Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 32, No. 3 September 1994

Europe and America in the Clinton Era

JOHN PETERSON* University of Glasgow

1. Introduction

In January 1994, in his first speech on European soil as United States (US) President, Bill Clinton mostly spouted well-worn platitudes about the virtues of transatlantic partnership. Notably, however, he urged that ‘the new security must be found in Europe’s integration . . . . The purpose of my trip to Europe is to help lead the movement toward that integration and to assure you that America will be a strong partner in it’ (US Mission, 1994, p. 2).

Clinton’s speech acted to resuscitate high hopes prompted within the Euro- pean Union (Ev) by his arrival in office. In 1990, the Transatlantic Declaration had signalled the Bush administration’s acceptance of the European Communi- ty’s increased legislative authority over ‘new’ security issues such as trade, foreign direct investment, environmental protection and aid to eastern Europe. In 1992, the election of Clinton - a fresh-minded, progressive leader interested in new solutions to global problems-seemed to offer opportunities for expanded US-EU co-operation.

* I a n grateful to the British Council fortravel funds and the Secretariat General ofthe European Commission foro research grant which facilitated my residence as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels in early 1994. Numerous US and EU officials provided crucial assistance in the form of non-attributable interviews. I am indebted to two anonymous referees. Elizabeth Bomberg, Stephen Dubrow, Thomas Frellesen. Roy Ginsberg, Erik Jones, Michael Smith and especially Youri Devuyst for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

0 Bmil BlnckwelI Ltd 1994,108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1 JF, UK and 238 Main Smet. Cambridge, MA 02142, USA

412 JOHN PETERSON

European optimism was reflected in a series of papers considered at the informal Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers in April 1993.1 Ideas were floated for new bilateral co-operation agreements on financial services, macro- economic, monetary, customs and standards issues. EU ministers were presented with a list of economic sectors ripe for ‘regulatory convergence’, as well as ideas for ‘early warning systems’ designed to detect and resolve bilateral trade disputes before they festered into political conflicts (see Danish Presidency, 1993; CEC, 1993b).

Yet, when asked what had come out of the Gymnich ideas for expanded co- operation six months later, a senior European Commission official replied, ‘nothing’ (interview, November 1993). Throughout 1993, the Clinton adminis- tration appeared to consider foreign policy to be, at best, a relatively low priority and, at worst, a distraction from its domestic agenda. Lacking clear or even identifiable doctrines, US policy became driven by events, the media and public opinion. Recriminations over Bosnia culminated in Clinton’s Washington Post interview in October, in which he accused France and the United Kingdom (UK) of obstructing US plans for using force against Serbian aggression. The same week saw the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, charge that western Europe was ‘no longer the dominant area of the world’? One American opinion leader described the EU as a ‘dead, soul-less creature’.3

Meanwhile, the Clinton administration invested much political capital in reinvigorating the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) mechanism and securing US Congressional acceptance of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFI’A). Evidence mounted that the US administration believed that America’s economic future lay in Asia and North America. Europe offered only ‘mature markets with few opportunities for expanded exports, foreign policy nightmares such as Bosnia, and an unimaginative and backward-looking pessimism’ (Graham, 1993).

The volatility of US European policy in 1993 acted to obscure three points fundamental to understanding transatlantic relations in the Clinton era. First, Clinton came to office with no fixed notion of whether or how European integration served US interests.4 Second, his administration showed that it will judge the EU by its actions in the post-Maastricht period. The third point is best

‘Gymnichmeetings are twice-yearly informal gatherings of EU foreign ministers heldover a weekend. They are designed to encourage reflective discussion on general and medium or long-term policy issues. The label ‘Gymnich’ derives from the name of the German castle where the fmt such meeting was held.

Quoted in the Economist, 30 October 1993, p.14. See also interview with Christopher in the Finunciul Times, 24 November 1993. ’New York Times columnist, Anthony Lewis, quoted in the Finunciul Times, 26 November 1993. ‘ Clinton made remarkably few statements on foreign policy during his Presidential campaign. One of his only substantive observations on the EU was that, ‘it is too early to say whether the integration of Western Europe will be a plus or minus for America. If they keep opening trade, well, that’s good’ (see USIS, 1993.

Q Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994 P. 6).

EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE CLINTON ERA 41 3

expressed baldly: the EU stands to get the Clinton administration that it deserves. This article reviews developments in transatlantic relations in 1993 and early

1994. It seeks to update a burgeoning recent literature on US-EU relations (Featherstone and Ginsberg, 1993; Gantz and Roper, 1993; Ludlow et al., 1993; Peterson, 1993; Smith and Woolcock, 1993). Its conclusion assesses the pros- pects for bilateral partnership in the Clinton era.

2. The Domestic Politics of US-EU Relations

The first transatlantic dispute of the Clinton eraensued almost immediately after the new administration took office in January 1993. Decisions taken during the Bush era to apply anti-dumping duties to US imports of steel were implemented at a time when EU governments were struggling to cope with massive over- capacities in European steel supplies. EU officials admitted that there was little that the Clinton administration could have done to block the move. Yet, fierce attacks on EU protectionism by Clinton’s Trade Representative (USTR), Mick- ey Kantor, exacerbated tensions arising from the steel dispute and threatened to provoke a full-blown trade war.

Unilateralism in American trade policy, as reflected in the anti-dumping action on steel, is mostly a product of the extreme sensitivity of the US political system to nanow producer interests. The ability of US industry lobbies to fmd political support, particularly in Congress, for specific protectionist measures means that the majority’s general preference for free trade is a relatively weak influence on policy. Clinton’s appeals to vixtually every industry lobby during the 1992 election campaign promised to make his administration especially responsive to sectoral interests. His threat to reopen the laboriously negotiated US-EU ‘Airbus accord’ on subsidies to domestic aircraft manufacturers, and Kantor’s insistence that ‘we will not subordinate our economic interests to foreign policy or defence concerns’ resonated loudly in European capitals (quoted in the Economist, 27 March 1993; see also Kantor, 1993).

Another feature of the US political system -the autonomy of individual US states -contributed to a bilateral row over public procurement in early 1993. US officials insisted that Washington was ‘traditionally opposed’ to ‘Buy America’ laws passed by state legislatures, which often prohibit public purchases of non- American products. But Jean-Paul Benoit of the European Parliament (EP) expressed the widespread EU view that the Clinton administration was ‘playing the autonomy of the federal States well’ on the issue (quoted in Agence Europe, 8 July 1993; see also CEC, 1993~).

Above all, bilateral trade tensions threatened to poison the climate for negotiations on a final settlement to the Uruguay Round of the General Agree- ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). By mid-1993, the depth of the Clinton 8 Bisil Blackwell Lid 1994

414 JOHN PETERSON

administration’s commitment to a GATT deal was unclear. In February, Clinton had declared that ‘open and competitive commerce will enrich us as a nation’.5 Yet, American negotiating positions within the GATT hardened. The new administration began to replicate the Bush administration’s penchant for casting the EU and Japan as scapegoats for declining US competitiveness. The schizo- phrenia of Clinton’s trade policy acted to validate EU fears that ‘without [an] external threat that acts as rallying point, umfying focus and target, the rampant pluralism and sectionalism of the US political system may be impossible to overcome’ (Williams et al., 1993, p.16).

Even on non-economic issues, the Clinton administration appeared hyper- sensitive to Congressional and public opinion. Clinton quickly backed away from his commitment to the humanitarian aid effort in Somalia after grisly pictures of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogad- ishu were shown on US television. His administration came within a whisker of bowing to domestic pressures to lift the international arms embargo on Bosnia in May 1993, despite strong indications that Clinton shared British and French concerns about the dangers involved. For many in the EU, Clinton’s behaviour on Bosnia painted ‘a depressing picture of the quality of the young US presiden- cy’ (Marr, 1993; see also Tucker and Hendrickson, 1993).

Meanwhile, the EU was living through the most acrimonious and crisis- ridden period in its recent history. The rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by Danish voters in the May 1992 referendum cast fresh doubt on the inevitability of closer European integration. The Treaty’s provisions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and links to the exclusively European military alliance, the West European Union (WEU), remained unconsummated.

The EU’s external policy remained driven mostly by domestic pressures in individual Member States. The ‘domestic politics’ of the EU consist of multi- dimensional conflicts within and between its Member States and common institutions. The plurality of influences which shape EU foreign policy decisions produces strong biases towards inaction and policy inertia. German insistence on tough military action in Bosnia using other countries’ troops was rooted in pressures at home to stop both the bloodshed in the Balkans and the influx of refusees into Germany, while respecting constitutional restrictions on the use of German forces abroad. The French contribution to the humanitarian aid effort in ex-Yugoslavia - the largest by far of any European state - was driven by public outrage in France at the EU’s inefficacy.

