EU-funded Roma programmes: Lessons from Hungary, Slovakia

EU-funded Roma programmes: Lessons from

Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic

By Will Guy and Martin Kovats

2 EU-FUNDED ROMA PROGRAMMES: LESSONS FROM HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

This report was commissioned by MRG in partnershipwith with four Roma NGOs: IQ Roma Servis, EuropeanUnion Association for Roma Youth, Project Schola and theWide Open School Foundation. We were aware that largeamounts of funding had been allocated by the EU toprojects targetting the Roma in accession states and at thesame time we were aware that many Roma communitiesreport little or no changes on the ground. Given that theaccession process continues and that more funding will beallocated to Roma in the newly acceding states, we felt thatit was important to independently research the impact ofthese programmes. Had positive impacts occurred but notreached all the Roma? Had changes begun but still neededmore time to fully work through? Or were the funds,although seemingly large, still too small to really tackle theproblem? Had the programmes failed? Or had they hadtemporary success but this was not sustained? We felt thatlessons from this process could be used by Romacommunities to lobby for new and different programmes infuture. This report examines three Roma-oriented projectsin the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia funded bythe European Union’s Phare programme between 1999 and2003. The study employed methods of participatoryevaluation to identify the experience of Roma beneficiariesand other stakeholders in the projects, and makesrecommendations for improving the effectiveness andefficiency of future EU-funded initiatives aimed atimproving the lives of Roma people in the Central andEastern European region. The lessons learnt are relevant toa new wave of accession states with significant Romapopulations as well as to other poor and excluded groups insuch countries.

The report is intended to be of use to the whole range ofthose involved in future initiatives to bring about the socialinclusion of Roma communities, including politicians,policy makers, opinion formers, activists, NGOs,researchers at international, national and more local levels,particularly Roma themselves. In this spirit the evaluationswere carried out in partnership with local Roma NGOswhere the projects took place.

There is one facet of this report which we feel couldhave been more developed; that of gender and theparticular difficulties faced by Roma women. One of thethree country sections has more mention of this, butotherwise the report is largely silent on gender. This ispartly as a result of the participatory nature of the exerciseand the fact that we allowed comments to come out fromthe participants and we did not prompt for any particularsubject areas in the interviews and group discussions.Gender was not raised as an issue by the participants andtherefore did not feed into the report. It may also bebecause gender was not adequately mainstreamed in thePhare projects evaluated. We would therefore recommendthe formulation of questions on gender even in the contextof open participatory analysis otherwise the findings maynot reflect the different situations and experiences ofwomen and men. MRG remains committed tomainstreaming gender into all of our work and ourpublications.

Claire Thomas,Deputy Director, MRG

Preface

Summary

Roma1 minorities constitute a significant and growingsection of national populations in Central and EasternEurope. However, Roma people have been among the mainlosers of post-Communist transition in this region. In allthree countries covered in this report, unemployment andpoverty are far higher for Roma than the national averageand social and economic changes and discrimination havedeepened segregation and social exclusion. At the sametime, democracy and respect for the rule of law have led tounprecedented opportunities for Roma people toparticipate in public life, as well as the development ofhuman rights and minority rights standards. Consequently,there is an acute need to ensure that the heightened publicprofile of Roma in the region is converted into tangibleimprovements in the living conditions and opportunities ofRoma people.

The Phare programme aimed to help applicants to adaptto EU legislation by supporting improvements ininstitutional capacity and promoting social and economiccohesion. From 1990 all the countries covered in thisreport became recipients of Phare funding and theutilisation of this support was outlined in NationalProgrammes agreed between the European Commissionand national governments. The implementation of Phare-funded projects was overseen by the Directorate General(DG) for Enlargement in Brussels and EC countrydelegations in each state.

In 1997 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakiabegan formal accession negotiations with the EU. Entryconditions included establishing functioning democraciesand viable market economies as well guaranteeing humanrights and respect for minorities. As candidate countries,the amount of Phare funding increased significantly and inMay 2004 all three countries became full members of theEuropean Union. As members states, the Czech Republic,Hungary and Slovakia are now no longer entitled to Pharefunds, however all are eligible to receive other resourcesfrom the EU, including structural and cohesion funds.

Support for projects specifically targeting Romarepresented only a tiny proportion of total Phare fundingin all three states. Furthermore, independent researchindicates that the effectiveness of Roma projects was verylimited and that the increased centralisation of largerinitiatives marginalised the input of Roma peoplethemselves. These conclusions are supported by theevaluations of the three separate projects carried out for thisreport.

The research was conceived as a pilot project to establishthe viability of using participatory evaluation as a methodfor assessing the impact of EU-funded Roma projects. Thestudy was conducted by a research team based in Londonand Roma partner NGOs in each of the three countries.The projects considered for evaluation had been completedprior to the research and were jointly selected on the basis

of agreed criteria so as to cover a variety of key issues, andbe of suitable scale and relevance to partner NGOs.

One project was evaluated in each of the three countriescovering important areas of particular concern:

� Hungary –Infrastructure and community development

� Slovakia – Pre-school provision

� Czech Republic – Housing

Background information was obtained from national andEuropean sources and evaluation methodology agreedbetween MRG, the research team and the partner RomaNGOs. Each evaluation employed a combination of semi-structured interviews with representative stakeholders andfocus group discussions with Roma who had participatedin or were intended beneficiaries of a project. Fuller andmore detailed reports on the evaluation in each country areavailable at www.minorityrights.org.

The study demonstrated the practicality and value ofparticipatory methods for evaluating projects. In each case,there were no significant problems identifying Romabeneficiaries and securing their cooperation. The fact thatthis task was carried out by Roma NGOs with theassistance of local Roma representatives was an importantfactor in establishing confidence in the research and in theresearchers themselves. At the same time, no problemsarose in respect of cooperation from representatives ofmainstream stakeholders either. As a result, the approachtaken was able to identify a variety of different perspectiveson each project.

The study also showed the feasibility of obtainingdetailed qualitative data about Phare-funded programmes,which is largely absent from official evaluations. However,the method does require the verification of information,which can be inconsistent between participants or simplyinaccurate. Inevitably, recollections deteriorate over timeand it is best to conduct participatory evaluation as soon aspossible after the completion of a project. At the sametime, inaccurate reporting can also reflect limitations in theway information about the project was disseminated toRoma beneficiaries.

A revealing impression from the evaluations was therather low expectations of most of those involved in theprojects. This provides insight into a broader conclusion ofthe study regarding the relationship between accountabilityand effectiveness. It also identifies an important role forNGOs in supporting the empowerment of Romacommunities in the course of participating in the design,implementation and evaluation of projects developed toassist them.

Overall, the findings of the research were disappointing.Though all three projects brought additional resources andbenefits, these were inadequate for effectively addressingthe problems of Roma communities, or even to achieve the

3EU-FUNDED ROMA PROGRAMMES: LESSONS FROM HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

original aspirations of the projects themselves. In someinstances, funds were wholly or partially wasted and allprojects suffered from the lack of sustainability to continuethe benefits that did accrue. Though Roma people wereinvolved in various stages of each project, their influenceover planning was very limited as the process did notsufficiently compensate for a lack of capacity or culture ofinclusion within the rules and timescale imposed by thePhare programme. These conclusions confirm the findingsof other research that Phare helps highlight problems, butis not well designed to address them effectively.

The report identifies a number of lessons that need to belearned to ensure future EU-funded Roma programmes aremore successful. These include ensuring that the scale ofresources is sufficient to address the depth and complexityof need in Roma communities, that more time andexpertise is employed in planning projects, which shouldinclude significantly more consultation with Romabeneficiaries and their participation in planning,implementation and evaluation processes. The study alsopoints to fundamental structural flaws in the operation ofthe Phare programme which was not well constructed toaddress the kinds of problems faced by Roma communities.At heart, there is a major problem of accountability atevery level which prevents shortcomings being realised andacted on and thus undermines the effectiveness of funds.

The report also makes a number of recommendationsaimed at public authorities and NGOs at European,national and local levels. While there is no simple solutionto the problems identified, the fact remains that for manyyears to come the EU will continue to be an importantsource of funds for projects aimed at improving the lives ofRoma people. Therefore, it is important to learn from theexperience of the Phare programme, in particular that ofRoma people, so that improvements can be made at everylevel to ensure Roma communities receive the assistancethey require to overcome poverty and exclusion.

MRG’s Roma Advocacy Programme

MRG has long been concerned about Roma communitiesthroughout Europe, publishing a series of reports abouttheir situation from 1973 onwards (Puxon 1973, Puxon1987, Liégeois and Gheorghe 1995). This latest report ispart of MRG’s Roma Advocacy Programme that started in2003 and looks at three EU-funded projects to improve thesituation of Roma in the Czech Republic, Slovakia andHungary. By working together on joint participatoryevaluations with partner Roma NGOs, the aim is to drawlessons for both the EU and especially for Roma groupsenabling these, as intended beneficiaries, to argue for moreeffective Roma programmes. To date, such programmeshave been profoundly disappointing, leaving most Romacommunities in disadvantaged conditions, which haveremained essentially unchanged. In the view of MRG thisunacceptable situation can only be altered with the full

involvement of Roma in such initiatives. For theirparticipation to be meaningful, Roma need to play a fullpart at every stage of proposed projects – initiating,planning, monitoring and evaluation.

