ESSMASEssayComp_06_PUCategory1st

8/8/2019 ESSMASEssayComp_06_PUCategory1st

1/22

Yuen Pak Man & Wee Liang EnHwa Chong Institution

The Asian Financial Crisis 10 years on:What has Changed and What have we Learnt?

Summary

Ten years on, Asian economies have apparently rebounded from the devastatingimpacts of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. However, recent volatility in Asianmarkets suggests that the threat of crisis has not fully receded from the horizonand highlights the need to examine progress made by Asian economies thus far.

In view of this, this essay first reconciles opposing views on the causes of thecrisis and argues that while investor panic did trigger the crisis, it wasprecipitated by weak macroeconomic fundamentals that exposed Asianeconomies to speculative attacks and contagion effects.

This essay proceeds to outline the progress made by Asian economies inapplying lessons learnt: specifically, in terms of crisis prevention, managementand resolution.Generally, Asian economies are better placed to prevent similarcrises with measured financial liberalization and prudent financial supervision.Even if a crisis were to occur, they are well-posed to limit its impact and handlethe aftermath. Hence, in the short run, a recurrence of the 1997 crisis is unlikely;strong fundamentals, buoyed by strong export growth, would prevent a suddencrash. However, in the long run, a reversal of this situation may be possible.Various scenarios could cause a slowdown in the global economy, possiblyderailing Asian growth.

Lastly, contrary to popular perception, this essay argues that significantdifferences between 1997 and today mean that crisis management is fraught withgreater difficulty; measures applied in 1997 may no longer be feasible, especiallywith increased volatility in the global financial environment. Little noticed, too, isthat Asian countries have placed less emphasis on building up social safety nets;hence, the social aftermath may be more significant and prolonged.

1


2/22


1. Introduction

Plus a change. Indeed, on December 19th, 2006, Thailand and the baht once

again made headlines as the Bangkok stock market crashed 15%, dragging

down regional bourses as investors relived nightmares of the financial contagion

that swept Asia in 1997.

Apart from that day of dj vu, though, nothing worse happened: markets

shrugged off their losses the next day, and talk of crisis seemed remote once

more. However, such incidents of volatility provide the impetus for a reopening of

the books on the tenth anniversary of the Asian crisis. Can a consensus on the

causes of the crisis be reached? What has changed since then in the economic

fundamentals of the region, and what lessons have policymakers learnt? Most

importantly, can such a crisis ever happen again?

2


3/22


2. Causes of the 1997 Asian Crisis: Defective Asian model or amere financial panic?

To address those questions, we must first look at the causes of the 1997 crisis.

Much of the academic discourse on the causes of the crisis has centered on

whether it was caused by macroeconomic factors or by investor panic. It is

necessary to determine which cause is more dominant, as the two have vastly

different policy implications. The former would warrant macroeconomic reforms,

while the latter would obviate the need for reform.

2.1.1. Shaky macroeconomic fundamentals

One school of thought focuses on economic fundamentals and asserts that the

crisis can be attributed to a defective Asian model of development. Although

first-generation crisis models1 suggested that macroeconomic fundamentals

then were largely sound, there were several indicators of increasing vulnerability

by the mid-1990s: misaligned exchange rates, high interest rates, large current

account deficits2 and excessive borrowing from abroad. By mid-1997, total

external indebtedness had reached extremely unhealthy proportions3.

In addition to those external factors, a number of internal weaknesses were

equally important: inadequate supervision, crony capitalism, and excessive

1 Krugman, 1979.2 In the five main crisis-stricken economies: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea and Thailand,deficits were $41 billion in 1995 and $55 billion in 1996. Deficit levels were 4.0% of GDP in 1995 and4.9% of GDP in 1996, high by international standards.3 By mid-1997, external indebtedness reached almost 50, 53, and 57 percent in The Philippines, Thailandand Indonesia respectively.

3


4/22


misallocation of investments. The glut of capital led to widespread misallocation

of capital into speculative enterprises. This was worsened by crony capitalism.

From Korean chaebols to banks in Indonesia, investments were made not via

arms-length transactions but through patronage networks. Rent-seeking

behavior4 contributed to the fragility of the financial system.

2.1.2. Boom and bust-financial panic

The alternative view asserts that macroeconomic and financial fundamentals

were sound, and highlights investor panic as a primary cause. Due to sudden

investor panic, massive capital flight occurred5 as speculative attacks drove

currencies down, with disastrous consequences for lenders and their over-

leveraged client firms. However, this theory still fails to explain why the Asian

Financial Crisis occurred at that specific point in time.

