EURO 2008 FinalReport Austria En

FINAL REPORT

UEFA EURO 2008 – FINAL REPORT

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Table of Contents

Part A – Internal Evaluation

1 Preface.......................................................................................................... 6 2 Introduction.................................................................................................. 10

2.1 Planning phase .................................................................................... 10 2.2 Implementation Phase.......................................................................... 12

2.2.1 Project Responsibility.................................................................... 13 2.2.2 Responsibilities of the Steering Group .......................................... 13 2.2.3 Responsibilities of the Project Manager ........................................ 13 2.2.4 Responsibilities of the Project Administration and the Project

Management ................................................................................. 14 2.2.5 Responsibilities of the Project Bureau........................................... 14 2.2.6 Responsibilities of the Sub-team heads ........................................ 14

2.3 Policing the EURO 2008 from May 2008 to July 2008 ......................... 15 2.3.1 Management structure in the Federal Ministry of the Interior ........ 15 2.3.2 FMI-Staff ....................................................................................... 15 2.3.3 Police Information and Coordination Center (PICC)...................... 16 2.3.4 PICC Austria ................................................................................. 16 2.3.5 Management and Command Staffs in the Federal Provinces ....... 17

2.4 International Evaluation Committee...................................................... 17 2.5 Evaluation of the Security Strategy Implementation and the Policing of

the EURO 2008.................................................................................... 18 2.5.1 Responsibilities of the Project Management/Project Administration.. ...................................................................................................... 19 2.5.2 Purpose of the Internal Evaluation ................................................ 19 2.5.3 Purpose of the Scientific Evaluation.............................................. 19

2.6 Acknowledgements .............................................................................. 20 3 Evaluation.................................................................................................... 23

3.1 Mandate ............................................................................................... 23 3.2 Instruments .......................................................................................... 24

3.2.1 Observation................................................................................... 24 3.2.2 Interview........................................................................................ 24 3.2.3 Qualitative Interviews .................................................................... 25 3.2.4 Document and Statistics Research ............................................... 25 3.2.5 SPSS ............................................................................................ 25 3.2.6 Evaluation Key Figures ................................................................. 25

3.3 Evaluation Process............................................................................... 25 3.4 Evaluation Priorities.............................................................................. 26

4 Evaluation Results....................................................................................... 27 4.1 Documented Evaluation Results .......................................................... 27

4.1.1 "3D-Philosophy" ............................................................................ 27 4.1.2 Subjective Feeling of Security ....................................................... 30 4.1.3 Outward Appearance of the Police (Uniformed Officers) .............. 32 4.1.4 Support Forces from Abroad (SFA)............................................... 34

4.1.4.1 With Police Powers.................................................................... 34


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4.1.4.2 SFA without police powers ........................................................ 37 4.1.5 Spotters (Scene Experts) .............................................................. 40 4.1.6 Private Security (Stewards)........................................................... 43 4.1.7 Public-Viewing Areas and Fan Miles............................................. 46 4.1.8 Traffic ............................................................................................ 49 4.1.9 Fan Movements ............................................................................ 52 4.1.10 Cooperation with OeBB (Austrian Railways) und Public Transport

(PT) ............................................................................................... 54 4.1.11 Stadium safety and security .......................................................... 57 4.1.12 Detention Facilities........................................................................ 60 4.1.13 Criminal Investigation Division ...................................................... 63 4.1.14 Prevention Measures .................................................................... 67 4.1.15 Person and Property Protection (PPP).......................................... 70 4.1.16 Coordination Unit of the Bomb Disposal Squad*........................... 73 4.1.17 Media Work................................................................................... 76 4.1.18 Team Security Liaison Officer (TSLO) .......................................... 80

4.2 Documentation ..................................................................................... 83 4.2.1 Police Accreditations..................................................................... 83 4.2.2 Security Clearance of Persons with Accreditations ....................... 85 4.2.3 Information and Communication Technology (ICT)....................... 87 4.2.4 Liaison Officers (LO) ..................................................................... 90 4.2.5 Legislative Measures .................................................................... 92 4.2.6 Civil Defence................................................................................. 95 4.2.7 Border ........................................................................................... 97 4.2.8 International Cooperation............................................................ 100 4.2.9 Cooperation with Switzerland...................................................... 103 4.2.10 International Data Exchange....................................................... 106 4.2.11 Human Resources ...................................................................... 109 4.2.12 Training ....................................................................................... 112 4.2.13 Logistics ...................................................................................... 114 4.2.14 Study Visits ................................................................................. 116

5 ANNEX...................................................................................................... 118 (Qualitative Interviews with Security Officers of the Competing Teams – SUMMARY) .................................................................. 118

6 List of Abbreviations .................................................................................. 121


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Part B – Scientific Evaluation (Summary)

1 Introduction................................................................................................ 125

1.1 About the Project................................................................................ 126 2 Project Concept......................................................................................... 127 3 Management and Command Structure...................................................... 129 4 Results ...................................................................................................... 131

4.1 Observers........................................................................................... 132 4.1.1 Positive Results........................................................................... 133 4.1.2 Improvement Potential ................................................................ 133

4.2 Online Poll .......................................................................................... 134 4.2.1 Positive Results........................................................................... 134 4.2.2 Improvement Potential ................................................................ 135

4.3 Interviews of Experts .......................................................................... 136 4.3.1 Positive Results........................................................................... 136 4.3.2 Improvement Potential ................................................................ 136

4.4 Recommended Action and Best Practice – Proposals for the future.. 137 4.4.1 Bi-national Policy......................................................................... 138


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PART A

Internal Evaluation Terms used in this evaluation report, such as law enforcement officer, police officer, employee, staff member, etc., are to be understood as gender-neutral.


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1 Preface

Dr. Maria Fekter

Federal Minister of the Interior

The Federal Ministry of the Interior had begun the preparation for the European Football

Championship 2008 very early. According to the feedback received from the organiser, the

national and international press, the competing countries, and many guests from Austria and

abroad, this football event excelled in perfect organisation, highest professionalism, and a

welcoming and hospitable atmosphere. Comprehensive preparation and many helping hands

were necessary to achieve this result. All 27,000 Austrian police officers were involved in the

security precautions in one way or another. Thorough planning and exemplary team work of

everybody involved in combination with a close international cooperation proved worthwhile,

which is also reflected in this final review.

The report sums up the most important conclusions, and once more clearly indicates that the

largest police operation in Austria's history had been very professionally managed. I want to

take the opportunity of expressing my sincere gratitude to everybody involved for their

excellent work before and during the EURO 2008, and for compiling this report. I also want to

thank each and every police officer personally, as without their commitment such a success

would not have been achieved. It was also very impressive to see how each officer in the

street lived the '3D-philosophy'. The Police's friendly and helpful conduct during the EURO

2008 has certainly greatly contributed to this enormous success.

During the EURO 2008, the largest joint European police operation on the occasion of a major

event to date took place. More than 1100 officers from all over Europe were deployed in

Austria during these weeks in June and supported our officers. 850 officers from Germany had

law enforcement powers.

Furthermore, I want to thank my counterparts abroad, in particular Mr. Wolfgang Schäuble, the

German Minister of the Interior, and Mr. Samuel Schmid,, the Swiss Federal Councillor, and

also all those officers from abroad who supported Austria in an exemplary manner. Germany

especially contributed to the largest cross-border police operation in history.


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I also want to thank the UEFA Tournament Directorate, in particular Mr. Martin Kallen, for their

model cooperation. From the very beginning, the Tournament Directorate had considered the

Federal Ministry of the Interior as an important partner in the preparation of this major sport

event. Thus, we were involved in the planning of the upgrading and the construction of new

stadia right from the beginning.

Last, but not least I also want to thank the media representatives who comprehensively and

objectively informed the public about our security measures.

The present report marks the end of the security activities in relation to the EURO 2008, and

will serve as an important foundation for future major sports events – both in Austria and EU-

wide – as it will be submitted to the relevant bodies (e.g. European Council and Council of

Europe).


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Foreword

Dr. Günther Marek Project Manager Security EURO 2008 The preparation for the EURO 2008 have so far certainly been the most intensive ones in the

history of the Ministry of the Interior and thus of the Austrian police. Austria and Switzerland

have presented themselves as worthy hosts and have lived up to their reputation to be among

the safest countries of the world. This has not been only due to the predominantly peaceful

behaviour of the majority of the fans, but to the security strategy of the Federal Ministry of the

Interior, the excellent work performed in each of the provinces, especially in the Security

Directorates and Provincial Police Commands, and all services involved. The international

cooperation, too, has been a key factor of the successful outcome. The support provided by

German police officers is to be stressed in particular, as they have greatly contributed to the

peaceful nature of the event.

At this point I also want to especially thank the Ministry's human resources department.

Elaboration and implementation of the security strategy, involving many different aspects of

police work, indeed required the full support and collaboration of all divisions. We managed to

successfully police a major football festival and to create a milestone in police work. Let me

mention just one outstanding example: the '3D-philosophy', applied in this way for the first

time, and quite successfully, as we may now say. International observers, among them the

members of the Evaluation Committee, were very impressed by the working climate in Austria.

The next step will be to make the good experiences and lessons learnt available to other

countries. There is already great interest in the results contained in this report. Therefore, I

want to express my heartfelt gratitude to each and everyone involved, also in my capacity as

project manager, who had the privilege of heading this project since 2003.

I also want to thank the members of the Evaluation Committee who provided many valuable

inputs. Furthermore, I want to sincerely thank my Swiss counterparts, Mr. Martin Jäggi, and

Mr. Urs van Däniken, who were available at all times and were instrumental in the excellent

cooperation with Switzerland.


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My special thanks go to Henk Groenevelt, who had been supporting us from the beginning in

building the National Football Information Point in the Central Unit for Sports Matters. I also

want to mention Juergen Mathies and Bernd Manthey who facilitated Austria's participation in

the German Government-and-Laender Committee during the preparation of the World Cup

2006, and Paul Gomes, who shared with us his experiences of the EURO 2004 in Portugal.

I am quite sure that many of the measures described in this report will be applied at future

major sports events in Austria and abroad; and everybody involved can be proud of having

contributed their share.


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2 Introduction On 31 May 2002, the Austrian Football Association submitted its candidature to host the European Football Championship 2008 from 7 to 29 June 2008 to the UEFA-Administration. On 12 December 2002, the bidders Austria and Switzerland were awarded the joint hosting of the European Football Championship 2008. Dr. Ernst Strasser, the then Federal Minister of the Interior, jointly with Mr. Friedrich Stickler, the then President of the Austrian Football Association, guaranteed that Austria will take all measures necessary to ensure the security of all persons involved, both spectators and accredited persons. Dr. Ernst Strasser and Ms Ruth Metzler-Arnold, Federal Councillor, then Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police, agreed on 17 February 2003 in Vienna in a joint declaration that the security authorities of both countries will cooperate as closely as possible in all matters relating to the European Football Championship 2008, especially by

o developing a joint organisation and planning strategy

o exchanging comprehensive information and data;

o mutually seconding of high-ranking experts to the planning staffs;

o holding joint meetings of the planning staffs in regular intervals;

o increasing measures to combat hooliganism;

o mutually deploying support units and supplying equipment, resources, and vehicles;

o nominating responsible contact persons in both countries.

On 23 April 2004, the office of the Federal Minister of the Interior issued the project mandate to devise a security concept for the EURO 2008. 2.1 Planning phase The security concept had to comprise an organisational structure for the preparation and actual policing of the event (Command and Management Staff), with all subject matters visualised in form of working packages containing time charts, calculation of manpower and resources requirements, and a draft budget plan. Under the responsibility of the Director General for Public Security, a total of 40 persons contributed to the elaboration of the security strategy under the lead of the project manager, in the following areas:

Total Number of personnel: 40 Areas

Overall Project Responsibility

Project Responsibility

Project Management

Project Coordination

Project Administration

Project Advice

Project Coaching

Sub-team Deployment


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Sub-team CID

Sub-team State Security

Sub-team Budget

Sub-team Personnel

Sub-team Training

Sub-team Press

Sub-team Legal Affairs

Sub-team Logistics

Sub-team IT

Province Coordination On 26 September 2005, Ms. Liese Prokop, the then Federal Minister of the Interior, approved of the national security concept, and instructed Dr. Erik Buxbaum, Director General for Public Security, and Dr. Günther Marek, as project manager to implement it. Two days later, on 28 September 2005, Ms. Liese Prokop, the Federal Minister of the Interior, and Mr. Samuel Schmid, the Swiss Federal President and Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, approved the joint Swiss-Austrian security strategy for the European Football Championship EURO 2008 and agreed upon the joint implementation. On 29 November 2005, the national security strategy was presented in Parliament to all political parties.


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2.2 Implementation Phase Using a project form as implementation method, the determination of the functional responsibilities and the further preparatory measures until the beginning of the event as well as the organisational form and the responsibilities regarding the actual conduct were laid down in a policy paper dated 15 November 2006, issued by Ms. Liese Prokop, the then Federal Minister of the Interior. The following project organisation was chosen to ensure smooth implementation of the national security strategy: The overall responsibilities rested with the heads of the divisions of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The project management was assigned to Dr. Guenther Marek, Head of the "ZSA - Zentrum für Sportangelegenheiten" (Central Unit for Sports Matters), a sub-department of Division II of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The project manager was accountable to the Division Heads, and the steering group for all implementation steps taken by the sub-teams. The heads of the divisions had to supply all human and material resources needed for a successful completion of the project, in other words, the project manager was entitled to draw upon the Ministry's resources to the extent needed, upon prior consultation with the respective Head of Division. Regular reports had to be submitted to persons responsible for the project and to the steering group. Written interim reports had to be compiled quarterly. Shorter intervals could also be required by those responsible for the project. The project manager could obtain advice by resorting to the expertise of senior management officials of the FMI (Federal Ministry of the Interior), especially with respect to strategic issues. The project staff members were, as far as necessary and feasible, released from their regular jobs. In some instances, personnel was explicitly assigned to the project. Project management, administration, office and coaching, internal project controlling, the Sub-teams and the persons involved in the EURO 2008 within security authorities and Provincial Police Commands were in all technical project-related issues subordinate to the project manager. The sub-teams supported him in doing his job, especially by ensuring smooth cooperation between the line organisation and the project organisation. The project manager was responsible for internal (to the line organisation) and external project communication, project-related media work, marketing issues, and information management, accomplished in close cooperation between line organisation and project organisation. A communication plan (e.g. internet and/or intranet sites, active internal and external dissemination of information, the methods and tools to be used, including dissent and crisis communication) was also devised in the course of the project work. A total of 71 persons were actively involved in the implementation of the security strategy, being in charge of the following subject matters:

Total Number of personnel: 71 Areas

Overall Project Responsibility Steering Group

Strategic Controlling Group Project Manager



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Project Management Project Bureau

Sub-team Operational Measures Sub-team Transport/Traffic

Sub-team Border

Sub-team Crisis and Disaster Management

Sub-team Operational CID

Sub-team CID – Prevention

Sub-team State Security

Sub-team Budget

Sub-team Personnel

Sub-team Training

Sub-team Press

Sub-team Legal Issues

Sub-team Logistics

Sub-team IT

Sub-team PICC

Sub-team International Data Exchange

Sub-team International Affairs

Sub-team Study Visits/work Shadowing

Province Coordination

2.2.1 Project Responsibility The overall responsibility for the implementation of the security strategy for the European Football Championship 2008 rested with the Heads of the Ministry's Divisions under the lead of the Director General for Public Security.

2.2.2 Responsibilities of the Steering Group The Steering Group had to control the project work in compliance with the strategic policy of the Ministry's line organisation, to develop adequate targets for the project management, to supervise and to support the inter-connected work of the project organisation and the line organisation, and the project-related inter-division cooperation. The group also exercised controlling and project-related dissent and crisis management as specified by the project stakeholders. Other tasks of the Steering Group consisted in monitoring the consistency with the strategic policy of the ministry's line organisation and in speeding up approval processes within the line organisation.

2.2.3 Responsibilities of the Project Manager The project manager had to ensure the implementation of the project, the cooperation with Switzerland, the security authorities, the Provincial Police Commands, the federal provinces, other ministries, authorities and external organisations (e.g. the Tournament Directorate of the


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UEFA EURO 2008 SA), as specified by the project stakeholders and the steering group of the FMI. He also acted as the representative of the Ministry of the Interior in the Steering Group of the Federal Chancellery. If the need arose for further coordination with respect to the Staffs, the project management had to take the Initiative.

2.2.4 Responsibilities of the Project Administratio n and the Project Management

Project administration and project management had to assist in the planning of the project implementation, development and proposal of project instruments, PSP-controlling, in information-processing in form of ongoing target-performance comparisons, and to ensure efficiency, mainly by creating and maintaining a project information and communication platform.

2.2.5 Responsibilities of the Project Bureau For the implementation of the national security strategy, as of October 2006 the project management required a manpower of 10 persons, who were assigned to the sub-teams for project work only. The main activities of the Project Bureau referred to the tasks of the following Working Groups

o Operational measures o Operational CID o Prevention o State Security o Logistics o Human Resources o Support forces from Abroad

These assignments were terminated in December 2008 after completion of the necessary follow-up and post-processing activities.

2.2.6 Responsibilities of the Sub-team heads The Sub-team heads and their deputies supported the project manager in fulfilling his tasks, especially as reards smooth cooperation between line organisation and project organisation, and also ensured the coordination with respect to their detailed mandate with security authorities, the Provincial Police Commands, other authorities and organisations. The Sub-team heads were authorized to appoint members to join their woking groups, in consultation with the project manager and the respecive superior in the line organisation.


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2.3 Policing the EURO 2008 from May 2008 to July 20 08

2.3.1 Management structure in the Federal Ministry of the Interior Based on the Austrian structure of authorities, as laid down under constitutional law, a so-called "BAO – Besondere Aufbau- und Ablauforganisation"1 (a temporary Special-Purpose Organisation) was set up in the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the security authorities, and the Provincial Police Commands.

2.3.2 FMI-Staff

Organisational Chart - FBI Staff A Staff, established within the Federal Ministry of the Interior with a strategic and an operational level, and corresponding so-called "Integrated Management and Command Staffs", set up in the subordinate services (PPC/SD), constituted an adequate structure to manage the tasks at hand. Austria and Switzerland mutually seconded Liaison Officers to the top management staffs of the respective other country. Furthermore, both countries granted each other access to the relevant electronic databases and situational profiles. These measures and close personal contacts of the strategic stakeholders made sure that immediate contact could be made, irrespective of the type of situation that might have arisen.

"BAO – Besondere Aufbau- und Ablauforganisation" (literally: Special-Purpose Build-up Organisation), in this review referred to as "Special-Purpose Organisation" 1


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The FMI-Staff permanently safe-guarded i.a.

• interfaces to other countries, especially Switzerland • inter-provincial coordination • a nation-wide situational status report • information management in the FMI

2.3.3 Police Information and Coordination Center (P ICC) In each of the two host countries, a National Police Information and Coordination Centre (PICC) was established for providing ongoing situation assessment in the run-up to and during the EURO 2008. Austrian and Swiss Liaison Officers were mutually stationed in the PICCs, likewise Liaison Officers from participating, neighbouring and transit countries in both PICCs, which facilitated both fast international communication and internal communication between Austria and Switzerland.

Chart LO-Stationing EURO 2008

2.3.4 PICC Austria The PICC played a central role at the operational level of FMI-staff. Organisationally, it was located in Subject 2 - Situation, and served as information hub for the entire duration of the EURO 2008 within the ministry, both at police level for all public services of the competing and

PICC - Vienna

PICC – Berne

Spotters

NFIS Participating

countries

Operational Command


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neighbouring countries, and for all relevant organisations of public life (cooperation partners, such as UEFA, AFA, OeBB, Austrocontrol, etc.). Two briefings were held daily: at 9 a.m. with the Liaison Officers from abroad, and at 11 a.m. with the cooperation partners. All EURO 2008-related information got processed and made accessible, and was presented to the stakeholders in the FMI and the high-level senior officers of subordinate services and authorities. In total, 11,164 incoming messages and 3,565 outgoing messages (including 1000 formal decrees) were handled. Org Chart PICC Austria

2.3.5 Management and Command Staffs in the Federal Provinces So-called 'Integrated Management and Command staffs were set up at the level of the Security Directorates and the Provincial Police Command of each of Austria's nine provinces, involving further 'blue-light' (emergency) organisations, i.e. authorities and organisations in charge of security and safety, representatives from municipalities and the provinces, UEFA, etc. These staffs were responsible for operational deployment. The coordination was made by the Staff in the FMI (from 26 May 2008 to 30 June 2008), where all relevant organisational units of the FMI were included in a coordinated management process. 2.4 International Evaluation Committee An international evaluation committee paid a visit to Austria in 2007 in order to scrutinize the

BMF

BMLV

BMLFU

BMVIT

BMGFJ

BMWA

BMeiA

BMJ

Österreich am Ball

Bundesrettungs-kommando

UEFA

ÖBB

Austro-Control

ASFINA

BKA


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Austrian security strategy for the EURO 2008. Another visit by this Committee in May 2008 had the purpose of monitoring the progress of the preparation of the security measures and compiling a pertinent report for the Federal Minister of the Interior. After having heard a presentation of the national security strategy in the FMI, visiting the four host cities Vienna, Klagenfurt, Innsbruck, and Salzburg, and going through the local security strategies, inspection of the stadia and fan miles, and intensive talks with the chief security officers, the Committee came up with a highly positive assessment. Members of the international Evaluation Committee (in alphabetical order)

Name Nationality Function

David BOHANNAN UK

Head of the Department Football in the British Home Office (Internal Affairs of England and Wales)

Chief Negotiator with UEFA as member of the Police Cooperation Working Group

Radim BURES CZ Former President of the Standing Committee of the European

Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events, in particular at Football Matches

Paulo GOMES Portugal Head of the Coordination Office for internal security in the

Portuguese Ministry of the Interior Chief Security Commissioner EURO 2004

Henk GROENEVELT NL Head of the National Football Information Point(CIV) Security Commissioner for the EURO 2000

Christoph LIPP Germany Permanent Representative of the Riot Police Inspectorate of the Laender in the German Federal Ministry of the Interior

Juergen MATHIES Germany Police Director of the District Government Cologne

Head of the Sub-Committee Management, Operations and Crime Combating at the WC 2006 in Germany

John DE QUIDT UK

Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at

Sports Events, in particular at Football Matches CEO of the Football Licensing Authority

Francisco Pedro Alfonso TELES Portugal Security Commissioner EURO 2004 In Porto

Jo VANHECKE Belgium Head of the Prevention Department - Football – in the Belgian

Ministry of the Interior Chief Security Officer for the EURO 2000

2.5 Evaluation of the Security Strategy Implementat ion and the Policing

of the EURO 2008 Upon request of this international Evaluation Committee, Austria agreed to document its EURO 2008-experiences in the form of a Handbook, and make it available to the 'Police Cooperation Working Group' of the European Council, and the Standing Committee of the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches of the Council of Europe. This agreement has been highly appreciated, in particular with a view to the forthcoming major European event, the EURO 2012, hosted by Poland and the Ukraine. As a consequence, scientific guidance with respect to the evaluation and a scientific analysis


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of the evaluation process was agreed upon. A total of 18 persons were in charge of managing the evaluation of the police measures, covering following areas:

Total Number of personnel: 18 Subject Matters

Project Management Project Administration

Internal Evaluation Scientific Evaluation

2.5.1 Responsibilities of the Project Management/Pr oject Administration In charge of compiling the final reports and presenting the review of the EURO 2008 policing activities.

2.5.2 Purpose of the Internal Evaluation The evaluation of the security strategy for the EURO 2008 focused in particular on the following areas:

� Prevention measures � Criminal police aspects � Stadium security and safety � Private Security � 3D-Philosophy � Subjective feeling of security of the general public � (Outward) appearance of the officers

(For further details, cf. Chapter 3)

2.5.3 Purpose of the Scientific Evaluation The research project "Information and Communication Structures in the Management Processes of the UEFA Euro 2008" comprised the following research and analysis subjects:

� Check list and questionnaire for observers at management briefings � Guide-lines for face-to-face Interviews � Design of a questionnaire for an online-interview of the operational forces � Online-Interviews, analysis and presentation of the results

(For further details, cf. Part B)


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2.6 Acknowledgements The project management cordially thanks all persons involved in the "Project EURO 2008", without whose commitment the extremely successful policing of the EURO 2008 – a sports event of a dimension which will most likely hardly ever occur again in Austria – would not have been possible. Alphabetical list of the persons in charge:

F/N Name Project Phase Function

Andreas Achatz Project Administration Head of Staff Project Administration

Markus Amann Press

Herbert Anderl Steering and Strategic Controlling Group

Christoph Archan Border

Wolfgang Artner Budget

Josef Binder Traffic/Transport

Susanne Binder S5

Wolfgang Blach Project Bureau

Manfred Blaha Logistics

Herbert Brunner Logistics

Erik Buxbaum Overall Project Responsibility

Michael Buxbaum Border

Roman D'Alessio IT

Monika Dalmatiner Project Bureau Prevention

Klaus Dengler Human Resources Head of S1

Jürgen Doleschal IT

Karlheinz Dudek Training Head of Staff

Wolfgang Eder EKO Cobra

Franz Einzinger Project Responsibility

Thomas Ensle Traffic/Transport

Erhard Rainer Criminal Inv. Division

Werner Fasching Border

Sonja Fiegl Project Bureau

Robert Freisling State Security

Roland Gaisbauer Project Bureau Internal Evaluation

Martin Germ Traffic/Transport Traffic/Transport

Enrico Gesiot Project Bureau Crowd Control

Michael Girardi Press

Peter Goldgruber Project Advice Operational measures

Ludwig Grohmann Study Visits

Walter Grosinger Legal Affairs Steering Group

Karl-Heinz Grundböck Crowd Control

Hannes Gulnbrein EKO Cobra

Eveline Hadwig State Security State Security

Herwig Haidinger Steering Group

Rudolf Halwachs Training

Gerd Hermann Legal Affairs

Andreas Hofbauer Project Coaching Project Management Internal Evaluation

Harald Hofmayer Internal Evaluation

Joachim Huber Training Head of S2

Karl Hutter Project Management

Siegfried Jachs Crisis and Disaster Management Crisis and Disaster

Management


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Linda Jakubowicz Scientific Evaluation

Peter Jedelsky Prevention Prevention

Andrea Jelinek Legal Affairs

Matthias Klaus Project Advice

Dietmar Kogler Project Administration Internal Data Exchange


Konrad Kogler Head of S5

Manfred Komericky Operational Measures Head of S3

Josef Koppensteiner Criminal Investigation Division

Bernd Körner Border

Günter Krenn Operational measures Head of S3

Franz Lang Project Team Member

Steering and Strategic Controlling Group

Gerhard Lang Project Advice Criminal Investigation Division

Criminal Inv. Division

Norbert Leitner Project Team Member


Günter Lengauer State Security

Karl Lengheimer Province Coordination

Herwig Lenz Internal Evaluation

Christian Mader Internal Evaluation

Thorsten Maintz Scientific. Evaluation

Alexander Marakovits Press Head of S5

Günther Marek Project Coordinator Project Manager Operational Command Project Manager

Werner Matjazic Human Resources

Manfred Mauersics Head of S4/6

Helmut Mayer State Security

Birgit Mayerhofer Internal Evaluation

Klaus Mits Criminal Inv. Division

Mario Muigg Scientific. Evaluation

Franz Offenegger Budget

Gernot Ortner Training

Matthias Osterkorn Message Center

Johannes Petz Border

Rainer Philippeit Project Bureau Internal Evaluation

Gert Rene Polli Steering Group

Karl Heinz Pracher State Security

Christian Preischl Message Center

Waltraud Prexl Logistics

Maximilian Prinz Operational Command

Sandra Pripic Internal Evaluation

Helmut Prugger Overall Project Responsibility

Gerhard Pürstl Legal Affairs

Brigitta Rannicher Project Administration Translations

Christian Romanoski Legal Affairs

Wilhelm Sandrisser Project Team Member


Thomas Schlesinger Human Resources Head of S1

Reinhard Schnackl Logistics Head of S4/6

Günther Schnittler Border Head of S3

Barbara Schrotter International Affairs Command


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Center

Fritz Schwarz PICC Head of S2

Franz Semper Project Advice

Werner Siebenhofer Prevention

Gerald Simmer Project Bureau

Günther Simonitsch Steering and Strategic Controlling Group

Helmut Spittaler Project Bureau

Ludwig Spörr State Security

Gerhard Steiger Project Bureau Prevention

Claudia Steindorfer Internal Evaluation

Helmut Steiner State Security

Nicole Stemmer International Affairs

Johannes Stippel Message Center

Andreas Stipsits Traffic/Transport

Harald Stöckl Project Bureau Criminal Inv. Division

Robert Strondl Border Head of Staff

Peter Stückler IT Head of S4/6

Markus Stütz Operational Measures

Gerhard Tatzgern Criminal Investigations Division

Criminal Inv. Division

Manuela Tischler Internal Evaluation

Mathias Vogl Overall Projet Responsibility

Burghard Vouk State Security

Peter Webinger Legal Affairs Operations Command

Josef Weinzettl EURO 2008 Film Service

Katharina Weiss Scientific Evaluation

Günther Wendt Border Border

Walter Weninger EKO Cobra

Peter Widermann Steering Group

Jörg Winter Head of S1

Wolfgang Winter EKO Cobra

Gerhard Zeller Budget

Manfred Zirnsack PICC Head of S2

Hermann Zwanzinger Crowd Control

Erich Zwettler Criminal Inv. Division

This list does not claim completeness; it goes without saying that acknowledgement is also deserved by those who were inadvertently not included in this list.


