Ethnic competition and mobilization in Taiwan’s politics

ETHNIC COMPETITION AND MOBILIZATION IN TAIWAN'S POLITICS

Wen Lang Li

Both global and historical contexts point to the importance of studying ethnic issues in Taiwan. In this article the author at- tempts to examine the political conflicts between the immigrants and natives in Taiwan and their resource mobilization strategies. Statistical findings based on Taiwan's election outcomes since 1986 are presented. The triangular relationship among the T- KMT, C-KMT, and DPP are analyzed. It is predicted that the mobilization strategies for the younger generation of immigrants may go beyond the traditional political arena.

INTRODUCTION

The ethnic factor is emerging as the most important issue in the world community? With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, ethnic conflict has replaced ideological conflict as the world's most troublesome problem. Eth- nic wars are currently rampant in Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia, and many other places. Ethnic separatist movements are commonplace in both Western (e.g., Canada) and non-Western societies. 2 It seems imperative that the sociology of development has to examine the dynamics of ethnic competition seriously, in order to provide a more thorough understanding of the world's development.

As a rapidly developing country Taiwan has its share of ethnic problems. Historically, Taiwan has been plagued by constant waves of ethnic conflict. Since the beginning of its civilization, Taiwan suffered dearly the loss of human lives in wars between aborigines and immigrant Han people. 3 The aborigines were pushed to become "mountain people," but ethnic conflicts continued among the Han people, between Hakka and Fukienese. Again, Hakka were pushed to less desirable hilly places, but two ethnic groups among the Fukienese, Chuan Chou and Chang Chou, had numerous bloody wars in the nineteenth century. In addition to inter-ethnic conflicts, Taiwan was con- quered and ruled by two imperial powers, the Dutch from 1624 to 1661 and the Japanese in 1895 tol945.

Both global and historical contexts point to the importance of studying ethnic issues in Taiwan. We should hasten to add that ethnic conflicts in

Wen Lang Li is professor of sociology at Ohio State University and author of Taiwan's Population and Social Development (Taiwan Jenkou Yu Shehui Fachan), (Taipei: Tungta Books, 1991), and Rethinking the Welfare State (Fuli Shehui di Shengsi), (Taipei, Youth Cultural Enterprises, 1992).

60 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / SPRING 1993

Taiwan are not a racial issue. 4 In fact, today's Taiwanese are not racially dis- tinguishable. Ethnic conflicts in Taiwan represent the competition between waves of immigrants. Since 1945, roughly two million Chinese Nationalists (Koumintang, or KMT) have come to Taiwan. They were political refugees from the communist mainland. They constituted only about 15 percent of Taiwan's population, yet, this minority group possessed ruling power in Tai- wan.

In this analysis I attempt to examine the political conflicts between the natives and mainlanders in Taiwan and their resource mobilization strategies. The natives are commonly referred to as the "Taiwanese," although the term "Taiwanese" could also mean various people living in Taiwan. I am also using the terms "mainlanders," and "mainland Chinese" interchangeably. I will first focus on the status differentials between these two ethnic groups, or what I refer to as the two "waves of immigrants." The purpose is to provide some background understanding of their emerging political conflicts. Then, I will proceed to propose a theoretical concept, which I call the "triangular advantages." I believe that ethnic issues cannot simply be regarded as internal problems. Contextual variables are always very important in ethnic concerns. Third, I will try to articulate the process as to how the mainlanders, as an ethnic minority, can still mobilize their resources to compete successfully in facing the inevitable democratization of Taiwan.

Additionally, I will attempt to present some empirical findings based on Taiwan's election outcomes since 1986, the year that an opposition party was formally established. The data were derived from the Election Communiques (Hsuen Chu Kung Pao) published by the Ministry of Interior for each election. In total there were four national elections: the 1986 election of national assemblymen and legislators, the 1989 election of legislators, the 1991 election of national assemblymen, and the 1992 election of legislators. The focus of the analysis will be on the most recent election outcomes.

