Ethnic and Racial Studies Nationalism, war and social cohesion

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Nationalism, war and social cohesionSiniša Malešević

First published on: 06 July 2010

To cite this Article Malešević, Siniša(2011) 'Nationalism, war and social cohesion', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34: 1, 142 —161, First published on: 06 July 2010 (iFirst)To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2010.489647URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2010.489647

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Nationalism, war and social cohesion

Sinisa Malesevic

(First submission February 2009; First published July 2010 )

Abstract

Most studies of nationalism and war focus on the direct causal relation-ship between the two. Whereas the naturalist theories see strong nationalattachments as a primary cause of war, the formativist approachesunderstand nationalism as an inevitable product of warfare. This paperchallenges both of these leading interpretations by problematizing thenature of group solidarity in the large scale violent conflicts. The authordevelops an alternative argument that emphasizes the centrality of twoinstitutional processes: centrifugal ideologization and the cumulativebureaucratization of coercion. The principal argument is that war doesnot create nationalism neither does nationalism generate wars. Insteadthe development of nationalism owes much to the macro historicalinstitutional processes that have little to do with the actual battlefields.

Keywords: Nationalism; war; ideology; solidarity; violence; bureaucracy.

Introduction

Common sense suggests that in times of war social behaviourundergoes dramatic change. The presence of actual or perceived threatis often seen as having a direct impact on existing social relationshipswith the escalation of violence polarizing groups involved in theconflict. The general assumption is that warfare inevitably fosters theemergence of strong national identities that also entail a lack ofsolidarity towards those who find themselves on the other side of theconflict line. Drawing on these generally accepted assumptions, muchof contemporary social theory and research see nationalism and war asmutually interdependent. Despite the fact that scholars disagree onwhat comes first, nationalism or war, there is near unanimity on theview that the conditions of warfare inexorably increase nationalsolidarity. In other words while some argue that excessive nationalbonds contribute to, or even cause wars, others see nationalism as an

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unequivocal consequence of warfare. Even those who are more wary ofthese assumptions such as Van Evera (1994), Comaroff and Stern(1995) and Scheff (2000) do not question the causality of thisrelationship and focus exclusively on the different forms of nationalistexperience. For example Van Evera’s (1994, p. 5) central researchquestions are: ‘What types of nationalism are most likely to causewar?’ and ‘What background conditions catalyze or dampen thiscausal process?’

In contrast to these approaches, I outline an alternative conceptualframework that aims on the one hand to challenge this taken forgranted view and on the other to engage more thoroughly with theprocesses through which micro level solidarity is organizationallytransformed into macro-level nationalist narrative. The key argumentis that for the most part nationalism is neither the product nor thecause of war. Instead, the relationship between the two is morecomplex, messy and often unpredictable. Rather than acting as anautomatic and natural response under conditions of hostility andexternal threat, nationalism is heavily dependent on long-termorganizational and ideological support, much of which has little todo with actual warfare. Far from being a self-evident and normalreaction to inter-group violent confrontation, national homogeniza-tion is often an untidy, contested and acrimonious process that relieson external structural factors. Among these factors two processesstand out: centrifugal ideologization and the cumulative bureau-cratization of coercion (Malesevic 2010). The argument is developedin two parts: first, I provide a brief critical analysis of the leadingexplanations that strongly tie social cohesion and nationalism to war;and then I articulate an alternative hypothetical model that focuses onthe crucial role that ideology and social organizations play in thisprocess.

Beyond nature and nurture: war and national solidarity

Most studies that tackle the relationship between war, nationalism andgroup homogeneity belong to one of two research traditions: theyeither see national solidarity itself as a cause of organized violence, oralternatively they posit wars as principal generators of nationalism.Whereas for one group of scholars � naturalists � cultural differenceis almost inherently linked to intergroup violence, for others �formativists � it is the violence itself that creates such strong culturaland national bonds.

For sociobiologists such as Van Hooff (1990), Van der Dennen(1995), and Gat (2006), the origin and escalation of warfare has astrong genetic basis. In this view, organized violence is rooted inaggressive dispositions that have evolved over millions of years. Thus,

Nationalism, war and social cohesion 143


just as with other advanced mammals, humans utilize wars as meansof competition over scarce resources and territory with a view ofmaximizing their reproductive potential. In particular, attention isgiven to the behaviour of advanced apes such as chimpanzees thatrely on strategic planning to build coalitions which attack otherchimpanzees. It is argued that in this sense apes resemble earlyhumans, with both species engaging in ‘primitive warfare’ (Van Hooff1990; Stanford 2001).

In addition, since most sociobiologists see ethnic and nationalattachments as an extension of kinship, they conceptualize nationalsolidarity as given, primordial and more or less automatic. Biological,and by extension cultural, similarities are in themselves understood asa principal source of group conflict. Thus, for sociobiologists war is aproduct of human genetics, a kin-based violent competition deeplyembedded in aggressive dispositions and utilized to maximize one’s‘inclusive fitness’. Simply put, the likelihood of organized violentgroup confrontation stems directly from the group’s inherent, geneti-cally developed, ethno-national solidarity.