Internal EU wrangling left the Union unable to relate to the US as an equal partner. Accusations in early 1993 by numerous French politicians and the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, that the US policy of benign neglect of the

Speech delivered at the American University in Washington, D.C. as reproduced in the Infernational Herald Tribune. 27-28 February, 1993. 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994

EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE CLINTON ERA 415

dollar was a deliberate attempt to undermine plans for a single European currency were both paranoid and incredible (Nelson, 1993; Smith, 1993). The Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia became a dead letter when the Clinton administration made it clear that the US was unwilling to enforce it with American troops. Afterwards, a myopic proposal to enforce ‘safe havens’ in Bosnia was initiated by the US together with France, the UK and Spain-not with the EU as a whole.

The Clinton administration became tempted to exploit internal EU divisions. First, in June 1993, Clinton tried to use German support for lifting the Bosnian arms embargo to split the Union on the issue. At virtually the last minute, Clinton and Kohl were outmanoeuvred by the French President, Francois Mitterrand. The commitment of 1300 additional French troops to the EU’s humanitarian aid effort gave new credibility to the argument that lifting the embargo would further ignite the conflict and increase the risks to western peace-keepers.

Second, the bilateral procurement row led Germany to invoke an obscure 1954 US-German treaty which appeared to exempt Germany from US retalia- tory measures. The Kohl government’s action was mostly a sop to the German multinational, Siemens, which coveted US public markets for telecommunica- tions. This blatant violation of the EU’s common external trade policy was seized upon with glee by Kantor.

The procurement dispute also showed that the Clinton administration had taken careful note of divisions within the Commission itself on the 1992 Blair House Agreement on bilateral agricultural trade. After initialling the agreement, the Commissioner for Agriculture, Ray MacSharry, had resigned his GATT responsibilities amidst allegations that the Commission President, Jacques Delors, had undercut his authority by intervening. Delors’ claim that Blair House offered too many EU concessions had fuelled suspicions that he was positioning himself for the French presidential election in 1995.

Delors subsequently recanted and MacSharry retook the trade portfolio. A senior British official later suggested that the incident ‘actually helped EU-US relations because it damaged Delors as a spoiler and it was arguably a necessary prelude to the Blair House Agreement’ (interview, May 1993). A more widely held view was that ‘even if a GATI’ deal is done, it will have been achieved at the expense of much damage to the reputations of Mr Delors, the Commission and the [Em’ (Economist, 14 November 1992).

As the procurement dispute threatened to escalate in March 1993, Delors paid Clinton an unscheduled visit in Washington. Delors warned that the imposition of US trade sanctions would give ammunition to EU protectionists. Clinton dutifully directed Kantor to delay the imposition of sanctions. At this point, Kantorapparently began to view Delors as an alternative ‘lever’ to the EU’s main trade negotiator, Sir Leon Brittan.

0 Bnsil Blnckwell Ltd 1994

416 JOHN PETERSON

When a new deadline for the imposition of sanctions was reached, Kantor approached Delors to ask for further concessions. Delors balked and insisted that only B r i m could negotiate with the US on the issue. The row was then effectively settled by Brittan and Kantor, even if both sides eventually imposed limited sanctions on telecommunications imports. One Commission insider later observed that ‘Delors was extremely good, very helpful in keeping negotiations from getting more complicated’ (interview, May 1993).

Remarkably, despite intense transatlantic tensions in 1992-93, bilateral agreement was reached on four key trade deals. First, the ‘Airbus accord’ remained intact despite Clinton’s rhetoric and his heavy-handed salesmanship of a bid to secure a large order of US aircraft from Saudi Arabia in early 1994. Second, the Blair House Agreement held despite the need for ‘clarifications’ by the US in response to French demands. Third, a bilateral agreement on govern- ment procurement substantially opened US and EU utility markets. Fourth and most critically, substantial progress in US-EU negotiations on market access paved the way for a GATT deal in December 1993. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round implied a firm acknowledgement on both sides that ‘domestic econom[ies] will fall or stand in the international arena’ (Yankelovich, 1992; see also Tarnoff, 1992). Against all odds, bilateral trade relations were on a good footing by early 1994.

Still, the increased politicization of trade policies can be expected to compli- cate and occasionally disrupt transatlantic relations in the 1990s. Expanded volumes of trade naturally give more domestic interests a higher stake in trade policies. Put simply, trade has become a ‘core’ security issue. Trade policies have become the targets of more diverse and intense domestic pressures.