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3 Evaluation The result has been divided into two parts: A: Documented evaluation results = Methodically obtained results by applying evaluation tools, and

B: Documentation = Drafting the chapters by the Sub-team leaders, or members of the "ZSA - Zentrum für Sportangelegenheiten" (Central Unit for Sports Matters) because of their subjective experiences and assessment (which does not automatically imply loss of quality the results, but only indicates how the results were obtained). 3.1 Mandate

PROJECT MANDATE EURO 2008 – Strategy and Operations Analysis

Project Start:

Meeting of project manager, sub-team 1 (Police Academy) and sub-team 2 (Criminal Intelligence) Service Austria

Project Start Date:

23 January 2008

End of Project

Presenting the Final Report to the Federal Minister of the Interior at the beginning of June 2009

Project Draft Report:

Completion of the draft report and beginning of editing: November 2008

Project Scope

� Input-phase (2003)

� Basic conception phase (2004)

� Security strategy devising/planning phase (2005)

� Preparatory phase (2006-2008)

� Operational phase (2008)

Project resources and costs

� personnel

� travel expenses

� other

Project Aims

� Compilation of the documentation material for a Handbook which is to become a summarized and concise reference work for future major sports event, hosted by two countries

� Quality control and concept methodology, and preparations for the EURO 2008 security strategy

� Description of the cooperation with Switzerland � Quality rating of the security strategy against actually

achieved (positive and negative) results � Drafting a master paper on the preparation processes

of a security strategy to be used for national and international presentations given by the stakeholders

� Setting up an administrative (contact-)point for the evaluation

� On-site analysis of the final preparatory phase � On-site analysis of the operational phase � Production of a documentation handbook � Presentation of the evaluation results � Compiling an observation catalogue � Compiling an Interview catalogue � Work schedule for the analysis team � Other necessary administrative measures

Strategic Aim

Comprehensive quality analysis of the project-phases, taking into account the insights gained during the implementation phase

Dr. Guenter MAREK Project Manager

Andreas HOFBAUER Sub-Project Manager "Strategy and

Operations Analysis"


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3.2 Instruments

3.2.1 Observation Observations were made using a prepared questionnaire. The objective was to obtain statements or judgements by means of the pre-defined questions from a "representative cross-section" (number of observations) to avoid subjective ratings as far as possible. Explanation

Apart from experiment, interview, and contents analysis, observation is an important research method to obtain empirical data, e.g. insights about the social behaviour of individuals. Scientific observation, as opposed to everyday observations, attempts to be objective and systematic. To make systematic observations, an observation plan and an organised observation process are needed, defining what is to be observed when, where and by whom, whether what has been observed is to be interpreted or not, and if so, in what way, and how the observations are to be recorded. Observation methods

• structured – unstructured (EURO 2008 – questionnaire technique) • open – discreet (EURO 2008 – discreet) • field – laboratory observation (EURO 2008 – field observation) • internal/external observations (EURO 2008 – internal observation) • direct – indirect (EURO 2008 – direct) • quantitative – qualitative (EURO 2008 – both)

Advantages and disadvantages Observations can help very much to research actual behaviour patterns. However, behaviour can be easily influenced, while attitudes and opinions can hardly be 'watched'.

3.2.2 Interview Interviewing is a method of data collection where the interviewed individuals give oral statements or comments by answering a series of pre-defined questions. Persons, whose answers were expected to provide information and facts of relevance and significance for assessment and documentation of the individual fields were selected as interviewees. Example Question: Have you (pub owner) been informed of police prevention measures in order to be prepared for the EURO 2008?

Interviewer � 4 evaluation teams Interviewees � 5 pub owners each on each interview day (17)

In total 340 (4 x 5 x 17) Explanation The Interview is a quantitative method of empirical research to systematically obtain information about the attitudes of human beings. It is possible to obtain an opinion profile of a larger population (e.g. the inhabitants of a region, or a whole country) on certain subjects, topical issues, or products by means of interviews based on more or less standardised questions.


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3.2.3 Qualitative Interviews The qualitative interviews have been conducted with in-house experts. Oral interviews were conducted personally (face to face-situation) with:

• standardised questionnaires • additional "freely" asked questions in the form of a casual talk, to get the interviewee's

own personal account. The selection of the interviewees was made individually according to the person's willingness and function during the operational phase. A summary statement was extracted from all interviews made and used as basis for assessment(s) and recommendation(s). Explanation: The term qualitative interview refers to all oral interview techniques that resemble a conversation about a subject matter, and in which a simple guideline is to be followed.

3.2.4 Document and Statistics Research The following sources were used for our research

• Documents from the concept development phase (Security Strategy 2005) • Documents from the preparatory phase (Implementation decrees), and • Documents from the operational phase (daily reports) and • Statistics of the FMI • Statistics of the AFA/EURO 2008SA • Statistics of the OeBB (Austrian Railways).

The results are quoted as "Key Figures" reflecting the quantity and facilitating inferences regarding the necessary action to be taken for the documentation.

3.2.5 SPSS The SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Science)-software is a modular programme package for statistical data analysis. This software can be used for systematic data management and comprehensive statistical and graphic data analyses which are quite computation-intensive.

3.2.6 Evaluation Key Figures Number of interviews ca. 5 000 – 6 000 Number of qualitative interviews ca. 1 000 Number of observations ca. 5 000 – 6 000 Size of the evaluation teams 2-3

3.3 Evaluation Process Evaluation means a systematic, objective analysis and assessment of the evaluation subject in relation to a certain topic. The present evaluation is an ex-post-evaluation after all project activities and the operation were completed. The summarized documentation material resulting from the evaluation is supposed to provide the hosts and organisers of the next European Football Championship with an accurate overview and a summary of the procedural process.


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January 2008 Mandate

February 2008 Appointment of the evaluation teams

March 2008 Selection of tools

Selection of evaluation fields by consulting with the senior officials in the FMI April 2008

Drafting the questionnaire May 2008 Operational planning

June 2008 On-site-evaluation in 4 teams (Vienna, Salzburg, Carinthia, Innsbruck)

July 2008 Merging the results August 2008 Statistics Evaluation

September 2008 Writing the individual reports

October 2008 Merging the individual reports

November 2008 Completion of the draft report

December 2008 – March 2009 Revising and editing

May 2009 Layout and print 3.4 Evaluation Priorities The evaluation of the security strategy of the EURO 2008 focussed mainly on the following areas:

� Prevention measures � CID aspects � Stadium Safety and Security � Private Security � 3D-Philosophy � Subjective feeling of security by the general public � (Outward) appearance of the officers on duty


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4 Evaluation Results 4.1 Documented Evaluation Results

4.1.1 "3D-Philosophy"

Analysis of '3D-Philosophy'

� Observations � Research Methods � Qualitative Interviews

Chart Key Figures

(1) Satisfaction with dialogues betw.

uniformed officers and members of the public

(2) Stage D2 Recognizability

(3) Stage recognizability through body

language/ comments

Number of training measures 150

Training Locations 9

Number of Trainers 40

Beginning of preparations

approx. 2.5 years before event start

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3

Percentages

Number of trained officers 16,000

Planning, Preparation and Implementation

Operations Philosophy The Federal Ministry of the Interior has developed a nation-wide, uniform operations philosophy to enable all forces deployed in public security service, both with respect to crowd management and crowd control, to optimally tackle situations to be dealt with by law enforcement. Dialogue (D1) 'Dialogue' means low-profile action taken in situations that are – from the police's point of view –fairly calm but relatively crowded with people/fans because of a certain event. In such a case, the objectives pursued by law enforcement range from mere patrolling and monitoring, information and intelligence gaining, and granting various types of assistance, to the legal obligation to render aid pursuant to the Austrian Code of Police Practice. For this reason, foot patrols and motorised patrols had to be strengthened. Public security officers had to be pooled in an "Operational Crowd Management and Control Structure" to deal with D1-situations. The forces were principally deployed in patrol teams composed of several officers. The officers wore multi-purpose uniform and carried standard equipment and weapons. De-escalation (D2) 'De-escalation' means low-profile action gradually evolving into higher-profile action in situations of increasing unrest in the streets, i.e. minor and medium disturbances of public peace, and small-scale and average local conflicts. The officers have to de-escalate the situation, mainly by helping to settle disputes, and by applying appropriate police powers, such as demanding


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trouble-makers to show their ID. As already mentioned, the officers were pooled in an "Operational Crowd Management and Control Structure". Where D2-situations arose, the operational units were ordered to respond quickly to dissolve the situation as fast as possible. As regards equipment and weaponry the officers had to follow the respective guide-lines. Determination/Drastic Measures (D3) 'Determination' (drastic measures) means high-profile police action in situations of greater unrest in the streets, presence of high numbers of potentially violent and violent-prone individuals causing trouble and intending to commit or already committing assaults or damage of property. If it had been necessary to pacify such a situation, the officers would have exercised their powers appropriately under the provisions of the Code of Police Practice and Code of Criminal Procedure. For the purpose of operating under such conditions, the officers were wearing protective gear, and were especially equipped and armed for tackling riots.

Appraisal

De-escalating measures (D2) by uniformed police/ spotters

With respect to D2 – de-escalating measures – it was made sure that neither the officers nor their equipment were provocative. Police vehicles were parked out of sight, and the uniformed officers remained more or less in the background, even at hot spots, but in a manner permitting them to respond and intervene instantly. It was virtually not necessary to take any of the measures foreseen to tackle stage 3-situations, which has also been confirmed by statistical data.

Body language/ forms of expression by uniformed officers/spotters depending on the "philosophy stage"

The course of action, including body language and remarks, applied by the officers on site, were in line with the respective "philosophy stage". Their outward appearance, i.e. the correct attire contributed to the positive impression. The police officers were neither by supporters nor passers-by felt as out of place, or as "killjoys of the adventure EURO 2008".

Recommendation

Deployment Generally, D1 and D2 forces should be deployed as the situation requires. Only if growing escalation necessitates it, the D3-forces kept in reserve are to be called up.

Awareness-raising

It is imperative to inform and educate the officers in the '3D-philosophy', and, most important, in the stage 'dialogue'. Potential trouble-makers can thus often be neutralized right away. Another important factor is the friendly intercourse with supporters by the police officers wearing uniform.

(Outward) appearance

In order to fully implement the '3D-philosophy', the appropriately adjusted appearance (normal uniform, protective gear) of the officers is just as important as the operational guidelines based on the three phases.

"Flags, body-painting"

It is quite possible that uniformed officers on duty on match days also want to demonstrate their support for competing teams (e.g. by painting the national flags on their cheeks). As long as such "face-painting" is not excessive, it is acceptable, but can by no means be permitted in a 3D-phase tackling operation.


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Comments

Precise definition of terms is vital to avoid misunderstandings, e.g. what is a Public-Viewing area, or a fan mile/fan zone/fan area.

� Fan zone: a precisely defined site, designated by the organiser, with access control

performed by Private Security, where rules have to be followed (e.g. fireworks). Law enforcement officers will have to intervene, if and when security cannot be otherwise upheld.

� Fan mile: an area freely accessible to the public – intervention by police only, no private

security. Unclear definitions and ambiguities can result in differing understanding and perceptions and thus impair the performance of duties.


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4.1.2 Subjective Feeling of Security

Analysis of Subjective Security

Methods � Interviews

Chart Key Figures

(1) Subjective feeling of safety and security

of visitors

(2) Acceptance of restrictions imposed

by the authorities

(3) Acceptance of obstructions by traffic

participants

Estimated number of visitors 2,426,000

Number of inhabitants in

Austria 8,205,600

Length of deployment 24 days

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3Deployed forces 27,000


"Fear of Crime" refers to the expectation, specifically the fear of an individual to fall victim to a crime. Fear of Crime arises from

� irrational moods and anxieties, and � an irrational experience and information processing linked to real incidents

Efforts are made to overcome fear of crime through information campaigns and educational strategies using different media with the objective of positively influencing the public's subjective feeling of security. Based on an analysis of the crime rate development in connection with the Football World Championship 2006 in Germany, a prevention campaign on the subject "EURO 2008" was launched. Flyers and free brochures containing security tips focusing on the most relevant types of crime were made available in all police stations.

Appraisal

Core statement The public's highly subjective feeling of security was maintained thanks to structured prevention work in cooperation with the media.

Perception of prevention

The prevention-related activities were widely perceived (by 80.2 pc. by the general public).

Coordination of prevention measures

The communication between the project team, the operational officers in charge of prevention, and the media met with some difficulties.

It would have been better to have measures pooled, and/or come up with adequate presentations in the media, especially regarding involvement of uniformed police, of detectives, the presence of uniformed officers, the types of police intervention, etc.


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Layout of flyers, leaflets, ...

Nicely structured prevention material, no language barriers due to the use of target-group oriented pictograms.

Recommendation

All in all, the information campaigns and strategies led to the desired result. The Austrian public's so far fairly strong feeling of security did not change. It is important to customized pictogram-spots, leaflets, posters, and the information material that is be distributed for the respective target groups.

It is also advisable to involve the media to a high degree in order to ensure consistent media reporting and thus achieve an even better result.


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4.1.3 Outward Appearance of the Police (Uniformed O fficers)

Analysis of Appearance (uniformed officers)

� Observation � Research � Interview

Methods

� Qualitative Interviews

Chart Key Figures

(1) Perception of officers wearing uniform

(2) Was the conduct of police officers perceived positively

Uniformed officers during the EURO 2008

Crowd Control 4000

Crowd Management police units

2100

Operational units 2795

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2

Percentages

WEGA 210


� The legal basis for the proper attire to be worn by police officers deployed during the EURO 2008 is regulated in the Provision on Police Uniforms. Special instructions were made known in form of supplements (special equipment, flame-resistant overalls, etc.)

� Important: a) Special attention was paid to uniformity of the attire worn when on duty b) Only approved police uniforms and equipment were allowed to be used c) Damaged uniforms/uniform parts were not permitted

� Orders to carry equipment and firearms (service pistol, riot shield, bullet-proof vest, helmet, radio set, handcuffs, belt bag, etc.) were given in every command as required by the situation to be dealt with

� In order to present the police in a uniform and professional manner, the type of uniform to be worn was explicitly mentioned in every oral command

� Admissible attire was also mentioned in commands concerning assignments and orders to move out in close ranks

Appraisal

Competence and security

� The correct looks of the officers greatly contributed to the impression of competence and providing security, and also increased the feeling of discipline and order

Appearance as perceived

� All officers on duty were at all times in all situations observed absolutely correctly and properly attired. This appraisal is based on about 350 observations made in various situations at different locations, at different times.


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Officers and fans � In the course of the event, harmony between supporters and uniformed

police officers was seen to be growing (e.g. friendly talks took place, snapshots were taken, etc.).

Recommendation

Equipment

Requirement surveys and call for tenders have to be made in good time to make sure that all items of equipments will be available for all forces planned to be deployed during the event. Budgetary cover and the time span from order to delivery must be taken into account, too.

Uniformly attired

� If changes occur, such as e.g. restructuring of police units, it must be made sure that in case of major missions, such as policing a European Football Championship, the police officers deployed on site will wear the same type of uniforms. Therefore, another factor to be taken into account is the purchase deadline for new uniforms to ensure a uniform appearance of all officers.

Painting/fan accessories

� "Painting" the cheeks with the national colours of the favourite team and wearing fan accessories could make an officer biased in exercising his duty.

� For the sake of completeness, it is mentioned that such a situation has not been observed in Austria.


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4.1.4 Support Forces from Abroad (SFA)

4.1.4.1 With Police Powers

Analysis of Support Forces from Abroad with Police Powers

� Observation � Research Methods � Qualitative Interviews

Chart Key Figures

How satisfactory was the cooperation as regards command structures between SFA and Austrian Police

Deployed SFA 866

Injured SFA 5

Intervention by SFA 279

0

20

40

60

80

100

1

Percentage

Expenses for SFA In total € 7.5 million


Legal bases

The treaty between the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany about cross-border cooperation in risk defence by police and in criminal matters formed the basis for seconding German support forces to Austria during the EURO 2008. The treaty also foresees deployment of crowd control forces on Austria territory. Hence, it was legally possible that German officers were given law enforcement powers in Austria. In accordance with the treaty, the forces had to be placed under the command of the local security authorities of the first instance. For this reason, the Bavarian (riot) police contingents were subordinate to the Heads of the Integrated Management and Command Staffs in the provinces Carinthia, Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vienna. Hence, action taken by the hundred-strong contingents and the support command from Bavaria, resulting in violation of section 88 of the Austrian Code of Police Practice (Complaints for infringements of subjective rights), would have constituted action taken by Austrian police authorities of the first instance. It has also been regulated that the contracting states may form joint operational units for joint defence against risks, in other words, officers from one contracting state can participate in operations on the territory of the other contracting state. Likewise, rendering assistance in cases of major events, disasters or major accidents has been regulated. Upon request of the contracting party on whose territory such a situation occurs (in the present case, in Austria) to send forces and provide equipment as far as possible, assistance


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and support can be rendered. The Federal Ministry of the Interior entrusted each officer of the Bavarian police forces with the law enforcement powers as outlined in the Second Chapter of the Austrian Code of Police Practice (general obligation to render assistance and maintain public order) and under the Code of Criminal Procedure of public security service officers.

Finalising the Deployment

At the beginning of 2008, heads of departments from Germany were invited to discuss and clarify jointly with the heads of the organisational and operational departments of the Police Commands of the host city provinces Carinthia, Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vienna, and with the commander of the "WEGA – Wiener Einsatzgruppe Alarmabteilung" (Vienna Special Operations Unit), in the presence of FMI-representatives, all organisational and logistical aspects of the forthcoming policing operation, such as

� arrival in Austria � accommodation (in collaboration with the Provincial Police Commands) � catering � mission planning � scenarios � uniforms, clothing, equipment � deployment times � management and command structures � operations philosophy � stadium inspections (access roads, positioning of forces) � radio communication management � fleet management � structure of local Management and Command Staffs � prisoner transport vehicles

Appraisal

Core statement

The support granted by the support forces from other countries was absolutely necessary and proved organisation-wise to be a very complex matter, which was managed successfully. Among other points, legal, logistical, and organisational preconditions, must be fully clarified in advance and agreed upon with the respective contract state.

Operation planning and execution

The cooperation with Bavarian police contingents was very positive. During the preparatory phase, these forces were under local command. In view of the successful deployment during the event, also mixed patrolling teams were put together, which was greatly appreciated both by Austrian and foreign supporters, in particular German fans, and also by the Austrian population.

SFA acceptance The Austrian and the German police got along very well; this joint mission certainly constituted another step towards future cooperation.

Holistic view The manner of initiating and establishing the cooperation proved extremely successful, and the instruments used were very effective in practice.

Recommendation

Survey of demand

It is essential to determine whether the national human resources are sufficient for policing a major sports event and for keeping up the regular


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daily routine work at the same time .

Legislative prerequisites

If support forces from other countries are needed, first of all existing bilateral treaties, etc. are to be reviewed to determine whether such treaties are indeed a suitable legal basis, or need to be adapted, or whether new treaties have to be concluded altogether.

Budget and payment modalities

Deployment of SFA is very costly. A budget plan and the payment modalities (e.g. payment of daily allowances on site) have to be fully prepared in consultation with the supporting country beforehand.

Time on duty The normal service hours of foreign support forces (with or without law enforcement powers) have to be taken into account, as differences in the host country are possible.

Language skills

Language nuances and differences have to be taken into consideration to ensure friction-free communication between national forces and the foreign support forces. If necessary, officers with knowledge of the respective foreign language should be selected for the job, or who are, at least, capable of using English as working language.


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4.1.4.2 SFA without police powers

Analysis of Foreign Police Delegations without

Law Enforcement Powers and International Liaison Officers � Qualitative Interviews Methods � Research

Key Figures

DE CRO RUS PL E S GR

Head of Delegation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SFA vehicles 43

Press 1

Uniformed officers 10 10 4 10 4 4 4

Spotters from abroad 14 14 4 10 4 8 6

Expenses SFA vehicles

68,000 €

Team-LO 2

Host City-LO 2 1 1 1 Deployed SFA 135

LO CID 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

LO PICC Austria 1 1 1 1

Total 31 31 11 25 10 15 12

Daily allowance SFA 50 €


Composition of Support Forces from Abroad (SFA) without law enforcement powers (police delegations)

� Head of Delegation overall responsibility for his delegation � Spotters (scene experts) police officers authorized to escort fans and pass on relevant

information to law enforcement � Uniformed officers exert calming and de-escalating (D1-phase) influence upon fans

from their countries at hot-spots � Liaison Officers work in different fields, serve as 'information hub' for home and

host country History � Support forces from participating countries without law enforcement powers were deployed

during the entire EURO 2008. The FMI had sent the request to the respective countries to send police delegations to Austria for the purpose of providing support for the police mission during the EURO 2008. These officers, however, were not given any law enforcement powers. In the course of the 3rd Security Conference of Neighbouring, Transit and Participating States, the numbers of officers and the type of activities of the delegations were discussed and agreed upon with the representatives of the competing countries.

� The request was sent to all participating countries after the group draw, each time in consultation with Switzerland, to second the police delegations to Austria and/or Switzerland. In other words, the scope of duties were clearly defined jointly with Switzerland beforehand and formulated as request addressed to the participating countries. The number of delegation members were agreed with the participating countries. The number of delegation members mainly depended on the number of supporters to be expected from that respective country.

� After the draw, an analysis of expectable situations of relevance for CID was prepared – bilaterally and internationally – and the duration of the presence of the delegations finally agreed upon. The deployment of Liaison Officers facilitated cross-border investigations.


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� Each foreign police delegation had appointed one Head (Head of Delegation), who was

joined by one Austrian Liaison Officer. These two officers formed a permanent team. The Head of Delegation had the overall responsibility for his delegation and was the sole contact person. He was the interface between the chiefs of operations and the commanders on site, as well as to the FMI-Staff via the L.O.

� The police delegations received identical sets of equipment (mobile phones, civilian vehicles, patrol cars, the head of delegation got a notebook with data modem, and "tabards" (slip-on identification vests) "POLIZEI" for delegation members in plain clothes.

� Working hour planning was made before the beginning of the event. � Likewise, the modalities of the daily allowance payments for the delegation members for the

entire duration of their stay had to be fixed prior to the event. � A training concept was prepared for the support forces from abroad. � The foreign support forces were deployed according to their task description upon approval

of their country. � Austrian officers with knowledge in a foreign language and who had passed the prior

selection procedure were allocated to the respective delegations. � When a national team had to shift location, the entire police delegation (except their CID-

and PICC-Liaison Officers) went with the team, as a rule on the day after a match. � Accommodation planning for the Support Forces from other countries was also completed

before the start of the event. � A Central Coordination Point for all delegation members and their Austrian "guides" was

set-up within the FMI-Staff. The CID- and PICC Liaison Officers were taken care of separately. The Police Commands of the Federal Province concerned was responsible for the deployment of the foreign support forces/crowd control forces and the Austrian officers assigned to them.

� A Liaison Officer Bureau for all Liaison Officers from the competing countries, Interpol and Europol, and neighbouring/transit countries was established in order to ensure the flow of information and the forwarding of warning messages, and to facilitate contacts with the respective country.

� The NFIP – National Football Information Point to combat hooliganism was in charge of collecting, analysing and exchanging data.

� As soon as the qualification for the UEFA EURO 2008 was completed, all competing countries were requested to transmit information on their own situation to enable drawing of a Pan-European situational profile.

Appraisal

Deployment of foreign officers

The deployment of officers from participating countries proved extremely valuable. Their presence had a preventive, de-escalating effect, and greatly contributed to keeping the event peaceful. The responsibilities given to them, serving in uniform and/or in plain clothes, as well as the use of Liaison Officers in different areas also proved very helpful.

Officers attached to SFA/equipment/ daily allowances

Handing over equipment, payment of daily allowances, information about their quarters, and giving general basic instructions, was done in Austria. The Austrian accompanying officers were centrally selected and assigned, while only drivers with local knowledge were recruited from local forces.

Accommodation Accommodating he uniformed officers and spotters (non-uniformed officers) of the support forces in different places turned out to be a drawback, as this entailed splitting of the delegations, which gave rise to discontent because


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accommodations were not of identical standards.

Detailed planning

The FMI had transferred the detailed planning concerning the SFA to the sector commanders on site. The delegations should rather have been dealt with as an "entirety". As a result, in some instances, the FMI had to intervene in accommodation issues.

D1 – Dialogue

The foreign support forces constituted an important element of the security precautions. The officers from abroad met with great appreciation both by the general public and by the Austrian police involved in the EURO 2008-mission. The officers' presence was extremely valuable, as they spoke the language of their "fellow countrymen" and were familiar with their mentality. Foreign support officers were deployed in the D1 – dialogue phase (crowd management) only.

Recommendation

Forces from other countries

Deployment of police officers from participating countries during major sports events can be regarded as an excellent example of international police cooperation. Information exchange and visible presence of the officers helps to build trust between the national citizens and the national police on the one hand and the supporters from abroad and "their" police on the other hand.

Attachment of local police officers

Local police officers have to be attached to the foreign support forces. These officers have to undergo a selection procedure as regards language skills and personal/social competence. The national Liaison Officer, assigned to the Head of Delegation, is in fact operationally responsible. He should actually also be superior (under service law) to all other national officers in charge of accompanying the delegations – both uniformed and plain-clothes officers. In principle, integration of the delegations on-site (host city) proved very useful.

Arrangements re delegation-deployment

Planning and arranging the deployment of the delegations should be done involving the local operational sector commanders. The SFA are to be considered as a homogeneous delegation with different tasks, but under one leadership. This fact has to be taken into account already during the preparation phase, to be able to provide quarters of identical standard and identical equipment.

Service hours When planning deployment of foreign support forces, the service hours regulations in the requested country have to be taken into consideration by all means, and inevitable changes have to be clarified bilaterally.

Daily allowances

Calculation of expenses caused by the daily allowances for the members of the foreign delegations must be made beforehand. Likewise, all payment modalities (amount, shift of delegation from one host country to the other,…) have to be clarified and agreed upon with the partner country in advance.