While sharing the central premise that strong ethno-nationalbonding precedes violent confrontations, the historical variant ofthis argument pays less attention to genetics and more to thehistorically documented cases of ethnocentric warfare. In the view ofsome military historians, cultural difference in itself is a potentgenerator of collective violence. Drawing in part on Sun Tzu’s (1971)philosophy of war which emphasizes the strategic benefits in knowingthe cultural background of one’s enemy, a number of influentialhistorians argue that war is a direct product of ingrained culturalhomogeneity. For example, for Keegan (1993, p. 46), rather than beinga Clausewitzean extension of politics by other means, war is ‘theperpetuation of a culture by its own means’. In his view, war is anexpression of culture and as such its occurrences and character aredetermined by the different ethno-cultural, national and civilizationaltraditions. In this vein he describes post-9/11 warfare as the continua-tion of ‘older conflict between settled, creative, productive Westernersand predatory, destructive Orientals’ (Keegan 2001). Although othermilitary historians generally do not go that far in deducing organizedviolence from inherent ‘civilizational’ divides, many tend to identifystrong national identification as a principal source of warfare. Modernwars in particular are seen as the direct product of strong nationalbonds. For example, for Schmitt (1958, p. 7), denial of national self-determination was a principal cause of the WWI.

Despite the fact that naturalism contributes to our understanding ofthe universal genetic propensities of human behaviour and is useful inemphasizing the historical versatility of warfare, it is in itself unable toprovide a plausible explanation that links war, nationalism and social

144 Sinisa Malesevic


cohesion. Even if one overlooks the reifying, essentialist and groupistdiscourse of most naturalist analyses, which is occasionally combinedwith explicit orientalist imagery, it is apparent that naturalists havedifficulty in explaining the social mechanisms of national cohesion.Rather than tracing the dynamics of social action and identifying theprocesses through which homogenization is achieved, most naturaliststake group solidarity as given. Instead of probing and problematizinggroup solidarity, they assume that biological and/or cultural resem-blance will inevitably result in organized social action. Nevertheless, associologists have demonstrated on numerous occasions (Weber 1978;Brubaker 2004; Malesevic 2006), there is no automatic link betweencultural or biological similarity and collective action. In other words,declaring oneself to be Vietnamese or German does not mean that aparticular individual will instinctively act in concert with otherindividuals who share the same national designation. Rather thanbeing a simple impulse that stems from cultural or genetic resem-blance, social action entails active and prolonged political mobiliza-tion. Furthermore, as only a small number of cultural and biologicalpractices can be successfully mobilized, the entire process of nation-alist mobilization implies arbitrary selection of cultural or biologicaltraits. For nations to become real social actors, it is essential that asimple category designation is organizationally and ideologicallytransformed into a conscious, politicized and active group (Brubaker2004; Malesevic 2006).

The second problem with the naturalist argument is its inability todifferentiate between the large-scale sociological process that iswarfare and the micro psychological and biological stimuli that mayor may not be involved in wars. While there is no doubt that humanbeings share much of their emotional and behavioural repertoire withtheir evolutionary predecessors such as fear, anger or aggression andengage in hostile contests, none of these are either sufficient ornecessary for war. Since war is a social institution that involves violentconflict between two or more social organizations often underpinnedby conflicting ideological narratives and political goals, it operatesaccording to a very different logic to that of animal hostility. Ratherthan relying on simple aggressive impulses, warfare entails rigorousdiscipline, instrumental rationality, regulated division of labour,meticulous organization and a great deal of emotional restraint. Inmost cases war is the exact opposite of the unimpeded aggressive ragepresent in animal disputes: no army tolerates undisciplined andaggressive individuals and most successful military machines haveconsisted not of ‘Alfa males’ but of highly trained, skilled, obedientand well organized soldiers. As technologically advanced warsdemonstrate, one’s physical robustness, innate hostility or anger aremore impediments than advantages on the frontline. Instead what is



needed are skills, knowledge and discipline in the use of science andtechnology to operate complex machinery such as stealth airplanes,radars, to navigate long-distance missiles, submarines, unmanneddrones and so many other technological devices. Simply put, war isnothing like a personal vendetta or a violent aggressive quarrelbetween two wolves; it is a highly complex, historically contingentand socially embedded process that requires organizational andideological reinforcement (Collins 2008; Malesevic 2010).

The third and most problematic aspect of the naturalist argument isthe implicit assumption that differences in culture or biology are bythemselves a source of violent conflict. Warfare is seen to be aubiquitous phenomenon linked to the universal struggle of ethnicgroups, nations, states, empires or civilizations over power, resources,territory and status (Keegan 1993). However if there was any directcausality between violence and cultural/biological diversity, we wouldlive in a world of rampant and inexorable warfare. However, asarchaeological evidence indicates, for most of our unrecorded historyhumans have lived in very small, loose, egalitarian and nomadicnetworks of bands that rarely exceeded fifty people and were mostlyincapable of and unwilling to engage in protracted feuds (Service 1978;Fry 2007). Despite the abundance of cultural and biological diversitythat characterized the life of early humans, there is no archaeologicalevidence for warfare among the nomadic foragers and very little forthe simple sedentary tribes (Textor 1967; Eckhardt 1992; Fry 2007).That is, the origins and expansion of warfare are not linked to humandiversity. Moreover, any attempt to infer the existence of nationalsolidarity on the basis of genetics alone is bound to fail, as all claims tocommon kinship and shared descent for the large-scale entities that arenations cannot be other than metaphoric: seventy-five millionGermans could not possibly share the same ancestors. Hence, ratherthan being fixed and given, primordial entities, nations are dynamic,contingent and changing historical creations. Therefore the naturalistargument, in both of its versions, cannot provide a coherent account ofthe relationship between nationalism, war and social cohesion.

