Ethics Discipline of Lawyers Cases

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[A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999]

GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. PRIMO

R. NALDOZA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before this

Court a Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The precursor

of this Petition was the action of respondent, as counsel for complainant, appealing

a Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to theappeal, complainant asserts that respondent should be disbarred for the following

acts:

1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and

executory

2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US

dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for cash bond in the

appealed case

3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.[1]

In his Answer,[2]

respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an

appeal. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainant who insisted on

appealing the case in order to delay the execution of the POEA Decision.

[3]

He alsocontroverts complainants allegation that he asked for a cash bond and that he

issued the fake receipt.[4]

In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and

recommendation.

The pertinent portions of the complaint were summarized by the IBP in this

wise:

Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent was given the task to

defend the interest of the complainant corporation in POEA Case No. 8888-06-468,

entitled Olano, et al. versus Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that

when the said case was resolved in favor of the complainant therein on October 5,

1992, the respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said decision had

already become final and unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an] apparent

desire to collect or to bleed his client of several thousand pesos of attorneys fees,

convinced the complainant to appeal the case before the Supreme Court. Thus, on

December 14, 1992, the respondent filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for

Review which was docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that two (2) days thereafter

misrepresented to the complainant corporation that the complainant ha[d] to pay,

which it did, *a+ Cash Bond in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to TWO

THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in

order that the said appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme

Court. The said amount was given to the respondent.

x x x *S+ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees to bepaid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of normal filing and docket fees for such

kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondents misrepresentation, Atty.

Naldoza presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme court

receipt representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.

Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant

corporation revealed that the said receipt issued by the treasurers office of the

Supreme Court x x x [was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The said verification

revealed that what was only paid by the respondent to the Supreme court was the

amount of P622.00 as shown by the enumerated legal fees of the Supreme Court

Docket-Receiving Section showing the handwritten name of the respondent forpurpose of showing that the said computation was requested by and addressed to

the respondent.[5]

(citations omitted)

Meanwhile, a criminal case[6]

for estafa based on the same facts was filed

against herein respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,

Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable

in the amount of US$ 2,555.

Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to

Dismiss on July 22, 1996, on the ground that he had already been acquitted in the

criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion.[7]

On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors

Resolution, which approved the investigating commissioners report

[8]

andrecommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one

(1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his

recommendation in this manner:

x x x *R+espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that the signature

[on the receipt for the amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence, respondent anchors

his position on a mere denial that it is not his signature. Likewise, the respondent

denies the check voucher dated December 15, 1992, and the encircled signature of

the respondent, which x x x according to him is falsified and irregular. No evidence,

however, was presented by the respondent that his signature therein was falsified

and irregular. [As to the altered Supreme Court Official Receipt, the respondent

denied] that he ha[d] anything to do with it because it was the complainant who

signed the Petition for Review and tried to explain that his name appear[ed] to be

the payee because he [was] the counsel of record of the petitioner. But while it is

true that the affiant in the said Petition for Review [was] Mr. Rogelio G. Gatchalian,

president of the complainant company, the respondent does not deny that he

signed the said petition as counsel of the petitioner corporation and that he was

actually the one who prepared the same and the notary public before whom the

affiant subscribed and [swore] as the one who caused the preparation of the said

petition.

The legal form (Exh. G) of the legal fees for the Petition for Review re G.R.

107984 was denied by the respondent because according to him he was never given

a chance to cross-examine the person who issued the [certification] x x x. However,

respondent does not deny that he is the person referred to by the handwrittenname P.R. Naldoza who paid the legal fees of P622.00.
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In addition to the said respondents Formal Offer of Evidence, he submitted to this

Commission as his most important piece of evidence the Decision of acquittal in

Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled People of the Philippines versus Primo R.

Naldoza, the copy of which Decision is appended to his Manifestation with Motion

to Dismiss dated July 22, 1996 praying for the dismissal of the present

administrative case in view of his being exonerated in the said criminal case based

on the same facts and evidence.[9]

(citations omitted)

Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondents contention that his acquittal in

the companion criminal case should result in the dismissal of this administrativecomplaint. The commissioner emphasized that the criminal case for estafa

[10]was

completely different from the proceedings before him; acquittal in the former did

not exonerate respondent in the latter.[11]

He further noted that the RTC Decision

itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found him civilly

liable to herein complainant for $2,555.[12]

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be

sanctioned. However, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the

gravity of the wrong perpetrated.

