Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy #2 (December 2012)

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Erasmus Student Journal o Philosophy#2 | July 2012


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ESJP#2 | 2012 Editorial

Erasmus Student Journal o Philosophy

For this second issue, the editorial board was delighted to receive so manysubmissions. Upholding our high quality standards, however, we couldonly accept a small number o essays that oer our readers the very best.

We strive to publish essays that besides solid argumentation and analysis make creative and original use o existing philosophical work and containcontributions that are distinctly the authors own. Students are thereorestrongly encouraged to write essays that make interesting and original con-tributions to the existing literature or a more general topic o interest orthe completion o their courses.

Again, there are many people to thank or making this second edi-

tion possible: the lecturers who nominated the best essays written ortheir courses; our anonymous reerees or their excellent comments andadvice; pro. dr. Wiep van Bunge, dr. Patrick Delaere and dr. F.A. Mulleror being on our supervisory board; Amanda Koopman or her help withour website and communications; Ivo Jeukens or his help with the layout;and, o course, our editors, Tijs Heijmeskamp, Julien Kloeg, Myrthe vanNus, Volker Ruitinga and jeerd Visser or all their hard work in puttingtogether this second issue o the ESJP. My deep-elt gratitude goes out to allo them.

Finally, there are some impending changes to our editorial board thatshould be announced. Our editor Volker Ruitinga graduated in March,and I expect to do the same later this year. For editors o a student journal,this, unortunately, means that we are orced into retirement. Ater thisissue, other students will take over our positions on the editorial board. Onbehal o the editorial board, I would thereore like to thank Volker or hiseditorial work and his proactive involvement in both strategic and practicalmatters. He has been a great help in the ounding and urther developmento the ESJP. And to conclude, I would like to personally thank everyone

who has helped to make the ESJP possible one last time. It has been a

deeply gratiying experience or me to see so many people come togetherand invest their ree time and energy in transorming a small idea into whatthe ESJP is today. My hope is that or many years to come uture genera-tions o editors will continue to increase the philosophical value o the ESJPand enjoy it as much as I did.

Daan Gijsbertse

Editor-in-Chie


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ESJP#2 | 2012

Te Erasmus Student Journal o Philosophy (ESJP) is a double-blindpeer-reviewed student journal that publishes the best philosophical papers

written by students rom the Faculty o Philosophy, Erasmus UniversityRotterdam. Its aims are to urther enrich the philosophical environmentin which Rotterdams philosophy students develop their thinking and tobring their best work to the attention o a wider intellectual audience. Anew issue o the ESJP will appear on our website (see below) every July andDecember.

o oer the highest possible quality or a student journal, the ESJPonly accepts papers that (a) have been written or a course that is part o the

Faculty o Philosophys curriculum and (b) nominated or publication inthe ESJP by the teacher o that course. In addition, each paper that is pub-lished in the ESJP is rst subjected to a double-blind peer review process in

which at least one other teacher and two student editors act as reerees.

Te ESJP highly encourages students to write their papers or coursesat our aculty with the goals o publishing in our journal and appealing toa wider intellectual audience in mind.

More inormation about the ESJP can be ound on our website:

www.eur.nl/w/esjp

[email protected]

All work in this issue o the Erasmus Student Journal o Philosophy is licensed under a CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License. For more inormation, visit http://

creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/

DisclaimerAlthough the editors o the Erasmus Student Journal o Philosophy have taken the utmost care in

reviewing the papers in this issue, we cannot exclude the possibility that they contain inaccuracies orviolate the proper use o academic reerencing or copyright in general. Te responsibility or these

matters thereore remains with the authors o these papers and third parties that choose to make useo them entirely. In no event can the editorial board o the Erasmus Student Journal o Philosophy orthe Faculty o Philosophy o the Erasmus University Rotterdam be held accountable or the contents

o these papers.

About the Erasmus Student Journal o Philosophy


Editorial Board

Daan Gijsbertse (Editor-in-Chie )

Tijs Heijmeskamp (Secretary)

Julien Kloeg

Myrthe van Nus

Volker Ruitinga

jeerd Visser (Guest editor)

Supervisory Board

pro. dr. Wiep van Bunge

dr. Patrick Delaere

dr. F.A. Muller
http://www.eur.nl/fw/esjphttp://www.eur.nl/fw/esjp


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ESJP#2 | 2012 In this issue


Te second issue o the ESJP sees its contributors engage critically withdiverse strands o normative thought to arrive at counterintuitive conclu-sions about some o the most accepted Western institutions.

In Te Paradox o Religious Neutrality, Sbastien de la Fosse putsDonald Looses provocative thesis that western secular states are inherentlybiased towards Christian values to the test. Conronting this idea with the

works o Robert Post and Ronald Dworkin on the secular state, he raisescritical questions about the preconditions o current conceptions o democ-racy and the secular state with what most people will consider a surprisinganswer.

In Te Alignment o Morality and Protability in Corporate SocialResponsibility, Joanna Semeniuk challenges the claim that the interestso society and market goals converge. Tis central claim behind someapproaches to Corporate Social Responsibility which nowadays guresso prominently in corporate communication is shown to perpetuate theneoliberal doctrine o subjecting stakeholder interests to shareholder inter-ests, without solving the tensions that exist between the two in capitalism.

In Luck Egalitarianism and Procreation, Johanna Toma appliesthe normative ramework o luck egalitarianism to the questions o whatchildren are owed and who should pay or them. Tis provides a rigor-

ous account o (the limits o) parental responsibility under conditions oinequality, proposing that, in principle, parents should be ully responsibleor the costs o raising their children: Only those parents who suer thedisadvantages o existing inequalities that are not a result o choices thatthey can be held responsible or should receive relative compensation orthe costs o raising their children.


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ESJP#2 | 2012 able o contents


The Paradox of Religious Neutrality

Sbastien de la FosseThe Alignment of Morality and Profitability inCorporate Social Responsibility

Joanna SemeniukLuck Egalitarianism and Procreation

Johanna Toma

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The Paradox of Religious Neutrality

1. Introduction

Philosopher and theologian Donald Loose argues that western liberaldemocracy is a product o inherently Christian societies. Broadly speaking,his reasoning is that owing to the act that modern secular democracy arosein societies marked by Enlightenment, and because Enlightenment arosein European societies marked by Christianity, modern secular democracyis inevitably and transitively inuenced by Christianity. Since Christianity

and democracy are historically intertwined in this way, it may be arguedthat the Christian aith is more compatible with the values o democracythan other religions, such as Islam or Judaism. In other words, accordingto Loose, modern secular democracy is biased toward Christianity.

Tis is a bold claim with ramications that threaten the very concep-tion o secularity in modern political thought. In my opinion, such a claimshould not go unchallenged. For this reason, the purpose o this paper isto evaluate to what extent this argument may be countered by alternativetheories on the relationships between religion and the secular state, withinthe boundaries o the specic case o ree speech on religious issues, whichincludes expressions o aith and expression o opinions on religions andtheir believers.

