermconsistsoftwoparts:The“multi‐level”partreferstotheflexibilityofscaleandthemanylevelsofgovernmentthatinteracttomakepolicy.Thesegovernmentsarebynomeanshierarchicalintheirfunctioning.Eventhoughtheyarebydefinitionnestedinsideeachother,linkagesbetweengovernmentsofdifferentlevelsexist:Levelscanbe“skipped”(Seefigure1.1).Thereisnolocusofpowerandauthorityisdispersedamongstmanylevelsofgovernmentratherthanbeingconcentratedinthenation‐state(Hooghe,1995;Hooghe&Marks,1996b).Thegovernanceaspectofthetermcanbecharacterisedastheinclusionofawidevarietyofactors,bothpublicandprivate,inthedecision‐makingprocessasdemandedbytheissueathand(Hooghe,1995,p.3).Inclusionisbasedontheabilitytocontributetothesolutionofcertainpolicyissues(DeJonghe&Bursens,2003,p.12).AccordingtoPetersandPierre(2004,p.78)governancecanbedefinedas“theprocessthroughwhichcollectiveinterestsaredefinedandpursued”.Itemphasizesprocessoverinstitutionsandaimstoincludemultipleactorsincoordinatedaction.Eventhoughtheemphasisisontheprocess,institutionsremaincritical,becauseitistheinstitutionsthatprovidethelinkagesbetweenthedifferentlevelsinthesystem.

Figure1.1:Differentlevelsofauthorityanddifferentrelationshipsbetweengovernments.Multilevelgovernanceisaresultoftwosetsofdevelopments,international(European)integrationandregionalism,thatconvergeinpullingdecision‐makingawayfromnationalstates.Nationalgovernmentsnolongerplaythecriticalroleofintermediaryandsub‐nationalgovernmentsarenolongernestedexclusivelywithinnationalstates(Hooghe&Marks,1996a).Nation‐statesineffecthavelostthemonopolyonpolicy‐makingandnowsharethatresponsibilitywithawidenumberofactors,bothpublicandprivate.Decision‐makingarenashavebeenlinkedandinteractandareinfluencedbyeachother(Benz&Berlein,1999,pp.132‐133).

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Thismodeofgovernanceimpliesachangefromaratheruniformwayofinteractionbetweendifferentlevelsofauthoritycentredonstates(intergovernmentalism)orsupra‐nationalentity(supra‐nationalism)1toamorediverse,heterogeneoussystemwhererelationsareunstable,contestedandnon‐hierarchical(Hooghe&Marks,1996a;Grasse,2001).TheEuropeanmulti‐levelpolityhasbecomeamulti‐centricpolity.

1.2 SystemeffectivenessanddemocraticlegitimacyThemainreasond’etreformulti‐levelgovernanceistheeffectivenessthatcanbegainedfromincludingmanymoreactorswithrelevantexpertise(Grasse,2001,pp.408‐409).Utilizingthisexpertise,EuropeanpolicyandregulationscanbemoreresponsivetotheinterestsofEuropeancitizens.Thisgainineffectivenessunfortunatelycomesatacost:Byusinganetworkconsistingofflexibleactorsandflexiblerules,thetransparencyandlegitimacyofthedecision‐makingprocesssuffers,unlessnewwaysarefoundtoconnectcitizensmoreeffectivelywiththeshiftinglocationsofpower(Hooghe&Marks,1996a;Grasse,2001,p.412;Bache&Flinders,2004,pp.204‐205).Olsson(2003,p.288)labelsthisthe“multi‐leveldemocraticparadox”inwhichcompetenciesareraisedtoahigherlevelforqualityandperformanceofpolicies,whilethedemocraticaccountabilityandcontrolremainatthelowerlevel.Byusingawidenetworkofactors,thedecision‐makingprocessisturningevermoretechnocratic.Thisconcernisessentiallyalackoflegitimacy,consideredtobeoneofthedrawbacksofmulti‐levelgovernance(Grasse,2001,p.412;Peters&Pierre,2004).Inessence,legitimacyissacrificedinfavourofeffectiveness.PetersandPierrehavedescribedthisasa“Faustianbargain”(Peters&Pierre,2004,pp.86‐88).Whiletheruleshavechangedandthenation‐stateisnolongerthecentralactor,democraticinstitutionalarrangementshaveforthemostpartfailedtoadapttothisnewsituationconsistingofnewrules,newactorsandanewframeworkoutsideofthenation‐state.InstitutionalandproceduralarrangementswithintheEUconcentrateinalargemajorityontherelationshipbetweenthememberstatesandtheEuropeanUnion.RegionshavethusfarlargelybeenleftoutoftheEUinstitutionalarrangements.InordertofulfiltheirpotentialintheEUmulti‐levelpolity,aswellastoinstitutionalisethemulti‐levelgovernanceprocess,itcanbeconsideredofthegreatestimportancethataninstitutionalarrangementtoincludetheregionsinEUdecision‐makingiscreated(Grasse,2001,p.411;Vos,Boucké&Devos,2002,p.214).Theexpansionofregionalcompetenciesdemandsanewandstrengthenedupper‐levelrepresentationandparticipation.Thisrequiresanadoptionofasystemthatisnolongerstate‐centric,eventhoughstatesremainimportant.

1SeeforinstanceJordan,2001foradiscussionofintergovernmentalism,supranationalismandwheremulti‐levelgovernancestandsinrelationshiptothesemodels.

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Amoreformalized,institutionalisedroleofregionscanpotentiallyreducethedemocraticdeficitandcombinetheefficiencygainedinincludingmultipleactorsfromdifferentlevelsofgovernmentaswellasincreasethedemocraticlegitimacyofthesystem(Hooghe&Marks,1996a;Carter&McLeod,2005).

1.3 TheEuropeanUnionasamulti‐levelgovernancepolityTheEuropeanUnion(EU)istheprimaryexampleofhowMarksandHooghehaveperceivedmulti‐levelgovernance.Beingthemostactive,institutionalisedandelaboratesupra‐nationalentityintheworld,theEUutilizesmulti‐levelgovernanceextensively.Networksandlinkagesbetweendifferentlevelsarenowcommonplace,bothformalandinformal.Inaddition,manynon‐stateactorsareincludedinthepolicy‐makingprocess.Inthelate20thcentury,sub‐nationalgovernmentshaveincreasinglycalledforaformalisationofrelationshipsinthemulti‐levelschemeaswellasagreaterinvolvementinissuesdirectlyrelatingtotheregions.Withpolicyareasoriginallyacompetencyofsub‐nationalauthorities(SNA’s)graduallybeingtransferredbynationalactorstowardstheEU,theEUincreasinglyconflictswiththeinterestsofsub‐nationalactors.Forinstance,environmentalissueshavelongbeenacompetencyoftheGermanLänderbuthaveincreasinglybeendelegatedtotheEuropeanpolicy‐makingarena.Aredefinitionofformalisedrelationshipsbetweenthesupra‐nationalandthesub‐nationalissubsequentlyneeded.TheregionsaswellastheEuropeanUnionhavealottogainfromacloseinteractionincreating,implementingandevaluatingthemanypoliciesandregulationsoftheEUtogether.

1.4 Studyset‐upThispaperwilllookintotherelationshipbetweentheEUandtheregionalauthoritieswithinthemember‐states.IwilldescribeandresearchexactlywhyregionalinclusionintheEuropeanUnionisbeneficialtoallactorsinvolved.Inaddition,Iwillcollectandevaluatepotentialsolutionstotheproblemsoflegitimacyrelatingtothisdispersionofauthoritybetweenlevels.Inordertodothis,Iwillusethefollowingcentralresearchquestion:InwhichformalarrangementcanregionsbestberepresentedintheEuropeanUnionpolicy­makingprocess?Inevaluatinginstitutionalarrangements,IwilllooktomeansofformalisingtheroleofregionsintheEuropeanUnioninordertoincreasethequalityandlegitimacyofthepolicy‐makingprocess.Togettothisoutcome,Iwillutilizeseveralsub‐questions:

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1. Whatareregions?

The concept of “region” is quite ambiguous.While every person has a generalideaofwhatconstitutesaregion,itisessentialforthisstudytodefinethesortofregionthatshouldbeparticipatinginthedecision‐makingprocessandwhatkindofactortheregionis.Iwillexploretheconceptofregioninchaptertwo,aswellasarguewhyIhavechosentousethepoliticalregionasmyobjectofthisstudy.

2. HowareregionscurrentlyrepresentedintheEuropeanUnion?3. IsthecurrentrepresentationofregionsintheEuropeanUnionsufficient?

Inchapterthree,IwilllookintotheroleofregionswithinEurope.WhatchangeshaveovertheyearsbeenmadeinhowregionsareincludedinEuropeandhoware they currently represented? How did the proposed European Constitutionaffect the regional involvement and what is being planned for the future? Dothesearrangementssuffice,orcantheybeimproved?

4. In which way can regions benefit from participation in the Europeandecision­makingprocess?

5. InwhichwaycantheEuropeanUnionbenefitfromregionalparticipationinthedecision­makingprocess?

6. Which criteria can be used to analyse formal arrangements for regionalparticipation?

Regions, as sub‐national actors, are by definition not allowed to participate indiplomacy,thisbeingacorecompetencyofthecentralstate.Yet,decisionsmadein the supra‐national arena greatly affect and often restrain regionalgovernments.Inchapterfour,Iwilldescribeexactlyhowregionsareaffectedbysupra‐national policy and how they can benefit from greater participation informulatingthispolicy.BoththeregionsandtheEuropeanUnionstandtogainfromacloserregional inclusion. Iwilldescribeexactly inwhichwaysbothcanbenefit.FollowinglooselytheCommission’swhitepaperongovernance(2001),Iwill list criteria that can be used to evaluate formal arrangements betweenactorsinamulti‐levelgovernanceschemeandcreateaframeworkforevaluationof institutional arrangements to include sub‐national actors in the Europeandecision‐makingprocess.

7. What options are available to formalise regional participation in theEuropeanUniondecision­makingprocess?

Inchapterfive,Iwillutilizethisframeworktoevaluateseveralsuggestionsmadeto increase and formalise the regional participation in the EU and answer thecentral research question. When the alternatives have been thoroughlydiscussed, I will compare the alternatives and make a suggestion on whichalternativeisbestsuitedtobeimplemented.

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2 RegionsTheconceptofregionisusedinseveraldifferentcontexts.Inthischapter,Iwillmakeclearwhichcontextanddefinitionoftheterm“region”Iintendtouseinthispaper.Thecentralquestionofthischapteris:

1. Whatareregions?Inordertocometoaclearunderstandingoftheconceptofregion,Iwilldescribeseveralsharedcharacteristicsofregions.Whenthesebasiccharacteristicsareclear,Iwillturntoa(nonexhaustive)listingofseveraldifferenttypesofregionsandtheirimplicationforthegovernancedebate.Afewremarksonthetwinconceptsofregionalisationandregionalismwillhavetobemadetocometoabetterunderstandingaboutthepressuresinvolvedintheformationofregions.Whenthecharacteristics,typesandmodesofformationofregionsareclearlydefined,IwillturntotheclassificationofregionsintheEuropeanUnionandarguemychoiceofdefinitionandtypeofregiontoincludeinthisstudy.

2.1 TheconceptofregionTheword“region”isusedinmanycontexts,mostofthoseconcernedwithgeography.Aregionnormallyrefersprimarilytoadesignatedterritory,oftenwithacommongeographical,culturalorsocialsimilarity.Thisterritorycanincludeseveraldifferentnationsorpartsofnations,orbeinitselfapartofalargernation.‘Europe”or“Scandinavia”areconsideredregionsinthisrespect,asare“theAlpes”or“thePacificIslands”.Thisusageofthewordregionchieflyfocusesongeographyoveralargearea.ThisisnotthetypeofregionIwilluseinthisstudy.Iwillconcentrateontheregionasapartofasinglenation‐stateAtthepresenttime,theterm“region”refersmostofalltosub‐nationallevelsofgovernmentorterritory,andinthispaper,Iwillassumeregionstobeadistincttypeofsub‐nationalentity.Thismeansthattheregionis“nested”withinastateandisanintegralpartofthisnation‐state.Theregionisanintermediatelevelbetweenthestateandthelocallevelofgovernment.Schmitt‐Egner(2002)includestheaboveinhisdefinitionofwhatconstitutesaregion:“aspatialpartialunitofmediumsizeandintermediarycharacterwhosematerialsubstratumisbasedongeography”(p.181,emphasisadded).Eurostatexpandsonthisandutilizesthefollowingdefinitionforstatisticalusage:A“region”isdefinedasatractoflandwithmoreorlessdefinitelymarkedboundaries,whichoftenservesasanadministrativeunitbelowthelevelofthenationstate.Regionshaveanidentitywhichismadeupofspecificfeaturessuchastheirlandscape(mountains,coast,forest),climate(arid,high­rainfall),language(forexampleinBelgium,Finland,Spain),ethnicorigin(forexampleWales,

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northernSwedenandFinland,theBasquecountry)orsharedhistory.(Eurostat,2005)Fromthisdefinition,itisclearthataregionismorethanonlyaterritoryandtherelationshipwiththenation‐stateofwhichitformsapart.Tomakeacleardistinctionbetweenwhatthephysicalregionisandwhathappensinsidetheregion,Schmitt‐Egner(2002,p.181)distinguishesbetweentheregionasanactionunitandtheregionasanactionspace.Theregionasanactionunitistheregionusingthegeographicaldefinitionandconcentratesontheformofthestructure:Thebordersoftheregionandtherelationtothecentralstate.Theregionasanactionspaceconcentratesmoreonthecontentofthestructure:Whathappensinsidetheregionandmakesitunique.Tocombineboththeactionunitandtheactionspaceandmakeclearthatthisisaslidingscale,Schmitt‐Egnercomesupwithascaleof‘regionness’(2002,p180):Firstthereisaregionalcharacter,whichmeansthattheregionhascertaindefinedboundariesandphysicalcharacteristics.Second,withintheregionexistsasocialsystemandanestablishednetworkofrelationswithinagroupofhumans.Third,notonlydoesinteractiontakeplace,butalsoorganisedcooperationthatgivesstructuretotheseinteractions.Fourth,thiscooperationsharescommonvaluesandformsacivilsocietyandfinallythefifthstageiswheretheregionachievesadistinctidentity,institutionalcapabilityandlegitimacy.Theregiontransformsitselffrombeingaterritorytobeinganactor.Inhisattempttoconceptualisetheregion,Schmitt‐Egner(2002,p.183)notesthatthereareseveralrolesfortheregion:Aformalrole,concentratingongovernanceandlegalandpoliticalmatters.Amaterialrole,primaryconcernedwithsocio‐economicstandardsandrelationshipswithintheregion.Andfinallyasymbolicrole,whichconcentratesonthecultural‐historicaspectsoftheregionaswellasitsuniqueidentity.Theserolesarereflectedinthetypologythathasbeenusedtodescribedifferentkindofregions.