On non-economic issues, domestic pressures will matter more than during Cold War years, when the imperatives of a bipolar world muted their impact. However, one possible lesson to be drawn from the early days of the Clinton era is that mutual recriminations aired in public may placate domestic opinion while masking an essential US-EU convergence of views on policy. One EU official acknowledged a ‘transatlantic rift on Yugoslavia’, but added ‘there really isn’t one because, for domestic reasons, everyone’s pleased with having the rift’ (interview, May 1993).

3. Foreign Policy-Making: Altered Structures and New Uncertainties

The Clinton administration came to power determined to restructure the US foreign policy-making process to better integrate US foreign and domestic policies. This determination inspired initial optimism in the EU about the possibilities for invigorated bilateral co-operation on ‘new’ security issues. Yet, the EU’s status as a weak trading club when the Democrats last held power in the @ Basil Blackwcll Ltd 1994

EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE CLINTON ERA 417

1970s was reflected in many of Clinton’s foreign policy appointments. Neither the new US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, nor Stephen Oman, the Head of the State Department’s European bureau, were experts in European affairs. Clinton’s National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, reportedly con- fessed that he had never heard of the Transatlantic Declaration (Economist, 27 March 1993).

New limes of authority within the US foreign policy community brought new uncertainties for US-EU relations. During the Bush years, senior State Depart- ment figures often stepped in to assert State’s primacy over European policy when the USTR, Carla Hills, demanded sanctions against the EU. One effect was to help keep trade policy free of capture by special interests, even if another was to provoke Congressional outrage.

By contrast, Clinton’s newly created National Economic Council (NEC) - modelled on the National Security Council but preoccupied with ‘economic security’ questions - often took the lead on trade policy (Stokes, 1993). Initial fears that it would favour tough anti-EU trade actions on ‘national security’ grounds proved unfounded. The NEC moderated Kantor’s sabre-rattling and kept trade policy within the remit of Clinton’s closest confidantes. It also deterred the State and Treasury Departments from intervening and sparking backlashes in Congress.

Robert Rubin, the head of the NEC, is clearly sympathetic to the argument that European integration is good for US interests. He also has been a personal friend of Sir Leon Brittan since their student days at Yale University. Despite the Treasury Department’s long-standing antipathy to the EU, both Clinton’s Treasury Secretary, Lloyd Bentsen, and the top Treasury official forhternation- a1 Affairs, Lawrence Summers, take a generally benign view of European integration. Despite Kantor’s tenacity and lack of trade policy experience, he at least offers good relations with Congress and (unlike Christopher) unquestioned access to Clinton himself. Kantor and Brittan appeared to develop a strong personal affinity after dozens of all-night negotiating sessions in 1993. On non-economic issues, Jenonne Walker (199 l), a member of the traditional

National Security Council, is a f m advocate of closer European integration. Clinton’s ambassador to the EU, Stuart Eizenstat, is a political heavyweight familiar with the intricacies of US domestic politics after his stint as a key policy adviser in the Carter administration. In January 1994, Clinton’s bizarre eulogy to France’s ‘constructive cooperation’ during the Uruguay Round carried the mark of transatlanticists in his administration.

Yet, the ability of the EU to act as an effective partner remained open to scepticism. The incoherence of the EU’s trade strategy was highlighted by French obstinacy on agriculture and German dithering on the procurement issue. The first use of the new CFSP mechanisms following the long-delayed ratifica-

0 B o d Blnckwcll Ltd 1994

418 JOHN PETERSON

tion of Maastricht in late 1993 yielded unambitious plansfor ‘joint actions’ in ex- Yugoslavia, eastern Europe, South Africa, Russia and the Middle East.

Altered structures for making foreign policy on both sides of the Atlantic reinforce the importance of the 1990Transatlantic Declaration. The backbone of US-EU political dialogue, bi-annual meetings between senior US and EU Member State foreign policy officials, are ill structured but still a huge improve- ment on pre-1990 exchanges, which were ‘usually little more than a superficial diplomatic chat’ (de Ruyt, 1989, p.34). A host of bilateral ‘panels of experts’ quietly nurture co-operation on a diverse range of trade, environmental, techno- logical and educational issues (CEC, 1993a, pp.1-2). For example, exchanges between US oficials and the EU’s Bangemann Group of telecommunications users and manufacturers in 1994 helped maintain an open dialogue despite differences of view on standards and govemment access to data on ‘information superhighways’.