Although I do not consider mysel a proponent o Looses account, Ishall nevertheless grant it signicant leeway and view it in the most avour-able light possible, in order to make a air assessment o its validity. othis end, I shall present two alternative accounts that explicitly supportthe (religious) neutrality o the modern secular state (by Robert Post andRonald Dworkin, respectively), and juxtapose these with Looses position.In this conrontation, Looses account will receive the benet o the doubt,

meaning that it will be treated as valid until proven wrong by the alter-natives, and that the burden o proo or such a disproval lies with theopposing positions.

One o the implications o this benet o the doubt is that i a con-rontation between Looses position and an alternative view amounts tonothing more than disagreement without any signicant shared argu-ments or assumptions, this is not sufcient to reject Looses position. What

is necessary or an evaluation o the validity o Looses position withinthese connes is a minimal degree o compatibility or shared assumptionsbetween the two positions, which should then be used to build an argu-ment leading to the conclusion that one position is more tenable than theother.

In the rst section o this paper, I shall present Looses argument orthe historical connection between modern secular society and Christian-ity, as well as his argument that this entails a bias towards Christian values

within modern democracies.

In the sections that ollow, I shall challenge this position by presenting

two alternative views on the secular state. Te rst o these is Robert Postsconception o the secular state, introducing the principle o democraticlegitimacy. I shall rst summarize his evaluation o arguments or andagainst limiting reedom o speech on religious issues, and subsequentlycompare Posts position to the picture painted by Loose, evaluating to whatextent Posts arguments have been shaped by Christian (moral) standards,and to what extent expressions on both Christian and non-Christian religi-osity may be evaluated dierently using Posts standards.

Sbastien de la Fosse

Sbastien de la Fosse | Te Paradox o Religious Neutrality


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Erasmus Student Journal o Philosophy Sbastien de la Fosse | Te Paradox o Religious Neutrality

Subsequently, I shall discuss Ronald Dworkins distinction between thetolerant religious and the tolerant non-religious or secular state, attempt-ing to evaluate to what extent western liberal democracy can be regardedas a tolerant secular state. Additionally, I shall investigate to what extentDworkins position is compatible with Looses point o view, based on the

various possible ways o connecting these two theories.

In the nal section o this paper, I shall present my conclusion on thevalidity o Looses argument. Based on this evaluation, I shall argue thatree speech in Enlightened secular democracies is unconsciously biasedtowards the Christian aith at the expense o other religions, and that thisis both unavoidable and undesirable given the current conceptions o stateand democracy.

2. Donald Looses Criticism o Religious Neutrality

Donald Loose argues that Christianity cannot be eliminated rom modernliberal democracy (Loose, 2007a). In order to understand this somewhatparadoxical statement, we need to rst consider the history o liberaldemocracy.

Loose reminds us o the great number o religious wars that took placein Europe, starting as early as the 11th century and culminating in boththe French Revolution and the American War o Independence. Teseevents gave rise to the ounding o a secular state, which was capable oending this religious strie by separating the public domain rom citizensprivate spheres, while simultaneously maintaining strict neutrality towardsthe various warring religious actions within this public sphere (Loose,

2007a: 20). By banning the dominance o any specic religious doctrinerom the public sphere, this newly created nation state could eectivelygovern its people, despite irreversible religious heterogeneity within theprivate sphere.

Te two most exemplary models o governing religion in the publicdomain within contemporary liberal democracies are the French policyo lacit and the American marketplace o ideas. Te French policyconsists in severely limiting all explicit expressions o religion in public lie,

thus banishing religion in its entirety to the private sphere o the citizen.By contrast, the American policy is the exact opposite o this: by givingall religious expressions equal and unettered opportunities or expression

within the public orum, religious doctrines compete with one anotherlike vendors in the marketplace, thus preventing any single religion rom

claiming the public sphere as its own. In practice, many states adopt apolicy somewhere in between these two extremes.

One problem Loose identies in these doctrines o the secular stateis that it leans heavily on the (articial) separation o public and privatespace. Religion, however, will not let itsel be ully conned to the pri-vate sphere, as evidenced by citizens increasing rebellion against thisdelineation: as Loose argues, citizens expect the social norms and moralconvictions that apply in their private domain (which tend to be basedon religious tenets) to be extended to public lie (Loose, 2007a: 20). Tismay be especially true or second-generation immigrants, who are shapedboth as citizens in a secular state and as members o a (minority) religiouscommunity (Loose, 2007a: 32-33). In practice, these two identities maynot always be reconcilable, resulting in riction and conict, both in theprivate and the public sphere. Tis shows that religion cannot be totallybanished rom public lie as in the French policy model, since by limitingreligious expression in public lie, citizenship runs the risk o becomingso restrictive that many citizens may eel excluded rom it (Loose, 2007a:21-22).

Te main allacy in the reasoning o the secular state is thus the assump-tion that all people are rst citizens, who may subsequently subscribe to areligious ideology within the connes o their private lives. People never

choose their religious background, however, as they are always shaped in acertain religious environment (or absence thereo ). For many, the require-ment to discard or disregard their religious identity when they enter publiclie is simply not realistic, as it is their religious identity upon which theiridentity as citizens is ounded. Loose (2007b: 141-142, 147-148) consid-ers this especially true both or Islam, which ocuses on individual piety

without a unied vision o the state, and or Judaism, which has doctrinalreasons or distancing itsel rom politics and thus citizenship.


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Although Loose (2007a: 20) explains that the separation between churchand state originates in the modern conception o the state, the secular statesattitude towards religion may itsel be argued to have originated rom itsinteraction not with religion in general, but specically with Christianity,including both the claim to universality o the Roman-Catholic Church,

and the Reormation, which arguably played a signicant part in bring-ing about Enlightenment in Europe. A similar argument can be made orsuch secular values as justice, charity, tolerance, and avouring the meek(Loose, 2007b: 169). Tese are moral values grounded in Christianity thathave been incorporated into Enlightenment, and subsequently adoptedas Enlightenment values. Tis illustrates that Enlightenment in Europeas a whole has been historically shaped against a background o Christianreligious belies.

Te secular state and its Enlightened values are thus a reminder o theChristian doctrine that is still implicitly present and prevalent in Europeanculture, law and (political) thought. Loose strives or a greater awarenesso the Christian roots o the secular state, or this may remind us that theneutrality o the secular liberal state is a more problematic position than itmay be perceived to be at rst glance.

Tis is the basis o the difculty o the American policy model inadjudicating air opportunities to all religious expressions in the publicdomain. For within this system, some religious expressions may be moredisruptive and disturbing to prevalent and implicitly Christian secular val-ues than others. In adjudicating these issues, the state is aced with thedilemma to either avour its own cultural history, thus compromising itsneutrality, or to maintain its neutrality but to ignore its moral values, thus

abandoning its claim to a secular morality (Loose, 2007b: 130-131).One nal complication o the liberal, secular society is that it has an

ideological drive to incorporate the totality o social reality, and thus tosubjugate all social dealings to the divide between the public and the pri-vate, including those elements that reject this liberalism itsel. Tis is anideological strategy that is similar to the one traditionally employed bythe Roman-Catholic church within the domain o aith: via the rhetoricalclaim that one given doctrine has universal validity, all opposing positionsare implicitly reduced to subordinate variants o the universal doctrine.