2.2 DistinctivetypesofregionsThroughoutthetimes,classificationsofregionshavebeeningeneraluse.Severaldifferenttypesofregionscanbediscerned,mainlybasedonwhichroleisthemostimportantwithintheregion.Loughlin(1996b,pp.146‐148)describesthesetypesofregionsandqualifiesthemaseconomic,historicalandethnical,administrativeandpoliticalregions.Schobben(2000,pp.11‐16)extendsthisqualificationandtakesamorein‐depthlookatthesetypesofregions.Themaintypesofregionsarelistedbelow:

2.2.1 EconomicregionsAneconomicregion’smainreasonforexistenceisacombinationofsharedeconomiccharacteristics.Forinstance:anagriculturalor(post‐)industrialdistrict.Frequently,theeconomicregionisthesubjectofeconomicdevelopment

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policybythenationalgovernmentoraspecialinstitutionalisedregionaldevelopmentagency.Inadditioneconomicregionsregularlyoccupyaspaceoutsideoftheexistingstructuresofpoliticalandadministrativeinstitutions(Loughlin,1996b,p.147).Aspecialtypeofeconomicregionisthecityregion.Thecityregionisaregioncomposedofonecentralcityaswellasaperipheryofsettlementsandsmallercitiesthatarecloselyconnectedwiththecentralcityeconomically,theurbanfringe.Themanyagglomerationsofcitiesthatarebecomingevermoreimportantintheworld’seconomy,liketheRijnmondareaconsistingofRotterdamandneighbouringsettlements,areausefulexampleofacityregion.

2.2.2 Historical/ethnicalregionsInthehistoricalorethnicalregion,themainfocusofregionnessisthesharedhistoryandculturaldistinctivenessthatdifferentiatestheregionfromthenationatlarge.Notonlyaretraditionsshared,butfrequentlyasharedlanguageordialectisoneofthetell‐talesignsthattheregiondiffersethnicallyfromtherestofthenation.Acivilsocietyisbasedonthecombinedhistoryandculturalvaluessharedbytheinhabitants.Thesevaluesnormallydiffersignificantlyfromthenationofwhichtheregionisapart.Thistypeofregionfrequentlygivesrisetoseparatistdemands,aswellasacallformoreautonomywithinthenation‐state.Well‐knownregionslikeScotlandorevenTwentecanbeconsideredhistoricalandethnicalregions.

2.2.3 Administrative/planningregionAdministrativeregionsareatoolusedbynationalgovernmentstoimplementacertainpolicy,ordrawlinesonthemapfortheprovisionofservices,likepoliceorwaste‐disposalservices.Theseregionsnormallyhavenopoliticalfunctionality,butonlydesignateaterritorytoprovideacertainserviceto.Themostimportantthingtotakeintoconsiderationisthatadministrativeregionsoftenarecreatedbythecentralgovernmentinordertomakethedistributionofservicesmoreefficientandeffective.Theterritoryisoftendemarcatedquiteclearlybyborders,whichdonotnecessarilycorrespondwithnaturalbordersorbordersofpoliticaljurisdiction.Theirbordersaremainlycreatedbythematerialcriteriaofefficientprovisionofservices(Schobben,2000,p.13).Examplesofadministrativeregionsarefirebrigadeandpolicedistricts.

2.2.4 PoliticalregionThepoliticalregiondiffersfromtheregionsmentionedaboveinthatithasademocraticelectedcouncilorassemblyandisabletomakedecisionfortheregionitselfthroughanexecutiveaccountabletotheelectorate.Incontrasttoadministrativeandeconomicregions,thepoliciesarenotdecidedbythenationalgovernmentbutbytheregionalassemblyitself.Thepoliticalregionconsequentlyhasameansofself‐government.Thesepoliticalarrangements

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comeinallkindofshapesandsizes.ThemostpowerfulpoliticalregionsintheEuropeanUnionarewithoutdoubttheGermanLänder,whichtogetherformtheGermanfederalstate.Allthesefourtypesofregionsareidealtypesandmostregionsincludecharacteristicsofeach.A‘perfect’regionwouldincludeelementsofallfourtypesofregionsoratleasthavebordersthatoverlap.Regionscanbecreatedindifferentways,bypressuresfromaboveandbelow.Tofurtherconsiderthisprocessaswellastheconceptsinusetodescribethese,Iwillnowturntoregionalismandregionalisationasdriversforthecreationofregions

2.3 Regionalism,regionalisationandthecreationofregionsTheseeminglysimilartermsregionalismandregionalisationareoftenusedinincorrectwaysandarefrequentlyinterchanged.However,theybothmeanquitedifferentthings.Regionalismisprimarilyanideologyandpoliticalmovementtowardsself‐governmentofregions.Itisabottom‐upprocessinwhichtheregionasaunitdemandsmoreautonomy,basedontheethnicandculturaldistinctivenessoftheregion.Theregionfeelsitisdistinctivelydifferentfromthenation‐stateinwhichitisnestedandhencedeservestodecidemoreonit’sownfutureandpolicies(Loughlin,1996b,pp.148‐149).Regionalisationonthecontrary,isatop‐downprocessinwhichthenationalgovernmentdecentralizesoratleastdelegatestaskstothesub‐nationalauthorities.Inaddition,itcanrefertothecreationofasub‐nationallevelofgovernmentwherenonepreviouslyexisted,likeforexampleinFrancein1986.(Loughlin,1996b,pp.149‐150).Thisdecentralisationisinstigatedbyadesiretomakeplanningandadministrativeprocessesmoreeffectivebybeingmoreresponsivetotheneedsofthecitizens.Inaddition,itcanservetostrengthendemocracybybringingthegovernmentclosertothecitizens(Grasse,2001,p.413).Variousinterestsareatstakewhenthedecisiontoregionalizeacentriststateismade,butitisfirstandforemostadecisionmadebythecentralgovernment.Bothprocessesarenotnecessarilyconnectedandcanevenbemutuallyexclusive(Loughlin,1996b,p150).Theformationofregionscanconsequentlybearesultfrombothpressuresupwardsanddownwards(Benz&Eberlein,1999,p.331).Overthelastfiftyyears,anincreaseinthelevelofregionalisationcanbeobserved.Marks,HoogheandSchakel(2008)observethattherehasbeenageneralincreaseinthelevelofregionalauthorityoverthelastfiftyyearsinmostcountries,andthatnoEuropeancountryhashadadeclineinthelevelofregionalauthority.Theyobservethatregionalisationtakesplacemoreoftenindemocraticcountriesthannon‐democraticcountries,andlargercountriestendtoregionalisemoreoftenthansmallcountries.Noteverycountryhasregionalised,somecountriesaresimplytoosmalltoefficientlyincorporateregions.Incaseofsmallnations,thecostsofcreatingandmaintainingaregional

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levelofgovernmentoutweighthebenefitsofscalediversity(Marks,Hooghe&Schakel,2008,p.10)Inthelastdecades,somecountrieshaveregionalisedbecauseofoutsidepressurebytheEU.Notadirectpressure,fortheEUisblindtonationalstates’institutionalstructure,butanindirectpressureresultingfromtheEUstructuralpolicies.Thesepoliciesaffectacertainregionwithinthememberstate,andtheEuropeanCommissioninsistedthatnationswouldregionaliseinordertobeabletoqualifytheirregionsforaccesstotheregionalfunds(Hoogheed.,1996;Marks,Hooghe&Schakel2008).Therewasaneedforasuitablelegislativeregionalframeworkinordertomakesurethestructuralfundswouldbeusedtogoodeffect(Tömmel,1998,p.60).Theresultwasseveralnationscreatingsub‐nationallevelofgovernmentswherenoneearlierexisted,solelyforthepurposeofbeingabletoqualifyforthesubsidiesthestructuralfundsoffered.Inthenextchapter,Iwilltakeacloserlookatthestructuralfundsandtheireffectonregions.Fornow,itisusefultotakealookathowtheEUclassifiestheirhugevarietyofregions.

2.4 RegionsinEuropeOneofthemainproblemswhendiscussionregionsinaEuropeancontextisthateachnationhasadifferentwayoforganisingitsinternalstructure.Regionsandsub‐nationalauthoritiesarenotcreateduniformlyamongtheEuropeannations.Somecountriesdonotevenhaveregionalauthorities,whileotherstatesareafederationofregions,forexample:Germany.Itissubsequentlyhardtocomparesub‐nationalauthoritieswithinEurope.Inordertodecidewhichtypeofregionswouldqualifyforstructuralfunds,theEuropeanUnionneededtodefineastatisticalframeworkofregionsandsub‐nationalauthorities.Inordertodothis,EurostatdevisedtheNomenclatureofTerritorialUnitsforStatistics,orNUTS‐standard(Eurostat,2008).TheNUTSsystemisdividedinthreelevelsofregionalsub‐nationalauthoritiesaswellastwolevelsoflocalauthorities.However,in2003theselocallevelswereofficiallyabolishedbyregulation.IntheNUTS‐system,everysub‐nationallevelofgovernmentisassignedtoacategory.ThisallowsregionsacrossEuropetobecomparedanddesignatedasthesubjectforpolicy.ItshouldbenotedthatnotallNUTS‐levelsexistineverymemberstate,andthatthepowersattributedtothelevelsdiffer.Somelevels,forexample,existinnameonly.TheschemeofNUTS‐levelscanbefoundintable2.1,usingDutchexamplesforthedifferentNUTSlevels. NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 3 Number of inhabitants

3-7 million 800.000-3 million 150.000-800.000

Dutch name Landsdelen Provincies COROP-regios Dutch example Landsdeel Oost Overijssel Twente Table2.1:NUTSclassificationofDutchregionallevels(Hooghe&Marks,2001;Eurostat,2008).

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Takenaltogether,ahugenumberandvarietyofregionalauthoritiesexistintheEuropeanUnion.Figure2.1illustratesthisnumberbylistingthenumberofregionsforeachNUTS‐level,aswellasthetypeofregion.Regionsingreyarenon‐administrativelevelsthatdonothaveaproperpoliticalregionalexecutive.

Figure2.1:AmountandtypeofregionalauthoritiesinEUcountries.In:Eurostat(2008),EuropeanRegionalandUrbanStatistics:Referenceguide(2008edition).

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2.4.1 Executiveregions:ThemostpowerfulregionsinEuropeAswehaveseen,notonlydolevelsofgovernmentdifferacrossEuropeancountries,theirpowersalsowidelydiffer.Somenationshaveregionalisedmorethanothers,andthelevelofregionalisationgivesrisetodifferencesinauthority.OneimportantdistinctionintheEuropeanregionsthatmustbetakenintoaccountwhenfocussingonaroleinthedecision‐makingprocessintheEuropeanUnionistheabilityofregionstomaketheirownlegislationinselectedpolicy‐areas,withoutinterferencebyanddependencyonthecentralgovernment.Inordertocreateextensivelegislation,afull‐fledgedexecutiveisneededwithstrongregionalministers.Thiskindofregionissubsequentlycalledan“executive”regional,andcanbecontrastedtodeliberativeregionsthatdonothavefar‐flungpowersoflegislation.InfederalstateslikeGermany,AustriaandBelgium,aswellascountrieswithautonomousareas,forexampleScotlandwithintheUnitedKingdom,thelargestsub‐nationalauthoritiessharearesponsibilitytomakelawsandpoliciespertainingtotheirterritory.Thisauthority,oftendefinedconstitutionally,isimportantwhenconsideringtheinfluenceofsupra‐nationalactorsontheregionitself.Atcurrent,thereareatleast74regionsacross8memberstatesintheEUthathaveexecutivepowersandthisnumberisonlyexpectedtoriseoncemoreregionsdemandautonomy(Grasse,2001;Evans,2003;Nergelius,2005).TheseregionsarethemostpowerfulregionalactorsintheEuropeanUnion,frequentlywithapopulationlargerthansomeifnotmostofthememberstatesoftheEuropeanUnion.TheconflictbetweenregionalandEuropeancompetenciesismostobviousforthesestrongregionsandtheyhavesubsequentlybeenthedriversoftheefforttocreatea“EuropeoftheRegions”.

2.5 DefiningtheregionforthisstudyConsideringthelargediversityofregionswithintheEuropeanUnion,adistinctchoicehastobemadeonwhichsortofregionwillbethemostsuitableforinvolvementinthedecision‐makingprocess.SimplychoosingaNUTS‐levelforanalysisisnotenough,consideringthefactthatnosinglelevelisuniformacrossEurope.Inthisstudy,sinceIamfocussingonimprovingthequalityandlegitimacyofEuropeandecision‐making,followingSchobben(2000),Ihavechosentofocusonthepoliticalregion.Thepoliticalregionistheonlyregionalentitythathasdemocraticlegitimacythroughanelectedassembly.Beingdemocraticallyelected,itisbestconsideredabletoadvancethewillofthepeopleintheirconstituency.Schobbenusesthefollowingdefinitionofthepoliticalregion:“Apoliticalregionisaterritorialentity,whichalwaysformsapartofagreaterentity,(…)inwhichahumancommunityexistsandisexperiencedbasedonaneffectivelyperceivedspiritofsolidarity,andinwhicharelativelyautonomousorganisationalstructureexiststhathasit’sowndemocraticlegitimationandwhichdedicatesitselftothefurtheringoftheinterestsofthemembersofthecommunity,

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withinlimitsthathavebeensetbyhigherauthorities”(Schobben,2000,p.26,translationmine).ThedefinitionbySchobbenispurposefullyverybroad,andallowsforalargevarietyofdifferentregions.ThehugediversityofregionsintheEuropeanUnionincreasesthedifficultyofcomparingpoliticalregions.Notonlythedifferenceinsize,butalsoinpowerandauthoritysignificantlyincreasesthelevelofdiversity.Tocompensateforthesedifferencesandthefactthatsomelevelsarecompletelyabsentinseveralmember‐states,IhavedecidedtomakeuseofthedefinitionofthepoliticalregionusedbytheAssociationofEuropeanRegions(AER):Theterm"Region"coversinprinciplelocalauthoritiesimmediatelybelowthelevelofcentralgovernment,withapoliticalpowerofrepresentationasembodiedbyanelectedregionalAssembly(AER,2002,art.2.2).Inessence,thismeansaregionisthedemocraticallyelectedlevelofgovernmentonestepbelowthecentralgovernment.Inusingthisoperationalisation,onlyonetypeofregionqualifiespercountry.Sizeandshapemaydiffer,butonthewholeonecanobjectivelyanduniformlydeterminethesubjectofmystudy.Consequently,Iwillconcentrateonthepoliticalelectedgovernmentonestepbelowthecentralgovernment.EverymemberstateoftheEuropeanUnionwillhaveatmostonelevelthatcorrespondswiththisdefinition,makingitworkablewhendesigningandevaluatinginstitutionsconcerningtheseregions.

