Ethics and the Invisible Psychologist

Gerald P. KoocherSimmons College

Psychologists have historically conducted research, taught, and provided human ser-vices directly with and for people who could readily identify the providers as psychol-ogists. Increasingly, psychologists find themselves engaged in supplying consultingservices that affect the lives of many people but take place without public scrutiny oridentification. In these situations, the client may be a nonprofit agency, corporation, orgovernment entity, but the effects of the psychologist’s work may have ripplingconsequences that affect many individuals’ lives profoundly. The ethical responsibilityof such invisible psychologists may extend to members of the public not typicallyconsidered clients of the psychologist and raise particular concerns when the net resulthas adverse consequences for individuals or society.

Keywords: ethics, invisible psychologist, multiple roles, work setting

The American Psychological Association’s(APA’s) Ethical Principles of Psychologists andCode of Conduct (APA, 2002) stress our com-mitment to increasing scientific and profes-sional knowledge of behavior, people’s under-standing of themselves and others, and theapplication of such knowledge to improve thecondition of individuals, organizations, and so-ciety. They also express a commitment to re-spect and protect civil and human rights, sup-port freedom of inquiry and expression, andstrive to help the public develop informed judg-ments and choices concerning human behavior(APA, 2002, Preamble). Consider how thosefundamental principles apply in these situations.

• From behind a one-way window, a consul-tant watches a group of young women, who lacka high school education and hold blue-collarjobs, talk about their music and recreation pref-erences. Later, she will use that information toframe an advertising campaign aimed at attract-ing such women to become smokers of a newbrand of cigarette aimed at their particular de-mographic profile.

• An expert on body language and people’spublic interactions teaches transportation secu-

rity officials to recognize signs of anxiety,guardedness, and unusual patterns of behavioras a strategy for selecting some air travelers forspecial scrutiny before aircraft boarding. Theexpert’s approach has a high false-positive rate,meaning that many people selected for specialscreening will prove completely innocuous.

• A psychologist with expertise in popula-tion demographics and group behavior helps acriminal defense attorney select jurors mostlikely to acquit the defendant. The consultantalso advises the defendant how to dress andbehave in the courtroom so as to appear mostlikable and credible to the jury.

• An agitated, heavily armed mental patienthas taken a classroom full of elementary school-children hostage and shot their teacher to deathin front of them. As the hostage taker issuesbizarre demands to police, a police officertrained as a psychologist coaches the officernegotiating with the offender on strategies tolure him close to a window so that a SWATteam sharpshooter can get a clear head shot.

• Under orders from the Pentagon, a mentalhealth professional serving as a military officerdevelops a set of instructions and training mod-ules to teach interrogators how to effectivelyelicit valuable intelligence information fromcaptured enemy personnel.

The Concept of Invisibility

Each of the preceding vignettes illustratesthe work of an invisible psychologist. The

Gerald P. Koocher, School of Health Sciences, SimmonsCollege.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-dressed to Gerald P. Koocher, School of Health Sciences,Simmons College, 300 The Fenway, Boston, MA 02115.E-mail: koocher@simmons.edu

Psychological Services © 2009 American Psychological Association2009, Vol. 6, No. 2, 97–107 1541-1559/09/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0013925

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psychologist who runs the marketing focusgroup, trains security screeners, consults to at-torneys and defendants, coaches hostage nego-tiators, or advises on interrogator training forthe military or police forces remains invisible tomany members of the public whose lives willultimately be influenced by his or her work.Some of the work done by these invisible psychol-ogists may surprise you, make you feel safer, ormake you feel angry. Some women may becomesmokers. Some innocent people or would-be-terrorists may find themselves subjected to intensescrutiny and delays at airports. A guilty defendantwith the resources to hire sophisticated expertsmay go free. A SWAT team sniper may kill aderanged hostage taker. People in jails or otherdetention facilities may find themselves talkedinto revealing more about themselves than theywish. In each of these situations, a psychologistmay legally provide the services described, yet notall psychologists would willingly take on theseroles. Some colleagues might assert that helpingpeople obtain a particular advantage or sufferharm as a result of psychologists’ work behind thescenes seems somehow unfair.

