Erejudlce and Understanding- A Study of Hans-Georgf Gadamer s Philosophical Hermeneutics

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....141 King Street* EastApartment 18Kingston, Ontario . .K7L 2Z9Title of Thesis Titre de la thesePrejudice and Understanding: A Study of Hans-Georg Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics.

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Erejudlce and Understanding:A study of Hans-Georgf Gadamer sPhilosophical Hermeneutics

ByRoss Upshur

A Thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophyin conformity with the requirements .for the

degree of Master of Arts.

Queen s UniversityKingston, Ontario, Canada (

February, 1983

Copyright C Ross Upshur, 1983


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I Methodological versus Ontological Conceptions of

Hermeneutics ..II The Social Scientific Dimension of Hermeneutics

The Problem of.Ideology and Understanding"III Tradition and.its Relevance to Philosophy.Conclusion

NotesBibliography Vi ta . ' ' , '-

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Abstract ": _ .

Hermeneutics has recently attracted scholarlyattention amongst Anglo-American philosophersT One of the

*pivotal figures in the rise of hermeneutics is the Germanphilosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. , In the introduction tothis thesis, I sjLtuate Gadamer's work in the context of

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modern hermeneutical dVbate. In the first chapter, severalkey elements of Gadamer's doctrine of hermeneutical under-"standing are explicated. In particular,. Gadamer's claimsf.or the historical, linguistic,, and-prejudicial aspects ofunderstanding are discussed.. ' The second chapter consistsof an evaluation of Gadamer's ideas in the light of two'major debates his ideas have stimulated.. It is argued' thatEric Hitsch's methodological conception of hermeneutics isnot antithetical to Gadamer's ontological conception ofhermeneut ics. Secondly, it is- argued that the criticismsof Jurgen Habermas force Gadamer to make explicit thepractical dimension of hermeneutics that is hinted at, butnot 'fully articulated in Truth and Method. The secondchapter conclud-es by considering the merits that Gadamer'sview of tradition possesses. In the conclusion, it isatgued that one of the great merits of Gadamer's philosophyis his view that understanding is productive rather thanreproductive. "

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Acknowledgements A . ^

I wish to thank the faculty -.members and secretariesof" the. Department of Philosophy for providing a congenial'*" and encouraging .environment in which to work. I would

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like also to thank my'fellow students for their unsurpassable friendship and Iwarmth. In particular, I owe adebt of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. A.P. Fell, forgiving me the freedom to lexplore all possible'avenues .

I of the subject matter I chose' to examine, and. toMr. Doug Williams for directing me to references and

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providin-g me with books and articles which I could, notfind or had overlooked.


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Introduction

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-O f

Introductory RemarksHermeneutics has long been an accepted feature of the

sEuropean philosophical tradition. Originally understood as th

' study of t,he procedures involved, in the interpretation of Bibcal and other texts, hermeneutics has -undergone many tran.sform

' " ' . ' '"...ations of character- in the Twentieth century. Recently it has

bean brought into the forefront of Anglo-American philosophica ? ' -

1 concern/. The reasons behind the. move towards a hermeneuticalapproach inphilosophy are varied and-s.tem from problems faced'.in contemporary philosophical research, most notably in aestheics, ep-^temology, the history of philosophy and the philosophof the social sciences. As a preface to the ^discussion of thenature of hermeneutics, the reasons behind the move towards ahermeneutical approach will be discussed in three, selected fie

i

In the philosophy of social sciences, the intro-duction of the methods of the natural sciences into thehuman sciences, most notably through positivism andbehaviourism, has brought about awareness of an inter-

pretive element in the social sciences. The fact thatthe interpreter of the data gathered is, at- timers, con-stitutive of the data interpreted has given rise to the

- *problems of value neutrality in the interpretationsgiven.-of social phenomena. The rele-vance of hermeneuticsto the philosophy of social .sciences consists chieflyin opening up a dialogue on the methodological presuppositions underlying the enterprise. Since, from a hermen-


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eutical point of view, the straightforward -apptific methodology to social fheory is regarded as problematic,hermeneutlcs provides a context for the critical examination and

2appraisal of the discipline as a whole. This critical functionis supplemented by positive, recommendations offered for procedures to be used in interpreting social-phenomena. Consequently,considerable thought has been devoted to the types of interpretation to be preferred in the social sciences, and to the thoroughexamination of the validity and "objectivity of these interpreta-tions. ' ;

The. concern for the objectivity and validity of interpretations is by no means limited to the" social sciences. Prior tothe emergence of hermeneutical reflection upon social phenomenastands a long and rich tradition of textual hermeneutics.. Thistradition has its origins in theological and juridical textualexegesis. In the late nineteenth and.early ,twentieth centuries,this reflection was extended to encompass all forms of textualexpression. One of the most important and influential figuresin the expansion of hermeneutics was WilheLm Dilthey, who soughtto move hermeneutics- beyond the concern for texts of specificdisciplines and make it, instead, the foundation of the humansciences. However, Dilthey by no means resolved all the prob- - ;leras of hermeneutics and certainly did not succeed completely inhis.universal methodological program. Dilthey.s work did^though,set the context within which a substantial amount of the modernhermeneutical debate emerged.


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"After Dilthey, the hermeneutical tradition split rather' !'cleanly into two schools. On fehe one hand stand the heirsto Schlelermacher and Dilthey: Emilio Betti, Eric Hirsch J r s,and their followers. Their-view of. hermeneutics stressesmethodology. This is typified, by the search for canons, rules.and norms to guide the process of* interpretation. The endsought by methodologically oriented hermeneutics is validand objective jULt_erpr*etations of all fypes. of texts. Where aprecise, or uniquely valid interpretation of a t'ext cannot be a'ttained, advocates of the methodological approach argue . that an optimally objective and valid interpretation can be

4 secured within a community of informed interpreter's.

On the other hand, contrasting with Betel's and Hirsch'smethodologically oriented hermeneutics are Martin Heideggerand his followers, the most-important of whom is Hans-Georg

Gadamer. Rather than pursuing methodology, they employ pheno-'menological concepts in order to explicate the "hermeneutics

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of facticity".- Interpretation and understanding are notviewed as separate cognitive functions, but are viewed insteadas ontological constituents of human Dasein. In more accessible language,' this means that interpretation,, in particular,

v and. understanding, are not, incidental features of human life,occasioned by failures in the coherence of expedience, but arerather essential .features of human experience in the -jtorld.

The existential 'orientation' of'Heidegger and Gadamer shiftthe focus of hermeneutics from a concern with methodology to anexamination of the possibilities of understanding from within a


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r >' --' .' ' V ' 1 * * ' '.'' :v ' ! * *' ' '" '.- . '.' ' .J * ' & ' - . ' . ' : - 4 ' - ' !

finite historical context. Textual interpretation, to be sure,falls.under their .purview and indeed plays a central role inGadaraer s thought. The introduction of an existential dimension

7into hermeneutics creates tensions wtrh-the"methodtfl-ogtc^l-schoolIt seems," to the methodologically committed, to imply abandoningthe pursuit of valid and objective interpretations in favour of

8either subjectivism, or some form of radical historicism. 'Thirdly, a forceful plea for the importance of hermeneutics

has been provided by Richard. Rorty in his book Philosophy and theMirror of Nature. Perceiving a failure on the part of traditionalphilosophy in"its attempts to.ground epistemology in order to'provide an efficacious framework from within which to adjudicate all

icultural practices, Rorty calls for the end of this traditionalpursuit and advocates instead a concern for hermeneutics in thecontext of a conversation.. .Hermeneutics, as Rorty conceives of

i t , does not strive for the ultimate commensuratibn of all discourses with each other, but recognizes the incommensurable, orabnormal nature of the many different discourses and practices ofthe modern world. Instead o f ' being concerned with establishingfoundations of truth claims for disparate disciplines, as epistera-ology traditionally has*, hermeneutics proceeds in an ad hoc , non -.systematic manner. Its aim is education in the variety of experiences offered by modern'intellectual and aesthetic culture.

