EU and Its Neighbours

8/13/2019 EU and Its Neighbours

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EU and its Neighbours : A Wider Europe

through inter-regionalism, through dependecia

regionalism or through Sub-regionalism?*

Charalambos TsardanidisDirector, Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens

Prepared for the Conference Mapping Integration and Regionalism in a Global World:

The EU and regional governance outside The EU

GARNET/ Sciences Po Bordeaux/ Centre for International Governance andInnovation Conference 3nd Annual Meeting of the GARNET networkSciences Po Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux

17-19 September 2008

Preliminary draft. Not valid for citation or distribution without the permission of the

author


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ABSTRACT

EU has established close relationships with its neighbours through various

forms: Building bilateral relations through Association Agreements, like the

Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Russia and Ukraine or having

established a Customs Union with Turkey, through inter-regionalism like the Euro-

Mediterranean EMP and its synergy with the Organization of Black Sea and finally

through developing cooperation with constructed sub- regional groups like the

West Balkans (the Process of Stabilisation and Association) and the Northern

Europe (New Northern Dimension Policy) or with other sub- regional schemes like

the South European Cooperation Process (Regional Cooperation Council) The paper

by comparing mainly EU relations with three regions, the South Mediterranean

states under the framework of EMP, with the Black Sea countries under the

framework of the new EU -BSEC relationship and with the West Balkans under the

framework of the Stabilization and Association Process and the Regional

Cooperation council intends to look at the role of the EU during the post cold war

period , as an external factor encouraging intra- regional cooperation in the EU

neighbouring countries in order to create circumstances that would not only limit

national conflicts, but would also broaden the economic interdependence among the

countries of the area.

Introduction

The decade following the end of the Cold War witnessed a remarkable

increase of many new regional projects.New forms also of often multi-layered inter-

regional relations have appeared as a corollary of new regionalism. Inter-regionalism

refers on the one hand to the political/economic relationship between two regional

more or less institutionalised cooperation schemes and on the other hand to the

process of building interactions and links between two separate regions.

Inter-regionalism theory started to emerge and differentiate itself from

regional integration theory when scholars started to understand that regions were


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becoming actors in their own right. Regions exercised this status by developing their

own external relations. Emergence of inter-regionalism also could mark as a turning

point in the study of regions and what it is that joins them together ( Olivet, 2005: 9).

Literature on inter-regionalism, though still scarce, tries to provide some

analytical insights on the patterns and features of relations among regions. Despite

the fact that literature on inter-regionalism is scarce and that this theory is still very

much in a continual process of development, there are certain convergences between

the scholars who have written about it, as for the reasons of the emergence,

development and maintenance of inter-regional dialogues and relations. Jrgen

Rland was one of the first to propose a research agenda on inter-regionalism and has

described seven functions its performs: balancing and bandwagoning, institution

building, rationalizing, agenda- setting and controlling, identity- building, stabilising

and development (Rland, 2002).

However, most of the existing studies as Heiner Hnggi, Ralf Roloff and

Jrgen Rland observe, have so far failed to contribute to a better understanding of

this new sub- field of international relations. Theoretical explanations, albeit, rare,

have been primarily deductive, at times even speculative, and mostly lacking

sufficient empirical evidence (Hnggi,- Ruloff- Rland, 2006:7).

The paper by comparing mainly EU relations with three regions, the South

Mediterranean states under the framework of EMP and the ENP, with the Black Sea

countries under the framework of the new EU -BSEC relationship and the ENP and

with the West Balkans under the framework of Stabilization and Association

Process and the Regional Cooperation Council would attempt to examine:

First, to what extent EU regional cooperation schemes with its neighbours is a

clear manifestation of an asymmetrical inter-regionalism which sees inter-regional

activism as an expression of reflecting the hegemons main priorities. For the EU as

a global actor with soft power - given its strength in areas such as economy,

provider of security and promoter of democracy through positive and negative

conditionality- is the cooperative hegemony approach an appropriate tool to explain

EU relations with more of its neighbours

Second, to what extent EU relations with its neighbours should be conceived

as a kind of integration process which it could be called dependecia regionalism

through inter-regionalism? Is Progress towards greater integration and the creation

of a mega EU-led region based on homocentric circles of integration seen to be


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more likely to come about by the use of EU separately leverage on its neighbours in

the ENP framework by using positive and negative conditionality?

Third, to what extent EU policy towards its neighbours should be analysed as

a process of promoting sub-regionalism through inter-regionalism? More

particularly to what extent EU as an external factor is able to encourage intra- regional

cooperation schemes in the EU neighbouring areas which would not only limit

national conflicts, but would also broaden the economic interdependence among the

countries of the area? To what extent this could lead to a new regional concept:

necklace sub-regionalism? Should the neighbour countries relations with the EU be

studied not according to the Wider Europe concept but as sub-regions building

relations with the EU on a soft, elastic and differentiated basis ?

Forms of inter-regionalism

The expanding network of inter-regional relations appears in a wide array of

manifestations. In order to categorise existing inter-regional arrangements, Heiner

Hnggi, observes that three different forms of inter-regionalism can be distinguished:

(a) relations between regional groupings/organisations which we could call

bilateral inter-regionalism (Hnggi, 2000:3). 1 Clear examples are the relationship

EU ASEAN and EU- MERCOSUR and MERCOSUR ASEAN (see Diagram 1)

1Hnggi,after six years subdivided inter-regional relations into five types: a) relationsgrouped around a regional organization/regional group and a third country, b) group- to-

group relations, c) relations between a regional organization and a regional group, d) relations

between two regional groups and e) relations between a group of states from more than a

region . Of the types only b to d defines as interregional relations in the narrower sense.(Hnggi,2006: 31-62).


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Diagram 1

(b)Trans-regional arrangements .Membership in these rather heterogeneous

arrangements is more diffuse than in traditional group-to-group dialogues; it does not

necessarily coincide with regional groupings and may include member states from

more than two regions. By the concept of transregionalism we refer to less

institutionalised forms of relations between regions. The most important

characteristics of trans-regional relations are three:

First, trans-regionalism encompasses a broader set of actor relationships than

simply those among states. Thus any connection across regions, including

transnational networks of corporate production or of non governmental organisations,

that involves cooperation among any type of actors across two or more regions can

in theory also be considered as a form of transregionalism ( Aggarwal- Fogar,

2004: 5). Thus, the actors behind regionalist projects are no longer only states, but

actually a large number of different types of institutions, organisations and

movements. According to Christopher Dent trans-regionalism implies the

establishment of common spaces between and across regions in which constituent

agents (e.g. individuals, communities, organisations) operate and have close

associative ties with each other. (Dent, 2003:232). Trans-regional strategies could also

according to the neofuctionalist hypothesis- be transformed and widened by spill-

over effects ( Hettne, 2003: 25).