Roma communities in Central and Eastern Europe

Roma communities in Europe are regarded as thecontinent’s largest and most marginalized ethnic minority.Those living in the former Communist-ruled countries ofCEE are estimated to form around three-quarters of thistotal population.2 Unlike Roma groups in Western Europethat are often associated with a nomadic way of life, thevast majority of CEE Roma have long been settled. From2000 onwards, a series of comparative surveys documentedthe extent and depth of Roma poverty and marginalizationin the CEE region3 and the 2003 World Bank reportidentified loss of their former jobs in Communistcommand economies since 1989 as the principal cause ofRoma impoverishment.4 The 2003 UNDP Roma HumanDevelopment Report found that 4–5 million [Roma]people in the [CEE] region endure living conditions closeto those of sub-Saharan Africa in terms of illiteracy, infantmortality and malnutrition. For most Roma the mostsignificant outcome of regime change was a reversal in theirlimited income, but increasing participation in widersociety.5

Replacing this participatory trend were pressures tointensify segregation – occupational, residential and social– that relentlessly pushed Roma back towards their formerenclaves and into new ghettos. On the whole, governmentsof the region appeared to lack either the political will orsufficient resources to take effective action to stem thisdecline. This is not to deny that state funding was allocatedto initiatives to assist Roma but these schemes were small-scale and generally did not address some of the moreserious problems afflicting Roma communities, such asemployment and housing. They were typically grants tosupport cultural activities, promote tolerance of minorities,underpin NGOs and encourage education. However forCEE countries the prospect of EU membership gave a newurgency and impetus to policy formation for Romacommunities.6

EU expansion and Phare programmes

The idea of expanding the EU eastwards to include CEEcountries arose soon after the collapse of Communist rulein 1989. Although individual Europe agreements wereconcluded with applicants, establishing the legal frameworkfor their gradual integration into the EuropeanCommunity from 1991 onwards, basic conditions to befulfilled by applicant countries were formulated by theEuropean Council in 1993 (in what are commonly knownas the Copenhagen criteria) and reinforced by theEuropean Council in Madrid in 1995. These criteria ofaccession required the establishment of a functioningmarket economy as well as ‘stability of institutions


guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights andrespect for minorities’ as a political condition for accession.7

In addition candidates were to adhere to the objectives ofpolitical, economic and monetary union, as well as adoptthe acquis communautaire, the entire EU legislation.8

A rather different formulation, aimed explicitly atsafeguarding national minorities, was the Council ofEurope (CoE)’s Framework Convention for the Protectionof National Minorities (FCNM). This was even moreexplicit in its demand for ‘full and effective equality’ forminorities – not just in terms of respecting cultural aspectsbut also material conditions – requiring that:

‘[t]he parties undertake to adopt, where necessary,adequate measures in order to promote, in all areas ofeconomic, social, political and cultural life, full andeffective equality between persons belonging to a nationalminority and those belonging to the majority.’ 9

(CoE 1994, Article 4 §2)

However, as a CoE convention, this could only berecommended to present and future EU members andtherefore, while applicants were strongly encouraged to signand ratify this instrument, it could not be required as acondition of accession, particularly since France, Belgiumand Greece ignored this convention maintaining that theyhad no national minorities to protect.

The pace of the enlargement process quickened with thepublication in 1997 of the EC’s Agenda 2000, which statedthat the integration of minorities was generally satisfactory‘except for the situation of the Roma in a number ofapplicant … [countries], which gives cause for concern’.The countries specifically identified were Bulgaria, theCzech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.Starting in 1998, the EC began a series of Regular Reportson each candidate’s progress towards accession, whichrepeatedly criticized the fact that little appeared to havechanged. In 2000 the European Council adopted aDirective, as part of the acquis, requiring equal treatmentof persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.10 In thesame year an Enlargement Strategy Paper pointed out thatalthough in most cases plans had been adopted aimed atimproving the situation of Roma communities: ‘The Romacontinue to face widespread discrimination and difficultiesin economic and social life’. The paper went on to demandthat ‘programmes … [be] implemented in a sustainedmanner, in close co-operation with Roma representatives,and that appropriate budgetary support is made available inall countries’.11

To support applicants’ political, economic andinstitutional reforms in adapting to EU legislation, targetedfinancial and technical aid is provided in various ways. ThePhare programme is the principal means of delivering suchassistance through grants rather than loans, and incomponent programmes EU funding is frequentlysupplemented by co-financing from applicants or other

sources. Phare mainly involves institution building,particularly modernization of the administration andjudiciary, by helping partner countries to developstructures, strategies, human resources and managementskills by the transfer of ‘know how’ expertise, andinvestment measures chiefly designed to promote economicand social cohesion.12 This second Phare priority seeks topromote the functioning of the market economy and helpbuild ‘capacity to cope with competitive pressure andmarket forces within the EU, which is key to fulfilling theobligations of membership’.13

Once the EC has made a favourable judgement on anapplicant’s suitability for EU membership, a complex pre-accession process is followed. National Programmes areagreed with applicants and account for most of the Pharebudget, while Accession Partnerships (AP) and RegularReports allow the EU to identify weaknesses and suggestwhat corrective action needs to be taken. Each candidate isthen required to prepare a detailed National Programme forthe Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). CEE countries havebeen helped in their economic and political restructuringby Phare since 1989, but increasingly after 1997 thisfunding has been focused on the pre-accession prioritiesidentified in APs and NPAAs of individual candidates. Forexample, the Slovak programme considered in this MRGreport is an explicit response to the AP and NPAApriorities of improving the situation of Roma, whichthemselves are directly linked to the political criterion foraccession of respecting national minorities.

After EU approval, the NPAA becomes a NationalDevelopment Programme (NDP), which is the basis forPhare programming. Implementation of programmes issupervised centrally through the EC’s EnlargementDirectorate General (DG) and locally by EC Delegationsin candidate countries, with the aid of monitoring andevaluation reports at sector (e.g. Social Cohesion) as well asat programme level. These then form part of the input tothe EC’s Regular Reports on each candidate’s progresstowards accession. Finally a draft Accession Treaty isprepared, agreed and when ratified by all concerned, thecandidate becomes a member state.14

This outline of the accession procedure gives the theorybut in practice the Phare programme was not able todeliver all it promised for ‘its aims were too ambitious andthe time allowed to achieve them too short’.15 A review ofall Phare programmes between 1999 and late 200316 founda third of all programmes were rated unsatisfactory andresults for Phare support for the Economic and Socialsector (ESC) ‘the most disappointing’ of all. This poorperformance was attributed to ‘insufficient support …provided to develop adequate strategies for economic andsocial development, and the instruments for deliveringthem’. As a result:

‘pilot investments were generally not made on the basis ofproper needs assessments but were instead executed more


on the basis of ad hoc allocations of funding with limitedimpact’.17

The same report found that ‘capacity to coordinate anddeliver pre-accession assistance … is not yet sustainable’,emphasising the damaging effects of ‘understaffing, lowsalary levels and institutional instability’. Therefore it isevident that such shortcomings were not peculiar to Romainitiatives but characteristic of Phare programmes ingeneral.

Phare Roma programmes

As the date of accession approached for the first group ofapplicants – including the Czech Republic, Slovakia andHungary – Phare funding increased, rising from an averageof €0.84 billion per year for the 1990-4 period, to €1.34billion for 1995-9 and €1.5 billion for 2000-2006. Incomparison with this overall expenditure Phare funding forRoma programmes was insignificant and in percentageterms almost invisible. Nevertheless, Phare Roma fundingfollowed the same rising trend, reflecting continuingconcern about this problematic issue, increasing from€11.7 million in 1999 to €13.65 million in 2000, and€31.35 million in 200118 While most of these Phare-funded programmes explicitly identified the beneficiaries asRoma, some aimed at a broader constituency such as‘ethnic minorities’ or ‘socially disadvantaged groups’. Pharewas the main source of EU funding for Roma communitiesbut it was not the only one for other programmes,particularly in the fields of education and anti-discrimination, which were supervised by other DGs. Inaddition, CEE governments also took their own initiativesdirected at Roma, as did national and international NGOs.

While national authorities bore responsibility foridentifying programmes within their overall Phareallocations in relation to current AP and NPAA priorities,in cooperation with the EC; they were encouraged toconsult Roma representatives and organizations duringprogramming and at other stages where possible. Before1998 Phare funding for Roma communities was distributedthrough Civil Society Development Foundations (CSDF),largely to projects proposed by local groups includingRoma NGOs. These were mostly in the fields of culture,education, human rights, law and media. Applicants wereencouraged by media advertisements and through moreinformal networks, and offered assistance by CSDFs indrafting projects. These were inevitably small-scaleinitiatives but the advent of Accession Partnerships (APs)allowed for the introduction of much larger programmes,frequently coordinated and implemented by governmentagencies.19 These larger programmes had the potential forgreater impact but, being more centrally planned,precluded broader participation at the programming stageand were less adaptable to the needs of beneficiaries.

In contrast, NGO projects do allow Roma to design anddirectly participate in schemes to benefit their communitiesbut these are usually too limited in scale to have muchmore than a localised impact. Frequently, Roma NGOs’lack of capacity has led to an insufficient take-up of theavailable funding.20 Also the characteristic problems ofmany smaller NGOs in securing continued funding andretaining staff has tended to undermine the sustainabilityof such projects.21 On the other hand, larger programmesdesigned at governmental level tend to minimize thepossibility of grassroots participation, replacing this byRoma representation on high-level advisory committees.For example, the Czech Republic’s GovernmentCommission for Roma Community Affairs includes Romamembers as does Bulgaria’s National Council for Co-operation on Ethnic and Demographic Issues (NCCEDI),22

while Slovakia has a Roma in the post of GovernmentPlenipotentiary for Roma Communities who is closelyinvolved in policy initiatives. However representation oncommittees does not necessarily ensure effective oradequate participation, and the EC conceded that a:‘frequent problem … is the identification of the relevantinterlocutors for Roma communities.23

Research by the Open Society Institute’s EU AccessionMonitoring Program (EUMAP) concluded in 2002 that:

‘unfortunately, … policies [to protect Roma and otherminority groups] are frequently more visible thaneffective. All too often, they have foundered due toinsufficient political backing, low levels of publicsupport, and even lower levels of funding’.24

A more comprehensive 2004 review of Phare Romaprogrammes, prepared from 1998 to 2002 in the CzechRepublic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania,emphasized their significance by stating that:

‘more than any other assistance programme, Phare iswidely acknowledged as the lever of change that … hadthe decisive effect of getting [CEE] governments to startto adopt an appropriate legislative framework and, in atleast some cases, to set targets and provide resources “tofulfil the Copenhagen political criteria in relation toRoma”’.25

However the wider impact of such assistance waslimited, in part due to the lack:

‘of a clear policy framework for social inclusion of Roma,[which meant] that many Phare programmes wereconsidered to fall outside the mainstream functions ofgovernment ministries’.