Rorty s understanding of hermeneutics'is. radical in that itcalls for abandoning many of the pursuits' that constitute the

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self-image of twentieth century professional philosophers. Hi s,


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claims have stirred much .controversy and he has successfullybrought hermeneutics to the attention of many North Americanphilosophers.

These preliminary reflections serve as an appropriate, butsuperficial overview.of -some of the important issues in contem-porary hermeneutics. Wiat is required, and what we shall turn tonow, is- a more precise and systematic consideration of- the natureof hermeneutics.

II

The Hermeneutical AporiaThe considerations above give but a,partial, view of.the nature

of hermeneutics. The major problem in coming to grips with hermeneutics is fi nd in g '. some sense to the scope and meaning ofthe terra itself. Richard.Rortyj in an essay entitled Pragmatism,Relativism and Irrationalism , says of pragmatism that it is a

9 vague, ambiguous and overworked word. Much the same is true ofhermeneutics. Richard Palmer, in his book Hermeneutics, listssix definitions of hermeneutics. They are as follows:

1) The theory of biblical exegesis.2) General philological methodology.3) The science of all linguistic understanding*4) The methodological foundation of the Geistes^jwissen-

schaften.5) Phenomenology of existence and of existential understand

ing. _ -,


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6) The systems & interpretation, both recollective andiconoclastic, used by man to reach the meaning behindr 10myths and symbols,'" ^

At least two mors ipf n* M o n s c.nn h(? aririfid to this list:'7) Hermeneutics as the critique of ideology. - 8) Richard Rorty s above noted understanding as an attitude

which implies an abjuration of the Kantian notion'thatthere is something called a structure of rationalitywhich the philosopher discovers and within which wehave a moral duty to remain...". ^ -

Given "the. remarkable diversity of definitions of hermeneut-ics and the methods and ways of proceeding .that each particulardefinition^entails, the question arises as to the value -eS ^he

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term itseLfT Eqr .example,', in the characterization of the splitin modern'hermeneutics, discussed abo ve, Betti and Hirsch .couldbe interpreted as supporting a view that embraces definitions 2 'and 4. Heidegger can be seen to support definitions 5 and 8.Gadaraer, in turn,"could be viewed as advocating definitions 5, 7.and 8. The significance of these differences should not be over-looked' or downplayed since they are related to determining precisely the nature of hermeneutics. It seems that each of theconceptions of hermeneutics is coherent and provides a compre-^hensive program for research. Howe ver, each position seems toexclude the possibility of mediation with the* rival position.Betti s and Hirsch s more systematic conception of, hermeneutics.cannot easily be reconciled, with Heidegger s and Gadamer s more


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historical approach. The problem of reconciling.these conflicting views constitutes a major problem in coming to a clear viewof hermeneutics., It seems one must choose, between either a

. A - 1 3systematic or historical view of the.enterprise.- ^wA second, and* related dif ficulty emerges fpm problems in

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sources. Hermeneutics has'^een associated with many specificdisciplines, but as "yet, no comprehensive approach has beenforged. Richard falmer is particularly sensitive to this problem. In a recent article he writes:

. .fci.t becomes? exceedingly difficult to get hold ofthe.subject of hermeneut'ics in a. comprehensive way-

that is, in a way that transcends the' limits of such 'disciplines as theology, literary criticism, legalehermeneutics., or myth and dream interpretation...

PalmerRecounts for this obstacle in the following manner:' - . . . * . . ,The student of hermeneutics finds it difficult to

compare various modes of textual interpretationand to evaluate the presuppositions* of his "own

, contemporary mode in the light of an inclusivehistorical context.. Furthermore, hermeneutics . does not wear one label but many, so its.sourcematerials'are all over the library. Often out of' print, presenting itself in a variety of .languages, hermeneutics constitutes a frustrat-ingly amorphous body of materials. .

The problems of both the definition of hermeneutics and ofchoosing some standpoint or approach from which to commence can


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of hermeneutics, it is also a distinctively philosophical contribution. . His work is of interest and importance to philosophers involved in the fields of aesthetics, philosophy of history,philosophy of language, and the history of philosophy. His af filiation with existential phenomenology should not deterphilosophers of the Anglo-American tradition from considering him,since one -of th,e major thrusts of his work is to break down suchphilosophical barriers., Gadamer,'s scope, depth and attention todetail in matters philosophical arid historical are sufficient towarrant serious scholarly appraisal. It is the aim of this thesis,to attempt to contribute to such an appraisal.

I L LObjectives . ,

Since Gadamer s scope'of thought is vast, and, as notedj-con-tributing to a variety of philosophical topics, it is necessary

* to limit the scope of the enquiry to keep It manageable. To thisend, the thesis is divided into two major parts, the first an ex-

iposition of Gadamer s central hermeneutical doctrines, the seconda critical examination of these doctrines. This will be followedby a short conclusion.

The exposition will focus largely upon Gadamer s conceptionof hermeneutical understanding. In particular, emphasis will beplaced upon what he calls the historical, prejudicial and linguistic nature of understanding. This disqussion will be supplementedby an examination of the hermeneutical circlea nd what Gadamerterms the universality of hermeneutical reflection. The purpose'


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of this part of the thesis will be to state clearly the salientfeatures of Gadaraer s position and to discuss the grounds uponwhich they rest. ,

* Gadamer s views have stimulated many interesting criticisms.The second part of the thesis will be devoted to examining someof these criticisms. The first of these, already alluded toabove, involves the views of Emilio Betti and Eric Hirach Jr..As noted, their criticism of Gadamer hinges upon two major issues.Firstly, should hermeneutics be considered as a methodological

discipline, and, if so, should the author s intention servfc as#the norm for determining the validity and objectivity of aninterpretation. Although Hirsch's and Betti's position seems tobe antithetical to Gadamer s, it will be argued that their positions are not so antithetical, and that both positions can beaccommodated within a comprehensive hermeneutic.

The second set of criticisms emerges from the exchange between Gadamer and the German philosopher, Jiirgen Habermas. Theirexchange is interesting because both share, to a large extent,

*a common philosophical tradition, and each has great sympathy forthe other s position. Habermas s claim that Gadamer s herraeneuticis not sufficiently guarded against the possible ideological anddominating facets of tradition and its transmitter, language, willbe examined as well as Gadamer s response to this claim. It willbe argued that Habermas s concerns are justified and that Gadamercan answer Habermas s criticism only through an amendment to someof the concepts presented in Truth and Method.


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' The second part of the thesis will conclude with a contrastof Gadamer1s"view of tradition with that of Habermas -and

Richard Rorty. Although Habermas and Rorty present conflictingviews on the nature of philosophical enterprise, they are bothin agreement about the need to overcome the philosophical treat-ment. It will be argued here that Gadamer s conception of tradition has virtues that both Rorty's and Habermas's lack.

As a short thesis, this work omits much that would need tobe dealt with in a more comprehensive treatment of the subject.

. A large and -important segment of Gadamer s work will not receivethorough consideration. Also, the original contributions ofPaul Ricoeur are neglected. It is hoped, however, that despitethe selectivity of this work, the importance of Gadamer's work isdemonstrated.


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CHAPTER ONE

An Exposition of Gadaraer s Doctrine of Understanding


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The title of Gadamer"s major work Truth and Method could beperhaps better' expressed in the form of a disjunctive questionTruth or Method? In the forward to' the second edition of Truth,and Method. Gadamer states clearly that his concern is not toelaborate a system of rules to describe, let alone direct, the

methodological procedure of the human sciences." Rather, ,Gadamer is concerned with a type of knowing that he considers tohave been neglected by the rise to prominence.of methodology in 'contemporary intellectual-practice. The upshot of Gadamer s claim

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is that method alone is not sufficient to guarantee all truth.What Gadamer means by method and truth is in need of brLef elab-oration because the conception he has of both is related to thedoctrine of hermeneutical understanding that he intends to provide. '

Gadamer equates method exclusive.l-y with the ways of proceeding particular.to the model prpvided;by the natural sciences.The increasing reliance upon scientific methodology in the humansciences has led, in Gadamer s view, to problems in the under-

' . ' ' ' > 3standing and. appreciation of Art and History.. The'experienceof Art and the study, of History Have been devalued since bothproye recalcitrant to the quantificational procedures that typifyscientific investigation.