2.2. Reconciling the two schools of thought

A better picture can be obtained of the Asian crisis causes by reconciling the two

aforementioned points of view. Investor confidence is to some extent

endogenous to perceptions of fundamentals; by mid-1997, a financial panic was

far more likely for three reasons.

Firstly, the increasingly close integration with world financial markets, coupled

with the pegged exchange rate, greatly increased the central banks vulnerability

to runs. In an open economy, the government cannot easily inject liquidity to

4 Such as the granting of artificial monopoly rights, bailouts of crony enterprises and direction of credittowards political allies5 More than US $100 billion was withdrawn from ASEAN and Korea in the space of 18 months after theThai devaluation of the baht.

4


5/22


prevent losses to depositors; the injection of liquidity can destabilize the

exchange rate and cause a run on the domestic currency. Secondly, much of the

excessive foreign borrowing mentioned earlier comprised short-term debt;

borrowers were thus increasingly dependent on the creditors willingness to roll

over short-term liabilities. Thirdly, the ratio of short-term foreign borrowing to

official foreign exchange reserves increased beyond 100% for the Philippines,

Korea, Indonesia and Thailand by 1995. This portended a possible crisis in the

event of any uncertainty, since frantic creditors were likely to rush to demand

repayment when they knew that foreign exchange was insufficient to repay

everyone.

Hence, massive capital flight exacerbated by investor panic triggered the crisis.

However, its underlying cause was weak macroeconomic fundamentals that left

many economies in the region vulnerable to the sudden withdrawal of capital that

devastated lenders and their over-leveraged clients.

5


6/22


3. What Has Changed and What We Have Learnt: Progress ofAsian Economies 10 Years On

Since 1997, to what extent have countries learnt and applied the lessons from

the crisis? How much progress has been made in reforming the economic

fundamentals of the region to guard against a similar crisis? We can chart

progress made in three key areas: the prevention of similar crises, the

management of crises should they occur, and the resolution of these crises.

3.1. Progress Made: Crisis Prevention

3.1.1. Cautious Financial Liberalisation in Todays Emerging Economies

In the case of crisis prevention, one of the key lessons of the 1997 crisis was that

financial liberalization, especially in developing countries, should proceed in a

measured and sequential manner. In their hasty capital account liberalization,

many countries possessed weaknesses in their financial systems that were then

exposed by the crisis. Thus, before domestic financial systems are opened up,

potential problems (such as high NPL levels, undercapitalized banks and weak

regulatory standards) should be addressed to avoid precipitating a crisis.

Ten years on, while continuing to encourage financial liberalization, many

emerging Asian economies have strengthened their domestic financial systems.

For instance, in 1999, Singapores five-year plan to liberalize the banking system

emphasized the improvement of corporate governance to ensure resilience and

stability. Vietnam, which entered the WTO early this year, has also embarked on

6


7/22


a comprehensive six-pronged reform programme6 to strengthen domestic banks

by 2010.

Most Asian countries were moving towards financial liberalization even before

1997. However, China remains an example of a significant emerging Asian

economy that has yet to achieve full financial liberalization. Indeed, China

emerged from the 1997 crisis largely unscathed because its capital account had

not been fully opened. Currently, China is liberalizing its capital account in a

sequential and prudent manner, and has been strengthening its fragile domestic

banking system to prevent the precipitation of a crisis resulting from foreign

competition.

3.1.2. More Prudent Financial Supervision

Once capital accounts have been liberalized, another lesson learnt is that capital

inflows should be cautiously managed. Developing economies should avoid

chalking up large deficits funded by short-term, unhedged flows of external

capital, and instead seek to attract foreign direct investment. Contrary to

neoclassical economics, capital controls, when imposed selectively for specific

periods of time, may prevent the development of crises 7. It cannot be assumed

that high export growth automatically ensures that debt can be serviced, as

6 The State Bank of Vietnam has drawn up a six-pronged reform scheme for full implementation by 2010.Two of the aims are to create a legal framework for the banking system, and to provide more inspectionand supervision of the banking operations. Other goals include turning the State Bank into a modern centralbank, improving monetary policy and policy management, and restructuring commercial banks.7 As shown by the experience of Malaysia in the Asian financial crisis, which turned to capital controls tominimise some of the fallout.

7


8/22


export growth may suddenly stall8. This is particularly relevant for East Asian

economies, whose growth today still tends to be export-driven.

