THIRD DIVISIONTRINIDADH. CAMARA,Complainant,- versus -ATTY. OSCAR AMANDY REYES,Respondent.A.C. No. 6121Present:YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,Chairperson,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA, andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:July 31, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xRESOLUTIONNACHURA,J.:Before us is a Letter-Complaint[1]filed by complainant Trinidad H. Camara against respondent Atty. Oscar Amandy Reyes.Sometime in 2003, complainant hired the services of respondent to handle her case.As partial acceptance fee, respondent received from complainantP50,000.00 evidenced by a receipt[2]placed on his calling card.Respondent, however, took no steps to protect complainants interest.As no service was rendered by respondent, complainant asked that he return the amount given him so that she could use it in repairing her house.Respondent offered that he would take charge of repairing the house.Yet, he again failed to fulfill his promise, which prompted the complainant to reiterate her demand for the return of the money.[3]As respondent failed to give back the amount demanded, complainant initiated the instant case.In his Answer, respondent prayed that the case be closed and terminated, simply because the matter has already been resolved by all the parties concerned.He added that complainant went to his office and explained that she signed the letter-complaint not knowing that it was against respondent, as she was made to believe that it was a complaint against her neighbor.[4]Complainant and respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference; and to submit their respective position papers.OnFebruary 19, 2007, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[5]In his Report and Recommendation, IBP CommissionerSalvadorB. Hababag made the following findings:There is proof that respondent receipted the amount of Php50,000.00 in his own handwriting.Even his calling card was given to the complainants.Canon 16, Rule 16.01 provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.Canon 18, Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.Canon 18, Rule 18.04 provides that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for information.Using the above yardsticks, clearly the respondent is liable and failed to live [up] to [the] above mentioned standards.While it is true that complainant Trinidad Camara allegedly executed an affidavit, the same will not save the respondent.As a general rule, disbarment proceeding shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute unless the Court motu proprio determines that there is no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent.We reiterate that the respondent did not traverse the charges against him.He simply wanted this case to be closed and terminated allegedly because he and Mrs. Camara had already resolved their problem and the latters son, who also signed the letter-complaint as attorney-in-fact has no authority to do so.WHEREFORE, premises considered, it [is] most respectfully recommended that the respondent be suspended for six (6) months from the active practice of law.[6]In its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-522, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the investigating Commissioner, thus:RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution a[s] Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for respondents violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Oscar Amandy Reyes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.We agree with the foregoing recommendation.The Court notes that despite the opportunity accorded to respondent to refute the charges against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid explanation.[7]It is incumbent upon respondent to meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.These, respondent miserably failed to do.[8]The record is bereft of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to dispute the charges against him.In his answer, he did not even deny complainants allegations.He only prayed that the case be closed and terminated, simply because the problem with complainant had already been resolved.The alleged compromise between complainant and respondent is not enough to exonerate the latter from the present disciplinary case.A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the complainant.What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of negligence has been duly proved.[9]Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.The complainant is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome of the case.[10]This is also the reason why this Court may investigate charges against lawyers regardless of complainants standing.[11]When respondent accepted the amount ofP50,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters case, and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established.From then on, it was expected that he would serve his client, herein complainant, with competence, and attend to her cause with fidelity, care and devotion.[12]The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainants case and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.[13]Specifically,Rule 18.03 states:A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to the latters genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights.An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client, likewise, serves the ends of justice.Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.[14]The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling.Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people, not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole, is eroded.To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required at all times to maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession.[15]The factual antecedents inReyes v. Vitan[16]andSencio v. Atty. Calvadores[17]bear a striking similarity to the present case.InReyes,complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer for the purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charges against the formers sister-in-law and the latters niece.After receiving the amount ofP17,000.00, respondent did not take any action on complainants case.InSencio, complainant therein, likewise, engaged the services of Atty. Calvadores to prosecute the civil aspect of the case in relation to the death of her son in a vehicular accident.The total amount ofP12,000.00 was duly acknowledged and received by respondent as attorneys fees.Despite repeated assurances by respondent, complainant discovered that the former had not filed any case on her behalf.In both cases, we suspended the respondent lawyers for a period of six (6) months.Thus, we impose the same penalty on respondent herein, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.WHEREFORE,Resolution No. XVIII-2008-522 of the IBP Board of Governors isAFFIRMED.Accordingly, Atty. Oscar Amandy Reyes is herebySUSPENDEDfor a period ofSIX (6) MONTHSfrom the practice of law.Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED.FIRST DIVISION[A.C. No. 6297. July 13, 2004]DOLORES D. PARIAS,complainant,vs. ATTY. OSCAR P. PAGUINTO,respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseA lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention and time to every case he accepts. A lawyer impliedly warrants that he possesses the necessary diligence, learning and skill to handle each case. He should exert his best judgment and exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of his clients cause.The FactsSometime in October 2001, complainant Dolores Dryden Parias (Parias) engaged the services of respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto (Paguinto) to annul her marriage to Danilo Soriano. They agreed that for the legal services, Parias would pay Paguinto an acceptance fee ofP25,000, the filing fee ofP2,500 and other incidental expenses.On 2 December 2001, Parias paid PaguintoP10,000 in cash as partial payment of the acceptance fee. An acknowledgment receipt evidenced this payment.