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4.1.5 Spotters (Scene Experts)

Analysis of Use of Spotters

� Qualitative Interviews � Observations � Interviews

Methods

� Research

Chart Key Figures

(1) Integration of spotters into the fan structures

(2) Good communication of Austrian and foreign spotters with

the fans

Number of spotters from abroad

62

Austrian Spotters 170

Officers supporting non-Austrian spotters

62

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2

Percentages

Number of non-Austrian spotter

teams 31


In Austria, a total of 170 officers have been trained as spotters.

Spotters (scene experts) Spotters are law enforcement officers who make risk analyses of major sports events, in particular football matches, in order to produce a situational profile and to take adequate preventive measures to prevent dangerous assaults from happening. The spotters are selected in an internal procedure and undergo specific training. Spotters from abroad fulfil the same functions in relation to the fans of their respective national team, or national clubs of their countries. Upon Austria's request, the spotters from abroad were sent by the neighbouring countries and the countries of the competing teams. The number of spotters depended on the intelligence on the number of problem fans to be expected from these countries. The foreign spotters worked in teams of two, each accompanied by two Austrian law enforcement officers (teams of four). Reconnaissance officers are national law enforcement officers who watch fans as instructed by the operational command and the spotters, and report the situation and incidents. Accompanying forces are trained national law enforcement officers to support spotters from abroad. Task and activities of the spotters

� Prevention o Appealing to problem fans in order to 'nip offences in the bud' o Escorting of risk fans, especially upon arrivals and departures o Influencing risk fans through visible presence and talks pointing to the consequences of

misbehaviour


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o Settlement of disputes o As regards the problem of "hooliganism", CID in collaboration with the local spotters,

offered advice how to prevent conflicts and rows typical of the scene in certain locations (e.g. inner city, crowded pubs, etc.).

� Deployment Planning o Spotter commanders were to a high degree involved in the planning during the

preparatory phase o Likewise, the spotters were consulted during the drafting of the security strategy .

� Fan Contact and Fan Escorting o The spotters present the very first contact to the fans o They were in permanent contact with clubs and fans (fan groups, fan clubs) o The spotters were present during the matches, watched the situation among the fans in

the stadia, and escorted them upon arrival and departure o The spotters also attended security briefings by the organiser and the authorities

� Appearance o The spotters wore plain clothes and a vest with an imprint "Police"

� Cooperation with other institutions o The spotters were also responsible for supporting the stewards, e.g. during access

control. o They also made proposals to issue stadium bans and granted support in enforcing this

measure, although stadium bans are basically measures under "owner's rights", to be taken by the organiser (UEFA).

� Reporting obligations and documentation o It proved useful to intensify information collection with respect to problem fans o The spotters got their information from the so-called "fan embassies" and were in

constant information exchange with the persons responsible for the fan embassies. o The spotters provided important information by especially paying attention to the

stewarding quality, e.g. when they performed person searches and during access controls.

o The spotters forwarded information about problem fans to the operational command o They were also in charge of Internet research and similar activities, and for preparing

situational profiles and analyses o For proper assessment, it is important to include the source of information in the status

reports. o Interfaces to photographing and filming documentation teams, to CID and security

authorities of the first instance, were in place. � Repression

The spotters assisted the special investigation teams by contributing to identifying, locating and prosecuting offenders. All spotters were supported by plain-clothes officers (recce officers) well familiar with local circumstances, and who also monitored the scene.

Appraisal

Identification of spotters

The spotters wore easily identifiable vests, commended by both fans and police officers (in accordance with the European Council Resolution)

Integration and communication

Intelligence was gathered mainly in the run-up to the event. As soon as mutual trust was established, the spotters were contacted by the fans, but only few spotters became a part of the fan-groups, since, as a rule, they are just tolerated. The presence of the spotters during the matches pursued the


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purpose of prevention and building mutual trust. The officers had to make sure that their official duties (response to criminal offences) was not conflicting with trust-building communication.

International cooperation

The international cooperation was excellent. In view of the fact that the spotters' duties in their home-counties differ, they responded differently to the same behaviour. Some countries, among them Austria, prefer a "3-Pillar Model" (guiding – watching – investigating), other countries restrict spotters' activities to mere contact and/or surveillance. This required enhanced communication and coordination of operational planning.

Escort forces

The escort forces were mainly recruited from detectives who had no spotter training. As a result they felt to be deployed in the wrong place, and indeed in some instances, some of the foreign spotters found the escort officers 'overqualified'.

Recce teams – handing over of problem fans

The communication between spotters and recce teams was excellent. When the need arose, the spotter commanders dispatched recce teams to the spotter team and the actual handing over of problem fan was done discretely.

Communication between spotters and uniformed officers

The communication (via the Staff) was excellent; however, uniformed officers rated the spotters' work as rather ineffective, which was most likely due to lack of understanding of the nature of the spotters' jobs.

Handling of D3 (3rd stage of the '3D-philosophy') by the spotters

It has turned out that it is advisable for spotters not to take 3D-action immediately among the fans. Playing a dual role (appealing to the fans and taking enforcing measures) is tactically wrong and even poses a risk for the spotter. Besides, it might impair the spotter-fan relationship.

Recommendation

Qualified information

All spotter information should contain further qualifying details, e.g. source of information, to facilitate decision-making for the operational command.

International uniformity of spotter activities

It is highly recommended to make spotter activities internationally consistent and compatible, at least a temporary harmonisation for the duration of major sports events appears necessary.

Hence, it is recommendable to consult with all countries involved regarding spotter jobs and methods, and to align command management and training.

Cooperation between spotters from abroad and escort forces

In principle, it is recommendable to assign police officers in support of national and foreign spotters, and to obtain targeted information and make situational assessments, despite the fact that spotters and law enforcement officers, as a rule, have to perform different jobs.

Spotters enforcing third stage of the '3D-philosophy'

For their own safety, spotters should by all means leave their sphere of action, when it has become necessary to enforce a measure under the third stage of the '3D-philosophy' (i.e. when dialogue and de-escalation no longer take effect), except when the officer's security is not at risk and/or the operations commander decides otherwise upon special instructions.


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4.1.6 Private Security (Stewards)

Analysis of Private Security


Methods

� Research

Chart Key Figures (1) Identifia-bility of Private Security

(2) Sufficient number of stewards

(3) PS training found satisfactory

(4) Cooper-ation betw. PS and unif. police

Total number of Private Security employees

approx. 4,500

Guards approx. 400

Stewards approx. 3,200

Private Security personnel approx. 900

010

2030

4050

6070

8090

100

1 2 3 4

Percentages

Number of trainings approx. 110


The organisational concept and the operational strategy of the Private Security Companies (EURO 2008-Security Strategy) were harmonized with the law enforcement security strategy right from the beginning of the preparations. Process (as of beginning of 2004)

� Analysis of legal conditions � Taking into account UEFA-provisions � Analysis of the organisational structure of the private security companies � Definition of the requirements (organisational and personnel-wise) of law enforcement to

be met by Private Security � Decision on identification/uniforms of PR-employees

In 2005, the AFA (Austrian Football Association) came up with the first list of basic requirements. It turned out that the Austrian private security labour market was capable of providing sufficient personnel.

� A 3-component hierarchical system had to be built: Guarding – Security – Service � The job division between organiser, Private Security and law enforcement for the host

cities, fan miles, and the Public-Viewing areas had to be agreed upon. � An additional training concept for members of Private Security provided by law

enforcement was to be elaborated and the pertinent agreement to carry out the training by the Police Academy had to be concluded. In 2007, the AFA came up with the second concept which centered on Private Security staff increase and ways to employ non-Austrian Private Security-Staff.

� Agreement on security clearance of the deployed personnel � Agreement on training � Agreement on communication structures


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� Agreement on cooperation in crises � Agreement on cooperation with Private Security during the four test matches (one test

match was played in each host city) � Agreement on debriefings of the test matches � Agreement on cooperation at the training locations

Test matches: After each test match, the Private Security system was evaluated internally and by the police. Deficiencies were identified and improvement suggestions made. Tasks and locations of deployment

• stadia (including entrance plazas) • entrances (ticket control, person and bag checking search for prohibited and hazardous

items) • fan zones • access/entry controls • sensitive areas (,e.g. team and referee rooms) • sectors (to ensure segregation according to tickets, and preventing spectators from

changing to another sector) • stairways between the tiers (have to kept clear) • escape gates • cloakroom attendance • parking lot (parking space assignment • CCTV-room (video surveillance) • VIP-stand and VIP-areas accesses (incl. monitoring and control).

Tasks of the Management of Private Security

• planning and organisation • participation in the entire security strategy • assistance in deciding on constructional and technical security measures • assistance in crisis management • assistance in the command centres

Appraisal

High work morale

No complaints were filed about reliability, capability and work ethics of Private Security, except for very few instances in the province of Carinthia.

Clothing Private Security employees were easily and clearly identifiable by their attire.

Job fulfilment

Basically, all tasks assigned to Private Security were completed. In some situations, deviations were noted and supervisors and/or police stepped in quickly and rectified the situation. This course of action – although not pre-defined – proved useful and efficient.

Cooperation with decision makers of the Tourna-ment Directorate

Authorities and law enforcement reported a generally good cooperation with the "Private Security" sector. However, there have been complaints about 'misconduct' of UEFA, as for UEFA their own economic interests had priority over those of other partners; UEFA often failed to keep agreements; when negotiations came to a dead end, they attempted to enforce their interests "through other channels", regardless of the possible consequences for security.

Entrance checks at match start Ticket controls were well organised at all matches, there were no delays


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because of security checks, which as a rule were almost completed when the matches started. Besides, the private security people in the stadia appeared to be excellently organised.

Training

Not all training courses and sessions were duly attended in the run-up to the event. During the event it turned out that not all of the private security personnel had been sent to undergo training. To a certain extent this was due to high staff fluctuations; trained staff left the company right before the event and had to be replaced instantly by (untrained) others.

Recommendation

Quality -management

Job descriptions and cooperation interfaces have to be determined. One way of doing it is applying quality management procedures for all sorts of operational or emergency situations and to take into account all contingencies – from petty information to complex notification and/or alerting situations.

Security checks

As regards the security clearance of private security personnel, legal provisions are needed, especially for defining deadlines that allow proper and in-time scrutiny of the person's reliability and honesty. The advantage for both sides would be that if a candidate is not accepted or steps down, new persons can be recruited and checked in time, ad no compromises need to be made in this respect.

Training of employees of Private Security companies

Joint training events should be agreed upon in good time and logistically arranged. Training must be upheld until before the very beginning of the event, better even until the event is already in progress. This way last-minute recruited personnel can still be properly trained.

Responsibility Responsibilities, also sanctions for non-compliance with agreed services, including framework conditions, should be clearly stated in the form of agreements.

Transfer of tasks to law enforcement

It is also highly advisable to have a provision in place regulating the transfer of tasks from Private Security to law enforcement, as in suddenly occurring incidents, discussions and negotiations – especially aiming at solving conflicts – will delay operations and might well impair security. For instance, when it turns out that a member of a private security company has not, or not properly been subjected to security clearance and immediate police intervention becomes necessary.


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4.1.7 Public-Viewing Areas and Fan Miles

Analysis of Public-Viewing Areas and Fan Miles

� Observations � Interviews Methods � Research

Chart Key Figures

(1) Were the routing systems suitable for

pedestrians?

(23) Were the escape routes alright?

(3) Subjective perception by police

Public Viewing-Licences in Austria

880

Fan zones in Austria 4

Austrian visitors in fan zones

980,484

Austrians and guests from abroad in the four host cities (fan

zones/Public-Viewing areas

1,941,140

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3

Percentages

Arrest in host cities, Public-Viewing areas

and fan miles 574


Definition of term "Public-Viewing Area"

� privately organised and operated site of defined size � requires UEFA-licence � official permit subject to safety regulations (e.g. no fireworks) issued by authorities � access control by Private Security

Definition of term "Fan Mile"

� defined locations � open to the public � licensed by UEFA as fan mile � official permit subject to safety regulations by authorities

Recommendations for operators of Public-Viewing areas and fan mile s

In Austria, event safety regulations are under the jurisdiction of the provinces. The FMI, in cooperation with the federal provinces, drew up a "catalogue", i.e. a list of recommendations, which was submitted to the provincial governments for dissemination down to community level, where the authorities in charge of event safety were to prescribe the conditions to organisers in case of events expected to be attended by at least 1,000 persons.


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Recommendations

• Proper area enclosure: event area enclosures have to provide escape exits and permit access for emergency services.

• Fan segregation and channeling must be made possible, if necessary, by activating the arrangements of a technical, constructional, or whatever kind, e.g. in case of risk matches.

• The visitor capacity has to correspond to the approved number of event visitors (restriction of the number of visitors in line with the local conditions, and monitoring by private security service).

• Open and closing times have to be fixed. • Access control by stewards is to be ensured (incl. frisking). • Deployment of qualified stewards in sufficient numbers – a certain minimum number can be

required by the authorities – depending on the number of visitors and the type of event venue, stewards for entry control and to control bans on alcohol, fireworks, weapons and firearms, and other dangerous items, esp. glass bottles, batteries, etc. that could be abused as missiles.

• Use of "wave breakers" in Public-Viewing areas of a capacity of several thousand persons, if deemed necessary under the local circumstances.

• Installation of CCTV*), i.e. video camera surveillance systems by the organiser, if the location, or the crowds make this necessary, but in any case at entries and exits.

• An adequate number of paramedics and/or a doctor for First Aid, including an ambulance vehicle, if deemed advisable, are to be foreseen.

• Ambulance and rescue access roads and gates have to be kept clear of obstacles. • Sanitary facilities must be provided within the event venue/event area. • Fireworks and other pyrotechnics items must not be carried into the event venue/area. • Event-safety and police authorities have to impose regulations, likewise so-called 'House

Rules', or 'Site Rules' (e.g. No access for unaccompanied children, for intoxicated persons, etc.) have to be laid down. Non-compliance with such rules and regulations presents a violation of the Administrative Law. House and Site Area Rules must list all items that must NOT be taken inside the event venue/area. Such bans should be displayed in the form of pictograms.

• Depending on the risk assessment, there should be no sale of alcohol, or at least only light beer (no brandies!), and strict compliance with protection of minors regulations.

• Ban on sale of glass or ceramic bottles or cups. • Tables and benches should be firmly mounted (to the ground or otherwise) to prevent their

use as weapons in disputes. • Back-up power supply and, depending on the circumstances, emergency lights in case of

power failures have to be in place. • A loudspeaker system for spectator-information-announcements on screen or by the on-site

speaker (also in the language of the fan group(s) concerned) is to be installed. • Organiser(s) and/or authorities have to prepare alternative entertainment programmes for

contingencies such as broadcast failures. • No construction sites should be in the vicinity of event sites/venues, but if inevitable, they

have to be closed off securely to prevent construction material from being used as missiles. • Local residents and tradespeople, especially catering businesses, have to be informed of

the regulations in good time. • Adequate measures have to be taken to minimise traffic obstructions by e.g. providing

parking lots, parking space assignment personnel. *) CCTV = Closed Circuit TV


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Additional measures by law enforcement

� Planning of resource incl. distribution of forces (increased guarding and patrolling around the Public-Viewing areas)

� Planning and erecting temporary police stations in the vicinity of major Public-Viewing areas and fan miles

Consultation with other 'blue-light' organisations to ensure medical services/First Aid also in these areas.

Appraisal

Conditions set by Event Safety Authorities

The recommendation given by the FMI (by local authorities responsible for event safety and security) were turned into requirements to be fulfilled, depending on the dimension and local conditions of the event sites.

Due to the implementation of the recommendations, no noteworthy incidents occurred in the Public-Viewing areas or the fan zones.

Temporary police stations

Erection of temporary police stations (office containers) near Public-Viewing areas, fan zones and stadia proved to be an immensely practical solution. The officers highly appreciated having "work-places" near to the potential scene(s) of intervention.

Subjective per-ception of police presence

Police presence was widely perceived by he public during the EURO 2008. It was made sure that officers were well visible at all times. Only the forces clad in full protective gear remained in the background (meant for stage 2/ de-escalation, or 3/drastic measures).

Recommendation

Security measures for PV areas and fan miles

A "catalogue" containing safety and security measures for Public-Viewing areas and fan zones/miles should by all means be prepared, and the recommendations given implemented by the local administrative authorities.

Cooperation between organiser(s) and law enforcement

In view of frequent short-term applications for permits to organise Public Viewing events, a close cooperation between organisers and security authorities is necessary to enable the coordination of resources and the formation of reserve forces. To this end, a list (centralised) of all registered events to ensure adequate force planning is to be kept.

Temporary police stations

Setting up temporary police stations near major event venues is highly recommended as very useful.


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4.1.8 Traffic

Analysis of Traffic

� Qualitative Interviews � Observations � Interviews � Research

Methods

� Statistics

Chart Key Figures

(1) Problem-free traffic volume on

match days

(2) Police presence among traffic participants

(3) Quality of signage and cordoning off Total number of road

pilotages for teams

Salzburg: 38 Vienna: 35 Tyrol: 92

Carinthia: 32

Traffic volume on match days

Fan busses

Salzburg: 75 Vienna: 100

Tyrol: ca. 100 Carinthia: ca. 110

Fan cars

Salzburg: ca. 1600 Vienna: ca. 1100

Tyrol: ca. 250 Carinthia: ca. 5000

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1 2 3

Percentages

Police cars for traffic regulation

Salzburg: 86 Vienna: 163

Tyrol: 90 Carinthia: 104


Traffic Concept A nation-wide traffic plan was devised jointly with all authorities in charge of transport and traffic issues, infrastructure operators, airports, motorway operators, communities, and the organiser. It proved advantageous that the traffic concepts focussed on the host cities/event venues. A national traffic plan was based on the local traffic management concepts. Main traffic routes The traffic routes where most of the supporter streams were expected had to be identified beforehand and assessed with respect to their capacity. Problems in multi-nodal interfaces and construction sites needed to be detected and solutions to be found. In/Out Routes The roads into and out of the host cities and to and from the event venues had to be clearly marked. Under the term "Local and Regional Traffic/Transport Management Plan", possible ways to and from the host cities and the stadia – both for private and public transport – were determined. Parking Parking lots were provided near the city borders, and around the event venues (stadium, Public-Viewing areas) and made known and posted in the form of "Pre-Trip-Information" and "On-Trip-Information". Furthermore, shuttle services were offered on the main access roads. Traffic Information System A "Traffic Information System" – using uniform signage and symbols – was in place on all approach roads.


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The relevant information was published "Pre-Trip-Information" in the media and the Internet, and also disseminated by the Transport Services and the travel agencies. Traffic information was also broadcast by several radio stations. Interfaces Already during the preparatory phase, interfaces between operational forces were determined as part of the overall traffic concept ("platform") operative 'round the clock (common dispatch centre) during the EURO 2008. Traffic Monitoring Traffic monitoring was intensified at the main focal points (transit-routes, junctions from primary to secondary road networks). Emergency routes Alternative routes with sufficient absorbing capacity were identified for emergency situations, both for traffic overload and for "Worst Case Scenarios" (disasters). Effects of fan jubilations upon traffic Spontaneous celebrating etc, such as "motorcades", or long marches on foot were also escorted and safeguarded. In these situations, it was very important to exercise the philosophy of phases D1 and D2 of the '3D-philosophy', namely dialogue and de-escalation. Road Guidance Road pilots had to be provided for team busses, referees, UEFA-delegates, and heads of state. The requirements – number of officers, vehicles, type/amount of equipment, mobiles, radio-sets – were determined in advance.

Appraisal

Core statement The traffic situation remained under control despite the EURO 2008 and the increased traffic volume.

Match days

As expected, traffic volume was much higher on match days. This was felt mainly in the vicinity of the stadia, and on the motorway feeder roads. In some instances traffic jams occurred, but, thanks to strategically placed traffic monitoring units, disastrous conditions were avoided and problems kept under control. Another factor that helped to keep traffic going was wide use of public transport.

Traffic on non-match days

The traffic situation before and after match days was more or less free of problems. This was widely due to the discipline of the event visitors, who to a very high extent used public transport.

Traffic Reports on match-days

The Information Center of company ASFINAG*) was operative 24/7 by phone and by e-mail. Updated traffic news could be retrieved at any time. Furthermore, the electronic nation-wide "Information Portal for Traffic News" also provided updated status reports.

*) Austrian Motorway and Expressway Financing Company

Traffic Monitoring Traffic monitoring was in place more or less all the time; activities were adapted to the amount of the traffic volume. The forces charged with traffic monitoring were strategically positioned at critical sites.

Bus Routing System

The bus routing system, like all other traffic directing systems for public transport, turned out to be adequate for situations that occurred during the period in question.


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Pilotage As regards road guidance, no problems were encountered apart from a few instances of brief traffic stoppages.

Recommendation

Important!

� Responsibilities have to be precisely clarified beforehand.

� The intended concepts and strategies are to be implemented as far as possible.

� Adequate resources have to be provided in time to enable implementation of the foreseen measures.


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4.1.9 Fan Movements

Analysis of Fan Movement


Methods

� Research Chart Key Figures

(1) Traffic volume – road

(2) Traffic volume – rail

(3) Traffic volume – air

Total number of supporters

2,426,000

Fans from abroad 1,055,000

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1 2 3

Percentages

Austrian supporters 1,371,000


Fan Escorting Fans were escorted to and from event venues. Main Police Activities

� Fan escorting "Road" � Fan escorting "Road" - cross-border � Fan escorting "Rail" � Fan escorting "Rail" - cross-border

Fan Monitoring

Main Police Activities � Patrolling and monitoring of main traffic arteries by police forces � Surveillance of motorway service areas and parking lots � Detailed strategies prepared by the regional police commands

Appraisal

Fan movements and effects upon traffic flow

Fan escorting "Road" consisted in escorting fans travelling by car to or from the host city; the strategy of pre-determined "sites of taking over" - "sites of handing over" was successfully implemented by the police services in charge.

Monitoring by police patrols of the main traffic routes concerned and coordinated action taken in response to streams of fans was positively assessed.

Naturally, the fan movements were most felt on match days, and caused


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greater traffic volume in the vicinity of the stadia.

Park and Ride, and routing systems (from, to, and within the host cities) also helped to coordinate the streams of fans.

All in all, monitoring and guiding to and from the event venues worked well. Despite the dimension of this major sports event, the stream of fans did not cause any major traffic obstructions.

Fan group re-routing

It was hardly necessary to detach and re-route fan groups to avoid traffic problems; no incidence requiring police intervention occurred.

Fan movement information

Relevant information was reported as stipulated; hence, adequate measures could be taken in good time.

Trans-border measures

When risk fans crossed the border into Austria, the information was instantly transmitted to the PICC, and if deemed necessary, police forces could be very quickly coordinated and action taken. When situationally required, thorough controls were made at the border crossings in question (road, rail, air, water).

Railway stations and airports

During the EURO 2008, train stations and airports were to a high extent in the focus of the police; however, no problems were encountered.

Recommendation

FMI Coordination Unit

It is useful and helpful to install a "PICC – Police Information and Coordination Center" as national and international Situation Room.

Cooperation FMI/ public transport

The cooperation agreement between the FMI and the transport operators (public and private) also proved quite useful for rapid information exchange. It is worthwhile to conclude such an agreement on the occasion of major events.

Traffic Management

A consistent signage, made up of symbols, and publication of related information in the form of "Pre-Trip-Information" in good time helps to prevent traffic jams at crossroads, where drivers are looking for the right way to their destinations.

Means of Transport

With uniform fares and stadium tickets entitling owners to use public transport for free, a high percentage of private (motor) traffic can be shifted to public transport.

Railway Information System

A Railway-Information-System which serves to transmit security-related incidents in trains to the PICC via the headquarters of the Austrian Railways to enable appropriate action, also proved advantageous.

Railpol Involvement of Railpol proved useful, too.


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4.1.10 Cooperation with OeBB (Austrian Railways) un d Public Transport (PT)

Analysis of Cooperation with OeBB (Austrian Railways) und Public Transport (PT)

� Qualitative Interviews � Observations Methods � Statistics

Chart Key Figures

(1) Appropriate use of PT (1)

(2) Efficient marking ad

routing systems

(3) Adequate "Park & Ride"

(4) Cooperation uniformed

officers and PT representatives

Passengers, total 21.9 million

Passenger increase 3.29 million

Degree of punctuality 91.5 %

Additional trains and busses

3,977 trains 22,000 busses

Charter trains from neighbouring countries

42

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1 2 3 4

Percentages

Service leaflets and pocket time-tables

800,000 €


Cooperation agreement FMI and OeBB

The FMI and Austria's largest transport company, the Federal Austrian Railways, entered policy agreements on cooperation in security questions, and a special additional agreement just for the purpose of the EURO 2008. In the latter, the responsibilities for providing public security were clearly stated and the willingness to exchange expert knowledge security-related questions was confirmed. � Experience

The DB - Deutsche Bahn (German Railways) was contacted because of their experience gained during the Football World Championship 2006.

� Security measures catalogue The OeBB published a special catalogue of security measures. The FMI was also involved in this process.

� Media work Information were disseminated to the public already during the run-up period to inform the public about the security precautions in public transport during the EURO 2008 (e.g. CCTV in stations, etc. )

� OeBB press spokesperson for the EURO 2008 The OeBB had their own press spokesperson for the coordinated dissemination of security-relevant information.

� Pre-inspection of railway stations In the run-up to the EURO 2008, railway stations and similar facilities were inspected jointly with police to give them an overview about the locations.

� Train Information System A Train Information System was created which could be used by conductors to directly inform


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OeBB-headquarters about unpleasant fan conduct or risk groups. � Training of OeBB-personnel

OeBB had organised psychological training for their own personnel in preparation to the event, to enable them to cope with high numbers of crowds and supporter behaviour.

� Marking and Routing Systems Extra signage was put up at public transport stops and stations to make finding the way to the trains easier.

� Contact with the neighbouring countries Permanent contact with the transport systems in the neighbour countries was upheld to inform the FMI about extra trains and about arrival of risk fans as soon as possible.

� OeBB-representatives in the PICC One OeBB-representative was delegated in the PICC during the entire EURO 2008, and reported directly about OeBB-related security issues and incidents.

� Instruction of EKO Cobra The Special Operations Force "EKO Cobra" received training by OeBB how to safely tackle security problems near and on the rails.

� Video surveillance Police received permission to use the on-line train-station video-surveillance system of OeBB.

� Operations Management of OeBB One law enforcement officer was present in the regional operations management of OeBB, e.g. railway-station Vienna-West.

� Training material for behaviour near and on rails Police were given training material about safe movements near and on rails and also an emergency number in case of an incident on the rails.

Appraisal (including all Public Transport)

Core statement Safe transport of passengers by public transport caused no problems during the EURO 2008.

Use of PT

Sufficient public transport was provided. If necessary, extra trains were operated. On match days, PT trains/busses were in some instances used to full capacity, which had no negative effect. All in all, the PT operators had been well prepared for the enormous numbers of spectators and visitors.

Signage easy to follow

Sufficient signage had been put up and the crowds were directed to the right stations and stops.

"Park and Ride"

"Park and Ride" was also available to an extent sufficient to ease the motor-vehicle traffic burden on the inner cities; PT to further transport the crowds worked well.

Law enforcement and PT

Communication between law enforcement and PT has always been very good in Austria and was excellent also during the EURO 2008.

Statement by OeBB

There were no major incidents during the EURO 2008, nor assaults or on guests or employees, nor any severe misbehaviour; maximum security was ensured.

Recommendation Clarification of responsibilities

It is recommended to clearly define the responsibilities of the public transport operators and of the police with respect to safety/security-related issues.


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Exchange of experience with other countries

Exchange of views with representatives from countries who already had experience in hosting similar major events, is advisable, as valuable information can be obtained.

Security measures catalogue

The PT-representatives should prepare a list of measures prior to the event, duly inform the Interior Ministry in good time so that the activities can be coordinated with the police.

Signage

PT-operators must make sure that clear and correct markings and signs are prepared and in place at the start of the event.