Loose argues that this claim o universal primacy o the divide betweenpublic and private is directly descended rom the claim o universal pri-macy o Roman-Catholic aith, and that thereore secular liberalism canbe seen as an extension o Roman-Catholicism, revealing the secular soci-ety as only one evolutionary step away rom the Christian society. In the

words o Loose:

Whoever rerains rom claiming eorts towards the common good asones own exclusive patrimony out o a religious inspiration, proves atthe same time that he or she acknowledges the autonomy o the secularand the religious, and is thus undamentally marked by Christianity(Loose, 2007b: 130-131).1

Tis implies a more than signicant compatibility o the Christian aithwith the secular state, and indeed raises the question whether non-Chris-tian religions can be compatible with the secular state to a similar extent.

3. Robert Posts Teory o Legitimate Democracy

Te next step in this investigation consists o reviewing a number o alter-native theories on the relationship between religion and reedom o speechin modern secular societies, to test their compatibility with Looses posi-tion, and to examine to what extent Looses argument remains tenable.Te rst such position is presented by Robert Post (2007), who makes aclear delineation o the extent to which secular democratic governmentsshould regulate or limit reedom o expression on religious issues.

Post posits one major assumption, specically that the secular societiesunder review are democracies, by which is meant a state in which citizensgovern themselves, or as dened by Bobbio (1989) and quoted by Post(2007: 73): Democratic orms o government are those in which the lawsare made by the same people to whom they apply.

Post also identies a necessary condition or democracy, which is openpublic discussion. He argues that it is not enough or democratic sel-government i citizens merely shape the actions and behaviour o the statethrough collective decision-making; they must also identiy with the state.


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Tis means that citizens must experience themselves not just as voters, butalso as authors o the state and its laws. Te primary way to attain suchauthorship according to Post (2007: 75-76) is through public discussion,in which citizens may actively and collectively inuence the states policiesand decisions. Obviously, reedom o expression is a key condition or

such public debate. Without sufcient liberty or opportunity to enter intopublic discussion, citizens become alienated rom public policy and societymay no longer be called democratic. For this reason, reedom o expressionshould be allowed as much space as possible in the public sphere.

Applying this to the discussion o issues o aith and religion, it is clearthat citizens must not only have the reedom to express their own religiousaith and opinions, but also to express their opinions on other religionsthan their own. Te cost o this reedom, however, is that some o theseopinions may be perceived as insults to those whose religion is the subjecto public debate, creating the possibility o conict and polarisation in thepublic domain.

Post acknowledges that these costs will sometimes outweigh the ben-ets o absolute reedom o expression. Consequently, he identies andoutlines three arguments that have been used to limit these liberties inliberal democracies, and he evaluates each o these arguments practicalvalue or actual public expressions o opinions on religions.

Te rst o these is the argument that religions should be protectedrom insult and blasphemy (Post 2007: 77-78). Tis is a protectionaorded not to believers or religious groups, but to the religions and dei-ties themselves. Te reasoning behind this argument is that certain sacredtenets o aith should never be deled by denouncement or ridicule, as

they are values that outweigh those o reedom and the state. Post arguesthat this limitation may have value in certain states, specically those whoonly aspire to govern a people who homogenously accept the religious ten-ets that are regarded as sacred. However, since most modern states do nothave such a homogenous population, Post concludes that this limitationo ree speech is mostly unacceptable.

Secondly, Post (2007: 78-82) states the argument that religious groupsshould be protected rom insult and humiliation. Tis is dierent rom

the previous argument in that it reers to the believers and the integrity otheir religious eelings, and not to the sacredness o religion itsel. Whatthis argument entails in its purest orm is that all members o societyhave a undamental right not to be subjected to public insult, criticismor denouncement o the religious belies and practices they uphold. Since

such a restriction silences any critical remarks on any religion, it eectivelysties ree public discourse on religious issues, thus endangering demo-cratic legitimacy.

As a result, a number o limitations o this broad blanket ban onexpression o opinion on religious issues exist. Post mentions the claim ogeneral tolerance within democracies, and the condition o only excludingthose opinions on religious issues that are gratuitously insulting and donot urther public debate, only to subsequently counter them both. Heargues that the aorementioned spirit o general tolerance within democ-racies should only apply to actions, not words, meaning that a democracyshould only actively enorce citizens not to act contrary to social pub-lic order (e.g. [w]e must not riot or murder in deence o our belies(Post, 2007: 79-80)), while allowing them the right to insult their ellowcitizens. And regarding the issue o gratuitous insults, he maintains thatthe criterion o gratuitousness (and thus not urthering public debate) istoo subjective to eectively apply to judging controversial expressions ina rational and objective way. He concludes that the argument o protect-ing religious groups rom insult is only valid in societies not committedto democratic legitimacy, or in specic cases where keeping the religiouspeace is considered more important or social stability than the values odemocracy (Post, 2007: 79-80).

Te third and nal limitation on ree speech on religious issues Post(2007: 82-84) lists is the argument o preventing discrimination. Contraryto the previous argument, this reers to the social standing o specic reli-gious groups, preventing them rom being marginalised within society andpublic debate through (intentional) incitement o public opinion againstthem as a group. Post readily admits that the prevention o discriminationis a prerequisite o democratic legitimacy, as this is enhanced by a broadspectrum o participants/authors in public discussion. Alienating any (reli-gious) group rom public lie detracts rom the legitimacy o democracy.


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However, he also argues that this argument o silencing some in the nameo equality should not be overused, in order to prevent the state rommisusing it to protect the political interests o those in power, or to stiepublic discussion out o political correctness. Post thereore supplies twocriteria or the justied use o this restriction on reedom o speech: Te

rst o these is the condition that there be no plausible alternative orlimiting citizens ree speech in combating inequality and discrimination(such as education or afrmative action). Te second criterion is the con-dition that the oensive expressions would qualiy as hate speech, i.e.they should have both the intent to discriminate, and a damaging eectto the discriminated parties. Post concludes that these conditions wouldensure responsible use o the argument o preventing discrimination onreligious and other issues.

Posts argumentation shows that in his theory o democracy, reespeech should be given as much space as possible, and that it may onlybe restrained in exceptional circumstances. When overlaying this view

with the picture provided by Donald Loose, it becomes apparent thatPost is a proponent o what Loose calls the American policy on religiousexpression; Post advocates virtually no limitations on public discussion oreligious matters, turning the public debate o religion into a marketplaceo ideas. Despite the problems Loose has identied with this position (i.e.the assumption o the supremacy o citizenship over religious identity, andthe greater compatibility Christian values have with those o the secularstate over the values o non-Christian religions), Posts position can becomplementary to his own: Posts description o democracy legitimized bypublic debate can be used as a urther clarication o Looses liberal secularstate, while Looses analysis can be used as a test o the neutrality o Posts

model o democracy.