Second, the membership of transregional process is comprised of individual

countries that may or may not be part of other regional groups, but if they are, they

participate in an individual capacity and do not act on behalf of the regional group

Comprehensive International Region Com rehensive International Re ion

BILATERAL INTER-REGIONALSIM


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they are a part of ( Olivet: 2005: 10). Examples of transregionalism are ASEM and

FEALAC. (see diagram 2)

Diagram 2

(c) Hybrid inter-regionalism.

Hybrid inter- regionalism could take three forms.

First is referring to relations between regional groupings and single states

(e.g. EU-Russia, ASEANAustralia) (see diagram 3)

Diagram 3

Comprehensive International Region International Region

INTER-REG IONA L IS M SINGLE P O W E RREL A TIONS HIP

ComprehensiveInternat ional R egion

State


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The second type of hybrid inter-regionalism refers to the relationship

between a formal regional group/regional organisation and a constructed regional

group. The constructed regional group is usually set up by countries which have

been obliged to form a regional group in order to be able of cooperating with a

formal regional group (Hnggi, 2006: 39).

A clear example is the relations of EU with the ACP countries under the

framework of the Cotonu Agreement a(See diagram 4)

Diagram 4

The third type of hybrid inter- regionalism refers to the creation of

institutional arrangement between major representatives of two or more regions

which claim regional leadership. A clear example is IBSA, the trilateral,

developmental initiative between India, Brazil and South Africa to promote South-South cooperation.2(See diagram 5)

2The launching of the IBSA Dialogue Forum was formalized through the adoption of the "Brasilia

Declaration" in June 2006 .The main objectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum could be summarized asfollows: to promote South-South dialogue, cooperation and common positions on issues ofinternational importance, to promote trade and investment opportunities between the three regions ofwhich they are part, to promote international poverty alleviation and social development , to promote

the trilateral exchange of information, international best practices, technologies and skills, as well as tocompliment each others competitive strengths into collective synergies, to promote cooperation in a

broad range of areas, namely agriculture, climate change, culture, defence, education, energy, health,

Constructed Region

HYBRID

CONSTRUCTED INTER-REGIONALISM

Comprehensive International

Region


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Diagram 5

HYBRI INTER-REGIONALISM

WITH LEADER STATES FROM DIFFERENT REGIONS

Asymmetrical inter- regionalism

Asymmetrical inter-regionalism stems from differences mainly in two areas:

a) in the economic field from the advancing gap in economic prosperity, from

trade imbalance in favour of EU, from the dependence of the one region from

FDI from the EU and from the huge inflow of development aid from the EU

to the other regions

b) in the political fiend, from the provision of security by the side of EU to the

other regions, from imposing EU political contionality (positive and negative)

from EU exerting political influence and potentiality of intervention to the

other regions and for promoting intra- region cooperation.

information society, science and technology, social development, trade and investment, tourism andtransport. The IBSA Dialogue Forum has regular consultations at Senior Official (Focal Point),

Ministerial (Trilateral Joint Commission) and Heads of State and/or Government (Summit) levels, butalso facilitates interaction amongst academics, business and other members of civil society.

INDIA

BRAZIL

SOUTH AFRICA


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Diagram 6

Diagram 5

For the EU as a global actor with soft power, the cooperative hegemony

strategy is an appropriate theoretical tool to explain EU asymmetrical inter-regional

relations with the MPCs under the EMP framework, with the West Balkans under

the under the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process and with the

BSEC. Given EU strength in areas such as economy, technology, culture and

ideology, provider of security, promoter of democracy and good governance through

positive and negative conditionality, supporter of intra-regionalism and

subregionalism, the EU is therefore well-placed to pursue a cooperative hegemony

approach.The cooperative hegemony approach involves the use of soft power through

engagement in cooperative arrangements linked to a long-term strategy (Pedersen,

2002). Implicit in the strategy is the notion that states have freedom to devise

strategies, to incorporate new ideas and to revise strategies. Under cooperative

hegemony, institutions and ideas are combined to offer a framework through which a

regional order is constructed. (Farell, 2004:7).Undoubtedly EU dictates much more

of the conditions for inter-regional cooperation.( Sderbaum and Stalgren and VanLangenhove, 2005:377). As Helge Hveem has noticed the dynamism in the

EU M PC/ W es t Ba l k an s/ BSEC

ASYMMETRICALINTER-

REGIONALISM


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contemporary inter-regional relations may probably be interpreted along two

dimensions: The first is related to hegemony and sees inter-regional activism as an

expression of the hegemons strategy3 and the second as a response to it by other

actors (Hveem, 2003:97). In cases of highly asymmetrical relationships inter-

regionalism may generate unintended collective identity-building.4(See diagram 7) .

Diagram 7

3This could explain how the EU negotiates with the relatively strong East Asian region and how to the

weak West Balkans.4 Such perceptions, which tend to denounce the behaviour of the superior organisation in terms of

paternalism or even neo-colonialism, inevitably produce backlashes by encouraging the weakerorganisation to develop its own set of collective symbols and mythology in explicit opposition to the

other side (Rland, 2001:9).


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EMP

EMP could be characterised as hybrid constructed inter-regionalism, because

in face of the well established coordination machinery of the EU, the Mediterranean

Partner Countries (MPCs) were almost forced to engage in some sort of regional

coordination in order to deal with the EU and its member states under the framework

of the Barcelona process.

EMPs asymmetry stems from difference in the economic filed like the

advancing gap in economic prosperity, trade imbalance with the exception of

energy- at least those which are not members of the EU as well from the

dependence of many MPCs on the development aid from the EU. The EU is an

extremely important trade partner for the MPCs, but the MPCs region itself is of minor

importance to Europe. The reality of the asymmetric dependence in the EMP has

undermined the EUs inclination to pursue a liberal inter-regional arrangement in

terms of two equal regions. It has also undermined EU ability to promote intra-

regional economic cooperation among the MPCs despite the signing of the Agadir

Agreement.5

Asymmetry in military organisation on the two rims of the Mediterranean

basin is an important also obstacle for the development of an effective cooperation

between the EU and the MPCs. On the Northern rim, national armies are linked to a

single alliance, NATO. The development of the CFSP and EDSP of the EU further

increases the co-ordination of the national defence systems of the European members

of the Partnership. On the Southern rim, instead national military power, and, in few

case, loose bilateral defence agreements are the only means available for a single

state to overcome any security dilemma with potential or real enemies (Attina, 2001:

41).