STATUS DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN NATIVES AND MAINLANDERS

Two major ethnic issues emerge in the relationship between Taiwanese (natives) and Chinese mainlanders (recent immigrants). One serious question is how political power should be properly shared and distributed. For more than four decades (since 1949), the Chinese Nationalists expected to recap- ture the mainland from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and promised to return political normality to the Taiwanese people. The immigrants' political privileges have been protected by the so-called Chieh Yen Fa (Martial Law). No congressional election was held, and native Taiwanese had only limited access to the central political machinery. As Taiwan was only one of the thirty-five Chinese provinces claimed by the nationalists, Taiwanese limited political access was legitimized.

LI 61

Language and class differences are the other serious issues between native Taiwanese and immigrant Chinese. 5 The prevailing language among Taiwan- ese is a Fukienese dialect, which was suppressed by the ruling class. The Taiwanese mother tongue was not allowed in classrooms or on formal occa- sions. Speaking the local dialect was treated as a symbol of low social class. Perhaps the most distinct difference between native Taiwanese and immigrant mainlanders is their educational background. In the 1950s, mainlanders were generally more highly educated than native Taiwanese. Admittedly, both the language and class differences have been drastically reduced in recent years. But the gap is still noticeable.

Since their arrival in 1949, immigrant Chinese have been the dominant social class in Taiwan. As they were selected from the upper class of mainland China, their levels of education and wealth were much higher than those of native Taiwanese. Thus, political power, educational prestige, and economic wealth were all concentrated in the hands of the mainlanders. Never- theless, the progression of the Taiwanese economy in the last forty years has gradually lessened the class dominance of the mainland Chinese. Taiwan has had one of the highest levels of education among the developing countries. The government provides nearly compulsory education up to the ninth grade. Currently, nearly 50 percent of high school students go to college. The education gap between the mainlanders and the natives has narrowed rapidly.

The growth of the private sector in the last few decades was the major reason for the creation of the so-called "Taiwan economic miracle. ''6 Taiwan has steadily maintained an extremely high rate of economic growth, about 8 percent annually. 7 When the nationalist government took over the island from the Japanese, the postwar Taiwanese economy was in shambles, and the proportion of the public sector was fairly large. However, the government adopted a market-oriented economic policy and the private sector grew strongly in the last few decades. Most of the mainlanders were employed in the public sector and thus their relative share of economic development has shrunk. On the other hand, the natives were mostly employed in the private sector and they benefited most from the economic growth.

As the class gap between the natives and the mainlanders narrows, the differentials in political power become an important issue. People in Taiwan are well aware of the strong linkages between politics and economics. To guarantee their continued economic interests, the natives have to ensure a strong grip on future political events. In Taiwanese, it is often referred to as the "redistribution of political resources." However, from the viewpoint of the mainlanders, political power is the last resource they have. The relative advantages in education and other social class dimensions have rapidly di- minished. In addition, they have lost dearly in the economic competition as the majority of the mainlanders do not own real estate. Many mainlanders are employed in public sector jobs, such as military and government-controlled


enterprises. To the mainlanders, the gradually diminishing role in the political arena will mean the end of their influence in Taiwanese society.

THE TRIANGULATION ADVANTAGE

What complicates ethnic politics in Taiwan is the inevitable external influence from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. The People's Republic of China (PRC) in the mainland always claims that Taiwan is one of its provinces under its legitimate jurisdiction. The PRC will never leave Taiwan's internal affairs to the Taiwanese. In this sense, ethnopolitics in Taiwan becomes an international issue. The Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan is recognized diplomatically by nearly thirty countries, and it has maintained active semiofficial relationships with most nations. Thus, the intervention of the PRC in Taiwan's ethnopolitics becomes a controversial issue in the world community.

The mainland Chinese in Taiwan are caught in a very awkward political situation. Their attitude toward the PRC is very ambivalent. On one hand, the majority are against the communist regime. That was the reason they took refuge in Taiwan back in 1949. They would do whatever possible to see that the communists lose control in the mainland. On the other hand, their attitude toward Taiwan's political autonomy is identical to that of the Chinese communists. If Taiwan becomes a separate political entity from China, that would be a betrayal to their ancestors, and to the tradition of the great Chinese civilization. To them, it is a political puzzle: who is their number one enemy, the communists or the Taiwanese separatists?