Psychologists have long worked behind thescenes or out of view of those affected by theirwork, but often their work did not directly leadto foreseeable adverse consequences for partic-ular individuals or groups (Lefkowitz, 2003;Lowman, 2006), and generally speaking, theiremployers did not seek to conceal their identi-ties or the fact that psychologists played a rolein the project at hand. Increasingly, evidence hasbeen found of deliberate concealment of both theidentities of such consultants and even the use ofpsychological research to gain hidden advantage.Secrecy in such circumstances aligns with theprinciple of confidentiality as applied to the rela-tionship between individuals and their psychother-apist, with one key difference. The invisiblepsychologist’s work may have direct dire conse-quences for third parties who have no role in theconfidential contract. In addition, the invisibil-ity tends to shield such psychologists from clearlines of accountability for their own ethical be-havior because any evidence of their role mayremain undetectable.

Unavoidable Harms

As ethical psychologists, we strive to benefitthose we work with while taking care to do no

harm. We attempt to safeguard the welfare andrights of those with whom we interact profes-sionally and with other affected persons. Whenwe confront conflicts among our obligations orconcerns, we seek to resolve them responsiblywhile seeking to avoid causing harm. However,at times avoiding all harm becomes impossible,and we must attempt instead to minimize harmresulting from our work. These concepts dateback to the Hippocratic oath, originating as apledge by a healer in situations in which aprofessional undertakes to treat a patient. Inter-estingly, however, the Hippocratic oath has apowerful parentalistic tone, making no mentionof consent by the patient.

The traditional practice of medicine has longrecognized the necessity to favor the needs ofone person over those of others (e.g., making atriage decision to provide immediate care to thepatient who has suffered a respiratory arrest,even though another person who arrived earliermust wait in acute pain with a compound frac-ture) or to coercively limit the freedom of cli-ents (e.g., quarantine of highly infectious pa-tients or the use of restraints with a violentmentally ill patient). In the past half century,many mental health professionals have taken onthe mantle of applying behavioral science forsocietal benefit apart from direct individual-focused contracts.

How do we begin to parse out our ethicalobligations to others in such circumstances? Wecan see this timeless ethical paradox of deon-tology versus utilitarian ethics attempting toreconcile conflicting obligations played out on auniversal interstellar scale in dialogue betweenthe Star Trek characters Kirk and Spock. In StarTrek: The Wrath of Khan (Bennett & Sowards,1982) a dying Spock addresses his friend Kirkwith the Vulcan logic of his species:

Spock: “Don’t grieve, Admiral. It is logical. The needsof the many outweigh . . .”

Kirk: “. . . the needs of the few.”

In the subsequent Star Trek film, Kirk leads avery risky mission to bring his friend, Spock,back from oblivion. In Star Trek III: The Searchfor Spock (Bennett & Nemoy, 1984), we see thehuman’s reversal of Vulcan logic:

Spock: “Why would you do this?”

Kirk: “Because the needs of the one outweigh theneeds of the many.”

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The role of invisible psychologist forces us toface this paradox directly. How do we assessethical duties we owe to members of societywho have not sought our services as clients, butwhose lives our work will clearly influence?How do we balance those obligations with theduty owed to the client who did hire us?

Identifying Our Clients and the Role ofthe Invisible Psychologist

When John Monahan (1980) and his col-leagues (and more recently Haag, 2006) calledon psychologists to consider “Who is the cli-ent?” they focused their attention on the crimi-nal justice system. The heart of the questioncalls on us to consider our ethical and profes-sional obligations to all people involved in thesphere of influence when providing services toor affecting one party at the behest of others. Attimes, the party requesting services may be aprivate entity (e.g., an attorney or corporation),but more often than not the hierarchy of author-ity will include a government or public entity(e.g., correctional authority, court system, po-lice, school district, or security officials). Thisgeneral pattern becomes particularly importantin situations in which the party directing orcontrolling the psychological service deliverymay remain deep within a corporate or govern-mental bureaucratic structure, unknown or hid-den from the recipient of services or object ofthe psychologist’s attention.

Historically, we have conducted research,taught, consulted, or provided human servicesdirectly with and for people who could readilyidentify us as psychologists. Role conflicts oc-cur commonly in our work with known clients,and we typically address them via role clarifi-cation and obtaining fully informed consent.For example, when beginning couples counsel-ing, a therapist would typically establish com-mon interests and ground rules related to anypotential future unilateral conversations. In ad-dition, even when both parties state as a treat-ment goal that they want to improve their rela-tionship, the therapist will point out that theymay ultimately discover conflicting interests.One party may have a strong interest in con-tinuing the relationship, and the other mightbenefit by ending the relationship. The practi-tioner clearly has the responsibility to clarify theroles and duties owed to each party.