[1]Parias gave Paguinto a diskette containing a narration of what happened between her and her estranged husband Danilo Soriano. Parias also furnished Paguinto with a copy of her marriage contract with Soriano. Before the end of December 2001, Parias gave PaguintoP2,500 for the filing fee.Sometime between January and April 2002, Parias inquired from Paguinto on the progress of her annulment case. Paguinto informed her that the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 64 (RTC-Manila, Branch 64), before Judge Ricaforte and that the hearing was scheduled on 25 April 2002. Before the hearing, Parias requested for a meeting with Paguinto but the secretary informed her that the hearing was cancelled. The secretary further informed Parias that the judge reset the succeeding hearings originally scheduled on 29 May 2002 and 26 June 2002 because the judge was sick or out of town.On the first week of July 2002, Parias went to the trial court to inquire about her case but the court personnel in RTC-Manila, Branch 64 informed her that there was no such case filed in their court. Parias asked Paguinto for the case number, date of filing, copy of the petition and the court where the annulment case was pending. Paguinto told Parias that the records were at his office and that he was in Malolos, Bulacan attending to a case. It turned out that there was no annulment case filed in RTC-Manila, Branch 64. Paguinto promised to return the money that Parias paid as down payment. However, Paguinto returned theP10,000 only after Parias filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) the present complaint for disbarment.In the Order dated 14 February 2003,[2]the CBD directed Paguinto to answer the complaint. Paguinto asked for an extension of 15 days to file his Answer. The CBD granted the extension in the Order dated 19 March 2003.[3]However, Paguinto failed to file his Answer within the extended period and thus the CBD declared him in default in the Order dated 15 July 2003.[4]After the hearing, Parias submitted her Position Paper praying that the CBD declare Paguinto guilty of violation of Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.On 10 September 2003, Parias filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal[5]of the complaint. Parias stated that Paguinto personally explained exhaustively the reasons why he failed to comply with his obligations and she realized that the complaint arose due to a misapprehension of facts, misunderstanding and miscommunication. Parias manifested that she was withdrawing the complaint, as she was no longer interested in pursuing the case.On the same date, Paguinto filed a Manifestation and Motion[6]explaining that he failed to attend the hearing on 30 July 2003 because he was in Tabuk, Kalinga attending a hearing in a criminal case for frustrated homicide. He apologized to Parias for his actuations claiming himself solely to be blamed. He further declared that he failed to timely prepare and file the petition for annulment because he spends his time mostly in Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Cavite where he practices law catering to those clients who have less in life.Commissioners Report & RecommendationThe IBP designated Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala (Commissioner) as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the case. The Commissioner found Paguinto negligent in performing his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. The Commissioner declared that a lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention, care and time to his cases, accepting only as many cases as he can handle. Paguinto failed to comply with this duty. The Commissioner recommended the suspension of Paguinto from the practice of law for six months.The Courts RulingWe agree with the Commissioner.Parias gave PaguintoP10,000 cash as partial payment of the acceptance fee. Parias also gave PaguintoP2,500 for the filing fee. Paguinto led Parias to believe that he had filed the annulment case. Paguinto informed Parias that the case was filed with the RTC-Manila, Branch 64, before Judge Ricaforte. However, Parias later found out that Paguinto never filed the annulment case in court.Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code) provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected for or from the client. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.[7]Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand.[8]Paguinto returned the money only after Parias filed this administrative case for disbarment.Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise his clients interests will suffer.[9]It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter. He must also give adequate attention to his legal work.The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and ability in handling his cases. A license to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge and diligence to manage their cases.[10]The legal profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family.InGamalinda vs. Alcantara,[11]we ruled:A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He shall serve his client with competence and diligence, and his duty of entire devotion to his clients cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed. An attorneys duty to safeguard the clients interests commences from his retainer until his effective release from the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his clients interests may require.And failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code.[12]Rule 18.01 of the Code is clear. A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service that he is not qualified to render. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. He has the duty to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. Rule 18.03 of the Code also provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence shall render him liable.One last point. Parias executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal[13]of the complaint stating that she was withdrawing the administrative complaint against Paguinto after realizing that said complaint against the respondent arose due to misapprehension of facts, misunderstanding and miscommunication. Paguinto, on the other hand, submitted a Manifestation and Motion apologizing to Parias for his actuations and admitting that he was solely to be blamed. A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer,[14]especially in this case where the lawyer admitted his misconduct.Pariass affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case does not exonerate Paguinto in any way. We reiterate our ruling inRayos-Ombac v. Rayos[15]that [A] proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken solely for the public welfare. x x x The attorney is called upon to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto GUILTY of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we penalize Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto with SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this Decision.Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago,andAzcuna, JJ.,concur.