In late 1993, Eizenstat admitted that some exchanges mandated in the Transatlantic Declaration had become ‘moribund’, but also declared that the US was ‘committed to breath[ing] life into that Declaration’ (Eizenstat quoted in Inside Europe, October 1993). A subsequent meeting held under the terms of the Declaration on 1 November brought together Brittan, Delors, Christopher and Kantor, and yielded critical progress on the GATT. The unveiling in February 1994 of an ‘early warning system’ at the sub-cabinet level promised a ‘somewhat quieter dialogue’ on thorny issues such as procurement and audio-visual trade.6 Logically, regular and institutionalized exchanges make it less likely that one side will be caught unaware of changes in the other’s foreign policy priorities or intentions.

The Commission continues to urge an intensification of contacts with the US on issues which are likely to become the subject of CFSP joint actions, such as arms proliferation, the migration of refugees and China (CEC, 1993b). A new Directorate General (IA) was created in 1993 to maximize the Commission’s role in the CFSP and assess the impact of joint actions on non-EU countries. The Commission also developed a new ‘internal think tank’ to provide strategic analyses of external trade relations that transcend the crisis of the day. The unit was directly linked to senior Commission officials responsible for the GATI’and was headed by a former Deputy Head of Unit for relations with North America, Agne Pantelouri. Similarly, the Clinton administration appointed Ellen Frost, a committed free trader with substantial knowledge of EU affairs, to a new USTR post for strategic planning.

However, different US and EU policy styles will continue to bedevil bilateral relations. The Clinton administration has acted according to a familiar pattern in

US Undersecretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Joan Spero. quoted in Agence Europe. 4 February 1994. 8 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994

EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE CLINTON ERA 419

American foreign policy-making: decisions are taken relatively quickly and then policies are revised if deemed ineffective. The EU’s foreign policy style remains far more cautious and methodical. Usually, its primary objective is to preserve unity amongst Member States, rather than actually to solve problems. The case of ex-Yugoslavia illustrates how difficult it is for the EU to respond firmly and quickly or to change its policy line once one has been taken.

Common actions to deal with problems which implicate both the US and EU require continuous bilateral dialogue at all levels. Despite the emergence of new pressures on foreign policies and the uncertainties which stem from changes in policy-making stmctures, the present transatlantic dialogue is more systematic and institutionalized than at any time since the formation of the European Community. On the other hand, truly joint foreign policy actions remain more of an ideal than a practical reality.

4. The Role of Ideas in US-EU Relations

The first year of the Clinton administration left two dominant and somewhat contradictory impressions on EU foreign policy-makers. First, Clinton’s general inattention to foreign policy left his administration prone to blunders when crises arose. Second, the Clinton administration showed itself willing to embrace - at least in principle - a host of new ideas for coping with the problems of modem govemance.7 A transatlantic convergence of ideas became palpable:

European visitors to the Oval Office are finding themselves questioned closely and sympathetically about European health care systems, environmental legislation, and vocational education. In its efforts to make the United States more competitive, the Clinton administration is seeking to learn from Europe. (Dobbins, 1993, p. 3)

Early in his Presidency, Clinton signalled his interest in the global co- ordination of macroeconomic policies to promote economic recovery and job creation. In the event, Delors’ White Paper on Growth and Competitiveness, adopted by the EU in December 1993, was substantially watered down from earlier versions. Clinton’s own 1993 growth initiative, which was too small to do much to stoke US economic recovery in the first place, was killed off in Congress. The prospects for further joint initiatives are dim, especially given the blocking power of the Republican minority and the vulnerability of the Demo- cratic majority in the US Senate. Far more Democrat-held than Republican-held marginal seats will be contested in the 1994 US mid-term election,

’ See New Perspectives QuorferIy (1993) for a review of previously published statements by key members of the Clinton administration - including A1 Gore, Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Robert Reich and Clinton himself - on ecology, demographic change, global economics. and education.

0 Basil BIackweIl Ltd 1994

420 JOHN PETERSON

Moreover, sharp variations in short-term economic circumstances will inev- itably provoke differences of view on macroeconomic questions. The US rate of job creation continues to increase much faster than that of the EU. By early 1994, the unemployment rate in the US had fallen below 7 per cent, while the EU’s was over 10 per cent and unlikely to decrease significantly until at least 1995. Only 6 per cent of those jobless in the US had been unemployed for over a year, while some estimates put the EU figure at nearly 50 per cent. The depth and persistence of the European recession gave protectionism intellectual respectability in the EU, particularly in France. The index shown in Figure 1, based on seven key economic variables! reflects the gap in US and EU short-term economic performances. Severe transatlantic tensions arose during previous periods of sharp divergences under the Nixon and Reagan Presidencies.