Ten years on, Asian countries have avoided the chalking up of the large deficits

that were common in the region pre-crisis. With healthy current account

surpluses9, large reserves, and a reduction of corporate-sector debt to pre-crisis

levels10, Asian countries are better prepared for a sudden flight of capital should

such an event occur. Furthermore, Asian countries are depending less on

portfolio inflows and more on FDI

11

, decreasing the potential impact of capital

flight.

On a national level, the lesson learnt was that greater supervision is necessary to

prevent the accumulation of large deficits. Governments should exercise a

disciplined fiscal policy and utilize regulatory frameworks to prevent lenders from

accumulating large asset-liability mismatches.

Indeed, capital adequacy ratios are rising across Asia, mostly well above the 8%

international minimum. Non-performing loans have also been reduced in most

countries; the ratio of NPLs to total loans, which exceeded 25% in Korea and

Malaysia and 40% in Indonesia and Thailand in 2000, stands at less than 10%

today. This reflects better risk management and regulation.

8 Growth rate of merchandise exports in Asia fell from 18% in 1995 to 3.5% in 1996, just before the Asianfinancial crisis.9 Forecasts from ESCAP predict that emerging Asian economies will generally chalk up current accountsurpluses in 2007; of the countries that were affected in 1997, only Thailand may see a deficit this year.10 Refer to Appendix 1.11 FDI in the region grew 18% between 1999 and 2005.

8


9/22


On a regional and international level, the 1997 crisis revealed the need for

various cooperative frameworks to assist economic surveillance by encouraging

countries within the grouping to quickly adopt better macroeconomic policies.

Over the past decade, economic surveillance has increased, with forums such as

ASEAN+3 established in the East Asian region to encourage regional policy

dialogue and help members implement better macroeconomic policies12.

Compared with 1997, when few such arrangements existed, such a development

represents a step forward for improving crisis prevention via early detection.

3.1.3. Developing Competitive Financial Markets

The 1997 crisis made countries realize the importance of developing competitive

financial markets. In pre-crisis Asia, a distinctive characteristic was the regions

stunted capital markets13 that led to overdependence on the banking sector.

Over-reliance on banks in turn led to high levels of leverage and inefficient use of

capital14. Thus, developing bond and equity markets in the region might allow

better capital allocation with an appropriate consideration of risk.

Ten years on, the setting up of an Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) in

December 2002 has facilitated the growth of East Asian local currency bond

12 Through the ASEAN Surveillance Process, Finance Ministers meet regularly to review financial and

economic issues. To date, six countries have set up National Surveillance Units that are in charge ofeconomic and financial monitoring.13 Asian bond markets are under 20% of the regions GDP, low in comparison with industrialised countries.14 Heavy reliance on bank financing led to poor return of capital employed for several Asian economiesfrom the period 1992-1996 (Pomerleano, 1999).

9


10/22


11/22


If a crisis does occur, however, the next step is to limit its impact: to quickly

restore market confidence and prevent the contagion that was so evident in

1997. Here, the main lesson was to ensure that in times of crisis, countries have

timely access to sufficient external liquidity to stave off collapse. The provider of

this liquidity has traditionally been the IMF; what the Asian crisis demonstrated,

however, is that official resources may be limited given the magnitude of the

crisis, and the cooperation of private creditors (bailing-in) may be necessary in

negotiating restructuring of external debt, as was the case in Korea18.

Since 1997, several mechanisms have been set up, post-crisis, to facilitate the

provision of timely and sufficient liquidity. The IMF, for instance, set up a

Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF)19 that permitted the lending of large sums

without any access limit. On a regional level, the East Asian region has

developed the Chiang Mai Initiative20, a network of currency swap arrangements

that can support a member currency in a crisis situation.

3.2.2. Reforming International Institutions

18 With regards to the restructuring of Koreas debt in 1997-8, the Korean government agreed with privatelenders (international banks) to temporarily suspend payments on external debt, during which it worked out

restructuring agreements. This restored confidence in the financial system and paved the way for futurerecovery.19 The Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) permits large lending, without any access limit. Maturity has

been kept short because the member is expected to repurchase within 12 to 15 months. Under specialcircumstances the IMF Board may extend the repurchase period up to two years. Interest rates have beenkept high at 300 to 500 basis points above any of the other facilities. IMFs objective is to provide strongincentives to emerging market economies to return to market financing as quickly as possible.20 The value of bilateral swap agreements under the Chiang Mai Initiative has now grown to over $70

billion. ASEAN+3 agreed in 2005 to increase the CMIs size, raise the level of disbursement permittedwithout an IMF program, and incorporate a collective decision making mechanism.