A number o observations can be made rom this combination. Temajor issue that I shall discuss in the remainder o this section is that itappears plausible that Christian groups generally t Posts model o soci-ety better than other religious groups. Tis can be seen by recalling thatPosts Enlightenment value o democracy through sel-governance relieson unettered public discussion, while also minding Looses point that thisEnlightenment value arose in Christian societies and has thereore been

shaped in part by Christian values. I shall make this clear by reviewingPosts three (countered) exceptions to reedom o expression on religiousissues in light o this peculiar position o Christianity.

Te argument o preventing blasphemy should not be applicable to

modern secular democracies, since secular Enlightenment has replacedreligion as the conceptual oundation o the state. Although Christianvalues still implicitly underlie Enlightened Reason, these are no longerembraced as the exclusive values o Christianity, but as belonging primari-ly to Reason. Since these values are already protected as allegedly neutralelements o the secular state itsel, no special protection is required orthem as religious tenets.2

However, because non-Christian religions maintain a set o sacred val-ues that do not all coincide with those o Enlightened Reason, it may bethe case that the sacredness o these religions is less widely acknowledgedthroughout society than that o Christianity, and that these religions are

not treated with the same (unconscious and unrecognised) considerationas Christianity. In this way, non-Christian religions may be seen as disad-vantaged in public debate as compared to Christianity.

Posts position on the second limiting argument, that o uncondition-ally protecting believers rom insult, is similarly biased towards Christianity.

With regard to this issue, Post presupposes that insulting citizens in theirreligious identity does not necessarily damage their standing as citizens(which would be a breach o democratic legitimacy). Tis assumption mayhold or those citizens who are either non-religious or have a religiousbackground such as Christianity that does not place the oundationo citizenship in religious values. However, or those citizens who adhere

to a religious doctrine that does base the legitimacy o their citizenshipon religious belies, Posts assumption does not hold, causing Posts posi-tion to deny them any protection rom attacks against the oundation otheir civic legitimacy. What this shows is, again, the hidden premise o thedivide between religion and public lie, as identied by Loose, once againunmasking the secular state as one built on Christian oundations.


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Many non-Christian religious groups, such as Muslims or Jews, derivethe virtues o citizenship rom their religious virtues. Indeed, such groupsmight argue rom this point o view that a state that allows its citizens toinsult and ridicule the belies (and thus the absolute virtue) o others couldhardly be considered legitimate at all. However, by criticizing the implicit

Christian bias in the secular state and thus making a stand or a dierentconception o citizenship these groups risk being themselves accused orejecting the principles o citizenship altogether.

Te nal argument Post reviews, the argument o preventing dis-crimination, is less criticised than the other two, as Post more readilyacknowledges its use, even though he warns o its overuse. At rst glance,this balancing act between the right to express ones opinion in public andthe right to have ones place in public lie protected by law appears to be atruly neutral tenet, which does not avour Christians over non-Christiansin any way. Te bias is still there, however, hidden in one o Posts restric-tions on the use o this argument, specically the condition that bothdiscriminatory intent on the part o the speaker and the damaging eecto the insult should be established.

An argument or this statement can be ound with Jill Gordon andMarkus Johnson (Gordon & Johnson, 2003), who argue that dening dis-crimination3 as an intentional act is an injustice. Tey emphasize that it isnot conscious discrimination, but unconscious discriminatory speech thatis both most common and most harmul in excluding minority groupsrom public lie. In their view, a better denition o discrimination wouldnot include the speakers intent as a necessary condition, but would ratherplace more emphasis on the interlocutors aect in experiencing speech as

discriminatory. In this light, it can be seen that Post utilizes a hidden prem-ise in his limiting o the restrictions on ree speech, which is the premiseo innocence until proven guilty. Although this is an admirable value tomaintain in determining objectively perceivable intentional acts, it maynot be in the case o determining subjective perceptions and experiences.Te reason or this is that, in the case o possibly discriminatory or insult-ing speech, the interlocutor is assigned the burden o proo to establish thespeakers discriminatory or insulting intent, which typically requires accessto the speakers private thoughts. Tis makes it a nigh-impossible task or

the interlocutor to meet the conditions or determining that he or she hasbeen discriminated against.

Te question remains whether or not this implicit assumption avoursthe Christian aith. In my opinion, this is oten but not necessarily the

case. Discrimination is a broad cultural phenomenon that is not merelylimited to religious dierences, but rather appears to be a near-universal(i unpleasant) characteristic o human culture and identity-shaping. Iteven appears to have a social unction, in that it allows similar or like-minded individuals to dene themselves as a group or even a community through opposition to others, while simultaneously dening the identityo these others in terms o the emerging newly-dominant community.4Because o this community-dening characteristic o discrimination, itcan be argued that discriminatory speech tends to exclude minorities roma dominant majority.

Applied to reedom o expression on religious issues, it can be seen

that in secular democracies the majority generally avours Enlightenmentvalues, which have a signicant overlap with the Christian values rom

which they evolved. What this means is that unintentionally discrimi-natory speech tends to avour Christians over non-Christians, but onlybecause Christian religious values are already dominant as a result o theiroverlap with Enlightenment values. Tereore, Posts restrictions on silenc-ing discriminatory speech does not in itsel cause a secular society to avourChristianity over other religions, but does play a role in maintaining suchinequality.

Tis discussion shows that an explicitly secular doctrine o democracystill harbours deep-seated Christian values and is thereore not truly neu-

tral in religious matters. Clearly, Posts approach o using democracy andsel-authorship as non-religious political values does not provide a deenceagainst the implications o Looses claims.


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4. Ronald Dworkins wo Models o the olerant State

A dierent approach to this discussion is Ronald Dworkins (2006) viewon the democratic state. Dworkin distinguishes between two conceptionso modern democracies: the tolerant religious state and the tolerant secular

state. He denes the tolerant religious state as a religious nation, collec-tively committed to the values o aith and worship, but with tolerance orreligious minorities including nonbelievers (Dworkin, 2006: 56), whileby contrast the tolerant secular state is conceived as a nation committedto thoroughly secular government but with tolerance and accommodationor people o religious aith (ibidem). While the actor o tolerance is animportant and undamental similarity between these two conceptions othe state, Dworkin argues that the two models are still undamentally di-erent in their conception o citizenship, and additionally that the tolerantreligious model is incoherent. In the ollowing, I shall present Dworkinsargument.

Te similarity between the model o the tolerant religious state andthe tolerant secular state is not merely the subscription to the ideal otolerance, but also to two basic principles o human dignity. Tese are theprinciple that each persons lie is o equal intrinsic value, and the principlethat every person has the same personal responsibility or their own lie(Dworkin, 2006: 70). In applying these principles o the individual tosociety, Dworkin argues that society is only justied to constrain citizensliberty on sound distributive or sound impersonally judgmental grounds(Dworkin, 2006: 73). What is excluded rom these i s constraints on per-sonally judgmental grounds, which Dworkin denes as laws that violatedignity by usurping an individuals responsibility or his own ethical val-

ues (Dworkin, 2006: 72), in other words paternalistic policies that imposemoral values on citizens. Such measures would violate the principle ocitizens responsibility or their own lives and should, in this account, bedisallowed or that reason.