FIRST DIVISIONCARLITO P. CARANDANG,A.C. No. 7813Complainant,Present:PUNO,C.J., Chairperson,CARPIO,CORONA,- versus -LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBERSAMIN,JJ.ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA,Promulgated:Respondent.April 21, 2009x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is a complaint filed by Carlito P. Carandang (Carandang) against Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina (Atty. Obmina).Atty. Obmina was counsel for Carandang in Civil Case No. B-5109 entitled Sps. Emilia A. Carandang and Carlito Carandang v. Ernesto Alzona.Carandang brought suit for Atty. Obminas failure to inform Carandang of the adverse decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 and for failure to appeal the decision.The FactsThe facts of CBD Case No. 06-1869 in the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) read as follows:Complainants Sworn Statement is hereto reproduced as follows:SWORN STATEMENTAko si CARLITO P. CARANDANG, nasa wastong gulang, may asawat mga anak, at nakatira sa 5450 Alberto Apt., St. Francis Homes, Halang Bian, Laguna.Na ako ay may kasong isinampa kay ERNESTO T. ALSONA tungkol sa aming bahay at lupa, at isinampa sa BIAN RTC BRANCH 25, CIVIL CASE NO. B-5109.Na ang naturang kaso ay natapos at nadisisyunan noong Enero 28, 2000 at ako ay natalo sa naturang kaso.Na ang aking naging abogado ay si ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA, tubong Quezon at bilang kababayan ako ay nagtiwala sa kanyang kakayahan upang maipagtanggol sa naturang kaso, ngunit taliwas sa aking pananalig sa kanya ang nasabing kaso ay napabayaan hanggang sa magkaroon ng desisyon ang korte na kunin ang aking lupat bahay, sa madalit sabi kami ay natalo ng hindi ko man lang nalalaman at huli na ang lahat ng malaman ko dahil hindi na kami pwedeng umapila.Na nalaman ko lang na may desisyon na pala ang korte pagkatapos ng anim na buwan.Ang aking anak na si ROSEMARIE ay nagpunta sa BIAN, sa RTC ay binati at tinatanong kung saan kayo nakatira at ang sagot [ng] aking anak BAKIT? At ang sagot naman [ng] taga RTC, HINDI MO BA ALAM NA ANG INYONG KASO AY TAPOS NA.Nang marinig yon ay umuwi na siya at sinabi agad sa akin.Tapos na daw yung kaso [ng] ating bahay at ako ay pumunta sa opisina ni ATTY. OBMINA at aking tinanong BAKIT DI MO SINABI SA AKIN NA TAPOS NA ANG KASO? At ang sagot niya sa akin AY WALA KANG IBABAYAD SA ABOGADO DAHIL WALA KANG PERA PANG-APILAdahil sa sagot sa akin ay para akong nawalan [ng] pag-asa sa kaso.Lumapit ako sa Malacaang at binigay yung sulat pero doon ay aking nakausap yung isang abogado at akoy kanyang pinakinggan at aking inabot ang papeles at aking pinakita at ang sabi ay hindi na pwede dahil anim na buwan na [nang] lumipas ang kaso.Kaya aking sinabi sa ATTY. ng Malacaang na hindi sinabi sa akin agad ni ATTY. OBMINA na may order na pala ang kaso.Kaya ang ginawang paraan ay binigyan ako ng sulat para ibigay sa IBP, at nang mabasa ang sulat ay sinabi sa akin na doon sa SAN PABLO ang hearing, at tinanong ako kung nasaan ang ATTORNEYS WITHDRAWAL NYO? Ang sagot ko ay WALA HO, kaya inutusan ako na kunin ang ATTORNEYS WITHDRAWAL at agad akong nagpunta sa opisina ni ATTY. OBMINA at tinanong ko sa sekretarya niya kung nasaan si ATTY. OBMINA ang sagot sa akin ay nasa AMERICA NA! Kayat aking tinanong kung sinong pwede magbigay sa akin ng attorneys withdrawal at ang sabi ay yung anak nya na si CARMELITSA OBMINA.Bumalik ako noong araw ng Biyernes at aking nakuha, pero hindi na ako nakabalik sa IBP dahil noong araw na iyon ay hindi ko na kayang maglakad, kaya hindi na natuloy ang hearing sa SAN PABLO.CARLITO P. CARANDANGAffiantCTC No. 21185732Issued on March 7, 2006At Bian, LagunaOn November 16, 2006, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through Rogelio A. Vinluan, the then Director for Bar Discipline (now the incumbent Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines), issued an Order directing respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina to submit his Answer, duly verified, in six (6) copies, and furnish the complainant with a copy thereof, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.On December 12, 2006, this Commission was in receipt of a Manifestation dated December 11, 2006 filed by a certain Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaa.Allegedly, she is the daughter of respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina.She further alleged that [her] father is already a permanent resident of the United States of America since March 2001 and had already retired from the practice of law.That on February 20, 2007, undersigned Commissioner [Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.] scheduled the Mandatory Conference/Hearing of the case on March 20, 2007 at 9:30 a.m.On March 19, 2007, Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaa filed a Manifestation and Motion reiterating her earlier Manifestation that the respondent, Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina is already a permanent resident of the United States for the last six (6) years and likewise, she reiterated her request that summons be served on her father thru extraterritorial service. Atty. Muaa likewise requested the cancellation of the mandatory conference and resetting of the same on April 10, 2007.On the scheduled Mandatory Conference on March 20, 2007, complainant Carlito P. Carandang appeared.The undersigned Commissioner directed Atty. Carmelita Muaa to appear before this Commission on May 18, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and to bring with her the alleged withdrawal of appearance filed by her father and to bring proof that her father is now really a permanent resident of the United States of America.