Gadamer s understanding of method may be coloured by therise of positivism in the Twentieth Century. Recent researchin the philosophy of science has indicated that the methodology 'employed by the natural sciences does not constitute the unified


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edifice that Gadamer-regards it to be. However, whether thereis, or/inot, a unified methodology in the natural science^, and

for that matter, the social sciences, scholarly activity has ' " ' . \ ' 5been focused largely upon methodological problems.* > i -i .

\ . 'What Gadamer means by method, therefore, is relatively clear.' - \ 6

However, his conception of truth is markedly problematic.Gadamer often speaks of the. experience of truth. His project, ,as stated in the introduction; to Truth and Method, is concernedto s'eek that experience of truth that transcends the sphere ofthe control of scientific method wherever it is found, and toenquire into its legitimacy.' (T.M. xii) It cannot be inferredfrom, this that Gadamer is trying to deny the legitimacy of thetruths accumulated by science. He does, in fact, make it quite

7 - 1clear that this is not the case. Gadamer s conception of truthis, in part, indebted to Heidegger s.conception of truth'asaletheia, or disclosedness. Consequently', it can be understoodas a rejection of correspondence theories of truth, or any theory8of truth based upon the verification principle. For the timebeingj however, we will set aside Gadamer s conception of truth,and instead turn to the doctrine of understanding. Once the doctrine of understanding has been outlined, the concept of truth canbe addressed more adequately, Gadamer_s doctrine of understandingis complex and is constituted by several related ideas. The bestmeans of ingress to Gadamer s view is by commencing with, a discussion of the historicality of understanding.* . r- ~


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* The historicality of understanding marks a radical re-orient-ation for Western thilosophy.. Rather than affirming the pursuitof eternal, immutable truths as the aim of philosophy, his.tori- tcality seems to imply that this task is misconceived from thebeginning. Reality cannot be seen, as Spinoza" so desiredv subspecie aeternitatis. One can understand the world only by start-ing from the perspective that one inherits., However, this doesnot entail that one is totally determined .by it.

Historicality emphasizes the temporal and situational dimen-- \

sions of understanding. The contrast with understanding the world. * isub specie aeternltatis is instructive here: To understand the,

world sub specie aeternltatis is to eliminate all elements of history and culture as constituents of understanding. Historicalityaffirms that it is precisely the historical and cultural determin-qnts of human life that comprise the productive ground from whichunderstanding emerges. To understand the world sub specie aeternltatis is to understand the world from a context less frameworkthat never requires alteration and revision. In a senses the worldis a transparent totality. Historicality maintains that understanding is always rooted in a framework, provided by culture and.history.This framework cannot present a transparent totality and must be"revised through human experience. .

Gadamer's view of historicality owes much to Heidegger sthought in Being and Tim e, as well as to Nietzsche s perspectiv- 4ism. However, Gadamer is not concerned with merely reiterating

Vtheir views. He seeks to extend their insights by supplementing


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them with principles and arguments through which he attempts toShow that the hi st or ic ally of understanding does not entail apernicious form of relativism.

Gadamer seeks to establish the histor ically of understandingby countering two aspects of the Germa-n Idealist tradition. Thefirst is the-=deRiaJ. of Hegel s absolute spirit, and the secondis the denial of the idea of a universal history.. Hegel s conceptof absolute spirit asserts an.identity between thought and theworld. In essence, everything can be known truly and completely,because there exists nothing outside the domain of thought.Reason thus permeates the world; and the absolute mind possessesabsolute knowledge.

Against the notion of the Absolute, Gadamer, r following Heidegger, emphasizes human finitude and human situatedness. Humanscome to awareness of the world only within an historical context.The finitude of human experience places limitations upon thepossibilities of their understanding of the world. It bars, forexample, complete self-knowledge, as well as absolute knowledge

9of the natural world. What had .sustained such ideas as these,according to Gadameri was a belief in the "infinite intellect asa means of securing their possibility. In a letter to Leo .Strauss,Gadamer writes:

What I believe to have understood-through'Heidegger...is, above al l, that philosophy must learrr to dowithout the idea of an infinite Intellect.

Abandoning the idea of the infinite intellect leaves philosophywith the task of explicating the conditions of understanding ina specific historical context. Also, without the idea of the


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Hegelian absolute, there is no telos or final end to which humanknowing can aspire. In short, the task of" human thinking is con-tinuous and in need of ,constant attention and renewal.

The idea of a universal history is also part of the Hegelianlegacy. Though the' Historical School' in Germany, representedby Von Ranke and Droysen, dispensed with the speculative and aprioristic dimensions.: of Hegelian historiography, they nevertheless proceeded with the aim of constructing a universal, history.Universal history is concerned with relating the, whole and thepart of the historical record. Simply put, the research of ahistorian into a particular aspect of the past must somehow beplaced within a context that accommodates the whole of the past.The German historical school, though professing.an antimeta-physical approach, retained a great deal of metaphysics i,n theirview of history. Forfthe idea of a universal history is pre-missed upon the assumption that history-can'be grasped as a coher-

art totality. The empirical orientation of the "historical school"made this an acute problem. As Gadamer puts it:

Universal history is not a mere marginaland residual problem of historical investig- .ation, but 'its very heart. Even the histori-..;- cal school knew that fundamentally there canbe njo other history than universal history,because the unique significance of the detailcan be determined only from the':-whole. Howcan the empirical researcher, to whom the whole can never be given, manage, without" closing his rights to the philosopher andh'is, a priori arbitrariness? (T.M. pp.175-176)._._-. Gadamer outlines the various attempts made by historians tosolve this problem. Ultimately, with Dilthey, historicism becomes


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1 1 - ^increasingly more prominent.- If one rejects the idea of a

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universal history, and instead insists upon the fact that historyis a process within which the historian must exist to conduct his/her research, then historicism, and with it relativism, seem tobe the eventual results. Gadamer argues that historicism andrelativism are problems in this context only if one desires auniversal history in the first place. Historicality implies'that the attempt to construct a; universal history is bound tofail. However, although historicality implies skepticism withrespect to complete historical knowledge, this skepticism is *mitigated in that it does not deny the possibility of accuratehistorical kjiowledge. Historicality, in Gadamer s view, is anenabling principle. This means that Gadamer wants to emphasizehistoricality so that the importance of one s historical situation is recognized as an integral and indispensible factor inhuman understanding. . .

The historicality of understanding has implications for the .interpretation of texts, Gadamer argues against the view ofSchleiermacher and the tradition of romantic hermeneutics, thatthe interpreter should extinguish all aspects of his/her ownpresent situation''in order to approach the text as it is in itself.

The process of removing all aspects constitutive of the interpreter s self.-understanding was thought to be the best way of ensuringobjectivity in interpretation.' If the interpreter, by followingcanons and rules, could bracket the ideas and mores of his/herown day, then the text could be understood, in its own right. -Gadamer contends that this is a false ideal. Historicality impliesthat an interpreter cannot possibly throw off all of the ideas


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that constitute his/her self-understanding in order to approachthe text as a pure object. The desire to bracket the interpreter s subjectivity is problematic because it-creates difficultiesfor an interpreter in transposing his/her understanding into thepast. The temporal gap between the interpreter and the world ofthe text becomes an insuperable barrier requiring an act ofimagination t'o enter into the methodological procedure of inter-

. - >pretation. Gadamer contends that this leads to an unacceptableform of psycholog ism. The historicality of understanding doesnot require the total bracketing of the interpreters present.Consequently the ideas the interpreter possesses constitute theproductive ground from which both understanding and interpretationcommence.

The historicality of understanding is one of the pivotal concepts in Gadamer s philosophy^ It is the linch-pin of his doctrine of understanding.'

Heidegger s re-orientation of philosophy is crucial to comprehending Gadamer, but a rejection of Heidegger s views does not13imply a rejection of Gadamer. From historicality, Gadamerderives, independently of Heidegger, the ideas of prejudice, application, and historically-effective consciousness.