The Middle East stalemate has been not only detrimental to the region itself

but has also had a negative impact upon regional relations across the Mediterranean

area and to the EMP iself. The ten years since 1995 have seen if anything a

degeneration in relations both between and within the two peoples- Israelis and

Palestinians- involved. Its milestones are familiar: Binyamin Netanyahus 1996

5TheAgreement for the Establishment of a Free Trade Zone between the Arabic Mediterranean

Nations of Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan singed in 2004.


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election victory, the collapse of Camp David and the outbreak of the second intifada

in 2000, the building of the separation wall and the war of Summer 2006 in

Lebanon .

Furthermore the overall political framework is being governed by US

hegemony. European Union initiative through the Barcelona process was meant to

displace the hegemony of the United States but it has clearly failed. Washington

remains the key player in Palestine and indeed launched its own democratisation

initiative on the Arab world in 2004 without any apparent reference to the existing

Barcelona process. EU therefore is unable for the time being to play a leading role in

the Middle East conflict, as the Europeans themselves are as divided as ever in

matters of security and foreign policy as evident by the dispute over Iraq since 2003.

West Balkans and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)

The basic objective of SAP is to achieve stabilisation of the Western Balkans

and its rapid transition to an open market economy. It helps the countries of the region

to reinforce their ability to adopt and to apply the European practices, including

Community acquis, as well as international standards intending to create appropriate

circumstances for the admission of Balkan countries into the EU. Consequently, all

Balkan countries are considered for accession to the EU. Croatia has already started

accession negotiations and has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement

(SAA) on 29 October 2001. This agreement entered into force only on 1 February

2005 FYROM has already been recognised as an applicant country. A Stabilisation

SAA was signed in Luxembourg in April 2001 and entered into force in April 2004.

The SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina was initialled on 4 December 2007.

Nonetheless, the signature of the SAA is depending on progress in addressing four

key priorities, notably police reform, ICTY co-operation, public broadcasting and

public administration reform. Albania signed a SAA with the EU on 12 June 2006 in

Luxembourg. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU

and Serbia was initialled on 7 November 2007, in Brussels but it has not been signed

yet as it has been linked by the Serbian government with the issue of Kosovo.

Montenegro, after about one year of negotiation has singed a SAA with the on 15

October 2007.


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One of the major aims of SAP is to achieve objectives, such as respect for

international law, state of right, democratic principles, human rights and right of

minorities. Moreover, it aims to create bilateral FTAs as a condition of accession and

the confinement of national disputes and interstate competition (imposition of

democratic peace) ( Pippan, 2004).

The real boost to SAP was given in June of 2003, when the Thessaloniki

Summit redefined SAP and added a range of means inspired by pre-acceding process,

aiming to support and reinforce all the necessary reforms that should be realized in

order that the approach of Western Balkan countries to the EU would be

unencumbered. The most important of these new means was the European

Partnerships which were supported by the Accession Partnership of Central and

Eastern Europe. European Partnerships did in fact include a wide range of means,

such us commercial concession, economic and financing assistance (CARDS

program), as well as Stabilisation and Association Agreements.

The relations between EU and BSEC

Since the June 2003 EU Summit, the BSEC member states Council of

Ministers of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly emphasised the interdependence between

the EU and the BSEC region and how instrumental the BSEC may be in bringing

about a comprehensive platform for cooperation between an enlarged EU and the

BSEC Organisation. However, despite the fact that the EU has adopted a positive

policy towards other regional cooperation schemes in Europe and in the world, its

attitude towards the BSEC has been described up to 2007 as apathetic and unwilling

in building an inter-regional relationship. It has placed too much emphasis, for

example, on the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which lists the European

Commission as one of its founding members meanwhile the European Commission

was not interested even some time ago in becoming an observer in BSEC, despite the

fact that this status was tabled by the BSEC long ago.

Despite the fact that European Commission in 1997 prepared a document on

the possible establishment of formal institutional links with the BSEC and has

suggested some priority objectives like the promotion of political stability and

dialogue, the strengthening of human rights, democracy and the development of the

regions transport, energy and telecommunications networks, including connections to


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European networks; regional commercial cooperation and the creation of favourable

conditions to attract EU and other foreign investment, the official EU position was

that cooperation with the BSEC should proceed on an ad hoc basis, without

institutional links. As a result, despite the insistence of the BSEC countries on

developing an inter-regional functioning relationship with the EU, the European

Commissions communication to the Council and European Parliament on Wider

Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and

Southern Neighboursin the section titled Promoting Regional and Intra- Regional

Cooperation only the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Northern Dimension

were mentioned as regional schemes with which the EU has a close partnership,

meanwhile the BSEC was totally absent. This had slightly changed in 2004 in a new

communication from the European Commission to the Council regarding the

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) mentioning that that BSEC has an important

part to play as a regional partner in this strategy ( Commission of the EC) , 2004:

21). Even in the last communication of the European Commission to the Council of

Ministers on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) it was stated

only that The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC) provides a

useful platform for our dialogue and cooperation with the region as a whole.

It seems that the most important reasons for the absence of a BSEC-EU inter-

regional cooperation up to now were the following four reasons:

First, there was an increasing overlap between EU regional and other policies

with the geographical area of activity. Greece was a full member of the EU and as far

as the Western Balkans is concerned (Albania and Serbia- Montenegro were full

members of the BSEC and FYROMs application has been accepted) the EU has

developed a concrete policy under the framework of Stabilisation and Association

Process. Turkey is a country which has opened admission negotiations and Bulgaria

and Romania became full members of the EU in 2007. The Russian Federation has

developed a single power form of relationship with the EU. Moldova and Ukraine are

covered by the New Neighbourhood Policy and although initially the Southern

Caucasus countries were not included, as of June 2004 they have been included in the

renamed European Neighbourhood Policy.

Second, it seems that the European Commission, as well as many states,

shares the view that the BSEC, before becoming a close partner of the EU should

overcome a number of problems. These problems among others include deep


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historical, cultural, and political divergences between the BSEC member states, the

existing unstable economic and social situation of most of the BSEC states and the

internal turmoil and disputes on minorities. All the above problems carry with them

dangerous possibilities for strengthening particularism and even military conflicts

all around the Black Sea area (Tsardanidis, 2005: 384) .

Third, it is difficult to define the Black Sea as a region since almost all of the

Black Sea states have already defined themselves according to other geographical or

institutional ties, for example Bulgaria in South East Europe, Georgia and Azerbaijan

in the South Caucasus, and Russia in the CIS. As a consequence an inconsistency

exists among certain BSEC state foreign policies on implementing regional

cooperation, as a number of countries give priority to their own achievements not

covering the mechanisms of the BSEC. Russia, for example, prefers to build its own

bilateral relationship with the EU rather that emphasise developing a process of

BSEC-EU inter-regionalism. Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, on the other hand, have

consistently played down the significance of the BSEC as their main foreign policy

priority has been NATO and EU membership. Furthermore, the EU-accession process

for some of the BSEC states has produced negative implications within the BSEC.