Increasingly, many psychologists find them-selves engaged in supplying consulting ser-vices, well beyond the correctional system andgovernment that affect many people but thattake place away from public view, as describedabove. In these situations, the clients may in-clude individuals, nonprofit agencies, largemultinational corporations, and even politicalcandidates, but the effects of the psychologist’swork may have rippling consequences that af-fect many individuals.

Common examples and activities alluded toearlier include consultation to attorneys in liti-gation (e.g., advising on jury selection, coach-ing defendants on courtroom behavior, and cri-tiquing the work of opposing experts); design ofconsumer advertising and marketing plans; in-surance claim reviews; crime profiling andthreat assessment; strategic employment ormanagement consultation; political polling;consulting to so-called reality TV or other en-tertainment programming; and training inter-viewers, investigators, or interrogators across arange of duties from industrial to governmentapplications.

Do the ethical responsibilities of invisiblepsychologists working in such roles extend tomembers of the public other than the party whohired and paid the psychologist’s fee? Certainly,psychologists remain obligated by the generalprinciples of beneficence, nonmaleficence, fi-delity, responsibility, justice, and respect for therights and dignity of people. But how far dothese very general ethical obligations apply?For example, the APA Ethical Principles andCode of Conduct (APA, 2002) calls on psychol-ogists to avoid or correct misuse of their workand to avoid conflicts between ethics and orga-nizational demands.

Does using our work to influence consumerbehavior to benefit a company’s bottom line andstockholders, through increased consumer pur-chases, constitute a “misuse”? Does the answerto the question change if the product we help tosell might not work as intended (e.g., comput-erized matchmaking software) or could proveharmful to a person’s health (e.g., alcohol,ineffective or unproven over-the-counter rem-edies, junk food, tobacco products, or un-proven weight loss plans)? Do we have anobligation to weigh these issues before ac-cepting an assignment?

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Should ethical psychologists care how theirsurvey data are used by others? Suppose weconduct polls for a political candidate, who thenrealigns her or his public statements to meshmore consistently with the measured prefer-ences of likely voters. Does that constitute amisuse of our data? Does the answer change ifwe have reason to believe that the candidate’scurrent promises will vanish once elected?

Suppose that on the basis of demographic andgroup dynamics research, a psychologist con-sulting to an attorney on behalf of a defendant ina criminal case has determined that certain typesof individuals (e.g., identifiable by gender, race,or religion) will likely view the defendant morefavorably. Can that psychologist ethically assistthe attorney in identifying and excluding lessfavorable individuals from the potential jury?Would such assistance constitute unfair dis-crimination or valid legal assistance? Whoseethics should carry the day, the attorney’s or thepsychologist’s?

Interestingly, the APA Ethics Code (APA,2002) guides psychologists to avoid harm (Sec-tion 3.04) by focusing on clearly identified cli-ents, stating,

Psychologists take reasonable steps to avoid harmingtheir clients/patients, students, supervisees, researchparticipants, organizational clients, and others withwhom they work, and to minimize harm where it isforeseeable and unavoidable.

Similarly, the code cautions us to avoid roleconflicts of interest (Section 3.06) and instructson requests for services to third parties (Sec-tion 3.07), but in each case focuses on clientstatus and makes an assumption that clientsknow and understand their status as a recipientof the psychologist’s professional efforts. Whenwe deliver services through organizations (Sec-tion 3.11), the code of conduct cautions,

(a) Psychologists delivering services to or through or-ganizations provide information beforehand to clientsand when appropriate those directly affected by theservices about (1) the nature and objectives of theservices, (2) the intended recipients, (3) which ofthe individuals are clients, (4) the relationship thepsychologist will have with each person and theorganization, (5) the probable uses of services pro-vided and information obtained, (6) who will haveaccess to the information, and (7) limits of confi-dentiality. As soon as feasible, they provide infor-mation about the results and conclusions of suchservices to appropriate persons.

(b) If psychologists will be precluded by law or byorganizational roles from providing such informationto particular individuals or groups, they so informthose individuals or groups at the outset of the service.

The crux of the issue in this section revolvesaround the terms clients and when appropriateto those directly affected. How do we assess theelements “when appropriate” and “directlyaffected”?