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4.1.11 Stadium safety and security

Analysis of Stadium


Methods

� Research

(1) Satisfaction with ticket/access control

effectiveness

(2) Spectators in the stadium in time

(3) Visitors' under-standing re restrictions of items to be taken inside

Number of stadia in Austria 4

Average number of officers deployed in Vienna during the preliminary round

2550

Average number of spotters deployed in

Vienna during the preliminary round

45

Number of Private Security in the

Vienna stadium 950

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3

Percentages Access control

(included in 950) 420


A separate Working Group, composed of representatives from the FMI, the local law enforcement and safety authorities, UEFA, stadia operators, the Federal Chancellery and the architects in charge of new constructions or upgradings, was established for the planning and implementation of all new constructions and renovations or upgradings of the stadia used for the EURO 2008. This WG, designated as "Venue Management Working Groups" (VMWG), was active in all 4 host cities.

The following FMI-recommendations for security measures were partially implemented in cooperation with the VMWG: � Inner and outer "security belt" � Sector segregation to prevent mingling of spectators � Flexible constructional partitions with buffer zones to prevent clashes of opposing fans � A corridor for making a complete inspection round (so-called "police round") – at the top

stadium level with access to the individual sectors � Pitch protection by private security and additional constructional measures (e.g. a "moat",

height of first row of spectators, net barrier) � Double pre-checks and access/ticket controls � Colour Routing System, proper signs, markings inside and outside the stadium; colours

marking the sectors – tickets should be in the corresponding colour � Central locking system to close and lock all doors and gates inside and around the stadium

with a master key and a sufficient number of key copies for the police � Adequate infrastructure for police (control room, command centre, video monitor centre to

watch CCTV, a police station including detention facilities, loudspeaker system, radio communication system, stand-by rooms, parking lots, etc.)

� Additional VIP-areas with separate entrance and special technical security devices (protection from terror attacks)

� Clear stadium/house rules laid down by the organiser


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� Separate arrival and departure routes for different fan groups

Special measures for the EURO 2008 event � The stadia, including the outer security zone were guarded by private steward services

'round the clock.

� On match days, arrangements with respect to the person-frisking instructions were made, and depending on the risk assessment, additional instructions what measures to take in the security zones (in compliance with legal provisions) were issued.

� Police were present to direct the spectator movements to the stadia from public transport and/or parking lots and vice versa.

� Securing of the stadia before, during and after the matches, protection of teams and referees, state guests, and delegations during arrival and departure was ensured.

Appraisal

Core statement Creation of an inner and outer security belt ("cordon sanitaire") and the ticket pre-control, which enabled separate person searching also turned out to be an advantage from the police's point of view.

Fan segregation The compromise between the police recommendation of strict fan segregation and the organiser's interests was successful.

Police (Inspection) round

The corridor for final rounds by police has been built in all stadia and has proven very useful to date.

Ticket control/pre-checks

The double checks and controls in place were quite effective. Time-consuming frisking of spectators for dangerous items were performed in a separate area by the access control personnel. This procedure prevented entrance delays.

Colour markings When the visitors had reached the stadium, they were guided with a colour routing system leading to their seats.

Central lock system The police were in possession of a sufficient number of master keys.

Infrastructure for law enforcement

In each stadium • a command centre, • a briefing room, • a police station • a CCTV system (video surveillance) • stand-by facilities • sanitary installations • detention facilities • police parking lots • a helipad

were provided and proved very valuable.

Private Security The private security services (stewards) managed their jobs quite well, all emergency exit gates were guarded, and all escape routes (staircases) were kept clear.

Emergency/ First Aid

A sufficient number of emergency and First Aid stations were onsite; the stewards were at all times well informed about the location of the nearest facility.

Guidance within the stadium area

Contrary to the police recommendations, the approach ramps to the VIP-entrances (inner stadium security zone) had not been arranged in advance.


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Hence, last-minute barriers/portable fences had to be set up to keep approach and entry of VIPs/teams and the public apart.

Recommendation

Fan Segregation A stringent implementation of all necessary measures for fan segregation, both in the immediate vicinity and inside the event venue is an absolute necessity.

Constructional measures

All a/m constructional measures fully serve the purposes of the police, and are therefore indispensable.

VIPs, teams Approach and departure – separated from the public – have to be arranged well in advance.


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4.1.12 Detention Facilities

Analysis of Detentions/Arrests

� Observations Methods � Research

Chart Key Figures

(1) Arrangement satisfaction

(2) Workflow satisfaction

(3) Facilities satisfaction Total number of

arrests 574

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3

Percentages

Arrests under criminal law

343

Arrests under administrative law

231

Detention facilities 3


Planning and preparation of detention facilities and procedures began 2006.

General � Special organisational concepts for detaining and arresting in the host cities Klagenfurt,

Innsbruck, Salzburg, and Vienna, had to be devised. � Detainee facilities for approx. 150 to 300 individuals had to be provided. � Likewise, a computerized database for EURO 2008-related arrests was created, including

a new "Data Sheet" for this purpose. � Equipment and facility-wise, mobile cells, recording devices in vehicles, prisoner

transporters, digital cameras, and photo-printers were needed. Underlying Assumption (Calculation) The following maximum numbers were assumed for preparing detainee logistics: � Federal Police Directorate Klagenfurt = 300 arrests a day � Federal Police Directorate Salzburg = 150 arrests a day � Federal Police Directorate Tyrol = 150 arrests a day � Federal Police Directorate Vienna = 300 arrests a day

In view of a/m figures, mobile cells in addition to the existing facilities had to be provided � Federal Police Directorate Klagenfurt = 8 modules � Federal Police Directorate Salzburg = 5 modules � Federal Police Directorate Tyrol = 5 modules � Federal Police Directorate Vienna = a container/courtyard of the Vienna Police Prison

Procedure � Transport of arrested persons to the mobile cells


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� Detainees body-searched and photographed � Photos marked with numbers and attached to the data sheets � Detainees incl. personal belongings-bag then transferred to stationary prison cells; in Vienna

to the police detention centre � Taking over of documents, the data sheet (with photo/number), belongings-bag by the

officer-in-charge who also makes sure all is complete � Renewed body-search � Data entry into the police recording system and Detainee Information System � Offence categorisation under the Penal Code or Administrative Law � Taking fingerprints and photographs � Detainee sees medical officers to confirm the person is fit for prison and criminally

responsible � Report to security authorities of higher instance or public prosecutor's office

Measures taken by Law Enforcement Authorities � Rapid processing of administrative penal proceedings � A legal officer had to be on duty/available at any time

Appraisal

Facilities

� A very small number of persons was arrested during the EURO 2008, except the 'mass detentions' in the Klagenfurt incident, in which case the detention system worked very well.

� A clear and logical workflow – the facilities were fully functional – made sure both the officers and the detainees were in possession of all relevant information. Clearly assigned responsibilities ensured methodical work and interaction of all deployed forces (incl. e.g. medical officer).

Workflow

� A sufficient number of officers were on duty for handling and guarding the detainees inside and outside the cells. Deployment was made on a 1:1 ratio, i.e. 100 officers for 100 arrests. 24/7-operation was ensured. Deployment of additional officers for making the video documentation would have been ideal.

Cell locations

� When selecting the location for the detention facilities, it was made sure that the distances for transporting detainees were short and that a sufficient number of commando rooms, parking spaces, and enough rooms for offices, and separated sanitary facilities were available for officers and prisoners.

� Following advice of the Austrian Human Rights Advisory Board (HRAB), in addition to the facilities, an additional lane of cells with six officer teams was set up in case of overcrowding, and four containers for 8 persons each for brief waiting periods. The IT-application "Detainee Information Database" proved extremely useful as it saved time and was also a tool to extract relevant information/statistics.


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Detainee transfer

� The cooperation between law enforcement and justice authorities and the administration authorities was very good.

� The Vienna Police Directorate had given instructions not to issue demands to immediately serve prison terms in lieu of a fine, so that only about 200 prisoners had frequented the Vienna police prison (making it possible to transfer detainees from host cities to Vienna).

� Only very few prisoner files were incomplete, sometimes true identity had been established.

� The requirement to observe human rights at all times and protection of privacy of detainees were fulfilled to one-hundred percent. No ethnicity- or gender-related misconduct was registered. The officers supported each other, especially concerning the use of foreign languages. There was no shortage of sanitary items.

IT-Support � Any use of notebooks, as originally intended, had to be refrained from, as the tests had resulted in temporary data line breakdowns.

Recommendation

Costs � In view of the cost for renting/leasing the facilities (cf. Cologne Model), it might be worthwhile to buy them.

Material � It is important to have sufficient stocks of film and photo material, bags for detainee's belongings, labels, etc. ready for use at the detention facilities.

HRAB contact officer

� One officer located in the detention facilities should be appointed as contact person for the members of the Human Rights Advisory Board, to mainly deal with possible human rights issues.

� During the EURO 2008, the HRAB paid three times as many visits as usual.


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4.1.13 Criminal Investigation Division The observation subject "CID" was split into the areas

- operational measures, and - prevention measures.

Analysis Operational measures

� Interviews � Research � Statistics

Methods


Key Figures

Criminal Offences

(Comparison of the evaluation period with the same period last year) B/m figures originate from the internal police analysis database. These figure indicate – in contrast to the police crime statistics – how many criminal offences were committed in June 2008, but not, how many of these were taken to court in June 2008. The total number of criminal offences (as per 31.12.2008) rose from 45,418 to 47,556 (i.e. by 4 pc.)

• Decrease of � breaking into motor-vehicles from 2191 to 1819 (-16%) � theft by breaking and entering (apartments/homes) from 1287 to 1154 (-10%) � drug-related offences (violation of s.27 ANA*) from 1522 to 1008 (-33%) � drug-related offences (violation of s.28 ANA) from 182 to 89 (-51%)

• Increase of

� bodily injury/affray from 3939 to 4461 (+13%) � pick-pocketing from 3164 to 4226 (+33%) � theft by breaking and entering (offices/stores) from 1458 to 1726 (+18%) � damage of property from 6801 to 7555 (+11%) � robbery from 292 to 360 (+23%) � frauds from 1745 to 2036 (+16%) � smuggling of human beings, illegal migration from 236 to 305 (+29%) � currency counterfeiting from 458 to 709 (+54%)

*) ANA – Austrian Narcotics Act


Creation of a centralised CID-service within the Cr iminal Intelligence Service Austria as the top coordinating CID-body, in charge of the fol lowing tasks:

• Participation in the central Management Staff • Performance of central CID activities • Functional supervision over the regional authorities/services • Installing

1. an international CID-Liaison Bureau to ensure an effective information flow 2. a nation-wide analysis unit to identity risk persons and suspects, and preparing

strategic and und operational analyses and status reports


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3. a Situation and Information Center within the CID, which - supported by the 24/7-service (SPOC - Single Point of Contact) of the Criminal Intelligence Service Austria, structured as "Special-Purpose Organisation", responsible for a) functioning as interface to local Management and Command Staffs, to other

organisational units, and to public and private institutions b) fulfilling information and reporting obligations

• selecting priorities with respect to CID-activities

Creation of a so-called "BAO"*) as specified by the Criminal Intelligences Services of the Provinces: It had to be established in the preparatory phase and maintained until the end of the event, including a post-processing phase.

� General responsibilities: • Taking action in line with the purpose, and fulfilling information and reporting obligations • Selecting priorities with respect to local CID-activities

sector-planning: analysis, investigation/search, interrogations, crime scene work, documentation and analysis, and surveillance.

• Determining the need for human resources

� Maintaining operational CID task fulfilment unrelat ed to the EURO 2008 Determining priorities in view of ensuring regular CID activities while covering the major event at the same time.

� Situation and Information Center

� Responsibilities A Situation and Information Center (SIC) was set up within the centralised CID-service in order to ensure nation-wide information gathering and dissemination, and to prepare a Crime Status Report. The SIC was located in the Criminal Intelligence Service Austria for the purpose of passing on all information to the representatives in the PICC.

� International Coordination

The SIC was responsible for coordinating - international cooperation at CID-level, - national and international information exchange, - national planning of CID-activities, - international criminal investigations and - international prosecution of crimes. EUROPOL, INTERPOL, EUROJUST, the FBI, the Liaison Officers of the competing countries and other countries concerned, and one public prosecutor who was especially appointed for EURO 2008-related cases, were involved in a/m tasks.

� National Coordination

The Criminal Intelligence Service Austria was also responsible for fulfilling further CID-related tasks, and to instruct the subordinate authorities and services accordingly. *) "BAO – Besondere Aufbau- und Ablauforganisation" (literally: Special-Purpose Build-up Organisation), in this review referred to as "Special-Purpose Organisation" � Special Teams

� DVI-Teams (Disaster Victim Identification Teams) and Negotiating Teams National und international DVI-teams would be activated for deployment in case of disasters


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or major incidents and coordinated by the SIC.

� Reconnaissance Teams Teams of two plain-clothes officers had to support the so-called "spotters" (football scene and hooligan experts). These officers were selected because of their skills or capabilities (e.g. surveillance specialists), their local knowledge, and familiarity with the scenes and locations.

CID Priorities

Offences against life and limb (bodily harm, affray, assault, resisting public officials,…)

Slight increase

Property offences (burglaries, thefts, shoplifting, etc.) in or near host cities, Public-Viewing areas, fan miles, crowded locations (underground trains/stations, airports, railway stations, shopping malls, entertainment parks)

No EURO 2008-related increase

Drug-related crimes (international drug-trafficking…)

No EURO 2008-related increase; rather a decline according to the statistics

Frauds (e.g. Internet and betting/gambling fraud, ticket and accreditation forgery)

Slight increase before and during the EURO 2008

Smuggling of and traffic in human beings, prostitution (trans-border prostitution, traffic in children...)

No EURO 2008-related increase; only slight increase of violations of the Aliens' Act

Currency counterfeiting

Increase of offences of this nature - in comparison to the corresponding period of the previous year

Pickpocketing Increase in the number of such offences, due to the extremely high numbers of visitors (but to be seen in proportion to the population density)

Appraisal

Core statement The organisational structures and the reporting system proved useful. The CID greatly contributed to ensuring security in the course of the EURO 2008-event.

Operational CID measures

Setting CID-priorities also proved successful, as it entailed an effective distribution of resources and tasks. Insights gained by detectives could be transformed into prevention measures, enabling Austria to respond to any threat potentials already in the run-up to the event.

"BAO"

When setting up the BAO ('Special Purpose Organisation'), it was also conducive to observe existing hierarchical organisational structures and competences, as this helped to achieve a successful implementation. At the end of the event and the dissolution of the BAO, friction-free resumption of the normal daily routine work was made easy.

Reconnaissance teams

Special recce teams were formed to verify and process information about fan behaviour and possible sources of dangers, who supported and cooperated with the Austrian spotters and the spotters (scene experts) from abroad.


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Recommendation

CID Services

A clear and transparent inclusion of all national criminal investigation services into the planning phase at an early stage is an absolute necessity for establishing smooth communication flow and distribution of responsibilities within the 'Special Purpose Organisation'

BAO *)

Reporting structures and competences, introduced for the BAO, might result in conflict situations between the officers concerned and officers who otherwise would be their superiors, as the 'dual structure' might entail loss of competence. Such situations can be avoided, or minimised, by clearly defining everyone's responsibilities and competences.

Situation and Information Center (SIC)

The decision whether a separate 'Situation and Information Center' should be set up, or whether the entire CID can be integrated in the 'Special Purpose Organisation' depends on the CID-structure of the country concerned. The fact that a separate 'Situation and Information Center', just for CID-purposes, would be an additional organisational challenge and require extra human resources is to be taken into consideration.

Reconnaissance teams

The recce teams can either act independently, or can be allocated to the spotters to support them.

Comment by the Head of the Situation and Informatio n Center

� It turned out that it had been very wise to build a separate temporary organisational structure beside the CID-line organisation which was responsible for criminal investigation matters in the course of the EURO 2008. However, it was important to have an interface between these two organisational structures to make sure that both, the SIC and the line, receive all information they need for task fulfilment.

� The temporary unit "Special-Purpose Organisation" (BAO*), established especially for EURO 2008-related CID-issues beside the line organisation, was very useful. However, it was important to have an adequate interface between these organisational structures, to make sure that both bodies (Situation and Information Center and the regular services) receive all information they need to fulfil their obligations.

� Likewise, it was very useful that Liaison Officers from the competing countries were present in the also temporary body "Situation and Information Center", and that they attended, inter alia, the daily briefings.

� The fact that international organisations had sent their Austrian Liaison Officers, turned out to be less conducive, as this caused some sort of hierarchical subordination problems. When planning the deployment of detectives in the "Special-Purpose Organisation" (BAO*), the regular daily routine work of the CID should not be neglected, as the "normal" work must also be done. Furthermore, occurrence and tackling of "Worst Case-Scenarios" – both with respect to the major event and the line organisation work, have to be envisaged and adequately prepared. In other words, operational forces have to be on stand-by to be deployed for such purposes without causing interference with other tasks.

*) "BAO" – Besondere Aufbau- und Ablauforganisation" (literally: Special-Purpose Build-up Organisation), in this review referred to as "Special-Purpose Organisation"


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4.1.14 Prevention Measures

Analysis of Prevention Measures


Methods

� Statistics

Chart Key Figures

(1) Prevention measures perceived by interviewees

(2) Interviewees' responses re prevention measures

(3) Prevention measures covered by media and noticed by the general public

Print media, Broadcast media,

Info-screen

Total costs 80,000 € Viewed by 82.8 %

Flyers 40,000

Posters 2,000

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3

Percentages

Spots on car burglary, vandalism, fireworks, violence,

pick-pocketing

5 spots permanently broadcast


The prevention measures aimed at preventing criminal and administrative offences, in particular violent riots, thefts, and bodily injuries. However, the principle of proportionality stipulated by the Austrian Code of Police Practice, had to be adhered to.

To this end, the existing structure of criminal prevention was used. The centrally prepared contents regarding prevention were included in lectures, individually given advice, and in the planning of security and safety precautions in relation to fan miles.

� Cooperation with Trade and Industry Recommendations in the form of a catalogue, distributed to business people o Drinks not to be served in glasses o Sale of light beer only o Ban on alcohol inside and in the vicinity of the stadia o Protection or removal of bottle banks and refuse bins near stadia or fan meeting points o Firm fixing or removal of tables, umbrellas, benches, in the vicinity of stadia and fan

meeting points o Protection of construction sites near stadia or 'hot spots' (train stations, bus stops/

terminals). � Training was held with representatives of the following institutions:

Fire-brigade and disaster management institutions, private security, catering businesses, public and private transport operators (OeBB, bus services, also into the neighbouring countries), operators of the fan camps, hotel owners, team accommodations), municipal authorities (garbage collection, street cleaning, towing service), Cab-drivers Association.


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Supplementary measures in the form of hotel controls, information events at tourism associations and in shopping streets, co-organisation of info-stands, e.g. jointly with the initiative "FairPlay", information for campsite operators, operators of motorway service areas and gas-station shops, open-air cinemas, attending various events organised by the guilds, cooperation with the working group 'Media', ambulance services, and heath authorities.

Main pillars:

o Cooperation with the Chamber for Economic Affairs o Cooperation with the Austrian Railways (OeBB) o Cooperation with the initiative "FairPlay" o Creation of a system to forward information to certain registered clients, e.g. by SMS-

messages to retailers, and to gas-stations o Cooperation with catering businesses in and near the stadia, the Public-Viewing

areas, and the fan miles � External Prevention Measures

In the run-up to the EURO 2008, prevention measures were not only taken in Austria, but also in the countries of the competing national teams. These activities included many different types of measures and were especially devised for the different target groups. For instance, prior to matches played by the Croatian national team, spots were shown on the screens inside the stadia, announcing among other information, the presence of Croatian officers in Austria during the EURO 2008. The addressees of such spots were violent-prone football fans. The video spots informed potentially violent supporters that they would be identified quickly by Croatian Liaison Officers, if necessary. The Initiative "FairPlay" provided information for fans in all participating countries, including police advice in their security information.

� Public Relations

Many information campaigns were arranged early on, especially designed for the general public and small business people, mainly focusing on damage of property, bodily injury, pick-pocketing, and motor-vehicle burglaries.

� Video Spots

Spots of simple design were used to provide information, containing one core message per subject matter. The contents were communicated to the target group with media support.

� Flyers

Flyers on different subjects, were printed and distributed among the general public to draw attention to possible risks and how to identify them.

Appraisal

Video-spots

Pictograms were used to design video spots without verbal messages. 15 seconds were devoted to one issue (car burglary, vandalism, fireworks (Bengal Fire), pick-pocketing and violence), including protection measures . These spots were shown in all public places during the entire EURO 2008, and were thus seen by a wide majority of the public.

Recommendation

Training The training objectives for training of prevention officers should be centrally elaborated and training should be consistent.


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PR

Prevention-related public relations work needs to be centrally coordinated. However, it is to be borne in mind that overly massive prevention campaigns rather cause fear among the public, and might have a negative effect upon the subjective feeling of security.

Internal communication

Internal awareness-raising for prevention measures should be effected as early as possible involving all central and subordinate organisational units, to enable the determination of the most important prevention targets, which facilitates consistent implementation of prevention measures.

Distribution strategies, such as spots, flyers

It is recommended to start as early as possible to seek agreement upon the strategy what to communicate by means of these spots, and to review all possibilities how to appeal to the target groups. Cooperation with UEFA in producing 15-second spots is certainly a practical solution.

"Language barriers"

When policing international major events, it is vital that material (posters, flyers, spots …) pointing to prevention measures contains self-explanatory messages to overcome language barriers.


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4.1.15 Person and Property Protection (PPP)

Analysis of Person and Property Protection (PPP)

� Observation � Research � Qualitative Interviews

Methods

� Statistics

Chart Key Figures

(1) Satisfaction re indoors/outdoors

protection

(2) Adequate checks of facilities/property

protection

(3) Relation – planned/implemen-

ted person protection measures

Deployed officers 429

Road pilotages 128

State guests from abroad

102

Bomb threats (hoaxes) 4

Property protected by state security officers

58

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3

Percentages

Temporary "Embassies" 2


An internationally significant major sports event such as the EURO 2008 can be assessed as potential target for extremist or terrorist attacks, because of international media presence and enormous public interest.

Procedure:

Preparation of a threat assessment with respect to terrorism and extremism for the countries qualified to compete. Austria and Switzerland agreed that each country would have independent risk assessments and threat analyses made by their own competent services. � Involvement of the decision-makers for person and property protection in the project planning

and structuring of operations of all sub-events (test matches) by the respective organisers was very important to determine the parameter for assessment of possible threats.

� Coordination and control of person and property protection was the responsibility of the "BVT – Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung" (Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism).

� Deciding on the protection necessity 1 - 3, according to the catalogue of measures (permanent person protection, temporary person protection, permanent property protection) was another important element.

� The regional state security authorities, LVT – Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (Regional Agency for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism) in the host cities were responsible for the planning and operational command of the protection measures for teams at risk, representatives of foreign states, international organisations, and other subjects of international law.

� All facilities concerned had to be searched and security-checked. � Protection measures for teams were implemented by plain-clothes officers (indoors) and

uniform officers (outdoors) according to b/m risk categories drawn up by state security.


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The security measures for competing teams were decided on the basis of a 3-stage risk assessment system: Risk category 1: increased/high risk

o operational command to take measures of person and property protection (PPP) by LVT o indoors and outdoors safeguarding of team quarters by police (in addition to private

security) o searching and checking accommodations for items possibly containing explosives o team-protection by EKO Cobra o TSLO-support by LVT (contact partner) o piloting the teams with flashing blue light

Risk category 2: slightly higher risk

o operational command to take measures of person and property protection (PPP) by LVT o outdoors safeguarding of team quarters by police (in addition to private security) o searching and checking accommodations for items possibly containing explosives o TSLO-support by LVT (contact partner) o guiding the team

Risk category 3: low risk

o operational command to take measures of person and property protection (PPP) by LVT o indoors and outdoors safeguarding of accommodation by private security o searching and checking accommodations for items possibly containing explosives o TSLO-support by LVT (contact partner) o guiding the team

� Setting up a Situation Centre ("Central Information Point") at the BVT – Bundesamt für

Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution and Combating Terrorism) to coordinate information flow and operations.

� Protection of high-ranking guests from abroad

PPP measures are confined to persons to be protected under international law (heads of states and governments, ministers or personalities of the same sort),and were decided on a daily updated threat assessment basis.

� Protection of critical infrastructure

Critical infrastructure means infrastructure or parts thereof that are vital for keeping up important functions for society (e.g. effective functioning of governments), health, economic and social well-being of the population. In principle, owners and operators of critical infrastructures are themselves responsible for keeping up capacity to act and to protect their property and facilities. In addition, owners and operators of critical infrastructures were asked in writing and through personal contacts by police authorities, to boost and adapt security measures especially if located near the stadia.

Appraisal

Host country coordination

Applying uniform methods of team risk analyses and threat assessments in Austria and Switzerland was agreed upon. Nevertheless, due to different appraisal conditions in the two host countries, threat assessments regarding the competing teams varied. The first threat assessments were made 3 to 6 months before the event. They were last updated 2 weeks before the start of the EURO 2008. During the event, daily updates were made.


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person protection (body-guarding) of foreign guests of state in the stadium

Security of state guests from abroad in the VIP-stand was the responsibility of the Special Operations Force "EKO Cobra". Foreign body-guards could not be there because the number of seats was limited – with the exception of a small number of body-guards whose seats had been booked well in advance.

Property protection – Private Security

In some instances it was necessary to transfer protection tasks from otherwise responsible Private Security to the police.

Recommendation

Host country coordination

� Risk and threat assessments in relation to the competing teams need to be identical as far as possible in the host countries as they form the basis for security measure decisions.

Threat assessment semi-final, final

� Whatever the nationality of the teams competing in the semi-final and final, the highest risk category should be assumed.

Person protection of foreign guests of state in the stadium

� It is recommend to discuss and determine the number of foreign body-guards in the stadium (VIP-stand, tribune) in advance with the organiser.

� Definition differences of the term "VIP" between UEFA (VIP: former coaches, top football players, and other sports celebrities) and state security (VIP: persons to be protected under international law) need to be discussed and clarified.

� Special attention is to be paid to prudent convoy arrangements. The routes leading to and from the stadia are to be selected so as to avoid any obstructions by fans.

Property Protection – Private Security

If Private Security is understaffed, which might result in impaired property protection, security is to be provided by law enforcement.

Personnel Deployment of human resources is to be planned in such a way that even in a "worst case" there would be sufficient reserves.

Leadership structures and reporting obligations

The tight management structure proved effective. Efficient information management is essential.

Temporary "Embassies"

Establishment of temporary 'field offices' of foreign diplomatic representations in the host cities also proved very useful and was also highly appreciated by the supporters.


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4.1.16 Coordination Unit of the Bomb Disposal Squad *

Analysis of Coordination Unit of the Bomb

Disposal Squad


Methods

� Statistics

Chart Key Figures

Targets met and

(1) Prevention (2) Resources (3) Regular Routine Work

Prevention fan mile Suspicious items 12

positive 0 negative 12

Searched premises

541

Searched motor-vehicle convoys

169

Deployed officers 165

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3

Percentages

Bomb threats 4


Planned and implemented tasks of the Coordination Unit of the Bomb Disposal Squad: � Identical measures in the stadia right before match days � Searching the stadia for items suspected to contain explosives, in particular for so-called IED

(improvised explosive devices), i.e. unconventional explosive and incendiary devices, before the match

� Assignment of stand-by of disposal officers, explosives experts, one explosive sniffer dog and handler, at the event venue

� Searching team accommodations, means of transport, and training grounds � Assignment of officers during arrival and departure at airports and border-crossing stations � Prevention measures for political stakeholders and high-ranking personalities at risk � Searching hotel rooms, means of transport and venues, frequented by political stakeholders � Prevention measures in public places � Measures regarding seized, discovered, or taken over fireworks items (handling, collection,

transport, interim storage, destruction) � Procedure planning in case of technical failure and/or human incapacitation � Cooperation with other services (Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Ministry of Defence) � Internal coordination of extra jobs and daily routine work – devising standard scenarios � Cooperation with international forces and/or support by foreign squads *) Sub-Dept. of the BK – Bundeskriminalamt Österreich (Criminal Intelligence Service Austria)


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Appraisal

Assignment of specialised officers

The presence of at least one team in the secured vicinity of the stadium/event venue was expedient for the purpose; during the finals 2 fully equipped teams, including a vehicle, were assigned.