That on May 18, 2007, Atty. Muaa again filed a Manifestation and Motion informing this Honorable Commission that she cannot possibly appear for the reason that she is the legal counsel of a candidate in Muntinlupa City and that the canvassing of the election results is not yet finished.She likewise submitted copies of her fathers Passport and US Permanent Residence Card.That with respect [to] the Withdrawal of Appearance, Atty. Muaa alleged that copies of the same were all given to complainant Carlito P. Carandang.That an Order dated May 18, 2007 was issued by the undersigned Commissioner granting the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion.Atty. Muaa was likewise directed to appear before this Office on June 22, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.On June 22, 2007, in the supposed Mandatory Conference, Atty. Carmencita Obmina Muaaappeared.Likewise presented was Mr. Carlito Carandang who is the complainant against Atty. Gilbert Obmina. In the interest of justice, Atty. Muaawas given a period of ten (10) days within which to file a verified answer.The Mandatory Conference was set on August 3, 2007 at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon.On June 29, 2007, Atty. Muaa filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file Answer.On July 3, 2007, this Commission is in receipt of the verified Answer filed by respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina.On August 3, 2007, during the Mandatory Conference, complainant Carlito Carandang appeared.Atty. Muaaappeared in behalf of [her] father.After making some admissions, stipulations and some clarificatory matters, the parties were directed to submit their verified position papers within ten (10) days.Thereafter, the case will be submitted on report and recommendation.On August 10, 2007, complainant, by himself, filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Position Paper.Likewise, respondent, through Atty. Muaa, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Position Paper on August 13, 2007.On September 3, 2007, the Commission on Bar Discipline received copy of the Respondents Memorandum.On September 12, 2007, this Commission received copy of complainants Position Paper.[1]The IBPs Report and RecommendationIn a Report[2]dated 2 October 2007, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) found that Atty. Obmina was still counsel of record for complainant at the time the decision was rendered and up to the time of the issuance of the writ of execution.Atty. Obmina received the Decision dated 28 January 2000 on 1 March 2000.Atty. Carmencita Obmina-Muaa manifested in Court that her father has been living in the United States of America since 2001.There is nothing on record that will show that Atty. Obmina notified complainant in any manner about the decision.Although Commissioner De La Rama observed that complainant is partly to blame for his loss for failure to maintain contact with Atty. Obmina and to inform himself of the progress of his case, Commissioner De La Rama nonetheless underscored the duty of Atty. Obmina to notify his client as to what happened to his case.Thus:One cannot escape the fact that the complainant himself failed to communicate with his counsel for quite sometime.There is nothing in the complainants Sworn Statement that would show that he regularly visited the office of the respondent, Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina.Complainant is partly to blame for his loss and it should not be attributed solely to the respondent.The Supreme Court held that clients should maintain contact with their counsel from time to time and inform themselves of the progress of their case, thereby exercising that standard of care which an ordinary prudent man bestows upon his business(Leonardo vs. S.T. Best, Inc., 422 SCRA 347)However, the respondent who has in his possession the complete files and address of the complainant, should have exerted efforts to even notify Mr. Carandang as to what happened to his case.Whether the decision is adverse [to] or in favor of his client, respondent is duty bound to notify the clients pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.Further under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18,a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.Lastly, under Rule 18.04,a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for information.That as a result of the respondents failure to notify the complainant, the latter lost the case leading to his eviction.In the case of Mijares vs. Romana 425 SCRA 577, the Supreme Court held thatas an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever information he may have acquired which it is important that the client should have knowledge of.In another case, the Supreme Court held thatrespondents failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility(Cheng vs. Agravante, 426 SCRA 42).WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with head bowed in sadness, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.Although the said respondent is reportedly in the United States of America and accordingly retired from the practice of law, this Commission will not close its eyes on the negligence that he has committed while in the active practice.SO ORDERED.[3](Emphasis in the original)In a Resolution[4]dated 19 October 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama.The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 14 March 2008.The Ruling of the CourtWe sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations.Atty. Obmina violated Canon 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Atty. Obmina Failed to Serve Complainantwith Competence and DiligenceCanon 18 states that [a] lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.Rules 18.03 and 18.04 provide that [a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable and [a] lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.In his Memorandum, Atty. Obmina admitted that he was counsel for Carandang in Civil Case No. B-5109.Atty. Obmina blamed Carandang for the adverse decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 because Carandang did not tell him that there was a Compromise Agreement executed prior to Atty. Obminas filing ofthe complaint in Civil Case No. B-5109.Carandang, on the other hand, stated that Atty. Obmina made him believe that they would win the case.In fact, Carandang engaged the services of Atty. Obmina on a contingent basis.Carandang shall pay Atty. Obmina 40% of the sale proceeds of the property subject matter of the case.Atty. Obmina promised to notify Carandang as soon as the decision of the court was given.Contrary to Atty. Obminas promise, there is no evidence on record that Atty. Obmina took the initiative to notify Carandang of the trial courts adverse decision.Atty. Obmina again put Carandang at fault for failuretoadvance the appeal fee. Atty. Obminas version of Carandangs confrontation with him was limited to this narrative:Sometime in the year 2000, complainant went to respondents law office. He was fuming mad and was blaming respondent for having lost his case.He asked for the records of the case because according to him, he will refer the case to a certain Atty. Edgardo Salandanan.Respondent gave complainant the case file.Complainant did not return to pursue the appeal or at least had given an appeal fee to be paid to Court in order to perfect the appeal.[5]Atty. Obminas futile efforts of shifting the blame on Carandang only serve to emphasize his failure to notify Carandang that the trial court already promulgated a decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 that was adverse to Carandangs interests.Atty. Obmina cannot overlook the fact that Carandang learned about the promulgation of the decision not through Atty. Obmina himself, but through a chance visit to the trial court.Instead of letting Carandang know of the adverse decision himself, Atty. Obmina should have immediately contacted Carandang, explained the decision to him, and advised them on further steps that could be taken.It is obvious thatCarandang lost his right to file an appeal because of Atty. Obminas inaction.Notwithstanding Atty. Obminas subsequent withdrawal as Carandangs lawyer, Atty. Obmina was still counsel of record at the time the trial court promulgated the decision in Civil Case No. B-5109.InTolentino v. Mangapit,we stated that:As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform her client of whatever information she may have acquired which it is important that the client should have knowledge of.She should notify her client of any adverse decision to enable her client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and [loss] of trust and confidence in the attorney.[6]The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the lawyer to informtimely and adequatelythe client of important developments affecting the clients case.The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the clients interests.[7]The Court finds well-taken the recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of law for one year.In the cases ofCredito v. Sabio[8]andPineda v. Macapagal,[9]we imposed the same penalty upon attorneys who failed to update their clients on the status of their cases.Considering Atty. Obminas advanced age, such penalty serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the public and legal profession.WHEREFORE, the CourtAFFIRMSthe resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.Accordingly, Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina is foundGUILTYof violation of Canon 18 and of Rules18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.The CourtSUSPENDSAtty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of law for one year, andWARNShim that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney.Likewise, copies shall be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED.

Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaSECOND DIVISIONATTY. ELMER C. SOLIDON,Complainant,-versus-ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD,Respondent.A.C. No. 8158Present:CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,BRION,DELCASTILLO,ABAD, andPEREZ,JJ.Promulgated:February 24, 2010

x---------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

BRION,J.:

In a verified complaint[1]before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines(IBP Commission on Bar Discipline),Atty. Elmer C. Solidon (Atty. Solidon)sought the disbarment of Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) for violations of Rule 16.01,[2]Rule 18.03,[3]and Rule 18.04[4]of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving negligence in handling a case.The FactsAtty. Macalalad is the Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office 8,TaclobanCity.Although he is in public service, the DENR Secretary has given him the authority to engage in the practice of law.While on official visit toEastern Samarin October 2005,Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty. Solidon by a mutual acquaintance, Flordeliz Cabo-Borata (Ms. Cabo-Borata). Atty. Solidon asked Atty. Macalalad to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land located in Borongan,Eastern Samarand owned by Atty. Solidons relatives.For a consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), Atty. Macalalad accepted the task to be completed within a period of eight (8) months.Atty. Macalalad received Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) was to be paid when Atty. Solidon received the certificate of title to the property.Atty. Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up to the present time.In the Complaint, Position Papers[5]and documentary evidence submitted, Atty. Solidon claimed that he tried to contact Atty. Macalalad to follow-up on the status of the case six (6) months after he paid the initial legal fees.He did this through phone calls and text messages to their known acquaintances and relatives, and, finally, through a letter sent by courier to Atty. Macalalad.However, he did not receive any communication from Atty. Macalalad.In the Answer,[6]Position Paper,[7]and affidavits of witnesses,Atty. Macalalad posited that the delay in the filing of the petition for the titling of the property was caused by his clients failure to communicate with him.He also explained that he had no intention of reneging on his obligation, as he had already prepared the draft of the petition. He failed to file the petition simply because he still lacked the needed documentary evidence that his clients should have furnished him.Lastly, Atty. Macalalad denied that Atty. Solidon tried to communicate with him.The Findings of the IBPIn his Report and Recommendation datedJune 25, 2008, Investigating Commissioner Randall C. Tabayoyong made the following finding of negligence against Atty. Macalalad:complainant submitted in his position paper the affidavit of Flordeliz Cabo-Borata, the mutual acquaintance of both complainant and respondent. In the said affidavit, Mrs. Cabo-Borata described how she repeatedly followed-up the matter with respondent and how respondent turned a deaf ear towards the same. There is nothing on record which would prompt this Office to view the allegations therein with caution. In fact, considering that the allegations corroborate the undisputed facts of the instant case...As respondent has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for the non-filing of the application despite the lapse of about a year from the time his services were engaged, it is plain that his negligence in filing the application remains uncontroverted. And such negligence is contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. In fact, Rule 18.03 even provides that his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.Acting on this recommendation, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-336 datedJuly 17, 2008, holding that:RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,with modification,the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad is herebySUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for three (3) months andOrdered to Returnthe amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) with 12% interest per annum to complainant The case is now before this Court for our final action pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, considering that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline imposed the penalty of suspension on Atty. Macalalad.The Courts RulingWe agree with the IBPs factual findings and legal conclusions.Inadministrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge.[8]We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainants evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies the required quantum of proof in proving Atty. Macalalads negligence.Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states:Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, thatthe mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is consideredper sea violation.Thus, inVillafuerte v. Cortez,[9]we held that a lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to protect his clients interest after receiving his acceptance fee. InIn Re: Atty. Briones,[10]we ruled that thefailure of the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary period (to the prejudice of his client who languished in jail for more than a year) is an offense that warrants disciplinary action.InGarcia v. Atty. Manuel, we penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the case, among other matters.[11]Subsequently,inReyes v. Vitan,[12]we reiterated that the act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the complainants case and, subsequently, in failing to render the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.Wemade the same conclusion inCanoy v. Ortiz[13]where we emphatically stated that the lawyers failure to file the position paper wasper sea violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his negligence in handling a case.InCanoy, we accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyers duty to inform his client of the status of the case.[14]Our rulings inMacarilay v. Seria,[15]inHeirs ofBallesteros v. Apiag,[16]andinVillaflores v. Limos[17]were of the same tenor.InVillaflores,we opinedthat even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to acquire the required information.We held that as between the client and his lawyer, the latter has more control in handling the case.All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyers duty to his client once an engagement for legal services is accepted.A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest withutmost diligence.[18]The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client.[19]Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer.[20]The records in this case tell us that Atty. Macalalad failed to act as he committed when he failed to file the required petition.He cannot now shift the blame to his clients since it was his duty as a lawyer to communicate with them.At any rate, we reject Atty. Macalalads defense that it was his clients who failed to contact him. Although no previous communication transpired between Atty. Macalalad and his clients, the records nevertheless show that Atty. Solidon, who contracted Atty. Macalalads services in behalf of his relatives, tried his best to reach him prior to the filing of the present disbarment case. Atty. Solidon even enlisted the aid of Ms. Cabo-Borata to follow-up on the status of the registration application with Atty. Macalalad.As narrated by Ms. Cabo-Borata in her affidavit,[21]she succeeded several times in getting in touch with Atty. Macalalad and on those occasions asked him about the progress of the case.To use Ms. Cabo-Boratas own words, she received no clear-cut answers from him; he just informed her that everything was on process.We give credence to these narrations considering Atty. Macalalads failure to contradict them or deny their veracity, in marked contrast with his vigorous denial of Atty. Solidons allegations.We consider, too, that other motivating factors specifically, the monetary consideration and the fixed period of performance should have made it more imperative for Atty. Macalalad to promptly take action and initiate communication with his clients.He had been given initial payment and should have at least undertaken initial delivery of his part of the engagement.We further find that Atty. Macalalads conduct refutes his claim of willingness to perform his obligations.If Atty. Macalalad truly wanted to file the petition, he could have acquired the necessary information from Atty. Solidon to enable him to file the petition even pending the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline investigation.As matters now stand, he did not take any action to initiate communication.These omissions unequivocally point to Atty. Macalalads lack of due care that now warrants disciplinary action.In addition to the above finding of negligence, we also findAtty. Macalalad guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer toaccount for all the money received from the client.In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not immediately account for and promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon even after he failed to render any legal service within the contracted time of the engagement.