The State as Protector of the Vulnerable

The doctrine of parens patriae illustrates theorigin of government intervention for the pro-tection of the vulnerable. Parens patriae, Latinfor “father of the people,” refers in law to thepublic policy duties of the state to use its powersacting as a kind of ultimate parent for vulnera-ble citizens in need of protection. Under thisdoctrine, government may mandate some typesof medical or mental health intervention orusurp the rights of natural parents or legalguardians to act as the parent of a child deemedin need of protection (e.g., a child whose par-ents are unable or unwilling to provide care oran incapacitated and dependent individual ofany age).

Under such doctrine, legislative bodies haveroutinely enacted statutes mandating breachesof individual clients’ confidentiality, and report-ing by designated professionals to governmentauthorities, when a vulnerable person or societybecomes threatened in defined ways (Brann &Mattson, 2004; Koocher, 1995; Monahan, 1980;Sarkar, 2006). The most common examples af-fecting psychologists in the United States in-clude laws that command us to report suspicionsthat a child or an elderly or dependent personhas suffered abuse or neglect. We may also faceobligations to seek the hospitalization of peopledangerous to themselves or to others, includingan obligation to alert police and warn potentialintended victims. Similarly, physicians andnurses may face requirements to report patientssuffering from gunshot wounds or certainhighly infectious diseases to police or publichealth authorities. Obviously, some of the pa-tients who come to us and disclose such behav-iors or hazards would prefer that we keep silentand may experience reporting to and subsequentintervention by the state as nonbeneficent andmaleficent.

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In some situations, government has deemedthe vulnerabilities of certain categories of peo-ple significant enough to warrant trumping theprivacy rights of individual clients, potentiallyforcing such clients to face public embarrass-ment, fines, or incarceration, triggered by dis-closures to their psychologist. Some legislatorsand attorneys who represent plaintiffs have pro-posed that psychotherapists become mandatoryreporters to state agencies when clients tell themof sexual intimacies with prior therapists, evenover the clients’ objections. The post-Tarasoffera has also spawned a spate of so-called prog-eny cases and legislation related to the duty ofthe psychotherapist to protect third parties fromharm (see, e.g., Eisner, 2006; Quattrocchi &Schopp, 2005; VandeCreek & Knapp, 2001;Yufik, 2005).

We can probably anticipate other futurearguments that the parens patriae doctrineshould apply to other types of breaches ofduties to individual clients. We deal with thisethically by advising clients of confidentialitylimits at the outset of a professional relation-ship, but the fact still remains: Some of ourprofessional duties may force us to choosebetween taking actions potentially harmful toan individual client, but deemed beneficial tosociety as a whole. Legal authority often pro-vides guidance, but the ultimate prediction ofrisk and decision about taking action restswith the professional.

The parens patriae doctrine also leads to thelogical conclusion that the state may use itsprotective obligation in ways that may harmindividuals in other ways. Indeed, violations ofindividual rights in quest of protecting the vul-nerable have formed the foundation of manygovernmental actions taken in recent years assteps toward national security, relying on utili-tarian ethics and permissible harms. Psycholo-gists may find themselves called on to assist thestate in its protective efforts in invisible ways.

Third-Party Situations

Conflicting interests can also occur fre-quently when the authority or request for aservice originates with a third party known orunknown to the object of the psychologist’sattention. In most circumstances, however, noreason exists to question the practitioner’s goalof helping and not harming the client. In a

number of other situations, however, psycholo-gists may ethically undertake intervention orevaluation at the behest of a third party knowingthat the client may ultimately experience harm.Examples include child custody, competency,or criminal responsibility evaluations and inde-pendent examinations to determine disability,fitness for duty, or suitability for employment.In such contexts, a third party (e.g., the courts,an employer, an insurance company, or otherauthority) have requested or ordered evalua-tions or other services.

Both the entity requesting the service and theperson undergoing evaluation hold a kind ofclient status in such cases. The process involvesan appearance of mutual consent, but conflict-ing interests, and hence a degree of coercion.The individual facing evaluation may decline toparticipate or to share the results of such anevaluation with the requesting party. However,such refusals will have predictable adverse con-sequences such as loss of custody, loss of em-ployment, or loss of disability insurance cover-age. A competent, ethical psychologist with ahigh degree of professional integrity will, it ishoped, perform a skilled valid evaluation andprovide accurate useful data that benefit boththe institutional client and the individual client.Society as a whole clearly gains by havingsignificant decisions of this sort aided by validbehavioral science data. Still, one party mayexperience a degree of harm or fail to benefit asa direct result of the entirely ethical work of thepsychologist.