It is inevitable that some Chinese mainlanders in Taiwan have reached the conclusion that the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) is their immedi- ate concern. Their primary reasons are based on two considerations. First, the communist regime in the mainland cannot be easily toppled, it can only be slowly modified. A sudden revolution in the PRC would not be good for Taiwan either. In this sense, Taiwan must learn how to adjust itself to the changing course of the mainland. Hopefully, ongoing interactions with the PRC will result in its internal "democratic evolution." Second, the TIM threatens the fundamental political interests of the mainlanders in Taiwan. If Taiwan becomes an independent and separate political entity, the mainlanders will immediately lose their legitimate claim of "representing" various Chinese provinces in Taiwan's government, the Republic of China.

Consequently, the mainland Chinese in Taiwan are employing three mobilizing strategies to enhance their political interests. The first and primary effort is to suppress the growth of Taiwan separatism. The TIM is portrayed as consisting of traitors to Chinese history and tradition. By rigorously pro- moting Chinese culture in Taiwan, it is hoped that a sense of national solidar- ity between Taiwan and the mainland will be reinforced. Second, mainland

LI 63

Chinese in Taiwan strongly encourage interactions between the ROC and the PRC. The once-important political taboo has been revoked. Taiwan's merchants are encouraged to invest in the mainland, and people from the mainland are welcome in Taiwan. Third, the "China card" can be played when necessary. The threat from the PRC is used as an instrument to enhance the political status quo in Taiwan.

Similarly, native Taiwanese also play another triangular game to promote their political interests. Since its retreat to Taiwan, the nationalist government has made a serious attempt to involve more native Taiwanese in visible political positions. The so-called "nativization" (Pen-tu-hua) policy was especially pronounced under the leadership of the late President Chiang Ching- kuo. In fact, some cabinet positions, such as the ministers of interior and transportation, were reserved especially for local Taiwanese politicians. In addition, elections for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan have continuously been conducted for the Taiwanese delegates, even though their number was proportionally small in comparison with those "forever-incumbent" members from mainland China. The elections provided some Taiwan- ese with political representation and visibility. Gradually the Taiwanese political force has emerged into a very strong faction within the Kuomintang regime. It may be labeled the Taiwan-KMT, which is ideologically differen- tiable from the traditional KMT. The mainlander-dominated faction within the KMT may be labeled as the China-KMT.

Some people may fail to recognize that the democratization in Taiwan is not only an increasing challenge to the Kuomintang regime, but also a source of internal friction within the Kuomintang. Indeed, the most well-known democratic movement in Taiwan was the formal establishment of the Demo- cratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. Even before 1986, there had been anti-KMT political movements, which were often called "Tangwai" or "the Outside Party." In fact, in the local provincial elections, the KMT candidates have constantly captured not more than three-quarters of the popular vote. The Tangwai candidates were always visible since the arrival of the nationalist government. The Tangwai, and its successor DPP, were composed mainly of the native Taiwanese politicians.

As shown in Figure 1, the triangular relationships among the Taiwan- KMT, China-KMT, and DPP represent the intricate ethnopolitical competi- tions in Taiwan. The T-KMT and C-KMT share the same political resources and legitimacy. They both adhere to the long tradition of Chinese culture and believe that the political destinies of Taiwan and China are inseparable. How- ever, the T-KMT and the DPP are all native-born. They believe that preserving the interests of the twenty-million Taiwanese is the foremost mission of Taiwan politics. This is known as the "Taiwan Priority" issue. What is hap- pening in the China mainland is of secondary importance.