[22]The PenaltyBased on these considerations, we modify the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplines recommended penalty by increasing the period ofAtty. Macalalads suspension from the practice of law from three (3) months, to six (6) months.[23]In this regard, we follow the Courts lead inParias v. Paguinto[24]where we imposed on the respondent lawyer suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.WHEREFORE, premises considered, we herebyAFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONResolution No. XVIII-2008-336 datedJuly 17, 2008of the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.We impose on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad the penalty ofSIX (6) MONTHS SUSPENSIONfrom the practice of law for violations of Rule 16.03 and Rule 18.03 of theCode of Professional Responsibility, effective upon finality of this Decision. Atty. Macalalad isSTERNLYWARNEDthat a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.Atty. Macalalad is alsoORDEREDtoRETURNto Atty. Elmer C. Solidon the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) with interest of twelve percent (12%)per annumfrom the date of promulgation of this Decision until the full amount is returned.Letcopies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidantandnoted in Atty. Macalalads record as a member of the Bar.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONA.C. No. 7298 June 25, 2007[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA,complainant,vs.ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO,respondent.R E S O L U T I O NTINGA,J.:In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005, complainant Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice, respondent wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his client's claim for separation pay. The letter also contained the following threat to the company:BUTif these are not paid onAugust 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).1Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards, complainant filed an administrative complaint2with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed an Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims)3claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainant's legal counsel, also played an important part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him. Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification against forum shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending before the Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public Functions4and for violation of the Notarial Law.5A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to appear.6Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position papers.The Report and Recommendation7of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.8On 10 July 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the notice of said Resolution and the records of the case.9Thereafter, on 18 August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for Modification of Decision)10reiterating his claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the "false, malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless and false suit."11Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline)12alleging that he personally submitted and filed with the IBP his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right to due process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his position paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May 2006 Resolution13of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition on the merits.Based on the records, there is truth to complainant's assertion that he filed his position paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of said document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on the same date.14Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court for his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.15Said rule states that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned.16The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.The Court's determination is anchored on thesui generisnature of disbarment proceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping requirement, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement, and the merit of complainant's complaint against respondent.The Court, in the case ofIn re Almacen,17dwelt on thesui generischaracter of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers aresui generis.Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather aninvestigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Courtmotu proprio.Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.18[Emphasis supplied]In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or "action" is one that necessarily involves "the same issues" as the one posed in the disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes,19which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.20Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.21It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided,i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either "taken by the Supreme Courtmotu proprio,or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person."22Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."23At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the supposed defect in the original complaint. The records show that complainant submitted the required certification against forum shopping on 6 December 2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss the present petition.Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant's case against respondent justifies the grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical.Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.24In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client.25In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.26InSps.Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,27we held that "[a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondent's disbarment from the practice of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution."28While the respondent inBoyboywas exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that "a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the State."29He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent's threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client's demands. It was not respondent's intention to point out complainant's violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to "keep silent" about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which a private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his client's interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.Carpio, Acting Chairperson, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., JJ.,concur.Quisumbing, J.,on official leave.

Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtBaguioCityTHIRD DIVISIONATTY.GEORGE C. BRIONES,A.C. No. 6691

Complainant,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,

Chairperson,

- versus -AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR.,

CHICO-NAZARIO,and

NACHURA,JJ.

ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ,Promulgated:

Respondent.April 27, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xR E S O L U T I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment[1]datedAugust 12, 2004filed by Atty. George S.Brionescharging Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez with violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91 on forum-shopping and Rule 19.01 and Rule 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is the April 3, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in SP Proc. No. 99-92870, entitled, In the Matter of the Petition for the Allowance of the Will of Luz J. Henson, to wit:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby:1.Reiterates its designation of the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S.Brionesof the estate of the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged against the estate.2.Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his commission which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.3.Directs the special administrator to deliver the residue to the heirs in proportion to their shares.From the share of Lilia J. Henson-Cruz, there shall be deducted the advances made to her.IT IS SO ORDERED.Complainant Atty.Brionesis the Special Administrator of the Estate of Luz J. Henson.Respondent Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is the counsel for the Heirs of the late Luz J. Henson (Heirs).OnApril 9, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the RTC a notice of appeal from the Order datedApril 3, 2002, questioning the payment of commission to Atty.Briones.