However, this was also due to poor coordination atnational level.26 It was noted that although:


‘in all five countries some form of National Office forRoma Affairs was established, … their status andcapacity, in terms of experience and staff numbers is, inmost cases, not adequate to influence effectively thepolicies of individual ministries’.27

In other words, initiatives to improve the situation ofRoma communities remained peripheral to the morepressing concerns of CEE governments. Consequently, andespecially when:

Phare tried to emulate complex socio-economicdevelopment schemes … for various reasons [including]the short-term nature of Phare, inexperience or lack ofpreparedness in the sector, the final outcomes of manyprojects fell short of their high expectation’.28

In contrast to top-down Roma schemes:

‘projects [which] promoted a “bottom-up” andparticipatory approach’, were praised for adopting ‘anapproach based on good practice’, ‘although this proveddifficult to achieve through Phare’.29

The report particularly criticized the balance in thetargeting of funds (totalling €96 million), which failed tocorrespond to the most pressing needs of Romacommunities. It particularly emphasized the less than 10per cent ‘to address long-term unemployment that isendemic in Roma communities, and only 3% on healthrelated initiatives’, as opposed to the 27 per cent forinfrastructure of which almost two-thirds was devoted to asingle project in Slovakia.30 The highest proportion ofexpenditure, a third, was spent in the education sector.31

Also highlighted was the variance in funding betweencountries, and the report suggested that these differences‘may be an indication of the level of politicalcommitment’.32 Even allowing for its lower Romapopulation, it is striking that the Czech Republic had byfar the smallest share of Phare Roma funding (8 per cent),particularly in comparison with the countries with thelargest shares (Hungary 28 per cent and Slovakia 26 percent). At the same time, it had about the same number ofprojects as the others but the average value of these (€1.3million) was much less. Countries with the largest averageproject sizes were Hungary (€5.2 million) and Slovakia(€5.3 million). The Czech Republic also had a smallershare of co-financing (33 per cent) than Hungary (42 percent) and Slovakia (37 per cent), although here thedifferences are not so marked. Another significantdifference was that, as prior to 1998, Czech Phareprogrammes were mostly grant schemes for small NGOprojects, administered by a separate Civil SocietyDevelopment Foundation (CSDF), ‘to strengthen [the]capacity of Civil Society Organisations’ and thus aimed at‘guaranteeing democracy’.33

Phare evaluation and participatory evaluation

Phare evaluation

Individual countries are responsible for identifying suitablePhare Roma programmes but negotiations over design withEC Delegations before approval is granted can lead toprotracted delays. Once approved as part of the NationalPlan, these programmes are subject to internal monitoringand periodic evaluations during planning andimplementation stages. Some of the most important ofthese checks are Interim Evaluations, which are conductedby an external agency for the EC, and usually take placeannually or sometimes more frequently at programme andsector level. Interim Evaluations are discussed at greaterlength because they offer the most detailed externalscrutiny and reveal basic shortcomings in what mightappear a thorough and systematic monitoring system. Lateroccasional thematic, summary evaluations, such as the2004 review of Roma programmes in five CEE countries,34

take a broader view of a range of programmes, and seek topresent comparative findings and draw more generallessons using mainly Interim Evaluation reports as their‘base source of information’35 Although Phare programmesrepresent expenditure of public money, key evaluationdocumentation, with the exception of broader reports, isnot publicly available as this information is regarded asconfidential.36

To gauge whether they achieve their ends all Phareprogrammes are evaluated on the basis of five key criteria –relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact (or outcome) andsustainability. Impact ‘is the extent to which benefitsreceived by the target beneficiaries had a wider overalleffect on larger numbers of people’, while sustainability‘relates to whether the positive outcomes of the project …are likely to continue after the project ends’37 Outcomes areto be measured by ‘objectively verifiable indicators’.Although the main emphasis is placed firmly onmeasurable, quantitative data, the evaluation process alsoinvolves interviews with stakeholders. In the case of Romaprogrammes, as well as close cooperation with the ECdelegation, most of these interviews are with non-Romaministerial and other governmental officials withresponsibility for implementation, etc., although a limitednumber are with Roma – most commonly representativesof Roma NGOs. Very limited time is available for fieldvisits to check on implementation on site and to talk withRoma beneficiaries about their views on programmestargeted at them.

As in the Strategy Enlargement Paper, explicit calls forRoma participation beyond the level of basic consultationhave continued to be voiced periodically in EC RegularReports, reports on compliance with the FrameworkConvention, NGO shadow reports and those of theGranada Conference (2003) and World Bank Conference(2003). This last report underpinned the Decade of RomaInclusion which proclaims Roma participation at every


stage to be a ‘core value of the Decade’, including ‘regularoversight and monitoring of the process over the next tenyears’. Despite such recommendations, Roma involvementin Phare evaluations is generally extremely limited.

While it might be expected that any basic flaws indesign would be picked up at the planning stage, it shouldbe appreciated that EC delegations are often dealing withnational officials with responsibility for implementingcurrent programmes in understaffed government offices,while planning the next round, and face problems ininfluencing relevant ministries. Lack of capacity is nothelped by low pay (see above), deterring recruitment ofwell-qualified personnel who can earn far more in theprivate sector.38 Criticizing the persistence of previousinstitutional culture, a Slovak Governance Institute (SGI)researcher recently argued that:

‘it is quite exceptional for state bodies to carry outsystematic monitoring and evaluation of their policymeasures and publish their findings. Furthermore, thepolicy process often does not start with defining theproblem and setting out clear objectives, which meansthere are no indicators to monitor and benchmarks toevaluate against’.39

Given these kinds of problems it is hardly surprising thatInterim Evaluation reports, at the implementation stage,sometimes find that objective indicators, by which thesuccess of component projects of programmes are to beassessed, are impossible to measure, or that relevantstatistics are simply not provided or available. Having saidthis, much of the evaluation process is a matter of tickingboxes such as whether the allocated money was spent onthe agreed activities within the allotted timeframe orwhether the planned number of Roma went on thetraining courses indicated, etc. Taking the last case as anexample, an attempt would be made to assess whethercompleting a training course would increase theirlikelihood of being employed but real outcomes – i.e.whether trainees actually found jobs as a result of thetraining – would typically remain unknown.

Participatory evaluation

Participatory evaluation, as defined in this MRG report, isan attempt to remedy some of the deficiencies of the Phareevaluation by directly involving Roma at two levels inassessing the outcomes of projects aimed at improving theirsituation. First, MRG evaluators worked with Romapartner NGOs at the local level to agree a way ofdiscovering whether such projects were successful in thelonger term. However, as well as cooperating with RomaNGOs, any meaningful participatory evaluation mustinvolve dialogue with the beneficiaries to seek their views.40

Combined in-depth interviews, focus groups and surveymethods were originally proposed but in view of thelimited resources our partners thought Roma would prefer

the former, rather than questionnaires from which theyoften felt they derived little.41 Therefore, the investigationadopted a qualitative approach42 so noticeably absent fromboth Phare methodology and recent large-scale surveys ofRoma populations. In the same spirit, it was agreed thatopinions should be recorded and transcribed rather than‘interpreted’ in researchers’ notes. This grassroots approachalso differs from asking the views of Roma representativeson national councils.

Nevertheless, a full research approach would combinequalitative with quantitative methods, providing a morereliable basis. The focus would also look ‘upwards’ at theprocess of programme design and coordination to avoid themistaken impression that NGOs, with their inherentstructural limitations,43 are largely accountable foroutcomes, whereas higher bodies bear the mainresponsibility.

This was the methodological basis for this pilot exercisein participatory evaluation and in each country a Phareproject was jointly selected and interview questions agreed.Target groups were informed of the purpose of the researchand volunteers recruited. These were told once more aboutthe project, assured of anonymity and confidentiality, andafter the interview offered payment for their time.44

Subsequently transcripts were jointly discussed andanalysed with partners and feedback on findings should begiven to participating communities.45

In all three case studies this focused, though limited,evaluation procedure revealed that the Phare projects wereincapable of addressing needs adequately. This was largelydue to a profound gap between programme aims,formulated at higher levels, and translation of these intorealistic, sustainable measures at the local level involvingmunicipalities and other key stakeholders.46 However thisprofound structural limitation was compounded by the factthat, to different degrees, the projects had design flaws thatundermined their effectiveness. While this method ofevaluation gave a very clear picture at ground level ofproject shortcomings and also their successes, difficultiesencountered exemplified the general problems alreadydiscussed and in some cases these had already beenidentified earlier in Phare evaluations, though to littleremedial effect.

In Hungary, the targeted villages fail to meet theeligibility criteria and rather than innovate, Phare wassimply used to implement existing plans. In Slovakia, oneexample shows a Phare project sustaining practices thatdirectly oppose its aims, while the other more promisingcase only partially meets people’s needs. In the CzechRepublic the difficulties and complexities of sustainedintervention are underestimated, and the essentialintegration with mainstream services is inadequate.