Both the T-KMT and DPP were all elated that Lee Teng-hui, a native son,


took the presidency of the Republic of China, following the death of Presi- dent Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. The T-KMT faction under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui became the "mainstream" (MS) of Taiwan's politics, while the C-KMT became the "non-mainstream" (NMS). The MS faction has many political advantages over the NMS faction. The MS has the strong support of Taiwanese grass roots and business communities. In fact, the business-politics connection has become the most vulnerable problem for the mainstreamers. It is much less a liability for both the China-KMT and the DPP. Both of them are not in power, and are not favored by the rich Taiwan- ese merchants. Ironically, both the C-KMT and the DPP share the same puritanical ideology at the current stage of Taiwan's political development. In the 1992 legislator election, both the C-KMT candidates and the DPP candidates used "anti-money politics" (Fan-ching-chuan) as their ideological means to achieve electoral success.

MOBILIZATION FOR ETHNIC ADVANTAGES

The process of Taiwan's democratization is inseparable from the masterful exploitation of the "Lee Teng-hui Complex" by the T-KMT faction. Undeni- ably, the T-KMT are the mainstreamers of Taiwan's politics. On one hand, they have the abundant political resources inherited from the legitimacy and accumulations of the KMT tradition. On the other hand, they appeal to native sentiments. In recent years, the Taiwan-KMT has acquired various political concessions from the China-KMT. The vocal threats of the DPP, the outside party, are frequently used to push for the concessions. A complete political reform is currently underway in Taiwan. A hotly debated issue is whether Taiwan's political structure should be converted into either a parliamentary system or a presidential system like that of the United States. The mainlanders would prefer a parliamentary system. Understandably, the traditional functions of the KMT will undoubtedly disappear under a presidential system.

The mainlanders have seen their political dominance gradually eroding under the Lee Teng-hui administration. An obvious example is the termina- tion of the "forever incumbent" system of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. For nearly half a century, the congressional members who were elected on the Chinese mainland in 1947 were still in power in Taiwan. They were treated as the "symbol of legitimacy" of nationalist China, which claimed to represent all Chinese in the mainland. Several hundred of these once-powerful "mainland representatives" suddenly found themselves unem- ployed under the Lee Teng-hui administration in 1990. Their privileges and prestige were gone too. Their children no longer had the comparative advantage in a seemingly strange land, whose language they did not even under- stand. To them, President Lee Teng-hui has betrayed the traditional mission

LI 65

of the Kuomintang, and the destiny of the Republic of China will eventually be undermined by the Taiwan-KMT.

In 1991, the legislative members of the T-KMT pushed through ethnic- sensitive legislation that was offensive to the mainlanders. It prohibited official publications from registering or publishing any statistical information on the population by "provincial origin." For several thousands of years Chinese culture encouraged descendants to "remember" their ancestors' origins. It was believed that a person should be proud of his/her roots and never forget them. However, under the zealous advocacy of the Taiwan-KMT, the Legis- lative Yuan endorsed the "total nativization" policy, which prohibited the "differentiation of the population by provincial origins." To the Taiwan-KMT members, the legislation was supposed to eradicate provincial differences and contribute to resolving the ethnic problems in Taiwan. Obviously, this is a chauvinistic view, insensitive to the ethnic pride of the mainlanders.

Undoubtedly, the mainlanders are currently in a state of political uncertainty. Some believe that they have lost their traditional control of the powerful political machine, the Kuomintang; they are demoted from the "mainstreamers" to the "non-mainstreamers." Others are worried that their children will be confronted with the "double jeopardies," of both economic and political disadvantages. Their traditional dominance of the political chan- nels is no longer possible, because of the inevitable trend of democratization. As a minority, the role they play in political elections is very limited. On one hand, they have to search for new ways to regain control of the powerful political machine; on the other hand, they have to branch out their influence beyond the political arena.

The 1992 legislator election was very much affected by the mainlanders' sense of political anxiety. In the past, the nationalist party machine was powerful, and few party members would dare to go beyond the party machine to run for election. The mainlanders did not have to run for the popular elections as they have control of the party machine. However, the political reality has changed since the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. Not only do the mainlanders have to run for election, but they also have to cross the Nationalist Party. As shown in Table 1, there were in total 170 KMT members who ran for the 1992 election; seventy-three of them, or about 43 percent, were not party-nominated. However, the picture was quite different among the mainlanders. Out of the twenty-four mainlander KMT candidates, 54 percent were not nominated by the party.