[2]On April 29, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition forCertiorari, Prohibition andMandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order dated March 12, 2002, appointing the firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit at the expense of the late Luz J. Henson, as well as the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it denied their motion for recommendation.[3]OnJuly 26, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the CA a Petition forMandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 71844,[4]alleging that the respondent Judge therein unlawfully refused to comply with his ministerial duty to approve their appeal which was perfected on time.[5]Atty.Briones, in his Comment, contends that the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, represented by Atty. Jimenez, are guilty of forum shopping for which reason, the petition should be dismissed.[6]On February 11, 2003, the CA without touching on the forum shopping issue, granted the petition and ordered the respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal taken by Atty. Jimenez from the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to Atty.Briones.[7]Atty.Brionesthen filed with this Court a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 159130, praying for the dismissal of the appeal from the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar as it ordered the payment of commission to him, as the Special Administrator of the estate of the deceased Luz J. Henson.[8]The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.Atty.Briones(hereinafter referred to as complainant) filed his Memorandum with Administrative Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jacinto Jimenez, Counsel for Respondents,[9]for violation of Rule 19.01 and Rule 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Revised Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping.Complainant claims that Atty. Jimenez (hereinafter referred to as respondent) and the Heirs engaged again in forum shopping when respondent, as counsel for the Heirs, filed a criminal complaint and executed an affidavit against complainant for resisting and seriously disobeying the RTC Order dated April 3, 2002 which directed complainant to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares, punishable under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.Complainant further claims that respondent violated Rules 19.01 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case of proceeding.Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:(a)on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like; orb)on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.by filing the unfounded criminal complaint against him to obtain an improper advantage in Special Proceedings No. 99-92870 before the RTC, Branch 46, and coerce complainant to deliver to the Heirs the residue of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson without any writ of execution or any pronouncement from the RTC as to the finality of the Order dated April 3, 2002;[10]and in executing an affidavit in support of the criminal complaint.The Court in its Resolution datedJanuary 24, 2005, in G.R. No. 159130, resolved to docket the complaint against Atty. Jimenez as a regular administrative complaint; referred said Complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC); and required Atty. Jimenez to comment.[11]Respondent filed his Comment onApril 6, 2005.He contends that when he assisted the Heirs in filing a criminal case against complainant, he was merely fulfilling his legal duty to take the necessary steps to protect the interests of his clients; that it cannot serve as basis for filing an administrative case against him.[12]Respondent further citesSantiago v.Rafanan[13]where the Court absolved the respondent lawyer from administrative liability in submitting an affidavit in a preliminary investigation in defense of his clients.OnJanuary 31, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation recommending that the administrative complaint against Atty. Jimenez be dismissed for lack of merit.[14]The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent is not guilty of forum shopping.Records show that respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, filed a special civil action docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order of March 12, 2002 appointing the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo and Co. as auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71488 assailing the Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to complainant.It is evident that there is identity of partiesbut different causes of action andreliefssought.Hence, respondent is not guilty of forum shopping.[15]The Court likewise finds no fault on the part of respondent in executing an affidavit in support of the criminal complaint as held in theSantiagocase.However, there is sufficient ground in support of complainants claim that respondent violated Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Records reveal that before respondent assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant, he sent demand letters to the latter to comply with the Order of JudgeTiponto deliver the residue of the estate to the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson.Considering that complainant did not reply to the demand letters, respondent opted to file said criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.The Order referred to is the third part of the assailed Order datedApril 3, 2002which directs complainant to deliver the residue to the Heirs in proportion to their shares.As aptly pointed out by complainant, respondent should have first filed the proper motion with the RTC for execution of the third part of said Order instead of immediately resorting to the filing of criminal complaint against him.A mere perusal of the rest of the Order datedApril 3, 2002readily discloses that the approval of the report of complainant as Special Administrator was suspended prior to the audit of the administration of complainant.Consequently, the RTC would still have to determine and define the residue referred to in the subject Order.The filing of the criminal complaint was evidently premature.Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact, did not violate Rule 19.01 because he assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant after the latter ignored the demand letters sent to him; and that a lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability.The Court is not convinced.Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.As held inSuzuki v.Tiamson:[16]Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal.However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law.Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client.Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and the principle of fairness.To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of justice.While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exertevery effortto assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.[17]Although respondent failed to live up tothis expectation, there is no evidence that he acted with malice or bad faith.Consequently, it is but fit to reprimand respondent for his act ofunfair dealing with complainant.It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clearcases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of thebar.Accordingly, disbarment should not bedecreed where any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired.[18]WHEREFORE,Atty. JacintoD.Jimenez is foundGUILTYofandREPRIMANDEDforviolation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 169079 February 12, 2007FRANCISCO RAYOS,Petitioner,vs.ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is a Petition for Review1of the Resolution dated 12 March 2005 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dismissing petitioner Francisco Rayoss complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ponciano Hernandez.Respondent was the counsel of petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 entitled, "Francisco Rayos v. NAPOCOR," filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan. The complaint alleged, among other things, that the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) recklessly, imprudently and negligently opened the three floodgates of the spillway of Angat Dam at midnight of 26 October 1978 until the early morning hours of 27 October 1978, during the occurrence of typhoon "Kading" causing the release of a great volume of stored water, the resultant swelling and flooding of Angat River, and the consequent loss of lives of some of petitioners relatives and destruction of his familys properties, for which he sought damages. Of the 10 members of petitioners family who perished, only four bodies were recovered and only petitioner and one of his sons, German Rayos, survived.On 21 December 1979, the complaint was dismissed2on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent as the operation and management of Angat Dam, Norzagaray, were governmental functions. Said dismissal was questioned directly to this Court which set aside the RTC decision and ordered the reinstatement of the complaint.3On 30 April 1990, however, the complaint was dismissed again by the RTC for lack of sufficient and credible evidence.4The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC decision and