A more complex set of ethical issues ariseswhen the authority or request for a psycholo-gist’s services originates with a concealed orinvisible third party. In such situations, the con-sulting psychologists also typically remain in-visible to the object of their professional atten-tion. For example, attorneys with cases thatinvolve psychological issues or testimony bypsychological experts will often hire other psy-chologists to review and critique the work of theopposing experts, who will soon face cross-examination. Still other psychologists mighthelp advise a lawyer on jury selection; run ajury simulation; use crime details to devise pro-files of perpetrators to assist police investiga-tors; help the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), Secret Service, or other agencies assess theseriousness of threats made against federal offi-cials; help an employer strategize about inter-

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viewing applicants for a specific job; or developa training program to assist investigators (pickthe venue of your choice) in interviewing orinterrogation.

In such instances, the client owed the primaryethical duty that accompanies actual client sta-tus may well not be the person on whom thepsychologist focuses attention, but rather a thirdparty seeking behavioral science advice. Theperson under study may never know that he orshe has been studied, profiled, critiqued, or sub-ject to behavioral analysis, as the psychologist’sactivities effectively take place behind thescenes. In addition, the person may experiencesome degree of harm as the result of the psy-chologist’s work. Careless or incompetent fo-rensic experts may find themselves embarrassedon the witness stand during a withering cross-examination enabled by detailed critical adviceprovided to the opposing attorney from otherexperts. Serial killers may find themselves iden-tified and convicted on the basis of a psychol-ogist’s analysis of crime scene evidence. Can-didates for executive positions may lose a jobopportunity because of emotional or personalityfactors uncovered during a probing interview.

The psychologist does owe ethical duties ofvarious sorts to people who have no direct clientrelationship in such situations. These includeduties of competence, integrity, and obedienceto law. For example, when advising police oninterrogation of criminal suspects, one must re-main aware that some police officers may focuson obtaining confessions rather than emphasiz-ing the importance of obtaining truthful data(Hartwig, Granhag, & Vrij, 2005). Ethical psy-chologists should not agree to consult in casesin which they lack sufficient competence toprovide valid advice and should not participatein depriving people of their rights. Ideally, anethical psychologist should not knowingly tol-erate others’ use of unreliable or invalid data tothe detriment of another person.

Police interrogators routinely use deceptivetechniques to obtain confessions from criminalsuspects (Janofsky, 2006). Asserting nationalsecurity, the Bush administration attempted tojustify coercive interrogation techniques inwhich physical or mental pain and sufferingmay be used during intelligence interrogationsof persons labeled as unlawful combatants.However, ethical standards in the mental healthprofessions demand integrity, scientific validity,

striving for objectivity, and respect for persons.Deceptive and coercive interrogation tech-niques violate these moral values (Arboleda-Florez, 2006; Behnke, 2006a, 2006b; Janofsky,2006).

Invisible Psychologists in the Marketplace

Consumers also become frequent objects ofstudy by anonymous psychologists in the em-ploy of advertising agencies. One notorious ex-ample became public in the late 1980s when theR. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company planned totest market two new brands of cigarette. Onecalled Uptown contained menthol, and its mar-keting focused chiefly on African Americanmales. Marketing for the other brand, calledDakota, was aimed at young, poorly educatedWhite females, termed virile females (Cotton,1990). Initially, the 1984–1985 the APA Coun-cil of Representatives had declined to take apublic stance, but after the outcry about Uptownand Dakota, the APA Council of Representa-tives (1992) adopted a resolution, reading inpart,

The American Psychological Association urges ourcolleagues who are using psychological techniques toassist in the marketing of tobacco products to takecognizance of the public welfare and consider volun-tarily suspending all efforts at using psychologicaltechniques as a matter of conscience. (Adopted August1992)

Some members had sought an outright ban onparticipation in such marketing, but others ob-jected, noting that the profession should not barcolleagues from working for purveyors of legalcommercial products that the public has an in-terest in purchasing. Still other psychologistsargued that psychological ethics should pre-clude assisting in the marketing of alcohol andfirearms as well.

The general stance evidenced in these argu-ments carries through for a range of profes-sional activities that although lawful, run afoulof core moral, political, or social values held byothers. Although all people obviously have theright to make such decisions for themselves,most professional associations or tax-exemptscientific organizations do not wish to takestands that could imply imposing restrictions onthe rights of members to engage in free pursuitof legal practice in the profession.