The formativist alternative

Much of mainstream social theory and research remains focused onturning the naturalist argument on its head: nationalism and intensivegroup solidarity are not the cause of war but the outcome of prolongedintergroup violent confrontations. In other words, national attach-ments are seen not as cultural or biological givens but as historicalcreation, often born through collective experience of violence. Theformativist argument is most consistently developed in the neo-Durkhemian and rational-choice perspectives. Despite the fact that



both positions concur with the view that the national homogenizationis a product, not the source, of warfare, they disagree on how thisprocess operates.

For rational-choice theorists the intensive bonds of nationalsolidarity originate in the instrumental rationality of individuals(Hechter 1995; Fearon 1995; Laitin 2007). Rather than being a basisof social action, cultural and biological similarities are viewed asindividual assets deployed for one’s economic self-interest. The out-break of war undermines the existing market situation and creates anenvironment of insecurity and instability. In such an environment,where key resources are in short supply, the dynamics of competitioncan dramatically change, leading toward the greater appreciation ofshared action. Thus, a greater national solidarity stems directly fromthe coordinated self-interest of agents that tend to utilize their sharedcultural markers with a view of maximizing utility benefits for theentire group. In this context even very destructive wars can beprofitable, as on the one hand they generate intensive nationalsolidarity that was lacking before, and on the other hand such newlyfound national bonds can lead towards economic reorganization of thepolitical structure. As Laitin (2007, p. 2) argues: ‘civil war is profitablefor potential insurgents, in that they can both survive and enjoy someprobability of winning the state. If there is an economic motive for civilwar . . . it is in the expectation of collecting the revenues that owner-ship of the state avails’. Hence, for rational-choice theorists, nationalsolidarity neither precedes nor governs individual action. Instead, in awar situation individual agents make rational choices to exploit sharedcultural markers for individual benefit, and in this process unwillinglyfoster the creation of intensive national solidarity.

In stark contrast to this view, neo-Durkhemian analyses downplayindividual rationality and emphasize collective affectivity as decisivein explaining the relationship between war, nationalism and socialcohesion. Drawing indirectly on Durkheim, Smith (1981, 2009),Hutchinson (2005, 2007) and Marvin and Ingle (1999) analyse theprocesses through which nations are historically articulated as sacredcommunities. In particular they stress the role myths and collectivememories of ‘blood sacrifice’ and ‘glorious dead’ play in creatingenduring national identities. The central focus is on historicalcollective interpretations of intergroup conflicts which establish theboundaries between culturally defined entities. For Smith (1981),warfare is one of the most important creators of ethno-nationalhistoric consciousness. Although he acknowledges the importance ofshared struggle and the presence of external threat for the increase ingroup internal cohesion, this in itself is not enough to forge intensivelong-term national consciousness. Hence, what matters more is thecollective representation and commemoration of past wars. It is



through the rituals and practices of collective remembering ofnational martyrs that nationhood is maintained and nationalsolidarity reinforced. In this sense, nationalism operates as a civilreligion that entails periodic worships of totemic, sacrificial symbols,the presence of which helps establish the normative universe ofnational communities. The commemorations of ‘glorious dead’ set upmoral parameters for the behaviour of future generations and in thisprocess perpetuate a strong national bond grounded in ethicalresponsibility towards the ancestors.

The formativist alternative is a much more persuasive attempt toexplain the link between nationalism, war and social cohesion. Itprovides a broader, more synthetic and complex answer that movesaway from the biological and psychological analogies towards socialand political processes such as instrumental rationality and thehistorical sociology of cultural representation. However, this approachstill suffers from the three pronounced shortcomings: it conflatessocial action on the micro and macro level; it overemphasizes theintegrative quality of warfare; and it takes rhetorical claims of sacrificeand killing at face value.

When formativist researchers state that the presence of externalthreat automatically leads towards greater national cohesion, theirargument essentially represents an attempt to apply the logic ofpsychological studies to the macro-historical level. The general view isthat large-scale collectivities operate in a similar way to that of themicro groups and the individuals interacting in experimental labora-tory conditions. Both rational choice theorists and neo-Durkhemiansposit social solidarity as a universal, trans-historical and, for mostpart, uniform phenomenon. While for neo-Durkhemians the mechan-ical solidarity of resemblance can replace the organic solidarity ofinterdependence, with an ethnic conscience collective growing into anarticulated national identity, for the rational-choice theorists allsolidarity presumes the pre-existence of individual self-interest. How-ever, to properly understand the relationship between nationalism andwar it is crucial to analytically distinguish between the behaviour ofindividuals in laboratory conditions, micro interaction in small, face-to-face groups and the organizationally mediated social action in thelarge-scale entities that are nations and states. Although psychologicalstudies from Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo’s (1971) early experimentsto more recent research (cf. Druckman 1995) have demonstratedconvincingly how easily individuals can act cruelly to conform toauthority, such studies have proved inadequate in explaining thedynamics of micro-group interaction.