Partner and project selection

Finding suitable partners posed problems, since anyviable partner needed both capacity and expertise to carryout the joint research with a minimum of training. Timeconstraints ruled out a process of competitive selection, soadvice was sought from relevant NGOs and experts intarget countries. Roma NGOs with experience of researchand evaluation were approached, and agreed to participatein the exercise.47 Indicative of their standing is that threepartner NGOs are now recipients of EU structural funds.

Selecting projects to be evaluated was mainly thechoice of MRG’s Roma partner organizations. Howeversome initial criteria were suggested by MRG with the aimof reporting on a balanced range of projects. These werethat ideally projects should be: significant – addressing aserious area of concern for Roma communities; relevant –representing an issue of importance to Roma partnerNGOs; representative – reflecting a main focus of acountry’s Phare Roma projects; well-established – allowinglonger-term project impact to be assessed; manageable –enabling adequate pilot evaluation with limited resources;and diverse – permitting comparison of a varied spread ofprojects across countries

Long lists were prepared of all main Phare projectstargeted at Roma communities and implemented from2000 until the end of 2003 in the three countries underreview, and a shortlist of possible projects also suggested. Inaddition, a comparative table of Phare expenditure wassupplied to partners to aid discussion about what appearedto be each country’s priorities for the Roma. After jointconsultation two projects were selected from the shortlistsbut the third, in the Czech Republic, had not even featuredon the long list.

In all cases NGOs chose to evaluate projects with whichat least some team members had links and knew well,giving rise to initial worries over whether such closeinvolvement might lead to suspicions of partiality. Anysuch doubts were dispelled when evaluations were carriedout and assessed in a spirit of reflexive self-examination,fully acknowledging shortcomings and difficultiesencountered.

The eventual choice of projects related directly to mainareas of Roma concern: Hungary – Infrastructure andcommunity development; Slovakia – Pre-school provision;and Czech Republic – Housing.

Country projects

Hungary

MRG partner: European Union Association for Roma

Youth (EURIFE)

The programme: Roma Social Integration (Phare 2000)

Hungary’s Phare 2000 programme, Roma SocialIntegration Programme (HU-0002-01) was selected forevaluation together with our Roma partner EURIFE(Európai Unió Roma Ifjúságáért Egyesület). This was anambitious initiative aiming to strengthen social cohesion,and improve communication and cooperation betweenRoma and non-Roma. The programme was consideredexperimental, with good practice to be shared and scaledup, and was intended to serve as a model for the intensivecooperation between Roma and non-Roma, serviceproviders, state institutions and the non-profit sector.Preparatory work started as early as 1998 but the ECDelegation only agreed the final programme in December2001. The expiry date for the programme was September2003.

The programme was divided into three parts: welfareinnovation, anti-discrimination capacity building andtraining, and an information service. The welfareinnovation element combined investment in infrastructureand community development in four disadvantaged micro-regions. The anti-discrimination initiative providedequipment to legal advice offices, and included training forstaff in anti-discrimination law and conflict managementskills. The information service element supported thedevelopment of a central information database to providecomprehensive and up-to-date information useful to Romapeople and those working with them, particularly Romaminority self-governments and NGOs. The website(www.romaweb.hu) was launched in May 2003.

The total budget for the programme was €3.35 million,of which 75 per cent came from the Phare programme(€2.5 million) with the remainder contributed by theHungarian government. The welfare innovationcomponent of the project accounted for over 60 per cent ofthe total budget, with the remainder shared between theanti-discrimination and information service elements.48

The project: welfare innovation

This evaluation examines the welfare innovation project inone of the three micro-regions, selected on size of Romapopulation, scale of slum-like settlements and whethervillages were disadvantaged even by the standards of theirdeprived region. A further criterion was meant to be theexistence of inter-ethnic tensions to be reduced.

In this bleak context the project aims were to improveprospects for village residents by upgrading basicinfrastructure and launching community developmentinitiatives. Apart from employing local people on


constructing new infrastructure and refurbishments tobuildings, Roma homes in the settlement were to berenovated and repaired. In addition, job training was to beoffered to unemployed Roma. In theory, the projects to beundertaken were to be decided following publicconsultation.


The selected micro-region is located within Hungary’seastern region and consists of three adjacent villages lyingon the eastern bank of the Tisza river in south-eastHungary. The villages are characterized by small,impoverished councils, with fewer than 10 per cent ofRoma inhabitants in work. While each village has a distinctRoma settlement, Roma also live among non-Roma.Overall, Roma form half of the population but locally theirproportion varies from 28 to 67 per cent.

Interviews and focus groups were conducted in each ofthe three villages by the MRG partner, Andras Teleki ofEURIFE, assisted by Erika Lencses, former head of PhareOffice of the Secretariat for Roma Affairs. Interviews wereconducted with one mayor, two village council clerks andtwo officers of the Gypsy Minority Self-Government(GMS-G),49 representing views from all three villages.Partners also sought the cooperation of local Romarepresentatives to identify and invite participants to a focusgroup in each village. These included people who haddirectly participated in the project, as well as beneficiaries.Altogether 24 took part, half of whom were women, andhalf the participants were parents of at least one child ofschool age. All interviews and focus groups were carried outin November 2005.

Evaluation findings

Phare and other evaluations

Interim evaluations were carried out in 2002 and 2003.While the latter report rated the whole programme as‘satisfactory’,50 serious problems were identified at an earlystage. It was noted that ‘although the main ImmediateObjective was to reduce conflict, relations at two of thefour micro-regions are harmonious’ and therefore thesefailed to meet a key selection criterion.51 Design changes,poor management and subsequent delays were cited. Thesehindered the original intention of allowing local people tocooperate in joint implementation, with the infrastructureinvestment being separate from community development.52

Further, claims about the innovative character of theproject were challenged,53 as was its sustainability, since ‘noprovision is made for the institutionalisation of successfulpilots’.54 Also the hope of finding jobs for Roma, with‘Roma employment indicators improving at the same ratesor faster than national averages’, was seen as unrealistic,given the prevailing high unemployment and lack ofplausible ideas.


On the positive side, the project did result in newinfrastructure, mainly in the form of improvements to theapproach roads, and renovation of public buildings,including nurseries. In addition, some Roma were givenshort-term employment, either in the form of public workschemes or paid to carry out improvements to their homes.However, these benefits were limited by the shortcomingsof the scheme and events bore out the earlier scepticism ofPhare evaluators.

Project planning and consultationThe planned consultation with the supposed beneficiaries –Roma residents, particularly those living in slumsettlements – was very limited. In part, this can beexplained by the relatively short period available forplanning. However, it also demonstrates that despite thesmall size of these communities, and the fact that each hasits own local GMS-G, there is no culture of widerconsultation with, support for, or capacity of, Romapopulations to become involved in decision-making.Consequently, the infrastructure investments (whichaccounted for three-quarters of the total budget) werebased on existing local government development strategies,rather than specifically addressing the needs and wishes ofthe most disadvantaged Roma residents.

Infrastructure developmentThe infrastructure improvements proved very limited inscope and offered little direct benefit to the mostdisadvantaged Roma. In two villages none of the roadsasphalted led to the Roma settlements and many dirt roadsremained. Despite requests that local people be givenconstruction work, only one subcontractor employed threeor four local Roma men for a day or two.55 While somepublic buildings were refurbished, one proved tooexpensive to run and two were subsequently converted forother purposes. Nursery enlargements were insufficient tomeet local needs in one case, while in the other, furtherexpenditure was needed; although focus group participantswere very pleased with the improvements.

The infrastructure improvements were appreciated asbeneficial to the villages, especially the road building andnursery enlargements. However, the later conversion ofrenovated buildings illustrated not only of a lack ofplanning, but also that the project was unable to addressthe profound economic problems in the most deprivedcommunities. In effect, Phare contributed primarily tohelping the local authorities make progress on their pre-existing development plans. It also showed howinfrastructure investment can create additional municipalcosts, which can ultimately lead to investment beingwasted.


Community developmentWhereas the infrastructure works were carried out by acontractor and administered centrally, communitydevelopment initiatives had to be channelled through localNGOs. The Phare programme also required these NGOsto make a small financial contribution (20 per cent) to thecost of the initiatives. Since the NGOs had little money, ineach village the municipality paid this contribution, thusreducing the finances available for local services ordevelopment.

In all, 30 long-term unemployed Roma were employedfor a year to carry out work on public buildings, to tidy upthe villages, and to repair and improve homes of Roma inone settlement. Many of those involved came from thesettlement and residents were also encouraged to take theopportunity to refurbish their own homes.

Those who had been involved in these activitiesevaluated them very positively, both for providing workand an income, as well as for their pleasure in being able toimprove the village, and especially people’s homes.However, there was widespread regret that the scheme hadended while no participants had been able to use theexperience to move into regular work. One mayor notedthat within a short period of time, 80 per cent of thehomes in the settlement on which work had been done haddeteriorated to their original poor condition due to the lackof money and motivation of the residents.

In addition to the limited effectiveness of theprogramme, such subsidised employment is not innovative,but is, in effect, another form of (and source of fundingfor) public work programmes, which are the main activeemployment tool used throughout Hungary for the long-term unemployed. Public work schemes generally employpeople for a few months on improvements to publicbuildings and parks, etc. and pay the minimum wage, as inthis and other Phare programmes. They do not usuallyprovide sufficient skills or experience to enable participantsto find work in the labour market. A more positive stepwas training for the unemployed where Roma and non-Roma took part in a basic computer skills course, precededby employment skills training. This was conducted in onevillage by the local labour office. Both trainers andparticipants rated the experience very positively, althoughonly one man said it had helped him into work.Nevertheless, the initiative led to an ongoing relationshipwith the local labour office.

Although social cohesion was the focus of theprogramme, in none of the villages were there anysignificant pre-existing tensions between Roma and non-Roma, confirming the earlier view of the Phare evaluators.In each village comments from interviews and focus groupsshowed the programme had made no difference to inter-ethnic relations, and in one there was little awareness thatthe programme had anything to do with Roma.