At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondents Motion to

Dismiss should be denied. In that Motion, he maintains that he should be cleared

of administrative liability, because he has been acquitted of estafa which involvedthe same facts. He argues that the issue involved there was the very same issue

litigated in this case,[13]

and that his exoneration was a result a full blown trial on

the merits of this case.[14]

In a similar case, we have said:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos *of+ the criminal charge is not a bar to

these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not

satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of xxx

criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely

different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. [15]

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.[16]

They are

distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proofbeyond reasonable doubt is necessary;

[17]in an administrative case for disbarment

or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that i s required.[18]

Thus, a

criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts

and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.[19]

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not

necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case .[20]

Conversely,

respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the

same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent will not

inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this

Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the

administrative liability of the lawyer.[21]

The basic premise is that criminal and civilcases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition

in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it

would be well to remember the Courts ruling inIn re Almacen,[22]

which we quote:

x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil

nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather

investigations by theCourt into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being

intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal

prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor

therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio . Public interest is [their]

primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not theattorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the

exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar

to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of

preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest

administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their

misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the

duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x (emphasis

ours)

We shall now discuss seriatimthe specific charges against respondent.

First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA Decision,

despite knowing that it had already become final and executory. The IBPinvestigating commissioner had no explicit finding on this point. Rogelio G.

Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the appeal, his company had

received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which led him to the conlcusion that

they *had+ lost the case before the Supreme Court.[23]

This, however, does not

substantiate the charge.

Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the

appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the

ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there has

been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed,

the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for

petitioners failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the

assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on.Second.Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent obtained

from complainant the amount of $2,555, on the false representation that it was

needed for the appeal before this Court. According to Gatchalian,[24]

respondent

explained that the amount would cover all the expenses to be incurred in the

Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which amount also will answer for

the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be given or

paid to the complainant in that case so that our deposit with the bank would not be

garnished.[25]

Corroborating Gatchalians testimony, Edna Deles declared that

respondent received the amount on the representation that it would be paid to

the Supreme Court in connection with the Olano case.[26]

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. Quite thecontrary, when he paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his moral
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allegations. Bayani Melo had signed as the representative of Ronald Reagan

Hernandez, while Matias Magnaye as a witness to the Consent to Quarry.

In reply, complainant submitted an affidavit, dated April 23, 1998, received by

this Court the following day. Respondent was required to file a rejoinder within 10

days, but he did not do so.

In her reply-affidavit, complainant submitted a copy of the resolution of the

provincial prosecutor of Batangas in I.S. No. 97-3353 (for falsification of public

document), finding probable cause against respondent and recommending the filing

of an information for falsification of a public document against all the respondentsnamed in the case, including herein respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling. The

prosecutor stated:

After a painstaking study and careful analysis of the evidence presented by both

parties, the undersigned has observed the following striking dissimilarities on the

two copies of the document Consent to Quarry (Authorization) which would

clearly distinguish one from the other, to wit:

Page 1 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 reveals that it has

that blank space for the technical description of a parcel of land subject of their

agreement; it is undated; it is signed by Bayani Melo at the bottom but unsigned by

Lucila Umali Magboo and it has insertions and modifications thereon.

On the other hand, page 1 of the notarized copy of that consent to quarry revealsthat the technical description refers to two parcels of land located at Anilao,

Mabini, Batangas described in Tax Declaration No. 003-00097 and in the approved

plan/Application for Small Scale Mining Permit for Quarry; it is dated July 3, 1997,

it has two signatures of Bayani Melo and one signature of Ronald Reagan

Hernandez and it is also unsigned by Lucila Umali Magboo.

Page 2 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 shows the

signatures of Mena U. Gerona, Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda as well as the

signatures of witnesses Rosemarie, Matias, Geronimo and Apolonia before the

acknowledgment portion; a signature of Lucila N. Magboo at the acknowledgment

portion; blank as to the Notary Public and the Doc., Page No., Book No., and Series

of.

Page 2 of the notarized copy of the Consent to Quarry bears the signatures ofMena, Feliciano, and Aurelia as well as the witnesses before the acknowledgment

portion; it is dated July 2, 1997 and signed by Notary public A.R. Datingaling and it is

docketed as Doc. No. 3473, Page No. 67, Book No. XXVII, Series of 1997.

It has been also established that the said document was brought to Menas

residence on July 2, 1997 ready for signatures and in fact it was signed there by

Mena, Feliciano, Aurelia and Bayani Melo in the presence of those witnesses. After

the signing of said document, a copy was left with Mena and the other copies were

brought by the group of Bayani Melo, which copies were notarized by Atty. Alfredo

R. Datingaling on July 3, 1997. The issue now is whether the crime of falsification

has been committed by the respondents?