While there is near consensus on the view that anonymousindividuals are more likely to act violently against other distant andanonymous individuals, even short periods of social interaction



significantly diminish the potential for cruel behaviour. In other words,as Collins (2008, pp. 1�7) argues and amply documents, much ofhuman violence is deeply social in character. Rather than focusing onviolent individuals, the researcher’s attention should be on the violentsituations ‘which shape the emotions and acts of the individuals whostep inside them’. In a similar vein, rather than being an exclusivepropensity of individuals, solidarity too is generated through socialmechanisms which are neither necessarily normative nor instrumental.The key point here is that there is a substantial difference in the way inwhich social bonds are created and maintained at the micro- andmacro-group level. The decades of thorough research on the behaviourof soldiers on the battlefield has revealed that despite officialpronouncements that glorify a soldier’s commitment to die for hisnation, state, ideology or religious doctrine, most of those who madethe ultimate sacrifice have done so for a much smaller group: theirfamily;close friends; or their regimental comrades (Henderson 1985;Bourke 2000; Miller 2000; Collins 2008). In this sense, most forms ofgenuine durable solidarity entail a substantial degree of micro-levelcontact and face-to-face interaction. In contrast to the neo-Durkhemianimage of nationalism as a form of synchronized and all embracingcollective effervescence that arises automatically and fills all the poresof a particular society, actual macro cohesion requires the organiza-tional integration of thousands of micro solidarity networks.

Secondly, most formativist accounts overemphasize the integrativepotential of warfare. While there is no doubt that the presence of adirect and real threat might stimulate shared feelings of fear, insecurityand anxiety, thus fostering the need for a greater cooperation andcloser attachments, these feelings and needs do not necessarilymaterialize. The history of warfare provides us with numerousexamples when the presence of a palpable threat acted not as acatalyst for national unity but as a source for its disintegration. Forexample, during the War of the Pacific (1879�1884) and the Mexican�American War (1846�48) the governments of the attacked states wereable neither to galvanize popular support nor to generate funds to paythe troops:

While the Chilean armies were marching on Lima, Peruvian financeminister Quimper suggested a small tax on capital to pay the troopsin the field. These measures were defeated . . . as the U.S. armymarched towards Mexico City in 1847, the government franticallynegotiated with the church and domestic lenders for funds. (Centeno2002, pp. 157�8)

In direct contrast to the view that warfare inevitably enhances nationalhomogeneity, one can pinpoint the cases of the late nineteenth- and



early twentieth-century Balkans and South America, as well ascontemporary Africa, where the extensive proliferation of wars didnot result in advancing greater national cohesion (Herbst 2000;Centeno 2002; Gerolymatos 2004). Similarly the argument that placesemphasis on the cohesive power of war commemorations neglects thecontextual, and hence often manipulative, character of these events.Rather than being a spontaneous and automatic popular reaction, thecollective worship of national martyrs and ‘our glorious dead’ entailelaborate organizational and ideological underpinning. The monu-ments, cenotaphs, triumphal arches and war cemeteries have to be builtand maintained by the state; grand public ceremonies require a greatdeal of organizational work; and securing public receptivenessnecessitates prolonged and effective primary and secondary socializa-tion. As the example of pre- and post-WWII Japan illustrates well, it isnot war itself that encodes which events and actors will be celebratedand commemorated, but the post-war political and cultural environ-ment which moulds who, what, when and how will be honoured andremembered. Although the Yasukuni Shinto shrine built in 1869,before the WWII, served in part as a monument for the glorification ofmilitaristic nationalism and the Japanese empire from 1945 onwards, ithas acquired a more religious and pietistic role (Nelson 2003).

Finally, in their attempt to link the rise of national solidarity to warexperience, formativists exaggerate the role of bloodshed and sacrificein forging strong national attachments. Both rational choice theoristsand neo-Durkhemians see willingness to die and kill for one’s nation asthe most reliable indicator of intense national solidarity. For neo-Durkhemians this is a sign that individuals are well integrated into theirnations whereby strong national identities often act as a surrogate forreligion. In Smith’s (1981, 2009) and Hutchinson’s (2005, 2007) view,intensive national bonds provide meanings and help individuals dealwith the question of one’s inevitable mortality. For the rational-choicetheorists, willingness to die for others is a form of exchange in whichindividual autonomy is traded off for solidarity. In Wintrobe’s (2006,p. 41) view, since nation is perceived as a ‘solidarity multiplier’, one isable and willing to make the ultimate sacrifice or kill others through theinstrumentally rational pursuit of ‘feeling of belonging-ness to a group’.

Although, as available research shows, self-sacrifice and jointparticipation in the killing of other human beings do help createexceptionally strong bonds among soldiers on the battlefield and inother small-scale groups such as gangs, terrorists or insurgents, thisprocess does not translate so well at the macro level (Grossman 1996;Collins 2008). For one thing, even in total and protracted wars, mostindividuals are unlikely to take part in combat, and in modern warfareeven the soldiers who fight rarely have the opportunity to see theenemy face-to-face and shoot at them. For example, out of 2.8 million



soldiers who were sent to the Vietnam War, only 300,000, that isaround 10 per cent, took part in actual battlefields, with an evensmaller number killing and dying in close combat (Gabriel 1987,pp. 26�30). As, since the introduction of the cannon onto thebattlefield, much warfare is fought at long distance, the possibility ofbonding through killing and dying has become remote even for thesoldiers, let alone civilians.