Historicality is closely related to the idea of prejudice.The phenomenological character of Gadamer s approach to hermeneu-.tics, manifests itself in the way he seeks to demonstrate how historicality and prejudice function as existential conditions ofunderstanding. Historicality and prejudice are conditions ,


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not the total determinations, of understanding. They are necessaryin that without them, understanding would exist in a vacuum." As

Gadamer puts it: '* Long before we understand ourselves through the processof self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self^.evident way in the family, society and state in whichwe live....The self-awareness of the individual is onlya flickering in the closed circuits of historical life.That is why the prejudices of the individual, fox morethan his judgements, constitute the historical realityof his being. (.TJL p \ 245)Gadamer's assertion that prejudices, not judgements, are ,

constitutive of human understanding no doubt seems odd to mostmodern readers. Is it not the task of the sciences, and indeedthe legacy of the,Enlightenment that prejudices be systematicallyabolished, and"the pursuit of knowledge be.conducted with as fewpre-suppositions as possible? In fact, this is the case, and itis the very prejudice against prejudices that Gadamer wishes totake issue with. _

Part of Gadamer's hermeneutical practice consists of thedetailed examination of the history of specific concepts .relevant to the humanities. Truth and Method commences with a discussion of "leading humanist concepts." Concepts such as '"taste", "judgement", and "culture" etc., are shown to have longand variegated histories of employment in the Western tradition.-What marks all of these concepts, and thus grants them similarity,is that in post-Enlightenment thought, their significance hasslowly diminished. Thus "taste", for example, became increasinglyassociated with matters of subjective preference. This is perhaps.best illustrated by the familiar modern rejoinder that some differ-


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ences between two persons on aesthetic issues, for instance, areall "a matter of taste", meaning that there exists no objectivemeans' of adjudicating these differenced. Gadamer shows thatprior to the Enlightenment, concepts such as "taste and judgement" were not charged with such subjective conno.tations, butinstead formed integral concepts in the humanities^ The questionGadamer raises is whether these concepts have been discredited ina convincing manner. Finding that they have not, he calls fortheir rehabilitation. Gadamer intends to do much the same withthe concept of prejudice. Against the Enlightenment, he'calls forthe rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and inserts itinto his hermeneutical theory as one of the integral^conditionsof understanding.

The term prejudice is itself in need of some elaboration.The recent history of the term has given it a distinctively emot

ional and controversial connotations because of its close affiliation with bigotry and racism. It is not "in this sense tha$/theterra is used by Gadamer, though these affiliations can legitimate-

i tly be included in the scope of the term. Prejudice means a prejudgement, a prior attitude or predisposition towards a subjectmatter, person or thing before embarking upon an examination ofthe subject matter, person, or thing. A prejudice can rangefrom an-expectation, or as Gadamer terras it, an anticipation ofmeaning", to a more hardened attitude such as a racial belief.That persons have prejudices of elther'T:ype cannot be denied,particularly from the point of view of lived experience.


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The crucial question, and the one Cadamer poses and attempts.to .answer, is whether legitimate prejudices, that is, those.which -are productive for understanding, can be distinguished from unproductive and limiting ones.

The question of prejudice is particularly relevSnT-for theinterpretation of texts (and to no'lesser degree'y the rnterpreta-tion of'primitive or foreign cultures). Gadamer confines hisutention to texts, particularly "those separated by a temporal . '

-igap. Here the.question of prejudice comes to the forefront. Howare texts, employing or examining outmoded or,discredited ideasand concepts to be understood? How'does one seriously countenance,for example, a text that claims;the reali.ty of phlogiston, or thebeneficial-qualities of tarwater? It is'easy to dismiss sometexts on the basis of the knowledge"provided by modern science,and this move is not always unwarranted. However, some texts, inparticular.religious, philosophical and literary texts, are muchmore difficult to dismiss on such.grounds. Aristotle s Physicsmay be regarded as a quaint reminder of a once powerful world view.However, The Nichomachean- Ethics, although rooted in this worldview is not quaint in quite thes am e way. The claims Aristotlemakes in The Nichomachean Ethics -cannot be as easily dismissed byappeal to the power of.modern science, as can the claims made inThe Physics. . *' '. '

Gadamer thinks that not all claims from-the past transmittedthrough texts can be so easily dismissed. The encounter with anhistoric'al text is an encounter with something alien, belonging to


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a world not quite our own- We may reject the idea of the beneficial nature of tarwater," but working through Berkeley s reasoning will no. doubt bring forth concealed elements of our own self-understanding. Whenever we react.to the text by claiming that, itscontent is,false, the question is immediately raised, why? Consequently, Gadamer claims that "the hefmeneutical task becomes automatically a questioning of things and is always in part, determined, by this," (T.M. p: . 238). This questioning is by no means oneway.. Not only is the text "in question, but also the prejudices ofthe one encountering the text.

A _

Gadamer's position may not elicit sympathy from those whomaintain that/ideas which have been discredited or refuted, bywhatever means, need no longer claim our attention. However, itis this very way of viewing history, and the written tradition,that Gadamer seeks to question, Gadamer argues that the hermeneu-

tically. trained mind should be sensitive-to the potential qualityof newness contained in any text, lie writes:

The important thing is to be aware of one s bias,so that the text may present itself in all itsnewness, and thus be able to assert its own truthagainst one s own fore-meanings. (T.M. p . 238)

According to Gadamer, hermeneutical activity serves the critical function of educing prejudices. The temporal gap betweena text and our historical epoch is the chi-ef means of bringingforth prejudices for reflective consideration. An encounter witha text provokes the prejudices that lie dormant in our understand-ing. The process of the provocation and eliciting of prejudicesis dialectical in its structure. Gadamer thus models hermeneutics

on the logic of question and answer as demonstrated in the Platonic


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' 2 3' , ' .. ' f' 1 8 " \ 19dialogues. The process of question and answer lacks finality.It is conditioned by where the questioner stands in history andwhat questions an era leads one to aslc of a text.

Yet, it is precisely one s position in history and the prejudices that this position in history creates, that allows for aproductive encounter with tradition and history. Interpretation,for Gadamer, is always productive rather than reproductive. Thismeans that rather than working, backwards through history to recreate the historical situation within which the text was written,(in a sense inverting the process of creatiolff which was the taskof hermeneutics for Schleiermacher, and to a lesser degree Dilthey),one questions the texts seeking some means of applying what was written to one s own historical situation. Gadamer calls this thei, n 2 0reflective appropriation of tradition. ' -

* t

The twin ideas of appropriation and application mark Gadamer smost original contribution to hermeneutics. By way of appropriation, the philosophical tradition becomes a constant source of m.at^erial for interpretation. Gadamer thus advocates viewing the trad- '

21ition as a partner in an ongoing conversation. Through appli- ,:,cation, the significance or relevance of that which was writtenbecomes integrated into' the interpreter s own historical situation.By virtue of appropriation and application, the prejudices of theinterpreter are. clarified. In a sense, the security of his/herself-understanding is risked in the confrontation with the tradit-22 ion. However, the process i.s never completely one sided. Theappropriation of the tradition does not mean that the past becomes


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' , 2 4

commensurate with the present, or the present reduced to the ,terms of the past. What Gadamer means by the concept of the 'fus-ion of horizons , iJs precisely that some of the interpreter spresent self-understanding is surrendered in order to open up andadmit some claim for the truth of the, past. The fusion^of horizons allows for the overcoming of the narrowness of the interpreter s horizon as well as supplementing the short-comings of the horizon of the text. ' .

Perhaps what makes. Gadamer s views about interpretation and

understanding difficult to accept is the apparent lack of criteriato adjudicate a variety of different interpretations of texts.Gadamer is quite emphatic about the fact that there is no singlecorrect interpretation of a text. He writes:' "in view of-thefinite nature of our historical existence there is, it would seem,something absurd aboujt the whole idea of a uniquely correct inter-pretationV (T.M."p . 107). Gadamer s reasoning to support thisclaim is tied, obviously, to the concept of historically. Sincehistory has no telos, there is no way to predict or .dictate where

" *human understandingvwi11 migrate. What is of concern to an agedevelops through the encounter each age has with its world and theexigencies that this encounter presents. This encounter establish-es the context from which understanding emerges and sets the hor-'izon within which questions towards the texts of the traditionwill be addressed.