awarded damages in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, the joint decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered:x x x x2. In Civil Case No. SM-951, ordering defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellant, with legal interest from the date when this decision shall have become final and executory, the following:A. Actual damages of Five Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P520,000.00);B. Moral Damages of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); andC. Litigation Expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).x x x xIn addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs-appellants, attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded.5The case was appealed to this Court, which affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.6The Decision of the Supreme Court became final and executory on 4 August 1993.Thus, a Writ of Execution7was issued by the RTC on 10 December 1993, upon motion filed by respondent. As a consequence, NAPOCOR issued Check No. 014710 dated 5 January 1994, in the amount ofP1,060,800.00 payable to petitioner. Thereafter, the check was turned over to respondent as counsel of petitioner. Petitioner demanded the turn over of the check from respondent, but the latter refused.On 24 January 1994 , petitioner filed with the RTC a motion8to direct respondent to deliver to him the check issued by NAPOCOR, corresponding to the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner sought to recover the check in the amount ofP1,060,800.00 from respondent, claiming that respondent had no authority to receive the same as he was already dismissed by petitioner as his counsel on 21 November 1993.9Respondent, on the other hand, justifies his retention as a means to ensure payment of his attorneys fees.On 7 April 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing respondent to deliver the check to the Sheriff of the court who will subsequently deliver it to petitioner. A Writ of Execution was subsequently issued. Despite the Court Order, respondent refused to surrender the check.However, on 4 July 1994, respondent deposited the amount ofP502,838.79 with Farmers Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., Norzagaray, Bulacan, in the name of petitioner which was eventually received by the latter.Thus, petitioner initiated this complaint for disbarment for the failure of respondent to return the rest of the award in the amount ofP557,961.21.In his comment,10respondent alleged that he handled petitioners case, in Civil Case No. SM-951, for 15 years, from the trial court up to the Supreme Court. On 21 November 1993, he received a letter from petitioner dismissing him as counsel. Simultaneous thereto, respondent received a letter dated 15 November 1993 from Atty. Jose G. Bruno asking him to comment on the therein attached letter dated 19 November 1993 of petitioner addressed to NAPOCOR, requesting that the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court be paid to him.Respondent also averred that petitioner had a verbal contract for attorneys fees on a contingent basis and that the said contract was only reduced in writing on 6 October 1991, duly signed by both of them. By virtue of the contract, petitioner and respondent supposedly agreed on a 40%-60% sharing, respectively, of the court award. Respondent was entitled to receive 60% of the award because petitioner agreed to pay him 40% of the award as attorneys fees and 20% of the award as litigation expenses.Respondent further asseverated that because petitioner dismissed the respondent and refused to settle his obligation, he deposited the amount ofP424,320.00 in a bank in petitioners name under Account No. 381 (representing petitioners share of 40% of the total award) on 10 May 199411; and the amount ofP63,648.00 in petitioners name under Account No. 389 (representing petitioners share of 40% of theP159,120.00 awarded as attorneys fees by the Court of Appeals) on 19 May 1994.12Petitioner already received the amount ofP502,838.79 in accordance with the RTC Order dated 7 April 1994.Respondent contended that the petitioners complaint was without basis and was meant only to harass and put him to shame before the residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan.In a Resolution dated 9 August 1995,13the Court referred the case to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.A series of hearings were conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, from March to September 2001.On 1 February 2005, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro B. Funa submitted her Report and Recommendation,14recommending the dismissal of the case.Thereafter, the IBP issued its Resolution dated 12 March 2005, approving and adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case lacks merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED.15We do not agree in the recommendation of the IBP.The threshold issue in this petition is: whether respondent is justified in retaining the amount awarded to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 to assure payment of his attorneys fees.Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitute trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client.16Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides as follows:CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.In the case at bar, when respondent withheld and refused to deliver the NAPOCOR check representing the amount awarded by the court in Civil Case No. SM-951, which he received on behalf of his client (petitioner herein), he breached the trust reposed on him. It is only after an Order was issued by the RTC ordering the delivery of the check to petitioner that the respondent partially delivered the amount ofP502,838.79 to the former, but still retaining for himself the amount ofP557,961.21 as payment for his attorneys fees. The claim of the respondent that petitioner failed to pay his attorneys fees is not an excuse for respondents failure to deliver the amount to the petitioner. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his clients money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorneys fees.17The failure of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. In short, a lawyers unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.18It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney has the following rights;Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. (Emphases supplied.)But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client, as above-stated, does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.19Thus, what respondent should have properly done in the case at bar was to provide the petitioner with an accounting before deducting his attorneys fees and then to turn over the remaining balance of the award collected to petitioner. The Court notes that respondent represented petitioner from the time of filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. SM-951 before what is now the RTC and of the appeal of the same case to the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. But respondent was not justified to hold on the entire amount of award collected by him until his fees had been paid and received by him.The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special trust and confidence. An attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all his relationship vis--vis his client. Respondent fell far short of this standard when he failed to render an accounting for the amount actually received by him on behalf of his client and when he refused to turn over any portion of said amount to his client upon the pretext that his attorneys fees had not at all been paid. Respondent had, in fact, placed his private and personal interest above that of his client.We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants.20Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.21A lawyer is not merely the defender of his clients cause and a trustee of his clients cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the fundamental function of administering justice in society.22It follows that a lawyers compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon taking his attorneys oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees.23There is another aspect to this case which the Court cannot just gloss over. Respondent claimed that he charged petitioner, his client, a contingent fee comprising of forty percent (40%) as attorneys fees and twenty percent (20%) as litigation expenses. The agreement provides:UNAWAIN NG LAHAT SA PAMAMAGITAN NITO:Ako, si Francisco Rayos, Sr., Pilipino, may sapat na gulang at ngayon ay naninirahan sa Pinagbarilan, Baliwag, Bulacan, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, ay nagpapatunay sa mga sumusunod:Na, kaugnay sa aking usapin laban sa NPC at Benjamin Chavez (Rayos vs. NPC, et al.) na ngayon ay nakabinbin sa Court of Appeals, ako ay nakipagkasundo sa aking abogado, Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez, gaya ng sumusunod:1 Sakaling ipanalo ang aking usapin, ang ano mang aking makukuha ay hahatiin gaya ng sumusunod: 40% ang para sa akin; 40% ang para kay Atty. Ponciano G. Hernandez; 20% ay ilalabas bilang gastos sa kaso.2. Kung matalo ako sa kaso