Quite often EU candidate countries erect barriers and impose restrictions on non-

potential-EU countries because of requirements to draw closer to the EU. As a result

the introduction of previously non-existent restrictions at the least impedes, and at

worst undermines, the efforts of an organisation such as [the] BSEC dedicated to

promoting regional cooperation and economic integration (Gavras, 2004:33

Fourth, the BSEC still lacks a clear priority or unifying core for its activities. It

has created fifteen working groups, which do not always produce positive results. The

BSEC must prioritise and select fewer areas where it has more interest and the

strength to engage so that it can present itself as a useful interlocutor to other

countries and organisations (Aydin, 2004: 30). Some of its activities have no regional

content and the several domains that do have essential regional substance are left

outside the house of [the] BSEC except in a token manner (Emerson- Vahl, 2002:

320). This is one of the reasons that the European Commission has insisted that any

cooperation with the BSEC should be on a project basis.6

6

On 20-21 March, 2001 in Brussels during high-level consultations, an understanding was achievedaccording to which interaction between the BSEC and the European Commission should be on a

project basis.


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However today the the inter-regional BSEC-EU relationship key issue refer to the

following two questions:

Is there a tendency on the part of the EU to move from a bilateral BSEC

member state-EU relationship towards developing an inter-regional BSECEU

relationship? Will the EU work towards, having an integrated approach to the Black

Sea region area, an Eastern Dimension, as in the case of the New Northern

Dimension ?

The European Commission Communication to the Council and the European

Parliament promoted the idea of Black Sea Synergy. The role of Greece in promoting

the BSEC from within the EU was crucial in 20052006 (Gltekin-Punsmann and

Nikolov : 117). The European Commission considers this new initiative not as an

inter-regional cooperation between BSEC and EU but as a new regional cooperation

intended as a flexible framework to ensure greater coherence and policy guidance.

This is evident from the fact that the Commission in its communication does not

propose any institutionalised inter-regional framework between the EU and BSEC on

a high political level like the existing ones in ASEM, or the dialogue between EU and

ASEAN or EU MERCOSUR but only meetings between senior officials and these

meeting will take place only with a view to better coordinate concrete projects

(Commission of EC,2007).

Actually we should perceive the Commission idea of a Black Sea synergy as

promoting an asymmetrical type of interegionalism which aims of promoting the

regionalisation process the Black sea area . For example in its Communication the

Commission points out that The primary task of Black Sea Synergy would therefore

be the development of cooperation within the Black Sea region and also between the

region as a whole and the European Union.

ENP : From asymmetrical inter-regionalism towards a

dependencia regionalism

The ENP includes the countries of the Western Newly Independent States

(NIS), the Caucasus and the Southern Mediterranean countries which have no

explicitly recognised prospect of membership. It was developed in 2004, with the


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objective of avoiding the EU the emergence of new dividing lines between the

enlarged EU and its neighbours.

The principles of the ENP reveal a new dimension of how the EU considers

itself and looks at the world. Although there was undoubtedly a discrepancy between

theory and practice, as Raffaella Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher observe, the

EMP stressed the importance of northsouth and southsouth cooperation, along with

the notion of partnership. Wider Europe conversely, explicitly conveys a centre

periphery approach with the EU obviously standing at the centre. (Del Sarto-

Schumacher, 2005:27)

The ENP was first outlined in a Commission Communication on Wider

Europe in March 2003 (Commission of the European Communities,2003), followed

by a more developed Strategy Paper on the ENP published in May 2004(Commission

of the European Communities,2004) . This document sets out in concrete terms how

the EU proposes to work more closely with these countries. As part of its report on

implementation, in December 2006, the Commission also made proposals as to how

the policy could be further strengthened (Commission of the European

Communities,2006).

The main emphasis is not on encouraging the countries to cooperate with each

other thus promoting subregionalism through inter-regionalism- but on bilateralism.

Bilateralism is clearly predominant over regionalism (Smith, 2005a:360). The

neighbours are being asked to adopt much of the acquis communautaire, to embrace

the values and norms of the EU, and to commit to political reform towards the goal of

creating a system that is a mirror image of the European Union in its normative design

and value systems ( Farell, 2004:25-26).

As the initial lexicon seemed to imply, the ENP is a policy for neighbours or,

rather, towards them and not with them It is certainly not old wine in new bottles

but, rather, a fresh foreign policy, harnessing and integrating instruments from across

the spectrum from support for human rights to judicial reform to elections, support

for institution-building, increased political dialogue and cooperation on crisis

management. Implementation will not be based on the common strategy approach

that marked the original EMP. In practice this means that Action Plans will be

drawn up for each individual country and adapted to the needs of each country.

Progress towards greater integration is seen to be more likely to come about by the

use of EU leverage on its neighbours separately and it will depend Commissions


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evaluation of the situation in each country in the direction desired by the EU( Smith ,

2005b: 762-763).

So while the ENP will not lead to the formal dissolution of the Euro-Med

partnership, it clearly signals a change of direction. Although the EU continues to pay

lip service to its multilateral engagement with the MPCs, in practice it has retreated

from it (Gavin, 2005: 359). In concrete terms, the EU is presenting a carrot and- stick

policy by offering the benefits of closer economic and political ties in exchange for

progress by its Mediterranean and Eastern partners in political and economic reform

(Farell, 2004:25-26). The ENP from the EU perspective, therefore, is considered as a

process where the relations between itself and its neighbours are unequal and

reinforce the power of asymmetries between the EU and the NC (Neighbouring

Countries).

Bjrn Hettne, considers the ENP as a soft form of imperialism7(asymmetric

partnership) based on conditionality, the prize ranging from assistance to full

membership. (Hettne, 2004:11) . Ulla Helm as well as observes that the ENP can be

perceived as a new edition of the colonialism by the NC on their way in the new

cooperation framework( Holm, 2005).

Therefore, ENP should not be considered as a type of inter-regionalism, but

as a process of regionalism through inter-regionalism which could be named as

dependencia regionalism. The ENP expresses through differentiated bilateralism

(Action plans) the aim of exporting the EUs values and expand its economic and

political interests and less of promoting sub-regionalism in the Mediterranean or/and

inter-regional contacts between EU and MPC . (See diagram 8). As George Howard

Joff points out, The ENP wishes to bind neighbouring states into permanent

relationships governed by an agreed body of law, as in the EU itself. ENP could

therefore be characterised as imperial for the satellite neighbours will be, in effect,

satrapies of the European core in which, in the end governance, security mechanism,

economic relationships and cultural paradigms will be impossible if the full benefits

of partnership are to realised. One states have accepted the European the aquis

communautaire- there will be no going back! (Joff, 2007:269).