However, Dworkin indicates that such personally judgmental poli-cies are actually held within the tenets o the tolerant religious state, sincesuch a state explicitly subscribes to certain religious principles and seeksto actively promote these through policy. Te tolerant religious state toler-ates citizens choices not to subscribe to these principles, but it states that

it would preer them to. Dworkin concludes that this type o paternalismin the tolerant religious state is incompatible with the principles o humandignity that it claims to adhere to.

Although this paternalism is a recognisable eature o the tolerant

religious state, it is not, according to Dworkin, the main reason whythe tolerant religious state is incompatible with the principles o dignity.Rather, it is its cultural majoritarianism, which is the circumstance withintolerant religious states where a majority o the population that shares cer-tain religious values wishes to impose these on public lie, not or the sakeo the minority (which would be paternalism), but or the sake o theirown ideal o public lie. In eect, the religious majority shapes the publicsphere according to their own religiously inspired values, converting theseto civic values (Dworkin, 2006: 74). Tis orces minority religious groupsas well as nonbelievers to adopt these same values in order to unction ascitizens. Tese minorities are thereore still ree to reject these values astheir religious identity, as long as they acknowledge them as the prevalentdoctrine in public lie.

Dworkins tolerant secular state, by contrast, does not impose any suchvalues on its citizens. Instead, it takes pains to shape public lie accordingto civic virtues that do not have a religious oundation. Applying his analy-sis to the case o the United States o America, Dworkin concludes that

American society actually shows more properties o a tolerant religiousstate, than o the tolerant secular state that it claims to be.

When comparing Dworkins position to that o Donald Loose, it isunclear at rst whether these two analyses are compatible, as is required inorder to perorm a meaningul comparison. In my opinion, there are three

possible approaches to connecting these two positions. Te rst two suchapproaches consist o applying Looses point to Dworkins tolerant secularstate on the one hand, and applying it to Dworkins tolerant religious stateon the other. Te third position is a more subtle one, requiring an altera-tion o Dworkins model. I shall make a case or each o these approachesand subsequently compare the three scenarios.


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Te rst approach applying Looses argument that the secular stateis inuenced by and biased towards Christian thought to Dworkins con-ception o the tolerant secular state implies that the tolerant secular statemodel is ounded on Enlightenment values that implicitly grew romChristian values. I we then accept Looses analysis, we are led to a two-

old conclusion. First, we can see that Dworkins review o the tolerantreligious state is not relevant to this discussion, because this account othe state does not claim secular values as its oundation. Secondly, on thisview, Dworkins distinction between a tolerant religious state and a toler-ant secular state would be reduced to a distinction between an explicitlyreligious state and an implicitly religious one, making it next to mean-ingless. Eectively, Dworkins position has been undermined by Loosesaccount through a claim to universality inherent in the chosen approach:by equating Looses argument o a pro-Christian bias in the secular state toDworkins tolerant secular state, Dworkins position has been neutered andpresented as a dissenting voice in Looses system. I I were to choose this

approach to combine the two theories, this would amount to a decisionon my part to reject the validity o Dworkins distinction. Tis would go

well beyond giving Looses position the benet o the doubt, and wouldamount to explicitly avouring it over Dworkins views, especially in lighto the act that this is not the only possible approach to relate these twoviewpoints.

An additional problem with this approach is that Looses descriptiono the American policy on religious expression as a marketplace o ideas

would become inaccurate, since Dworkins model reduces this Americansituation to either personally judgmental government policy to promotereligiosity (in the United States as a tolerant religious state), or to one that

tries to reduce religious expression in the public sphere more similar tothe French policy o lacit (within the picture o the United States as atolerant secular state). Dworkin clearly preers the latter.

Te closest alternative to this scenario consists o applying Loosesstatements to Dworkins tolerant religious state. Tis would provide more

justication or Looses description o the marketplace o ideas policyin its appeal to tolerance, against Dworkins denouncement o the reli-gious core o American society. However, this view also oers a potential

challenge to Looses claim that the secular state is predisposed towardsChristian values, in that it leaves open the possibility that a secular statecould be capable o maintaining a neutral position towards Christianityas compared to other religions. Te problem o the cultural dominanceo implicit Christian values in public lie is thus relegated to Dworkins

tolerant religious state. However, this approach would not do Looses pointjustice, as it ails to explain in what way Dworkins tolerant secular statecould overcome this challenge. Tereore, choosing this approach wouldenable Dworkins position to evade Looses points by stipulation, which

would entail opposing Looses arguments through begging the question.

As can be seen rom these two separate attempts at comparing Loosesand Dworkins respective positions on religion and public lie, these posi-tions remain incompatible to some extent, as Dworkin would argue thatLooses analysis is inaccurate in stating that the American marketplace oideas policy would t the policy o a secular state, while Loose would denythat Dworkins distinction between a tolerant religious state and a tolerantsecular state could be made in a meaningul way, because in his opinionsecular societies are still subconsciously marked by (Christian) religiousvalues. Tis last consideration, however, provides the starting point or athird attempt to connect these two analyses.

Te third approach to combining Looses and Dworkins theoriesrequires a urther distinction within Dworkins theory. Dworkins tolerantreligious state and tolerant secular state both reer to a states consciousselection o its stance towards any or all religious doctrines. However, whatI propose is to include not merely the conscious position o the state, butalso the unconscious position o the public in a denition or Dworkins

distinction between religious and secular. Tis is an alteration inspired bythe perception o discrimination raised by Jill Gordon & Markus Johnson(2003); i we exclude unconsciously discriminatory remarks rom the de-nition o discrimination, this denition would be too narrow. Similarly, i

we exclude unconsciously non-neutral opinions on religious issues romthe state position o religious neutrality, this religious neutrality o the statecannot be considered complete.

Te ramications o this interpretation are quite ar-reaching orDworkins model. It implies that Dworkins arguments are limited in their


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application to political reality, as unconscious social undercurrents thatdraw on historically Christian cultural inuences have given rise to anoverly narrow conception o the secular state. More charitably, it can besaid that Dworkins model is an idealization that leaves problems pertainingto the position o religion in public lie unaddressed. Te resulting image is

similar to the one painted by the rst approach, in that it leaves Dworkinsposition with a signicant burden o proo, but it does not invalidate hisdistinction between the tolerant religious state and the tolerant secularstate and still leaves a coherent view on the American marketplace oideas policy.

Based on the above investigation, the rst two scenarios show a lim-ited extent o compatibility between Loose and Dworkin, which wouldresult in either subjugating one theory to the other or the sake o com-patibility, or denying their compatibility altogether, rendering meaningulcomparison impossible within this studys parameters. Te third scenario,however, does not pose any serious limitations on the premises on eithertheory, although it does require some exibility on the part o Dworkinsassumptions. As a result, the (non-stipulated) possibility o an unbiasedtolerant secular state and Looses claim o modern secular states predis-position towards Christian values do not exclude one another. For thisreason, this third approach allows or the greatest degree o compatibilitybetween Looses and Dworkins respective positions, which in turn allowsa meaningul evaluation o their validity, without resorting to judgementsby stipulation. For this reason, I argue that this approach is the most ruit-ul in terms o both academic impartiality and meaningulness within theconnes o this study. Finally, based on this approach to connect Loosesand Dworkins respective positions, it can be concluded that Dworkins

views do not meet the burden o proo required to disprove Looses argu-ment.