Overall, the programme demonstrated that an injectionof resources is welcome and can achieve a certain amount.

However, the lack of consultation and effective planning,the small scale of investment, and the lack of sustainabilitymeant the project did not make any significant or long-lasting improvement in conditions in the micro-region,particularly for the most disadvantaged Roma residents. Inthe words of one GMS-G President:

‘You can organize cultural programmes, a bit of singing,a bit of dancing, but democracy is not about that. If wecarry on like this the Gypsy question will never be solved.’

Slovakia

MRG partners: Wide Open School Foundation

(WOSF) and Project Schola (PS)

The programme: Improvement of the Situation of the

Roma in the Slovak Republic (Phare 2000)

Slovakia’s 2000 Phare programme Improvement of theSituation of the Roma in the Slovak Republic (SK0002)was largely an attempt to develop the 1998 pilot initiativeImproving the Situation of Roma in the Spišská Nová VesRegion (SR9813.04), which ‘mostly focused on educationand community development’, by broadening its activitiesand application within Slovakia. Like its predecessor, thisprogramme adopted an integrated approach, addressing arange of interrelated areas that included inter-ethnicrelations, community development, social work, vocationaltraining and counselling, as well as various educationalaspects. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister forHuman Rights, Minorities and Human Rights wasresponsible for the overall coordination andimplementation. The cost of the programme was €4.1million of which the Phare funding amounted to €3.8million and national co-financing €0.3 million. The focuson education highlighted the short- and medium-termpriorities of the 1999 AP, which cited ‘increased access toeducation’. To assist the programme, including the transferof good practice, a twinning covenant was concluded withFrance.

The project: Pre-school education initiative

MRG’s Slovak partners were two educational NGOs withextensive experience of Roma initiatives, the Wide OpenSchool Foundation (WOSF) (Nadácia Škola dokorán) andProject Schola (PS) (Projekt Schola). Together it wasdecided to evaluate a crucial part of the programme’seducation plan (sub-programme 3), implemented incooperation with the Ministry of Education (MoE). Thisaimed:

‘to reinforce a comprehensive pre-school education systemfor Roma children including a child-centred approachand mothers’ involvement into the education processsupported by trained Roma assistants’.


The scheme was put into practice in 50 kindergartens inthree regions, targeted at children between the ages of 3–6years.56 The staff were backed up by EU and local experts ata cost of €230,000, while equipment costs amounted to€200,000. Also a Roma mother was appointed ‘formediation between the kindergarten and the community’.Other mothers were encouraged to help in class or after-school activities, to join discussion groups on family andhealth issues, including drug abuse, and to attend sewingclasses.

The activity continued from October 2002 untilNovember 2003 but similar provision was made in asubsequent 2001 Phare programme Support to the RomaMinority in the Educational Field (SR0103.01), where 50kindergartens were refurbished in various locationsthroughout Slovakia.


Two kindergartens were chosen for comparison in similarsize villages (approaching 2,500) near Košice and Prešov,the largest towns in eastern Slovakia. While onekindergarten was small with only one teacher apart fromthe headteacher for 20 children; the other was three timesthe size with a headteacher and four teachers for 60children. In both, slightly less than half of their childrenwere Roma and both had one Roma assistant teacher at thetime of the project. The smaller kindergarten had twoclasses, both integrated, while the larger had two non-Roma classes plus one with only Roma children.

According to the 2001 census Roma form over 60 percent of the inhabitants of the village with the smaller,integrated kindergarten. In 2003 sociographic mapping57

recorded the Roma population as being 80 per cent ofinhabitants, with almost 20 per cent of Roma living withinthe village and the remainder in a settlement on theperimeter. Corresponding figures for the other village are23 per cent and 40 per cent, with only 5 percent of Romawithin the village.

It was agreed to use a mixture of interviews and focusgroups to gather information on the experience of theproject in each kindergarten from Roma mothers, a Romateaching assistant, teacher and headteacher (all female).MRG partners agreed the main questions, focusing on theimpact of the main activities two years after the project hadended. Since the project specifically targeted mothers it wasdecided that this pilot evaluation would focus on them,although a fuller investigation would also seek the views ofRoma fathers and of non-Roma parents. During February2006, some 24 Roma mothers gave their opinions on theirexperience.

Evaluation findings


The main method of monitoring appeared to be crudecomparisons of overall statistics rather than more precise

tracking of performance.58 The MoE was responsible forproducing these statistics but a December 2003 Phareevaluation noted that:

‘indicators of achievement (IAs) have proved verydifficult to measure since keeping statistics on Romapupils seems to be difficult due to compliance with the[currently] valid anti-discriminatory legislation inSlovakia’.59 Similarly the final twinning reportcomplained of ‘the absence of reliable data on thesituation of Roma children’.60

Interim evaluations of the whole programme, togetherwith other programmes in the relevant sector, were carriedout on four separate occasions from 2001 to 2003. Themain concerns were delays associated with the lack ofcapacity in the main coordinating body and the poorfunctioning of the twinning arrangement. As regards theeducation component, from the first report onwards,strong recommendations were made for ‘the educationalintegration of the Roma minority’ and for ‘freekindergarten places in all locations with Roma children’,with an adequate support system including properly trainedand pedagogically recognized ‘Roma assistant teachers’.61

Nevertheless, the programme as a whole was judged to be‘satisfactory’ in 2003.62


The choice of the two kindergartens proved fruitful as verydifferent pictures emerged of how the project had operatedand of parental satisfaction.

Integration and segregationIn the smaller kindergarten Roma children were recruitedat the start of the Phare project,63 when it was decided thattwo classes should be completely integrated. Both teachingstaff and Roma parents saw this as essential. Initially therehad been some resistance from non-Roma parents but thiswas not repeated the following year and Roma parentsreported good relations with non-Roma. Roma parentswere overwhelmingly positive about the project,participating eagerly in activities and feeling welcome inclassrooms, and their children reciprocated this feeling. A2002 UNDP report stated: ‘Roma children attendingintegrated preschools have incomparably higher chances tocontinue their educations than those attending segregatedinstitutions. Preschools should be where integrationbegins.’64 In contrast, the larger kindergarten placed allRoma children in a Roma-only class, the headteacherjustifying this on the grounds that Roma came when theywere aged five and were therefore less acclimatized to theregime than ‘white’ children, who often started from three.While the teacher felt that Roma children were notisolated, their parents complained bitterly how ‘everythingis divided’ and especially how the Roma-only class hadbeen suddenly introduced. As children they had attended


integrated kindergartens, so they felt that conditions haddeteriorated despite Phare. Relations with non-Romaparents were poor and their children’s progress in primaryschool was patchy, with some unwilling to attend school.Some parents reluctantly suggested that all-Roma classesmight avoid bullying and primary teachers’ favouring non-Roma children. This is very different from the otherparents’ account, where all children ‘had got used to eachother’ and formed friendships in kindergarten.

Nevertheless, all Roma children had progressed to thefirst grade of primary school from both kindergartens andnone were sent to special schools for those with learningdisabilities. A child-centred approach is still used in bothlocations and parents continue to use the parents’ roomand kindergarten facilities.

Roma assistant teachersIn the view of both kindergartens, apart from being ageneral helper, the assistant teacher’s main function was toassist Roma children unable to speak Slovak. Indeed, all theRoma parents insisted on the need for their children tolearn Slovak. Good results were reported on theintroduction of Roma assistants, not only in relation to ‘theremoval of the initial language barrier … [but also] to theacceleration of learning success, and … [an] improved …social climate’.65 Both teachers praised the work of Romaassistant teachers but their situation was fraught withambiguities. The assistant teachers spoke of their warmreception by staff in the kindergarten but neither wasworking when interviewed. They saw little prospect offuture employment as assistant teachers, due to thefinancial constraints of the municipalities.66 Despite thecurrent national policy, the smaller kindergarten still doesnot employ an assistant teacher, although the larger onedoes.

One argument offered to justify Roma assistants hadbeen that they could serve as role models for children andparents. While these assistant teachers had enjoyed theirwork, they – like the Roma parents – saw this as low-level,teaching children basic skills like holding pencils andscissors correctly. As such, they appeared to have little self-confidence. These issues have been recognized in Slovakiaand other CEE countries and steps have been taken toimprove assistants’ qualifications and position.67

Kindergarten provisionA major theme to emerge was the limited effectiveness andimpact even of successful practice. In both kindergartens,Roma children were almost all admitted at five for a singleyear, despite many parents wanting their children to start atthree and teachers saying this produced much better results.A rationing system for the restricted places available wasbased largely on whether mothers worked, rather than onchildren’s needs and consequently favoured non-Roma. Assuch it was discriminatory against children with greaterneeds. While both the Phare project specified Roma

children from ‘the age of 3 to 6’,68 the practice here was fora single year.