7

Soft form of imperialism refers to an asymmetric relationship, and the imposition of normsin order to promote the EUs self-interest rather than a genuine (interregional) dialogue as afoundation for sustainable global governance ( Hettne- Sderbaum, 2005:15)


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Diagram 8ENP: Dependecia Regionalism

By promoting ENP the EU has started a process of building up a new region Wider Europe-

which consists from homocentric circles. According to Fabrizio Tassinari five regional

clusters can be identified in the post-2004 European neighbourhood:

1. Northern Europe

2. Mediterranean

3. Balkans

4. Black Sea Region and

5. Eastern Dimension ( See diagram 9)

Diagram 9


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Source: Tassinari (2005: 12)

ENP therefore should be perceived as a process leading towards a mega region

of a Wider Europe.

From asymmetrical inter-regionalism to subregionalism throughinter-regionalism?

Inter-regionalism although is not only fundamentally cooperative in nature,intended to bring benefits to both parties through voluntary may promote sub -

regionalism through inter-regionalism. In other words the development of an

interregional relationship could lead to the creation either of regional cooperation

schemes linking closely with a wider regional area or to subregionalism

cooperation The term subregionalism has been adopted in order to distinguish the

higher levels of regionalism like the EU from the lower levels of micro-regionalism

(sub-subregionalism or , in certain cases, sub- states regionalism) promoted by

national and subnational actors ( Hook and Kearns, 1999: 6) Or sub-regionalism

intensifies the interactions among nodes (states or parts of states) that transcend

national borders within and beyond a macroregion ( Mittelman , 2001 : 214) One of

the implications is that region- building, leading to such inter-regional relationships, is

creating its own dynamic of more sub- region- building. (Bs - Machand- Shaw,

2005, p.168).

EU through its relations with its neighbours produces two categories of sub-

regionalism which form a necklace of groupings around EU.


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21

1. Trade imbalance

2. Dependence on

FDI

3. Development Aid

4. Economic gap

1.Provision of Security2.Political

conditionality

3. Promotion of

regional identity and

intraregionalism

4. Exercising

political

influence

The first one reflects the role of the EU acting as an external factor for

creating sub- regional co-operations schemes. The second category refers to the

process of EU strengthening its relations with its neighbour states through the creation

of sub- regional partnerships on a soft, elastic and differentiated basis (See

diagram 10)

Diagram 10Mediterranean Union as a Sub-regional scheme

Sub-

Regionalism

through

Inter-regionalism

RCC/

SEECP

UfM

Sub-regional necklace area

CEFTA

Agadir

Process

Promoting

Sub-Regional

Cooperation

Schemes

Promoting

SubRegional

Partnerships

Northern

Dimension

EasternPartnership


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22

EU Promoting Sub-Regional Cooperation Schemes

One clear example of EU promoting sub regional cooperation is in the West

Balkans region. The EU did not just encourage regional cooperation, but demanded it

before moving to commercial and other concessions with Western Balkan countries (

Bechev, 2006:32; Dangerfield, 2004).

After the Thessalonici Summit, the programme for regional cooperation,

which had significantly cooperated with the Stability Pact and other regional

initiatives, marked impressive progress.

The sectors of cooperation among the West Balkan states that have advancedwithin the framework of the SAP and, consequently, have also been contributed to by

the EU, are mainly on trade, energy, overland transportation and protection of the

environment

The European Union has already pressed the countries of the Western Balkans,

in line with the Stability Pact, to create a network of bilateral Free Trade Agreements

with the signing of a Memorandum in 2001 for the liberalisation and facilitation of

trade. The results initially have not been impressive. In spite of the fact that mutual

transactions increased significantly, notwithstanding, the level of inter-regional trade

continued to be low. In addition, the application of bilateral agreements was not

always satisfactory.

With the encouragement of the EU, the Ministers of Trade of South Eastern

Europe met in Sofia in June of 2005. At this meeting it was decided that the existing

free trade networks should be transformed into a free trade area. This came true with

the evolution of the Central Europe Free Trade Area (CEFTA) which was established

in 1993 and included the Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and FYROM. As the ultimate objective was the

liberalization of inter-regional trade, the Agreement foresaw the total abrogation of

tariffs as well as all obstacles equivalent to tariffs for industrial products until January

of 2001. For agricultural products it was decided there should be a mutual preferential

status only for certain amounts of products.8 After the accession of the first four

8For CEFTA see http://www.syslab.ceu.hu/~martin/econ/cefta.html and (Hyde-Price, 1996; J. Misala,1995).


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countries to the EU in April of 2004, the other member-states of CEFTA along with

the remaining countries of the Western Balkans (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Albania, as well as Moldova) and Kosovo (represented by UNMIK) at

their meeting in Bucharest, with the encouragement of the European Commission and

the Stability Pact, agreed to negotiate for a new single free trade area. The new

CEFTA 2006 was signed in December of 2006 in Bucharest. Bulgaria and Romania,

after their accession to the EU in January of 2007, ceased to be members of CEFTA.

It was also agreed by the member states to apply programmes for reducing or

abrogating non-tariff barriers and to attempt to achieve further harmonisation of trade

regulations in the sector of providing services, to establish competition regulations for

state supplies, for protection of royalties, for trade of services and for other sectors.

The European Commission supported these initiatives and was committed to

providing advice and technical assistance so that inter-regional cooperation proceeds

in total harmony with the route to European integration.

However, it is doubtful whether the establishment of a Free Trade Area among

the countries of the Western Balkans, including Moldova, could constitute an

important core of regional cooperation. The establishment of a free trade area is, of

course, the most usual way for development of regional aggregations. But the new

CEFTA 2006 does not seem to have long term objectives as long as: Firstly, the FTA

does not intend to be anything more than a waiting room for accession to the EU,

which means that following the integration of member-states into the EU, the FTA

would be unlikely to last for long. The main priority of member-states is not the

development and the reinforcement of the FTA, but their participation in the EU.

Secondly, it is not certain whether the member-states consider that they have

additional competitive interests, as far as attraction of foreign capital or the

possibilities for infiltrating Western markets are concerned. Thirdly, the Free Trade

Area has not provoked the interest of enterprising circles of member-states and (apart

from an augmentation of inter-regional trade) no notable capital movement between

countries has been observed. The enterprises seem to trust or to wish to cooperate

with Western enterprises rather than with enterprises from other countries of the FTA.