Searching team quarters, vehicles, training sites

Despite the very high number of searches of this nature to be carried out the task was optimally fulfilled.

Prevention measures in public places

The high frequency of preventive patrols helped to identify anything suspicious and appropriate measures could be taken.

Dealing with fireworks

Disposal of pyrotechnics items: This issue had been well planned for the EURO 2008 and was successfully implemented. The stewards at the gates removed all dangerous items from spectators. In Vienna, fireworks and items of that nature were handed over to the fire-brigade, which reduced the work of the explosives disposal team. In the host cities Innsbruck, Klagenfurt and Salzburg, these items were collected by explosives disposal officers.

Resources

Resources planning was efficient. Regular daily routine work was not impaired. The number of forces planned for coping with special scenarios and possible incapacitation met the requirements so that task fulfilment was ensured at all times.

Cooperation with other services

Cooperation with the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence in case of special scenarios, such as an NBC-attack, was well prepared. However, as no such incident occurred, there was no need to call in MoD-forces.

Internal coordination

As internal coordination of duties was well organised, normal routine work was upheld without impairment. Operational processes to be carried out in the framework of the a/m "Special-Purpose Organisation" caused slight difficulties at the beginning which were quickly eliminated and had no negative impact upon the activities of the squad's coordination unit.

International cooperation Cooperation with foreign forces had also been well organised and coordinated. Exchange of experience and practical cooperation can be assessed as very positive.

Recommendation

Stadia-related measures

The problem of constructional measures and permanent guarding of the stadium gates should be negotiated with UEFA already during the preparatory phase, to ensure smooth work flow during the mission.

Searching stadia and venues for explosive devices

Searching the stadia before the match for items suspected to contain explosives, especially so-called IED (improvised explosive devices) is very time-consuming. Therefore, it is important to make sure that in the area surrounding the pitch reserved for reporters and UEFA-officials, and in and around the VIP-areas, no bags or other pieces of luggage are left behind unattended.


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Prevention measures in public places

It is important to come to terms with Private Security regarding procedures to prevent taking hazardous items into fan areas.

Handling of fireworks

It is recommended to leave handling and disposal of pyrotechnical articles to the fire-service. Later on, either the Explosives Squad, or an especially trained unit of the fire-service can properly dispose of such items.

Incapacitation Scenario

It is recommend to have a pool of human resources as reserve in case of personnel shortage. Thus, a sufficient personnel reserve would be available, if, on the occasion of a risk match, a special situation occurs.

Cooperation with other agencies (FMI, MoD)

Rapid response to special situations, e.g. NBC risk, can be ensured through appropriate organisational and workflow structures. Immediate and reliable substance-analysis results are essential, necessitating the availability of classified laboratories that are operative 24/7, and if necessary, military assistance is to be asked for.

Internal coordination / regular duty – standard scenarios

It proved advantageous for representative(s) of the individual organisations to be present in the Command Staff(s), as this way misunderstandings and frictions were avoided.


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4.1.17 Media Work

Analysis of Media Work

Methods � Qualitative Interviews

Chart Key Figures

(1) Information of the public re security

(2) Satisfaction re reporting about

police

(3) Satisfaction re cooperation between the

police press team and the media

Total number of EURO 2008-press conferences in

Vienna during the tournament

25


the Host Cities – during the tournament

53


the FMI – prior to the tournament

39

Internal communication 30,000 manuals were handed out

Merchandising 42,000 € 0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3

Percentages

Media inquiries in June 2008

approx. 1,100


Press and Marketing Priorities � Internal communication � External communication � Internet � Corporate Design � Newsletter (electronic and paper version) � police videos

Objective Purpose and objective of the media work was to ensure a consistent and timely internal and external communication. Hence, central coordination was vital. Media and PR in the Run-up to the EURO 2008 The head of the sub-team "Press" was in charge of the management of the media work during the run-up to the event in close cooperation with the project management and the PR-department of the Ministry of the Interior. Regional press contacts were also established in the nine provinces. The entire EURO 2008-related PR activities (incl. media work) were handled by "regional contact partners" in consultation with the head of the sub-team "Press". The most important contents were agreed upon with the project management, and placed at the disposal of the regional contact partners. Thus, they and the local police authorities were able to focus on region-specific topics and answers to such questions. Nevertheless, to ensure nation-wide coordination, it was necessary to always inform the head of the sub-team "Press" in advance, as


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he was accountable to the Office of the Federal Minister of the Interior, to the ministry's PR-Department, and to the project manager. Intensive information exchange and active collaboration with the media (visits to editorial departments, attending press conferences, Jour-fixe events, etc.) formed an essential part of this work. PR and Media Work During the EURO 2008

In order to present the police work consistently and in a professional manner, all the more as the media were very keen on watching police activities, PR had to be particularly coordinated and unified during the time before, during and after the EURO 2008,

Such consistent communication was ensured by forming PR-teams "EURO 2008" and by coordinated and harmonised action at all levels and by the Management and Command Staffs.

Following units/persons were responsible for media work in the course of the EURO 2008

• top responsible person for the project in the FMI

• project manager on the FMI

• press spokesperson(s) in the FMI and/or appointed press officers of the PR-team "EURO 2008"

• heads of the security authorities (Security Directorates, Federal Police Directorates)

• uniformed police commanders (Police Commands at province, city and district level), or

• person(s) especially appointed and authorized for this purpose by the head of the PR-team "EURO 2008"

Press Briefings During the EURO 2008, a press conference was held daily at 10.00 a.m. in Vienna, attended by representatives of the FMI, the Federal Government (the Governmental Coordinator), the Federal and Provincial Police Directorate Vienna, the City of Vienna, and other "blue-light" (emergency and rescue) organisations. The FMI gave an overview of all security-relevant topics for the entire territory of Austria. In the host cities Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, and Salzburg, press briefings were not held daily, because only 3 matches were played in each host city, but on

o days before a match o match-days, and o days after a match

In order to ensure a nation-wide consistently coordinated communication, daily briefings, as a rule by phone, regarding incidents of interest for the media-and the messages to be communicated were held. The information in question also formed part of the situation reports and assessments of the FMI. The contents were approved by the PR-team upon consultation with the project manager using a communication strategy aiming at an Austria-wide identical "wording". Effective media work requires quick reaction. Incidents of interest for the media were reported within the a/m 'Special-Purpose Organisation', and directly to the FMI-Staff. Communication Strategy The communication in the course of such a major event requires a clear strategy. In case of the EURO 2008, the most important factors were

� conduct as outlined in the Communication-Code (transparent, situationally adequate and cooperative inward and outward communication)

� (pro)active media work and topic setting � dialogue-oriented involvement of the media (e.g. background talks) before and during the


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EURO 2008 � integrated communication

o Sequence of communication: 1. inward, 2. outward, or 3. simultaneously o topic consistency in all communication channels, each recipient-oriented (Newsletters,

press releases, websites, personal communication, etc.) o Focussing on core messages and their argumentative reasoning (cf. table "Strategy

Paper Summary") o Prior determination of a functional and competent speaker continuity (proposal

contained in b/m decree) Crisis Communication The entire FMI had to be prepared for media-suitable communication in case of especially challenging situations. For this purpose, crisis scenarios were defined. For each of these scenarios, proposals on what action to take were made, which in case of a crisis would ensure a quick and purposeful response. Corporate Design A special Corporate Design (CD) was created for any public contact of the police with the media. The design was used for PR-purposes (merchandising, website, press releases, DVD, etc.) Merchandising Merchandising products, all bearing the same CD, to be used all over Austria were purchased, mainly as handouts for media representatives and study visit trainees. Website "www.euro2008.police.at" An important component of PR was on-line communication. A separate website (www.euro2008. polizei.gv.at) was created in German and English, to communicate facts about the security measures taken by the FMI and its subordinate agencies and authorities. The website was operated by the PR-team for the EURO 2008 of the FMI. Film Documentation A 25-minute video film has been made about the EURO 2008-policing. Newsletter For internal communication a "EURO-2008-Newsletter" was introduced exclusively dealing with the topic "Security Euro08". The newsletter was disseminated electronically and on paper. Manual A 200-page police manual about the European Football Championship was published for law enforcement, which was distributed to each and every police officer.

Appraisal

Media Reporting EURO 2008-related information were presented in the media fairly correctly. Polemic articles have not been noticed; sufficient security-related information had been communicated to the public in good time.

Consistency

A clear strategy to prevent contradictory media reports was in place right from the beginning. To this end, the same press spokes-persons handled media appearances, and releases were coordinated nation-wide as far as possible. The fact that media reports were consistent also had a trust-building effect upon the general public.

Cooperation Cooperation between media and the Ministry of the Interior and the police respectively, can be rated as very good. Having PR-teams "EURO 2008" in each of the nine provinces, centrally coordinated by the FMI's PR-team, and


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their actively approaching the media (e.g. visits to editorial departments, attending press conferences, etc.) during the run-up and the event itself was instrumental. As a consequence, there was mutual information exchange, greatly facilitating the work of both sides.

Motivation The police media work decisively contributed to a positive media attitude, promoting the press officers motivation and a positive image formation.

Language skills

The press spokespersons of the PT-team EURO 2008 had been given the chance to attend an intensive class in English at the Austrian police academy to enable them to handle interviews and media inquiries also in English. Press conferences were held in German, with English translation. This procedure is customary at major events, makes police media work look more professional, and creates the same framework conditions for everybody present thanks to trained interpreters. The press conferences were attended by predominantly German media representatives. Take-away material for the press was available in German and English. Each press release was translated into English. All translations were retrievable from the EURO-2008-police-website.

Recommendation

Spokespersons Trust-building police appearance requires skilful selection of spokespersons. Who is capable of speaking most impressively about what? This also ensures continuity of the way of presenting information.

Media rules In order to ensure effective PR in connection with a major event all communication strategies have to be clearly laid down in writing.

Communication structures Clear communication structures have to be defined.

Corporate Design If a separate "Corporate Design" (logo) is to be used, it has to appear on each and every communicating tool and instrument (website, merchandising, press conferences…)

Employee Representation

The staff representations (Police Union) also have to be included in the media work in time.


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4.1.18 Team Security Liaison Officer (TSLO)

Analysis of Team Security Liaison Officer (TSLO)

� Interviews � Observations � Research

Methods


Chart Key Figures

(1) Satisfaction with communication between TSLO

and the TSO of UEFA

(2) Satisfaction with communication by Command Staff

– Management Staff – TSLO (pilotage, excursions)

Austrian TSLO 11

Length of deployment 177 days

Number of flights of teams

52

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1 2

Reihe1

Convoys 116


Tasks of the TSLO

� The TSLO - Team Security Liaison Officers - were contact persons and advisers of the teams with respect to all police and security-relevant issues.

� During the event in Austria and in Switzerland, the TSLO represented the interface between the teams, their contact persons, the "Team Security Officer" (TSO), UEFA, UEFA-contact persons, and the police.

� Another of their responsibilities was to help avoiding risks and to protect the teams by taking preventive measures (e.g. police device).

� Furthermore, the TSLO had to manage crisis/emergency situations until the arrival of further police officers.

� The operational activities of the TSLO were limited to the legally absolutely necessary minimum.

Recruitment

� The TS Liaison Officers were recruited from a pool of officers with a certain level of language skills in the languages of the countries competing in Austria.

� The 16 TSLO selected met the following criteria: speaking foreign language(s), profound football scene knowledge, experience in liaison functions, good looks, and good organisational, rhetorical, and communication skills, flexibility.


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Equipment � uniform UEFA-clothing (suit) � accreditation (plus service ID card) � mobile phone � notebook/laptop � digital radio set � service firearm � other items (non-sleeve police identification vest, torch, maps, etc.).

Activities

� One TSLO was allocated to each national team to guide and accompany the team as long as it participated in the EURO 2008. Officers who speak the native language of the respective country were given preference. The TSLO were the first contacts for the teams and of UEFA regarding security matters.

� In view of the good experience with the TSLO-system at the EURO 2004 and the WC 2006, UEFA proposed to appoint TSLO also for the EURO 2008.

� Cross-border TSLO-activities and the equipment needed were planned and coordinated jointly with Switzerland.

� There was regular communication with UEFA n order to include the needs of the organiser, as far as TSLO were concerned, in the planning.

� The TSLO and the TLO (Team Liaison Officer of UEFA) were at all times staying with the teams, i.e. in the same hotel, etc., until the team was eliminated from the tournament.

� Whenever teams were transferred (training, matches, airport, etc.) by bus, the TSLO were on board.

� If, for some reason or other, the TSLO could not be on board of the team bus, he travelled on board of the police pilot vehicle.

� The TSLO also accompanied his team when it changed the country, i.e. to play a match in Switzerland. In that case a second national TSLO joined them.

Preparatory Measures

� Several workshops and practical exercises were held to prepare the officers for the TSLO–activities and how to effect the cooperation, some of them jointly with UEFA-Team Liaison Officers.

� The stadia, training sites, and the team accommodations were inspected together with the regional police forces.

� The actual TSLO-activity started upon arrival of the teams in Austria.

� The TSLO-activity ended upon elimination of the team from the tournament and their transfer to the airport.

� During the EURO 2008, eleven Austrian and three Swiss TSLOs were deployed in Austria: eight, whose team were accommodated in Austria; two, whose teams played in the preliminary round in Austria, and one TSLO whose team was shifted from Switzerland to Austria after the preliminary round.

� Informing them about the reporting channels, their reporting obligations and organisational affiliation were part of the preparations.


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� For the duration of their EURO 2008-activities, the Team Security Liaison Officers were released from their normal routine duties, and assigned to the Staff.

� They had to send daily reports about the activities of their teams (daily programmes, incidents, etc.), which were relayed by e-mail via the PICC to the FMI-Staff and the subordinate command staff in the federal provinces (depending on where the teams were staying).

� In urgent cases, information was transmitted by telephone. Besides, there was permanent communication at regional level between the TSLO, the local sector commander, the road pilots, the regional State Security Agency, the person-protection teams (body guards), etc. concerning the team-activities and what was going on around them.

Appraisal

Communication between TSO and TSLO

In general, the entire police work (road pilotage, person and property protection) was greatly appreciated. The teams expressed high satisfaction about the support received from the TSLO. Both TSO and TSLO emphasized the friendly intercourse with each other and with the teams.

Reporting channels

The TSLO observed their reporting obligations through the foreseen channels, especially in case of sudden incidents, which facilitated a quick response of the operational forces on site.

TSLO-acceptance

In the run-up to the event, the TSLO were in some instances regarded by regional police stakeholders as the "odd men out". However, they soon realised that the Team Security Liaison Officers had connected well with the teams owing to their language skills, their personal qualities, and their police competences, an had thus become an important interface. It would have been of advantage if the regional stakeholders had been better informed about the TSLO-system beforehand.

Involvement of regional units

The local police services applied differing standards/structures with respect to the regional support to be given to the TSLO, which could have been avoided, if the local police services would have been involved in the overall planning and if the regional structures had been charged with determining a standard size of the TSLO-supporting forces.

Comments

The teams were very satisfied with the police measures and the support they had in Austria. The team managers highly commended the police team-protection and support activities.


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4.2 Documentation

4.2.1 Police Accreditations

Analysis of Police Accreditations

� Interviews � Qualitative Interviews Methods � Research

Key Figures

Police Accreditations Austria total (personalised and non-

personalised) approx. 1,150 these included personalised

delegation members 129

included personalised spotters, accompanying

officers 62 these included personalised

SKB 175


Accreditations for Police Deployment After the number of accreditations had been determined, the applications for police officers to be deployed during the EURO 2008, for all FMI-departments and for the Provincial Police Commands were centrally sent to UEFA. Accreditations (including extended access rights) were foreseen for all officers, both in uniform and in plain clothes. It had been agreed that all Austrian police officers in uniform get access to zone 3 (spectator area), to the Command Centres and to the police service rooms WITHOUT accreditation. It was the sector-"stadium" commander's responsibility that on match-days, esp. during the match, only officers on duty there were inside the stadium. Personalized accreditations with name and photograph were issued for all TSLO, members of foreign police delegations, Austrian and foreign spotters, their accompanying officers, as well as senior officials of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, of the security authorities and of the Provincial Police Commands; all other accreditations bore only the imprint "police ". In case of "imminent danger", police officers would have been authorized to enter the stadium also without accreditation. These procedures had been agreed upon with UEFA. The accreditation workflow was as follows: � Survey of demand

� Stating reason for need and the person's rights and powers within the FMI and the subordinate service

� Assessment by decision-makers in the project team

� Deciding on allocation on the basis of a distribution key

� Interface definition

� Application sent to UEFA

� Allocation by the FMI/ZSA according to the results of the demand survey.


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Appraisal

Accreditation for uniformed police officers

The fact that uniformed police were generally exempt from needing accreditation proved to be very practical. It was within the responsibility of the respective sector commanders to decide how many officers would indeed be needed inside the stadium during a match.

Accreditation for other personnel

Decisions concerning the required number of accreditations were made on the basis of discussions of the situation and decisions made on site on what sort of personnel would be needed. It had also to be taken into account that exercising different functions (management, reporting and documentation) required different types of access authorization, and, hence, different types of accreditations.

AT-CH Accreditations

In Switzerland, the applications for accreditations had been made for both host countries already during the run-up to the event. In Austria, these accreditations were applied for only at the end of the preliminary round. This procedure required additional personnel. Besides, in Switzerland only non-personalised accreditations were issued, while in Austria, mostly upon demand by UEFA, hundreds of personalised (name and photograph) accreditations had to be issued which also caused an additional workload.

Evaluation Restricted access for the evaluation teams rendered objective assessment inside the stadium quite difficult, although UEFA itself had asked for an evaluation.

Workflow

The workflow devised for the accreditation procedure proved implementable in practice, but took a considerable amount of time, as a high number of police accreditations had be issued in a personalised version upon pressure of UEFA.

Recommendation

Modus

In principle, in case of bilaterally hosted events, accreditations should be issued for both host countries at the same time and under the same conditions. Furthermore, as few as possible personalised accreditations should be issued, as collecting and entering data into the UEFA-accreditation system requires an enormous amount of time and human resources. Police officers involved in the mission should be exempt from needing accreditation at all.

Identical procedure

It seems advisable to develop a uniform accreditation concept and procedure for both host countries and reach an agreement with UEFA beforehand. Such a strategy would ensure identical treatment of both countries.

Quantity The principle for issuing accreditations should be "As little as possible – as much as necessary".


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4.2.2 Security Clearance of Persons with Accreditat ions

Analysis of Accreditations

� Interviews � Research Methods � Qualitative Interviews

Key Figures

Accreditations issued approx. 48,000 Accreditation centres 2

Withdrawals 135 Accreditation parameter 6

Refusals 1


General

Security clearances of all persons accredited by UEFA and permitted access to all non-public areas of the stadia, the media centres, or team hotels, were part of the comprehensive measures for the EURO 2008. These checks were supposed to refuse persons who might pose a risk access to a/m sensitive areas. The legal prerequisites for such security clearances were in place, but disclosure of the results was subject to stringent data protection provisions and therefore confined to use for defence against possible dangerous assaults. Data transmission between UEFA and the national services was carried out via secure lines. Data retrieval happened automatically (computer-aided).

Appraisal

Cooperation with UEFA

Cooperation with UEFA worked well. The framework conditions had been jointly elaborated and the technical means needed for the data transfer were created.

Legislation The legal basis for the security clearances were not fully ideal (limited data exchange). It has not been possible to enact the proposed amendment to the law. The essential task was accomplished though.

Private Security The Private Security employees were subjected to a far more thorough scrutiny with respect to security, based on the relevant provisions of the Industrial Code.

Recommendation

Investment As security clearances of persons with accreditations require an amount of work and time that should not be underestimated, it is recommended to clearly define the workflow processes and use automatic data processing.

Identical rules A uniform legal basis and a harmonised procedure for performing security clearances of persons to be given accreditations in both host countries is recommended.


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Security clearance abroad

Thorough security clearance checks of accreditation applicants in their home-country would be the preferable course of action.

The ideal case would be to have each accreditation applicant from abroad submit his accreditation application together with the confirmation of having been security-cleared by the competent authorities of his/her home country. A security check in the person's home-country is an absolute necessity for the employees of the Private Security companies.

Data transfer It is also recommended to create the legal prerequisites for comprehensive data transfer ("hit"-reports to the organiser).


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4.2.3 Information and Communication Technology (ICT )

Analysis of Information and Communication

Technology � Interviews � Research Methods � Statistics

Chart Key Figures

(1) Satisfaction with the radio coverage

(2) Satisfaction with the digital radio system

(3) Satisfaction with "EPS-Web"*

(internal recording) Mobile phones 1200

Notebooks 300 (ca. € 380,000)

Walkie-Talkies 1,700

Headsets 2,000

0

20

40

60

80

100

1 2 3

Percentages

= additional purchases for the EURO 2008


First steps to provide ICT-hardware (Intranet- and Internet-PCs, notebooks, smartphones, 2-way radio sets and accessories)

� Demand survey � Demand evaluation � Purchase process � Transfer

Tasks of Dispatch Centres (including the Ministry's Crisis Management Centre):

� Ensuring permanent availability of information of relevance for Management and Command Staffs

� Providing adequate data communication networks � Preparing complete mission documentation � Evaluation of existing structures jointly with the requiring agencies and corresponding

services ("Blue-light organisations", such as ambulance, fire-brigade, Regional Warning Centres, private security companies, etc.)

� Implementation of tactical targets observing the principle "as decentralised as possible, as centralised as necessary"

Creation of framework conditions for radio communic ation by

� preparing a detailed "radio directory" as communication aid for the operations on site � coordinating the "radio and communication directory" with corresponding organisations

and organisational units and blue-light organisations � installing digital radio (TETRA) services in the host cities Salzburg and Klagenfurt � technically adapting the control centres in the host cities � training national and foreign officers in using the new digital radio system

*) EPS-Web = Elektronisches Protokollierungssystem im Web (Web-based protocolling system of all event-related incidents and police activities)


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Integration of mobile telephony by

� setting tactical rules for the use of mobile phones; the existing radio systems (analogue/digital) were designated as primary means of communication, and the mobile network was supposed to be an "additional communication network.

Expansion of the Ministry's own hard-line telephone network by

� strategic priority planning concerning expansion of the so-called "Call-Center Cells" � continuing to use the so-called PolPhone (= make existing systems compatible) � improving the telephone infrastructure in the host cities. � temporarily jointly using of existing "private" infrastructure (e.g. the infrastructure of the

stadium operators), unless using one's own infrastructure would be more advantageous. Joint use of line-CCTV (i.e. video surveillance systems) in the stadia, by

� using existing CCTV in the stadia to watch the premises � negotiating with the operators of the systems to be used � ascertaining the available capacities and the technical equipment requirements � adapting network capacities � including existing CCTV systems (stadia, OeBB, communities, etc.) � procuring the necessary transmission equipment

Use of other line-CCTV , if necessary, by

� preparing a list of measures at regional level for prior ascertainment to be made � inspecting the location in view of tactical considerations � choosing where to place the cameras � concluding rent/usage contracts with property owners � procuring material and technical equipment for the respective location � equipping other focal points (fan parks, locations with video walls, etc.) with CCTV � preparing a technical activity documentation (radio and phone recording) � strategically choosing software for documentation of operations � documenting police activities (in a backtraceable way) by means of recording systems

Appraisal

ICT-hardware The existing equipment and the supplementing purchases for the EURO 2008 ensured nation-wide coverage, meeting the requirements.

Control centres

The existing structure in control centres had to be modified to be in line with the process organisation and workflow management. The presence of members of various partner-organisations in the Management and Command Staffs proved very useful.

Mobile telephony

Mobile phones were very useful for back-up, but the logistical and financial investments were considerable. Inevitable system-related problems (network congestion, point-to-point-connection, etc.) turned out to be further drawbacks.

Hard line telephony

Continued use of hard line phones was also very expedient, as the system was already in place, and only a few improvements (esp. networks and hard line of temporary police stations) had been necessary.

Radio directory Having a unified radio and communication directory was a great help both for the super-regional Management and Command Staffs, and also for the commanders on site in terms of allocation of the forces.


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Digital radio system

During the mission, the digital radio system worked faultlessly and facilitated inter-organisational radio-communication. Dual operation of analogous and digital radio systems did not cause any noteworthy problems.

CCTV (Closed Circuit Television)

Early and focused preliminary ascertainment in connection with the complex area of "video surveillance" ensured friction-free installation and satisfactory operation.

Documentation

The decision to use the software "EPS-Web"*) was very wise. Every piece of event-related information was entered, including instructions received from or given to the Staffs. Entries are made instantly, are brief, and very fast, and are audit-proof. *) EPS-Web = Elektronisches Protokollierungssystem im Web (Web-based protocolling system of all event-related incidents and police activities)

Recommendation

� It is recommended to begin the planning process as early as possible (demand survey, outline planning, detailed planning), as lead time periods for procurement and technical implementation must be taken into account.

� Tactical aspects, such as monitoring strategies, combined with the necessary location-fitting measures also need to be agreed upon very early.

� Reserve equipment immediately available at the venues and also a centrally stored reserve should be foreseen and ensured.

� Budgetary means have to be allocated in good time, either in the line organisation, or as a separate event-related ICT-budget.

� Members of a project group "policing a major event", such as a European Football Championship or a Football World Cup, have to understand that this activity is their main job for the period in question. This way, dual and multi-competences can be avoided which helps to prevent conflicts of interests and time management problems.

� Early and nation-wide supply of a digital trunk radio system (TETRA) is absolutely necessary.

� Ensuring bandwidth-increase of the data networks in time is also recommended to avoid express-surcharge and "last-minute-actions".

� Function-related concepts for the use of ICT-infrastructure (especially notebooks, Smartphones, and PDAs) have to be ready in time.

IKT

� Continuous and complete documentation is needed for follow-up processing after the end of the event.


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4.2.4 Liaison Officers (LO)

Analysis of Liaison Officers (LO)

� Interviews Methods � Research

Key Figures

Length of training 2 days Notebooks for Heads of

foreign Delegations 7


Tasks of the Liaison Officers include

a) Supporting foreign Heads of Delegation (HoD), b) Supporting foreign Support Forces without law enforcement powers, c) Processing inquiries from the Control Centers in the provinces or cities, the Disaster and

Crisis Management Centre, and d) Supporting participants in study visits from abroad.

Recruitment of Liaison Officers and organisational framework conditions

� Selection of Liaison Officers from a pool of officers with foreign language skills (administration by the FMI), officers in special service are exempt from being recruited as L.O.

� Allocation to the delegation, etc. by the FMI. � Travelling to the event venues in the preparatory phase (the L.O. is informed about the

local security structures and local conditions by the Provincial Police Command of the respective host city, contacting officials/functionaries, inspection of 'hot spots).

� Deployment began at the first site; after the group phase, Liaison Officers were shifted to the other country.

� Duty scheduling by the Police Command of the Province of the first site of deployment. Resources

� Accommodation and board were organised by the Police Command of the host city Province.

� Each L.O. was given a service mobile phone. � The delegation heads were given notebooks and mobile phones. � Transport:

− One vehicle with driver for L.O. and HoD, provided by the respective Provincial Police Command. Advantage: the teams can focus on their actual job, and the driver's knowledge of local conditions facilitates transport.