5. Conclusion

Te investigations above have shown that Donald Looses deconstruc-tion o the religious neutrality o the modern secular state poses seriousproblems or the conception o the secular state. Loose argues that secular

democratic governments claim to religious neutrality is built on a ounda-tion o Christian belies and values, showing this position o neutrality tobe tenuous at best. I have challenged this position with two alternatives,each o which needs to possess sufcient compatibility with Looses theory.

Applying Looses analysis o the secular state to Robert Posts concep-tion o democracy as a political value, I have shown that Post leans heavilyon the assumption o absolute religious neutrality, revealing that his argu-ment or a mostly unrestricted reedom o expression in public discussiono religious issues does indeed avour the religious values o Christianity

within this public debate over those o other religions. It should be noted,however, that this is not merely caused by the cultural history o the con-

cept o the secular state (as Loose argues), but it is also maintained throughthe systematic discounting o unconscious discrimination o minorityopinions, a dynamic identied by Jill Gordon & Markus Johnson, whoargue that such disregard or unconscious considerations is a ailing o cur-rent theories o morality and justice.

Dworkins distinction between the (tolerant) religious state and the(tolerant) secular state is a position that is partially incompatible withLooses views and requires a reinterpretation o at least one o the theoriesin order to make a meaningul comparison. Applying Gordon & John-sons distinction between conscious and unconscious discrimination toDworkins conception o the tolerant secular state results in an image that

presents Dworkins model as an idealized version o the conception o thestate, which does not address the issue o unconsciously religious premisesin the concept o the religiously neutral state. Dworkin thus models theideals o the secular state rather than its real problems.

Both challenges to Looses criticism o the secular state have there-ore ailed. For now, the claim that secular governments have a signicantinherent predisposition towards Christian values and opinions in theirconception o the state stands. However, it i s made clear by both Post and


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Dworkin that a breach o religious neutrality on the part o the state is notdesirable. As Post would argue, a state predisposition towards a certainreligion would impose a severe limitation on public debate, resulting ina reduction o democratic legitimacy. Conversely, Dworkin would claimthat a state that systematically avours certain religious views over others

is not only paternalistic, but also culturally majoritarian, and violates theprinciples o human dignity. Surprisingly, Loose rerains rom comment-ing on the desirability o this situation, with the exception o his appeal orgreater awareness within modern secular democracies o their own culturaland religious history. While this appeal may merely be meant to stimulateparticipants in public debate to become better inormed on the nature opublic lie itsel,5 it may also be taken by some as an implicit approval or

justication o the privileged position Christian values enjoy in modernwestern societies.

What I have shown in this paper is twoold. On the one hand, reespeech in modern secular democracies is inevitably and unconsciouslybiased towards the Christian aith at the expense o other religions. Tis isin line with Looses position, which was not disproven through conronta-tion with either Posts or Dworkins respective alternative positions. Onthe other hand, however, I have shown that this bias is undesirable andunjust rom the point o view o the modern secular state, as both Post andDworkin argue. In addition, though, a urther extrapolation o Gordon &

Johnsons argument provides an even more undamental support or thisconclusion: an exclusive ocus on conscious intent o the speaker entailsnot only a passive disregard or the perceptions and interpretations o theinterlocutor, but also or the unconscious biases o the speaker; both thesedisregards are injustices. Perhaps they are even inherent weaknesses o the

very Enlightenment that is the oundation o the secular state.

Te nal remaining question is whether any possible solutions maystill be ound or this compromised religious neutrality o the non-reli-gious state. wo possible strategies are available: on the one hand, societiesmay seek to oster awareness o the inherent aw in their neutrality andseek to minimize it, while on the other hand the concept o democracy andthe secular state could be rethought. Te ormer is a task or those politicalphilosophers who subscribe to the ideals o Enlightenment, while the lat-

ter is best let to more unorthodox thinkers, as it requires a new conceptiono the state, o political thought, and o Enlightenment itsel, preerablyone that has no genealogical ties to Christianity. Perhaps the recent politi-cal upheaval and subsequent tentative rise o democracy in some MiddleEastern and North Arican countries may (eventually) provide uel or a

new account o Enlightenment.

Sbastien de la Fosse (1979) studied Philosophy at Erasmus University Rot-terdam, obtaining his bachelor degree in 2009, and his master degree withHonours in 2011, both cum laude. He also studied Economics at the ErasmusUniversity Rotterdam, obtaining his master degree in 2001. He has a broadinterest in many philosophical topics, and it is his ambition to pursue an aca-demic career.

Te Paradox o Religious Neutrality was originally written or the mastercourse Free Speech and Its Limits at Erasmus University Rotterdam, taught by

pro. dr. Marli Huijer.


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Notes

1. I have translated this quote rom Dutch or the purposes o this paper.

2. It should be noted that various secular democracies still maintain laws banning blas-phemy. However, these laws are increasingly seen as a relic o the past and have come underexamination or elimination.

3. Te authors argument concerns racism, which is a specic orm o discrimination. Tepoint, I believe, can also apply to all other orms o discrimination without losing any oits merit. Additionally, as will be seen in the ollowing section, I shall apply this argumentto a dierent issue as well.

4. Tis is an adaptation o the argument that ones identity is dened through a naming actperormed by another, developed by Butler (1997).

5. Donald Loose has embraced this interpretation in personal communication.

Literature

Bobbio, N. (1989) Democracy and Dictatorship: Te Nature and Limits o StatePower, rans. P. Kennealy. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Butler, J. (1997) Excitable Speech. A Politics o the Perormative. New York &

London: Routledge.Dworkin, R. (2006) Religion and Dignity. In: R. Dworkin, Is Democracy PossibleHere? Principles or a new political debate. Princeton/Oxord: Princeton UniversityPress: 52-77.

Gordon, J. & Johnson, M. (2003) Race, Speech, and a Hostile EducationalEnvironment: What Color Is Free Speech?.Journal o Social Philosophy34: 414-436.

Loose, D. (2007a) Politiek en de publieke rol van religie. In: D.A.A. Loose &A.J.A. de Wit (eds.) Religie in het publieke domein, undament en undamentalisme.Vught: Radboudstichting: 19-45.

Loose, D. (2007b) Het belang van het christelijke paradigma voor de verhouding

samenleving en religie. In: D.A.A. Loose & A.J.A. de Wit (eds.) Religie in hetpublieke domein, undament en undamentalisme. Vught: Radboudstichting: 140-171.

Post, R. (2007) Religion and Freedom o Speech: Portraits o Muhammad.Constellations14: 72-90.

Tis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 UnportedLicense. For more inormation, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/


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ESJP#2 | 2012

Joanna Semeniuk | Te Alignment o Morality andProtability in Corporate Social Responsibility

Joanna Semeniuk

The Alignment of Morality and Protability in

Corporate Social Responsibility

1. Introduction

Nowadays most o the big companies pride themselves on their socialresponsibility. When visiting the websites o IBM, Cisco, ING, Philips,BP, etc., one will easily nd a tab called corporate social responsibility,or sustainability.1 Here, companies describe how they contribute to thecommunity and balance their impact on the environment. Why do theydo that? Tere is a long tradition o moral considerations or commerce.