Still, the Group of 7’s ‘jobs summit’, held in early 1994 at Clinton’s insistence, reflected his administration’s almost obsessive fascination with new ideas for international co-operation. Clinton and Karitor both-urged repeatedly that existing international organizations should be used to link trade with environmental, technology, labour and competition policies. Attempts to flesh out or multilateralize such links would almost certainly have to begin with joint US-EU initiatives.

The Clinton administration’s generally positive view of the Commission, whose external policy responsibilities are expanding, could help facilitate such initiatives. The Commission’s leadership in pushing EU Member States (in the face of strong national resistance) to expand access to the EU’s market for eastern European countries has played well in Washington. Whatever its limitations, Delors’ White Paper in key respects sought to replicate US success in simulta- neously creating employment while increasing productivity. Eizenstat (1993) termed it ‘a historic turning point’.

In 1993, the Clinton administration pledged to re-examine the Transatlantic Declaration to verify whether the EU’s new post-Maastricht powers justified stronger co-operative links. It determined that a formal co-operation treaty was unlikely until after 1996, given EU plans to review the Maastricht arrangements in a new intergovernmental conference. Delors concurred that ‘it is premature to foresee a Declaration number two. Our task today is to reinforce and to give more content to the present Declaration’ (European Report, 12 May 1993). At the

The variables are real growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). industrial production growth (excluding construction), consumer price inflation, employment growth, unemployment levels. govem- ment borrowing requirements as a percentage of GDP. and current account balances as a percentage of GDP. Performance with respect to each variable is ranked over time on a scale from 1 to the total number of years being assessed. The index value for any given year is the sum of rankings for each indicator across the full range of all seven indicators, divided by the product of the number of years and the number of indicators, multiplied by 100 (see Jones. 1994).

B Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994

EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE CLINTON ERA 42 1

0 Basil Blackwell Lrd 1994

422 JOHN PETERSON

transatlantic summit of January 1994, Clinton claimed to be ‘committed to deepening our relationship with the EU . . . at all levels’ (USIS, 1994).

The most important prerequisite for enhanced US-EU co-operation is an effective and unified CFSP. Clinton’s focus on eastern Europe during his first visit to Europe in 1994 implied that the EU policy in the region will be an important litmus test. Leading figures in his administration have condemned as senseless the bilateral rivalries which emerged on aid to the east during the Bush Presidency. For the most part, the US, EU and various financial institutions still deal with each recipient individually and thus give them little incentive to co- operate amongst themselves. An integrated western approach, which channels aid regionally and encourages its recipients to design collective decision-making processes on aid and trade, has long been supported by the Commission.

A convergence of ideas has also emerged on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Brussels NATO Summit in January 1994 showed Clinton to be far more relaxed than Bush had been about the develop- ment of an independent European security and defence identity. Clinton con- f m e d US support for the integrated Eurocorps,g the principle of stronger WEU links to eastern Europe, and even the possible use of NATO assets by the WEU. The communiquk of the Brussels NATO summit contained seven references to a ‘European security and defence identity’, five to ‘the European pillar of the alliance’ and eight to the WEU (reprinted in the Financial Times, 12 January 1994).

Meanwhile, views on questions of European security have converged within the EU. The UK’s endorsement of the French conviction that change in the Atlantic Alliance is ‘both indispensable and incomplete’ is indicative (Weston, 1992, p. 9). France’s position on the use of NATO forces beyond the Alliance’s borders softened considerably in 1993. NATO’s subsequent endorsement of more flexible command structures for ‘combined joint task forces’ offered the possibility of French participation in specific peace-keeping missions without France having to accept the diplomatic bloody nose of rejoining NATO’s integrated command.

After public FranctAJS diplomatic clashes about what to do about the crisis in the Balkans, the French found themselves in the unfamiliar role of supporting the US line that only NATO possessed the resources needed to pose a credible threat to the Serbs. Eventually, air strikes against Serbian forces around Sarajevo and Gorazde were threatened by NATO and several Serbian aircraft were shot down over Bosnia in early 1994. The French seemed sanguine about the way in which NATO practice in ex-Yugoslavia had overtaken NATO doctrine (see Hunter, 1994).