2.6 ConclusionInthischapter,wehaveseenthatregionscomposenotonlyofaterritorialdimension,butalsoasocialdimension.Regionspossessadistinctivecivilsocietybasedonsharedvalues.Thesecharacteristicscombinedgivelegitimacytotheauthorityoftheregion.Theactuallevelofauthoritydiffersacrossregionsandacrosstypesofregions.WehaveobservedthatintheEU,theamountofregionsandthefuctionsandcompetenciesallocatedtothemdiffergreatly.Andfinally,wehavedecidedonwhatdefinitionofregiontouseinthisstudy:Thepoliticalelectedlevelofgovernmentonestepbelowthecentralgovernment.Inthenextchapter,wewilllookintotherolethatregionsplayintheEuropeanUnionatthismomentandwhythisrolecanbeconsideredunsatisfactory.

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3 RegionalrepresentationintheEuropeanUnionOverthelastdecades,regionshavebecomeincreasinglymorevocalindemandingentrytotheEuropeanpolicy‐makingarena.Startinginthe1980’s,thiscallhasbeenheededandadjustmentsintheEUdecision‐makingprocesshavebeenmade.RegionscurrentlyhavevariedbutlimitedformalchannelsofrepresentationattheEuropeanlevel.Inthischapter,IwillexploretheformalmeansinwhichregionscurrentlyhaveaccesstotheEuropeanarenaandmakeafewremarksontheunofficialmodesofaccess,inordertoanswerthequestions:

2. HowareregionscurrentlyrepresentedintheEuropeanUnion?

3. IsthecurrentrepresentationofregionsintheEuropeanUnionsufficient?Iwillpayspecialattentiontotheorganformallyrepresentingtheregion’sinterests:TheCommitteeoftheRegions.Whendescribingeacharrangement,IwillarguethatregionsarecurrentlynotadequatelyrepresentedintheEuropeanUnion,foreveryformalarrangementlimitsactiveregionalinvolvementinsomeway.

3.1 ‘EuropeoftheRegions’andthestructuralfundsThecallfora‘EuropeoftheRegions’firstwasheardduringthe1980’s.DuringtheDelorspresidencyoftheEuropeanCommission1985‐1995),itwasincreasinglyfeltthatregionscouldofferasubstantialadditioninthequalityofEUpolicies.RegionswerethoughofasbothaninstitutionalbuildingblockforEUconstitutionaldebates,aswellasamechanismforreconnectingthecitizenswiththeEU(Jeffery,2002,p.1).RegionshadincreasinglybeenempoweredbytheirnationalgovernmentsandnowwerepoisedtomoveintotheEuropeanarena.TheneedforregionalinvolvementwasmostobviousinEUstructuralpolicy,whichwasprimarilyconcernedwithstrengtheningofeconomicallybackwardspartsofcountries.Until1988,theCommissionandthememberstatescombineddidthedistributionofstructuralfunds.Theregions,theprimarybeneficiariesofthesubsidies,werelefttotallyoutsideofboththeallocationandtheimplementationprocess.In1988,thestructuralfundswerereformedandtheEuropeanRegionalDevelopmentFundswerecreated.Thelevelofimportanceofthestructuralfundswasincreasedandmorebudgetswereallocatedtothesefunds.Inaddition,inthereformtheroleofsub‐nationalauthoritieswasincludedandformalised(Christiansen,1996,p.94).Fromthenon,regionsweretobeincludedinatripartitepartnershipbetweenregion,memberstateandCommission(Tömmel,1998,p.58).Regionswereincludedindrawinguptheplanstoimplementprojectsthatmadeuseoftheallocatedfunds,knowingthelocalsituationandneedsbestofall.TheStructuralFundscompromiseonlyalimitedspanofpoliciesintheEU,andthestructureofinvolvementofsub‐nationalactorsiscontingentonthedistribution

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offinancesacrosstheEU,decideduponbytheCouncilofMinisters.The1988changesineffecterodedthegatekeeperroleofnationalauthoritiesinaccessingtheEuropeanarena(Hooghe&Marks,1996a,p.79).Fromthispointon,theregionswouldbeincludedmoreandmoreinthedecision‐makingprocess.

3.2 ThePrincipleofSubsidiarityTheMaastrichttreatyin1992wasthefirsttreatythatexplicitlyrecognisedtheimportantrolethatsub‐nationalauthoritiescouldplayintheEuropeandecision‐makingprocess,andincludedseveralmeansbywhichtheregionswouldbeabletoexerttheirinfluenceonpoliciesandbeincludedintheEuropeandecision‐makingprocess.IntheMaastrichtTreaty,thebasiswouldbelaidforregionalparticipationintheinclusionoftheprincipleofsubsidiarity.Subsidiarityisaconceptusedtoexpressthedesiretopartakedecision‐makingonthelowestlevelandbytheleastcentralisedauthoritypossible.InthecurrentEUtreaty,theprincipleisdefinedasfollows:Inareaswhichdonotfallwithinitsexclusivecompetence,theCommunityshalltakeaction,inaccordancewiththeprincipleofsubsidiarity,onlyifandinsofarastheobjectivesoftheproposedactioncannotbesufficientlyachievedbytheMemberStatesandcantherefore,byreasonofthescaleoreffectsoftheproposedaction,bebetterachievedbytheCommunity(Art.5EU).IntheEUcontext,thismeansthattheEUshouldonlyactwhenactionsbyanindividualmemberstatesprovesinsufficient.Thetermsubsidiarityispurposefullyvague,buthasthepotentialtoraisetheprofileoftheregions.ItwasanopeninvitationtothinkaboutthebestlevelofgovernanceintheEU,eventhoughinthecurrentincarnationoftheprinciplethesub‐nationallevelsarenotincluded.InthedraftEuropeanConstitution,thesub‐nationalactorsaretobeincludedbychangingthetexttoinclude“eitheratcentralleveloratregionalandlocallevel”.Theprincipleofsubsidiarityoffersapotentialtoatleastclearlydefinethecompetenciesofeachlevelofgovernment(CommitteeoftheRegions,2006).Withtheadditionofsub‐nationalactorsinthedefinitionofsubsidiarityusedbytheEU,thispotentialismorepresentthanever.However,acloserassessmentofsubsidiarityshowsthattheprincipleofsubsidiarityisonlyinvokedbytheEuropeanCommissiontoreasonwhytheEUshouldtakeaction,notwhytheEUshouldrefrainfromtakingaction(Weatherill,2005b,p.137).Theapplicationisapparentlymaderatherone‐sidedly,withnoopportunitytocallthisapplicationinquestion.SuggestionshavebeenmadetoallowforanappealtotheCourtofJusticewhenanactorisconvincedtheprincipleofsubsidiarityhasbeenbreached,butsofaronlynationsareallowedtodoso.Inthedraftconstitution,theCommitteeoftheRegionsgainsthisprivilegetoo,whichisasignificantempowermentoftheCoR.Theindividualregions,though,havenomeansofmakingsuretheprincipleofsubsidiarityisinvoked.Consequently,itremainstobeseeniftheprincipleofsubsidiaritywillbeactivelyusedtoempowertheregionsintheEUcontext.

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3.3 AccesstotheCouncilofMinistersArticle146oftheMaastrichttreatyallowsforregionalministerstoleadtheirmemberstate’sdelegationandrepresenttheircountryintheCouncilofMinisters,arguablythemostpowerfulinstitutionintheEU.However,theaccesstotheCouncilthatsub‐nationalactorsformallyhaveisconstrainedbythefactthattheEUsetsnorulesforthisaccess,butdelegatesittothenationalpoliticalarena.Sub‐nationalministersdonothavea“right”torepresentthenation.BeingabletoparticipateintheCoMthen,becomesamatterofdomesticpoliticalstruggle.Onlyinthemostfederalisedstatesthisarticleiscurrentlyinuse.Besidesthelimitedusabilityofthearticle,aregionalministerparticipatingwouldnotbeabletorepresentit’sownregion,butonlythenationasawhole.Onlyoneministerisallowedtorepresentthenation,theministersofallotherregionsareabsentandhavetomakesuretheiropinionsaretakenintoaccountintheparticipatingminister’sinput.Theregionalinterestsaretobesubservienttotheinterestsofthenationasawhole.RegionalinterestsareconsequentlyhardlyabletobeexpressedandrepresentedintheCouncilofMinisters.Eventhoughtheregionsofficiallyhaveaccesstothisinstrument,itisusedveryrarelyandwithoutmucheffectonEuropeandecision‐making.Formanyregionalgovernments,tryingtoinfluencetheirnationaldelegationtotheCouncilofMinistersthroughnationalchannelsismoreeffectivethanactuallyparticipatingthemselves(Jeffery,2005,p.37).

3.4 TheCommitteeoftheRegionsAthirdchange,inArticle198oftheMaastrichtTreaty,wastocreatea“CommitteeoftheRegions”(CoR)thatwouldprovideapoliticalvoicefortheEuropeanregions.EspeciallythepowerfulGermanLänderhadlonglobbiedfortheformationofaseparateEuropeaninstitutiontorepresentregionalinterests,andwiththecreationofthisbody,theregionsweretofinallyhaveformalisedpresenceintheEUdecision‐makingprocessatlarge(Loughlin,1996b,p.155)TheCommitteestartedfunctioningin1994.TheCoRisanassemblyofrepresentativesfromsub‐nationalauthorities,bothregionalandlocalandcurrentlyhas344members.ThemembersoftheCommitteeareselectedbythememberstatestorepresenttheirsub‐nationalgovernments.Bothelectedandnon‐electedappointeescouldberepresented,butsincetheNicetreatythisislimitedtoelectedofficials.TheCoRisnotanofficialinstitutionoftheEuropeanUnion,onlyanadvisoryorganonparwiththeEconomicandSocialCommittee(EESC).ThepowersoftheCommitteeareconsequentlylimitedtoprovidingadviceinsteadoffully

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participatinginthedecision‐makingprocessinaco‐decisionprocedure.TheEuropeanCommissionmustseektheadviceoftheCommitteewhenevernewproposalsaremadeinseveralareasrelatedtoregionalinterests‐economicandsocialcohesion,trans‐Europeaninfrastructurenetworks,health,educationandculture.IntheNicetreatyseveraladditionalpolicyareaswereaddedtotheareasinwhichtheCommissionmustconsulttheCommitteeoftheRegions:employmentpolicy,socialpolicy,theenvironment,vocationaltrainingandtransport.Thecombinationofthesepolicyareaswiththosepreviouslyallocatedtotheconsultation‐procedureincludethelargerpartoftheEU’scompetences,sotheCoRisactiveinnearlyeverypolicyarea.Inadditiontoit’smandatoryconsultation,theCommitteecanissueit’sownopinionsonEUaffairs–andfrequentlyusesthisability.Also,theCommissionisabletoasktheCommitteeforopinionsinpolicyareasinwhichconsultationisnotobligatory.ThecreationoftheCommitteeoftheRegionswasanimportantsteptoincludingtheregionsintheEUdecision‐makingprocess.Unfortunately,fromthestartitbecameobviousthattheCoRwouldnotbeabletoliveuptoit’sexpectations.Itsdefectsarebothstructuralandoperational(Bomberg&Peterson,1998,p.225).Severalreasonsareprovidedforthisfailure(Hooghe,1995;Christiansen,1996;Jeffery2005;Müller‐Graff,2005).Chiefamongsttheseisalackofaclearfoundingpurpose:Itistorepresentregionswithoutmakingclearwhatexactlyaregionis(Nergelius,2005,p123).ThedesignoftheCommitteeconsequentlyassumesafalsehomogeneityandisnotadequatelyequippedtodealwithsuchadiversityofmembers(Vos,Boucké&Devos,2002;Nergelius,2005;Weatherill,2005a).SeveraldifferentkindsofcleavageshaveconsequentlybeenobservedwithintheCommittee:Localversusregional(andalargevarietyoflevelsinbetween),leftversusright(politiciansusuallyhaveapartyaffiliation),northernversussouthern(theculturalandeconomicroleofregionsdiffersacrossEurope),urbanversusruralandexecutiveversusdeliberative(Christiansen,1996;Hooghe&Marks,1996a).Thislastcleavagerelatesmostofallto“stronger”and“weaker”regions,withtheexecutiveregions,capableofissuingtheirownlegislationbeingthestronger.EvenwhentakeninaccountthatregionsvaryacrossEurope;thefactthatregionsaregroupedbynationaldelegationfurthermakesforagreaterdiversityofinterests.ThediversityinrepresentationisboththestrengthandtheweaknessoftheCommittee.Itisstrength,becauseitmakessurenosinglepowerfulregioncandominatetheCommitteeandtheinterestsofalargediversityofregionsistakenintoaccountwhenissuingopinions.Amajorityopinionhastobereachedthatmakessurenoparticularinterestsareover‐represented.Itisasignificantweakness,becausethiscompositionandneedforconsensusmakesitextremelydifficulttocometoagreementonanyissue,becausetheinterestsofallmembersoftheCommitteevastlydifferinscopeandsize.TheopinionsissuedbytheCommitteehavebecome“lowest‐denominator”opinionsthatoftenlackrealoutspokenness.