The initiatives for economic cooperation, and especially the FTA, do not aspire to

play a major role in security of the wider region of South Eastern Europe. It is


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24

expected that the augmentation of commercial inter-regional transactions and the

improvement of their conduction will improve economic conditions and economic

interdependence. On the other hand, though, there are also difficulties in realising this

FTA, because of existing problems in the region, such as the problem of Kosovo and

the unsettled situation in Bosnia. These problems inevitably deter the creation of a

community of security.9

The greatest progress of intra-regional cooperation seems to be marked in the

energy sector. In Athens, on the 25thOctober of 2005, within the framework of the

Athens process entitled, The Convention for the Energy Community between the EU

and the countries of South Eastern Europe, there was created the basis for a cohesive

regulating area in the sector of energy. The EU will focus progressively even more on

the attempts to ensure connections between international energy networks, including

oil pipelines in the above area.

Much progress was made also in overland transportation, when in June of 2004

an Agreement Memorandum was signed for the development of basic regional

transport networks in South Eastern Europe. Moreover, in December of 2005, an

agreement for a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) was agreed by the

countries of the region and the European Commission.

In the field of protection of the environment, the European Commission is

playing a major role aiming at the establishment of regional cooperation through the

development of a Regional Programme of Environmental Cooperation, which will

provide the suitable background for environmental action to be taken on a regional

level. All the countries of the region participate in this process and in the

Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network for Accession (ECENA).

Another example was the Agadir Agreement for the Establishment of a Free

Trade Zone between the Arabic Mediterranean Nations of Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco

and Jordan. The EU has long supported South-South economic integration and

successfully assisted and pressed the above countries to conclude the Agadir Regional

Free Trade Agreement that was signed on 25 February 2004. The Agadir process

could become a precursor to an Arab free trade area.

EU Promoting Sub-Regional Partnerships

9 For the existing problems of the liberalisation of trade see (Grobas, 2006:30-32


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25

In the last few years EU has set up new forms of partnership with the

neighbouring countries in an effort to enrich its existing inter- regional relationships

such as the EMP and the ENP or to recreate old ones in a new dimension, like the the

RCC and the New Northern Dimension.

A clear example is the French initiative for a Union for Mediterranean

(UfM).

Even before assuming the French presidency, Nicholas Sarkozy has been

aspiring to create a Mediterranean Union (MU) between European nations on the

northern bank of the Mediterranean and those on its southern bank10. The concept

would attract countries searching for better ties with the 27-member European club,

which includes seven Mediterranean area countries. "The time has come to build

together a Mediterranean Uion," Mr. Sarkozy is quoted as saying. "The Mediterranean

is a key to our influence in the world, also a key to Islam torn between modernity and

fundamentalism."

From the French point of view the Barcelona process has failed by setting

excessively broad objectives. Barcelona involved too many actors with divergent

interests, whereas the countries really interested in the Mediterranean are few.

However, French President Nicolas Sarkozys proposal to create a Mediterranean

Union and later a Union for Mediterranean (UfM,) was not clear from the beginning ,

especially on the nature and objectives of this new regional cooperation proposal.

Indeed, for many political analysts in the region, Sarkozy's nascent idea was creating

more questions than answers: Would it be a supranational organisation like the EU

with the power to set national laws or merely an institutionalized forum for

discussion? And how would it interact with the existing regional forums such the

Mediterranean Forum, the 5+5 West Mediterranean Forum , the Union of the Arab

Maghreb and above all with the inter-regional scheme of EMP? Would this Union

take over from the Barcelona process? Would additional policy instruments be

provided by the members of the MU alone? How this Union could finance

development projects? With the escalating hub of conflict in Israel-Palestine-

Lebanon-Syria, how would the Mediterranean Union resolve the diplomatic impasse

10The plan was calling for intense, multistructured cooperation in the fields of energy, employment,education, infrastructure, security, protection of the environment, counterterrorism and immigration.

Mr. Sarkozy's plan was envisaging for regular summit meetings in the form of G-8 for every twoyears with a rotating presidency and setting up a Mediterranean Investment Bank modeled on the

European one.


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26

that has be devilled the Barcelona process? Could the Mediterranean area be

perceived as a region in economic, social and cultural terms?

One analyst considered that there was a risk that the proposed Mediterranean

Union will favour an unofficial redistribution of roles in the basin, facilitating

consequently the emergence of a powerful group of the EU Mediterranean countries (

Giannou, 2008: 11).

The deficiencies of the French initiatives as were described above as well as

the strong reaction from member states like Germany, the Netherlands and other

states which feared the plan could split the EU down the middle, with the new union

becoming a rival to the EU itself redirected the idea of the UfM towards its merger

with the EMP. Therefore, the European Council on 14.3.2008 decided that the Union

for the Mediterranean will include the Member States of the EU and the non-EU

Mediterranean coastal states. The Council also invited the Commission to present to

the Council the necessary proposals for defining the modalities of what will be called

Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. The UfM was declared in a

Summit which will take place in Paris on 13 July 2008.11 The 20-page Declaration

notes that this initiative will build on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of

achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process.

An Annex to the Declaration sets out the priority fields and key initiatives, which the

future Secretariat is mandated to detail. These are: De-pollution of the Mediterranean.

maritime and land highways, civil protection, Mediterranean solar plan, Higher

11Germany also prevailed by holding to its position that no new EU money beyond the funds allocatedfor the Barcelona Process should be given to the new union, countering Franco-Italian demands that the

financing for the new body be multiplied. Another element of the compromise relates to theUnion's management structure, which will consist of two directors coordinating cooperation between

the EU and the partner countries. One director is to come from the EU member states and the other

from a non-European Mediterranean country. Both will be appointed for two years, supported by a 20-

strong secretariat, to be located in a yet-to-be-determined southern EU city. Barcelona and Marseille

have been mentioned as potential candidates, claimed Sarkozy, who denied having endorsed the French

city. It also foresees bi-annual summit meetings between the EU and its partner The agreement

countries. Seen as a partial victory for Paris, the southern EU nations will hold the first presidencies.

See http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/summit-approves-union-mediterranean/article-170976


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Education and Research, Euro-Mediterranean University and The Mediterranean

Business Development Initiative for the MSEs.

Another example of necklace subregionalism is the creation of the

Regional Cooperation Council in 2008 in South Eastern Europe.

Following a wide consultation process with countries of SEE, the Stability Pacts

highest decision-making body the Regional Table in Belgrade in May 2006 took

the decision on the transformation of the Stability Pact into Regional Cooperation

Council ( RCC).