Also troubling was the number of children unable toattend kindergarten. In 2003 Roma children were just over40 per cent of the kindergarten total, although in the sameyear Roma formed 80 per cent of the village population,and given the demographic imbalance an even largerproportion of village children.69

During the Communist period attendance atkindergarten had been mandatory for all children in theirlast year before primary school. With the regime changemany nurseries closed, especially in poorer areas wheremost Roma lived, including one in the village with thesmaller kindergarten. A 2001 report quantified this changein stark terms, calculating that:

‘between 1988 and 1995 … the total number of Roma… in kindergartens [in Slovakia] dropped from166,852 to just 1,181 … [and] in 1999, just 1,120Roma children were attending kindergarten’.70

Educational research from the UK and elsewhere hasshown that while all children benefit from pre-schooleducation, those from deprived backgrounds gain the most,and correspondingly suffer more from its absence.71 Despitethe advice in Phare evaluations72 and the final twinningreport73 that pre-school education should be mandatory inSlovakia, as it is in Hungary, this has yet to be realised.74

Nevertheless, all parents receiving social support havealmost all of their kindergarten costs provided includinglunches.75

As well as wanting pre-school education for theirchildren,76 Roma interviewees wanted this to be integrated.However, there was no mention in the fiches of either ofthe projects evaluated or in its successor in the followingyear (SR0103.01) of ‘integrated education’ as a goal.77 Animportant point is that, following the AP priorities, thisproject did not require this but instead aimed at ‘increasingthe access to education which is the basic condition foremployment, creating in this way better conditions for theintegration of this national minority.’78 This evaluationshows that in some cases Phare funding was evidentlysupporting segregated education and this undermined theeventual goal of integration.79 In July 2002 decentralizationtransferred responsibility for educational establishments tomunicipalities where competing demands for resourcespose ‘a real risk of … a two-track educational system: onefor the majority population and one for the Roma’.80


Czech Republic

MRG partner: IQ Roma Servis (IQRS)

The programme: Improvement of long-term

opportunities for Roma (Phare 2003–4)

The Brno-based Roma NGO IQ Roma Servis, togetherwith MRG, chose to examine a component project of theCzech Republic’s Phare 2003–4 programme, Improvementof long-term opportunities for Roma (CZ2003/004–338.01.01). This was a Civil SocietyDevelopment Foundation (CSDF) grant scheme invitingsmall-scale projects in the fields of employment, educationand housing. The scheme was targeted at experienced civilassociations with an established network of fieldworkers,with the idea that in the future they could manage largergrants from EU Structural Funds. This was thought to besufficient assurance of sustainability. In fact the expectationabout Structural Funds was not fulfilled for mostparticipants. IQRS was an exception in later applyingsuccessfully for an EQUAL scheme to promote equalopportunities in accessing the labour market. The overallbudget anticipated around 22 projects of between €30,000to €50,000 each.81 For housing, the ‘desired results’ were‘improved local public spaces by community initiatives andattractive “safe places” created within Romaneighbourhoods to de-stigmatise/de-ghettoise Romahousing’.

The project: Reviving Community Life

The Reviving Community Life project ran from 1 February2004 to 31 January 2005 as part of the above-mentionedPhare 2003-4 programme. It was inspired by the integratedstrategy for social inclusion and justice adopted by theLondon Borough of Greenwich, which had particularlyimpressed an IQRS community development worker on astudy trip to England. The main municipality concernedhad already commissioned a local social policy departmentto adapt the Greenwich model, resulting in a Strategy forSocial Inclusion of Roma.82 However IQRS stressed that forproject sustainability ‘this partnership [with municipalities]needs to be mutually encouraged and developed further inthe future’.83 As a pilot scheme the IQRS project aimed toimprove relations between the mainly Roma residents offive inner-city, tenement blocks, through regular tenants’meetings which would hopefully lead to a system of self-governance. This would provide a basis for formulatingtenants’ demands and for better links with publicinstitutions, including the police. A main activity in all thebuildings concerned was to involve tenants in clearing awayhuge amounts of rubbish in communal yards and then tomaintain this situation. Another aim was to achieveessential repairs to some of the buildings through theassistance of the municipality. Also seen as crucial was theinvolvement of property management companies in lesserrepairs, resolving problems of rent arrears and preventing

new debts from arising. IQRS social fieldworkers were tointervene to alleviate these and other problems ofindividual families, and act as advocates on their behalf.84

IQRS workers did succeed in organizing initial rubbishclearance from yards, while the main municipality madesubstantial renovations to two adjacent houses. Regulartenants’ meetings were held, sometimes attended bymunicipal officials. In addition, ‘the post of caretaker wasestablished in two of the buildings and was being discussedin the remaining three’.85 Also tenants appreciated the workof the IQRS fieldworkers, who were credited withmediating successfully on behalf of individual families.


For the evaluation the views of all the main stakeholderswere sought by IQRS fieldworkers, through a mixture ofinterviews and focus groups a year after the project hadended. Interviewees were mainly tenants as thoseprincipally involved, but also social fieldworkers, whocarried out the project, as well as a municipal official and arepresentative of an estate management company. Opinionswere expressed by 23 tenants, mostly women, andincluding a few non-Roma, from all five houses duringNovember and December 2005.

Evaluation findings


Although a final report was produced for this project, nointerim or other Phare evaluation is available. However inreports on multiple grant schemes only a limited selectionof projects is discussed and in this case the completeabsence of an indicator by which to measure the project’ssuccess would have made evaluation difficult to say theleast.86


Despite the undeniable, positive achievements resultingfrom the project, such as the successful initial rubbishclearance from yards and substantial renovations to twoadjacent houses, the overall results were disappointing.

Reviewing the impact of the project as a whole, therewas little evidence that the hope of communityempowerment by establishing a system of self-governancein the houses was likely to be realised. From the vantagepoint of a year later, the planning appears weak and over-optimistic, both in underestimating the difficulties ofreaching and influencing all tenants, and then transformingthem into a viable community. The most recalcitrantresidents did not attend tenants’ meetings and so wereinfluenced neither by IQRS, nor by their neighbours.87 Therefuse in most yards was mounting again, attempts toappoint and retain caretakers had failed and, moresignificantly, all tenant and fieldworker interviewees sharedthe view that relations between neighbours had notimproved or changed in any significant way. Further, the


anticipated cooperation with municipalities and propertymanagement companies was not working satisfactorily.

While some IQRS fieldworkers felt ill-prepared andoverwhelmed by the intractable problems theyencountered, the evaluator felt that the NGO waspowerless to offer sufficient incentive to tenants in terms ofbenefits such as employment and training, and thereforethat a more integrated and long-term scheme was required.Here, sustainability had also been underestimated but thisstemmed from the short-term nature of such Phareprojects, particularly of the type supported by the CSDF inthe Czech Republic.88 The project had a one-year timespanbut the expectation in the fiche was that communityworkers would be available ‘after the project life’, possiblyfor an unlimited period, even though no funding for suchdemanding work was guaranteed.

The other problem was the NGO’s inability to exerteffective pressure on public institutions on behalf of itsclients. The officials misunderstood the role of IQRS. Theofficials were not proactive. They reportedly excused theirinaction by claiming a lack of resources, or stating that itwas ‘pointless’ to carry out expensive repairs, claiming thesewould be vandalised again. Even in the case of the majorrepairs undertaken, these were only partial and both IQRSand tenants suspected the ulterior motive was to improvethe exterior appearance of buildings in the vicinity ofBrno’s massive new shopping mall.

In itself, the project attempted to address serious,structural problems with extremely limited resources.Without adequate support from municipalities andinstitutional agencies, the odds against a positive outcomewere overwhelming, yet the omens were not promising.The social inclusion strategy report had sharply criticizedall three previous policy documents of the mainmunicipality as ‘declaratory in nature … [which] did notlead to fulfilment [of the policies] in practice’.89 The reportalso stated that while NGOs had better contacts withRoma, only the administration and official agencies had thepower and means to solve the problems, and concludedthat ‘the main reason for the lack of communication andco-operation [between them] at this level is …unwillingness and mistrust on the part of stateinstitutions’.90 In such situations, Phare is unable to compelpublic institutions to take effective action and projects areforced to rely on their good will. Indeed the entire networkfor coordinating and implementing Roma policynationwide effectively disintegrated in December 2002 as aconsequence of decentralization.91

While the main Brno municipality has a goodreputation for its pro-Roma stance, particularly as regardshousing, the Czech Republic as a whole does not.92 Aleading Czech sociologist recently gave a warning fromongoing research that many Roma localities are potentiallythreatened with social exclusion, and criticized ‘a certaintendency of city halls to pressure [Roma] … into doingsomething with themselves or leaving’.93 This echoed the

2004 report by the Government Council for RomaCommunity Affairs which, drawing on municipal sourcesof authorized information, indicated that of 80,059 Romafor whom data was available, nearly a quarter (23 per cent)lived in ‘socially excluded communities (ghettos)’.94 Thereport concluded: ‘Social exclusion and material povertyand the consequent degradation of human dignity are themost severe problems for the majority of Roma . In thiscontext the IQRS project was a tiny initiative and whileother housing projects were undertaken elsewhere, eventaken together these were hardly likely to reverse suchnegative trends. Here it is relevant that ‘housing isconsiderably less developed as an area of European Unionpolicy than other fields of relevance to social exclusion’.95

Conclusion

All three projects undoubtedly brought certain benefits tothe communities involved and participation in activitieswas viewed positively by most Roma interviewees.However, project weaknesses were largely attributable tothose of the Phare Roma programme as a whole, namely:limited institutional commitment, a restricted approach tomulti-faceted structural problems, short-term duration ofprojects, and hurried planning undermining effectiveness.In principle, the EU’s Roma Phare programme was awelcome offer of assistance, however, evidence to dateindicates that none of the serious problems afflicting mostRoma communities are nearing a solution.

The lessons to be learned from this exercise inparticipatory evaluation are twofold. One clear message isthat direct involvement of intended beneficiaries atgrassroots level in every stage of future initiatives –planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating –would offer better hopes of such projects delivering moremeaningful and sustainable outcomes. The other is thatwithout committed and active participation of mainstreaminstitutions, extending to governmental level, little is likelyto be achieved.

Lessons learnt

� The projects all sought to address genuine needs ofimpoverished and excluded Roma, including improvingrelationships between Roma and public authorities andnon-Roma neighbours. However, none of the projectswas able to tackle or meet these needs effectively.

� The fundamental problem was that this size of project,in terms of budget, time and expertise, was too limitedfor the scale of the problems being addressed by them.

� The level of funding was too low, or too widely spread,to be effective.


� Projects were not funded for a long enough period totake root, or to find alternative sources of financing bywhich the initiatives could be sustained.