We should hasten to add that the number of "mainlanders" in the 1992 election was slightly underestimated, as the official registration did not allow identification of "provincial origin." Candidates were permitted to give only their "province of birth." Hence, the younger mainlander candidates, though fewer in number, had to register as "Taiwanese" according to their birthplace.

In any case, it remains true that the mainlanders can no longer count on


TABLE 1 Candidates' Likelihood of Success by Party and Nativity,

1992 Legislator Election

Same Other Party County C o u n t i e s Mainlander Total

KMT-Nominated 65.2 52.9 81.8 65.0 (69) (17) (11) (97)

KMT-Self 24.5 36.4 15.3 24.7 (49) (11) (13) (73)

DPP-Nominated 56.4 83.3 - - 64.9 (39) (18) (57)

DPP-Self 0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 (4) (2) (6)

Other 10.3 4.6 0.0 7.0 (58) (44) (13) (115)

Total 38.8 32.6 30.6 36.2 (219) (92) (37) (348)

Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number of candidates.

the KMT machine as their only source of political power. Yet, ironically, the party machine is still the most effective mechanism to gain any political advantages. As shown in Table 1, Taiwan has basically been moving toward a two-party political system. Only the candidates nominated by either the Kuomintang or the DPP could have about the same (65 percent) electoral success. The self-nominated party members have very limited chances of winning any election, and the likelihood of success for a non-party candidate was as low as 7 percent.

Obviously, the most effective political mobilization for the mainlanders is still through the KMT party machinery. Those candidates who stayed within the party and were nominated by the party had an excellent chance of electoral success, about 82 percent. The comparative advantage for the native KMT-nominated candidates was only 63 percent. Interestingly, the likelihood of electoral success for the natives is roughly the same regardless of whether he/she is a KMT-nominated or a DPP-nominated candidate. In other words, a Taiwan-KMT member still has the political advantages of staying inside the party. This statistical reality perhaps provides a good explanation as to why so many natives are still staying inside the KMT, and there has never been a large-scale exodus to the DPP camp.

INCREASING POLITICIZATION OF THE MAINLANDERS

To the mainlanders in Taiwan, the beginning of the Lee Teng-hui administration in 1988 marked the end of their political dominance. The sense of their political uncertainty is reflected in Taiwan's election outcomes. As

LI 67

shown in Figure 2, the proportion of mainlanders running for national elections was low before 1988. The mainlanders had majority control of both the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan. Thus, in 1986, the proportion of mainlanders was about 11 percent for both KMT-nominated and total candidates. Three years later, in the legislator election, the proportion dramatically surged. It was 27 percent among KMT-nominated and 46 percent among total candidates, far exceeding their population share, which was less than 15 percent.

The mainlanders' explosive interest in political participation could have raised a skeptical reaction in the general Taiwanese population. Many people viewed the mainlanders' enthusiasm for political participation as an effort to preserve their monopoly interests. This backlash was especially harmful to the native Kuomintang candidates, who had to share the blame. The results of the backlash contributed to the loss of many Taiwanese KMT candidates. Their likelihood of success declined suddenly from about 80 percent in 1986 to less than 70 percent in 1989, as shown in Table 2. The Taiwan-KMT politicians had to bear the ethnic burden of the Chinese Kuomintang, though they also share the political legitimacy, as well as the bountiful financial resources.

In retrospect, the mainlanders' explosive interest in political participation might have long-term disadvantages. They have used the Kuomintang political machine to preserve their political advantages. Two electoral strategies were pursued by the mainlanders. The first mechanism was the mobilization of the well-known Huang Fu-Hsing (HFH) division within the Kuomintang. The HFH division was composed of veterans who retired from active military duty, and the majority of them were mainlanders. For years, they constituted the stronghold of KMT electoral success. They obeyed the party's orders, and cast 100 percent votes for the party's chosen candidates, who might or might not have been mainlanders. They were the so-called "mobile votes" (Chi Tung P'iao) according to KMT electoral strategists.