Furthermore, since both self-sacrifice and killing go so much againstthe normative universe of ordinary upbringing in nearly all socialorders, these practices are extremely difficult to perform and mostindividuals avoid them at all costs. The recent research makes apparentthat the majority of frontline combatants prefer to misfire, shoot inthe air or not shoot at all rather than to aim at and kill enemysoldiers. Even the most experienced soldiers dread close-range killings(Grossman 1996; Bourke 2000; Collins 2008). The situation is nearlyidentical with one’s willingness to die, as once they reach the battlefieldmost soldiers become overwhelmed with fear, with trembling, violentpounding of the heart, vomiting, cold sweat, urination and soilingone’s pants fairly widespread practices (Grossman 1996; Collins 2008).If, even for soldiers on the frontline, both sacrifice and killing for thenation remain rare and exceptional events, they are highly unlikely tohave a decisive impact on the development of national cohesionamong those who are far away from the battlefields. To sum up, theonset of war and the presence of external threat do not automaticallytranslate in the greater national cohesion. In order for this to happen,other social processes have to be at work. Let us briefly sketch whatthese processes are.

Moulding social cohesion: ideology, social organizations and nations

To argue that the strong national bonds are neither the cause nor theconsequence of war does not mean to suggest that the two phenomenaare completely unrelated. The onset of war usually influences mostaspects of everyday social life where the patterns of solidarity rarelystay unaffected. However, the social origins, direction, intensity andduration of social solidarity can never be taken for granted. Inparticular it is wrong to simply assume that the large scale collectivitiesact similarly to individual agents or micro groups. There is nothingnatural and automatic in the formation of group solidarity, andparticularly not for such gargantuan social entities as states andnations. In this context the mere presence of an external danger isunlikely to mechanically translate into greater national homogeneity.Instead the construction of social cohesion at the macro level is for themost part a historically contingent, messy and complex processinvolving events, actions and practices that often have little or nothing



to do with the actual battlefields. The fact that in the modern age warsare often satiated with widespread nationalist enthusiasm does notmean that one phenomenon is caused by the other, nor that one isbound to trigger the other. Rather, I argue that a better understandingof how national cohesion is achieved requires re-focusing our attentionto the origins and workings of two historical processes that shape thisrelationship: centrifugal ideologization and the cumulative bureau-cratization of coercion (Malesevic 2010). In what follows I outline aconceptual framework that theoretically explores the impact of thesetwo processes on the development of national cohesion in the modernera. The aim is not to formulate an alternative causal theory of therelationship between nationalism and war but, more modestly, tocritically examine the role social organizations and mass ideologiza-tion play in forging an ‘illusory correlation’ between these twophenomena.

Ideology as a mass phenomenon

There is nothing obvious in expressing solidarity with one’s co-nationals. As students of nations and nationalism have extensivelydocumented for much of our history, an individual’s sense ofattachment rarely expanded beyond the locality and close kinshipnetworks (Weber 1976; Hobsbawm 1990; Breuilly 1993). Even whennationalism emerged as a fully fledged ideology in the second half ofthe eighteenth century, it still, for most part, remained a preserve ofthe cultural, economic and political elites and some middle-classgroups influenced by the philosophies of Enlightenment and Roman-ticism (Leerssen 2006; Hroch 1985). It took hundreds of years fornationalist discourse to become a widespread phenomenon, a trans-class ideology shared by an overwhelming majority of populationsthroughout the world. Since normative ideological doctrines werelargely a creation of cultural and political elites, and have slowly andgradually permeated different layers of society, relying in the processon the structural power of various social movements and organiza-tions, I call this process a centrifugal ideologization (Malesevic 2010,pp. 8�11). The fact that this phenomenon originates at the top of socialpyramid does not suggest that the process itself is top-down, onedimensional. Instead its prevalence and intensity are determined bythe active participation of various social agents: not only stateinstitutions such as the education, mass media, military, police andadministrative agencies, but also social movements, civil societynetworks and family units.

While the pre-modern world relied on the legitimizing power ofmyths and religions, the modern era necessitates the emergence ofcoherent and all-embracing ideological doctrines able to maintain a



hold on millions of largely independent individuals. The classicalsociologists, from Ibn Khaldun, Toennies, Marx, Weber to Durkheim,comprehended well the profound structural difference between mod-ernity and its historical predecessors: far greater impersonal and blaserelations; individual autonomy; the general shift from normative tomore utilitarian relationships; the emergence of an elaborate andadvanced division of labour; the weakening of broader kinship bondsat the expense of contractual arrangements; and the ever-increasingrationalization of social action. Hence, one of the central problems inmodernity is how to develop and sustain solidarity among millions ofautonomous and impersonal individuals who are unlikely to ever meetover nine-tenths of their co-nationals.