11


12/22


While such a bailout needs to be coordinated at the regional and international

level, countries need to play their part too by making appropriate adjustments to

their fiscal policies21. In formulating those adjustments, the Asian crisis suggests

that there may be no one-size fits all approach. Thus, another key lesson from

the Asian crisis is that the IMF cannot continue applying uniform reform

strategies to crisis-hit countries. A main criticism of the IMF was that its routine

remedies of interest rate hikes, combined with tight monetary and fiscal policies,

exacerbated the Asian financial collapse.22 Alternatively, Asian countries could

consider reducing their reliance on international institutions, and instead look

towards the creation of an Asian Regional Fund, which may allow more timely

and sensitive responses to their needs. For example, it can serve as a lender of

last resort for regional economies.

Since then, the IMF has moved away from universal policy prescriptions and

instead shaped its adjustment programmes according to individual country

characteristics. Local authorities now have a greater voice in determining the

specifics of their countries IMF programmes; IMF reform is also giving Asian

countries more say in IMF policy.

3.3. Progress Made: Crisis Resolution

3.3.1. Establishment of Procedures to Restore Financial/Corporate Sectors

21 International intervention, particularly via the IMF, has been criticised on two grounds: firstly that itcomes too little and too late; and secondly that moral hazard problems are created when countries areinduced to run excessively risky policies, assuming that the IMF will step in as a lender of last resort.Ensuring the cooperation of private creditors is thus necessary to address the former criticism; that crisis-hitcountries make adjustments addresses the latter.22 Stiglitz, 1998.

12


13/22


Finally, the aftermath of crises has to be cleared up swiftly; 1997 caused large-

scale corporate and financial insolvency. Thus, to allow quick recovery, the key

lesson was that procedures must be quickly initiated to restore healthy financial

and corporate sectors. Banks need to be recapitalized or consolidated, while

corporate debt needs to be restructured; tax relief can also be provided to

improve cash flow. For firms that cannot be restructured, efficient insolvency

procedures need to be established.

Ten years on, recapitalisation and consolidation efforts have resulted in a

cleanup of banking sectors in many regional economies. While more remains to

be done, bankruptcy procedures have generally been streamlined and made less

onerous, to allow swift restructuring of corporate sectors in case of crisis.

3.3.2. Alleviating the Political and Social Impact

Another key lesson was that countries need to be prepared to deal with the social

aftermath: problems quickly exposed by economic crisis (poverty, unemployment

and a loss of political stability)23. This was especially so in the Asian crisis, where

most countries had deficient or even non-existent social safety nets24,

exacerbating the crisis impact. Multilateral development banks, in this case the

23 Within the space of a year after the initial signs of the Asia Crisis became evident, Korea experienced a

4.3 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate translating into 1.5 million jobless individuals. Theheadcount poverty ratio jumped from 3 percent in the last quarter of 1997 to 7.5 percent in the third quarterof 1998. In Thailand, the headcount index increased by 1.4 percentage points to 12.7 percent of the activelabor force between 1996 and 1998, implying that nearly 1 million people had been pushed below thepoverty line as a result of the crisis.24 As of 1997, social policies and programs in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand provided very limitedprotection for workers. In Indonesia, old age and disability benefits were limited to firms with more than 10employees. In Thailand, the pension system covered only 10 percent of the labour force.

13


14/22


Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, should thus help crisis-

affected countries finance policies designed to tackle these social problems25.

However, having safety nets in place before a crisis would be more helpful, as

the lag in their implementation during the Asian crisis meant that their rollout

coincided with economic recovery, spurring pro-cyclical demand pressures.

Since then, most Asian countries (including those spared the crisis effects in

199726) have made progress in implementing new social safety nets. Examples

include cash transfers, targeted subsidies

27

and human development programs

28

linked to job retraining. Singapore, in particular, has institutionalised the idea of

Workfare, which aids the unemployed but prevents the development of a crutch

mentality. Regional cooperation has also helped: the APEC Social Safety Net

Capacity Building Network was established in 2002 to help APEC members

share their experiences in reforming social safety nets.