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Death Penalty Issues: Invisible Physicians

One particularly interesting issue on whichprofessional groups have weighed in involvesdeath penalty cases. People who participate asexecutioners typically qualify as invisible toboth the public and the condemned person. Thefederal government and 38 states currently al-low capital punishment and have a broad spec-trum of statutes and regulations concerningroles for physicians in execution procedures.These laws have the goal of ensuring the con-stitutionality of capital punishment (i.e., avoid-ing cruel and unusual punishment), althoughcurrent procedures for lethal injection have beencalled into question on the basis of allegationsof pain to the condemned person and botchedexecutions (Levy, 2005; Radelet, 2007).

Any role for physicians runs afoul of profes-sional medical ethics, and the official medicalcommunity stands directly opposed to physicianinvolvement. In response to a 2006 Californiacourt decision mandating physician participa-tion, the chair of the American Medical Asso-ciation’s (AMA’s) Council on Ethical and Ju-dicial Affairs stated in part,

Judge Jeremy Fogel has disregarded physicians’ ethi-cal obligations when he ordered procedures for physi-cian participation in executions of California inmates bylethal injection . . . . As the voice of American medicine,the AMA urges all physicians to remain dedicated toour ethical obligations which prohibit involvement incapital punishment. (Ray, 2006)

Note that the AMA does not assert that it willdiscipline any members who choose to assist inan execution. Similarly, it seems highly un-likely that any state medical licensing boardwould discipline a physician for assisting in astate-authorized execution within its borders.Current laws allow government broad, somewould say excessive, discretion in decidingwhen to honor or disregard medical ethics inthis respect. Some physicians have called foramending state and federal law to eliminateproblems by creating uniform views of physi-cian responsibility in law and medicine thatcomport with medical ethics (Levy, 2005).However, such proposals seem doomed to failon the basis of potential contradiction andvagueness related to other sensitive social issuessuch as euthanasia and abortion.

Psychologists may find themselves facingroles in death penalty cases in the aftermath of

Atkins v. Virginia (2002), in which the courtshave indicated that IQ scores may constitute abasis on which to conclude that a person shouldnot face execution because of mental disability.Those conducting assessments to determine com-petency for execution will not likely have ano-nymity, as in the case of executioners. However,such roles will raise very interesting ethical issuesfor our colleagues who accept such roles.

Public Safety and National Security

Hostage situations afford an interesting ethi-cal dilemma. Suppose that an angry, troubledteenager has brought a gun to school and takena class hostage. A SWAT team arrives andprepares to storm the classroom, as snipers fo-cus their laser sights on the armed teen. Nowsuppose that a psychologist working with thepolice interviews the parent of the hostagetaker, who has arrived on the scene. On thebasis of the information gleaned from the par-ent, the psychologist contacts the hostage takervia cell phone, attempts to establish rapport,asks questions, and engages him emotionally.Because of the intentional efforts of the psy-chologist, the teen ultimately becomes tearful ordistracted and momentarily puts down hisweapon, allowing the SWAT team the secondsneeded to rush in and disarm him.

By using psychological skills and personaldata in such situations, psychologists havesaved lives while never incurring a therapeuticobligation or even disclosing their professionalidentities to the people whose behavior theyattempt to influence. But what if the effort tohave the weapon put down does not work?Would the psychologist have justification toshift gears and lure the hostage taker into aSWAT sniper’s sights?

Yet another example involves concerns aboutpsychologists consulting to interrogations asso-ciated with national security. Shameful behav-iors by military personnel dealing with detaineesat the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq or the Guan-tanamo Bay detention site (e.g., intimidation withdogs, sleep deprivation, infliction of physical dis-comforts, forced nudity, and other types of humil-iation) have rightly attracted condemnation.APA has clearly and repeatedly stated that psy-chologists who commit role violations (i.e.,mixing health services delivery and interroga-tion support) or who participate in any way in

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torture or inhumane or degrading practices haveviolated its Ethics Code (Behnke, 2006a,2006b).