This also has a direct impact on individual behaviour in times ofwar: whereas in the pre-modern world an attack on the village wouldquickly galvanize unity among those who know and trust each otherand who find themselves in clear danger, the involvement of a largestate in an overseas military adventure might have no impact at all, orcould even act negatively, on the social cohesion of its citizens. Thus,unlike bands, tribes, chiefdoms, city-states and empires, modernnation-states require a different form of social cement to hold itscitizenry together. I argue that it is centrifugal, mass ideologizationthat provides this cement as, when successful, it acts as an organiza-tional surrogate for genuine social solidarity. In other words, togenerate and maintain a degree of social cohesion within the nation-state, it becomes necessary to attempt to replicate the intimacy andtrust of the face-to-face interaction on this macro level. Paradoxicallyand indicatively, nationalist rhetoric insists on the warmth andemotional cosiness of communal and kinship-like ties at the verymoment when such ties are in the process of disintegration. As Gellner(1983, p. 124) astutely put it, nationalism inverts reality: ‘it claims todefend folk culture while in fact is forging a high culture; it claims toprotect an old folk society while in fact helping to build up ananonymous mass society’. Despite the strenuous attempts of nation-alist ideologues and state authorities to portray an uninterruptedcontinuity between the pre-modern and modern forms of groupattachments, nationalism is a profoundly different and historicallynovel phenomenon (Hobsbawm 1990; Mann 1993; Breuilly 1993;Malesevic 2006). In contrast to rigid medieval status hierarchies whereone’s feeling of solidarity and group loyalty rarely, if ever, expandedbeyond and below one’s social rank, and where for overwhelmingnumbers of individuals one’s entire social universe coincided with one’svillage of birth, modernity entailed a dramatic increase in bothterritorial and social mobility.

Although this centrifugal process of ideologization is rooted inconcrete structural changes such as the standardization of vernacular



languages, the growth of large-scale public educational systems, adramatic increase in literacy, state centralization, the expansion ofmilitary draft and the availability of cheap, nation-wide, mass media(Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Mann 1993), its successful proliferationalso entails the ongoing, and almost never-ending, political mobiliza-tion of civil society, family and other local networks. To generate ashared feeling of attachment which would incorporate millions ofautonomous and anonymous individuals, it was essential to bind thethousands of pockets of micro-solidarity into a coherent and believ-able macro-nationalist narrative. Since solidarity is a fragile ‘commod-ity’ that requires permanent affirmation and reinforcement, it is muchmore easily achieved through direct face-to-face interaction andphysical contact (Collins 2008) than through symbolic projections of‘an image of one’s communion’ (Anderson 1983). In the modern era ofanonymous and cold Gesellschaft, where there is little genuine warmthof Gemeinschaft, it is ideology that acts as a principal provider ofontological security for large number of individuals.

It is not only that centrifugal ideologization ‘invites the masses intohistory’ (Nairn 1977, p. 340), but it also keeps them there bymaintaining an enduring ideological scaffolding through the institu-tions of modern state and though civil society groupings. As Billig(1995) has noted, much of this ideological support is articulatedthrough the practices and ideas of banal nationalism. That is, thestrength of nationalism is better gauged by its habitual pervasivenessthan by its venomous outbursts and rallying calls: a hot, emotional,‘red in tooth and claw’ type of nationalism, is an intense but rare andtransitory phenomenon, while cold, ordinary and routine nationalismis stable and enduring. Centrifugal ideologization is so pervasiveprecisely because it is encored in unnoticeable, ordinary and taken-for-granted processes and events: the routine, tacit and everyday rhetoricof mass media; educational institutions; advertising; political speeches;entertainment; administrative orders; stamps; banknotes; and evenmeteorological broadcasts. Both Barthes (1993) and Bourdieu (1990)have demonstrated convincingly that much ideological power isgenerated through normalization and enhabitation: what is seen asobvious, normal and natural is rarely questioned. The idea that anation, class or race are self-evident and objective forms of beingentails the existence of what Bourdieu (1990) calls doxic experience:the deep-founded, acquired, almost unconscious values, beliefs andpractices. Thus centrifugal ideologization normalizes and naturalizesnationhood as a fundamental cognitive category and an essentialsocial practice.

Nevertheless, what is missing in Billig’s account are the social agentswho are not simply objects of ideologization but are active participantsin this process. Weber (1978), Simmel (1990) and Elias (2000) have all



emphasized the role of rational self-disciplining as crucial formodernity. Whereas for Weber Calvinism was the true predecessorof ascetic ethics, ‘methodical control’ and eventually rationalization ofone’s life, for Simmel modernity promotes calculability: becausehuman actions become centred on long-term goals, they are moreprone towards utilitarian behaviour and the internalization of socialconstraint. Similarly, Elias emphasizes the changing character ofinterpersonal conduct, with focus on the control of one’s emotions,bodily functions, table manners and forms of speech. This personalconditioning is integral to the process of centrifugal ideologization asit gradually helps project internal social hierarchies outside of one’ssociety. By internalizing values and practices associated with being agood and responsible German or Pole, one is able to symbolically raiseone’s own prestige at the expense of the excluded Other. In otherwords, by embracing a routine nationalist narrative, large sections ofthe population are in position to tie their own social status to thatof their nation while simultaneously denying such exceptional qualitiesto other (potentially adversary) societies. In this sense, nationalism isalmost the exact opposite of pre-modern forms of prejudice: ratherthan being dependent on the sporadic and arbitrary emotionaloutbursts of hatred that could relate to any individual and looselydefined collectivity, it entails implementation of relatively systematic,coherent ideological blueprints that depend on the utilitarian andvalue rationality of masses. Bauman (1989) clearly demonstrates thatthere is a qualitative difference between the sporadic outbursts of anti-Semitic, religiously and mythically inspired rage that characterized thetraditional world and the methodical, efficient, almost scientific andhighly regulated ideological enterprise of the ‘final solution’. Nation-alism operates most competently through habit and routine of coldand calculated rationality, not through sudden eruptions of uncon-trolled emotions. Hence, centrifugal ideologization involves boththe institutional proliferation of ideas and practices as well assubjective self-disciplining, both of which make ideology, and in thiscase nationalism, a normal, mundane and self-evident discursivepractice shared by a large majority of people. Simply put, ratherthan being a creation of warfare, nationalism develops long before anysign of upcoming interstate violence.

