EU2015 from a systemic view to scenarios - Antonio Alvarenga

8/14/2019 EU2015 from a systemic view to scenarios - Antonio Alvarenga

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TREND- UND ZUKUNFTSMANAGEMENT

uropean n onFrom a systemic view to scenarios

Antnio Alvarenga - 18th May 2006

[email protected]

Focus TimeHorizon

Intelligence Scanning& Gathering

Rationales

DiagnosisExploration &

Clients &Stakeholders

Project Planning + Team& Experts

CreativityImagination

Structuring

Categorization

Antecipation

na ys s

Interpretation

Synthesise

Visioning

Actors

Vision

Factors

CommunicationAppropriation

Planning

Launch

Prog./ Proj. Management

Strategic Definition

Strategic Implementation

Strategic Monitoring

Quantification

Feedback

Adaptation

Mobilization

Antnio Alvarenga /Paulo S. de Carvalho


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Focus TimeHorizon

Intelligence Scanning& Gathering

Rationales

DiagnosisExploration &

Clients &

Stakeholders

Project Planning + Team

& Experts

CreativityImagination

Anticipation

na ys s

Interpretation

Synthesise

Visioning

Actors

Vision

Factors

StructuringCategorization

CommunicationAppropriation

Planning

Launch

Prog./ Proj. Management

Strategic Definition

Strategic Implementation

Strategic Monitoring

Quantification

Feedback

Adaptation

Mobilization

Antnio Alvarenga /Paulo S. de Carvalho

PRESENTATION OF THE-

FOR THE EU

Antnio Alvarenga


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FINAL GOAL

To reach a set of Alternative Futures forthe EU allowing for better identification

of risks and opportunities

Antnio Alvarenga

ROADMAP

1.The EU Today

2.Working with an EU System

3.The EU Future Group Projections

4.The EU Future - Scenarios

Antnio Alvarenga


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1. THE EU TODAY

Antnio Alvarenga

FATNESS

www.ccs.ornl.gov.bmp


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THE

INSTITUTIONALMODEL

http://slonews.sta.si

http://www.rlg.nl

FINANCIALFRAMEWORK


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http://rodapedaleira.com.sapo.pt

ENLARGEMENT

& BUDGETCOORDINATION


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LISBON &ECONOMIC MODELS www.lissabon-umgebung.de -

foto: Johannes Beckwww.portugalvirtual.pt

IMMIGRATIONin www.dw-world.de


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www.reefrunner.com

EXTERNAL POLICY& DEFENSE http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapon

DevelopingAsia excluding

GLOBALIZATION,CHINA &

INTERNATIONALPOSITION

Western

Rest ofDeveloping

World

18%

14%

Asian NIC's4%

China30%

USA19%

Hemisphere

4%

Eurozone

5%Developed

excluding USA,

Euroland & Asian

NIC's

6%

Contributions to global real GDP growth (ppp), 2001-2004 - Primary Source: WEO Database; Secondary Source: Poltica Econmica, 2004 (adapted by Marques & Alvarenga)


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2. Working with an EU System

Antnio Alvarenga

EU

Complex superposition of processeswhose existence/development is highlyinfluenced by two global driving forces:

enga

/

o

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Alvar

Jos

F.

Ribeir


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EmergentEconomies

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION - KEY DYNAMICS

GlobalInvestment

Internationalizationof Companies

Mutation ofTechnologies

Antnio

Alvarenga

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Jos

F.

Ribeiro

Economic growth of the main EUeconomic partners

Emergent economies with a key

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION WHERE TO LOOK?

Dollar stability

Evolution of the process initiatedwith the Kyoto protocol

Internationalization ofcompanies and outsourcing

dynamics

natural gas

Asia and OPEC foreign exchangereserves policy

Free circulation of capital

Commercial OpennessAntnio

Alvarenga

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Jos

F.

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South

Korea

USA

Caucasus

NorthKorea

Japan

Russia

GEOPOLITICAL FRAGMENTATION TENSION AREAS AND THEARC OF CRISIS

USA

Palestine

Balkans

Vietnam

Malaysia

Central Asia/

Afghanistan China

SyriaIsrael

Egypt

IranIraq

SaudiArabia

Pakistan

TaiwanTurkey

Thailand

Indonesia

YemenSudan

EritreaSomalia

India

USA

Australia

Tension zones - China

Tension zones - India

Tension zones - Islam

Arc of Crisis

Key actor in energy supply

Antnio

Alvarenga

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Jos

F.

Ribeiro

GEOPOLITICAL FRAGMENTATION WHERE TOLOOK?