In the early days o capitalism, the goal o the business was solely to makeprots. Tis changed when business was challenged by social movementsand legislation (Carroll, 1991: 39). Nowadays, business is not only respon-sive to external pressure, but is rather proactive in its social responsibility.Companies keep extending their responsible agenda, oten going beyondlegislation. It appears that companies have adopted their ethical dimen-sion. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) seems to have ound a wayto make capitalism work or societies, with businesses driving social bet-terment.

Tere is no unied approach to CSR. It consists o a myriad o diverseapproaches. However, one popular stream o thought can be identied

within CSR literature (Garriga & Mel, 2004: 53). Tis type o CSR theo-rising claims that the protability o CSR supports a sustainable interacebetween business interests and social interests. It asserts that once it isacknowledged that the social and environmental responsibility o busi-nesses pays o, aligning CSR with the shareholders interest o makingmoney, it will make the capitalist system work to societys advantage. Inother words, provided that companies recognise the prot to be made byimplementing CSR policies, their operations will, as usual, be sel-inter-ested, but serving society at the same time.

CSR became one o the leading rameworks to think about moralresponsibility in business. From the perspective o moral philosophy, CSRcan be regarded as a response to allegedly ineective business ethics basedon moral duty claims or appeals to values like equality, justice or rights.CSR has been addressed by companies, governments and supranationalbodies like the European Union and the United Nations. CSR comesto the ore especially in areas where legal obligation ends but environ-mental and social needs remain unmet. So, with many arguing that CSRhas already proven its social worth (e.g. Matten & Moon, 2008: 416), itappears that CSR could move the business sector to benet our societiesand our environment.

In order to see the bigger picture, we should, however, consider thisclaim within the context o changing relation between the state and themarket.

Tere is a trend in the United States and Europe to transer traditionalstate unctions (education, transport, pension, environmental protection,etc.) to the business sector (Matten & Moon: 415). Scholars argue thatthis retreat o the state is caused by globalisation. Globalisation causes a

partial denationalizing o national territory and a partial shit o somecomponents o state sovereignty to other institutions, rom supranationalentities to the global capital market (Sassen, 1996: 4). Tereore a dis-tinctive eature o globalisation is a changed division o responsibilitiesbetween the state and the market. Te state adopts the market ideology aspart o the process o marketisation1 and the market takes on the ethicalunctions through its responsibilisation (Shamir, 2008). Responsibilisa-tion responds to the missing or ineective international regulations that

would cover global corporate activities and to business lobbying against


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coercive regulations, but in avour o sel-regulation (in the orm o CSR).

Te retreat o the state doesnt mean that laws no longer work - theyoten do, but the law does not necessarily have to be at the oreront osocial change. State-driven law is not the sole source o regulation any-more; on the contrary, there is a complex system o private and publicsources o regulation (Shamir, 2008). In such a matrix, corporations canchoose which regulation to apply, or instance which charter to sign or

which ranking to participate in. What is more, they are involved in creat-ing these regulations, or example by participating in multi-stakeholderconsultations or by sponsoring the agencies that specialise in CSR report-ing and accreditation. For that reason, critics o CSR (Shamir, 2008; Kuhn& Deetz, 2008) stress the dangers o an optimistic attitude towards CSR.Tey doubt that sel-motivated and sel-imposed regulations o corporatecitizens are more eective than state-imposed regulations. It is thereorereasonable to ask: can moral philosophers advise on how to approach CSR,

with social goals in mind? Tese issues can and should be investigatedby moral philosophy.

In this paper I will examine the proposition that seems to be at thecore o mainstream CSR: CSR can integrate market goals and the interestso society by mediating between the two in places where they tradition-ally come apart.2 My thesis is that this integration is very unstable due toCSRs primary commitment to market goals. Tis position places me onone o the sides o the ongoing debate about whether CSR is a reaction toneoliberalism or its product (Lebano, 2010: 14). I suggest that the popularapproach to CSR is much closer to a traditional neoliberal stance, mostamously articulated by the title o Milton Friedmans in his 1970 article

Te Only Social Responsibility o Business is to Maximize its Prots in whichhe claims that business needs no ethics, than what the proponents othis popular approach to CSR would like to admit.

Te next section denes what CSR is exactly and what its constitutiveeatures are. Te ollowing section, called CSR and moral philosophy,places CSR in a wider philosophical debate. Subsequently, in the sectionon CSR and the business case, I explain what the CSR business case is andexplore its relation to the neoclassical concept o market logic. TereaterI present some instances o conicting social and business interests - the

problem o CSRs empirical grounds, the issue o public opinion preer-ences and the risks o ree riding mechanisms.

2. Defning CSR

Te term corporate social responsibility has been gaining popularitysince the 1970s, and is associated with a wide range o corporate practiceslike employee diversity, carbon neutrality, support or local communi-ties, improvement o working conditions in suppliers actories, sociallyand environmentally responsible nancial investments, etc. Sometimes itis reerred to as Corporate Social Perormance (Wood, 1991), CorporateCitizenship (Zadek, 2001), or Sustainable Business (Vogel, 2005: 16).

Alan Neal (2008), in his attempt to systematise various denitionso CSR, concluded that most authors agree that CSR makes a norma-tive claim, since it says what ought to be done: [] businesses need to

integrate the economic, social, and environmental impact in their opera-tions (2008: 465). Te denitions also speciy how this should be done- namely, CSR needs to be embedded in the way in which businesses aremanaged (Neal, 2008: 465). Tis means that companies need to take intoaccount other stakeholders interests, such as local communities, custom-ers or trade unions and incorporate CSR in a thorough manner not asan add-on to their business as usual, but by integrating these considera-tions into the very core o their management strategy. However, these twoeatures are not what makes CSRs concept dierent rom other businessethics approaches. Neal reports the third constitutive eature o CSR vol-untariness and alignment with the organisations own long-term interest:

CSR is behaviour by businesses over and above legal requirements, volun-tarily adopted because businesses deem it to be in their long-term interest(2008: 465).

Tis last eature voluntariness and being in organisations interest inorms the business case or CSR, which I address in a later paragraph. Itake the business case aspect as constitutive o CSR. I am aware that otherinterpretations o CSR exist which are more in line with traditional busi-ness ethics and do not include the business case aspect (see: ethical CSRtheories in Garriga & Mel, 2004: 60). I will reer to them in the next



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section as primarily based on another kind o reasoning on duty, moralvalues, rights, etc. When I reer to CSR I will mean only the approach thathas the business case at its centre.

But beore I discuss the notion o the business case or CSR and itsconsequences, I would like to show where CSR lies within the wider dis-cussion o relations between morality and business, as well as clariy keyterms which will be used throughout the essay.