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AnotherperceivedfailureoftheCommitteeisthedistinctlackofformalpowersattributedtotheCommittee.TheCoRisonlyanadvisorybody,notevenaformalinstitutionoftheEU.ThismeanstherealpoliticalscopeoftheCoRisseverelylimited.CoRtheCommissionandtheEuropeanParliamentwithoutrepercussionscanignoreopinions.Consequently,theopinionsissuedbytheCommitteehavenotyetreachedthepointofhavinganysignificance(Vos,Boucké&Devos,2002,p.214).Paradoxically,theCoRitselfhaschosentofocusonamorepoliticalrolethatreliesonpowerandnotpersuasion.Arepresentativemodehasbeenpreferredtoaconsultativethatconcentratesonexpertise.ConsideringtheCommitteeonlyhasanadvisoryrole,persuasionthroughexpertiseiswhatshouldtakeprecedenceoverrelyingonthepowertoinfluencedecision‐making(Christiansen,2002,p.111).Christiansen(1996)concludesthattheCommitteeoftheRegionsislargelyasymbolicbodythatsuffersfromentrencheddivisionsandfunctionaloverreachinanabsenceofrealinfluenceontheEU’spolicymakingprocess.Jeffery(2002)confirmsthisconclusionwhenhestatesthattheCommitteeoftheRegionshasnotdemonstratedmuchofacapacitytocoordinateandconsolidatetheregionalmovement.AccordingtoNergelius(2005,p.129)theCommitteeissufferingfroman“identitycrisis”,becauseitmaybequestionedif,evenwiththechangesmadetothepowersoftheCoRintheproposedconstitution,itisinfactabletorepresenttheinterestsofthemanyregionsattheEUlevelandwithintheworkoftheEUinstitutionsinanefficientway.Concluding,itcanbesaidthattheCommitteeoftheRegionsisnotlivinguptoit’sexpectations.ItmighthaveaddedatinyflickeroflegitimacytotheEUpolicy‐makingprocessbutonlyinasymbolicway:Itcurrentlyhaslittlepotentialforinfluencingorobstructingthepolicy‐makingprocess.FrustratedbythelackofpoweroftheCommittee,themorepowerfulregionshaveturnedtheirbackontheinstitutionandabroadconsensusexiststhattheinstitutionassuchhasfailedtoadequatelyrepresentregionalinterests.

3.5 TheregionsandtheconstitutionaldebateAfteryearsofrelativelylittleattentionforregionalconcernsinEUtreaties,inthenegotiationsforaEuropeanconstitutiontheregionalinteresthadalimitedrole.Theconstitutionaltreaty,aswellasitsLisbonrevisionstillhasnotbeenratifiedbyallEUmemberstatesfollowingdefeatsinnationalreferendabyFranceandtheNetherlandsontheoriginalandadefeatinIrelandfortherevisedtreaty.InthedebatesconcerningtheEuropeanconstitution,thechangestoregionalinvolvementwasnevertheissue,andwecanexpectthatthesechangeswillfindtheirwayintoaEuropeantreatyonewayortheother.ThechangesproposedincludeafurtherclarificationofthecompetenciesofthememberstatesandtheEU,aswellasabetterunderstandingoftheprincipleofsubsidiarity.Inaddition,theCommitteeoftheRegionswouldbeabletoapplytotheCourtofJusticeifaperceivedbreachoftheprincipleofsubsidiarityisobserved.TheCommitteeof

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theRegionsgainsalittleinpower,buttheregionalinterestisstillnotadequatelyrepresentedintheEU.ThemorepowerfulregionshavebecomefrustratedbythislackofregionalinfluenceoftheEUdecision‐makingprocessandhavefrequentlyturnedtootheroptionsofinfluencingEUregulationsandpolicy.Oneoptionistoworkthroughnationalchannels,anotheristoutiliseunofficialchannelsinBrussels.

3.6 InformalmeansofaccesstotheEUInadditiontotheformalmeansofaccesstotheEUarena,regionsutiliseseveralunofficialmeanstoinfluencetheEUdecision‐makingprocess.Overtheyears,individualregionshaveestablishedofficesinBrussels.Thisnumberhassteadilyincreasedfromonlyahandfulinthe1980’stoseveralhundredsnowadays.Theirprimaryconcernislobbyingandadvancingtheinterestsoftheirspecificregion.BecausemaintainingapresenceinBrusselsisquiteadrainonresources,onlythemostpowerfulandwell‐establishedregionsareabletoestablishanoffice(Hooghe&Marks,1996a,p.83).Regionalpresenceandtheamountofinfluencetheyhaveisconsequentlynotavailableforallregions.NotonlydoregionstrytoindividuallyinfluencetheEUprocess,trans‐nationalassociationsofregionalandsub‐nationalactorshavealsoproliferated.Theseassociationsattempttorepresenttheregionalposition‐eitherasageneralexponentoftheregionsoraparticularcommonissue‐tothebestoftheircapabilities.AfewexamplesofassociationscreatedaretheAssociationofEuropeanRegions(AER),theConferenceofPeripheralandMaritimeRegions(CPMR),the“FourMotorsofEurope”(anassociationofBaden‐Wurttemberg,Catalonia,LombardyandRhône‐Alpes,beingstrongeconomicregionswithsimilarinterestsinmaintainingthatposition)andREGLEG,anassociationforregionswithexecutivepower.REGLEGwascreatedindiscontentaboutthelimitedrolethe‘stronger’executiveregionsplayintheCommitteeoftheRegionsandisnowtryingtoinfluenceEUdecision‐makingusinginformalEuropeanandformalnationalchannels.

3.7 ConclusionTakenaltogether,theamountofmeasurestakentoincluderegionalactorsintheEUappearstobeimpressive.However,muchofthementionedformalisedprovisionstogaininfluenceinBrusselsaremoreofasymbolicnaturethaneffectiveinallowingregionstoinfluenceEUdecision‐making.TheStructuralFundscompromiseonlyalimitedspanofpoliciesintheEU,andthestructureofinvolvementofsub‐nationalactorsiscontingentonthedistributionoffinancesacrosstheEU,decideduponbytheCouncilofMinisters.Theprincipleofsubsidiarityisvagueandusedcircumstantial,eventhoughtheenforcementintheCourtofJusticemightprovideforarevivaloftheprinciple.

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AccesstotheCouncilofMinistersisbasedonnationalarrangementsandnotavailabletothevastmajorityofregionalgovernments.TheCommitteeoftheRegionssuffersfromtoomanycleavagestomakeeffectiveuseoftheiralreadylimitedpowers.FormalisedwaystochannelregionalrepresentationintheEuropeanUnionareconsequentlylimitedandineffective.TheaccessofregionstotheEUisdependentonnationalgovernments’willingnesstodelegatepartsoftheirpowerstosub‐nationalactors,whichmanynationsareunwillingtodo.Theinclusionofregions,however,couldgoalongwaytoincreaseboththedemocraticlegitimacyoftheEuropeanUnionaswellastheeffectivenessofEUregulations.Inthenextchapter,IwilldescribethepossibilitiesanincreasedregionalpresenceintheEuropeanUnionoffers.

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4 ThebenefitsofregionalparticipationInthepreviouschapter,IhavedescribedthecurrentmeansofregionalparticipationinEuropeanUniondecision‐making,andarguedwhythecurrentformalchannelsdonotsuffice.Inthischapter,IwillargueexactlywhyregionsshouldberepresentedintheEuropeanarena.Aftertakingintoconsiderationanumberofproblemsassociatedwithalackofregionalparticipation,IwillturntothebenefitsbothregionsandtheEuropeanUnionatlargecangainfrommoreactiveregionalparticipation,inordertoanswerthefollowingresearchquestions:

4. In which way can regions benefit from participation in the Europeandecision­makingprocess?

5. In which way can the European Union benefit from regional participation in the decision-making process?

6. Which criteria can be used to analyse formal arrangements for regional participation?

Usingbothnegativeandpositiveargumentsforparticipation,fromboththeviewpointoftheregionsandtheEU,IwillcreateamodestframeworkthatcanbeusedtoanalyseandevaluateproposedchangesinformalregionalrepresentationattheEuropeanlevel.

4.1 CompetencesanddiplomacyAswehaveseen,regionsarehardlyrepresentedattheEuropeanlevel.Theyhave,however,beenarguingforinclusionforthelasttwenty‐oddyears.Chiefoftheregions’concernwasthefactthatwhiletheEuropeanUniongainedmorecompetences,theregionsobservedthatmanyofthesenewpowersborderedonorinvadedtheresponsibilitiesofregionalgovernmentsinatleastsomememberstates,especiallythefederalisedstatesofGermanyandBelgium.Hard‐wonnationalresponsibilitiesandcompetencieswereinthismannertransferredawayfromtheregionstowardstheEuropeanUnionwithouttheregion’sconsent(Weatherill,2005a,p.7).ConflictingcompetenciesweretheresultofthisincreaseinpoweroftheEuropeanUnion.NotonlydonationsshiftcompetencestotheEuropeanUnion,indoingso,theyareindirectlylimitingthepowersoftheirsub‐nationalauthoritieswithouttheirpermission.Forexample:TheFinnishautonomousregionofÅland,agroupofislandsbetweenFinlandandSweden,hashadalongtraditionofself‐government.Oneofthemostimportantoftheirautonomouscompetenceswastoregulationsconcerningfisheriesandthequotatheirfishermenwouldbeabletocatchinthewaterssurroundingtheislands.Now,increasingly,theEuropeanUnionsetsregulationswithregardstoquota.Whichquotatakesprecedence?UnderEUlaw,thiswouldbetheEuropeanregulation.Thecompetencytosetthis

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quotaconsequentlyshiftedfromtheregionaltothesupra‐national.Thehard‐foughtrighttosetthesequotaswaslosttoÅlandwithouttheconsentofregionalauthorities(Jääskinen,2005).Naturally,regionalactorsarereluctanttolosepartsoftheircompetences.Unfortunately,regionsareunabletovoicetheirconcernsaboutthesechangesincompetences,fordiplomacyandthesigningoftreatiesremainsanexclusivecompetenceofthenationalstate.Inaddition,theEuropeanUnionisofficially‘blind’totheinternalmemberstatestructuresofauthority(Weatherill,2005a,pp1‐4).TheEuropeanUnionisanassociationofstates,notofregions.ThisfactrathercomplicatestheinclusionofregionsinEUpolicy.Nationstatesaretheonlyauthoritiesabletoconductdiplomacy,but‘paradiplomacy’,diplomacyatalevellowerthanthenation‐stateisrapidlyincreasing(Vos,Boucké&Devos,2002,p205).MemberstatesnegotiateattheEuropeanlevelwhencompetenciesdomesticallydelegatedtotheirregionsareconcerned.Acertain“loosening”ofsometimesconstitutionallyprotectedcompetencesoftheregionsistakingplace(Weatherill,2005a,pp.6‐7).Sincethenation‐statesnegotiateattheEUlevel,theyhaveeffectivelyre‐claimedcompetencesatthecostoftheregions.Topreventconflictsofcompetencesfromtakingplace,competencesoftheEUshouldbemoreclearlydefined.TheproposedEuropeanConstitutionmadeanattempttodothis,andtherenewedprincipleofsubsidiaritymightplayaroleinmakingsurethisisenforcedaswellasprovidingaguidewhenconflictovercompetencesemerges.

4.2 ImplementationAnotherareainwhichregionsobserveEuropeaninfluenceintheirfunctioningisthelargeamountofregulationsandpoliciestheEUcreates.Ontheonehand,regionsareoftenresponsibleforimplementingEUlegislationbutontheotherhand,asmentionedbeforeitisthememberstatethatnegotiatesattheEuropeanlevel.Regionsconsequentlyhavetoimplementregulationsandlegislationinwhichtheydidnothaveasingleinvolvementinthecreation.Inaddition,regionsobservethatEuropeanregulationsoftenfailtotakeregionalconcernsintoaccount.Partsofnationscandiffertremendously,andlegislationthatmightbenefitsomepartsofthecountrymightbedetrimentaltootherparts.Asmentioned,theEuropeanUnionitselfisofficially“blind”totheinternalinstitutionalstructureofmemberstates.TheEUholdstheirmemberstatesresponsiblefortheimplementationofregulationsandpolicy,whileoftensub‐nationalgovernmentsareresponsiblefortheimplementationonthedomesticlevel.TheregionsarejointlyresponsiblefortheimplementationofEUlegislationandregionsareinfluencedeitherdirectorindirectlybyEUlegislation.Thisisalsothepolicy‐makingstageinwhichtheyaremostpowerful(Bomberg&Peterson,1998,p.232).Itcomesasnosurprisethatattheimplementationstageofthepolicy‐process,multi‐levelgovernanceisthemostprominent(Marksetal.199,p.365).Theregions,however,havenoguaranteeofbeingabletovoicetheirconcernsinaformalarrangement.

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BeingbothinfluencedbyregulationsandpoliciesmadebytheEUandunabletoinfluencethedecision‐makingprocessrelatedtotheseregulationsandpoliciesseriouslylimitsthecompetenciesandauthorityofsub‐nationalactors.Inordertocreateefficientregulationsandpolicy,itisthereforeessentialthatregionaldecision‐makersaretobeinvolvedatboththenationallevelandtheEUlevel(Bomberg&Peterson,1998,pp.234‐235;Vos,Boucké&Devos,2002,p.205).

4.3 GoodGovernanceImentionedearlierthattheincreasedfocusontheeffectivenessinmulti‐levelgovernancecameatthecostofadecreasedlegitimacyofdecision‐making.TheEuropeanCommission,too,noticedthistrendandforthefirstdecadeofthiscentury,thedesiretoincreasethelegitimacyoftheEuropeanUnionhasdominatedmuchoftheEuropeanconferences.In2001,theCommissionissuedthe‘WhitePaperonGovernance’thatlaidouttheirintentionsasregardtoaninstitutionalreformoftheEuropeanUniontoincreasethelegitimacyandbringtheEUclosertoitscitizens.Thefocuswason“goodgovernance”,includingsuchconceptsasaccountability,transparency,participation,legitimacy,effectiveness,efficiency,coherence,proportionalityandsubsidiarity(Commission,2001).Also,goodgovernancewouldenableagreaterpublicinvolvementwiththeEU.ThiswasperceivednotonlytobeataskoftheEU,butofalllevelsofgovernment(Carter&Macleod,2005,p.79).Increasedparticipationofregionalactorsinthedecision‐makingprocesswouldbeabletocontributesignificantlytothegoalsoftheCommission.Inordertoexplainexactlyhow,Iwillfirsttakeadeeperlookattheconceptoflegitimacythatissocentraltothedebate.