A problem that arises with regard to this matter is the problem of anachronism. Surely one cannot ask of Plato, for example,


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' 25

enlightenment on issues not within his own historical.horizon.It would- be unfair to accuse Gadamer of such a position. Gadameris quite clear that^ a meaning cannot be arbitrarily affixed to a

7 23 .text. By extension, any question cannot be asked of a;text.The task of understanding does consist in the first step of grasping the text in its original horizon. However, Gadamer wants togo beyond romantic hermeneutics by insisting that a text s sig-

jf

nificance can go beyond its own horizon. Thus, the aim of hermeneutics, for Gadamer, is to locate that significance and bring itforth for consideration and integration into the interpreter s ownhorizon. ,

The integration of a te"xt s horizon into the interpreter s1 horizon is aided by what Gadamer calls the principle of effective

history. The principle of effective history is Gadamer s way ofsidestepping the problems of historicism. Since understanding isconditioned by both history and prejudice, there is a sense inwhich history is operative in the manner.by which humans come toa more fully articulated understanding of their wdrld. Yet understanding is not limited to the particular historical world thatpersons come to awareness within. The past, or the tradition, isnot a self-sufficient and complete entity, to be understood in its.own terms, or disregarded as antiquated or of little value,'Gadamer perceives a tendency in many thinkers to view the past inprecisely fhis way. Hence, he .asserts, somewhat enigmatically,that understanding.'v7==1?s-always the fusion of these horizons Cofpast and present) which we imagine to exist by themselves.

'. (TaM. p . 273).


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This fusion is always a living process undertaken by persons ina concrete historical situation, possessed of a horizo n, howeverill-specified or sketchily defined, seeking to understand boththeir own horizon and the horizon of the past.

The idea of the fusion of .horizons is an appropriate metaphor to characterize Gadamer s view-of herraeneutics. Understanding and interpretation are two aspects of the same fluid process.The flu-idity of the process must be stressed. Since self-under-standing can never be total, the process of working out one s hor-

izoru is continuous with one s life practice. It is for this rea-son that Gadamer "emphasizes its dialectical character; for texts,as noted, this is best illustrated by the process of question andanswer. Thus Gadamer claims:

Every age has,to understand a transmitted textin its own way, for the text is part of the

, whole of tradition in-which the age takes anobjective interest and in which it seeks to ,understand itself. The real meaning of atext, as it speaks to the interpreter, doesnot depend on the contingencies of the author and whom he originally wrote for. It iscertainly not identical with them, for it isalways partly determined also by the historical situation of the interpreter and hence bythe objective course of history. (T.M. p ,. 263)

That every agg==must understand a text in its own way is thekey to understanding the ontological dimension of Gadamer s hermen-eutics. The ontological dimension of understanding means that itbelongs to the nature of human endeavour to interpret and under-stand the world that humans inherit. Part of this task consistsin the re-working of texts that tradition presents them with.Interpretation^ and understanding, rather than being conceived

- /


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of as incidental human activities, aire seen.by Gadamer as funda- I .. 25

mental and inevitable activities of human being-in-the-world.

Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics seeks' to' refine the experience of interpretation such that it incorporates the aesthet-ic and historical dimensions of tradition which have been neglect-ed due. to a concern with method and correct procedure in interpretation. According to Gadamer, 'there is no precise method orjprocedure by means of which this experience can.be determined.He writes: - ' '

.The hermeneutical experience is concerned withwhat has been transmitted in tradition. This iswhat has to be experienced. But tradition isnot simply a process that we' learn to know andbe in command.of through experience, it is language, i.e., it expresses itself like a Thou .A .Thou' is not an object, but stands in a relationship.with us. 7;.For tradition, is a genuine partner in communication, with which wehave a fellowship as does the 1 with the Thou .

(T.M. p... 321)It is. the "Thou"-like quality of the experience of tradition

that denies the security of method in approaching the tradition.Since, in Gadamer's view, the tradition is not an object, but aconstitutive relationship, what characterizes hermeneutics is notmethod, but openess to participation in communication: Thehermeneutical consciousness has its fulfilment, not in its method- .

ological sureness of itself, but in'the same readiness for experience that distinguishes the experienced man by comparison withthe man captivated by dogma. (T.M. pj . 325).

Gadamer's view that tradition expresses itself through langu-age as a "Th ou", indicates a quite different" view of language from the one expressed by mafet Anglo-American philosophers. Gadamer
http://can.be/http://can.be/


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does not focus on the taxonomy of speech acts, problems of reference or cataloguing the various uses of ordinary language. Hisconcern is for the world-disclosing nature of Language, and howlanguage relates to community, life practice and understanding.t

The relationship between language and tradition is of import-ance because, as Gadamer puts it: ...it is the nature of tradit-

f

ion to exist in the medium of language, so that the preferred ob-ject of interpretation is a linguistic one." .(T.M. p . *357). It -.is important to note that the,emphasis is upon linguistic entitiesas preferred; objects of interpretation, and not the soLe object.This is an important point because ultimately, the interpretationof tradition must extend to the plastic and visual arts, as wellas to architecture-and any other manifestation of human activity.Gadamer stresses the linguistic aspect of tradition because written texts are perhaps the most amenable to being understood, orbecause understanding is .best demonstrated through the comprehen- ,

" \ ' V ' ' " i " "

sion of texts. \ ,tGadamer demonstrates the close relationship between language

nd^world views. The-language that one inherits Cor frs possessedby , in a more Heideggerean fashion} is intimately woven withthe way in which one comes to view and experience the worfd.Gadamer, following the later work of Heidegger, stresses that

- . ' \- ' ' - 'language is not a tool. Language is not something that one can\ i 'x . \ . - i pick up and use for whatever purpose and discard when one is

i

finished with it. His objections to the instrumental view oflanguage makes him hesitate to accept formal languages as true

\\


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27languages. Langua ge, for Gadame r, is constituted by its re-i. ^ .

lation to community and communication. As Gadamer puts it:All.-forms of human community of life are forms.oof linguistic community: even mor e, they constitute language. For language , in its nature,is the language of conversation, but it acqui res ,its reality only in the process of communicating.'''

(T.M.p.404).The communicative and world constitutive aspects of Lang-''

uage are of importance for Gadamer because* this in principleallows for the possibility of'the fusion of two disparate and

distinct world views: ,--' - ,It 'is true that the historical worlds that succeed one-another and in the course of historyare different from one another and from the world

j. of today; but it is always in whatever .traditionwe consi3er it, a human, i.e., a linguistically

i constituted world that presents itseLf to us .Every such worl d, as linguistically constituted,is.always open of itself, to every possible insight and hence for every expansion of its ownworld-p icture , and accordingly available to

' others . (T.M. p .' 405),.It is important to be clear upon what exactly-Gadamer is as

serting by these statements. The world he speaks of as linguistically constituted refers to the world of human practice and self-understanding. He is not so much advocating a species of linguistic idealism, but*trying to point out that philosophical hermeneuti

(

is concerned with the way humans-understand the world through lang.28 " . " " ' ,uage. Further,v the world views that are presented by language

* . . ' -

do not form impenetrable who les . Gadamer asserts that the perspectives articulated in linguistically constituted worlds can beextended into each other,. Hence perspectives are open to hermen-eutical mediation. Thus Gadamer s view is not perniciously relat-


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ivistic. Since all perspectives are open to mediation and exten-sion, it cannot be asserted that any one perspective occupies aprivileged position immune from mediation. Gadamer, though, doesadmit a limited form of relativity in that each perspective hasits-own existence, and, so to speak, integrity. The aim of her-meneutics is not to violate, the integrity of the disparate pers pectives, but rather to let them bloom in an expanded horizon.