Global Terrorism

Tension level in the Arc of Crisis

Reform of the UN system

Relations between the US andIslamic countries

Privileged relations between theUS and regional powers

Global re-positioning of USmilitary forces

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Alvarenga

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Jos

F.

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NATO

EU Enlargement The Balkans

EastMediterranean

JHA

Budgetary

CFSP

EMUCommon Policies

Reform

Aeronautic, Aerospace andDefence Industries

Commercial andCooperation Policy

InstitutionsReform

StrictnessEU Budget

GrowthPotential

StructuralReforms

Demographics

Investment inDefence

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Alvarenga

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Jos

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NATO

EU Enlargement The Balkans

EastMediterranean

JHA17

20

21

22

InstitutionsReform

13

12

CFSP

EMU

Common PoliciesReform

Aeronautic, Aerospace andDefence Industries

1823

24

Commercial andCooperation Policy

2528

BudgetaryStrictness

EU Budget

GrowthPotential

StructuralReforms

4 5

Investment inDefence

Demographics

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Alvarenga

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Ribeiro


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3. The EU Future

- Group Projections

Antnio Alvarenga /Jos F. Ribeiro

Enlar ement

Name

Relations withthe US (Group

III)

EMU, StructuralReforms

& InternalSecurity / JHA

processes

(Group II)

Common Policies &Budget processes

(Group I)

Demographics

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Alvarenga

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Hypothesis for the Evolution of Economic Globalization

1. Pacific-based Globalisation

(i) Growing integration of the American and Japanese economies with Japanese savings massively placed inAmerican financial assets, instead of a privileged use on the sustainability of Japans public debt;(ii) Follow up of Chinese economic reforms with strong growth, always in a peaceful international context;

(iv) Intense involvement of American and Japanese companies in Chinas and Asias economic growth;(v) Strong investment in increasing the supply of oil with greater involvement of private companies and centredin ex-USSR and the Gulf;(vi) Climate change matters dealt through the use of regulatory market mechanisms, involving from the startemergent economies and giving priority to the development of green and clean technologies.

2. Retreating Globalisation

i Prolon ed crisis of the Ja anese econom and a retraction of ca itals exit towards the US due to the

utilization of savings (reduced as a consequence of an older population) in the financing of the Japanesepublic deficit;(ii) Energy crisis resulting from the incapacity in replenishing reserves and increasing production from currentreserves (because of difficulties created by Gulf countries);(iii) Delay in the economic transformation of China due to political drawbacks in reforms, a consequence of anincapacity to develop predominantly rural zones and of managing the social consequences of reorganizing theentrepreneurial state sector;(iv) Recession in the US followed by a period of slow growth;(v) Reduction in the perspectives of growth at a world level.


Hypothesis for the Evolution of Geopolitical Fragmentation

1. Maintenance of the Centre(i) Relative calm along the Arch of crisis during the beginning of the 21 st Century;(ii) After initial difficulties, the change of regime in Iraq occurs with a lot less drawbacks than expected thanks to a new regime

that is able to manage several politico-religious tendencies of the country and to trigger a process of modernization;(iii) North Korea abandons the development of its nuclear programme in exchange for greater international economic

cooperation;(iv) The Gaza pull-out by Israel unfolds in a rather peaceful manner and allows for a new negotiation phase to begin;

(v) NATO remains the central security organization in Europe and of transatlantic cooperation outside Europe;v uss a approxma on, a owng uss a o ocus on s economc eve opmen , vaue s energe c po en a an s a ze

its internal Islamic arch, in return for its support to the anti-terrorist and rogue states struggle spearheaded by the US;

(vii) Reform of the UN towards a better adaptation to anti-terrorist actions and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,with an enlargement of the Security Council;

(viii) Moderation of the emerging powers China, India and Iran concentrated in internal problems related to the stability and/orthe functioning of the respective regimes and/or the economic reform agendas that stimulate moderation in terms of foreign

relations.

2. Reformulation of the Centre(i) Great instability in the Arab World with a profound crisis in the Saudi monarchy and a strong activity of Al Qaeda (whichreinforces its stance on Pakistan/Kashmir);

(ii) Controlled geopolitical tension between China and the US;

(vi) Cooptation by the US of new allies, namely India.