4.4 LegitimacyandtheregionsLegitimacyisaconceptofteninvokedwhengovernanceisconcerned.Legitimacyisquiteanelusiveconcept,whichiswhyitisimportanttogettograspswiththemanyfacesoflegitimacybeforeproceeding.AccordingtoBeethamandLord(1998),politicalauthoritycanbeconsideredlegitimatewhenauthorityisacquiredandexercisedaccordingtoestablishedrules,theserulescorrespondtosociallyacceptedbeliefsandtheauthorityisconfirmedbyboththesubordinatesaswellasotherlegitimateauthorities(Beetham&Lord,1998,p.3).Thismeansthatdemocraticauthoritymustrelyontheruleoflawaswellasanormativejustifiabilityofthoselaws.Prescriptionsonauthorityareviewedaslegitimatesuccessfullylinksharedbasicnormsandideastopracticalrules.Legitimacyisthecomplianceofapoliticalsystemtothesetraditionalvaluesinsuchawaythatthereispassivetoleranceoractivesupport.(Beetham&Lord,1998,p.4).Differentkindsoflegitimacyareoftenobserved,basedondifferentcriteria.BeethamandLordarguethatthreesourcesoflegitimacyareinexistence:Democracy,identityandperformance.Scharpf(1999,pp.26‐28)preferstolabel

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thesesourcesdifferently,andcallsthemrespectivelyinput,socialandoutputlegitimacy.Democraticlegitimacyreferstostructuralaspectssuchasrepresentationofthepopulationandseparationofpowers.Sociallegitimacyreferstothepopularacceptanceoftheprojectofthepoliticalauthoritythatgovernsandtoissuessuchasidentityandcitizenship.Legitimacybasedonperformanceconcentratesontherelationofthepoliticalsystemtotheendsorpurposesitwouldserveandtheeffectivenessofthedecision‐makingprocedures.Thesespheresoflegitimacycorrespondtoeachotherinsuchawayastoraiseoneleveloflegitimacymaywelldisplacetheproblemsoflegitimacytoanothersphere.Iwillshortlydescribeeachsphereoflegitimacyandargueinwhichwaysregionalparticipationcanraiselegitimacyinthatparticularsphere.

4.4.1 DemocraticlegitimacyThedemocraticlegitimacyismainlybasedonrulesandproceduresconcerningtheprocessofgoverning.Inaliberaldemocracy,thismeansfirstandforemostthatthereisadirectorindirectlinkagewiththeelectoratethroughpopularelections.Authoritiesshouldbeheldaccountablefortheiractions.Inorderforthistohappen,proceduresneedtobeastransparentaspossible.ItisfrequentlyperceivedthattheEuropeanUnionlacksdemocraticlegitimacy(DeJonghe&Bursens,2003).Thisisanimportantaspectoftheso‐called“democraticdeficit”thatgaverisetotheincreasedemphasisongoodgovernance(Beetham&Lord,1998;Hix,2008).Notallprocessesinamulti‐levelgovernancesystemaretransparent,andnotallactorsparticipatingareelectedofficialsaccountabletothepublic.Formalisingtheroleofalevelofgovernmentthatdoesconsistofelectedofficials,thepoliticalregions,wouldimprovethedemocraticlegitimacyaslongasdecision‐makingprocessesaretransparent.Inthisregard,thepositiveinfluenceofregionalparticipationiscontingentonthe‘openingup’oftheEUpolicyprocess.Includingregionalactorswithlegislativeabilitieswouldprovidelegitimacyasfarascompetencesareconcerned.NolongerwillcompetenciesbetakenawayfromregionalauthoritiesandredistributedtotheEUwithouttheregionbeinginvolvedinthedecision‐makingprocess.Inthisregard,regionalparticipationcanprovideadditionallegitimacytotheEuropeanUnion.FormalisingtheinclusionofanelectedlevelofregionalrepresentationcanconsequentlyimprovethedemocraticlegitimacyoftheEUdecision‐makingprocesswhencareistakentouseatransparentinstitutionalframework.

4.4.2 SociallegitimacySociallegitimacyconcernstheidentificationwiththepoliciesandthoseinapositionofpower.Itisfrequentlyarguedthatincreasingtheroleofsub‐national

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actorswillsignificantlyincreasethesociallegitimacyoftheEuropeanUnion.Sub‐nationalauthoritiesareassumedtooperateatalevelofgovernanceclosertothecitizens.Notonlydoesthismeanastrongeridentificationwiththeregionalauthorities,italsomeansthatcitizenscanassumethattheywillbemoreproperrepresentedbypoliticiansthatsharetheirculturalvaluesaswellascanbeexpectedtorelatetotheirconcernsinamoredirectway(Vos,Boucké&Devos,2002,p.207).WehavetoadmitthattheEuropeandemosorEuropeanpeopledoesnotexistandmostlikelywillnevercometobe.Theamountofdiversityisconsiderablyandthiswillonlychangegradually.TheEUinstitutionsshouldtakeintoaccounttheculturalandethnicaldiversityofitscitizens.Includingregions,theself‐labelled‘guardiansofculturaldiversity’(Vos,Boucké&Devos,2002,p.207)wouldmakesurethatdiversityistakenintoaccountintheEUdecision‐makingprocess.Usingtheconceptofthehistoricalandethnicregion,regionsmakesurethatthereremainsaculturaldiversitywithinnotonlyEuropebutalsothemember‐statesitself.Regionshaveaspecificinteresttoguardthisdiversity,becausetheirveryexistenceisdependantonit.RegionalactorsareafraidtheEUisonlyconcernedwiththesinglemarket,andignoretheamountofculturaldiversitytheEUharbours.BoththeregionsandtheEUconsequentlyhavetogaininmakingsurediversityisrespected.Tosummarise,sociallegitimacycanbesignificantlyimprovedbynotonlyallowingcitizenstoberepresentedbyanauthorityclosertotheirvaluesandinterests,butalsobymakingsureculturaldiversityisrespectedinEuropeanUniondecision‐making.

4.4.3 PerformancelegitimacyDemocraticandsociallegitimacyalonedonotprovideenoughlegitimacyforaninstitutiontowarrantitsexistence,fordemocraticprocessisanemptyritualwithoutdelivery(DeJonghe&Bursens,2003,p.8).Legitimacybasedonperformanceconsistsoftwoelements:Dependsontwodistinctelements:Somemeasureofpublicagreementonthecriteriatobeattainedandtheevidentinstitutionalcapacitytoattainthem(Beetham&Lord,1998,pp.23‐24).Effectivedecision‐makingproceduresshouldbeinplacetomakesureboththeseelementsarepresent.Multi‐levelgovernanceiswidelyperceivedtoincreasetheeffectivenessofpoliciescreatedbytheEuropeanUnion.Infact,accordingtomany,effectiveproblem‐solvingisthelargestsourceoflegitimacyoftheEuropeanUnion(Weatherill,2005a,p.30;Hix,2008).TheEuropeanUnionreliesextensivelyonitsperformanceinpolicyareasthatwouldbeimpossibleforasinglenationtoaccuratelymanage.Regionalrepresentationinthedecision‐makingprocesscaninfluenceperformancelegitimacyintwoways.Thefirstisthatregionalinvolvementhasthepotentialtoincreasetheeffectivenessofpolicy.Regionalandlocal

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authoritiesareoftenwellplacedtoassessthecoherenceandeffectivenessofpoliciesthathaveamajorimpactontheirterrain(Weatherill,2005a,p.26).Inaddition,regionalauthoritieshavebetterinformationaboutthedemandsforlocalprovisionofgoodsandservices,andtolocalinterestsingeneral.Higherlevelshaveimperfectinformationonlocalpreferences(Oates,1972).Beingclosertothecitizens,regionshavemorespecificknowledgeofthelocalconditionsandtheirneedsandwants.Thismeansthattheimplementationofpoliciesisbothmoreeffective,becauseitismoreadjustedtothelocalsituation,andmoreefficientbecauserespondingtothewishesoftheregioninanearlystagecanpreventresistanceagainstimplementation.Thekeytosuccessfulimplementationisaproactivepolicyandthequalityofgovernmentwouldimprovewhenallactorsinvolvedarefullyincludedinthedecision‐makingcycle.(Vos,Boucké&Devos,2002,p.211).ThedownsidetoregionalparticipationfortheperformanceoftheEUwouldbethatitovercomplicatesdecision‐makingproceduresbyaddingyetanotheractor.An“overinstutionalisation”couldbedetrimentaltothesystem,becausethiswouldslowtheprocessdownandwouldcreateariskofdrivingparticularlocalpreoccupationsintotheheartofasystemthatwasmeanttofunctiononbehalfofallEUcitizens.Yetthisargumentappliestotheempowermentofnationalparliamentsinthesameway(Weatherill,2005b,p.149).Europeanpolicyperformancecanbesignificantlyincreasedbyincludingregionalactorsinthedecision‐makingprocesssolocalsituationsandproblemssurroundingtheimplementationofregulationsaretakenintoaccountatanearlystage.Caremustbetaken,however,tomakesurethatthedecision‐makingrulesdonotbecometoocomplicated,forthiswouldmakethedecision‐makingprocessfarlessefficient.

4.5 TowardsaframeworkofanalysisofregionalparticipationIncludedintheanalysisaboveareseveralmeansbywhichregionalparticipationintheEuropeandecision‐makingprocesscanpotentiallybenefitnotonlytheregionsthemselves,butalsotheEuropeanUnionatlarge.Region’sconcernsaboutlosingcompetenceswithouttheirconsentandafterwardsbeingfacedwiththeimplementationoflegislationthatisinnowayadjustedtotheregionalsituationcanbesolvedbysaidinvolvement.Manysuggestionshavebeenmadeaboutexactlyhowthisregionalparticipationshouldtakeplace.Iwillfocusontheseinthenextchapter,butinordertoanalysethesearrangements,itwillbenecessarytobuildasmallframeworkforanalysisofinstitutionalarrangements.Iwilldothisbyconcentratingonanumberofquestionstoanswerforeachformalarrangement.Basedontheanswers,acriterioncanbescoredsoastobecomparabletootherarrangements.

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4.5.1 CriteriaofanalysisThecriteriaandquestionsassociatedwiththemareasfollows:Criterion1‐Democraticaccountability:DoesthearrangementmaketheEUdecision­makingprocessmoreaccountabletothepublic?DemocraticaccountabilityisthecoreconceptofthedebatesurroundingthedemocraticdeficitoftheEuropeanUnion.Byincludingelectedofficials,accountabilityofthedecision‐makingprocessshouldbeabletoimprove.Adirectchainofaccountabilityshouldbepresentbetweendecision‐makersandthecitizens.Thiscriterionconcernsprimarilydemocraticlegitimacy.Criterion2–Identification:WillthearrangementbringEuropeclosertoitscitizensandinwhichwaywillEuropeanpolicyberesponsivetoregionalinput?Includingregionsinthedecision‐makingprocedurewouldbeabletoincreasetheemphasisondiversitywithintheEuropeanUnion.BeingabletoexpresstheinterestsofthecitizensoftheregionswouldgoalongwayinordertobringEuropeclosertoitscitizens.Closelyrelatedwiththeconceptofsubsidiarity,thecriterionconcernsthesociallegitimacyoftheEUinreflectingthevaluesoftheEuropeancitizens.CitizensshouldbeabletoidentifythemselveswiththeactorsmakingdecisionintheEUdecision‐makingprocess.Criterion3–Effectiveness:Doesthearrangementallowforasignificantregionalparticipationinanearlystageofthepolicy­makingprocess?Aswehaveseen,earlyparticipationinthedecision‐makingprocessisessentialinordertocreateeffectivepolicies.Theamountandmomentofregionalparticipationinfluencestheamountofperformancelegitimacythearrangementcanaddtothedecision‐makingprocess.Includingregionsinlaterstagesmeansregionalinfluenceisminimal,negatingthepotentialbenefitsofregionalparticipation.Anearlyandsignificantparticipationinareaswithinthecompetenceoftheregionswouldbeoptimal.ThecriterionconcernsthebenefitstotheeffectivenessofEuropeanpolicy.Criterion4–Efficiency:Doesthearrangementcomplicateorsimplifythedecision­makingprocedure?Thisquestionmainlyconcernsthecriterionofefficientdecision‐making.Overlycomplicatedprocedureswilldoharmtonotonlyperformancelegitimacybutalsotodemocraticlegitimacy,forcomplicatedproceduresmakethedecision‐makingprocesslesstransparenttothecitizens.Asimple,clearprocedurewouldworkbest.However,anyprocedurethataddsyetanotheractor,likeregions,isboundtocreatemoreinstitutionalthicknessandreflectnegativelyonthiscriterion.Themaininterestishowbigthisnegativeinfluenceis.Weshouldaimtokeepthisisminimalaspossible.

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Criterion5–Realism:Isthearrangementrealisticinthatthereisapotentialforrealisation?ThiscriterionofrealismconcernstheprospectsoftheactualarrangementbecomingincludedinthefuturestructureoftheEuropeanUnion.Incrementalstepsmightworkoutbetterthanlargeinstitutionalreform,andthisshouldbetakenintoaccountwhencreatinganewformalarrangement.AnincrementalchangeisbetterthannochangewhentheEUandtheregionscanbenefitfromthischange.