From the glaring dissimilarities between the copies of the document consent toquarry and the testimony of the complainant and his brother Feliciano, the

undersigned honestly believes that indeed the crime of falsification had been

committed by the respondents in conspiracy with one another. The evidence is

clear that Mena Umali and her brother and sisters had not presented themselves or

appeared before said Notary Public for the acknowledgment of said document as

their free act and voluntary deed and that the lots described in the notarized

document are different from the lot they intended to be the subject of their

agreement. From the unnotarized copy dated July 2, 1997 which bears the

proposed insertions/modifications, the land intended to be described as the subject

of that agreement is but a parcel of land while in the notarized copy, it describestwo parcels of land. Further, had the complainant and her brother and sisters

appeared before the Notary Public for notarization of said document, then there is

no reason why Lucila Magboo, Mena Umali, Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda

would not be required to sign on the first page of the document. In fact, Bayani

Melo signed again the said document on the first page while Ronald Reagan

Hernandez who is already represented by Bayani Melo was required to sign said

document on the first page. Hence, there is sufficient ground to hold respondents

for trial for the said offense under I.S. No. 97-3353.

. . . .

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that an

information for Falsification of Public Document be filed against all the respondentsunder I.S. No. 97-3353 . . . .[6]

In addition, complainant submitted on December 4, 2000 a list of criminal

cases, eight in all, filed against respondent, including that filed by

complainant. Four of the cases had been dismissed, while four others were

pending. Most of the cases were for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, estafa, and estafa

through falsification of a public document.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP). Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, to

whom this case was assigned, recommended the suspension of respondent Alfredo

R. Datingaling from the practice of the profession for a period of one year. In his

report, Atty. Cunanan stated:

We are therefore of the impression that, to say the least, the respondent has notshown qualities that endear him to the profession or the Bar. While complainants

present criminal case against the respondent may be pending, and he still enjoys

the presumption of innocence so far as Crim. Case No. 9426 (I.S. No. 97-3353) is

concerned, the fact remains that for purposes of this administrative complaint, the

evidence presented by the complainant considered vis--vis the unconvincing

explanation of the respondent, his silence and failure to file a rejoinder, and the

criminal cases filed against him, it is clear that Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling has

violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, more particularly Canons 1 and 7.

We therefore recommend the suspension of Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling from the

practice of the profession for a period of one (1) year.[7]

The IBP Board of Governors approved the report with modification:
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RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, . . . the Report and Recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner . . .; and, finding the recommendation fully supported

by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and

considering respondents violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility more

particularly Canons 1 and 7, Respondents Commission as Notary Public is hereby

SUSPENDED with disqualification for appointment as Notary Public for two years

from receipt of notice.[8]

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration declaring himself innocent and

insisting he had no participation in the transaction. In addition, he denied receipt ofthe resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, his motion was denied by

the IBP Board of Governors on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction over the

case as it had already been endorsed to this Court. The IBP Board cited Rule 139-B,

12(b) of the Rules of Court as the basis of this resolution.

Rule 139-B, 12(b) provides:

Section 12.Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

. . . .

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines

that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it

shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,

together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to theSupreme Court for final action.

As the provision reads, no mention is made of motions for

reconsideration. However, it was held in Halimao v. Villanueva[9]

that although Rule

139-B, 12(c) does not mention motions for reconsideration, there is nothing in its

text or history which prohibits the filing of such motion. A motion for

reconsideration of a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors may be filed within 15

days from notice to a party appealing. Indeed, the filing of such motion before the

Board is in fact encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of

exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the

judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a

misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[10]

Be that as it may and considering that the motion for reconsideration was filedafter the records of this case had been forwarded to this Court, we have decided to

treat the motion as a petition for review within the contemplation of Rule 139-B,

12 (b).

After due consideration of respondents motion for reconsideration, we find

the motion to be without merit.

First. As regards the charge of falsification of a public document filed against

respondent, the records show that as of the date of filing of respondents Urgent

Motion for Reconsideration on September 16, 2002, the same is still pending trial

before Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Batangas City.[11]

Respondent claims that

although he notarized the document, he had no participation whatsoever in the

transaction. He merely notarized the document on the representation of thepersons who appeared before him.

[12]

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear

case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a

respondent as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar .[13]

Disbarment

should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,

could accomplish the end desired.[14]

To be sure, conviction in a criminal case is not

necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an administrative

proceeding. As we have held inCalub v. Suller,[15]

the dismissal of a criminal case is

not determinative of the liability of the accused for disbarment. In the case at bar,

however, the criminal prosecution based on the same acts charged in this case isstill pending in the court. To avoid contradictory findings, therefore, any

administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of

the criminal case for falsification of a public document.