The Eurocorps is a multinational m y unit of divisions from France, Germany and Belgium. As of mid-1994. it consisted of approximately 50,000 troops and 650 main battle tanks. 8 Basil Blackwcll Ltd 1994

EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE CLINTON ERA 423

More generally, US and EU visions of a new European security architecture may be at an early stage of convergence around a logical chain of assumptions. It is difficult to imagine an effective CFSP without an effective WEU, an effective WEU without strong links to NATO, or, ultimately, memberships of the EU, WEU and the European pillar of NATO which are not broadly similar. Amongst the factors fuelling defence cuts in several EU Member States are public deficit reduction programmes needed to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria for Economic and Monetary Union. Thus, the development of the EU is already having defence implications. Pressures for pooling EU military resourc- es - while keeping ‘America in Europe’ -remain strong. In early 1994, Clinton demurred from endorsing the simultaneous future accession of eastern countries to NATO, the WEU and the EU. Eventual US support for the ‘big idea’ of linking their memberships is not inconceivable, but it will require anEU which is amore reliable and unified partner.

5. Conclusion

After 18 months in office, the Clinton administration seemed determined to encourage European integration and an altered US role within the western alliance. The evolution of US policy invites reinterpretation of the ‘transatlantic crisis’ of 1993. For example, when Christopher toured Europe to present a ‘menu’ of options for western policy towards Bosnia in May, he shocked European allies with his receptiveness to their views. The impression given was one of US weakness and a lack of will to lead on Bosnia. Yet, in urging that, ‘we have to move forward with Europe’, Clinton broke important new ground in making clear to the US public new limits to American power (quoted in the Independent, 13 May 1993). His actions also provided evidence that his foreign policy will not be driven exclusively by his domestic agenda or US public opinion. It may even feature the ‘new idea’ of aligning US foreign policies, perhaps to an extent previously unseen, with those of its most trusted allies. Early 1994 brought f m US endorsement of the EU’s action plan for ex-Yugoslavia. For their part, EU Member States welcomed more active US diplomacy in the region and a US plan for a Muslim-Croatian confederation in Bosnia.

The list of preconditions for a true US-EU partnership in the Clinton era is daunting. It includes, in the short term, a lasting political settlement in Bosnia, the effective implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, and continued progress on Clinton’s domestic agenda. In the longer term, the EU must develop a more unified foreign policy and offer the countries of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union far more access to its markets. The central problem for US-EU relations is that the EU remains unable to take up the challenge of a US administration which admits - in the words of a senior official - that ‘we 0 Basil Blnckwell Ltd 1994

424 JOHN PEIERSON

Americans have to get better at learning how to share leadership’ (quoted in the Economist, 19 February 1994).

However, there is little question that the combined power of the US and EU across a broad range of both traditional and ‘new’ foreign policy issues far surpasses that of any other conceivable alliance (Peterson and Ward, 1994). Clinton’s initiative in 1993 for an ‘Asia-Pacific Economic Community’ re- vealed the limitations of a Pacific Rim alliance more than its viability as a provider of leadership in global politics. The APEC summit in November focused almost exclusively on trade and investment. Its ultimate purpose became the enlistment of other Asian nations in the American trade campaign against Japan. It is impossible to imagine the Pacific Rim as a cohesive political grouping. Doubts persist even about its capacity for expanded economic co- operation.

In contrast, the January 1994 transatlantic summit in Brussels yielded calls by Brittan and Kantor for the US and EU to work ‘shoulder to shoulder’ in pushing Japan to open its markets.10 It also featured bilateral discussions about linking trade with environmental protection, anti-trust regulations and labour standards in the new World Trade Organization. Whether the obstacles to developing these links are so formidable as to be insurmountable is open to argument. However, joint US-EU leadership is clearly a necessary, if far from sufficient, condition for surmounting them.

References

Brittan, Sir L. (1994) ‘The World Economy After the Uruguay Round’. Address delivered at the Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) 17 January.

Commission of the European Communities (1993a) General Overview of EC-US Relations (Brussels: CEC, DG I), April.

Commission of the European Communities (1993b) Relations Between the European Communities and the United States. Communication from the Commission to the Council, SEC (93) Def, 61 10/93 (Brussels: CEC) 6 April.