25 Thailand and Korea increased their expenditure on social protection programs by 1% of GDP; Indonesiaincreased its expenditure by 4% of GDP (1998-1999 period).26 China has unveiled a multi-billion yuan programme to pay for education and healthcare costs in the

countryside, while building more infrastructure. To date, Beijing has abolished an agricultural tax onpeasants, invested in rural education and introduced direct grains subsidies.27 Cards or vouchers that gave access to education and health care services at zero or

reduced rates were rolled out in Thailand.28 The new Livelihood Protection Program established under the Minimum Living Standards Security Act

in Korea combined means-tested cash transfers and in-kind transfers linked to participation in public worksand job training.

14


15/22


4. Analysis: Implications for Asia - Possibility of another Crisis?

4.1. Reforms: Not Far Enough, Not Fast Enough

It is evident that most Asian countries today are generally pursuing more prudent

economic policies. However, though reforms have been implemented,

macroeconomic fundamentals in countries previously hit by the Asian crisis and

emerging economies (China, Vietnam) have not been fully shored up. Problems

in Chinas banking sector, including high levels of non-performing loans, are well

known; in Vietnam, too, banking reform is long overdue. In both countries, too,

inefficient state-owned enterprises that have accumulated large corporate debts

form a significant component of the economy. An increase in public debt burdens

across the region is also worrying; public debt in emerging Asian economies has

rapidly risen from 40% of aggregate GDP in 1996 to 55% in 2005.

Less emphasis, too, has been placed on reforms that aim to minimise the social

fallout of crises. Income gaps are widening in Asias major economies, including

China, India and Japan29; social safety nets in emerging economies like China

and India are still inadequate. Should a financial crash occur, the social costs are

likely to be significant and prolonged.

29 Gini coefficients have been steadily rising in China, demonstrating a widening of the rich-poor divide.

The countrys Gini coefficient, originally pegged at around 0.4, has already exceeded this acceptablethreshold. An official study claims that the income gap could trigger social chaos if unchecked by 2010. InIndia, the more developed states in the west and south are drawing away skilled workers from their poorernorthern rivals. However, as much as 60% of Indias population increase by 2051 is expected to take placein these northern and central Indian states, which are laggards in economic growth and in most socialindicators. Japans Gini coefficients have also been rising over the past few years, from 0.297 a decade agoto 0.308 last year.

15


16/22


4.2. Changes in the Global Financial Environment

Even if all of the promised post-crisis reforms materialized, todays global

financial environment is significantly different from that of 1997. Thus, measures

used to stabilize Asian economies in 1997 may no longer work the same effect

today.

With dramatic increases in hedge fund activity and credit-financed capital inflows

encouraged by the carry trade, capital flows today are much swifter and come

from more diverse sources, increasing the possibility of contagion. Similarly to

1997, Asian economies are at the receiving end of a global liquidity bonanza.

The recent volatility in Asian markets30 further underscores this point. Given the

increased volatility, will international institutions ever be nimble enough to provide

timely liquidity in the event of a crash? Regional funds for support of crisis-hit

economies are also insufficient. The proliferation of complex new financial

instruments has also made monitoring more complex. More importantly, the

possibility of a private sector bail-in is less feasible. Coordination in 1997, when

most of the funds were in the hands of a small number of large lenders, was

much easier: given the larger number of players today, such coordination may no

longer be possible and a bail-in infeasible.

30 In late February, the Shanghai bourse, having risen 135% in the past 12 months, declined by 9%,triggering selloffs in regional markets and the steepest 1-day dive in Wall Street stock prices since March2003. Vietnams market, too, appears overheated, with a 182% rise over the past 12 months.

16


17/22


4.3. Possible Impact of External Shocks; Continuing Internal Weaknesses

Currently, in the short term Asian economies maintain strong macroeconomic

fundamentals (Appendix 1) and depend more on FDI, rather than volatile

portfolio inflows. However, in the long run, is a reversal of these fundamentals

possible?

Internally, Asian countries have instituted certain reforms that decrease the

likelihood of such a reversal, such as better economic surveillance to provide

early warning and banking reform to prevent lenders from accumulating large

asset-liability mismatches. A reversal is thus less likely but still possible, for two

reasons: external shocks, and internal weaknesses.

Beginning with the former, various scenarios exist that may derail global

economic growth. Examples include a slow in US consumer demand, global

trade imbalances, an unwinding of the carry trade, or overheating in China that

forces the government to slam on the brakes. Such a situation would adversely

affect Asian economies, by and large still export-driven. As Asian economies

become more intermeshed with the US and Europe due to globalization, the risk

of such scenarios is heightened. With a drop in exports, macroeconomic

fundamentals in Asian economies may be weakened. Todays current account

surpluses, for instance, are largely driven by a robust 14% growth in exports. In

particular, Singapores high reliance on exports and insignificant domestic

demand make it especially vulnerable, despite its strong fundamentals.