Second. The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Renato

Cunanan, as to the violation of Act No. 2103 are fully supported by the

evidence. Act No. 2103, 1(a) provides:

The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly

authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or

documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer

taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the

instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person whoexecuted it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The

certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a

seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.[16]

Respondent had a duty to require the persons claiming to have executed the

document to appear personally before him and to attest to the contents and truth

of what are stated in the document. If the parties were represented by other

persons, their representatives names should appear in the said documents as the

ones who had executed the same and the latter should be required to affirm their

acts.[17]

Respondent failed to do this.

Respondent also failed to controvert complainants evidence that Wendy

Sunshine Umali are actually two different persons named Wendy and Sunshine,

both surnamed Umali; that they were minors at the time of the execution of theaforesaid document; and that their signatures therein had been made by an

unidentified person. It is clear even from the face of the Consent to Quarry that

Wendy and Sunshine Umali are two different minors, who were represented by a

person who signed the document in their behalf, thus lending credence to

complainants claim that the document is fictitious. In fact, the residence certificate

number of Wendy Sunshine Umali is not stated in the notarized document. In

addition, page one of the agreement appears to have been intercalated and to have

been typed with a different machine.

The acknowledgment of a document is not an empty act. By it a private

document is converted into a public document, making it admissible in court

without further proof of its authenticity.[18]
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The importance of the function of a notary public cannot therefore be

overemphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents

is at stake in every aspect of that function.

However, the suspension of respondent from his commission as a notary

public for two years, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is too severe

a penalty for what he has committed. InVillarin v. Sabate, Jr.,[19]

this Court

suspended respondents commission as a notary public for one year for notarizing

the verification of a motion to dismiss when the fact was that three of the affiants

had not appeared before him and for notarizing the same instrument of which hehad been one of the signatories. In accordance with that case, the suspension of

respondent from his commission as notary public for one year would be proper.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling is found guilty of violation

of Act No. 2103, 1(a) and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as notary

public for a period of one (1) year, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or

similar negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with more severely. The

charge of falsifying a public document is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing

of an administrative case for the same act should the evidence warrant such action.

SO ORDERED.
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[B.M. No. 793. July 30, 2004]

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF

ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA,J.:

May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from

the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an

attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the

same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Courtprovision covering this cases central issue. Up to this juncture, its reach and

breadth have not undergone the test of an unsettled case.

In a Letterdated August 20, 1996,[1]

the District Court of Guam informed this

Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of

law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior

Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94,[2]

a

disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera.

The Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in Guam to the Bar

Confidant for comment in its Resolutiondated November 19, 1996.[3]

Under Section

27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a

member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also beenadmitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this

realm, provided the foreign courts action is by reason of an act or omission

constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral

conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath.

In a Memorandumdated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda

C. Verzosa recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record of Maqueras

case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District Court do not contain

the factual and legal bases for Maqueras suspension and are thus insufficient to

enable her to determine whether Maqueras acts or omissions which resulted in his

suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the Philippine

Bar.[4]

Pursuant to this Courts directive in itsResolutiondated March 18, 1997,[5]theBar Confidant sent a letter dated November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam

requesting for certified copies of the record of the disciplinary case against

Maquera and of the rules violated by h im.[6]

The Court received certified copies of the record of Maqueras case from the

District Court of Guam on December 8, 1997.[7]

Thereafter, Maqueras case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60)

days from the IBPs receipt of the case records.[8]

The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the

IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline on July 28, 1998.[9]

However, the notice was

returned unserved because Maquera had already moved from his last knownaddress in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding address.

[10]

On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and

Recommendationand its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending

Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and unless he updates

and pays his IBP membership dues in full.[11]

The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February

28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the

territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for

misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal services,

then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handlinghis clients case.

[12]

In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987,

Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against

Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castros counsel in said case. Castros

property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in

satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of

redemption over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be

exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid

period.[13]

At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for Five Hundred

U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him.

[14]

On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in

the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera

and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter.[15]

On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by paying

Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera

had the title to the property transferred in his name.[16]

On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C.

Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).[17]

On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted

hearings regarding Maqueras alleged misconduct.[18]

Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam

praying that Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 [19]and 1.8(a)[20]ofthe Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its

Petition,the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee

for his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his

failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a

lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire

a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms

governing the lawyers acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the

client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in

writing.[21]

The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the

practice of law in Guam for a period of two [2] years, however, with all but thirty(30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to Castro the
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difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs and the amount

due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the

disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also recommended that

other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has been subject to disciplinary action

by the Superior Court of Guam.[22]

Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property

in his favor as compensation for past legal services and that the transaction, except

for the deed itself, was oral and was not made pursuant to a prior written

agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was made three daysfollowing the alleged termination of the attorney-client relationship between them,

and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal services to

Castro.[23]

On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered

its Decision[24]

suspending Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for a period of

two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State Professional Responsibility

Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that the attorney-client

relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet completely terminated when

they entered into the oral agreement to transfer Castros right of redemption to

Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too much from

the eventual transfer of Castros property to him since he was able to sell the same

to the Changs with more than US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for

services rendered to Castro amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court also

ordered him to take the MPRE upon his admission during the hearings of his case

that he was aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding business

transactions between an attorney and his client in a very general sort of way.[25]

On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded

that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no

evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the

Philippines.[26]

However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his

failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in

turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of

Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.[27]The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions

committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised

Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutiondated February 13, 1992,

which states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as

attorney by the Supreme Court forany deceit, malpractice, or other gross

misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction

of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is

required to take before admission to practice , or for a willful disobedience

appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice

of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid

agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent

court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also

been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the

basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall

be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis

supplied).The Court must therefore determine whether Maqueras acts, namely:

acquiring by assignment Castros right of redemption over the property subject of

the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of

redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate

Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine

Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension or disbarment in this

jurisdiction.

The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property

by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in

payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in

relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph

5 of Article 1491[28]

prohibits the lawyers acquisition by assignment of the clients

property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article

1492,[29]

the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption.

The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is

founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily

take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client[30]

and unduly enrich

himself at the expense of his client.

The case of In re: Ruste[31]

illustrates the significance of the aforementioned

prohibition. In that case, the attorney acquired his clients property subject of a

case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his

clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at the instance of his

clients because they had no money to pay him for his services. The Court ruled thatthe lawyers acquisition of the property of his clients under the circumstances

obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held:

Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses

driven by financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latters

behest, as contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case an

attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a

harassed client, in breach of the rule so amply protective of the confidential

relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the

rights of both.[32]

The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maquerasacquisition of Castros

right of redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling theredeemed property for huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad faith when it
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concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant fee for his legal services. The

court held that since the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in

payment for his legal services, and since the property redeemed by him had a

market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right

of redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting

payment for his legal services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to

US$45,000.00.

Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2) -year suspension from

the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension fromthe practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyers sworn

duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that *a+ lawyer

owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence

reposed in him; and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character

is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a

continuing requirement to maintain ones goods standing in the legal profession.[33]

It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Courts judgment ordering

Maqueras suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically

result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section 27,[34]

Rule

138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are

mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the

basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or

suspension in this jurisdiction.[35]

Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of

Guam only constitutesprima facieevidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a

lawyer.[36]

More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the

opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary

evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule

139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer

must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable

notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the

scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.[37]The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on

his behalf regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is

not certain that he did receive the Noticeof Hearingearlier sent by the IBPs

Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maqueras current

and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically

informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why he

should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through this Resolution),

may be sent to him.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be

suspended from the practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues

from 1977 up to the present.

[38]

Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rulesof Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant

suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year

shall be ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of

Attorneys.[39]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within

fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be suspended or

disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings against him in

the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.

The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty.

Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for

ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes

later.

Let a copy of this Resolutionbe attached to Atty. Maqueras personal record in

the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
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[A.C. No. 4552. December 14, 2004]

JOSE A. ROLDAN, complainant, vs.ATTY. NATALIO PANGANIBAN and ATTY.

JUANITO P. NOEL, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:

Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Jose A.

Roldan against respondents Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban and Atty. Juanito P.

Noel. Complainant charges that respondent lawyers reneged in their duties and

obligations towards him as their client, especially in the complainants right toappeal to the higher court after losing his case in the lower courts. The allegations

in the complaint dated February 12, 1996[1]

in support of the accusations are as

follows:

1. Na ako ang plaintiff sa Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose A.

Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano, na ang Judge ay si Honorable

Severino De Castro, Jr. na ang kaso ay Recovery of possession with damages. Itoy

iniapila ko sa RTC Branch 43 with Civil Case No. 95-73739 na ang Judge naman dito

ay si Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo ng RTC. Si Atty. Panganiban at Atty. Noel ang

abogado ko.

. . .

4. Na noong February 6, 1995 bago kami pumasok sa court room ay nagtanong

sa akin si Atty. Noel, ng ganito: Mr. Roldan nasaan nga pala yung resibo na ibinigay

ni Tessie sa iyo na nagbigay ka ng down payment na Ten Thousand Pesos

(P10,000.00) noong March 1, 1986. Agad akong sumagot at sinabi ko sa kaniya,

Atty. Noel lahat po ng original ay hiningi ninyo sa akin, lahat po ay binigay ko sa

inyo kasama iyong resibo ni Tessie Dalusong, na akoy magbigay ng Ten Thousand

Pesos bilang downpayment sa ipinagbili niyang bahay sa akin. Agad siyang sumagot

Wala kang ibinibigay sa akin!