Commission of the European Communities (1993~) Report on UnitedStates Trade and Investment Barriers (Brussels: CEC) April.

Danish Presidency (1993) ‘EC-US Relations’. Note to informal meeting of EC Foreign Ministers at Hindsgavl on 24 April, 61 10/93 (Brussels) 22 April.

de Ruyt, J. (1989) ‘European Political Cooperation: Toward a Unified European Foreign Policy’. Atlantic Council of the United States Occasional Paper (Washing- ton D.C.) October.

Dobbins, J.F. (1993) ‘Europeand ArnericainthePost-Cold WarEra: AgendaforaEuro- Atlantic Community’. Address by United States Representative to the European

lo Kantor quoted in the Financial Times, 10 January 1994 (see also Brittan, 1994). Cg Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994

EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE CLINTON ERA 425

Communities delivered at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, USAT AM 2 (Brussels: US Mission to the European Communities) 24 May.

Eizenstat, S.E. (1993) ‘Sober Lessons From an Era of Job Creation’. WallStreet Journal Europe, 9 December, p. 16.

Featherstone, K. and Ginsberg, R. H. (1993) The United States and the European Community in the 1990s (New York and London: St. Martin’s).

Gantz, N. and Roper, J. (1993) Towardsa New Partnership: US-European Relations in flie Cold War Era (Paris: Institute for Strategic Studies of the West European Union).

Graham, G. (1993) ‘Weary Clinton Sets Sights on Pacific Goals’. Financial Times, 22 November, p. 6.

Hunter, R. (1994) ‘NATO: Leading theEuropean Union Eastwards’. Address delivered at Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) 25 February.

Jones, E. (1994) ‘Measuring Relative Economic Performance: A Short Research Note’. Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels), mimeo.

Kantor, M. (1993) ’Global Village Gathers Speed’. Financial Times, 13 October, p. 3 1. Ludlow, P. with Frellesen, T. and Jones, E. (1993) EC-US Relations: Priorities for the

Next Four Years (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies), CEPS Paper No. 53.

Man, A. (1993) ‘Believing One Thing and Doing Another’, Independent, 22 April, p. 17.

Nelson, M.N. (1993) ‘TransatlanticTravails’. Foreign Policy, No. 92, Autumn, pp. 75- 91.

New Perspectives Quarterly (1993) ‘NPQ and the Clinton Administration’, Winter, pp. 44-55.

Peterson, J. (1993) Europe and America in the 1990s: the Prospects for Partnership (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar).

Peterson, J. and Ward, H. (1994) ‘Instability and the New Multidimensional Politics of Security: A Rational Choice Argument for US-EU Cooperation’. Department of Government, University of Essex, mimeo.

Smith, M. (1993) ‘Clinton and the E C How Much of a New Agenda?’, The World Today, April, pp. 70-3.

Smith, M. and Woolcock, S. (1993) The United States and the European Community in a Transformed World (London: Pinter for the RIIA).

Stokes, B. (1993)‘In Your Face’. National Journal, 21 August, pp. 2068-72. Tarnoff, P. (1992) ‘An End to Foreign Policy’. Harvardlnternational Review, Summer,

Tucker, R.W. and Hendrickson, D.C. (1993) ‘America and Bosnia’. The National

USIS (1993) ‘Clinton on Foreign Policy Issues’. United States Information Service

USIS (1994) ‘Wireless File 7’. United States Information Service, 12 January. US Mission to the European Communities (1994) ‘Remarks by the President to a

Multinational Audience of the Future Leaders of Europe’. Delivered at HGtel de Ville (Brussels) USAT PL2,9 January.

14, pp. 4-8.

Interest No. 33, Autumn, pp. 14-27.

(London: US Embassy).

0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994

426 JOHN PEilERSON

Walker,J. (1991) ‘KeepingAmericainEurope’. ForeignPoZicy,Vol. 83,No.4,pp. 128- 42.

. Weston, J. (1992) ‘The Challenges to NATO: A British View’, NATO Review, December, pp. 9-14.

Williams, P., Hammond, P. and Brenner. M. (1993) ‘Atlantis Lost, Paradise Regained? The United States and Western Europe After the Cold War’. Inrernutiond Affuirs,

Yankelovich, D. (1992) ‘Foreign Policy After the Election’. Foreign Affuirs, Vol. 7, No. VO~. 69, NO. 1, January, pp. 1-17.

4, Autumn, pp. 1-12.

@ Basil Blackwell Ltd 1994