� Insufficient time and resources were available to ensurethe quality of planning required for a full considerationof the multiple factors which needed to be taken intoaccount if projects were to be implemented successfully.

� Inadequate preparation reflected the failure of the Phareprogramme to allow for the limited capacity of localauthorities and Roma communities; and to permit therelationship between the two to develop, in order toplan and implement effective projects of benefit toRoma.

� Better monitoring and evaluation, including greateraccess to information and more involvement of Roma,including beneficiaries, would still have been frustratedby poor initial planning.

� The ultimate responsibility for these limitations lies withthe Phare programme, which was not was not wellconstructed to address the kinds of problems which theprojects sought to tackle. In particular, there was a lackof expertise and commitment at the highest level toevaluate proposals properly to ensure the effectiveallocation of resources.

� The Phare programme contained a fundamentalstructural problem of a lack of accountability at everylevel, including local communities, local and nationalauthorities, and also the EU. Lack of accountabilityseverely reduced the incentive of decision-makers toensure money was allocated and used efficiently andeffectively.

Recommendations

For the foreseeable future, EU funding will have a crucialrole in supporting initiatives addressing the deprivation andexclusion of Roma minorities in CEE. However, theprimary responsibility for inclusion and respect for therights of Roma citizens lies with national governments, andlocal authorities have a key role to play in ensuring thattargeted funding is used effectively. In addition, NGOs canmake an important contribution to supporting Romapeople and encouraging greater accountability at everylevel.

At the European level:

� The European Commission should ensure that Romacommunities receive an appropriate share of EU fundsfor social inclusion, economic development andinfrastructure improvements

� Higher standards and greater expertise is required toassess proposals from national governments for the useof EU funds to ensure they will lead to genuineimprovement in the lives of Roma communities

� European politicians should more effectively seek tohold the European Commission to account over the useof EU funds targeted at Roma minorities

� International NGOs need to increase awareness amongEU politicians and administrators of the needs of Romaminorities, and demonstrate how addressing the needs ofRoma should have a high priority if EU funding is toachieve its policy goals

� International NGOs need to raise awareness of thelimitations of previous EU funding in respect of Romaand lobby for far greater quality in planning, monitoringand evaluation, along with greater access to informationand clear lines of accountability

At the national level:

� Governments should maximize opportunities to use EUfunds to support Roma projects in NationalDevelopment Plans, which should be coordinated withnational Roma policy frameworks

� Governments should provide sufficient information,resources and support to Roma NGOs, representativesand communities to enable them to participate fully inthe development, implementation and monitoring ofRoma-oriented initiatives

� Governments should improve the standards by whichproposals for Roma projects are evaluated to ensure theyare practicable and can be objectively measurable, andthey should demonstrate the meaningful involvement oflocal Roma representatives and communities

� Governments should ensure that local authorities,agencies and communities have the capacity toeffectively use EU funds to improve the livingconditions and opportunities of Roma people

� NGOs and media organizations should work together toensure greater accountability of national politicians andadministrators so that EU funding allocated forimproving the lives and opportunities of Roma people istargeted appropriately and used efficiently

At the local level:

� Local authorities should use EU funds to bring newresources to their communities that will directly improve


the lives of Roma and should fully utilize financial andtechnical support provided by central government

� Local authorities should use the opportunity providedby EU funding to develop constructive relationshipswith local Roma representatives and communities

� EU-funded Roma-oriented projects should becoordinated with, but not subordinated to, localdevelopment plans

� There should be greater public awareness of EU-fundedRoma projects in order to demonstrate the contributionRoma can make to the wider community

� NGOs can also encourage capacity building in Romacommunities by facilitating training, workshops andother opportunities by which Roma people can acquireskills and experience to build a stronger collective voice

� NGOs should work with Roma communities tomonitor the implementation of projects and to evaluateoutcomes and to demand greater accountability ofnational and local agencies and officials

Notes

1 In this report the term ‘Roma’ is used to refer to the very diverse

communities generally perceived by others as ‘Gypsies’ and

including those identifying themselves as Roma, Gypsies or by

other names. The term ‘Roma’ is used as a singular and collective

noun as well as an adjective in accordance with current

widespread usage, although some prefer ‘Romani’ as an adjective.

2 See Liégeois and Gheorghe 1995, p. 7. Census figures for Roma

populations are widely accepted to be severe undercounts as

many Roma do not choose to identify themselves as Roma to

census takers for a variety of reasons (Marushiaková and Popov

2001, pp. 34–5). Instead a range of different estimates are

preferred for social policy purposes. In Slovakia, a count of Roma,

known as sociographic mapping and carried out in 2003 on behalf

of the Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities (Slovak Government

2005), reported a total of around 320,000 Roma or 6.9 per cent of

the total population (Slovak Statistical Office 2003), as opposed to

the 2001 Census figure of 89,920 (1.7 per cent) (Census 2001). In

Hungary, a national Roma survey carried out by the sociologist

Istvan Kemény, most recently in 2003, estimated the Roma

population at between 550,000 and 650,000 or 5.4–6.4 per cent of

the population (Kemény et al. 2004) in comparison with the 2001

census figure of 190,046 (1.9 per cent) (Census 2001). In contrast,

the Czech government has not sanctioned any similar survey on

data protection grounds but in 1999 it accepted an estimate of the

Roma population at around 200,000 or 2 per cent of the population

(Czech government 1999, p. 33, endnote 9) as opposed to the

2001 census figure of 11,716 (0.1 per cent) (Census 2001). A

sociographic mapping approach, as in Slovakia, is now being

considered (Swanson 2005).

3 Ringold 2000, World Bank et al. 2002, UNDP 2003 and 2005,

Ringold et al. 2003.

4 Ringold et al. 2003, p. 1. Throughout the CEE region Roma

employment had increased significantly and in both

Czechoslovakia and Hungary the rate for men reached that for the

general labour force (Guy 2001, p. 293, Kovats 2001, p. 338). A

1967 study of social stratification in Czechoslovakia showed the

average monthly income of employed Roma to be higher than that

of Slovaks (Machonin a kol. 1969, p. 537, Table 16.7).

5 The Communist period generally had overtly assimilationist

policies, accompanied by certain abuses of human rights; these

included sterilization of Roma women in Czechoslovakia (Helsinki

Watch 1992), the placement of Roma children in special schools

for ‘people with learning disabilities’ (ERRC 1999) and the refusal

by Czech local authorities to register Roma as residents (Guy

1975). Such abuses did not necessarily cease with regime change.

6 These included national policy documents such as longer-term

plans for Roma populations, which were adopted at various times

and are considered in individual country reports.

7 European Commission 1999a, p. 3).

8 Europa 2006.

9 Article 4 of the FCNM affirms commitment to equalizing action in

paragraph 2, while paragraph 3 declares that any such action is

not itself discriminatory.

10 Existing member states were required to implement this Directive

by 19 July 2003, while candidate countries had until the date of EU

accession (European Commission 2002, p. 7).

11 European Commission 2002, pp. 5–7.

12 European Commission 1999b.

13 Europa 2006.

14 Ibid.

15 Bailey and De Propris 2002.

16 Allocated in 1999–2002 and implemented until November 2003.

17 EMS 2004a, p. 1.

18 European Commission 2002, pp. 7–8.

19 European Commission 1999a, p. 6.

20 EMS 2004b, p. II.

21 See Trehan (2001) for discussion of the difficult environment for

Roma and pro-Roma NGOs, and Šiklová (1999) for an account of

the chaotic situation in the Czech Republic in 1997.

22 Formerly NCEDI.

23 European Commission 2002, p. 8.

24 Guglielmo 2002

25 EMS 2004b, p. 9.

26 EMS 2004b, pp. II, III.

27 EMS 2004b, p. 9.

28 Ibid.

29 EMS 2004b, p. II.

30 Ibid, pp. 6, 17.

31 EMS 2004b, pp. 12, 13.

32 Ibid, p. 4, footnote table 1.

33 Since its establishment in 1993 the CSDF (NROS) has

administered a continuing, EU-funded grant scheme, the Civil

Society Development Programme. Between 1993 and 2002 almost

2,700 projects were supported in the Czech Republic with grants

totalling more than CZK 700 million. These were claimed to be

‘above all of a long-term character’ within the three main priority

areas of developing civil society and the non-profit sector, human

rights and the integration of the Roma community and

programmes for children and young people (CSDF 2003).

34 EMS 2004b.

35 EMS 2004a, p. 1. The evaluation team normally consists of agency

workers resident in the country concerned who review all the

applicant’s Phare programmes when required by the EC, plus an

external expert as Short-term Technical Specialist (STTS) on

particular topic areas. One of the authors has been involved as

STTS in Interim Evaluations of Phare Roma programmes in the

Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria as well as in the

2004 comparative review across five CEE countries (EMS 2004b).

In the process he evaluated two of the three projects examined in

this MRG report.

36 Project fiches, describing the programmes, are presented on

Europa’s Phare website but not necessarily with subsequent

changes, while other documentation, such as Terms of Reference

(ToR), monitoring and quarterly reports relating to the Consultant

and Steering Committee minutes, is usually available from the

Programme Implementation Unit (PIU). Interim Evaluations are

confidential. While Phare Guidelines declare: ‘Evaluation reports

will be systematically published and made available to all

concerned’, this appears to refer only to broader ex-post

evaluations (European Commission 1999, p. 11).

37 EC Interim Evaluation Guide, annex 1, pt 3, pp 4, 5.

38 At least three, and probably more, Interim Evaluation reports have

urged governments to increase salaries as a solution to

understaffing but this would have implications for civil service pay

structures.

39 Kubánová 2005.

40 The NGO partner in the Czech Republic had already received

training in participatory evaluation and is now offering this to Roma

and non-Roma organizations.