5. Na kaya nga sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Ibigay ninyo sa akin ang folder at

ako ang hahanap ng resibo ni Tessie Dalusong. Tumulong din si Atty. Noel, at

nakita din namin. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel Sayang hindi na natin maipasok ito, hindi na

kasi pwedeng magpasok pa ng mga ibidensya. Di ko alam kung bakit hindi niya

ipinasok noon pa man. (Ang resibo na nagpapatunay na ako ang unang nakabili ngbahay sa 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Maynila).

6. Na noong nasa loob na kami ng court room ay handa na ako sa sinasabi ni

Atty. Noel no Rebuttal pero nagtaka ako kinumbinsi ako na diumano ay malinaw

na ang aking deklarasyon at malinaw ang mga ebidensya kaya hindi na raw dapat

mag rebuttal i-waive na lang daw sa Memorandum kaya nga sinabi ng Judge

na: Gumawa kayo ng Memoranda within fifteen days submitted for

decision. Noong March 8, 1995 ang memorandum ay submitted for decision;

7. Na noong Abril 7, 1995 sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel, Ba kit may ibinigay na zerox

copies ng decision si Robert Montano na aking kalaban sumagot si Atty. Noel, at

sinabi sa akin Tsekin mo sa court. Gayon nga ang aking ginawa. At bumalik ako

kay Atty. Noel, at sinabi ko: Totoo nga na may decision na. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel na:Ginapang nila yun, sapalagay mo, magkano ang inilagay nila? Sa palagay ko ay

hindi lang trenta mil (P30,000.00) pesos ang magagastos nila sa kasong ito, yun ang

isinagot ko;

8. Na iminungkahi ko kay Atty. Noel na magpayl ng mot ion for reconsideration,

sinagat ako ni Atty. Noel na: Ginapang na nila yun kaya dapat umapila na lang

tayo. Sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Kung matalo pa rin ako dito, ay dalhin natin sa

Supreme Court para parehas ang laban; Na bilang bahagi nito inilakip ko dito ang

decision ng MTC; at ang apilasyon sa RTC, at ang petsa ng decision ng RTC na

tinaggap ni Atty. Noel.

9. Na noong Abril 24, 1995 umapila ako sa Court of Appeal makaraan ang ilangbuwan ay dumating sa office ni Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban, noong November 13,

1995 ang decision subalit tinawagan ako ng sekretarya nila Atty. Noel at Atty.

Panganiban noon lang November 24, 1995. Tinanong ko ang sekretarya ni Atty.

Panganiban kung nasaan si Atty. Noel, ang sagot ng sekretarya ay Nasa probinsiya

maraming inaasikaso doon. Agad kong sinabi: Hindi ba fifteen days lang para

maka-apila sa Supreme Court. Sumagot si Zeny at sinabi Isang buwan daw yun

para sagutin.

10. Na madalas kong tawagan si Zeny (ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban) na

sinasabi kong nakahanda na ang pangbayad gawin na ninyo ang apilasyon sa

Supreme Court, itoy madalas kong sabihin sa sekretarya (si Zeny) kayat ibinigay

niya ang bagong office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco Centre Rm. 134, 1564 Mabini St.,

Ermita, Manila.

11. Na madalas akong magpunta sa bagong office ni Atty. Noel gaya noong Dec. 1,

1995, Dec. 4, 1995, Dec. 5, 1995, Dec. 7, 1995, Dec. 8, 1995 at noon pang huling

linggo ng November ay sisimulan ko ng sabihin sa dalawang sekretarya (si Zeny at

Marie Cris) na gawin na ang aking apilasyon sabihin kay Atty. Noel sa Supreme

Court.

12. Na noong December 12, 1995 maaga pa ay nagpunta ako sa office ni Atty.

Noel sa Gedisco 3rd

Flr. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila. Tinanong ko ang kaniyang

sekretarya kung nakausap si Atty. Noel, sinagot ako ng sekretarya at sinabing

Tinanong ko si Atty. Noel kung yari na yung apilasyong ipinagagawa ninyo (Jose

Roldan) hindi po niya ako sinasagot.

13. Na kaya agad akong magpunta sa RTC Branch 43 upang alamin angkatotohanan nabatid ko noon lang, na akoy natalo ng walang kalaban-laban, pagkat

nag-laps na o lampas na ang panahong ibinibigay ng batas para makapag-payl ng

apilasyon sa Supreme Court.