4.5.2 ScaleInordertoprovideascoretoeachcriterion,ascaleisneeded.Sincemostcriteria’sareabletoscorebothpositivelyandnegatively,Ihavedecidedtoutiliseascorerangingfrom‐5to+5.Usingthisscale,gradientsofconformitytothecriterioncanbemeasures,ascanasituationinwhichthereisnoperceivedeffectonthecriterionthroughascoreof0.Thescalesubsequentlylooksasfollows:

-5 -4 -3 -2- -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5

Most negative influence

on criterion

No effect

Most positive

influence on

criterion

Figure4.1:Scaledistributionforscoringoncriteria.Inmyanalysis,Iwillnotgiveweighttothedifferentindividualcriteriacomparedtoeachotherandwillassumethemalltobeequallyimportant.Iamfullyawarethatthisisnotalwaysthecase,howeverthedecisiononwhichcriterionismoreimportant,andhowmuchisessentiallyapoliticaldecisionwhichIconsidernottobesuitableforthisthesis.Whenutilizingtheframeworkbypoliticalactors,aweightcanbeaddedtowhatevercriteriaareconsideredtobemoreimportanttothatparticularactor.Inordertodecidewhichalternativeismostsuitableforimplementation,oratleastbeconsideredabasisforthedebateonregionalparticipation,Iwillsimplyaddall5scorestocometoatotalscore.Thehighesttotalscoreisthemostappropriatealternative;thelowesttotalscoretheleast.Thetotalframeworkthuslooksasfollows(figure4.2):

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Alternative

a Alternative

b Alternative

c Alternative

d 1. Democratic accountability

2. Identification 3. Effectiveness 4. Efficiency 5. Realism Total Figure4.2:AframeworkforanalysisofformalarrangementsforregionalparticipationinEuropeandecision‐makingprocesses.

4.6 ConclusionInthischapter,wehaveexploredinwhichwaystheregionalauthoritiesandtheEuropeanUnionaswellastheEuropeancitizenscanbenefitofacloserregionalinvolvementintheEuropeandecision‐makingprocess.RegionsareprimarilyinterestedinparticipatingintheEuropeanarenatopreventtheircompetencesfrombeingtransferredtotheEUandtoinfluenceEUpolicyandregulationssotheyarenotfacedwiththeimplementationoflegislationtheydonotsupport.TheEuropeanUnioncanutiliseregionalparticipationinordertogainlegitimacyinallthreespheresoflegitimacy:Againindemocraticlegitimacyduetotheinvolvementofaccountableanddemocraticallyelectedauthorities,andgaininsociallegitimacyduetotheguaranteeoftakingintoaccountthediversitytheregionsprovide.Andfinally,theperformanceoftheEUcanbenefitwhenmoreandbetterinformationaboutcitizensinterestsandsituationcanbetakenintoaccount,aswellasincludetheimplementationstageofthepolicyatanearlierstage.Usingtheseaspectsoflegitimacy,aswellastheconceptsofefficiencyandrealism,IhavecreatedaframeworkwithwhichtoanalyseproposedchangestotheformalrelationshipofregionalauthoritiesandtheEuropeanUnion.

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5 EvaluatingformalregionalparticipationThereareseveraldistinctivelydifferentwaysofsecuringmoreregionalinfluenceintheEUdecision‐makingprocess,dependingontheEUinstitutionusedtoexertthisinfluence.Inthischapter,IwilldescribeandanalyseseveralsuggestedoptionsforEUinstitutionalreformthatemphasiseandimprovetheroleofregionsintheEUdecision‐makingprocess,inordertoanswerthefollowingresearchquestion:

7. What options are available to formalise regional participation in theEuropeanUniondecision­makingprocess?

Usingthealternativespresentedinliteratureaswellaspoliticaldebates,suchasthe Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 2002, I will utilize the frameworkpresented in the previous chapter in order to answer my main researchquestion:InwhichformalarrangementcanregionsbestberepresentedintheEuropeanUnionpolicy­makingprocess?Iwillnotpresentacompletelistingofalternativearrangementsinwhichtoincluderegions,itisaselectedsampleofdiversesuggestedarrangementssortedbythedifferentchannelsofrepresentationtheyconsistof.Incollectingthesealternatives,Ihaveconcentratedonpresentingdistinctalternatives,basedonthemeansofaccesstotheEuropeanUnion.Subsequently,eachalternativeutilizesadifferentformalorinstitutionalarrangement.Thismakesitpossiblenotonlytocomparealternatives,butalsopotentialroutestotheEU.ThevariousalternativesthatIhaveincludedinthisstudyarethefollowing:

A. Councilsplit­vote.ThisalternativefocussesontheCouncilofMinistersandsuggestsadjustingthevotingprocedureintheCouncilofMinistersbyallowingfornationalvotestobesplit.

B. AccesstotheEarly­WarningSystem(EWS).Concentratingonthepowersnewlyattributedtothenationalparliaments,thisalternativeextendsthesepowerstotheregions.

C. ReformoftheCommitteeoftheRegions.TheCommitteeoftheRegionsistheonlyinstitutionthattrulyrepresentstheregions.ConcentratingonincreasingtheeffectivenessandpowersoftheCommitteeissuggestedasameansofincreasingregionalparticipation.

D. A“ThirdChamber”ofRegions.Themostextensivealternativeputstheregionsonparwithnation‐states,andadvocatesthecreationofaseparateparliamentforregionalgovernments.

Thischapterwillpresentanddescribeeachalternativein‐depth.Afterthisdescription,Iwillanalysethepresentedalternativeonthebasisofthe

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frameworkcreatedinchapterfour.Basedonthis,Iwillpresentthescoresofeachalternativeinasmalltable.

5.1 AlternativeA:Councilsplit‐voteAswehaveseen,regionscurrentlyhavethetheoreticalpossibilitytorepresenttheirnationintheCouncilofMinisters,butonlyasanationalrepresentative,notaregionalrepresentative.Everynationhastospeakwithonevoiceandhasonlyonevote.TheScottishscholarandmemberoftheEuropeanParliamentNeilMacCormickhassuggestedthateverynationwouldgainanumberofvotesinCouncildecision‐makingandthenbeabletosplittheirvotes(MacCormick,CONV298/02).RegionswouldbeabletovoicetheirconcernsonanationallevelandtherepresentativeattheCouncilmeetingwouldthenreflectthestanceoftheregionsinthesplitvotecast.Thiswaysub‐nationalheterogeneitycanbetakenintoaccountinCouncildecision‐making,somethingthatiscurrentlynotpossible.Currently,castingavoteintheCouncilisanall‐or‐nothingaffair.Beingabletoreflectaninternaldivisionofinterestscouldinpotentialallowforaregionalinfluenceinthedecision‐makingprocess,beitthroughtheintermediarylevelofthenationalinstitutions.

5.1.1 AnalysisUtilisingasystemofsplitCouncilvotesmeansthatanationaldelegationcanbesplitandwouldhavetosimultaneouslyargueforbothperspectives:Bothinfavourandinopposition.ThiswouldnotmakeCouncildeliberationsverymuchmoreeffective.Whendemocraticaccountabilityisconcerned,theregionswouldbeindirectlyinvolvedintheEUdecision‐makingprocess.However,preliminarydeliberationswillhavetotakeplaceinordertoformulatethefinalvotesplit.Whilethesedeliberationscouldwelltakeplaceinatransparentsetting,Councilmeetingsarerathernontransparantaffairs.ThereisnowaytodiscernwhethertheinCouncilnegotiations,whereoftenpolitical‘deals’areoftenmade,thevotesplitwillberespectedbythenationaldelegation.Democraticaccountabilitymightimproveslightly,butthismightcomeatacostindecision‐makingefficiency.Asmentioned,additionaldeliberationsmeanmoremeetingsandnegotiationsandanextrapreparationforCouncilmeetings.Aquestionalsoemerges:WhathappenswhenEUproposalsarechangedduringCouncilmeetings?Howwouldthenationaldelegationdealwithsuchasituation?Often,adhocdecisionshavetobemade.Itwouldbeimpossibletodeliberatewiththeregionsoneverychange.Thisalsomeansthat,eventhoughregionsareparticipatinginafairlyearlystageoftheprocess,theyhavehardlyanyinfluenceonthefinaloutcome,thisbeingtheresultofapoliticalprocess.Usingasplit‐votesystemintheCouncilmightimprovetheconnectionbetweencitizenandtheEuropeanUnioninconfirmingthatnationalgovernmentsaswellasregionshaveasignificantsayinEuropeanpolicy‐making.Theoverallresults,however,wouldnotnecessarilytakeintoaccountregionalconcernsorevenmentiontheregionsexplicitly,sincenegotiationstilltakesplaceamongst

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nationaldelegations.Diversityisonlypresentasasecond‐levelactornationaldelegationshavetotakeintoconsideration.Achangetoasplit‐votesystemwouldentailrestructuringdomesticprocedures.Everynationmustmakesuretoincluderegionsinpreliminarydeliberations.ThisworkseasierfornationsthatalreadyhaveaSecondChamberofregionalrepresentativesandforfederations.ThesenationsalreadyhavetofrequentlydebatewiththoserepresentativesaboutEuropeanpolicy.Forothernations,itisunlikelythatthisalternativewillbeembraced.Notonlywoulddomesticstructuresbeoverhauled,inadditionthestatewouldbeseverelylimitedintheirnegotiationsintheEU.

5.1.2 FinalscoringofAlternativeA:CouncilSplit‐VoteThealternativeofsplitCouncilvoteswouldonlymarginallyimprovethepositionofregionsinEuropeandecision‐makingprocesses.However,itwouldcreateamethodofinfluencingthecentralgovernmenttotakeregionalinterestsinaccountwhennegotiatingattheEUlevel.ThisrelativelyminorchangewouldaffectthedomesticlevelmorethanitwouldtheEUlevel.1. Democratic Accountability Slightly positive (+1) 2. Identification Slightly positive (+1) 3. Effectiveness Slightly positive (+1) 4. Efficiency Slightly negative (-1) 5. Realism Slightly negative (-1) Total score +1 Table5.1:CriterionscoringforalternativeA–SplitCouncilVotes

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5.2 AlternativeB:RegionsandtheEarlyWarningSystemInordertoimprovethedemocraticlegitimacyoftheEuropeanUnion,theyEUinthelastdecadehasgivenseveralmorepowerstonationalparliaments.IntheproposedEuropeanConstitution,thesepowersareexpanded.Jeffery(2005)andMüller‐Graff(2005)suggesttogiveregionsaccesstoseveralofthesepowersgrantedbyEUtreaties,mostnotablytheEarlyWarningSystem(EWS).Broadlyspeaking,therearethreepowersthataresubsequentlyinvokedthatinterrelateandmighteffecttheregions’involvementinEUdecision‐making.Thefirstistherighttogetinformationofproposedlegislationinatimelymanner.Usingthisinformation,nationalparliamentsareabletousetheearlywarningsystem.UsingtheEWS,notonlydonationalparliamentsgainanearlynoticeaboutCommissionlegislativeproposals,butitallowsthemtogivea“reasonedopinion”iftheyfeelthattheproposaldoesnotcomplywiththeprocessofsubsidiarity.Ifathirdofnationalparliamentsraiseconcernswithinaperiodofsixweeks,theCommissionhastoreconsidertheproposal.Ifafterthisreconsideration,legislationisnotchangedtotheparliaments’satisfaction,theparliamentsareabletobringtheissuetotheCourtofJustice.TheCourtwilldecidewhethertheCommissionactedcorrectlyandinlinewiththeprincipleofsubsidiarity.Theearlywarningsystemhaspotentialforusebyregions,too.Infact,itwillbepossiblewithoutfurtherconstitutionalchangesforsomeregionsrepresentedinmemberstates’upperchamberstoissueanearlywarning.Inaddition,theUKgovernmentbywordofMEPPeterHain(CONV526/03,2003)suggestedthatnationalparliamentsmightdecidetoincluderegionalactorsintheearlywarningprocess.RegionswouldinthisrespectgainaccesstotheEarlyWarningSystem.

5.2.1 AnalysisAccesstotheearlywarningsystemmightappeartobeonlyasmallproceduralchangeonthesurface,butwhentakingacloserlookthebenefitsregionscanhavefromhavingaccesstosuchaninstrumentmightbeplentiful.Forone,theyareinvolvedataveryearlystageinthedecision‐makingprocessandcanbeassuredthattheiropinionisatleasttakenintoaccountbytheCommission.IftheCommissionignorestheopinionsfiledbyanumberofregionalactors,theyatleastareobligedtoexplainexactlywhytheseopinionshavebeenignored.ThisforcestheCommissiontotakeacloselookatsaidopinions.EnforcementattheCourtofJusticemakessurethattheCommissioncannotmindlesslysetasidereasonedopinions.Theeffectivenessandinfluenceoftheearlywarningsystemusedbyregionsisconsiderable.Inaddition,itallowsforagoodseparationofcompetencesbetweenCommission,member‐stateandregions.TheEWShasapotentialtobringEuropeclosertoitscitizens,becauseeveryregionwouldbeabletoexpresstheirreasonedopinionbasedontheirspecificcircumstances.Regionaldiversitywouldbeabletobetakenintoconsiderationinthedecision‐makingprocess.Democraticaccountabilityistogainfromthisproceduremainlythroughalargeincreaseintransparency,forallinformation

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flowsusingtheEWSaretransparent.Inaddition,byhavingpopularelectedactorsbeabletoreacttoproposedlegislation,theseactorscanbeheldaccountablefortheiractionsindividually.Thelargestdownsidetoallowingsuchamechanismtobeappliedtoalargegroupofactorsistheirpotentialtostalllegislationindefinitely.NotonlywillrespondingtoalargenumberofreasonedopinionstakeupvaluableresourcesbytheCommission,inaddition,prolongedbattlesbeforetheCourtofJusticecanmakesurethetimespanbetweenconceptionandimplementationofaparticularpolicycanbesignificantlyextended.TheseargumentsofefficiencyandinstitutionaleffectivenessarethemainreasonwhysuchaprovisionisnotincludedintheproposedEuropeanConstitutionatthemoment.ThisisbothaverypowerfultoolforregionstouseasathreatandapotentialmethodtogettheEuropeanintegrationprocesstocometoagrindinghalt.