17


18/22


More important, however, are internal weaknesses: though reforms have been

drawn up on paper, there may be a lack of will to continue with them, or follow

them to the letter. Regulations are easy to amend; mindsets, however, are not as

easy to change, and little has been done to address this. Corruption, for instance,

is still deeply rooted in many Asian countries and has worsened in some

countries since the crisis (Appendix 2) - the cause, in 1997, of cosy relationships

between lenders and borrowers that led to weak, liability-laden financial sectors.

Such mindsets could lead to the reversal or undermining of reforms, with dire

consequences for Asian countries.

18


19/22


5. Conclusion

Given the currently buoyant economic situation in Asia, with strong export growth

and large reserves, a repeat of the 1997 crisis is unlikely in the short term. The

recent volatility demonstrated that the potential for investor panic and sudden

capital flight still exists; however, given strong economic fundamentals, todays

fluctuations are unlikely to create tomorrows sudden crash.

If a crisis were to occur, however, todays volatile and challenging financial

environment will make crisis management even more difficult. Injections of

liquidity may not come fast enough to restore investor confidence, given an

increase in the volatility of capital flows; bail-ins are also becoming harder to

coordinate given the increased numbers of investors. Furthermore, poverty and

income disparity have widened over the past decade, laying the foundations for

another social crisis should economic growth suddenly stall. A repeat of the

Asian crisis today might hence be more long-drawn and severe than the 1997

one. Most importantly, despite reform, corruption is still endemic in many Asian

countries, making a reversal of this progress possible. Despite improved

macroeconomic fundamentals, Asian economies are not out of the woods yet;

more needs to be done, and more needs to be learnt, before we can say that the

spectre of another Asian crisis is truly remote.

19


20/22


6. Appendix

Appendix 1: More prudent fiscal policy and lower corporate debt in Asianeconomies, post-crisis (Figures taken from Finance and Development,June 2006, 43:2)

20


21/22


Appendix 2: Corruption has remained endemic in many Asian economies

Country 1997 CPI Scores 2006 CPI Scores Increase/Decrease

Crisis-hit Countries

Malaysia 5.3 5.0 -0.3Philippines 3.3 2.5 -0.8Indonesia 2.0 2.4 +0.4

Thailand 3.0 3.6 +0.62006 EmergingEconomiesVietnam 2.5 2.6 +0.1

China 3.5 3.3 -0.2

Note: Highest score on the Corruption Perceptions Index is a 10.

21


22/22


7. References

Print1. Apec Financial Ministers Meeting. (2001). Social Safety Nets in Response to

Crisis: Lessons and Guidelines from Asia and Latin America.

2. Aksu, E, Camilleri, J. (2002). Democratizing Global Governance.3. Bird, G, Rajan, R.S. The Evolving Asian Financial Architecture. Essays in

International Economics No. 26(February), Princeton University

4. Burton David, Tseng Wanda, Kang Kenneth. (2006). Asia's Winds of Change.Finance and Development.43:2

5. Dilip K. Das. (2000). Asian Crisis: Distilling Critical Lessons.6. Eichengreen, B. (2006). The Parallel Approach to Asian Monetary Integration.

University of California, Berkeley

7. Furman J, Stiglitz J. (1998). Economic crises: Evidence and insights from EastAsia. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 2:1135.

8. (2007). Vietnams Banking In Need Of Reform. Asia Economic Institute. 1(5).

9. Jong-Wha Lee, Changyong Rhee. (1999). Social Impacts of the Asian Crisis:

Policy Challenges and Lessons.10. Krugman, Paul. (2001). Analytical Afterthoughts on the Asian Crisis.11. Mario I Blejer. (2001). Asian Crisis Four Years Later and its Implications for

Emerging Market Economies.

12. Masahiro Kawai, Richard Newfarmer, Sergio L. Schmukler. (2003). FinancialCrisis: Nine Lessons From East Asia. Eastern Economic Journal.

13. Pomerleano M. (1999). The East Asia crisis and corporate finances.

14. Warwick McKibbin, Will Martin. (1998). The East Asian Crisis: InvestigatingCauses and Policy Responses.

15. Yellen, Jenet. (1997). The Asian Financial Crisis Ten Years Later.

Non-Print1. http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/030707.htm

Documents

ESSMASEssayComp_06_PUCategory1st