Social organizations and national cohesion

Centrifugal ideologization is a potent historical device for thetransformation of micro-level solidarities into macro-level nationalistnarratives. However, its very existence and expansion depend heavily onthe workings of concrete social organizations. Since Weber (1978), ithas become apparent that complex social orders operate much better



when patrimonial and nepotistic traditional authority is replaced withthe legal and instrumental rationality of bureaucratic rule. The gradualhistorical shift from traditional forms of domination based on thepersonal whim of rulers towards those rooted in the impersonal rule ofabstract laws was crucial in legitimizing modern social orders. However,what is often neglected in this sanguine diagnosis of modernity is thefact that the bureaucratic form of organization is no less domineeringthan its traditional counterparts. On the contrary, its operationaleffectiveness and its historical success are grounded in its coercivecharacter. Not only are modern administrative organizationsprofoundly (albeit transparently) hierarchical, with clearly defineddivisions of labour and responsibility, but they are also able tosuccessfully and legitimately enforce mass obedience on a scaletraditional authorities were never able to achieve. By privilegingknowledge, instrumental efficiency and institutional teleology, bureau-cratic organizations have proved capable of imposing strict discipline,social control and organizational loyalty. The fact that bureaucraticorganization is nominally articulated as open to social mobility,meritocracy and transparency, makes it more coercive rather thanless, as disobedience to such a legitimate authority is swiftly repri-manded and punished with little resistance. In contrast to common-sense views that see modernity, and in particular bureaucraticorganization of rule, as less coercive than its historical predecessors,the opposite is the case. All bureaucracy entails discipline and alldiscipline presupposes control and acquiescence. Nevertheless, what iscentral to note is the gradual and constant expansion of bureaucraticpower. The coercive reach and penetration of social organizations hasbeen on the increase over the last 10,000 years, with the last twocenturies witnessing a dramatic escalation (Malesevic 2010, pp. 92�120). Once modern social organizations managed to monopolize theuse of violence over vast and clearly demarcated territories, they werealso able to swiftly mobilize and recruit entire societies to confrontcompeting social organizations that, in turn, maintained hold on theirown societies.

Consequently, the proliferation of bureaucratic control was decisivein changing the character of violent confrontation. While in earlierepochs violence was macabre and gruesome but largely limited inscope, in the modern era morbidity has been replaced by surgicalefficiency, evidenced in spectacular increases in mass slaughter. Forexample, as Eckhard’s (1992) meticulous study demonstrates, theglobal war casualties go hand in hand with the expansion of statepower: whereas in the combined tenth and eleventh centuries all wardeaths amounted to no more than 60,000 people, in the joint sixteenthand seventeenth centuries this figure leaps to nearly 8 million dead.However, the last two hundred years, and in particular the twentieth



century, represent the pinnacle of mass killings, with 19 millionwar casualties in nineteenth century and 111 million in the twentiethcentury alone. All of this indicates that the bureaucratization ofcoercion is a cumulative historical process whereby the increase instrength, size and reach of social organizations is paralleled with therise of their destructive potential. Since warfare is not, as socio-biologists would have it, an intergroup feud written large but a highlycoordinated violent contest between two or more social organizations,as these organizations grow and expand, so does war. Hence, thegradual increase in the rationalization of social action has itspronounced dark side: as the infrastructural and bureaucraticcapacities of states spread and grow and as social organizationsbecame more complex, pervasive and instrumentally rational, theirmalign propensities increase.

This is best illustrated by analysing social orders which arecommonly seen as underdeveloped and less modernized, such asRwanda in 1990s. Despite popular perceptions which saw Rwandangenocide as a continuation of pre-modern tribalism, its preparationand execution owe a great deal to the cumulative bureaucratization ofcoercion and to centrifugal ideologization. Firstly, no pre-modernrulers possessed technology, social organization or ideology to imple-ment mass killings on such a scale and at such a speed, but moreimportantly, were it not for the proliferation of profoundly modernistprinciples and practices, it is highly unlikely that Rwandan genocidewould have happened at all. The genocide was a systematic and highlyorganized event that relied on pre-existing bureaucratic machinery andwell-articulated ideological blueprints. By the late 1980s Rwandaboasted developed road and communication networks, good educationand health system, a stable economy with low inflation and minisculeforeign debt, relatively high literacy rates, an extensive, well-run andlargely non-corrupt administrative apparatus (Prunier 1997; Taylor1999; Hintjens 2001) all of which gained her the reputation of being ‘theSwitzerland of Africa’. More importantly, this was a remarkablycentralized and ordered state with ‘chillingly purposeful bureaucraticcontrol’ (Oplinger 1990, p. 260), very disciplined civil service and apolitical culture that encouraged ‘systematic and unconditional obedi-ence to authority’ (Prunier 1997, p. 141). Consequently the execution ofgenocide was conducted with utmost speed and efficiency coordinatedfrom the highest political and bureaucratic authority (Reyntjens 1996,p. 245). Rather than being an irrational explosion of uncontrolled andemotional butchery, the killing was highly organized, controlled anddirected ‘by the civil servants in the central government, prefets,bourgmestres and local councilors’ (Prunier 1997, p. 247). As Mamdani(2001, p. 144) convincingly demonstrates, ‘the administrative machin-ery of the local state was key to organizing the series of massacres that