14. Na dahil dito sa mga panloloko, at pagwawalang bahala sa aking kaso ni Atty.

Noel, at Atty. Panganiban ay idinidimanda ko sila ng Damages na halagang one

hundred fifty thousand (P150,000.00) pesos at dapat silang alisan ng karapatan na

makapag-practice sa kanilang propesyon.

In his Comment dated August 8, 1996, Atty. Panganiban avers that he was

neither aware nor did he participate in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 144860-CV

M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano and in the

appeal of said case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43; they do not have alawyer-client relationship because he is on leave in the practice of law since
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October 18, 1993 when he was designated Acting Mayor of Laurel, Batangas, and

during his incumbency as such, and up to the filing of this administrative complaint

in 1996, he is still on leave as law practitioner because he was elected Mayor of

Laurel, Batangas in the last 1995 election; probably, complainant included him as

respondent because he thought that he is practicing law and is still an associate of

Atty. Juanito P. Noel, due to the fact that on some occasions complainant might

have seen him or they might have talked casually in the law office from which he

was on leave in his practice of law because he drops there from time to time to

meet visitors from Laurel who are living and who have problems in Metro Manila;and he has not received any single centavo from the complainant.

In his Comment, dated August 29, 1996, Atty. Noel alleges: Sometime in 1994,

he agreed to represent complainant in recovering a one-half portion of the ground

floor of a house located at 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Manila which complainant

bought from one Simplicia Villanueva represented by her daughter Teresita

Dalusong on November 28, 1986. A civil complaint for recovery of ownership and

possession was filed on February 8, 1994 with the RTC but upon the effectivity of

the law expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) the case

was transferred to the MTC. From the evidence of the defendant, he honestly saw

no need to present a rebuttal evidence. The MTC rendered a decision dismissing

the case on the alleged ground that the identity of the subject matter of the action

was not clearly established. He filed an appeal in due time to the RTC of Manila

(Branch 43) and not with the Court of Appeals as stated in paragraph 9 of the

complaint. On November 13, 1995, he received a copy of the RTC decision dated

October 10, 1995, affirming the decision of the MTC. Through the telephone, he

informed the complainant about the decision of the RTC. Complainant instructed

him to prepare an appeal to the higher court which actually refers to the Court of

Appeals and not with the Supreme Court as complainant claims. He advised the

complainant that he could find no error in the said decision and a further appeal

would be frivolous and without merit and requested the complainant to come over

so that he could discuss the matter with him. Whenever the complainant went to

the law office, he failed to see him because the latter was still attending court

hearings. The complainant asked for the records of the case which was given by hissecretary. Complainant never returned the case folder to him, neither did he call up

by phone, or see him personally. He then assumed that the complainant had hired

another lawyer to handle the appeal. He was surprised when he received on July

18, 1996 a copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated June 19, 1996,

requiring them to file their comment on the complaint of Jose A. Roldan.

We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for

investigation. After hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel A. Quiambao

submitted his Report and Recommendation dismissing the complaint against Atty.

Panganiban and imposing censure to Atty. Noel. In a Resolution dated February 27,

2004, the IBP adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation.

We shall first resolve the issue of the existence or non-existence of lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Panganiban and the complainant.

From a careful reading of the records of this case, it appears that Atty.

Panganiban and Atty. Noel used to be law associates. However, Atty. Panganiban

went on leave from the practice of law since October 18, 1993 when he was

designated as acting mayor of Laurel, Batangas[2]

due to the indefinite leave of

absence filed by the mayor and by reason of his election as mayor of the said

municipality in 1995. The complainant claims that he secured the services of Atty.

Panganiban on January 6, 1994.[3]

It is thus clear that Atty. Panganiban was not an

active associate of the law firm, since at that time, he was already on leave from the

practice of law. Moreover, the complaint filed in 1996 before the RTC for Recoveryof Possession and Ownership with Damages was prepared and signed by Atty. Noel

alone and not in any representation of any law firm. In fact from the filing of the

said civil case in the RTC, it was Atty. Noel who represented the complainant. Not

once did Atty. Panganiban appear for the complainant nor did he sign any

document pertaining with the aforesaid case. Necessarily, the complaint against

Atty. Panganiban must be dismissed.

As to the complaint against Atty. Noel.

The main issues to be resolved are: (1) whether there was a deliberate

attempt to suppress evidence on the part of Atty. Noel, to the prejudice of

complainant and (2) whether it was correct for Atty. Noel to refuse to file a further

appeal of the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review despite the

manifest desire of the complainant to do so.

Anent the first issue.