However, although Gadamer asserts that it is the nature oflanguage that permits the expansion of horizons, he is emphaticon the point that this-process is always bound to a-concrete his-torical situation. Understanding cannot completely transcendeither language or history. This entails, though, that there isno single criterion by which one can measure or adjudicate theclaims- of each perspective. As Gadamer phrases it:

The criterion for the continuing expansion ofour own world picture is hot given by a worldin itself that lies beyond all language.Rather, the infinite perfectibility of thehuman experience of the world means that, whatever language we use, we never achieve anythingbut an ever more extended aspect,'a ~ view ofthe world. These views of the world are not relative in the sense that one could set themagainst the world in itself , as if the rightview from some possible position outside thehuman', linguistic world, could discover it inits being in itself.-. (T.M. p .'405)

Gadamer may well be correct- that there is no world in itself by

which one can determine the adequacy or inadequacy of views of theworld. If this is so, it would certainly not be a consolation to.Tthose of a realist persuasion. However, it could be asked how itis determined whether the "view" of the world is expanded, if wehave no idea of what would constitute an expansion. The answer


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to this query introduces the two final elements of Gadaraer sthought that require discussion: the hermeneutical circle andthe universality of the hermeneutical problem.'

The discussion, thus far, could*be regarded as preparatoryto the introduction of the hermeneutical circle. . Gadaraer s viewof the hermeneutical circle is not taken directly from Schleier-macher s concerns with relating the part to the whole in the in-terpretation of texts. Rather, following again from the thoughtof Heidegger, it is a phenomenological account of the actual process of understanding. Prejudices naturally play an important rolein the hermeneutical circle since they are the productive groundfrom which interpretation and understanding emerge. The hermeneu-tical circle describes the movement from prejudice, through thequestioning of the text, to the amendment of prejudice by virtueof the encounter with the text. It is a provisional process thatinvolves the testing of one, s prejudices against the view present-

: ' ' - *ed by the text, and relinquishing those prejudices that cannot besquared with the text or do not yield an understanding of the . .text. Since prejudices are not merely negative, that I s , they arenot simply wrong or unfounded,' working through a text can. revealthe positd-ve prejudices that can lead to genuine understanding of

i

a text. However,Hwithout this .critical encounter, prejudices cannot be brought forth and be reflectively examined.

iIt may be asked, what is so circular about this? Does not __the encounter with a text yield something solid and founded,'namely a. judgement? If judgements, that i s, apodictic knowledge, can


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be attained does this not break the shack les-acnf the herjneneuticalcircle? The answer to these questions is no. The historicallyof understanding places limitations on the number of judgementsavailable to any epoch." Judgements may be arrived at throughthe encounter with a text, but they would be limited in scopeand could not form a totality which would render the tasks ofinterpretation and understanding unnecessary. Self and world arenever completely transparent to the intellect and hence interpretation and understanding are always required, . Thus the process iss til? circular.

The consideration of the hermeneutical circle provides theanswer to the question posed above concerning how it is determined whether one s horizon has been expanded- and extended throughan encounter with a text. Quite simply, by the working out ofthe positive and negative qualities of prejudices through theencounter with'the text, the negative and limiting prejudicesfall away, and the positive and enabling ones are revealed intheir productivity. A productive prejudice may turn out to be ajudgement. The crucial point that Gadamer wishes to emphasize isthat the understanding achieved through the hermeneutical circleis one of agreement, or as Gadamer terms it, , finding a common

..29 ' .-. , \ language . (T.M.p. , 349) This common language correspondsneither to that of the text, nor that of the interpreter, but issomething wider in scope than either. . It is in this way that horizons are expanded and extended, and the criterion, to determine-such an expansion and extension is revealed reflectively through


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the greater understanding that has been secured.The hermeneutical circle aptly illustrates the experiential

nature of hermeneutics that Gadamer wishes to illuminate. Thehermeneutical circle is, irtgHeideggerean terms,-an ontologicalaspect of human existence. As,such,.it is something that cannotbe avoided, and granted the productive possibilities that it contains, should not be be avoided. The scope of the hermeneuticalcircle is not limited to texts, although Gadamer uses texts as an

of the process. The hermeneutical circle illustrates

ystematic nature of Gadamer s hermeneutics. As Gadamere cannot tell a priori which 'prejudices are productiveare not:the prejudices and fore-meanings in the mindof the interpreter are not at his free disposal. He is not able to separate in advance theproductive prejudices that make understanding >possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding and lead to misunderstanding.

(T.M. p ;. 263)important point that Gadamer wishes to insist upon isnot deny the presence of prejudice by ./concealing it be-security of methodologically guaranteed objectivity. ToGadamer:A person who imagines that,he is free of prejudices,basing his knowledge on the objectivity of t\is procedures and denying that he is himself influenced byhistorical circumstances j experiences the power ofthe prejudices that unconsciously dominate him as a -vis a tergo. A person who does not'accept that heis dominated by prejudices will fail to see what isshown by their light. (T.M. p . 32 4) .

Thus, the hermeneutical problem is universal in its scope because of the omnipresence of prejudice. The linguistic nature of

exemplar

the non-snotes, onand which

Thethat onehind the

return to


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understanding, though, opens up the possibility of mediation andhence the supergession of prejudice. Herm^neutical reflection is

\thus universal in the' sense that it can be extended into all

N s . -forms of linguistic expression. This form of universality shouldbe qualified. It does, not mean that any one individual can gainaccess to every horizon. Any individual is , of course, limitedby his/her historicality. As Gadamer puts it:

If we start from the linguistic nature of understanding weiare emphasizing, on the contrary,the finiteness of the linguistic event, in which .understanding Is constantly concretized." *

* t'lsM. p . 443)The universal aspect of hermeneutics consists in the way j,n whichlanguage presents being so that it"'scan be understood:

"For man's relation to the world is absolutely andfundamentally linguistic in nature, and hence -intelligible." ", (T.M. p.. 43 2) .

-

The task of hermeneutics is to reveal the structure of "understand-ing; to describe and highlight its process so that the experienceof the world as presented through language is valued. In this way,the encounter with tradition, through art, history, literature, orphilosophy is an encounter that is productive, rather than reproductive, integrating rather, than distancing; it expands one s ,horizon rather than confirming one s historical superiority;

y% * - Understanding, then,, does not consist in "H" tech- nical virtuousity of every thi-rfg.written. Ratherit is. a genuine experience, i e'. , an encounterwith something that ,.asserts itself as truth.

;j ,^ 1TM . p - 445)- 'This l'ast ^quotation brings us/back to the unresolved problem

of Gadamer s conception of truth. Having examined hi's doctrine of


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understanding, the nature of truth should be more amenable to analysis. It should be kept in. mind that the truth G'adamer is concerned with is the truth that exists outside the domain of science.Heri'C'e, truth is- somewhat like language in*"that it is not some.-thing that one can use^as an implement. Rather, truth is something experienced "by passing through the hermeneutical circle and.

... *the encounte'r with tradition. It is notssomething handed to usdogmatically through tradition, but is instead something critic-

' . . . ' '"30 ' -ally appropriated from tradition. Hermeneutics, which.starts,for Gadamer,-' from a concrete historical situation, must critically engage the texts it seeks to understand. It must bring themunder close scrutiny and yet; be ready to acknowledge the qualityof'newness contained therein. In an essay entitled The Problemof^Historical Consciousness,' Gadamer writes:

In truth,, the confrontation of our historictradition is always a critical, challenge ofthis tradition....".Because every experience sets something new against somethingold and in every carse\ it is open in princ-

' iple whether-^thenew will :prevail - that is,will truly become experience,. - or whetherthe old, accustomed, predictable will be- . " >confirmed in the end.