The RCC , founded in February 2008.12The Council will be connected with

the SEECP as an implementation of the principle of regional ownership. Regional

ownership suggests the reinforcement of regional and local cooperation which in the

case of South Eastern Europe is SEECP, so that it will be capable of handling its own

problems. Practically, this means that South Eastern European countries will have to

accept that the promotion of regional cooperationlie first and foremost in their hands

and it is their own responsibility and they have to act accordingly.At the end of the this

process of enhancing regional ownership and streamlining the task forces and initiatives

established under the auspices of the Stability Pact, the leadership and management of many

processes has passed into the hands of regional bodies, several of which have been created for

this specific task.13

The tasks of the RCC are defined as follows: to sustain focused regional co-

operation in SEE through a regionally-owned and -led framework; to provide political

guidance to and receive substantive input from relevant task forces and initiatives

active in specific thematic areas of regional co-operation; to promote European and

Euro-Atlantic integration; and to provide guidance to the Secretariat of the RCC and

its Secretary General ( Altman, 2007).

Since 2003, the European Commission has pointed out that the WesternBalkan countries will have to be gradually encouraged to take upon themselves the

regional cooperation through initiatives, such as the SEECP.

12The members of the RCC are Participating States of the South East European Co-operation Process(SEECP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on behalf ofKosovo in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the European Union

(EU), represented by the Troika, consisting of the EU Presidency, the European Commission and theCouncil Secretariat, as well as those donor countries, international organisations and international

financial institutions substantially and actively engaged in support of regional co-operation in SouthEastern Europe.13

Final Report f the Special Co-ordinator on Regional Ownership and Streamlining of Stability PactTask Forces and Initiatives, Special Coordinator, The Stability Pact for South- Eastern Europe, Sofia,

27.2.2008, p.19


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The RCC will have a Secretariat and as General Secretary has been selected the

former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia, Hido Biscevic. The General

Secretary will also assist the country holding the presidency of SEECP. The Council

has its head office in Sarajevo. 14

The main duties of the RCC will be:

Firstly, handling and coordinating the programmes that are funded by

international donors. Six basic fields of action have already been designed, which

refer to economic and social development, infrastructure, justice and Home Affairs,

security co-operation, building human capital and Parliamentary Co-operation Social

cohesion and gender mainstreaming will also be given due attention. Particular

emphasis is placed on the role of civil society actors in regional cooperation. These

processes constitute the backbone of regional co-operation. Furthermore, most of

these activities and initiatives already benefit from regional ownership, and are

designed to meet the priorities for cross-border co-operation identified by the region

itself.15 While they used to co-operate within the framework of the Stability Pact,

they now move under the RCC umbrella. These activities will build on recent

achievements such as the creation of a regional free trade arrangement (CEFTA), the

establishment of an Energy Community for South-East Europe, the signing of a

European Common Aviation Area agreement, as well as on other ongoing regional

cooperation activities.

Secondly, supervising, coordinating and implementing the political decisions of

the SEECP that deal with matters of regional cooperation in South East Europe. The

most important preconditions for a sustainable regional co-operation framework in

SEE are: a strong involvement of both the South East European countries and the EU;

full political commitment by the countries of the region; and involvement of the non-

EU donor community during the transition process towards regional ownership

14Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the South East European Cooperation Process, Europes New South East, Zagreb, 11 May 2007.15From a conflict prevention and confidence building initiative in South Eastern Europeto a regionally-owned Regional Co-operation Counci. See

http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/SPownershipprocessPortal.asp


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Thirdly, supporting and preparing the summit conferences and assemblies of

Ministers of SEECP. In other words, without official declaration, the RCC will act as

Secretariat of the SEECP.

Fourthly, organizing high level meetings among all South Eastern European

countries, the Troika of the EU and the countries that will contribute to the budget of

the RCC. 16

Therefore, inter-regional dialogues like the RCC may promote regionalism

through inter-regionalism or even subregionalism through inter-regionalism One

of the implications is that region- building, leading to such inter-regional

relationships, is creating its own dynamic of more region- building (Bs and

Machand and Shaw, 2005:168).

Inter-regionalism is not only fundamentally cooperative in nature, intended to

bring benefits to both parties through voluntary negotiations but it could be perceived

also a) as a product of asymmetrical relationship, and b) as an expression of the

hegemons strategy or as a response to it by other actors .

SEECP in full cooperation with the RCC (especially after the admission of

Bulagaria and Romania as full members of the EU) and with full correspondence to

the SAP in which the Western Balkan states participate, could be transformed into a

sub-regional cooperation within the EU. RCC relying on the SEECP would e

provided with a sort of ownership trademark and the necessary political support from

the region. On the other hand, the RCCs strctures, such as its secretariat, could

provide,as Alessandro Rotta points out, the CEECP with the operational capacity it

lacks (Rotta, 2008: 67).

The creation of the CCR and the potential dyanamism of SEECP could be

considered as an attempt of creating a new sub regional cooperation scheme through

an inter-regional process between the EU and the West Balkans. The term

subregionalism has been adopted in order to distinguish the higher levels of

regionalism like the EU from the lower levels of micro-regionalism (sub-

subregionalism or , in certain cases, sub- states regionalism) promoted by national

and subnational actors (Hook and Kearns, 1999:6). Or sub-regionalism intensifies

16Report of the Special Co-ordinator on Regional Ownership and Streamlining of Stability Pact

Task Forces and Initiatives, 16-11-2006, http://www.stabilitypact.org/rt/Annex%202%20-%20Report%20of%20the%20Special%20Coordinator%20on%20Regional%20Ownership%20and%20

Streamlining.pdf


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the interactions among nodes (states or parts of states) that transcend national borders

within and beyond a macro region ( Mittelman, 2001:214).