Complainant insists that Atty. Noels failure to present in evidence the receipt

dated March 1, 1986 was fatal to his cause. The receipt shows that complainant

made a partial payment of P10,000.00 of the P40,000.00 price of the subject

property. Complainant claims that this piece of document proves that complainant

bought the subject property ahead of the defendants who bought it only on July 30,

1986. Thus, to the mind of the complainant, the non-presentation of the subject

receipt is suppression of evidence.

Atty. Noel denied receiving the subject receipt and asserts that the same was

mere fabrication of the complainant. He insists that said receipt did not exist during

the preparation and filing of the complaint and even during the presentation ofevidence. Otherwise, he argues that such fact should have been alleged in the

complaint to show that complainant bought the subject property ahead of the

other buyer. Atty. Noel also claims that assuming that the receipt was given to him,

the same cannot be used as evidence because the receipt shows that it was signed

by one Romeo Dalusong who is not a party to the sale; neither does it appear in the

receipt that Romeo was acting in a representative capacity.

A short historical backdrop is necessary for a clearer insight of this issue.

It appears that the subject property was subjected to a double sale by the

same seller. The Deed of Sale of the complainant is dated November 28, 1986 while

that of the other buyer is dated July 30, 1986. But complainant claims that actually

the sale as to him took place on March 1, 1986 as evidenced by the subjectreceipt. Complainant however failed to take possession of the subject property as
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the same is already in the possession of the other buyer. Complainant filed an

ejectment case[4]

against the tenant of the other buyer but the same was dismissed

for the reason that complainant failed to show that he had proprietary right over

the property in question. Unable to take possession of the subject property,

complainant filed a case against the seller for the annulment of the contract of sale,

the Deed of Sale dated November 28, 1986. Complainant won and the court

awarded him damages of P80,000.00.

Subsequently, the seller and the complainant entered into a Compromise

Agreement.[5]

The seller, agreed to sell one-half of her duplex house which is thesame property that was previously sold to complainant on November 28, 1986,

including all her proprietary rights over the land, in the amount

of P80,000.00. Since the Court awarded damages to the complainant in the same

amount, this was set-off against the price of the property. Pursuant to the said

compromise agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer of Right[6]

in favor of

the complainant was executed on December 22, 1990 by the seller over the said

property.

Even with the sale on December 22, 1990 over the subject property as a result

of the compromise agreement, complainant still failed to take possession of the

subject property, hence he filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and

Ownership with Damages against the other buyer. It is in this case that complainant

claims that Atty. Noel failed to present the subject receipt. The MTC dismissed the

complaint and the RTC on appeal, dismissed it again. Upon failure of Atty. Noel to

file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, complainant filed the present

administrative complaint against him.

We find credence to the allegation of Atty. Noel that the subject receipt was

not in existence at the time he prepared the complaint or even at the time of

presentation of evidence. The complaint was verified by the complainant stating

the fact that he caused its preparation, that he read the same and attested that the

contents thereof are true and correct. If complainants allegation that he gave the

receipt to Atty. Noel at that time, and considering the importance of the subject

receipt to his case, he should have called the attention of Atty. Noel that there was

no allegation of the existence of the subject receipt.We thus hold that Atty. Noel is not guilty of suppressing evidence.

As to the second issue, that is, the issue of propriety of Atty. Noels refusal or

failure to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.

It is the contention of the complainant that he lost the right to file a further

appeal because he was not informed immediately of the result of the appeal to the

RTC. Complainant insists that Atty. Noel, through his secretary, called the

complainant only on November 24, 1995 or 11 days after the receipt of the adverse

RTC decision and was given the impression that he has still one month within which

to file an appeal. The complainant also said that he paid the respondents visits on

December 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8, 1995, to follow up the filing of the appeal to the higher

court but that he was not able to talk to Atty. Noel; that it was only when he went

to the RTC that he learned that he lost the case because the period of the appeal

has lapsed.

Atty. Noel contends that he received the RTC decision on November 13, 1995

and on the following day, he instructed his secretary to contact the complainant to

inform him of the adverse RTC decision with the directive for the complainant to

call up Atty. Noel; that when complainant called, he was instructed by the

complainant to prepare an appeal to the higher court; that he told the complainant

that there is no need to appeal the case because, first, the decision of the court is

correct, and second, he is obligated by the code of professional responsibilities torefrain from filing a frivolous and unmeritorious appeal; that thereafter,

complainant went to his office twice, the last of this instance was when

complainant took all the records of the case and never came back which led him to

believe that complainant will not appeal the adverse RTC decision. Atty. Noel

further states that, in any event, his relationship with the complainant ended upon

the issuance of the decision and that the complainant should not expect that he

would still appeal the case.

We find for the complainant.

It is noted that the complainant has been very diligent in fo

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