5.2.2 FinalscoringofAlternativeB:RegionsandtheEWSThecombinedperspectivesofalargeempowermentofregionsatthecostofefficiencyofEuropeanlegislationmakessurethisalternativehaswidelyvaryingscores.Itdoessucceedverywellinempoweringtheregions,butatacost:TheriskoftheCommissionbeingheldhostagebyacombinationofregionsispresentandwouldmostlikelypreventtheearlywarningsystemfromapplyingatafullEuropeanscale.However,itwouldbefullypossibleforindividualparliamentstoextendthispowertotheirsub‐nationalauthoritiesinordertobettertaketheirconcernsintoconsideration.ConsideringEUregionalblindness,domesticarrangementswouldmostlikelybeneededforthisinstrumenttobeuseablebyregions,forEU‐wideapplicationcouldwellmeanagreatlossinsystemeffectiveness.1. Democratic Accountability Positive (+3) 2. Identification Positive (+3) 3. Effectiveness Very positive (+4) 4. Efficiency Very negative (-4) 5. Realism Very negative (-4) Total score +2 Table5.2:CriterionscoringforalternativeB–RegionsandtheEWS

5.3 AlternativeC:ReformoftheCommitteeoftheRegionsEversincetheCommitteeoftheRegionswasconceived,suggestionshavebeenmadeonhowtomoreinvolvethisorganoftheEuropeanUnioninthepolicy0‐makingprocess.Jeffery(2005)arguesthatinordertomaketheCommitteemoreeffective,severaladjustmentshavetobemadetothestructureandpowersoftheCoR.ThesearechieflyconcernedwiththepowertobringbreachesofsubsidiaritytotheCourtofJustice,apowerattributedtotheCommitteebytheproposedEuropeanConstitution.Assumingthisarticlewillfinditswayintoeffect,theCommitteeitselfwillneedtochangeinthreedistinctways:

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1. TheCommitteewillneednewfocus.Atcurrent,theCoRproducestoomanyopinionsattoolowacommondenominator.Choiceswillhavetobemadeabouttheamountandqualityofopinions.

2. TheCommitteewillneedtohaveanewstructureofopinion‐formationthatwilltakeintoaccountthedifferentinterestsoftypesofregions.Agroupingbyregiontypewouldgoalongwaytostreamlinedecision‐makingwithintheCommittee.

3. StreamlinedproceduresalsowillhavetobecreatedinordertomanagethepowersoftheCoRconcerningsubsidiaritymatters.(Jeffery,2005,p.44)

WhentheCommitteesucceedsinreformingitself,itcouldbegrantedfullinstitutionalstatusbytheEuropeanUnion.Thisinstitutioncouldthenpotentiallybegrantedsomerightsnowgrantedtonationalparliamentsliketheyellow‐cardproceduredescribedearlierandserveasade‐facto“parliamentoftheregions”onequalfootingwithnationalparliaments.

5.3.1 AnalysisTheCommitteeoftheRegionsatcurrentformsaninstitutionalisedvoiceofconcernforregionsandlocalactorswithinEurope.SincethechangesintheNicetreaty,onlyelectedofficialsareallowedtoholdaseatintheCommittee.StrengtheninganinstitutionthatconsistsofelectedofficialswillmostlikelyimprovethedemocraticaccountabilityoftheEuropeanUnion,eventhoughCommitteemembersareassignedratherthanelected.Inaddition,theCommitteeoftheRegionsisthelargestexponentofthediversityoftheEuropeanUnionandconsequentlymightwellbeabletobringcitizen’sconcernsmoredirectlyintotheEUarenaofdecision‐making.Bylimitingtheiropinionsonmattersofdirectregionalinvolvement,effectivenesscanincreasebysupplementingotherEUinstitutionsinamoreindirectway.EmpoweringtheCommitteeoftheRegionswouldnotnecessarilycomplicatedecision‐making.Infact,usingtheabove‐mentionedguidelines,decision‐makingwithintheCommitteewouldbecomemuchlesscomplicated.TheamountofinstitutionalthicknessthatwouldbecreatedwilldependontheamountofpowersattributedtotheCommittee.TheCommitteehaslongbeenconsideredamoresymbolicinstitutiontochannelregionalinterestswithoutgivingtheregionsareallypowerfulvoiceinBrusselsandupsettingdomesticrelationships.UsingminoradjustmentstotheCommitteemightbeaveryrealisticpossibilitywhenconsideringthepoliticalwilltoincreasethelegitimacyoftheEuropeanUnion.ThepowersoftheCommitteearealreadyplannedtobeexpandedbytheConstitutionalTreatyanditisnotunlikelythatthistrendwillcontinue.Themember‐statesconductingthetreatieswouldnotloseanypowerstotheCommitteeandwouldconsequentlybelesshesitanttoempowerthisinstitution.Infact,changingtheCommitteeintoatrueEuropeanInstitutionmightevenbedoneasa“side‐payment”inthemoregeneralbargainingprocessoftheCouncil.

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5.3.2 FinalscoringofAlternativeC:ReformoftheCommitteeoftheRegions

ThecombinedminorchangestotheworkingoftheCommitteeholdspotentialfortheEuropeanUnion.WhenonlytheoldviewsabouttheCommitteeareforgottenandafreshstartcanbemade,usingmorestream‐linedproceduresandmorefocus,theCommitteecouldintheorybeabletomakeregionalinvolvementbeneficialtotheEuropeanUnion.ThisiscontingentonhowtheCommitteewouldtreatthepowerfulexecutiveregionsintheEU,whichatcurrenthavemarginalisedthemselveswithintheCommittee.AgreeingtoasuitablerolefortheseregionsintheCoRwillbeessentialinordertomakeasuccessfulsecondbeginningfortheCommitteeoftheRegions.1. Democratic Accountability Slightly positive (+1) 2. Identification Moderately positive (+1) 3. Effectiveness Slightly positive (+1) 4. Efficiency Slightly positive (+1) 5. Realism Positive (+3) Total score +7 Table5.3:CriterionscoringforalternativeC–ReformoftheCommitteeoftheRegions

5.4 AlternativeD:A“ThirdChamber”ofRegionsThefinalalternativethatIwilldescribeisalsothealternativethataltersthecurrentstructureoftheEuropeanUnionthemostintensively.Inthe“ThirdChamber”variant,theregionsformaseparatedemocraticallyelectedchamberthathasaboutthesamefunctionandrightsastheEuropeanParliament.Whenthecallfora“EuropeoftheRegions”wasfirstheard,manyaregionenvisionedaroleforitselfinsuchathirdchamberinstitution.TheCommitteeoftheRegionsfinallybecamethat“thirdchamber”butneverhadanypowersremotelycomparabletothoseoftheEuropeanParliament.Creatinganewchamber,ortransformingthecurrentCommitteeoftheRegionstoaThirdChamberparliamentwiththerightsofco‐decisionwouldseriouslyalterthebalanceofpowersintheEU.Inhisdissertation,Schobben(2000)thoroughlyinvestigatesstructuresoffurtherfederalisationoftheEUinordertoincludetheregions,andconcludesthatasystemof‘doublefederalisation’usingbothachamberofnationalrepresentativesandachamberconsistingofregionalrepresentativeswouldgothefurthestwayintoinstitutionalisingregionalrepresentationintheEuropeanUnion.Inordertobeabletodothis,theEuropeanmemberstateswouldallhavetoadaptafederalstructurethemselves.Inthedoublefederalsystem,notonlywouldthememberstatesgainseatsintheEuropeanParliament,theirsub‐nationalstateswouldgainseatsinthethirdchamberoftheregions.ProcedureswouldbefairlysimilartothoseoftheEuropeanParliamentandthethirdchamberwouldoperateatthesamelevelastheEuropeanParliament.EachregionwouldhaveadirectrepresentativeintheupmostregionsofEuropeandecision‐making.

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5.4.1 AnalysisTheThirdChambermodelinvolvesathoroughregionaldemocraticrepresentationintheEuropeanUnion.Adirectlyelectedrepresentativeresponsivetotheelectoratewouldrepresentregions.Thecitizensoftheregions,woulddirectlyelectthisrepresentative,makingsuretheyaredirectlyrepresented.ThiswouldgoalongwaytobringingtheEUclosertothecitizens.Thedecision‐makingprocessitselfwouldnotnecessarilybecomemoretransparenttothepublic,becauseofthenumberofinstitutionsthatwouldbeinvolvedinthecreationoflegislation.Anotherconcernisthatincludingasecondlevelofauthoritieswithfulllegislativeandco‐decisionpowerswouldcreateahugeriskofmakingtheUnionunworkable.WhilediversitywouldbeinthecenterofEUdecision‐making,theamountofdiversitybetweenregionsmightwellmakethethirdchamberunabletocometodecisions.Inaddition,disagreementbetweensecondandthirdchambermightholdtheEUinapolicydeadlock.Eventhoughpolicymighthavetotakesub‐nationaldiversityintoaccount,theamountsofpoliciessuccessfulmightbelowindeed.Utilizingadoublefederalisationnecessarilyimpliesmakingsurethatcompetenciesareclearlydefinedanddividedamongstalllevelsofgovernment.OnthepoliticalrealismoftheEuropeanUniontransformingtoafull‐fledgedoublefederationwecanbeclear:Notonlyistheiralreadyhugeoppositionagainstformingasinglefederation,utilizingadoublestructureimpliesbroaddomesticreformsinallmembercountries.Inshort:Thisscenarioasextremelyunlikelytohappeninthenextdecades.

5.4.2 FinalscoringofAlternativeD:“ThirdChamber”AswiththeEarlyWarningSystemscenario,thisalternativealsohasawidevarianceinscoring.WhilethestructuralchangessuggestedmightstrengthendemocraticlegitimacyandcreateacloserconnectionbetweencitizensandtheEuropeanUnion,thesituationwouldputalotofinstitutionalstrainonthesystem,letalonetheveryfaintprospectofthisscenarioevercomingtopass.1. Democratic Accountability Very positive (+4) 2. Identification Extremely positive (+5) 3. Effectiveness Very positive (+4) 4. Efficiency Extremely negative (-5) 5. Realism Extremely negative (-5) Total score +3 Table5.4:CriterionscoringforalternativeD–“ThirdChamber”ofRegions

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5.5 ConclusionInordertocompareallfouralternatives,theywillberepresentedinatable,figure5.5: Council split-

vote Access to

EWS Improving the CoR

Third Chamber

1. Democratic accountability

+1 +3 +1 +4

2. Identification +1 +3 +1 +5 3. Effectiveness +1 +4 +1 +4 4. Efficiency -1 -4 +1 -5 5. Realism -1 -4 +3 -5 Total +1 +2 +7 +3 Figure5.5:TotalscoringofallfouralternativesWhencomparingalternatives,itbecomesobviousthatthealternativesthatharbourthegreatestregionalparticipationarealsotheonesthatplacethegreatestinstitutionalthicknessonthesystem.This,aswellasaperceivedlossofpoweroftheindividualmemberstates,combinesintheratingsonthe“realism”scale:NotmanyofthesuggestedalternativesstandanychanceofbeingincorporatedinareformoftheEuropeaninstitutionalstructureanytimesoon.AcomparisonofthealternativesonallfivecriteriafindsthatonlyalternativeC,thereformoftheCommitteeoftheRegions,scorespositivelyonallaccounts.ThisisinpartduetothefactthatthecurrentCommitteeisunderperformingandreformcanonlyexpecttoincreasetheeffectivenessofthisinstitution.Inaddition,intheConstitutionaldebatethememberstateshavealreadymadeprovisionstoincreasethepowerandscopeoftheCommittee.Inaddition,alternativeCscoreshighestintotal.ItlooksliketheCommitteeisheretostay,soinordertosecureabetterregionalrepresentationthebestroadtoinfluencewouldbeforactorstoconcentrateonincreasingtheeffectivenessoftheCommitteeoftheRegionstogether.AnincreasedinvolvementofregionsthathaveturnedtheirbackontheCoRisadamantinreformingtheCommitteesuccessfully.

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6 ConclusionInthisstudy,IhaveexploredformalarrangementsforactiveparticipationofregionalactorsintheEuropeandecision‐makingprocess.Utilisinganextensivesetofsub‐questions,Ihaveansweredthemainresearchquestion:InwhichformalarrangementcanregionsbestberepresentedintheEuropeanUnionpolicy­makingprocess?Inordertocometomyconclusion,itwasfirstandforemostimportanttohaveasolidunderstandingoftheconceptofregion.Findingthataregionconstitutesmorethanaterritory,Ihavedecidedtousethepoliticalregionasthefocusofthisstudy.Thepoliticalelectedlevelofgovernmentonestepbelowthecentralgovernmentprovedthebethemostsuitableregionalactortoinclude.Overtheyears,regionshavebeenincludedintheEuropeanUnionmoreandmore.ThroughaccesstotheCouncilofMinistersasleaderofanationaldelegationandtheinstitutionalisationofaCommitteeoftheRegions,theEUhasattemptedtoincluderegionalactorsintheirprocedures,aswellasinanattempttosafeguardnationalandregionalcompetenciesthroughtheconceptofsubsidiarity.Theseformalarrangementshaveprovedtobeinsufficient,leadingtothestrongerregionsattemptingtoseekEUinfluenceoutsideoftheofficialchannelsofrepresentation.Thisisunsatisfactory,becauseregionalparticipationisnotonlybeneficialfortheregions,whichcankeeptheEUcompetenciesincheck,butalsototheEuropeanUnionasawhole.Theregions’activeknowledgeoftheon‐the‐groundsituationandimplementationcanhelptoimprovethequalityandlegitimacyofEUpolicies.Regionalparticipationwouldnotonlyprovideadditionalpoliticallegitimationtothedecision‐makingprocess,butalsobringEuropeanpoliticsclosertothecitizensoftheEuropeanUnion.Indoingso,regionalparticipationcanservetodecreasethedemocraticdeficitoftheEuropeanUnion.Severaldifferenttrackscanbedistinguishedwhenanalysingformalarrangementsofregionalparticipation.IhavedescribedalternativesbasedontheCouncilofMinisters,theEarlyWarningSystem,theCommitteeoftheRegionsaswellasabrandnewsystem‐widearchitecturebasedontheadditionofaThirdChamberonparwiththeEuropeanParliament.Utilisingamodestframework,IhavefoundthatthebestoptiontopursueforbothregionsandtheEuropeanUnionistoconcentrateonincreasingthepowersandeffectivenessoftheCommitteeoftheRegions.Notonlyisthisinstitutionallreadyactive,EuropeanleadershaveshownawillingnesstoincreasethepowersoftheCommitteeoftheRegionsovertime.GradualchangemightindeedbetheonlywayforregionstobecomemoreactivelyinvolvedintheEuropeanarenainthelongrun,fornationalstatesareontheaveragereluctanttopartwithpowerattheEuropeanlevel.