41 This is by no means to assert that survey methods are

inappropriate for research among Roma, particularly when field

interviewers are trained Roma.

42 In practice, discussions in focus groups were found to be a more

acceptable and effective way of gathering opinions from Roma


participants than individual interviews.

43 These include detachment from mainstream institutions, financial

instability and personnel change.

44 Paying respondents used to be regarded as suspect for possibly

introducing bias by influencing answers but this practice is now

widespread and regarded as fully justifiable (Thompson 1996).

45 In two evaluations some anxiety was expressed about personal

views disclosed and so these locations have been made an

anonymous as possible, but in Hungary the villages involved are

easily identifiable and concealment was not required.

46 Prospects of effective intervention are extremely low without the

close involvement of local stakeholders as the main partners,

particularly municipalities with their devolved powers

47 The NGO partner in the Czech Republic had already received

training in participatory evaluation and is now offering this to Roma

and non-Roma organizations.

48 Miniszterelnöki Hivatal Roma 2004, pp. 9–10.

49 The 1993 Law on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities

established the basis for Minority Self-Governments. Each of the

country’s 13 recognized minority communities can elect its own

local Minority Self-Government in any of Hungary’s 3,200 local

government jurisdictions. At the last elections in 2002, 1,999 Gypsy

Self-Governments were set up. The word Gypsy (cigány) is used in

both the law and in the title of self-governments.

50 EMS 2003a, p. IV

51 EMS 2002, p. 19

52 EMS 2002, pp. II, III; EMS 2003, abstract.

53 EMS 2002, p. 11.

54 EMS 2002, p. III.

55 The infrastructure work was won by a non-local firm in a public

tender. The villages of the micro-region were not party to the

selection procedure and did not have a contract directly with the

firm.

56 The project drew not only on the experience of the Spiš pilot but

also that of various MoE and other NGO projects, including those

of WOSF, which had been cooperating with the MoE since 1995

and was particularly involved in pre-school education.

57 See earlier references and Plenipotentiary (2005).

58 While ‘sources of verification’ for this activity were the ‘project

report[,] statistical figures [and] education surveys’, the stated

indicators of achievement were an ‘increased number of Roma

children attending pre-school institutions (kindergartens) (by 15%

in 2003 compared to 2001)’ and a ‘decreased number of Roma

children attending elementary schools for handicapped [sic]

children (by 10% in 2003 compared to 2001)’ (Project fiche, p. 20).

59 EMS 2003b, §18.

60 Bavoux 2003, p. 46.

61 EMS 2001b, p. IV.

62 EMS 2003b, p. IV.

63 Prior to the project only two Roma children had attended the

kindergarten.

64 UNDP 2002, p. 6.

65 Rigová et al. 2002, p 431.

66 Although assistant teachers are seen as integral to the Slovak

National Action Plan for the Decade of Roma Inclusion, their

provision remains uncertain and a recent report is highly critical

that the largest Roma kindergarten in Slovakia has no assistant

teachers. ‘In an environment where there is such a strong language

barrier, where 100 percent of the children are Roma, there is no

excuse why there aren’t any assistants. This is unacceptable.’ (Roma

Press Agency, Košice, 28 March 2006).

67 Kocze and Tankersley 2004, pp. 316–8. The assistant teachers

interviewed had received training with certificates from accredited

institutions but since 2002 the position of assistant teachers has

been strengthened in Slovakia, as elsewhere, and bachelor-level

university training is available.

68 Project fiche, p. 10.

69 A survey in 2000 found that whereas 11.12 per cent of children

attending the first grade of primary school in Slovakia were Roma,

they formed only 5.35 per cent of those who had previously

attended kindergarten (Rigová et al. 2003, p. 418).

70 Save the Children 2001, p. 181.

71 Taggart 2003 .

72 EMS 2001a ,§6.2.2.

73 Bavoux 2003, p. 47.

74 Slovak ‘Ministry of Education officials … said there were no such

plans and believed there would be significant opposition to such

proposals’ (World Bank 2004, p. 31).

75 Kindergarten costs vary but here parents paid 50 crowns monthly

plus 20–25 crowns per lunch, the main expense. It is indicative of

the positive atmosphere in the smaller kindergarten that Roma and

non-Roma parents, whether or not they receive social support,

voluntarily contribute 150 crowns (c 4) monthly to cover costs of

toys and other materials.

76 While previous Slovak research has shown that demand is variable,

the conclusion was that ‘other factors … have a much greater

impact [on Roma attitudes to education] … above all their poverty

and social exclusion’ (Krieglerová and Kušnieriková 2003, pp.

447–8).

77 The emphasis throughout was on ‘increased access to education’

although the Terms of Reference (ToR) listed as an aim: ‘to support

the contacts between Roma and non-Roma children’ (ToR

SK0002.01 §4.2.1). However, in 2003 the Slovak government’s long-

term (2003–10) policy document, gave as its first educational

priority for 2003: ‘to draft and adopt a policy of Romany children

and youth integrated education including a proposal of temporary

affirmative action’ (Slovak Government 2003, section A). Eventually

a Government Resolution of May 2004 approved the concept of

integrated education (Slovak Government 2005, p. 1).

78 Project fiche §3.1.

79 An ERRC report includes information on segregated schooling in

Slovakia gathered in the school year 2002–3 (ERRC 2004).

80 Bavoux 2003, p. 47.

81 Project fiche §3.4.

82 Navrátil and Šimíková 2003. Brno is the second largest city in the

Czech Republic with a total population of 368,169 (Brno Labour

Office 2004, p. 3). In the 2001 Census only 374 people declared a

Roma ethnicity but the Roma community is estimated at

10,000–20,000, forming 3–4 per cent of all inhabitants (Navrátil and

Simíkova 2003, p. 14). Most are concentrated in inner-city areas.

83 IQRS 2004, pp. 4–5.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., European Dialogue 2005, p. 33.

86 The nearest was the following: ‘4 Community centres supported in

regions with a high minority concentration; each community centre

ensured at least two Roma and non-Roma community and/or field

social workers as intermediaries between relevant authorities (e.g.

housing, employment, education) and minority community; field

community workers available for both sides during and after the

project life’ (Project fiche, Annex 1). While the role of fieldworkers

as mediators is described, this has more to do with capacity

building of NGO community centres rather than evaluating the

success of any particular activity undertaken, such as creating

‘safe places’.

87 Tenants meetings for the two largest houses were attended by a

mere handful of residents.

88 Sirovátka et al. 2002, p. 73.

89 Navrátil and Šimíková 2003, p. 25.

90 Ibid., p. 28.

91 Czech Government Council 2005, p. 11.

92 Baršová (2003) has charted the rapid erosion of protection for

poorer families since 1991 following state withdrawal from the

housing sector.

93 Asiedu 2006. The impetus to renovate city centres has put

municipalities under growing pressure if they seek to protect their

weaker citizens, since economic rationality ‘dictates … get[ting] rid

of apartments and buildings with high indebtedness, including their

high-risk residents’ (Víšek 2003: 39-40). Even where Roma tenants

cause no problems whatsoever, their mere presence lowers the

value of buildings and their associated apartments (Frištenská

2000: 29).

94 Czech Government Council 2004, p. 16.

95 Focus et al 2004, p. 25.


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EU-funded Roma programmes: Lessons from Hungary,

Slovakia and the Czech Republic © Minority Rights Group

International, September 2006.

Acknowledgements MRG and its programme partners

gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Sigrid

Rausing Trust and Cordaid. In the Czech Republic and

Slovakia, thanks are due to the interviewers in our partner

organisations and especially to: IQ Roma Servis (Czech

Republic) – Katarína Klamková, Executive Director, Wail

Khazal, Project Manager; European Union Association for

Roma Youth (Hungary) – András Teleki and Erika Lencses;

Wide-Open School Foundation (Slovakia) – Eva Konèaková,

Executive Director; Project Schola (Slovakia) – Silvia Rigová,

Executive Director, Renáta Šmidová.

Commissioning editor and project coordinator of the

evaluation study – Galina Kostadinova.

Authors Martin Kovats is a Community Development

consultant and a part-time lecturer at Birkbeck, University

of London. Dr Kovats has been conducting research into

Roma civil society and Roma policy in Central and Eastern

Europe and at the European level for more than 10 years.

He has worked as a consultant on Roma projects for Save

the Children and UNICEF.

Will Guy is Research Fellow in Sociology and a member of

the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the

University of Bristol, UK. Following his 1970s doctoral thesis

on Communist Roma policy in Czechoslovakia, he

continued researching the situation of Roma and since

2000 has carried out evaluations for the European

Commission of Roma integration programmes in Hungary,

Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Minority Rights Group International (MRG) is a non-

governmental organization (NGO) working to secure the

rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities worldwide,

and to promote cooperation and understanding between

communities. MRG has consultative status with the United

Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and

observer status with the African Commission on Human and

Peoples’ Rights. MRG is registered as a charity, no. 282305,

and a company limited by guarantee in the UK, no.

1544957.

ISBN 1 904584 54 3 This study is published as a

contribution to public understanding. The text does not

necessarily represent in every detail the collective view of

MRG or its partners. Copies of this study are available

online at www.minorityrights.org. Copies can also be

obtained from MRG’s London office.

Minority Rights Group International

54 Commercial Street, London E1 6LT, United Kingdom

Tel +44 (0)20 7422 4200 Fax +44 (0)20 7422 4201

Email [email protected]

Website www.minorityrights.org

Minority Rights Group International 54 Commercial Street, London E1 6LT, United Kingdom

Tel +44 (0)20 7422 4200 Fax +44 (0)20 7422 4201

Email [email protected] Website www.minorityrights.org

working to secure the rights of

minorities and indigenous peoples

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EU-funded Roma programmes: Lessons from Hungary, Slovakia