3. Fragmentation of the Centre(i) Succession of crisis in the Gulf, Central Asia and the Northwest of the Pacific, leading up to a weakening of USs position (due

to the impossibility of avoiding the crisis and afterwards of being able to provide effective answers in military terms);

(ii) Uncontrollable civil war in Iraq with a withdrawal ofAmerican troops;;(iii) Coming into power in Pakistan of pro Al-Qaeda military and great instability in Kashmir;

(iv) US/Russia approximation difficulties;(v) Worsening of USs conflicts with (increased nationalist) China, culminating in a crisis surrounding Taiwan;

(vi) Growing conflicts of interest between the US and Germany/France;(vii) China/Saudi Arabia alliance centred around the exchange of oil and gas for nuclear weapons and missile technology;

(viii) Total paralysis of the UN

Antnio

Alvarenga

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F.

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Hypothesis for the Demographic Evolution

1. Continuity

Normal migratory fluxes not altering any of the three identified cases of ageingpopulation;

2. From the South and from the sphere of the ex-USSR

Exceptional migratory fluxes (particularly of extra-communitarian origin) which altersboth the eneral a ein of the o ulation and the a ein of the active o ulation also

placing European Immigration Policies under new demands;


Hypothesis for the Evolution of Group I EMU, Structural Reforms &Economic Growth / Common Policies & Budget

1. Reforms and Economic GrowthIn a context of advancing Structural Reforms in EMUs central countries (France, Germany and Italy) and of gains whenit comes to Growth Potential, the UK, now more convinced of the sustainability of the project, joined the eurozone. Thegains in confidence arising out of the success of reforms and out of the UKs accession to the eurozone has facilitatedthe sustainability of the process of flexibilization of the SGP criteria. These criteria now take into account budget-impacts of the first phase of Structural Reforms and the MSs different needs in terms of public investment. A greatersolidity of the budget consolidation process has given, in turn, greater leeway for reinforcing expenses with defence

when it comes to traditional EU policies.

2. Core NucleusIn a context characterized by the refusal of the UK to integrate the eurozone, by the political impossibility to carry out

converging Structural Reforms in the eurozone and by permanent difficulties in Growth Potential, the tensions aroundnational Budget Policies have deteriorated. In face of this panorama, reducing the market credibility of the euro andthreatening the EMU in its initial configuration, France and Germany decided to advance towards greater integration(including in terms of Defence), a movement that was only accompanied by a small group of MS. The imperious need tocontain national budget expenses has led to a franco-german refusal in increasing the Communitarian Budget,unleashing a series of tensions between them and the liquid beneficiaries of traditional EU common policies.

3. CrisisIn a context characterised by the low endogenous growth potential in Europe, it has been politically impossible in thecore EMU countries to carry out Structural Reforms destined to share the burdens of an ageing population betweenState and families, aggravating the differences in budget performance between the UK, Netherlands and Scandinaviancountries and the core nucleus of the EMU (which the UK had decided not to integrate). At the same time, the growingcosts of a non-reformed Welfare State in the core EMU countries has rendered impossible an increase of investmentsin defence. Successive conflicts surrounding the SGPs targets and persistent arguments between Germany andFrance, mutually accusing each other of the euros failure in the exchange rate markets and of the abandoning of jointefforts in the defence sector, has brought about, halfway through the decade, a serious crisis in the EMU.



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Hypothesis for the Evolution of Group II Enlargement & InternalSecurity / JHA

1. Good Enlargement with Consolidation of the JHA Pillar

The process of enlargement initiated in 2004 contributed towards the arrival of an agreement in the question ofCyprus and for the success of CAPs reform. While the process of enlargement was ongoing we witnessed aconsolidation of the JHA - Common Policy of Immigration and creation of European police forces involved inborder controls.

2. Turkeys quick accession with a Reinforcement of the JHA Pillar

The process of enlargement initiated in 2004, besides having contributed towards reaching an agreement in thequestion of Cyprus and for the success of CAPs reform, it also assumed an unexpected direction, with theEuropean decision of facilitating a fast-track integration of Turkey (as means to rewarding the behaviour of thiscountry during the Cyprus negotiations and also for facilitating its internal democratic and secular evolution).Turkeys accession has made a reinforcement of the JHA imperative and has brought about new opportunitiesin terms of organized fighting to drug trafficking, namely the one that is processed through the Balkans.

3. Bad Enlargement and Great Difficulties in JHA

The communitarian institutions face successive blockades as a consequence: of the entry into the EU of adivided Cyprus and of consequent growing tensions with Turkey, of the EUs growing internal resistances to aneffective freedom of circulation of people of the new MS, of the incapacity to reform CAP in time and of thediscontentment of the populations of several candidate countries towards the conditions imposed by the EU.Simultaneously, the difficulties in reaching a consensus about JHA have worsened, with some countries optingfor a nationally-based approach to the Immigration Policy, and some even deciding to give up Shengen.