This means that the Balkan sub-system will be prominent as an autonomous

geopolitical region, with SEECP as a leading actor and with certain needs and

interests which will have to be fulfilled within the EU's boundaries, eventually

becoming the EUs SEE Dimension similarly to the Northern Dimension. This

would provide framework for cooperation between SEE countries even after all or

most countries are EU members (Delevic,2007:20). Its prominence as an

autonomous geopolitical region has not only emerged because of the serious

problems to the stability of the region after the collapse of Yugoslavia. It is not even

attributed to the geo-economic role which SEECP was asked to play in the region for

the delivery of the energy resources from Central Asia and the Upper Caucasus to

Western Europe. It is mainly attributed to the regional consciousness which developed

in the region through the last two centuries. A clear sense that the states of South

Eastern Europe belong to a region which obtains a regional identity (Hurrell,

1995:41). This, however, does not concern all South Eastern countries, like Romania

and Croatia. This regional identity, despite the differentiations and the rivalry

between the states of the region, has many common elements17which make SEECP

capable of becoming the most important forum of regional cooperation in South

Eastern Europe (Tsardanidis, 2003: 318-319). The question, however, of whether this

regional consciousness is enough in order for the region to act within the EU, remains

to be seen. As Ettone Greco rightly observers The challenge facing the EU is not

only to act as a political force of attraction and engine fro regional integration, but

also to prove itself an effective actor noton;ly in managing but also in resolving

conflicts(Greco, 2004: 76).The unstable situation in Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia

Herzegovina and FYROM are problems that without doubt are undermining the EUs

hegemonic project for the Western Balkans. 18

If the RCC through its close cooperation with the SEECP is really take off in the

following months then we would be able to assume that a new process is emerging:

17These common elements according to Alina Mungiu and Andrei Pippidi are a common Ottoman and

Byzantine legacy, a common culture and religion being mostly Christian Orhodox and a sharedexperience of ethnic difference, in every country of the region the dominant ethnic group have toshare both the pre- modern and the modern state with other groups . See (Mungiu- Pippidi, 2008: 169)18

The shifting discourses and conflict among the various ethnopolitical groups have created cycles ofcrises that have, in neo-Gramscian terms, undermined the formation of a historic bloc, and thus the

EUs hegemonic project remains open-ended ( Trkes and Gkgz, 2006:688).


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The EU by developing close economic and political inter-regional links with non-

member states or potential member states, as is the case of the West Balkans, is

creating in the periphery of the EU a necklace of sub-regional cooperation groups

linked with the EU on a dependent, diffused, soft, elastic and differentiated basis.

Other example of necklace subregionalism are the expected creation of

Eastern Partnership to be launched by the end of 2008 and the New Northen

Dimension. The Eastern Partnership, proposed by Poland and Sweden in May 2008

and approved at the EU summit in June 2008, would cover countries including

Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Under the partnership, the EU will enhance regional

cooperation between these countries and open bilateral negotiations with each one of

them on a visa regime and free trade areas.

The New Northern Dimension (ND) initiative officially launched by the EU a

decade ago has been transformed in 2006 in order to better reflect the current

situation in Northern Europe, where four Baltic Sea states became EU members in

2004 and where Russia and the EU are developing their relationship based on four

Common Spaces (Haglund-Morrissey, 2008).

. From initially being developed as an EU foreign policy initiative, the ND is today

considered a 'common policy' of four equal partnersthe EU, Russia, Norway and

Iceland. (Several key priority themes for dialogue and cooperation under the Northern

Dimension have been identified, including the followings: Economy, business and

infrastructure, human resources, education, culture, scientific research and health, the

environment, nuclear safety, and natural resources and cross-border cooperation and

regional development.

Conclusions

The paper by proposing a typology of comparing inter-regionalism tried to

examine the dynamics of EU relations with its neighbours. The analysis found out :

First, in all the economic and most of the political features the inter-regional

relations of EU with MPC , the West Balkans countries and the BSEC is

asymmetrical with the exception of energy and of security to a certain extent.

Second, EMP and the Stabilisation and Association Process are clear

examples of a constructed inter--regional relationship.


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Third, whereas much of EUs interregional relations are conducted under the

pretext of mutual benefits and winwin solutions, the distribution of these benefits

seems to be a function of the relative power positions of the EU visvis its

counterparts. The stronger the counterpart, the more concessions are given by the EU.

With weaker partners, the EU dictates much more of the conditions for interregional

cooperation.. (Sderbaum Stalgren- Van Langenhove, 2005:377) . As Helge

Hveem has noticed the dynamism in the contemporary inter-regional relations may

probably be interpreted along two dimensions: The first is related to hegemony and

sees inter-regional activism as an expression of the hegemons strategy and the second

as a response to it by other actors(Hveem, 2003:97). This could explain how the EU

negotiates with the relatively strong East Asian region and how to the weak MPCs,

the West Balkans states and most of the BSEC member states with the exception of

Russia.

Third, the collective European response to the Mediterranean, the West

Balkans and the wider Black Sea region has been examined primarily by concerns

over their likely effects on Europe itself, rather than as part of a regional solution.

Fourth, in cases of highly asymmetrical relationships inter- and

transregionalism may however also generate unintended collective identity-building.

This may be the case, as Jrgen Rland points out, as if the relationship is perceived

by one side as a device in the hands of the other to establish or consolidate

superiority. Such perceptions, which tend to denounce the behaviour of the superior

organisation in terms of paternalism or even neo-colonialism, inevitably produce

backlashes by encouraging the weaker organisation to develop its own set of

collective symbols and mythology in explicit opposition to the other side (Rland,

2001:9). This is exactly the case of EMP where the Arab states , especially after 9/11

and the invasion in Iraq have started to develop a different approach from the EUs

one on terrorism.

Fifth,following the above typology we were able to find out that EU relations

with the MPCs and the Eastern European Countries with the exception of Russia

since 2003 has started to change its direction: From asymmetrical inter-regionalism

towards depedencia regionalism in the framework of the European Neighbourhood

Policy (ENP). ENP therefore, should be perceived not as a type of inter-regionalism,

but as a process of regionalism through inter-regionalism which will lead to the

creation of a mega- region extending from the Atlantic to the Urals and the


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Caucasus and from the Barent Sea to Sahara desert based on homocentric

circles of integration.

`Sixth, since 2006 and more emphatically since 2008 another characteristic has

appeared in the geographical area surrounding the EU. The emergence of a number

of sub-regional cooperation schemes creating in the periphery of the EU a necklace

of sub-regional cooperation groups linked with the EU not as parts of a Wider

Europe but as a kind of association with the EU on a diffused, soft, elastic and

differentiated basis. These sub-regional groupings like the Regional Cooperation

Council linked with SEECP in the South Eastern Europe and the Union for

Mediterranean (UoM) might become a proper tool of accommodating states which,

first are unable or not reluctant to accept the conditionality-positive and negative-

that comes with ENP, second are satisfied with a bilateral cooperation with the EU

like Russias Strategic Partnership and third, candidate countries that the public

opinion of some of the EU member states is unwilling to accept their admission to

the EU.

The analysis points at the need for more empirical comparative studies as a

way of assessing the real value and impact of inter-regionalism. A fundamental

question which has been raised by Yeo Lay Hwee about ASEM but applies also to

EUs relations with its neighbours has to be answered. How do the members states

themselves look at inter-regionalism? Do they see inter-regionalism as an instrument

that can be used effectively to address issues of regional concern, global governance,

and influencing world politics? Or do they see it merely as an instrument to promote

narrow self- interests? (Hwee, 2003:181).

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