The "mobile votes" are no longer mobilizable by Lee Teng-hui, as the HFH leadership believes that he has betrayed the political interests of the China-KMT. The mainlanders have to protect their own political interests. Thus, with their bountiful veteran budget, the HFH division mobilizes to support only the mainlander candidates. They are not willing to divert their resources to Taiwan-KMT members. For this reason, we see in Table 2 that the mainlander KMT candidates' likelihood of success suddenly surged in 1989, and continued until 1991. The probability of their success was 86 percent in 1989 and 93 in 1992.

Another strategy to preserve mainlanders' political interests was to reform the electoral process. A well-known European electoral system, known as Proportional Representation, was borrowed by the Republic of China in 1991. Three types of political representation were established: general, party,

68 JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTASIAN STUDIES / SPRING 1993

TABLE 2 Likelihood of Success of KMT-Nominated Candidates

by Nativity, 1986--1992

Year N a t i v e Mainlander Total

1986-Legislators 79.2 50.0 75.9 (48) (6) (54)

1986-Assemblymen 80.0 71.4 78.9 (50) (7) (57)

1989-Legislators 70.4 87.5 75.0 (44) (16) (60)

1991-Assemblymen 82.0 93.1 83.5 (183) (29) (212)

1992-Legislators 62.8 81.8 65.0 (86) (11) (97)

Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number of candidates.

and overseas. Quotas were set in each election to allow for party and overseas representatives. The quotas were divided among the parties that won at least 5 percent of the total seats in the general election. Only the KMT and the DPP passed that threshold in the 1991 and the 1992 elections. The Kuomintang then used that quota to distribute political power equally between the natives and the mainlanders.

As shown in Table 3, in the general election the proportion of mainlander representatives was about 15 percent in 1991, and 13 percent in 1992. (Keep in mind that the definition of "mainlanders" was changed from 1991 to 1992.) But in terms of total representation, the mainlanders' share increased to 20 percent in 1991 and 15 percent in 1992. This was possible because of the Proportional Representation system. Kuomintang candidates, including both mainlanders and natives, won more than 70 percent of the votes in the general elections. Thus, they were given that share of the representative quota. The party then distributed the quota more or less equally between the mainlanders and the natives. Notably, among the overseas representatives the party overwhelmingly favored the mainlanders, 67 percent in 1991 and 75 percent in 1992. In this way, an innovative European political system was used to preserve the political interests of an ethnic group, and to enhance the "political equilibrium."

M O B I L I Z A T I O N T H R O U G H S T A T U S A D V A N T A G E S

To paraphrase a quote from General Douglas MacArthur, "old political advantages never die; they just fade away." The mainlanders have three major political advantages in Taiwan, even though they are an ethnic minority in an increasingly democratic society. First, they are able to make use of the triangular advantages. By taking advantage of the external threat from the

L/

TABLE 3 Proportion of Mainlanders among Elected Members by Party

and Type of Representation, 1991 and 1992

69

Type of Representation KMT DPP Other Total

1991-Assemblymen General 15.2 2.4 14.3 12.9

(177) (41) (7) (225) Party 43.3 5.0 - 33.8

(60) (20) (80) Overseas 66.7 0.0 - 50.0

(15) (5) (20) Total 25.0 3.0 14.3 20.3

(252) (66) (7) (325) 1992-Legislators General 12.6 0.0 0.0 8.7

(81) (37) (8) (126) Party 47.4 0.0 - 30.0

(19) (11) (30) Overseas 75.0 0.0 - 50.0

(4) (2) (6) Total 22.1 0.0 - 14.2

(104) (50) (162)

Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number of positions.

PRC, the mainlanders can argue for preserving the status quo and their old political interests. Second, by mobilizing the resources within the Nationalist Party, they can extend their political influence. Some innovative political systems have been adopted to advance the minority political interests. Fi- nally, they take advantage of their own community resources and compete successfully in a modernizing society.

Unquestionably, the mainlanders have a serious disadvantage: they do not have predominant control of the economy. A democratic system is inseparable from economic influence. One needs money to win an election. The mainlanders have lost economic control because of Taiwan's rapid industrial- ization and the growth of the private sector. In Table 4 we can see clearly that the percentage of business owners was small among the mainlander representatives, and about 25 percent among the native politicians. The lack of economic resources will certainly handicap the mainlanders in political competition in the future.