Can one ever work ethically in such a con-text? Consider case of the psychologist whodeveloped relationship- and rapport-based strat-egies for training military interrogators to servein Afghanistan and Iraq (Koocher & Keith Spie-gel, 2008). He holds a PhD in social psychologyand studies interpersonal influence, grew up inthe region, and speaks fluent Arabic. His cur-riculum involves teaching concepts such as thatpeople share information with others who ap-pear empathic; Arab culture respects elders andseniority; learning the background of a personcan enhance his or her cooperation; effectiverapport flows from quid pro quo, commonali-ties, fairness, and mutual respect; listening care-fully to a detainee’s narrative without interrup-tion, then going back over the material canprove effective; and understanding and ac-knowledging person’s sense of honor is impor-tant. He also coaches his trainees to understandthat the motivation and reasoning of many Arabfighters would differ significantly from those ofAmericans. For example, the culture of learningSharia (Islamic law) confers status on the basisof memorization of the Koran, not by analysisof ambiguity or nuance, fostering a culture ofobedience. Arab culture focuses on relation-ships, oriented toward a larger collective, andon impression management.

By helping interrogators understand these ap-proaches to the world that differ significantlyfrom American cultural expectations, this psy-chologist hoped to help interrogators bettergrasp the mindset of the people they wouldultimately interview. Such coaching certainlyseems fully consistent with ethical practice.

Reports of involvement by psychologists andbehavioral scientists in interrogation consultingroles at such facilities have led many to call onAPA to demand that psychologists refuse towork in such capacities. Often such demandscome from people who assume that all suchpersonnel probably engage in torture or similarbehavior. Still others recognize potential legiti-mate, lawful, and nonabusive roles, but arguethat no participation by psychologists at suchfacilities is ever acceptable in any capacity.Some opposition to psychologists’ participationin such activities flows from principled politicalobjections rather than broader ethical principles.

Should we expect that military psychologistswould have to disobey lawful orders or thatpsychologists should decline any military ser-vice? Or should we provide ethical guidance toassist our colleagues in challenging situations toactively discriminate among choices on the ba-sis of professionally accepted standards? Giventhat reasonable, ethical psychologists can come todifferent conclusions, that latter path supportive ofcontinuous peer interaction and consultationseems most appropriate (Gonzalez & Packer,2004; Williamson, 2006; Wilson, 2006).

Espionage and National Security at Home

The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act

One interesting aspect of national securityactivities in the aftermath of the September 11,2001, terrorist attack on the United States arisesfrom Public Law 107–56, also known as theU.S.A. PATRIOT Act of 2001, an acronym for“Uniting and Strengthening America by Provid-ing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept andObstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.” Section 215of that act provides for access to records andother items under the Foreign Intelligence Sur-veillance Act (FISA). The U.S.A. PATRIOTAct amended FISA in part by allowing the FBIto seek a secret ex parte order granting themaccess to materials (including records), whileprohibiting the person forced to produce thematerial from telling others.

Under these provisions, a psychologist couldconceivably face demands to provide confiden-tial client files to federal authorities withoutever informing the client. This statute truly cre-ates the potential for invisible use of psycho-logical records in situations in which the clienthas every normal expectation of privacy. In atleast one instance that predates the U.S.A.PATRIOT Act, communications between apatient and her therapists were intercepted andused by invisible psychologists to help convicther of espionage.

Theresa Squillacote and Kurt Stand

Theresa Squillacote was born in Chicago inNovember 1957. She did well in school andearned a master’s degree from the University ofWisconsin and a law degree from Catholic Uni-versity in 1980.

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Kurt Stand fled from Germany during theNazi era but maintained contacts with friends inpostwar East Germany. In the early 1970s, hebecame an agent for the East German intelli-gence agency. His assignment involved recruit-ing agents in the United States. In 1981, heallegedly recruited Theresa Squillacote, andthey married in 1983.

Theresa served as a senior staff attorney inthe office of the Deputy Undersecretary of De-fense for Acquisition Reform until January1997. Before her Pentagon assignment, sheworked for the House Armed Services Commit-tee. She used many aliases, including Tina,Mary Teresa Miller, the Swan, and Lisa Martin.She and Kurt Stand are currently serving 22and 17 years, respectively, in federal prison forespionage (United States of America v. TheresaMarie Squillacote, 2000).

Authorized under a FISA warrant, the FBImaintained clandestine electronic surveillanceof the couple for 550 days, including monitor-ing their bedroom, intercepting telephone callswith Theresa’s psychotherapist (Jose Apud,MD), and executing “Operation False Flag” tolure her into damaging disclosures.