*

*. It is.because, it is 'open in principle whether the new orthe old will prevail that Gadamer affirms the experiential charac-

trer of truth. As such, Gadamer s conception of truth is strikingly different from most Anglo-American conceptions. His emphasisupon experience may lead one to think that it is a form of subjective truth that Gadamer is advocating. This is -not the case becauseof the* linguisticality. of understanding. Since Language is


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social and communal in nature, and since truth must , in Gadamer sview, be expressed in language, then it cannot be the privatepossession of any individual. Truth must be an open horizonjithin the grasp of any member of a linguistic community. =

Our exposition of Gadamer has been cursory . Thus -far, theviews of Gadamer have been presented uncritically. This does notmean that his thought is unproblematical; On the contrary., itcontains many tensions and obscurities. Gadamer s mode of ex-pression* often indebted to Heidegger> *spmetimes resists easy comprehension. This observation, asserted bluntly, does not consti-

tute a damaging criticism. However^ we will turn now to considersome of the criticisms advanced against Gadamer -and evaluate. ,whether his views withstand these criticisms, and if ik&j'4o not,whether there are aspects of his thought that should be retained.

"\


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(

CHAPTER TWO

C r i t i c a l E x a m i n a t i o n

' /

"T-


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. . .

';-


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quaestio juris. Ultimately it focuses upon the nature of interpretation itself. Is interpretation something incidental, required only for the .determination of meaning of texts, or is interpretation ont ologi cal, with texts being an exemplar of theprocess of interpretation? The differing epistemological commit..-

!ments of Gadamer, and Hirsch and Betti account for thi* reluct-ance both sides have to countenance.a mediation between theirpositions. The difference is demonstrated most clearly in Gadanf2er s insistence upon the historicity of understanding. To Bettiand Hirsch, this implies a denial of the possibility of objectiveand valid interpretations because it entails a denial of the efficacy of the norm they wish to uphold for determining the validity and objectivity of interpretations: the author s intention.It,is important, then, that Gadamer s view of how the historicityof understanding relates to the au th o rs intention be examined.Once it is clear how Gadamer views the role of authorial intentionfor the process of interpretation, his view can be contrasted withHirsch s. Once this has' been achieved, it ca,n be determined ifthere is an irreconcilable difference between Gadamer and Hirsch.

The historicity of understanding permits Gadamer not to emphasize the role of the author s intention in,the determinationof textual meaning. Since the integration and application of thecontent of a text to the interpreter s historical situation is ofcentral importance for Gadamer, the re-construction of the text spriginal meaning is of subordinate importance. Gadame r states :... a hermeneutics that regarded understanding as the reconstruct-


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ion of the> original would be no more than the discovery of adead meaning. ' (T.M, p ,. 149) This Is not to say that reconstruction is unnecessary. As noted in the previous chapter,' the

integrity of the horizon of the text must" be maintained. Hence ,Gadamer can be.seen as suggesting that reconstruction of mean1rng=__is the first step in hermeneutics. Howev er, for hcrmeneutics tobe of value, interpretation must go beyond reconstruction.and theconcern with dead" meanings and seek application in the contextof the interpreter s own horizon.

With this in mind, Gadamer s view of the author s intentioncan be put into perspective. What Gadamer seeks to avoid by making claims such as "Not occasionally only, but always, the "meaning of a text goes beyond its author. (T.M. p.264) is a-regression to Schieiermacher s view that the key to understanding atext is to penetrate the author s subjective point of view by virtue of a divinatory act, Gadamer thinks this implies an unacceptable form of subjectivism. To avoid subjectivism he maintainsthat the focus of interpretation should be on the subject matteraddress ed by the text. (Thus Gadamer advocates trying to determinethe question to which the text Ls an answer. Consequently, ratherthan locating the subjectivity of the author, on-e tries to determine the perspective of the text. This, Gadamer argues,- meanssimply that we try to accept the validity of what he (the author)is saying." (T.M. p.259). Thus Gadamer does not wish to banishthe intention of the author, but wishes to place it in a subordin-

/\ate role to the task of application. Hirscfi s and Betti's under-/


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standing of the role of the author s intention is quite different. For the purposes of this argument, attention,will be restricted to the arguments of Hirsch.

Hirsch, in his book Validity in Interpretation, presents asystematically developed methodology for the validation of interpretations of texts. His theory includes ton account of types,genres and other concepts"that aid the classification and categorization of texts. Central to his theory is the distinction between meaning and significance. The task of interpretation is todetermine the meaning of a text. This is supplemented by criticism which is^ebneerhed with how a text is valued by a society ofreaders. The author's intention is crucial to the determinationof meaning, Hirsch perceives certain dangers in abandoning theauthor s intention from the determination of the meaning of atext. He writes: "To banish the original author as the determiner of meaning is] to reject the only compelling normative principle that could lead'to an interpretation. (V.1.1, p. 5) .

Hirsch claims that Gadamer is guilty of such banishment andconsequently Gadamer fails to distinguish between meaning and significance. For Hirsch, meaning is an affair of .consciousness, notwords. ' (V.1.1. p. 4 ) . Meaning is ething that is willed by aperson, and with texts, the meaning is willed by the author who

2commits a set of linguistic signs to paper. Meanings are self-identical and persist through time. Hence they are capable ofbeing recognized through the passage of time and reconstructed ina public context. Interpretation, then, copftists of a relation-


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ship between the author, the text, and the public context of understanding. The aim^of interpretation is to recover the text soriginal meaning as the author willed it. To attain this meaning, Hirsch provides a logic of validation that owes much to thework of Keynes and topper.

Significance, on- the other hand, concerns the relationshipbetween the text and the series of readers that consider the text__^through the passage of time. In Hirsch s words: Significance...names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a con

ception, or indeed anything imaginable. (V. T. 1. p. 8 ) . Hirsch,-,describes the relationship between meaning and significance quitesuccinctly: Significance always implies a relationship, and oneconstant unchanging pole of that relationship is 'what the textmeans." (V.I.1. p.8) The upshot of the distinction is that a textalways has one meaning but many different significances. Hermen-euticists, like Gadamer, whom~Hirsch claims are' ignorant of thisfundamental distinction, have thus, confused the distinction between interpretation,- the goal of which is to determine the original meaning of the text, and criticism, which is concerned withdetermining .rfie significance of a text to an age.

It is not d e a r that Gadamer is as unaware of this distinction3as Hirsch would like to think. For, as it has been shown, Gadamer

does allow for the recognition of the author s meaning. His conception of hermeneutics requires both recognition, through appropriation, and integration, or criticism, through'application. Itcould be argued, then, that Gadamer is in fact concerned with the


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V

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significance of texts.y and that discerning the significance of atext is the aim of hermeneutics. For, as-Gadamer argued:

Is it not true of every text, i.e. that it.must be understood in terms of what it says?Does this not mean that it must always berestated? And does not this restatement always take place through its being related to .the present. In as much as the object ofhistorical understanding is not events, buttheir significance , it is clearly not'acorrect description of this understandingto speak of an object existing in itself,and the approach of the subject to it.

f ' (T.M, p.293)Clearly, therefore, Gadamer recognizes the distinction be--,

tween meaning and significance. The differences between Gadamerand Hirsch could be resolved neatly, by giving each their domainof concern. Consequently, Hirsch s technique for discerning meaning could be useoVto supplement Gadamer s hermeneutical requirement of application. Unfortunately, the differences are not thateasily resolved, and further steps must be taken for a proper mediation of their positions, to be attained.

.o. . ; . . . . .. ' '

In the first place, it is not clear that Gadamer and Hirschare concerned with the same thing in their discussions of authorial intention. For Gadamer, authorial intention is related tothe author s subjectivity. Gadaraer subordinates authorial intention to the subject matter of the .text in order to avoid psychoio-gism. Hirsch would like to avoid psychologism as well. ForHirsch, authorial intention serves as a discriminating norra forthe determination of textual meaning. However, this is attained'at the cost of giving a stipulative definition of meaning, i.e.something'that is willed^ Hirsch s contention that meaning is ah


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affair of consciousness, which is also determinate, self-identi-cal i through ;time, and publicly accessible, may be applauded byPlatonists, but it boils down to more of an exhortation than anargument. Whether this account of meaning can be squared withhis logic of validation is a crucial question, and one that willbe addressed below.