Hypothesis for the Evolution of Group III External Positioning of the EUand Relations with the US

1. Transatlantic AxisIn a context of relative calm in the world, the US have maintained interest in the evolution of the Balkans and havereinforced trust in the intervention of its European allies in the region (with the EUs progressively greater

responsibilities in managing the problems in the region), keeping up with the European preference for a stability ofborders and multi-ethnic States in a framework of continuity of NATO. This Alliance was reinforced with means andstructures for military interventions outside the area. CFSP has evolved towards an affirmation of an European voicein the transatlantic relation, not free of tensions but always structuring European security. The improvement intransat ant c reat ons as opene up new co a orat on opportun t es n t e area o t e e ence n ustr es etweenAmerican and European companies, including French ones.

2. The EU put asideIn the context of a strategic collaboration with Russia, the US, interested in reducing its strategic expenses withEurope, specially with the Balkans (where crisis were frequent), have proposed a new security architecture based on arevision of borders and on the articulated resolution of the main focus of tension in Eastern Europe, in the Black Seaand in the Caucasus. In this new context, NATO has evolved towards a pan-European security structure of which theEU and Russia were integral parts of and CFSP has lost a great deal of use (condemning efforts of putting together anEuropean Aerospatiale and Aeronautics Policy), since one of the factors that gave it cohesion preference for stability

of borders and multi-ethnic states has been abandoned. The US has opted for reinforcing bilateral relations (e.g withthe UK and Turkey).

3. Core NucleusIn the beginning of the decade, pressed on by the demands of engagements in other regions of the world, the US hasdrastically reduced their troops in the Balkans. In this context, the difficult equilibriums in which the policy of

protectorates had been sustained in the region fell apart and the European troops, sent in the beginning of the decadesubstituting the American troops, proved themselves incapable of imposing respect, with a re-ignition of the strugglesbetween ethnic factions. Given the exit of the American troops, NATO had lost its most important active in the mostturbulent region of Europe. CFSP in turn, had failed its first big test, leaving the countries of the Union disoriented whenit comes to future actions in the international scene. Germany and France answer to this evolution with a project ofgreater integration in the area of defence and (almost) with an alliance with Russia and China.



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4. The EU Future

- Scenarios


Good

1. What ifeverything went

well?

TransatlanticAxis

Reforms and

Enlargementwith

Consolidation

of the JHA

EconomicGrowth

ContinuityAntnio

Alvarenga

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What if everything went well?

Gradual reduction of CAPs weight

Structural Reforms towards rowth and aF

Victories Political contextConcessions/Ruptures

Dynamism of the European defence industry

Effective Euro ean Defence identit within

Proximity of the EU to the US

Greater international protagonism with anentry as a permanent member of the UNSecurity Council

Accession to the eurozone

Gradual reduction of the rebateUK

Maintenance of its role as the largest li quidcontributor towards the communitarian budget

A deepening of Structural Reforms

G

transformation of the French Capitalism Model

International role in opposition to the US

NATOs nucleus

UKs entry into Euro

Reduction of the liquid contribution towardsthe budget

Acceptance of the JHA (although with moreefficiency in terms of controlling immigrationand with some leverage for MS)

NL


Bad

2. Two in One

Core Nucleus

Enlargement

and GreatDifficulties in

JHA

Core Nucleus

From the South and from the sphere of the ex-USSRAntnio

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Bad

3. Redesigning

Europe

The EU putaside

Enlargement


JHA

Crisis


Alvarenga

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F.

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Turke s uick

Atlantic Europe

TransatlanticAxis

Reforms and

accessionwith a

Reinforcemen

t of the JHA

EconomicGrowth

Continuity / From the South and from the sphere of the ex-USSRAntnio

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Good

Reviewing

Ambitions

TransatlanticAxis

Enlargementwith

Consolidationof the JHA

Core Nucleus

ContinuityAntnio

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Good

Welcome to Russia

The EU putaside

Reforms and

Enlargementwith

Consolidation

of the JHA

EconomicGrowth

ContinuityAntnio

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F.

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Bad

Two by two

The EU putaside

Enlargement


JHA

Core Nucleus


Alvarenga

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Jos

F.

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TREND- UND ZUKUNFTSMANAGEMENT

uropean n onFrom a systemic view to scenarios

Antnio Alvarenga - 18th May 2006

[email protected]

Documents

EU2015 from a systemic view to scenarios - Antonio Alvarenga