− one L.O. and two support officers from abroad for each team ○ analogous to L.O./HoD, or ○ shift of entire delegation incl. L.O.

− L.O. for guest support (study visit participants) as for L.O./HoD. − accreditation for L.O., regardless of whether with or without uniform required.

Other

� The L.O. sent a brief daily report to the L.O. management in the PICC. Upon elimination of the country's national team, the allocation of the L.O. ended. He had to return to his original service, but remained on stand-by a for a possible new L.O.-assignment in a later phase of the tournament.


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Recommendation

Central contact point

� A permanent Contact and Coordination Point, a direct interface, an adequate crisis management to provide logistical support to L.O.s would be advantageous.

� To have a central administration (for duty scheduling, financial settlement, etc.) is recommendable.

� The L.O. should meet the officers at the contact points, and the senior officers on site and in the central units in person, as this makes communication so much easier.

L.O. deployment Use of Liaison Officers at international major events proved very useful, as they are essential within a Special-Purpose Organisation of that type.

Early start of preparations

Early beginning of preparations – including language classes, various training seminars, conceptional and organisational tasks, meeting the contact persons, various briefings – are of decisive significance for successful policing of a major event.

Infrastructure Providing infrastructure – that includes financial means, motor-vehicles, driver(s), mobile phones, notebooks, accommodation, meals) is absolutely necessary to enable the Liaison Officers to do a good job.

Advance inspections

� It is recommended to travel to the deployment sites beforehand and to take a look at the 'hot spots' during the preparatory phase.

� A timely beginning should enable the Liaison Officers to familiarise themselves with their sites of deployment, to re-inspect the 'hot spots', to establish personal contacts and to meet the team.

Comment

The deployment of Liaison Officers during the EURO 2008 can be considered extremely successful. Special mention is to be made of the great commitment of the Austrian officers who thus presented a very positive image of Austria and of the Austrian police to the world, but who were also instrumental in making this event such a unique success. An international network has been formed because of their professional action and invaluable experience gained, not just by the individual L.O. alone, but by the entire Federal Ministry of the Interior.


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4.2.5 Legislative Measures

Analysis of Legislative measures

� Qualitative Interviews Methods � Research

Key Figures

Security zone 12 Warnings 12

Order to come to police station

89 Hooligan-Database Entry of 7,002 data


General There are several possibilities under Austrian law to tackle problems encountered at major sports events. First, a review of the legislation in force was made. In a next step, the target legislation was defined taking into account experience gained at previous European major sports events (EURO 2004 Portugal, World Cup 2006 Germany), and a comparative study of all European norms of that nature undertaken. At the same time, national legislation was scrutinized for compliance with all EU-directives. It had become necessary to create different legal instruments to meet international standards which were implemented with the two amendments of the Austrian Code of Police Practice 2006 and 2008. The objective of the two bills was to establish legislation enabling the security authorities to better prevent and combat the phenomenon of increasing violent disputes and clashes at national and international sports events al over Europe. The First Amendment to the Austrian Code of Police Practice of 1.1.2006

Security zone(s) at major sports events If there is reason to suspect that potentially violent persons are going to attend a major sports event, or that there will be a general danger for persons or property on a large scale, the law enforcement services are authorized to declare the site of the event venue and a surrounding "belt" of max. 500 metres as a "security zone". Within this security zone, law enforcement officers are authorized to expel/remove persons who can be assumed to commit dangerous assaults using violence from the security zone and ban them from re-entry (e.g. if they are known to have in the past committed dangerous assaults on life, health, and on property, in connection with major sports events). Individual warnings (of hooligans) in connection wi th major sports events The power to pronounce individual warnings of persons posing a risk at major sports events was introduced in 2006, and was amended under the 2008 Amendment of the Austrian Code of Police Practice. Individuals who committed an administrative offence pursuant to sections 81 or 82 of the Code of Police Practice, or the Fireworks Act, on the occasion of major sports events, and who in view of certain facts can reasonably be assumed to commit such offences also at future sport events, can be summoned by the police and informed about lawful behaviour at such events. The database on "Violent offenders" (hooligans) The law enforcement authorities are authorized to investigate name, sex, former names, nationality, date and place of birth, address, parents' names, and alias data of a person and to store these data in a central information system, including the reason for doing so, and likewise, if available, personal description and clothing, and, if necessary, an indication what action to take, and to forward these data to other authorities, if the individual concerned has in the past

Gelöscht:


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committed dangerous assaults on life, health and property on the occasion of major sports events, and who in view of certain facts can reasonably be suspected of committing such offences also at future sport events.

Amendment of the Austrian Code of Police Practice o f 2008

The Amendment of the Austrian Code of Police Practice 2008 (Federal Law Gazette I No. 113/2007), which entered into force on 1 January 2008, provided the law enforcement authorities with additional powers, such as ordering a person to report to the police (at a given time). Furthermore, a separate paragraph "Special powers to prevent violence at major sport events" has been added. Preventive measures: Showing up at police station, lecturing, forcibly escorting to police station and custody

When a person has committed a violent assault on life, health, or another person's property not longer than two years ago, in connection with a major sports event, or has committed an offence of this nature abroad, or has violated a stadium or area ban, the law enforcement authorities are authorized to order this person (by means of written notice) to appear before the law enforcement authorities or at a police station at a given time during the duration of a certain major sports event, and to verifiably lecture him about lawful behaviour, if his past behaviour justifies the assumption, he will again commit an assault against life, health and property in connection with this major sports event.

When lecturing (warning) the person concerned, the reasons that have led to the order to report to the police, the potential risk of such behaviour, and the legal consequences are to be especially stressed.

Appraisal

Security "belt" Designation of a security zone ("belt") for preventive measure taken by police proved effective and useful, as it greatly increased the police's effectivity, despite a relatively high executing effort.

Hooligan warnings Personal contact and lecturing makes the person concerned more aware of the consequences of unlawful behaviour.

Hooligan database Central recording of violent-prone offenders (in particular fans of this type from abroad) made it possible to quickly identify hooligans and helped to devise counter-strategies to ensure safety and security of the public.

Showing up at police station

Mandatory reporting to the police station at a given time has proven to be more efficient than warnings and brings about an international approximation of national framework conditions under administrative and constitutional laws. Lecturing and actual hindrance to attend a major sports event present targeted violence prevention measures.

Recommendation

Legislation It is recommended to review existing legislation in terms of violence prevention measures, i.e. identify any missing legal instruments, as early as possible, as it requires a certain period of time to pass a bill.

Support by the other countries concerned

It appears advisable to identify all legal provisions that render support for the organising country/countries possible, in the form of measures such as data exchange, personnel or logistical assistance, travel restrictions imposed by the participating, adjacent and transit countries.


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Bilateral treaties Preparations to conclude bi-lateral agreements not yet in place, e.g. for the purpose of data exchange, or human resources support, should begin as early as possible.


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4.2.6 Civil Defence

Analysis of Civil Defence

� Observations � Interviews Methods � Research

Key Figures

Disaster Exercises 1 in each host city

(4 in total) Emergency doctors on

match days Vienna 60 - 67

Paramedics approx. 1,600 per

match day Paramedics on match

days Vienna 680 - 870

medical assistance/ interventions, total

6.550 Hospitalisations (entire

EURO 2008) 853


The PICC within the FMI-Staff in Vienna functioned as "Single Point of Contact" - both for the host partner Switzerland and for the neighbouring countries (as outlined in Civil-Defence Agreements), for the European Union, and for the Federal provinces. � The very basis was a "Framework Plan of the Federal Provinces for Non-Police Risk Defence"

for the purpose of preparedness in case a disaster or a crisis, involving the regional authorities and blue-light organisations. The main contents, which had to be more or less identical for all four host cities (jurisdiction of the federal provinces ), were as follows: � Defined reference scenarios (mass falls, mass brawl, panic, technical failure, fire,

accidents involving hazardous chemicals in the vicinity of the venue, terrorist attack –threat or real (conventional and NBC),

� Ambulance service plan (by the organiser) in the stadia and at fringe events � Rescue service � Hospital surge capacity � Integration of management structures of the security and disaster management

authorities at provincial level � Event safety precautions and preparedness in case of major emergencies, by fire-

services � Assistance provided by the Armed Forces � NBC-defence (detection and decontamination) � Establishing identity in case of a disaster � Training/drills

� Disaster preparedness was dimensioned for up to 2 percent of stadium spectators (greatest

possible crowd) who might be affected by some sort of accident/disaster. These figures include 60 percent assumed injured. Adequate arrangements were made at each location, both stationary (stadium) and mobile (Public-Viewing areas!)

� A central hotline was installed in the FMI that could be called by family members looking for

missing persons in case of a disaster or a major accident. DVI-trained officers (detectives) were deployed for disaster victim registration in a computer-database.

� The Crisis Management Centre also planned a temporarily operative Missing Persons Hotline

(Call Centre) via GSL-Web (structured entry of personal data), should there be a major disaster/accident, including human resources needed and organisational measures to be taken.


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� During a match, a medical contingent was on stand-by at the stadium. In addition, mobile paramedics contingents were stationed near the Public-Viewing areas to tackle possible incidents.

� All medical/paramedical units had tents with proper workplaces in case victim registration was

necessary. � At each location a so-called "Integrated Coordination Staff" was set up, composed of

representatives from the disaster management, ambulance services and the fire-brigade. � Civil defence drills were carried out at each location.

Appraisal

Core statement During the EURO 2008 neither serious incidents nor disaster occurred.

Command structure/ L.O.

Thanks to the "integrated coordination structures" and the Liaison Officers all organisations involved had at all times a good situational overview, as all information was pooled in one place and wholly retrievable.

Statistics In the course of the event, the medical and rescue services had to intervene in a total of 6,550 cases; 853 persons were taken to hospital.

Statistics Medical and rescue services provided on match days approx. 1600 and on non-match days on average about 900 forces.

Recommendation

Command structure

The formation of so-called "Integrated Coordination Staff", composed of representatives from in charge of disaster management, ambulance service and fire-brigade, is very recommendable, as such a structure greatly facilitates coping with the situation in case of a disaster.

Hospital/ Health authorities

Hospitals and health authorities in the vicinities of the stadia, etc. should be contacted already during the planning phase, and also be involved in the planning process.

Disaster drills

At least one disaster drill should be held in each host city jointly with all authorities and institutions involved. The main objective is to approximate the different working procedures and methods in order to be ready in case disaster strikes.

Province coordination In a federal system, a province coordination point, or a coordinator, should be set up, in order to unify the measures and ensure nation-wide consistent preparations.


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4.2.7 Border

Analysis of Border

� Statistical Analysis Methods � Qualitative Interviews

Key Figures

Personnel at the border (situation-related)

400-800 Refusals at the border upon re-introduction of

border controls 214

Frontex-personnel in AT, AT-officers abroad

141 55

SIS-hits 138 Vehicle and person searches 2992


Planning by Sub-team "Border" took into account the beginning of the Schengen-evaluation phase of the new EU-member states in 2006. There was every reason to assume that controls at the internal borders to the new EU-member states would be abolished as of October 2007. Four scenarios were elaborated to prepare for tackling any situation that might arise during the EURO 2008:

Scenario 1 was based on the assumption that the Schengen Convention will enter into force in all EU-neighbour states. A measure pursuant to Article Art. 23 of the Schengen Border Code in respect of all of the 6 Schengen-neighbours was regarded expedient. As regards Switzerland and Liechtenstein nothing needed to be changed as border controls are in place there anyway.

Scenario 2 – no reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders to Germany, Italy, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.

Scenario 3 was based on the assumption that elimination of border controls towards Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic, will not yet become reality. Hence, reintroduction of border controls would only make sense towards Germany and Italy.

Scenario 4 did not foresee any reintroduction of border controls at the internal borders, but compensation measures in Austria. These compensation measures were intended to betaken all over Austria in accordance with a risk analysis focusing on the host cities. Visas Regime It was important to offer an efficient and service-oriented entry procedure to facilitate entries and stays for the guests from all over the world. Switzerland and Liechtenstein had agreed to recognize the special Austrian "EURO 2008-Schengen Visas" for the duration of the EURO 2008 also for their countries. These "EURO 2008-Visas" were issued only by Austrian diplomatic representations and entitled the holder – apart from being valid for the Schengen Area – to enter Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein. Hence, in theses cases an additional visa for Switzerland or Liechtenstein was not necessary. Reintroduction of Border Controls Border controls were re-introduced at the internal borders to the Schengen neighbour countries, pursuant to Article 23 ff of the Schengen Border Code. The border controls were temporary and only at certain border crossings of international and regional significance to Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Hungary, depending on the countries competing on certain days, and expected supporter travel routes.


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Scope and intensity of the border controls were limited to the absolutely necessary extent in order not to excessively hamper freedom of movement. The main purpose of reintroducing border controls at the internal borders was to - prevent potentially violent fans from entering the country from or via neighbouring states, - prevent illegal migration taking advantage of the major sports event EURO 2008, and - ensure a trouble-free event. Separate handling areas (border and security control) were set up at international airports for adequate handling of potentially violent fans. A separate terminal ("GENO") had been installed at Vienna Airport for this purpose

� In the course of the "Joint Operation EUROCUP 2008" (JO), the FMI and the European Border Agency FRONTEX carried out a joint so-called HIO (High Impact Operation). While the EURO 2008 lasted, a total of 55 Austrian officers served at the external borders (incl. embassies, airports and land borders, e.g. Poland-Ukraine), and 141 foreign officers served at Austrian land-borders and at international airports in support of the Austrian border control officers, aiming at − Coordinating the information flow of relevance for the EURO 2008 − Preventing illegal migration taking advantage of heavy passenger traffic − Preventing potential hooligans from entering Austria and disturbing the EURO 2008 − Opening an Operational Coordination Centre (OCC) at FRONTEX in Warsaw to

coordinate the information flow and the operational measures. � FRONTEX - Risk Analysis

The operational planning of the JO and all other border-related measures taken in Austria were based on a specific risk analysis which was regularly updated. According to an initial analysis, the following scenarios were to be expected: − increased illegal migration pressure, in particular from Eastern Europe, − growing illegal migration both via Austrian airports and airports in the neighbouring

countries, utilizing low cost carriers, − taking advantage of increased passenger traffic because of the EURO 2008 for illegal

immigration with forged documents. Austrian officers taking part in the FRONTEX Joint Operation abroad: The FMI seconded so-called "document advisers" to assist Austrian embassies in Moscow, Ankara, and Istanbul, in checking documents submitted with visa applications. The JO also foresaw the assignment of Austrian officers to the so-called "Focal Points" (border posts at the external EU-borders) and to international airports. This way, violent-prone individuals were subjected to controls already at the external borders.

Appraisal

Results: The methods and procedures applied proved to be very successful, and the legal instruments created and applied served the purpose well

Refusals, total 214 Residence bans 10

§ 41/2/1 161 Visa-annulments 0

§ 41/2/2 23 Expulsions 9

§ 41/2/3 10 Re-admissions 2

§ 41/2/4 lit a 13 EKIS*/SIS-hits 138

§ 41/2/4 lit b 0 Hooligan database hits 10

§ 41/2/4 lit c 6 Searches 2,922

§ 41/2/5 1


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Border control By reintroducing border controls it had become possible to prevent violent fans from entering the country. A total of 214 individuals considered to present a risk were refused entry into Austria.

Police Information Systems – hits

Important information was also retrieved from the Austrian police computer system, known as *EKIS – Elektronisches Kriminalpoli-zeiliches Informationssystem (Electronic Criminal Police Information System), in conjunction with the SIS (Schengen Information System). 138 hits were registered.

Searches A total of 2,922 suspicious persons/vehicles were searched at Austria's border to avert dangers.

Prevention

Since the a/m prevention measures had been massively publicised by the media, the public was quite aware of the border-control procedures in place because of the EURO 2008. Thus, long queuing was successfully prevented and border controls went smoothly.

Recommendation

Border control

The reintroduction of border controls is certainly a suitable tool to prevent violent-prone individuals from entering the country. However, border controls should be made on a situationally necessary basis to keep restrictions of freedom of movement as low as possible.

FRONTEX It is recommended to involve FRONTEX in the planning phase of the border control measures.

Media

The population in the own country and the surrounding countries (from where high traffic volume is to be expected) should be fully informed in time about the border control measures foreseen on the occasion of the event.

Fan segregation Conflicts or clashes at the border posts can be prevented by making sure that big rivalling fan groups remain physically separated from each other by technical means.


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4.2.8 International Cooperation

Analysis of International Cooperation

� Qualitative Interviews Methods

� Research

Key Figures

International Conferences 3 Conference of the Chiefs

of Police 1

Bilateral ministerial agreements with CH

3 Security Working Group Members

14

Joint Declarations 22 Security Working Group meeting

8 x 2 days

Planning and Preparatory Phase

In view of the experience made by Portugal during the EURO 2004 and by Germany during the WC 2006, international cooperation was one of the corner-stones of Austria' national security concept and, of course, in particular, of Austria's and Switzerland's joint security strategy. International cooperation with Switzerland

Austria's traditionally close and cooperative relations with Switzerland were further enhanced and intensified during the preparations and the run-up to the EURO 2008. To this end, three bilateral ministerial agreements were concluded:

� Joint Declaration by the Ministers, dated 17 February 2003 � Joint Press Statement, dated 10 September 2004 � Joint Declaration on the agreement on a joint security strategy dated 28 September 2005

The progress of the joint preparations was evaluated at the annual ministerial meetings and instructions given how to proceed further. Furthermore, a bilateral "Sicherheitarbeitsgruppe – SiAG" (Security Working Group – SWG) was established, composed of the officials in charge of policing the EURO 2008 and responsible for parallel preparations, ongoing planning harmonisation, and devising a joint security strategy. Joint Declarations – political Declarations of Intent

Willingness to cooperate and to support each other in the security sector other was explicitly laid down in the political agreements. These agreements, in the form of Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), and other existing bilateral and multilateral police cooperation agreements(e.g. Prüm Treaty, Police Cooperation Treaties with all neighbour states), constituted the foundation for the operational cooperation in relation to the EURO 2008. The MoU focused on personnel support, information exchange, fan escorting and monitoring, transit control measures, and measures to prevent potentially violent fans from leaving their home-country. A cooperation in the media sector was also agreed. These agreements facilitated the data and information exchange on risk fans and the deployment of foreign police officers – spotters, uniformed officers with and without law enforcement powers, Liaison Officers, press spokespersons, etc. on the occasion of the EURO 2008 in Austria. Austria entered into bilateral agreements with the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Croatia, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Czech Republic, Turkey, the Ukraine, and Hungary. Furthermore, agreements with Europol and Interpol were signed.


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Conferences

To ensure best possible preparation and harmonisation with the neighbouring, transit and competing countries, the host countries Austria and Switzerland jointly organised and held three international conferences of "Neighbouring, Transit and Participating States": - 1st Conference in Vienna, on 29 Nov. and 1 Dec.2006 - 2nd Conference in Zurich, on 13 and 14 December 2007 - 3rd and last Conference in Vienna, on 31 March and 1 April 2008

Cooperation with foreign diplomatic representations

The foreign diplomatic representations in Vienna were kept informed about the planning by letter in order to involve them in the international preparations for the EURO 2008. In addition, embassy representatives were invited to the a/m Conferences. If individual issues regarding the EURO 2008-preparations had to be clarified, some embassies received direct assistance. Special "EURO 2008-Visas" were created to facilitate travel movements of supporters.

These "EURO 2008-Visas" were issued by Austrian diplomatic representations only, especially for EURO 2008-visitors, and entitled the holder – apart from the Schengen Area – to enter Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein. Support forces from abroad

Approximately 1100 police officers from other countries, most of them wearing their national uniform, supported the Austrian police during the EURO 2008. Germany, in particular, made a great contribution. A bilateral treaty was the basis for a legally binding agreement on supplying forces with operational powers and operating resources.

Implementation agreements to supplement the Treaty were concluded with the German Laender, supplying the forces, i.e. Bavaria and Northrhine-Westphalia.

Another implementation agreement was concluded with the German Federal Ministry of the Interior on possible support by officers from the German Federal Police. This agreement regulated the secondment details and the deployment of the German support forces with law enforcement powers in Austria during the EURO 2008. 850 German police officers with law enforcement powers provided support to ensure security during this major sports event:

� 375 members of the Riot Police from Northrhine-Westphalia � 375 members of the Riot Police from Bavaria � 80 officers of the Bavarian "Support Command" � 20 detectives from Bavaria

Another 136 officers from seven countries also supported the Austrian police. These officers had no law enforcement powers, but nevertheless played an important role as Liaison Officers or spotters (Germany: 31, Croatia: 31, Russia: 11, Poland: 25, Spain: 11, Sweden: 15, Greece: 12)

Appraisal

Cooperation with Switzerland

The excellent cooperation, in particular speaking with one voice and taking a unified stand immensely contributed to a virtually incident-free and smoothly running event. It has become evident that early harmonisation measures are the best foundation for jointly hosting such a major event.

Joint Declaration The early start of talks and negotiations of the Memoranda of Understanding concerning support during the EURO 2008 was instrumental in concluding the agreements in time.


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International Conferences

By arranging these conferences, all countries concerned were taken on board, i.e. included in the preparations, and important bilateral talks were held on the sidelines of the meetings, e.g. about fan behaviour, expected number of spectators, required support, etc.

Diplomatic representations

Active information of the foreign representations in Austria also ensured good cooperation. News Letters helped to reduce Euro-related inquiries by some embassies on special issues to a minimum. In such cases, answers were provided by direct contact.

Support forces from abroad

The deployment of the foreign support forces turned out – in more than one respect – to be an essential element of the EURO 2008-security measures (Example: permanent information exchange on fan movements)

Recommendation

Early contact It is recommended to get into contact with the neighbouring countries concerned and the competing countries and to involve them in the most important planning steps.

Ministerial agreements

Agreements at ministerial level constitute an important basis for cooperation among experts. It is recommended to conclude bilateral MoUs with all participating, neighbouring and transit countries, to facilitate the work done at the level of officials.

Informative meetings Apart from a permanent information exchange by e-mail and phone, meetings with all experts at international level are absolutely necessary, to discuss the status of preparations, cooperation, and mutual support.

Diplomatic representations

The information and involvement of foreign diplomatic representations in the host country as first contact points of the countries concerned is an important element to ensure a smooth major event.


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4.2.9 Cooperation with Switzerland

Analysis of Cooperation with Switzerland

� Qualitative Interviews Methods

� Research

Key Figures Conferences

(2 in Vienna, 1 in Zurich) 3

Members of SWG in average 4 persons

(7 AT – 7 CH)

SWG meetings 13

(2004-2008)


In implementation of the Swiss-Austrian ministerial declaration dated 17 February 2003, representatives of the security authorities of both countries constituted a joint "Sicherheits-arbeitsgruppe – SiAG EURO 2008" (Security Working Group – SWG) and prepared a policy paper, which was approved by the ministers in September 2004. Subsequently, the mandate was given to devise a joint security strategy. Upon completion it was approved on 28 September 2005, followed by the implementation mandate. A project organisation with the same project structure was formed in each host country to work out the national security strategies. The a/m SWG elaborated the framework concept on the basis of the national security strategies to make sure that security standards were identical in all areas. Both countries had to respect the following principles :

� Ensuring a peaceful European football festival bringing nations together � Ensuring transparency and proportionality of the security measures � Applying uniform security standards � Speaking with one voice at international level � Setting up compatible planning staffs during the preparation phase, and compatible

Management and Command Staffs during the implementation stage, in both countries � Mutual seconding of representatives � Maintaining normal routine policing

The principles in detail

a) Operational measures � Consistent threat assessment of danger potential � Uniform guidelines for safeguarding persons, teams and other official representatives

to be protected � Uniform guidelines for property protection � Concerted action by Austria and Switzerland as regards external borders � Approximation of traffic/transport strategies � Comprehensive information exchange about planning civil defence measures � Border: Concerted action to facilitate passenger traffic between Austria and

Switzerland, and a compatible visa-regime during the EURO 2008

b) Criminal Investigation Division � Mutual support in cross-border operations � Joint approach in involving Interpol and Europol, and deployment of Liaison Officers

of other countries


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� Close cooperation with the public prosecution and the courts of both countries � Identical categorisation of violent offenders at sports events (hooligans) � Concerted cross-border deployment of foreign spotters (scene-experts) � Joint organisation of the Conferences of the Participating, Neighbouring, and Transit

Countries during the run-up to the EURO 2008 � Harmonisation of preventive measures

c) State Security

� Close cooperation with respect to collecting intelligence on terrorist and extremist threats

� Applying the same standards in making threat assessments and planning of safeguarding individuals to be protected under international law

� Identical procedures regarding security clearance of persons with accreditations under the respective legislation in force

� Concerted action to ensure aviation safety and security

d) Press � Devising and applying a joint media and communication strategy to provide

comprehensive information before and during the event � Designing a common "Corporate Identity" of the security authorities in both countries � Setting up Press Offices in both countries

e) Training

� Training modules tailored to all forces involved in policing the event � Uniform training objectives und training contents for stewards of private security

companies

f) Legislation � Uniform security standards as far as possible under national legislation

g) Logistics / IT

� Secure communication lines � Consultation on procurement of resources

h) Personnel

� In general, all police activities to be carried out by own forces � Situation-related deployment of foreign police officers in accordance with the bilateral

agreements

i) Police Information und Coordination Center (PICC) � Creation of one PICC in each country to support the Management and Command

Staffs � Information and data exchange between the two countries via the PICCs in

accordance with the national legislation

j) Alignment of International cooperation � Agreement on contents, coordinated transmission of political Declarations of Intent to

neighbouring, transit and competing countries

k) Hooligan-database (major sports events) � Common approach for a close cooperation in exchanging data on violent offenders at

major sports events, and concerted action in exchanging data with all countries concerned


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Appraisal

Cooperation Despite differences in the legislation in force in Austria and in Switzerland, respectively, cooperation was perfect.

Implementation All jointly agreed and decided measures were implemented as scheduled.

Recommendation

Planning Timely start of planning a joint strategy and jointly scheduling a timetable is of paramount importance.

Project organisation Agreement on a compatible or identical project structure is advantageous.

Information transfer Information exchange should take place on a regular basis.


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4.2.10 International Data Exchange

Analysis of International Data Exchange

� Qualitative Interviews Methods � Observations

Key Figures

Data exchange with 22 states Transmitted data

quantity 10,754

Storage (after legal scrutiny)

7,002 data sets List of persons check

for hooligans 781 persons (these

include 34 hits)

Hooligan checks (in the course of compensation measures)

10 hits


General

The latest amendment to the Austrian Code of Police Practice provided the legal prerequisites to store person-related data of individuals known for displaying violence at major national and international sports events.

Legal basis (s.57, para.1, lit.11a of the Code of Police Practice – "Hooligan database")

The law enforcement authorities may determine data of a violent individual and process the data in a centralised information system, if

• the person is known for having committed dangerous assaults on life, health and property on the occasion of major sports events in the past, and

• can be reasonably suspected of committing such offences also at future sport events; risk assessment made by spotters (scene exerts)

• data referring to 'scene of crime Austria' have to be deleted 2 years after the last entry, if the data originated from police authorities of other countries immediately after the relevant period, in other words, at the end of the major sports event. Entry of such data from foreign security authorities is subject to the same legal provisions as Austrian data.

Purpose of data exchange

Entry in the database "Violent Offenders" provides the police with valuable information and evidence in case of an intervention and can justify banning an individual from security zones at major sports events, or expulsion upon a control in the course of compensation measures near the border. National planning phase

The "ZSA - Zentrum für Sportangelegenheiten" (Central Unit for Sports Matters), a sub-department of Division II of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, is in charge of operating a central Information System, namely the a/m Hooligan Database in compliance with a Council Resolution of 25 April 2002 "concerning the creation of a national information centre on football vandalism", thereby observing the a/m legal restraints concerning violent offenders who commit a crime in Austria.