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Inaddition,myanalysisshowsthatwhenincludingtheregions,anyproceduralorinstitutionalarrangementrunsalargeriskoffurthercomplicatingthealreadyintricatesystemofEuropeandecision‐making.Whenpowerisshiftedtomoreactors,thedecision‐makingproceduretendstobecomeslower,leadingtoadecreaseintheabilitytomakeeffectivepolicy.Ineffect,thismeansthatevenincreasingthepowersoftheCommitteeoftheRegionscouldprovedetrimentaltotheefficiencyoftheEuropeanUnion.Inthisregard,thefavoredalternativeinthisstudymightbemoreofa“leastbad”alternative.ProvidetheCommitteeoftheRegionswithtoomuchpower,andtheefficiencyoftheEuropeansystemmightwellsuffer.Acarefulbalancemustbestruck.Whileregionshavealargepotentialtoaddlegitimacytothedemocratic,socialandperformanceaspectsoftheEuropeanUnionsystem,caremustbetakennottoseekregionalrepresentationatallcosts,forthecureintheendmightproveworsethanthedisease.TheinitialfocusshouldbeconcentratedonincludingregionalactorslesttheyturntheirbackstotheEuropeanUnionandseektoisolatethemselvesfromsupra‐nationalinvolvement.ThiswouldbeaprospectthatcouldworkoutverydetrimentaltotheEuropeanUnioninthelongterm.Whilea“EuropewiththeRegions”mightnotbeattainable,a“EuropewithouttheRegions”couldwellbethenailonthecoffinontheEuropeanUnion.

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7 DiscussionThemainproductsofthisstudyarebotharecommendation–topursueregionalparticipationthroughtheCommitteeoftheRegions–aswellasadetailedanalysisofpotentialbenefitstoregionsandtheEUinincreasedregionalparticipation.Basedontheseconceptstobeusedintheanalysis,aframeworkwascreated.Thisframework,eventhoughIconsiderittobelargelycomplete,isfarfromperfect.Inthisdiscussion,Iwillbrieflyreflectontheframeworkandit’sapplication,afterwhichIwillturntotheresearchfielditself.

7.1 AreflectionontheframeworkutilisedIncludedintheframeworkareseveraldifferentkindsofconcepts,whichmayormaynotbedirectlycompareable.Allconceptsarerelevantintheanalysisofformalarrangements,butoneconceptisthe“oddoneout”:theinclusionofthe“realism”criteriumcanbeopentodebate,foritisforthemostpartnotascientificbutapoliticalcriterium.Inaddition,thecriteriumitselfdiffersfromtheotherfourcriteriainthatitdoesnotconcernthequalityofthealternative,onlytheroadtowardsimplementationofthecriterium.Fromapurelyscientificbest‐caseanalysis,itshouldnotbepresent.Still,Iamconvincedthatthiscriteriumisneededinordertogivearecommendationtopolicy‐makers,forstrivingtoattaintheimpossiblewouldbeawasteofresourcesforallactorsinvolved.Anotherdownsideofutilisingthisframeworkistheinherentsubjectivenatureofthescoring.Ihaveusedamoderatelyeasyscale,butanyscale,ofanylevelofcomplexity,intheendboilsdowntoanassessmentofthescorebytheresearcherinquestion.Thepersonalestimates,preferencesandlevelofknowledgeoftheindividualdoingtheassessmentmightinfluencethescoringbothpositiveandnegative.Themainpurposeofthescale,howeveristobeabletocomparealternativestoeachotherondifferentcriteria,andinthisitsucceeds.IhaveallreadymentionedthatIhaverefrainedfromweighingthedifferentcriteriaandinsteadwouldleavethattoindividualdecision‐makers,basedontheirfocusandposition.EachEuropeanorpotentialEuropeanactorperceivesdifferentconceptstobeofmoreimportancethanothers.Assigningdifferentweightsmightchangetheconclusionradically.Inaddition,Icouldhavechosenseveralmorealternativesforanalysis.IfeelconfidentthatinincludingfourdifferenttrackstoEuropeanparticipation,Ihavecoveredindirectlymostotherperceivableoptions.Bycombiningalternativescoinedinpoliticaldiscoursewithalternativesofferedinscientificliterature,agrosscrosscutofideashasbeenincluded.

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7.2 RegionsandtheEU:AfieldofresearchInthisstudy,IhaveconcentratedonamassiveamountofliteratureconcerningregionalinfluenceintheEuropeanUnion.Mostofthisliteratureisfromthe90’s,inwhichtheconceptof“EuropeoftheRegions”wasaverypopularnotion.Adinstinctdifferencecanbeseenbetweentheearlyliteratureinthe90’sandthemorerecentliteratureatthestartofthe21stcentury.Themorerecentliteratureisbyfarmorecriticalinitsassessmentoftebenefitsofregionalparticipation,aswellasitisaboutmulti‐levelgovernanceingeneral.Boththesebuzzwordsarenolongerseenasideals.Especiallytherealisationthatmulti‐levelgovernanceincludesadistinctlackoflegitimacyisslowlyenteringscientificdiscourse.Icanimaginethatthisfieldofstudy,especiallywhencombinedwiththeperceivedEuropeandemocraticdeficit,willbethesubjectformanystudiesoverthenextdecade.Multi‐levelgovernanceschemesaregettingusedmoreandmoreallovertheworld,andnewwaysmustbefoundtocompensateforthefailuresofMLG.Focusingonregionsitself:Inliterature,littledistinctionismadeaboutdifferentkindsofregions.Forone,regionsarehardtoqualify.Secondly,whenanalysingregionalparticipationintheEU,regionsofanycountryshouldbepresentbynecessity.IgnoringthefactthatregionsthroughoutEuropediffertremendouslybynation–asIhavedonemyselfinthisstudy,byfocussingonalevelofgovernmentinsteadofatypeofregion–makesforahardanalysisofmodesofregionalinfluenceintheEuropeanUnion.AlineofstudyworthytobepursuedishencetoclassifytheseregionsnotonlybyfunctionbutalsobyEuropeaninfluence,bothperceivedandpotential.Includinglocalgovernments’Europeaninfluence,ofwhichsurprisinglylittleisknowninthescientificcommunity,canevenextendthis.Thedifficultyinanalysingwhatthelevelofinfluenceofanylevelofgovernmentshouldbeisinthatitincludesanormativeassumptionofsub‐nationalparticipationbeingdesirable.Inthisstudy,IhavebuiltuponthatnormativeprincipleeventhoughIhavetriedtolimitmyselfbynotblindlyassumingitsnecessity.Amorethoroughandaboveallbalancedanalysisofthebenefitsanddisadvantagesofsub‐nationalparticipationintheEuropeansystemmightwellbeneeded,andwouldproveforaveryinterestinglineofresearch.Withmulti‐levelgovernanceandsub‐nationalparticipationbeingrelativelynewtotheEuropeanUnionandtheworldatlarge,manyopportunitiesforfurtherstudiessubsequentlypresentitself,leadingtoaveryinterestingemergingfieldofresearch.

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9 SamenvattingDezescriptieconcentreertzichopderolvanregio’sindeEuropeseUnie.IndelaatstejarenisdemanierwaaropEuropeseUniewerktsignificantveranderd.Eenvandelaatsteveranderingenisdebewegingnaareensysteemvanmulti‐levelgovernance,waarhiërarchischeverhoudingennietlangernoodzakelijkzijnvoordeinteractietussenregionaleenlocaleoverhedenendeEuropeseUnie.Hetvormenvanbeleidvindthedentendageplaatsinnetwerkenvandeskundigenuitallelagenvandeoverheid–endaarbuiten.Dezebewegingheeftzorggedragenvooreeneffectieveremaniervanbeleidmaken,maarheeftookhaarkeerzijde;delegitimiteitvandedeelnemendeactorenisnietaltijdgewaarborgd.Vaakzijndeelnemersindebesluitvormings‐proceduresnietdemocratischgekozen,ofishetmandaatkarig.Bovendienisvaakonduidelijkwaardeverantwoordelijkheidvooreenbepaaldebeslissingligt.Bevoegdhedendiedoordenationaleoverheidaanregionaleoverhedenzijngedelegeerd,kunnendoorEuropeaniseringopeensdeverantwoordelijkheidvanEuropesebesluitvormingworden.HetisderhalvenoodzakelijkdatregionaleoverhedeneenrolgaanspelenindezeEuropesebesluitvorming.Eenregioisinprincipeeenbepaaldgrondgebied,meteenbepaaldebevolking.Dezebevolkingheeftvaakhaareigentradities,gebruikenencultuurdiehaardifferentiërenvandenationalenorm.Hierontleentderegiohaaridentiteitaan.Vaakgeeftdezeidentiteitredenvoorhetnastrevenvanzelfbestuur,hoewelookdenationaleoverheidkanbesluitentothetinstitutionaliserenvaneensub‐nationaalniveau.WanneernaardeEuropeseUnieendepotentiëlerolvanregio’sdaarbinnengekekenwordt,isvooraldepolitiekeregio,meteengekozenvertegenwoordiging,vanbelang.Overdelaatstetwintigjaarhebbenregio’sintoenemendemateeenformelerolindeEUtoegedeeldgekregen.ZohebbenzijdemogelijkheidomdenationaledelegatienaardeRaadvandeEuropeseUnieteleiden.Bovendieniserspeciaalvoorsub‐nationaleoverhedeneeninstituutinhetlevengeroepen:HetComitévandeRegio’s.DaarnaastbevindtzichindeEuropeseverdragenhetprincipevansubsidiariteit,waaringestreefdwordtnaarhetnemenvanbeslissingenophetlaagsteniveaumogelijk.Helaasschietenaldezewijzenvanregionaledeelnemingaanhetbesluitvormingsprocestekort:DeelnemingaandeRaadvandeEUisslechtsmogelijkwanneerdenationaleoverheidditwenselijkachtenhetComitéderRegio’sisteverdeeldenmachteloosomvangroteinvloedtezijninhetEuropesebesluitvormingsproces.Hetprincipevansubsidiariteit,datbeschermingdienttebiedenaannationaleenregionalebevoegdheden,wordtslechtsselectiefgebruiktenbovendienslechtsomaantegevenwaaromeenbevoegdheidbeteraandeEUtoebedeeldkanworden.Hetgebrekaanactieveregionaledeelnemingaanhetbesluitvormingsprocesiseengemistekans.Regio’skunnenprofiterenvanactievedeelnemingindeEuropesearenadoordatzijdebevoegdhedenvandeEUintoomkunnenhouden,zekerwaarhetbevoegdhedenzijndieopnationaalniveaunaarderegio’sgedelegeerdzijn.Bovendienkunnenderegio’s,doorhaaruitgebreidekennisvan

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deimplementatieeneffectenvanEuropeesbeleid,ineenvroegtijdigstadiumpotentiëleproblemensignalerenenmeenemenindebesluitvorming.VooraldoordezelaatstemogelijkheidstaatdeEuropeseUnieooktewinnenbijregionaleinmenging;dekwaliteitvanhetbeleidzalsignificantverbeterdkunnenwordendoortoevoegingvandekennisenexpertisevanregio’s.DaarnaastkanookdelegitimiteitvanhetEuropesebesluitvormingsprocesverbeterdwordendoorhettoevoegenvaneendirectverkozenendusdemocratischgelegitimeerdevertegenwoordiging.Dezedemocratischverkozenvertegenwoordigingbevindtzichooknogeensopeenniveauwatdichterbijdeburgerstaat.Immers,hoekleinerhetterritorium,hoedirecterdepoliticusbetrokkenisbijdedagelijkseervarenproblemenenbekommeringenvandeburgerenhoegroterdekansisdatdevertegenwoordigerdenormenenwaardenvandeburgerdeelt.Helaasbiedtregionaleparticipatienietenkelvoordelen.DoorhettoevoegenvaneenextraactorinhetbesluitvormingsprocesbestaaterhetrisicototovercompliceringvandemomenteelalzeergecompliceerdeproceduresvoorEuropesebesluitvorming.HetgevaarbestaatdatdeEUalshetwarevastlooptdooreentegroteinstitutionelecomplexiteitenhetinbeschouwingmoetennemenvanteveel,vaaksignificantverschillende,overwegingenenbelangen.Overdejarenzijnerverschillendesuggestiesgedaanomregio’smeertebetrekkenbijdeEU.Eenviertalverschillendealternatievenwordenindezestudiegeanalyseerd:TeneerstehetdelenvandestemmenindeRaad,waarbijregio’sinvloedhebbenopdestemverhoudingenbinnendeRaadvandeEuropeseUnie,hethoogsteorgaan.Tentweededemogelijkheidomnetalsnationaleparlementengebruiktemakenvanhetvroege‐waarschuwings‐systeem.Hierbijzoudenregio’sineenvroegtijdigstadiumhunbezwarenbijeenvoorgenomenbeleidofregelgevingkenbaarkunnenmaken.DederdemogelijkheidbetreftdeversterkingvanhetComitéderRegio’senbehelstnietalleeneenefficiëntieslagmaarookeenuitbreidingvandebevoegdhedenvanhetComité.Delaatsteenmeestingrijpendemogelijkheidishetinstitutionaliserenvaneen“DerdeKamer”vanregio’s,naasthetEuropeesParlementendeRaad.Uitdeanalyseblijktdatallealternatievendeinvloedvanregio’sophetEuropesebesluitvormingsprocesvergroten.Ditvarieertvanmarginaaltotsignificant.BovendienvergrotenallegenoemdealternatievendedemocratischelegitimiteitvanhetEuropesesysteem.Keerzijdeis,zoalsgemeld,hetrisicovanover‐institutionalisering.Zekerbijdemeeruitgebreidealternatievenishiereenreëelgevaaraanwezig.Verderisookgekekennaarhetrealismevandealternatieven:Ishetüberhauptuitvoerbaarenisdepolitiekewilaanwezig?Wanneerdealternatieventegenelkaarafgewogenworden,blijktdatdeversterkingvanhetComitévandeRegio’sdevoorkeurheeft.NietalleenhebbendelidstatenalregelmatigdebevoegdhedenvanhetComitévergroot,bovendienkanhiergebruikgemaaktwordenvaneenbestaandeinstitutionelearchitectuurdiedebinnen‐lidstatelijkeverhoudingennietbeïnvloeden.Hetisdanookaantebevelenvoorzowelregio’salsdeEuropeseCommissieomhunenergietestekenindeopwaarderingvanhetComitéderRegio’s.