However, as shown in Table 4, the mainlander politicians fare better in the "modernizing" characteristics. Their level of educational attainment is higher than that of the natives. Among the elected representatives in 1992, all mainlanders had at least a college education, while the comparable figure was 79 percent among the native. In addition, the mainlander women are more politi-


TABLE 4 Status Characteristics of the KMT Elected Members

by Nativity, 1986 to 1992

Year Percent Percent College- Percent

Business-Owners Graduated+ Female Native Mainland Native Mainland Native Mainland

1986- 23.2 0.0 90.2 100.0 13.7 0.0 Legislators (51) (3) (51) (3) (51) (3) 1986- 28.8 40.0 65.4 60.0 13.5 20.0 Assemblymen (52) (5) (52) (5) (52) (5) 1989- 26.7 12.5 86.7 81.2 8.3 37.5 Legislators (60) (16) (60) (16) (60) (16) 1991- 27.0 17.2 57.6 82.8 12.2 24.1 Assemblymen (196) (29) (196) (29) (196) (29) 1992- 8.7 0.0 79.1 100.0 8.7 27.3 Legislators (115) (11) (115) (11) (115) (11)

Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number of elected members.

cally capable than their native sisters. More mainlander women were in- volved in politics and won their elections. In the 1992 election, 27 percent of the mainlander representatives were women, in contrast to only 9 percent among the native representatives. If women's status is taken as an indicator of modernization, then the mainlanders certainly are superior to the natives.

In the current stage of ethnic competition, the mainlanders seem to use their relatively superior status characteristics to fight for political preserva- tion. In comparison to the natives, the younger generation of mainlanders are better educated, more culturally sophisticated, and more in tune with prevailing social trends. They are very active in the mass media, and have a dispro- portionate share of media control. With such an unequal standing ground, their claim for "equal political representation" still violates the true rules of the democratic game.

It appears that the best mobilizing strategy for the younger generation of mainlanders may not be in the political arena. De-politicization is perhaps their best mobilizing strategy. The mainlanders should make use of their "modernizing" advantages in non-political frontiers. They could develop their sophistication in business, technology, and other arenas. By following the de- politicization strategy, the mainlanders can and will become the innovating force in Taiwan's democratic process.

N O T E S

This article is a preliminary version of a paper presented at the conference on "The Domes- tic Roots of Taipei's Growing Role in International Affairs," The Gaston Sigur Center for East Asian Studies, The George Washington University, February 26--27, 1993.

LI 71

1. See Timothy M. Frye, "Ethnicity, Sovereignty and Transitions from Non-Democratic Rule," Journal oflnternationalAffairs, vol. 45 (Winter 1992), pp. 599-623, and James G. Kellas, "The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 45 (Win- ter 1992), pp. 645-48.

2. See Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams, The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity, and Language in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); and Richard H. Thompson, "Theories of Ethnicity," Rural Sociology, vol. 55,(Spring 1990), pp. 31-32.

3. Ch'i-nan Ch'en, Tai Wan di Ch'uan T'ung Sheh Hui (Taiwan's Traditional Chinese Soci- ety), (Taipei: Yun Ch'en Publishers, 1988).

4. Frank Dikotter, "Group Definition and the Idea of 'Race' in Modern China (1793-1949)," Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 13 (July 1990), pp. 420-32.

5. Robert Norton, "Ethnicity and Class: A Conceptual Note with Reference to the Politics of Post-Colonial Societies," Ethnic and RacialStudies, vol. 7 (July t 984), pp. 426-34.

6. Yuan-li Wu, Becoming an Industrialized Nation: ROC's Development on Taiwan (New York, NY: Praeger, 1985).

7. Wen Lang Li, Tai Wan Jen Juo yu Sheh Hui Fa Chan (Taiwan's Population and Social De- velopment), (Taipei: Tung Ta Publishers, 1992).

Documents

Ethnic competition and mobilization in Taiwan’s politics