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Laborious programming and/or adopting new laws (data protection) had not been necessary as in terms of technical implementation the existing system – "EKIS - Elektronisches Kriminalpolizeiliches Informationssystem" (Electronic Criminal Police Information System) – could be used. Planning phase 'International Data Exchange – EURO 2008'

After the end of the World Cup 2006, an intensive exchange of experiences (study visits) with experts in this field took place in Germany. In the beginning of 2007, a joint Austrian-Swiss Working Group (WG) with the name "International Data Exchange" was put together. The WG met several times. The objective was to define a common procedure to be applied by Austria and Switzerland in approaching the participating, neighbouring and transit countries, and to agree upon cooperation between Austria and Switzerland during the EURO 2008, as far as possible under the respective national legislation in force. First of all, "Single Points of Contact" for the international data exchange were set up in Austria and Switzerland and countries expected to provide the most important data. Next step was to agree on an electronic standardised form containing basic information: first name, family name, gender, date of birth, nationality, and additional remarks. Agreements had to be reached on technical and administrative conditions, how to treat error files, special characters, data updates, table of country names, compulsory deletion, secure data transfer, etc. Another important point was the mutual exchange of the national data, handling of data of "new" violent offenders, detected during the EURO 2008. Daily data matching during the EURO 2008 was agreed upon. Technical implementation in Austria In view of the data quantity to be expected (approx. 25,000 person-related data), a computer programme was developed specifically for this purpose to import these data automatically into the existing system (EKIS) on the one and, and to extract the data from the system for the ongoing data cross-matching between Austria and Switzerland during the EURO 2008 on the other hand. The programming work took 40 days, it was tested with test-data obtained during international matches (Germany, England, the Netherlands) before the EURO 2008. Preparatory phase Austria – Switzerland In the course of the a/m three international conferences in Vienna and Zurich, and at political level by means of several Memoranda of Understanding, Austria and Switzerland requested 22 states to transmit data of individuals known to be potentially violent at major sports events. A request to transmit data, drafted jointly by Austria and Switzerland, was sent simultaneously to 22 states on 28 February 2008. The deadline was set at1 May 2008 to have enough time for scrutinizing the data. All states legally permitted to send data were fully cooperative. Operational phase Austria – Switzerland

Storage of data of foreign violent offenders (known hooligans) began on 1 May 2008. Further data were steadily transmitted until the end of the EURO 2008 ("data-updates"). The "Single Points of Contact" in Austria and Switzerland, reachable all day from 15 May 2008 to the end of the EURO 2008, were responsible for the organisational implementation. During the event, the data were daily cross-matched with the data in the Swiss system, and as of 26 May 2008, a daily hooligan-data analysis was made and forwarded to the FMI-Staff. The majority of the countries transmitted their data on condition that they were treated strictly confidential and not made public. All data received from abroad were automatically deleted from the system on 30 June at the latest.


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Appraisal

Core statement International data exchange proved very useful and constituted an important element in the entire prevention strategy for the EURO 2008.

Common strategy – Austria & Switzerland

As Austria and Switzerland came forward with identical methods in connection with international data exchange and proposed identical procedures, they met with a very positive response. Hence, sufficient data on hooligans from competing countries were transmitted in conformity with the law.

Recommendation

Identical procedure for data exchange

The strategies in connection with international data exchange and national use of such data by two or more host countries of a major sports event have to be approximated as far as possible. It is also important to use identical forms and formats to facilitate data exchange between partner countries and third countries. This applies in particular to having same kind of technical implementation and fixing a schedule in both the preparation phase and the operational phase.

Information exchange

Early information of the countries concerned about the legal framework conditions and the technical implementation modalities of the international data exchange during the preparation phase and in the course of the event itself are essential.

Transit and neighbouring states

It is absolutely necessary to include all neighbour countries and the more important transit countries in this process – even if these countries do not qualify to compete – in order to ensure comprehensive data exchange.


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4.2.11 Human Resources

Analysis of Human Resources Measures

� Qualitative Interviews � Research Methods � Statistics

Key Figures

Total number of police officers 27,020 International support forces for host cities - preliminary round

911

National support forces for police in host cities

preliminary round 2780

National support forces for police in host cities - final round 1209

Total of police "Man-days" 306,665 International support forces for

police in host cities – final round 20


Preparatory phase

In 2006 and 2007, it had become necessary to define a strategy for hiring additional police personnel. The trainees in the basic training course and the teaching personnel to be deployed during the EURO 2008 had already been taken into account in the 'calculation'.

A personnel inventory of the police force had to be made to determine any additional workforce requirements by identifying the number of

� personnel in the districts and in the organisational units of the Staffs � personnel, already in special deployment for the EURO 2008 (e.g. operational units,

spotters, document advisers, etc.) � minimum personnel to maintain daily routine activities

The difference between the existing workforce and the required minimum staffing (special deployments already calculated) was the number officers to be deployed in the host cities. A vacation ban was imposed throughout the period of the EURO 2008

� Announcement in March 2007 � Decree in October 2007

Allocations to the host city Provincial Police Commands upon consultations with decision-makers on the basis of the personnel inventory had to be arranged. Selection of applicants both of law enforcement and of admin personnel had to be carried out by the central Human Resources Department of the FMI, for

� support of the host city Provincial Police Commands � use in the Command Staff of the FMI

Negotiations with the Employee Representation/Unions concerning

� allocation of officers to another province ("transfer between authorities") � vacation ban

had to be entered into.


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A team for the issue "Human Resources" had to be formed within the FMI-Management Staff and duty rosters had to be planned, which involved negotiations with the Employee Representations/Unions. Time recording had to be arranged to ensure remuneration payments for all Staff members without delay. HR-related activities by the FMI Management Staff

� Daily human resources overview and/or adaptive changes in deployment/duty rosters, including the reserve contingents, had to be made

� Daily reports on the number of officers on duty were to be forwarded to the Staff top level and to other Staff sections

� Super-regional officer allocations had to be ordered or cancelled A personnel administration for the members of the FMI-Command Staff was set up for

� Support in roster planning and control � Support in monthly payroll management � Daily workforce control � Keeping attendance/absence lists and list of contact data

Post-processing phase

Identical procedures were applied for the entire law enforcement workforce as regards � Payment of financial claims without delay � Appreciation of special performance (monetary reward or time off)

Statistics concerning deployment of human resources were processed and visualised.

Appraisal

Preparation

Several years of preparation had been necessary to devise the personnel strategy

� Planning of workforce to be recruited as of 2004 for the years 2005 to 2007

� Collecting basic data of all employees and the initial distribution of newly hired staff for the sub-teams in April 2005

� Detailed planning and discussion of manpower requirements as of mid-2007 with the Provincial Police Commands and the Sub-teams

� Special vacation regulations during the EURO 2008; announcement in March 2007; decree in October 2007

� Involvement of Employee Representation/Unions as of 2006

Central control Smooth and efficient manpower deployment – both during the project preparation phase and during the event – can only be handled through central coordination and control.

Requirement adaptation

Even during the preparatory phase it had become necessary to permanently cross-match the number of available staff with the personnel deployment plans.

Communication

Regular contact with the project management, the other sub-teams, the line senior commanders, the Provincial Police Commands, and Employee Representation had to be maintained to ensure efficient deployment planning.


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Recommendation

Planning transparency

Timely announcement of assignments and allocation of forces, including return arrangements, are highly advisable to make sure that there are no problems with respect to deployment planning.

Technical resources

Decisions about the technical management tools to be used in the Command Staff have to be taken in time, and Staff members have to be trained in their use (e.g. drafting deployment documentation by the Staffs).

Consistent terminology

Responsibilities, competences, and terms to be used in relation to special duties in the course of policing an event of such a dimension (e.g. spotters, delegation escorts, TSLO, SFA, etc.) need to be fully clarified to facilitate communication and to avoid misunderstandings.

Employee representation

When dealing with personnel-related issues, the Employee Representation/ Unions have to be involved right from the beginning.

Personnel administration

Optimum personnel administration during the event can be achieved in all Command Staffs by nominating and making known contact persons. Preconditions are training and clear instructions to everyone involved, which should include preparing statistics, planning and implementing ad-hoc-personnel measures.

Vacation ban It makes sense to impose a general vacation ban for the period in question.


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4.2.12 Training

Analysis of Training

� Interviews � Research Methods � Statistics

Key Figures

Training Examples

Information events/ basic training in Austria for the EURO 2008

120 courses 7,500 participants 4 hours each

Agency heads and commanders

5 courses 250 participants 56 hours each

Stewards 4 courses 110 participants 8 hours each


Training contents:

� Authority representatives and commanders Seminars in the host cities and in the FMI, lasting several days, for senior officers supposed to manage operational deployment in connection with the EURO 2008.

� Foreign languages As there had to be a sufficient number of officers speaking foreign languages, those with language skills were preferentially selected for EURO 2008-deployment and received further training in police-academy courses.

� In-service training Courses focusing on crowd psychology, panic management, 3D-philosophy

� Training of support forces from abroad Mainly training in Austrian legislation of relevance for the EURO 2008

� Training of Private Security Training courses for medium-level management

However, special training courses (crowd management/crowd control, radio system operation) were not within the responsibility of the "Sub-team Training", but arranged by the specialised units.

Appraisal

Agency heads, commanders

The training provided for authority representatives and commanders met with great appreciation, the contents were regarded as practice-oriented and useful, and positively implemented.

Foreign languages

Early advance planning which officer/employee would be deployed, and if so, for which type of job in the course of the EURO 2008, was not entirely possible. Intensive courses shortly before the event could only be arranged for small groups (e.g. press).

Foreign support forces

Training provided for the support forces from abroad was highly appreciated by the participants. The knowledge required was conveyed and no problems occurred.


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In-service training

A comprehensive training concept for each and every officer was not feasible in view of the extremely long lead time needed. Human resources and time expenditures would have been unjustifiable. Therefore, the training as originally planned was terminated after one year by the FMI, resulting in the necessity to organise information workshops for all District and City Commanders, held about 9 months before the EURO 2008.

Stewards

Training of stewards by police was not quite carried out as foreseen because of inadequacies on the part of the organiser; instead, a one-day information workshop for private security was held in the host cities. The objective was to introduce the forces to each other and to pass on information of police-relevance.

Recommendation

Agency heads, commanders

It is recommended to provide training also for those authorities and commanders not directly involved in the operation, to facilitate cooperation among all officers during the event.

Foreign languages

Foreign language training should focus on improving the skills officers already possess; technical terms are less important than "normal" everyday communication with guests.

Foreign support forces

It is recommended to elaborate a targeted training concept in consultation with the countries concerned.

In-service training

In view of the extremely long lead time it is not recommendable to arrange general, comprehensive training. It is more advantageous to provide short-term seminars for leadership level officers who would then have to act as multipliers and convey information.

Stewards

As regards private security companies, information seminars should be arranged instead of large-scale, detailed training courses. Cooperation between law enforcement and stewards from private security companies should be reviewed and improved.


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4.2.13 Logistics Analysis of Logistics

� Interview Methods � Research

Key Figures

Overalls (flame-resistant) 11,000 Flexible restraints*) 50,000

Helmets 7,700 Camcorders 100

Body armour 4,500 Shields 3,000

Gloves 7,000 Pepper sprays 1,200


Vehicles, weapons, riot control equipment, uniforms The following measures were taken:

� Identification of demand based on the operational strategies � Evaluation of demand claims � Budgetary cover for intended procurement � Completion of the procurement process � Allocation to the supply departments � Handing out equipment items to the officers

Accommodation The following measures were taken:

� Identification of demand based on the personnel deployment concept � Agreements with the Ministry of Defence � Accommodation inspection commissions (incl. Union representatives) � Renting facilities � Partial adaptation of facilities � Cleaning (bed linen and accommodation)

Catering The following measures were taken:

� Catering strategy based on the personnel deployment plan � Agreements with the Ministry of Defence � Approval and implementation

* disposable handcuffs

Appraisal

Vehicles

� Identification of demand, allocation and distribution of vehicles was done efficiently and problem-free.

� Delays in the procurement phase occurred because budgetary means were not available in time.

Uniforms

� Identification of demand, allocation and distribution of various types of uniforms was all in all carried out problem-free, availability was ensured.

� Demand identification caused problems at times, esp. with respect to uniform sizes and the procurement of flame-retardant overalls) for the crowd control forces. In the end, not every officer of this unit could be equipped with two such overalls.


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Quarters

� All accommodations (MoD) were inspected in the presence of employee representatives and brought up to standard or rejected altogether.

� Mass accommodation was available only to a limited extent.

� All in all, sufficient accommodation could be provided.

Catering � Catering was supplied by the MoD and by private companies. � Own mobile and stationary catering units were established to ensure that

of operational forces were supplied with food and drinks.

Weaponry/riot control equipment

� Additional riot control and self-defence equipment (expandable baton, CO-Spray, helmets, protective gear, etc.) was purchased for the riot control officers.

� Riot control equipment, especially purchased for the EURO 2008, proved effective and useful in practice.

� Weapons and special equipment were available in sufficient quantities.

Recommendation

Demand identification in time

� Identification of demand must begin in good time, as the procurement process takes quite some time.

� It is advisable to review the "workflow" of the individual subject areas, tactical strategies, and the standard of equipment prior to actual demand identification.

� It is also vital that budgetary cover is provided in time.

Accommodation

� In host cities, where only preliminary round matches were played, the demand for accommodation was by far much lower in the final phase. Reservations should be in line with the different phases of the event.

� A detailed operational concept helping to estimate the real need should be available in time before rooms for accommodation are rented.

� It would have been of advantage for optimum resource planning to have the option after the group matches, to rent additional accommodations/ rooms. A certain reserve should be included in the planning.

Supply

� It is absolutely vital to provide a sufficient amount of cold drinks to maintain physical and mental fitness of the operational units. If the event takes place in summer, adequate arrangements have to be made by all means.

Employee Representation

� Employee Representatives (Union) are to be involved in the process from the beginning.


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4.2.14 Study Visits

Analysis of Study Visits

� Qualitative Interviews Methods � Research

Key Figures

Number of Visits 86 Total length of stay 145 days

Total number of persons 307 Group size 1 - 28


International cooperation between European police forces in the field of prevention and crime combating is becoming increasingly important. Comparable national and international services, agencies, and organisations have enhanced mutual support. For the purpose of promoting the exchange of experience between officers from services of the same nature, or performing similar activities, study visits (work shadowing programmes) were arranged in the FMI during the EURO 2008. Procedure to be followed • A work shadowing visit to Austria had to be applied for by a police service or a police officer

of a member state of the European Union, a candidate state, or a state adjacent to Austria. • The ZSA – Zentrum für Sportangelegenheiten (Central Unit for Sports Matters), part of

Division II of the FMI, reviewed and – after consultation with the top commander of the host city province – approved the applications.

• The work shadowing visits by police officers from abroad must not cause any expenses • A framework programme for all work shadowing visits must be prepared, paying special

attention to o the person's function, knowledge and previous experience o giving each person at the beginning a general overview about the structure and tasks of

the Austrian law enforcement, o giving each visitor the chance to see and get familiar with several different services or

units. • The maximum duration of the work shadowing visit was 3 days, if these visits were just

within one host city authority. An exception to this rule was made for delegations from Poland and the Ukraine, as these countries will jointly host the EURO 2012. Their visit lasted 5 days.

• In principle, the applicants had to arrange accommodation themselves, but were offered assistance in finding a room.

• A valid insurance while on Austrian territory was a condition for an applicant to be granted a work shadowing visit.

Other conditions Participants in the work shadowing programme

• had no law enforcement power while in Austria, and were not allowed to take any official action themselves which would infringe the rights of third parties.

• were not allowed to wear uniform or (service) firearms

• they or their service(s) had to bear the costs for travel, accommodation and board

• had to sign a Liability Agreement, and to furnish evidence of a health and accident insurance, either taken out by themselves or their employer.


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Appraisal

Work shadowing

The number of participants confirmed the need for such programmes.

Experiences Officers from succeeding host countries in particular were able to gain experiences on site (also in line with the "Best-Practice-Maxim" in European cooperation)

Recommendation

Administration One "central" point for dealing with applications for work shadowing visits to avoid duplication of work.

Programme Creation of a standard framework programme for the entire country to ensure identical programme contents.

Insurance Insurance arrangements have to be made in good time.

No Uniform/ no firearm

Work shadowing participants are never supposed to posses law enforcement powers. Hence, the person shall refrain from wearing a uniform or carrying a (service) firearm. These conditions have to be clearly communicated and accepted before an application is made.


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5 ANNEX (Qualitative Interviews with Security Officers of t he Competing Teams – SUMMARY)

The Security Officers of the teams competing in Austria were interviewed in order to hear opinions from outsiders about the performance of the Austrian police. In the case of the Polish team, team boss Leo Benhakker himself answered the questions. The summary of the opinions voiced are attached to this report to serve as an example of many instances, where private parties had been directly involved in the daily work of the police. The opinion of the team representatives reflects the positive appreciation of the police activities as it has been described in this report.

1) How did the team rate the Austrian police while staying in Austria?

The teams stated that security was of a very high standard, both in their hotel, their transfer hotel, and when going to the stadia. They felt very secure at all times. Some of the TSO (team security officers) confirmed this statement in view of their many years of experience with police where they had been deployed as TSO, and in the course of events of this magnitude as this one, or similar ones. Drawing a qualitative comparison, they stressed that security in Austria was of optimal quality.

The support provided by the Austrian police was very good. No matter which security topic they had to discuss, the police was available as contact partner at all times. One team member even said they had been better taken care of than during the WC 2006 in Germany. In his opinion this was due to the fact that the technical and administrative structure of the Austrian police was less complicated, which facilitates event-related missions.

2) Was there sufficient police presence and had eno ugh precautionary measures been taken for the team?

In the opinion of the TSO, all measures taken by the police had been adequate and effective, in the hotels, at all events, at all places and the vicinity of all places they had been to, en route to the venues. From a professional point of view they understood that the measures had been based on certain expectations, e.g. in one instance a far greater number of fans had been envisaged, but because of bad weather did not show up. The officers responded immediately to this new situation and did not stubbornly act according to plan. According to the TSO, it was highly professional to be prepared for all contingencies, but likewise, to respond flexibly under changed circumstances.

The TSO stated that the police had been present all the time, both inside and around the hotels and at the training facility. The team had the feeling the police were always ready to take action, and they could have easily communicated with the officers. In view of the precautionary measures in place, the teams felt safe all the time. In fact, they had not expected to get so much police attention, but were very impressed by the good performance. One team specifically mentioned the daily security briefings (in the presence of representatives from all relevant police services and agencies) enabling a flexible response to the daily challenges. Only very few team members voiced the opinion that the precautionary measures for the teams had been beyond necessity.

3) How do you rate the cooperation between TSLO/TSO and police from the team's

perspective?

In the TSOs' opinion, the TSLO had been fully accepted by the entire team. The cooperation between TSO and TSLO was excellent. The communication channels had been fully observed,


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and everybody involved played their part correctly. It was proposed that that UEFA should review the delineation of responsibilities in the run-up to the next EURO 2012 in Poland/Ukraine. The TSO/TSLO should have less directives and more competences which would reduce need of communication and make everyone's job easier.

The profound local knowledge of the TSLO was also appreciated and the TSO explicitly commended the TSLO's good knowledge of the national legislation and excellent contacts to the local law enforcement authorities. The fact that many TSLO spoke the team's native language enormously facilitated the cooperation and created a friendly atmosphere. The deployment of TSLO/TSO made cooperation with the police extremely easier.

4) Was the role of the TSLO important for your team security planning, or in general?

The TSO stated that everything had been professionally prepared, down to the last detail. Changes were dealt with in a simple, unbureaucratic, fast and flexible manner. All decisions were transparent so that no unexpected situation occurred. Everything went problem-free.

Unforeseen situations could be managed at once thanks to the TSLO's excellent contacts to the local police.

In one comment it was said that the part played by the TSLO in terms of security was not only extremely important but virtually indispensable.

It was confirmed that the TSLO was present at all times, and that the team was always informed forthwith about any steps of relevance to security.

In another comment it was mentioned that the TSLO had always been able to find a solution to even very short-term team requests concerning security.

5) Were the TSLO accepted by the teams/team manager s?

According to the TSO, the TSLO had been fully accepted by the entire team. His manners were in line with their respective role. The TSLO's language skills greatly facilitated communication and task fulfilment. The TSO found it recommendable to deploy more police officers with a sound knowledge of foreign languages for events of that nature, in particular for the EURO 2012 hosted by Poland and the Ukraine.

Six other TSOs also confirmed that the TSLO had been widely accepted and had been on good terms with the teams. One interviewee emphasized the positive fact that one TSLO was an athlete himself which greatly contributed to becoming integrated into the team.

6) How do you rate the organisation in the run-up? Did the teams receive adequate

information about their stay and the host cities?

The TSO stated that the preparations for the event began about 3 or 4 years ago. Everything had been discussed in great detail, in other words the work in the run-up was excellent. All information were of good quality and had been received in time in a way that facilitated planning and made it possible to make needs and wishes known. Everything the team had asked for was provided. Hence, there had been no (negative) surprises and no reasons for complaints. Everything worked perfectly well in Austria. One TSO, however, reported that in Switzerland, despite the same preparations before the event, there had been some difficulties: when contacts had to be made, competences and jurisdiction were often unclear so that the teams, according to their own statements, at times felt uncomfortable.


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7) Can the team make proposals, how the work of the TSO/TSLO could be further improved?

The teams were of the opinion that the TSO/TSLO-system should not be changed. They expressed their hope to be supported during the EURO 2012 by TSLO who are just as competent as the Austrian officers. They thought the TSLO-training must have been perfect otherwise such a performance would not have been possible. The fact that the TSLO was also a police officer by profession made communication especially easy. He was fully familiar with the structures and had had no difficulties whatsoever to fulfil his tasks. The very right person had been selected for the TSLO-job. He had manners, respected the national culture, hierarchy and each one's role within the systems. He was well informed about the different tasks and players involved. He had never been intrusive, reachable at all times ready and willing to assist. According to the teams, the TSLO should not be "invisible" in the background, but should be present in the foreground.

All interviewed teams confirmed that their TSLO had completely fulfilled his mandate, had been important for network formation and was the first contact for the TSO. One team stated that Austrian security strategy had been perfect, but had two further proposals for the EURO 2012:

- More careful recruitment and training of Private Security staff members - Creation of an adequate legal basis to ensure that all teams will be treated equally at the airports in the Ukraine and Poland to avoid delays.

One team suggested communication with security people should be channelled through the team manager.

Some teams explicitly expressed their gratitude to the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior for the optimal organisation, the support, and the security provided. They had been very pleased and insisted to have their thanks passed on.


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6 List of Abbreviations

.BK Bundeskriminalamt Österreich (Criminal Intelligence Service Austria) AFA Austrian Football Association APC Austrian Penal Code ARC Austrian Red Cross AT Austria

BAO Besondere Aufbauorganisation (literally: Special-Purpose Build-up Organisation), in this review referred to as "Special-Purpose Organisation"

BVT Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism)

CCC Crisis Coordination Centre CCTV Closed Circuit TV CH Switzerland CID Criminal Investigation Division DVI Disaster Victim Identification EC European Championship

EKIS Elektronisches kriminalpolizeiliches Informationssystem (Electronic Criminal Police Information System)

EKO COBRA Einsatzkommando Cobra (Special Operations Unit) EU European Union EURO 2008 European Football Championship 2008 FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football; International Football Association FMI Federal Ministry of the Interior FRONTEX European Border Agency HoD Head of Delegation HRAB Human Rights Advisory Board hrs hours i.e. id est (that means) ICT Information and Communication Technology IED improvised explosive device incl. including IT Information technology L.O. Liaison Officer lit. littera (letter)

LVT Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung (Regional Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism)

MoD Federal Ministry of Defence MoU Memorandum of Understanding (Declaration of Intent) NBC-Defence Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence NFIP National Football Information Point OC Organised crime OCC Operational Coordination Center OeBB Österreichische Bundesbahnen (Austrian Railways) ORF Österreichischer Rundfunk (Austrian Broadcasting Company) PICC Police Information Coordination Center PR Public Relations


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PT Public Transport PV Public Viewing SFA Support forces from abroad; foreign support forces SiAG Sicherheitsarbeitsgruppe EURO 2008 (SWG - Security Working Group) SIS Schengen Information System SMS Short Message Service SPOC Single Point of Contact SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences TETRA police radio system TSLO Team Security Liaison Officer TSO Team Liaison Officer UEFA United European Football Association VIP Very Important Person WC World Cup, World Championship WEGA Wiener Einsatzgruppe Alarmabteilung (Vienna Special Operations Unit) ZSA Zentrum für Sportangelegenheiten (Central Unit for Sports Matters)


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PART B

Scientific Evaluation

Summary Terms used in this evaluation report, such as law enforcement officer, police officer, employee, staff member, etc., are to be understood gender-neutral.


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Information and Communication Structures in Management Processes,

using the Example of the UEFA-EURO 2008

Research Project carried out by the Institute for Science and Research of the Austrian Police Academy (Federal Ministry of the Interior)

Linda Jakubowicz Torsten Meintz

Mario Muigg Katharina Weiss

Vienna, February 2009


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1 Introduction On 12 December 2002, the Executive Committee of the UEFA announced that Austria and Switzerland were awarded the hosting of the European Football Championship 2008, the third-largest recurring sports event in the world. This day marked the beginning of an intensive planning and preparation phase, in particular for the law enforcement authorities. Ensuring public security and maintaining peace and order constitute essential parameters at major sports events. Hence, possessing these core competences are an important factor for a successful bid. For Austria, the EURO 2008 entailed the largest police mission carried out so far. For this reason, the opportunity of taking advantage of the experience and empirical values obtained from this event should not be missed. The purpose of the survey, prepared by the Institute for Science and Research of the Austrian Police Academy (Federal Ministry of the Interior), is to present the results of the study on the EURO 2008 from the police's point of view, taking into account the opinion of everybody involved. It is supposed to be presented to a wider public, with the objective to have personal experiences compared with the results presented in the survey, and thereby scrutinized. The intention being that pointing to chances for improvement will be beneficial for planning and organising the policing of future major events. After all, catchwords such as "New Public Management", "optimisation of resources", and "cost effectiveness" are inevitably gaining increasing importance also in government organisations. In view of the recurring nature of such events, we feel obliged to pass on "best practice"-recommendations and the lessons we have learnt to future host-countries, which in the present case are Poland and the Ukraine (host countries of the EURO 2012). This has also been of great concern to the European Commission, which voiced the urgent request to prepare such a "Best Practice"-Handbook. In general, the scientific analysis of and preoccupation with major events, and in particular with the security issue, are attracting growing interest, even far beyond the sphere of law enforcement. This is also reflected by the fact that in the course of the investigations for this survey numerous studies have been evaluated, which used different approaches to deal with the topic2. Internationally, great importance is attached to the subject matter, especially in the context of enhancing international police cooperation. In 2004, a research project was launched under the Sixth EU-Framework Programme focussing exclusively on "Security at Major Events in Europe", aiming at "placing research in this field onto a new, trans-border level and thus contributing towards

2 Note: Examples (incl. links, as far as available) are listed in the Annex of the Final Report on the Scientific Research Project on 'Special Information and Communication Structures' of Management within a "BAO – Besondere Aufbauorganisation" (literally: Special-Purpose Build-up Organisation, in this survey referred to as "Special-Purpose Organisation") using the example of the major sports event UEFA-EURO 2008, Vienna 2008 (available via the Institute for Science and Research of the Police Academy of the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior.


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implementing a European Research Area"3. The project had been initiated by the project coordinator "United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)". The fact that in spring 2008, the mandate was given for more in-depth research of these areas in the course of a continuation of the project, in which almost all EU-member states are involved, can be regarded as an indicator for the growing significance of this subject matter. Since 2004, the Institute for Science and Research of the Police Academy of the Federal Ministry of the Interior4 has been the Austrian partner in the implementation of this project.