It seems that the question of authorial intention is notwhat truly separates Gadamer and Hirsch. The crux of their differences can "be found in Hirsch s rejection of historicism.Hirsch writes, no doubt with'Gadamer in mind; The historicity ofinterpretation is quite distinct from the timelessness of understanding. (V.I.I. p. 137). Hirsch, thus admits that historicalconsiderations are of importance for interpretation,, particularlywith respect to the data available to a group of interpreters.This helps to account for the diversity of interpretations withinany given time. However, Hirsch considers Gadamer a radical his-toricist', and argues that this commits Gadamer to a position thatentail&^ekepticism with respect to determining the text s originalmeaning. According to Hirsch, Gadamer s position entails asserting that the only meaning a text can have is the meaning an interpreter gives it. Hirsch writes: He (Gadamer) cannot say thatthe interpreter understands the original sense of the text, sincethat would be to. disregard the historicity of. understanding.(V.I.I, p. 253)Hirsch, in this passage, is being uncharitable towards Gadamer,and too selective in his reading. As has been shown in the previous chapter,, the purpose of the principle of effective history


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and the fusion of horizons is to avoid the problem of the interpreter being locked into his or her own historical age. Hirschis aware of the concept of the fusion of horizons, and.states:

For once it is admitted that the 'interpretercan adopt a fused perspective different fromhis own 'contemporary one, then it is admitpedin principle that he can break out of his ownpersp ective. If that is possible, the primaryassumption of the theory is shattered.

W.I.I, p. 254)Indeed Gadamer admits that one can break out of one s perspective.However, rather than shattering the theory, it confirms preciselywhat it is supposed to do.

Historicity is/a problem for Hirsch because he inflates anddistorts its role in Gadamer s thought. As has been shown,Gadamer is not a radical historicist, and to depict him as one,as Hirsch does, is to misinterpret him. Historicity, for Gadamer,is a condition that enables one to begin the process of understanding. If it were the case.that historicity was an obstacle to understanding, then one could not make sense of Gadamer s appreciat-

7ion of the hermeneutical relevance of Aristotle. Therefore, forHirsch to write that "The doctrine of radical historicity is ultimately a dogma, an idea of reason, an act of faith."(V.I,I.p.256-7)is to engage in polemics with a straw man. '

It is apparent, then, that the different ontological comrait-ments of both Gadamer and Hirsch prevent an easy reconciliation oftheir views. However, there is a way by which the two opposingpositions can be brought together. The key to this reconciliation

ris provided by Hirsch s process of validation conjoined with a re-


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orientation of Gadamer s claims for the historicity ...of understanding. By softening some of the Intransigence on both sides,it can be shown that the two projects are complementary. If themethodological conception of hermeneutics and the ontologicalconception of hermeneutics are shown to be complementary, thenthe necessity for a fundamental choice between the two, noted inthe introduction, is unnecessary, and a more comprehensive view ofhermeneutics emerges.

Hirsch is skeptical of the possibility of determining withcertainty the meaning of a text. Since genuine certainty is im-possible, the aim of the discipline (i.e. hermeneutics^ must be to

? , -reach consensus, on .the basis of what is known, that correct understanding, has been achieved . (V.I.I. p. 1 7) . The fact thatgenuine certainty cannot be attained leads Hirsch to claim that

the aim of interpretation is validity not verification: To'verifyis to show that a conclusion is true ; to validate is to showthat a conclusion is probably true on the basis of what is known.(V. 12.. ' p. 171).. Although some logicians would be puzzled by Hirschdefinitions of validity and verification, he makes a plausible casefor his usage. Validation, since it secures a probable meaninggiven the "evidence at the disposal of an interpreter, is.thus aprovisional process.* Hirsch recommends a "survival of the fitt-est model for the process of advancing,critizing and rejecting,interpretations. Hen ce, the process of. adjudicating interpretations is similar to the adversary system in law: !

v - ' **'


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,A ,' - ; . . / ! The advocates have' the task of bringing forward-evidence favorable to their side and unfavorable to their opponents. In doing so, they maybring to light evidence which a judge might nothave thought to consider. But without a judge-all those relevant pieces of knowledge float'-uselessly.....However, unless advocates sometimes serve as T. judges, none of this activity will actuallycontribute to knowledge. (V. I.I, p. 197) . -.

Two important points emerge from Hirsch s view of validation..Firstly, since the process of validation is carried out-in thesocial context of a community of interpreters, the hypothesesthat interpreters put forward will be determined-in part by thequestions they ask of the text, and h ence, to some extent,: guidedby their historicity. Hirsch concedes as much, but thinks thatthrough the test of the survival of the fittest, the best possiblereading will emerge. However, this suggests that the best possible reading is liable, to alter if further evidence emerges thatwarrants the rejection of the previously established best reading.Hirsch would argue that this is the manner by which the growth ofknowledge is secured. It is important to note that this idea ofgrowth .bears similarities wi th Gadamer s view of the extension ofhorizons. What separates Gadamer and Hirsch 6n this point i- notso much their" views on either historicity or validity, but Hirsch sunstated belief that there is an ultimate standard to which a valid

interpretation should correspond. Although Certainty cannot beattained, it is an ideal that should be sought. Gadam er, by denying the existence of a world in itself, and by extension, a textin itself, denies such a possibility.

These considerations lead to the second major' point,.


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-which is the tension-between Hirsch s doctrine of validation andhis conception of the author.s intention. - It seems that on the

adversary/ model of the adjudication of interpretations the author s intention could not play as crucial role as Hirsch wouldlike. Either each rival interpretation has captured the author sintention, and thus the meaning of the text, or it could-notcount, on Hirschs criteria, ,as a possible interpretation. Ifan interpretation is ruled out on the basis of not" capturing the

t author s intention-; then, accordingly, one of its rivals musthave captured the author s intention. However, if the author sintention has been adequately.determined, it would seem that acertain understanding of the text has been attained," and not merely a probable one; 'on the other_hand, if it is shown, by whatevermeans, that each of a set of conflicting interpretations has aclaim to grasping authorial- intention, then the judgement of validity cannot be adjudicated" by appeal to the author s intention,

t

but must instead be adjudicated by some other criterion. A Likely c andidate,-in this cas e, would be the significances or applications the interpretation may uncover. Therefore, interpretationcannot, as Hirsch thinks, be divorced from criticism, and further,the.distinction between meaning and significance is not absolute,

* .

It seems,, then, that Hirsch s conception of authorial intent-.'"

ion functions more as a regulative ideal than^an actual discrim-^. r

8inating norm. Since certainty cannot be attained authorial intention can be used to rule out only some, interpretations, butcannot serve to adjudicate all interpretations, as Hirsch set out

/'


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to demonstrate. However, Hirsch, by leaving, open the possibilityof fallibility in the process of interpretation,- has set the context within which his view of hermeneutics can be reconciled with

' ' .

Gadamer s. ~There are some implicit dangers in Gadamer s position. -With-

out certain doctrines being qualified, his position could be con--. sidered untenable. It is never quite clear, when.he speaks of theexperience of truth and tradition.whether he is referring to anindividual or an historical age. Since Gadamer wishes to avoidsubjectivism , the hermeneutical task of appropriating tradition

.m us t be carried out and expressed in some form of community orsocial context. However, whereas Hirsch is quite clear on howvarious understandings and interpretations are put forth for con-,sideration, acceptance or rejection within a community of inter-

el-

preters, Gadamer is not. The model of dialogue and conversation,' ' V

the aim of which is agreement upon the subject matter of the text,is. the closest Gadamer comes to providing, an account of how ac'cept-ance of an interpretation is attained. Gadamer seems to be shackled by his desire to be descriptive and phenomenologi'cal. However,for;his claims of the experience of'truth'to be tenable, and indeed,

t t

for the process of appropriation and application not to be cons

trued as a subjective and arbitrary undertaking-, some further ac-count.must be given stating how certain interpretations are accept-ed> ... - : . The recourse to the. communal nature of language does not suffice because even if an interpretation 6f a text

* . . ' y'is publicly accessible, it does not guarantee an interpretations


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Documents

Erejudlce and Understanding- A Study of Hans-Georgf Gadamer s Philosophical Hermeneutics