constituted the genocide’. Thus, the proliferation of violence inmodernity entails reliance on the disciplinary effects of socialorganizations. It is modern bureaucratic machines that make systema-tic killing possible by discouraging disobedience and by transferringresponsibility to higher chains in the hierarchy.

However, the cumulative bureaucratization of coercion cannotoperate successfully without centrifugal ideologization. It is massideologies that provide justification and ethical comfort for all thoseenveloped by the bureaucratic machine. The cold and routinizedcharacter of everyday nationalism, generated by processes of centrifu-gal ideologization, synchronizes with the indifferent, unemotional andhighly instrumental moral codes of bureaucratic organizations. Just asbanal nationalism does not require battle cries and exuberant outburstsof hatred but is encored in almost invisible repetition and routinizationof nationalist symbols and practice, so modern social organizationsprivilege and prioritize orderly obedience, delegation of tasks anddetached professionalism over passionate and impulsive commitmentsfor a specific cause. Bureaucratic organization bestows a coerciveenvironment where social action is routinized and trivialized, whilecentrifugal ideologization imprints meanings on these processes and inthis way provides the glue that holds the nation-state together. Sinceeveryday, banal nationalism is nothing but an habitual expression ofloyalty to a concrete social organization (i.e. nation-state), it is boundto operate according to a logic which mirrors other forms of bureau-cratic ethics. In particular, this means that it provides a teleologicalblueprint that on the one hand allows for the smooth operation ofsocial organizations, and on the other galvanizes routinized popularsupport for the actions of these social organizations. As the Rwandanexample shows, the trigger that transformed the cumulative bureau-cratization of coercion into genocidal action was centrifugal ideologi-zation. From the colonially imposed, fixed and mutually exclusiveethnic categorizations, through the Hamitic ideology of Tutsi supre-macy, to the Hutu Power counter-ideology codified in the BahutuManifesto of 1957, it was popularized ideological doctrines that pavedthe way for organized slaughter (Hintjens 2001; Mamdani 2001).Hence, despite its relative economic underdevelopment, Rwanda was asociety with high levels of cumulative bureaucratization of coercion andextensive centrifugal ideological penetration.

Therefore, rather than causing war or being a cause of war,nationalism remains a highly autonomous phenomenon with its owndynamics, dynamics that have been and remain shaped by two long-term historical processes � cumulative bureaucratization of coercionand centrifugal ideologization. Although these two processes cannotpossibly account for all aspects of the relationship between war andnational homogeneity, it seems highly unlikely that social orders which



operate under low levels of bureaucratization and ideologization canin times of war easily transform local solidarities into an all-embracingnationalist discourse. As European history shows so well, excessiveviolence requires elaborate social organization underpinned by believ-able popular ideologies: whereas medieval warfare was a prerogative ofsmall groups of aristocrats engaged in the highly ritualistic brawls withfew casualties and no support from the wider (peasant) population, themodern era gave birth to total wars that involved the mutualdestruction of millions of highly organized and ideologically mobilizedcitizenry. Hence, the outbreak of war and the presence of externalthreat do not automatically translate into greater national solidarity:the escalation of virulent nationalism owes much to its organizationaland ideological embeddedness.

Conclusion

Although much of contemporary social theory and research posits astrong and even inexorable link between nationalism and war, these twophenomena in fact exhibit much more autonomy. Despite conventionalviews that associate the outbreak of war with the automatic eruption ofnationalist euphoria, there is nothing inevitable and natural in thisrelationship. Rather than being a direct and instinctive extension of kinsolidarity, nationalism is a complex social process that relies oncontinuous organizational and ideological support. Similarly, neitheris war an augmented, aggressive crowd tussle but a highly organizedand ideologized political confrontation involving antagonistic socialorganizations. Hence, to understand the relationship between war andnationalism, it is paramount to look at their structural origins, both ofwhich, I argue, have been shaped by long-term processes � cumulativebureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal ideologization. It isthe historical development of these two macro processes that has adecisive impact on whether the outbreak of a particular war will resultin a greater national homogenization. Following this hypotheticalmodel, it is argued that a greater bureaucratization of social order and amore pervasive ideological penetration of society � involving both theinstitutional spread of ideas and practices as well as subjective self-disciplining � are more likely to create conditions for strongernationalist homogenization in times of war. The next step is toempirically verify or falsify this theoretical framework.

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SINISA MALESEVIC is a Member of the Royal Irish Academy andSenior Lecturer in the School of Political Science and Sociology,National University of Ireland, Galway.ADDRESS: National University of Ireland, Galway, Aras Moyola,Galway, Ireland.Email: [email protected]



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Ethnic and Racial Studies Nationalism, war and social cohesion