1.1 About the Project

In August 2007, the "ZSA – Zentrum für Sportangelegenheiten" (Central Unit for Sports Matters) of the Ministry of the Interior contacted the Institute for Science and Research with the request to analyse the security strategy planned by the Austrian law enforcement authorities for the EURO 2008, from a scientific perspective. One of the objectives was to prepare a Handbook required by the European Commission. In view of the complexity of this venture it became very soon clear that a scientific analysis of this subject matter would be possible only with certain sub-topics, while in other areas a more detailed consideration might be more rewarding. Besides, a scientific scrutiny of the project concept does not seem feasible for the required practice-oriented verification of most of the sub-parameter, as the criteria for verifiability (valid reference data) were lacking. To this end, an approach had to be sought in the course of the management-oriented scrutiny of the project concept and the putting into practice of the individual work packages, subsequently carried out by Unit 1.4.1 of the Criminal Intelligence Service Austria, i.e. the agency in charge of the project management. The results have been included in Part A of the present Handbook. For the sake of a scientific debate of this subject matter, the analysis focussed on the communication structures, the staff structures and the leadership processes within a so-called "BAO Besondere Aufbauorganisation" (Special-Purpose Organisation)5. The reasons for this specification are as follows:

• The subject matter should be seen as some sort of superstructure for other areas, because "Communication is Everything", and, should communication fail, many consequences have to be faced: e.g. non-supply of resources, insufficient information or motivation from superiors, deficits in selecting personnel, and/or inefficient chain of command, etc. Conversely, it can be inferred that functioning of all these sub-areas, which altogether bring about a successful (major) event, is due to well functioning communication processes. In the past couple of years, the importance of communication within organisations and for organisations in line with the "New Public Management" and Organisation Theory has become increasingly recognised, also in the public sector.

3 Cf. Jakubowicz, Linda (2007): "Der Faktor Sicherheit". Planung und Durchführung von Großver-anstaltungen. .SIAK.Journal 4/2007, pages 42-54. 4 Note: jointly with MoI, Dept. II/2. 5 *) "BAO – Besondere Aufbau- und Ablauforganisation" (literally: Special-Purpose Build-up Organisation), in this survey referred to as "Special-Purpose Organisation"


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• The subject matter is very suitable for an analysis by means of scientific tools, as the questions referred to experiences made by everyone involved in the EURO 2008, regardless of their function and subject area, and the statements made can be included in a scientific assessment. All these factors will eventually contribute to the final assessment of the communication flows and the management processes. Likewise, the on-site experiences made by the operational forces – in other words, a cross-section of the huge number of persons concerned – can also be included. In fact, they represent the lowest level in the management process, and thus have become an essential part of the same.

• In view of the novelty of applying the ministry's Guideline for the Law Enforcement

Command System in Special Situations6 and the entire policing activities in relation to the EURO 2008 – completely different from the regular duty routine as part of such a "BAO", challenges outside the norm arose, especially with respect to the management process and the communication structures. Closer scrutiny of the communication processes and the managerial functions is vital for answering the question, whether, and in what way, leadership is to be accomplished in the framework of major events, both within and outside the line organisation, and which parameters deserve special attention.

2 Project Concept The concept and the description of the scientific instruments applied are briefly mentioned below7: The basic concept rests more or less on three pillars:

1. Participating observers 2. Standardised Online-polls 3. Qualitative expert interviews ad 1. Observers were assigned to the management and command staffs as well as relevant (because most informative) operational sectors in the host cities. They were given a questionnaire8 that had been prepared beforehand (free text answers, in combination with a multiple choice of scores). The observers were supposed to complete the questionnaire and – if applicable – award points. The preparatory work in particular presented a challenge and also constituted an important element in implementing this instrument. All executive level officers had to be contacted in good time and asked for their support in this matter. Naturally, this required a lot of explanatory work, as such a course of action could be easily misinterpreted as a disguised assessment of an officer's leadership skills.

6 BMI-EE1000/0019-II/2/a/2007, 06.04.2007. 7 Note: For further details on Research Design, Instruments and Methods", see the Scientific Project Report, prepared by the Institute for Science and Research of the Austrian Police Academy, Jaklubowicz/Meintz/Muigg/Weiss (2008): „Die Informations- und Kommunikationsstrukturen im Führungsprozess bei Besonderen Aufbauorganisationen (BAO) am Beispiel des Sportgroßereignisses UEFA-EURO 2008“. 8 Note: cf. Annex 6.2.


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Accordingly, it was important to stress the (future) benefit of the findings obtained in this way, not least also for one's own work, and to convince those interviewed that the purpose was by no means any form of appraisal of individuals or incidents, but that we the sole purpose of the analysis was to obtain a representative number of anonymised observer protocols. The pre-work was worthwhile and at this point it has to be underlined once more that the method was accepted by the executive officers concerned and by other staff members with the exception of a few isolated cases, the cooperation was excellent, and the observers were supported in every respect. A total of 19 observers was involved in the study. They were instructors from the Police Academy of the Ministry of the Interior. They operated in four teams of 4 observers for each host city, except in Vienna where teams of seven members were operating. One team member was the team leader, who was the contact person for the project management and the interface to the other team members and was responsible for submitting the final report at the end of the observation period. In total, 87 observations were made.

ad 2. The online interviews were the core element right form the beginning. Everyone involved in the operation, or to be more precise, all employees of the Ministry of the Interior (as the delimitation was done only at the beginning of the questionnaire) were so-to-speak democratically co-involved in the survey. The basic concept and the contents of the questionnaire had been prepared by the Institute for Science and Research and subsequently finalised jointly with the "ZSI – Zentrum für Soziale Innovation" (Centre for Social Innovation) which had also carried out the technical implementation of the survey. The decision to also include an external partner possessing the necessary scientific expertise was made at a very early stage. The primary aim was to maintain objectivity as a vital factor, and to ensure transparency – not least in order to increase the response rate. Respondents display a higher degree of trust that the data will remain anonymous if handled by an external institution, as would be the case if the survey were carried out by using the ministry's own computer equipment and servers. The questionnaire was placed on-line from 29 June to 6 August 2008 and was opened by a total of 5,789 persons. Evaluation and analysis were made in accordance with strict criteria. Only questionnaires which had been completed to at least 50 percent completed, were taken into account. A total of 2,083 questionnaires could finally be utilized. The original plan had been to make to questionnaire accessible already during the actual event of the EURO 2008, and offer respondents the opportunity of documen-ting their personal experience while deployed in almost real-time. We had to refrain from doing so upon request of the client.


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ad 3. Furthermore, subsequent to the EURO 2008, qualitative interviews were held with selected high-ranking commanders, i.e. only those who had been playing a vital part in conducting the police operation (Management and Command Staffs of the Ministry of the Interior). A total of 13 persons were interviewed about their experiences, observations, and their overall impressions during the period from mid-July to mid-August 2008. To make sure to maintain the necessary analogy, only questions (in total 10) which had also been a central element in the other instruments9 were asked.

Apart from the three main components, a study using pre-defined parameters from the angle of crime statistics and crime analysis was completed. Again, the decisive factor was the holistic approach. The objective was – by taking a closer look at the general crime rate – to gain insights and to be able to draw conclusions about the stress situation and the workload to be dealt with during the event, and to obtain general information on the security situation during the EURO 2008. However, it is imperative to point out that these data present just one element in this assessment, and are most certainly not exhaustive, as stress and workload are not necessarily always associated with a higher volume or complexity of work and effort. In view of the data material contained in the practice-oriented part of the present Handbook, the results of the crime analyses were not repeated in the summary of the final scientific report10. 3 Management and Command Structure As already mentioned, the so-called "RFbL – Richtlinie Führung in besonderen Lagen" (lit. Guideline 'Command in Special Situations') was applied for the first time for policing the EURO 2008. During the initial planning phase, the first issue to be clarified was the choice of the organisational form in which the project was to be accomplished. For several reasons it was agreed to choose a project structure, a decision, which, in retrospect, turned out to be ideal. The rationale was that not only all the preparatory measures, which had already begun in April 2004 under the direction of the "ZSA – Zentrum für Sportangelegenheiten" (Central Unit for Sports Matters) of the Ministry of the Interior, but also the mission as such, be accomplished outside the line organisation. A so-called "BAO – Besondere Aufbauorganisation" (Special-Purpose Organisation) composed of 'integrated staffs' was chosen as management strategy, because of the involvement of expert groups representatives. "BAO" stands for the German term "Besondere Aufbauorganisation" (Special-Purpose

9 Note: cf. Annex 6.4. 10 Note: For further data see a/m Report, prepared by the Institute for Science and Research of the Austrian Police Academy, Jaklubowicz/Meintz/Muigg/Weiss (2008): „Die Informations- und Kommunikationsstrukturen im Führungsprozess bei Besonderen Aufbauorganisationen (BAO) am Beispiel des Sportgroßereignisses UEFA-EURO 2008“, Chapter 3.5.


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Organisation)11 of the law enforcement authorities12, which, in contrast to the "AAO – Allgemeine Aufbauorganisation" (General Organisational Structure)13 can be created on a temporary basis. "The Special-Purpose Organisation in complex situations is a great challenge, not only with respect to commanding tactical operations, but also with respect to their legality within the system of the Austrian structure of authorities and law enforcement bodies. The system-immanent application of management principles, the joint agreement for applying management procedures, the work in staffs resulting therefrom, and a largely uniform management structure (staff organisation) in case of scenarios that require inter-organisational coping, are continually gaining importance in view of the present threats and challenges".14 Frequently, complex situations cannot be managed by the police within the "normal" structures of the "AAO". Complex situations can result from natural disasters, terrorist attacks15 or hostage taking; situations in which life and health and property are at high risk, or could be seriously damaged. In such cases, police authorities and several governmental and non-governmental16 organisations have to cooperate. In Austria, staffs are formed in two areas. The Command Staff is responsible for the political-administrative component including the tactical and operational framework conditions. It has to take fundamental policy decisions, e.g. to approve the use of firearms in a case of hostage-taking. The Command Staff is a body to assist the authority's head of operations17. The Operations Staff is responsible for all concrete operational measures taken in connection with an event, an incident or crime scene, while the Command Staff has to ensure the implementation of the given framework mandates by taking suitable tactical measures by means of the available police forces. Tactical and/or local operational sectors are formed and their interaction is to be coordinated by the Command Staff. The Operations Staff is a body to support the on-scene commander. "The Operations Staff has to ensure that the commanders of the operational sectors are given the instructions, information and resources they need for task fulfilment".18 The Operations Staff works in a structured manner and is sub-divided into various command sectors to facilitate the accomplishment of the operation. The operational sectors S1 to S6 were established.19

• S1 – Personnel: Registering the human resources and assignment of operational forces, recruitment of personnel for the staffs, assessment of HR situation

11 BAO – Besondere Aufbauorganisation (temporary special project-oriented structure) of the police to manage major Operations (disasters, major events, etc.) 12 Def.: Law Enforcement, Federal Police in Austria. 13 AAO - Allgemeine Aufbau Organisation (General Organisational Form) of the police, daily routine task fulfilment. 14 Dudek/ K. (2007). Die Besondere Aufbauorganisation, SIAK Journal (1), S.14 15 11.09.2001 in New York/USA, Attack on the World Trade Center. 16 Ambulance, Rescue, Recovery Services. 17 e.g. Security Director 18 Dudek/K.(.2007). Die Besondere Aufbauorganisation, SIAK Journal (1), p.18 19 as 16, p. 20 f.


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• S2 – Situation: threat analysis, assessment of risk and possible damage and of the opponent's situation, as well as of the general situation in the framework of the management procedure

• S3 – Operations Command: Central position in the command process, summary of the sector contributions for the overall assessment and decision-taking, ops preparation and management

• S4 – Logistics: supply of police operations resources, technical supplies, medical service, catering for the operational forces, assessment of the supply situation

• S5 – Public Relations: Media work, direct press contacts, preparation of documents for the Command Staff, agreement on the information to be released to the press, evaluation and assessment of the media situation

• S6 – Communications Technology: Staff infrastructure with IT-operations support, communication plans and deployment documentation, assessment of the communication situation.

4 Results 20 The results obtained by means of different investigative instruments are presented below. Firs of all, focus is placed on the positive results, in other words, on those parameters which were vital in making the EURO 2008 such a success. However, as there is always room for improvement, improvement potentials are detailed under point 2.2 in order to benefit from this knowledge in future (major) event-organising. At this point it should be stressed that it had been attempted to extract the critical comments contained in the otherwise all in all predominantly positive replies, in order to contribute to optimised structuring and communication processes in the future. This should be borne in mind to avoid getting a distorted impression from the contents mentioned below. When matching the most important statements contained in the individual investigative results, it becomes apparent that they strongly confirm the general impression of the professional policing of the EURO 2008. The results of the individual investigative instruments appear fairly consistent and also corroborated this impression. Besides, firstly, these results are indicative of a valid data acquisition, and secondly, most of the interviewees seem to have gained a similar impression and made similar observations, regardless of their function and place of deployment, which in turn indicates more or less that indeed a uniform and working system had been used. The instructions specified in the "RFbL – Richtlinie Führung in besonderen Lagen" (Guideline 'Command in Special Situations'), and thus also referring to how to conduct such a major operation as foreseen in a "BAO" were largely adhered to.

20 Note: The results presented appear somewhat contradictory at first glance, whichis due to mixed opinions on somepoints and thus heterogenous replies (often in the context with the invetiative tool = hierarchy level), which were supposed to be submitted in a differentiated manner on the one hand, but on the other hand, the results of the project are all in all very positive. However, for identifying possible improvements, weaknesses and points of criticism need to be brought forward and are therefore stressed disproportionately.


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However, different functions within the hierarchy bring about different ways of looking at situations, different viewing angles and qualities. Retrograde interviews of executive level officers (hereafter referred to as "experts") have – quite naturally –clearly shown that the focus lies on a comprehensive scrutiny of the superordinate structure and principal contents, while members at so-called "grassroots"-level were able to provide insights into leadership style not easily or not at all accessible to the top management, as from their specific position they can neither observe nor themselves experience such processes. All these factors are of significance for reviewing communication structures and management processes. Only the holistic approach to include everybody involved in the survey ensures a representative and an as far as possible realistic outcome. Evaluation of the questionnaires further showed that the top executive officers' replies were far more critical than those of the observers present in the staff. We can only speculate about the reasons. The phenomenon of increased criticism might be due to management expertise and hence to the ability of a more critical view and assessment of situations, or because the will to bring about improvement (having the capability of doing so) is stronger among them.

4.1 Observers

Owing to the predominantly peaceful and incident-free course of the EURO 2008, most observers replied either positively or not all to most of the questions posed in the questionnaire. There is reason to assume that the observers were not consistent or systematic in their own opinion whether they were competent to fill in answers to certain questions at all, or whether they rather wanted to make a positive statement. This uncertainty should be taken into consideration in the assessment of the respective result. For instance, "no answer" to questions regarding communication could either mean that no communication had been watched, which might imply something negative, or that it was not possible to answer the question for other reasons (in fact, most often because there was no need for communication for lack of incidents). For the sake of better understanding and result interpretation we need to stress that the submitted observation reports contained either very restrained critical comments, or none at all. (As one can only speculate about the reasons, it has been refrained from doing so). It therefore seems that in some instances the "negative" replies were overrated, but this was the only way of bringing out any criticism at all - as this was what we were looking for in order to attain possible improvements. However, statistical evaluation of the individual questions21 made it possible to place the interpretation made of this subject area into the overall context. There is no intention to diminish the positive overall result. The point is to realise that many difficulties, especially in communication processes - and thus in the entire leadership attitude – were really tested under stress situations, and, as it turned out, the EURO 2008, was - fortunately - not the best suitable example. On the other hand, a major operation lasting several weeks can also be seen as a test regarding training

21 Cf. Project Report by the Institute for Science and Research of the Austrian Police Academy


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and preparation of the law enforcement authorities for this event. In retrospect it can neither be proven beyond doubt, nor is it subject of a scientific study, how far the smooth and professional handling of the EURO 2008 was in fact due to adequate training and preparation. A summary of the most important findings from the observer reports is given below.

4.1.1 Positive Results • The staff structures were adapted to the needs expected to arise in this event,

based on the lessons learnt from events of a similar nature. It turned out that the division into a Management Staff and a Command (Operations) Staff made sense. Members of both staffs hardly ever interfered with the task areas of the respective other staff. Depending on the opinion of the respective operations commander, the number of staff members was kept as small as possible so that the principal structure in accordance with the so-called "RFbL Richtline 'Führung in besonderen Lagen" (Guideline Command in Special Situations) could hardly be recognized. Nevertheless, observation and review proved that the individual staff structures were optimal for coping with situations cropping up.

• The observers rated the personnel selection very positive. In their opinion, the successful and smooth operation could also be attributed to the officers appointed into the staffs. The officers concerned were all rated as very competent and highly motivated.

• Furthermore, the sufficient number of officers deployed was also rated positively.

• Competence distribution was complied with in line with the specifications, and no interference into task areas of others was noticed.

• The '3D-philosophy'-philosophy22 was at all times taken into account when making decisions and giving commands.

4.1.2 Improvement Potential In spite of much quite positive feedback regarding staff structure, some criticism was received which should not be concealed. The structure as foreseen in the a/m "RFbL – Richtline 'Führung in besonderen Lagen" (Guideline 'Command in Special Situations') was not perceivable at times (which in most cases was due to the Staff size/ composition).

• Several observers were of the opinion that the presence of parallel structures in the Operations Staff, and – although number of the personnel was much lower – in the Command Staff there had been a few cases of duplication of work which in some instances led to disagreement about functional responsibility.

• Improvement potential was also perceived with respect to the dissemination of information, both as regards contents and time span (wrong figures, or information received later than reported by the media, etc.).

• There is a direct correlation to the statement claiming improvement potential with respect to clarity of command structures and command relay.

22 Operations Philosophy: Dialogue, De-escalation, Determination (drastic action)


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4.2 Online Poll

The replies in the on-line poll were basically consistent with media reports and perceptions made by official representatives from UEFA and the AFA (Austrian Football Association) who attested a high degree of security and the general atmosphere during the EURO 2008 very positive. According to the replies given by the more than 2,000 respondents this holds true also for the communication and internal procedures within the Austrian police, likewise for the collaboration with other institutions (emergency organisations, Armed Forces, private security companies), and various other 'clienteles'. The latter were identified and addressed as follows: in the narrower sense, fan groups of different nationalities, guests from abroad in general, media, and in the wider sense, the general (Austrian) public. When analysing the pattern of the replies by officers, the most striking deviations were not regarding types of operation, but age and experience (partially reflecting functions and rank hierarchies). In general, the replies given by the three age-groups "25 or younger", "26 to 35", and "36 to 45" were fairly consistent, but noticeably different to the two age groups "46 to 55" and "above 55", as the latter groups' ratings were distinctly better. Seasoned senior law enforcement officers displayed a more positive attitude towards die EURO 2008-mission (there is a "natural" correlation between age and service experience). Differences were also registered as regards the place of deployment: in some respects the replies from Salzburg had an even more positive note than those from Innsbruck, Vienna, and Klagenfurt.

4.2.1 Positive Results • The online poll results also indicate that the '3D-philosophy' was not only

systematically applied but also reflected in the decisions taken and the orders given.

• In the interviews of the executive officers, the excellent preparations were commended, but also explicitly the early and comprehensive training opportunities, which facilitated the adequate professional and practical preparation of law enforcement officers.

• Another factor meeting with a positive response was the deployment of sufficient human resources.

• Likewise, the support provided by officers from abroad was also judged positively. The presence of the foreign support forces was seen to have a de-escalating effect, as they were easily identifiable (uniform) and capable of talking to the respective target group (native language).


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4.2.2 Improvement Potential • Despite the largely positive assessments regarding the training measures (see

above), two points leave room for improvements. The proposals made concerned provision of more intense language training opportunities and supply of communication aids in foreign languages (phrase books, etc., for the most often needed foreign languages), and the like. Some respondents found language training should begin much earlier and in some ways be more profound.

• As regards foreign operational forces and spotters (scene experts), the majority

of respondents seemed to think their deployment had not really been worthwhile23.

• Another recommendation – derived from the on-line poll and to be stressed at

this point – refers to the demand for clear orders and their enforcement by the commanders. Here, too, there is a certain potential for improvement, and the following proposals have come up:

o better and faster information about the mission and the deployment in

general – reason and purpose – given to as many officers as possible to avoid misunderstandings;

o orders and instructions to be given earlier, more clearly and more precisely,

including a reason to ensure optimum implementation – even if the framework conditions should change at short notice. After all, approximately 25 percent of the respondents indicated not to have been fully sure how to proceed further;

o improvement of the preparation of sector commanders; o provision of a better overview about competences and task allocation, also

for the "grassroots level".

• Another insight gained from the on-line poll concerns the dissemination of information to "grassroots". 81.1 percent answered the question "what would be the effect of more comprehensive information on reason and purpose of the operation concerned" with "positive", while 16.7 percent found that it would not make any difference at all, but 2.2 percent thought the effect would rather be negative. In view of more than four fifth replies indicating an expectation of a positive impact, it can be assumed that additional information is certainly welcome and usable.

• The demand for providing "the bottom level" with a better overview about

competences and jurisdictions in general and task assignments was expressed in similar terms.

23 Note: However, this statement should be read with some reservations, as the majority of the law enforcement officers had no insight into the tasks and activities of the foreign fan stewards and spotters. Their assessments are most probably based on insufficient information and resentment.


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4.3 Interviews of Experts

4.3.1 Positive Results

• Senior officers also highly commended the early and intensive preparation and training measures.

• The early establishment of an international cooperation was also rated very

positively. • The internal structure of the staffs – especially the presence of expert groups

(representatives from emergency organisations, Armed Forces, Vienna Public Transport, Austrian Railways, etc.) – also met with high agreement.

• Another element highly commended by senior officers was the professionalism

of the media work – in particular the setting up of dedicated Police Media and Press Centres24.

4.3.2 Improvement Potential

• The experts felt the so-called Besondere Aufbauorganisation (BAO) nach der Richtline Führung für besondere Lagen (RFbL) (Special-Purpose Organisation in compliance with the Guideline 'Command in Special Situations') to be more or less a compromise and came forward with the following points of criticism:

o There were doubts regarding the effectiveness of a dual leadership tier (a

structure with Command Staff and Operations Staff, and each one had been divided into the sectors S1 to S6, in accordance with the a/m "RFbL".

o The effectiveness of having a dual integration of the expert group (in

Command Staff and Operations Staff) was questioned. o The system in the way it was brought about led to a duplication of activities

and thus to unclear competences • The exact time of outsourcing the preparatory measures to the "BAO" (Special -

Purpose Organisation) was not considered ideal either. In the experts' opinion this should have happened much earlier.

• Opinions regarding the 3D-philosophy varied or were even contradictory. On the one hand, according to senior officers "it was successfully communicated and applied", on the other hand, also some were among them who did not share this view: The statements made in the interviews suggested that the 3D-philosophy

24 Note: The three polling instruments yielded different results. Possible reasons: different angle, as insight/experience and/or courage to utter criticism, depend on hierarchy level


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was not that easy to convey, and at the beginning of the operation, had met with reservations by the law enforcement officers.

Experts think that this attitude was most likely due to previous unpleasant experiences with football fans in Austria. As a consequence, Austrians frequently associate football fan with "C-Fan" or "Hooligan".

These deficits had already become apparent in the course of the preparatory measures. For this reason additional training seminars were held, but only for senior officers.

Against this background it seems advisable to make such re-training events accessible to a wider audience, or to instruct senior officers to pass on the contents and to teach adequate motivation techniques. Some senior officers themselves suggested to have 3D-philosophy training permanently integrated into the basic training.

• The positive view regarding the high staffing level held by the observers and the participants of the on-line poll was seen more critically by senior officers. Some were of the opinion that the operation could have been accomplished with far less personnel.

• Critical comments were also made as regards the media work which otherwise had all in all been viewed quite positively. The recommendation was to begin media work much earlier and to be more consistent in disseminating information.

• The issue of private security companies also met with criticism. The interviewed senior officers criticised the companies' somewhat careless recruitment of personnel, implying the risk of causing extra work for the police. Deficiencies as regards training and equipment of the private personnel were also identified.

4.4 Recommended Action and Best Practice – Proposal s for the future

Summing up the results of the individual parts of this analysis, the most important recommendations for policing future (major) events are listed below:

• The dual structure Command (Management) Staff/Operations Staff should at least be reviewed. One possibility would be to have one legal expert who represents the authority included in the Operations Staff. Thus a separate Command Staff would not be necessary and legal requirements would not be neglected either.

• Besides, having the expert group in the Operations Staff would be sufficient, and

offer the additional advantage of reducing the presence of "external personnel" in the Staffs.

• The 3D-philosophy training should become part of the usual basic training and/or a senior officer training should be initiated for them to successfully convey the contents of the 3D-philosophy (snowball effect).

• An earlier incorporation of the preparations into a "BAO" (Special-Purpose Structure) – in other words, relieving the line organisation earlier: this had already


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been frequently demanded in the run-up to the event, as thus unclear competences could have been avoided.

• Better foreign language training opportunities: foreign language(s) should by all means be trained in the course of ongoing and specialised training within the Ministry of the Interior. Obtaining language skills takes time and can hardly be achieved in the short term for a certain deployment. Adequate material (phrase books, dictionaries) in the language required should be provided to facilitate communication.

• Compulsory feedback reports provided by foreign officers deployed in Austria: feedback and "external" opinions and accompanying evaluation should be utilized to a greater extent for process improvement.

• More attention is to be paid to the personnel recruited by private security companies and the recruitment process planned earlier.

• Special attention is to be paid to the systematic reporting of information and consistent dissemination of information to the media.

• Operational forces consider the deployment of a high number of officers as a decisive factor.25

• Comprehensive and early preparatory measures are considered instrumental for a positive policing of any major or non-routine events.

• Involvement of and regular contact with political stakeholders and the media is of paramount importance.

• The "EPS-Web – Einsatzprotokollierungssystem" (on-line incident and operations recording system) did not really prove effective. Such systems can be used for logging and record keeping purposes (documentation instruments), but hardly as on-site decision aid. It turned out that either solely one or several traditional communication channels hade been used. Nevertheless, all respondents stressed that in this context the communication with their direct superior was very positive.

• Deployment of officers from abroad constitutes an essential element of prevention.

• Applying the 3D-philosophy proved useful, due to the more visible presence of restrained, but friendly and well-prepared police forces.

4.4.1 Bi-national Policy Advantages:

• Risk groups are not concentrated in one country. • Security work is shared. • Different experiences can be taken into account in planning

25 Note: A generous personnel policy constitutes a motivating factor; can also be seen as indicator for importance and recognition of the work, but economic aspects and ways of saving resources need also be considered.


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The importance of a thorough preparation in form of a project organisation has become evident. Decisive Factors:

• Speaking the same language greatly facilitates matters - a true advantage for the host countries Austria and Switzerland

• Close cooperation is vital • Consistency in procedures, legal provisions, standardised reporting methods,

commands, etc. • Early personal contacts, not only between the top executive officials, have an

integrating effect not be underestimated; this in turn has a positive impact upon the entire mission and the cooperation.

• In this context, the importance of information networking, e.g. mutual information about operation planning, etc., must not be overlooked.

The fact that almost 80 percent of the interviewees stated that the image of the police has been improved, or even greatly improved, thanks to their conduct during the entire EURO 2008, further corroborated the positive overall impression. The main reason for this outcome was the fact that police forces were visible at all times at critical spots, but not as a "wall" or as "opponent". The police were rather seen as a safeguard for security. The internal evaluation report of the Human Rights Advisory Board also rated the police activities during the EURO 2008 as very positive, permitting inferences about the mutual respect for each other, the handling of the event, and the implementation of the 3D-philosophy – most certainly a great success achieved by the Austrian law enforcement authorities and the Ministry of the Interior.