A Behavioral Analysis Program (BAP) teamat the FBI prepared a report of her personalityfor use in the investigation based on her cap-tured conversations with Dr. Apud. The BAPreport noted that she had “a cluster of person-ality characteristics often loosely referred to asemotional and dramatic.” The team recom-mended taking advantage of Squillacote’s“emotional vulnerability” by describing thetype of person with whom she might develop arelationship and pass on classified materials.For example, the team’s report cited in courtdocuments suggested,

She ignores and neglects her children; her clandestineactivities take precedence in her life. . . . [She] is takingthe antidepressants Zoloft and [sic] Diserel. She haswide mood swings. She has dependent childish rela-tionships with men. She is totally self-centered andimpulsive.

The team went on to specify the type of under-cover agent most likely to elicit secret documentsfrom Squillacote (United States of America v.Theresa Marie Squillacote, 2000, Appendix A).In this case, invisible mental health experts onthe FBI BAP team helped to catch spies. Squil-lacote and her husband maintained their inno-

cence and sought unsuccessfully to overturntheir convictions as entrapment.

Recommendations for EthicalRole Management

Some colleagues occasionally argue againstany concealed roles involving application ofbehavioral science to serve the needs of somethird parties, usually by asserting a personalimportant moral values position. Our EthicsCode has generally not attempted to prohibitsuch activities, so long as the psychologists insuch roles perform their duties lawfully. Aspsychological science advances, we must ex-pect that private parties, governments, and cor-porations will continue to seek psychologicalconsultation out of public view. The EthicsCode (APA, 2002) should compel attention tohuman welfare, integrity, appropriate role clarity,and obedience to law, but not become a tool foradvancing political or narrow social agendas.

Protection of the public and vulnerable mem-bers of society should remain a prime directivefor psychologists. In many situations, psychol-ogists will face requests for services that in-volve multiple layers of clients, each with dif-ferent positions in a hierarchy of control andvulnerability. We must remain mindful of thesenuances and focus on retaining our professionalintegrity, while providing high-quality servicein the context of relative strengths and weak-nesses of the parties involved.

These situations will certainly remind ethi-cists of the divergent views of deontological andconsequentialist philosophers. Deontologistssuch as Immanuel Kant would argue that therightness or wrongness of an action does notdepend on its consequences, but rather on theintent of the actor. In contrast, consequential-ist or utilitarian ethics as expounded by JohnStuart Mill or Jeremy Bentham would holdthat determining the ethically correct act orsystem of rules depends on the degree to whichit maximizes good consequences, based onsome impartial determination of good and evils.Frances Kamm, a contemporary professor atHarvard’s Kennedy School of Government, hashighlighted the principle of permissible harm(Kamm, 2006). She might assert that one mayethically cause harm to save more, if and only ifthe harm is an effect or an aspect of the greatergood itself.

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We must begin to conceptualize our profes-sional obligations much like the leaves of anartichoke, connected at the base by our ethicalresponsibilities and closely packed but still dis-tinct and separable. As our science continues toimprove and gains more public recognition forvalue added to decision making, we will findourselves increasingly drawn into situations inwhich a multitude of social and political inter-ests apply across hierarchies to whom we owevarious degrees of professional duties. Theseconsiderations can help guide our responses insuch situations whether visible to the peoplewho become the objects of our professionalattention or not.

• First, by clarifying our professional obliga-tions to ourselves and the other parties involvedat the outset of our professional relationships,we reduce the risk of subsequent confusion andmisunderstanding. This requires us to considerthe potential application of our work, evenwhen the specific parties remain unspecified.

• Second, at times legal standards or emer-gent need may legitimately dictate the prece-dence of one person’s priority and rights overanother’s in considering professional obliga-tions. Such standards should emerge from legit-imate public policy decision-making processesand not become confused by political ideologiesof the right or the left. Invisibility shouldheighten our personal and professional senses ofaccountability.

• Third, by focusing on the welfare and bestinterests of the most vulnerable party in thechain of individuals to whom one owes a legit-imate professional duty, psychologists optimizethe likelihood of a beneficial outcome. We mustremain particularly mindful of this obligationwhen those at the bottom of the chain remainunaware of our involvement.

• Fourth, at times the most vulnerable partymay be the public at large. In such situations,psychologists must weigh their moral obliga-tions against legally permissible options (e.g., Imay legally help to market cigarettes, but I maychoose not to do so to preserve public health).Sometimes withholding our services may yielda greater public good than providing them.

• Finally, engaging in illegal, inhumane, cruel,degrading, or other torturous practices can neverpass as ethically acceptable conduct under anyrationale. Doing so from a concealed role beto-kens cowardice and ethical misconduct.

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Received September 17, 2007Revision received August 11, 2008

Accepted August 25, 2008 �

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