3. CSR and moral philosophy

CSR can be classied as one o the theories within business ethics. Busi-ness ethics is a branch o philosophy and is dened as an applied ethicsdiscipline that addresses the moral eatures o commercial activity (Mar-coux, 2008). Business ethics, i understood broadly as a moral reectionon commerce, has accompanied trade since its origins (Marcoux, 2008).

As a contemporary and independent discipline, business ethics is ocusedon business corporations. Tese are large, publicly traded enterprises thatoten operate internationally. In this essay I, too, will speak o corpora-tions, sometimes reerring to them as companies, or simply as businesses(when emphasising general market mechanisms which aect both smalland big enterprises). In general, I will use these dierent terms as reer-ences to commercial organisations operating in a capitalist system that ischaracterised by the logic o capital accumulation and competition (Heil-broner, 2008).

Let us now look at how dierent moral philosophies approach thetroublesome relation between commercial activity and morality. Subse-

quently I will try to position CSR within this context.It is argued that there are currently three major approaches in norma-

tive ethics: virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism (Hursthouse,2010). Virtue ethics emphasises moral character. Applying this to businessethics, a moral philosopher who argues or morally bound corporationscan do so by claiming that corporations, like natural persons, should havecertain moral qualities and can be praised or blamed or behaving accord-ingly or not. From a deontological perspective, which puts duties or rules

in the centre, the philosopher would claim the existence o a certain moralduty that corporations have towards stakeholders. Finally, consequential-ists, like deontologists, would argue or attention to stakeholders interestson dierent grounds through an appeal to consequences o corporateactions.

All three moral philosophies can orm the normative core o corporateresponsibility. Tey all answer the question as to why businesses need tointegrate the economic, social, and environmental impact in their opera-tions (Neal, 2008: 465), albeit in dierent ways.

In other words, they serve the same purpose o providing philosophi-cally sound reasons or businesses to care about social interests.

How is it done in practice? For example, Adam Smith, in his Teoryo Moral Sentiments, prescribes strong normative directives entrepreneursshould act according to virtues like prudence, temperance, civility, indus-triousness and honesty. Without these virtues commerce would neither

work in societies advantage nor provide ethical progress (Ashley, 2010:89; Wells & Graaand, 2012: 321-323).

Tis moral quality can be applied not only to individuals but also tocollective bodies like a university or a corporation by treating them likemoral agents, as i they were individuals. Peter French (Marcoux, 2008)advocates this approach in order to argue that corporations also have a(collective) moral responsibility3 towards societies and the environment.

An example o corporate responsibility based on the duty approachcan be ound in the stakeholder theory developed initially by Freeman(Garriga and Mel, 2004: 60). Here the very purpose o the rm is the

coordination o and joint service to its stakeholders (Marcoux, 2008).But CSR as dened by Neal doesnt use virtue ethics or deontology

as its justication. Tis is contrary to the act that CSR has responsibilityin its name, which suggests certain duties or obligations that business hastowards the society(the latter also eaturing in the name).

In act, CSR takes its justication rom the third type o normativeapproach towards business ethics - consequentialism. Consequentialismasserts that whether an act is morally right depends only on its conse-



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quences (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). Tis entails that in a moral appraisalo an act we look solely at its consequences, not duties, the moral charactero an agent or the intrinsic character o the act or circumstances.

A particular type o consequentialism is represented in Milton Fried-mans 1970 article in the New York imes Magazine. Ever since, Friedmans

words have been a point o reerence or many articles on CSR (e.g. Birdet al., 2007: 190; Carroll, 1991; Garriga & Mel, 2004: 64; Matten &Moon, 2008: 405; Grifn & Mahon, 1997). Friedman argues that there isone and only one social responsibility o business - to use its resources andengage in activities designed to increase its prots so long as it stays withinthe rules o the game, which is to say, engages in open and ree competi-tion without deception or raud (Friedman 1970). Tis is predominantlya consequentialist approach because the activity is not appraised per se,but only compared to a particular end, which equals increasing prots. 4

We can say that Friedman provides yet another take on business ethics astand that business doesnt need any ethics, besides the minimum require-

ment o reraining rom deception and raud.

Why, then, does Friedman call this a social responsibility? Because,according to Friedman and all those who ollowed the neoliberal inter-pretation o the invisible hand theorem, the pursuit o shareholder valuemaximization by businesses in a ree and competitive market will achievemaximum efciency and optimally satisy the needs o the greatest amounto people (Duska, 2007: 53). So the ree market should produce the maxi-mum amount o well-being, which is the ethical goal. Pursuing othergoals than maximizing shareholders value, according to Friedman, wouldeven obscure market mechanisms, and subsequently orce companies intobankruptcy.

One might ask whether Friedmans quote is not outdated and no longerrepresentative o the proponents o CSR in todays competitive market.

Ater all, no one who wants to seriously advocate CSR would phrase hisor her argument as Friedman did. Te ame o Friedmans words comespartly rom his inuence on the discipline o economics, and partly romthe bluntness o his ormulations, but also rom the act that they encapsu-late the whole neoliberal conception o the unction and legitimacy o thebusiness. We have to remember here that in accordance with neoclassical

economics, the law in most capitalist countries obliges corporations to cre-ate maximum wealth or its owners the shareholders (Heilbroner, 2008).Tereore Friedmans quote does represent the status quo o the 1970s as

well as o today, as the corporate duciary duty towards owners, knownas the shareholder theory, roughly equals Friedmans position (Marcoux,

2008). As I will discuss in the next chapter, the position o the businesscase proves that CSR is in line with shareholder theory. Tis means thatNeals and Friedmans denitions o CSR are not so ar rom one another.Both statements come down to the primacy o prot Friedmans explic-itly and Neals implicitly.

In this section I have suggested that the concept o CSR is closer toconsequentialist shareholder theory than to deontological and virtue eth-ics approaches to the relation between business and society. Subsequently,I will show that the commitment to CSR based on its protability orbusiness shares the shortcomings o the shareholder theory represented byFriedman.

4. Te Business case or CSR

Te business case or CSR postulates that socially responsible behaviourbrings material benet to the company. Bob Willard (2002), a promotero CSRs business value, writes: Saving the world and making a prot isnot an either/or proposition; it is a both/and proposition. Good environ-mental and social programs make good business sense. (Willard, 2002: 3).Duska summarises the business case line o thinking with a slogan GoodEthics is Good Business (2007: 57). Numerous publications discuss the

benets that CSR brings to companies (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Te mostpopular ones are the ollowing: easier hiring and higher retention o toptalent, increased employee productivity and innovation, reduced manuac-turing expenses, reduced expenses at commercial sites, increased revenuesand market share, reduced risk and easier nancing (Willard, 2002).Empirical research on these benets, however, does not always veriy thealleged correlation between ethical and nancial perormance (Bird et al.,2007: 191-193; Crane et al., 2008: 4; Grifn & Mahon, 1997; rebucq &DArcimoles, 2002). Some studies conrm the correlation, some deny it



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and others nd that it is limited to certain areas o responsibility (Kuruczet al., 2008; Bird et al., 2007). Despite this academic dissensus, CSR is apopular theory and a widespread practice. It seems that CSR has gainedpopularity because o the way it attempts to commit businesses to socialand environmental causes. Since duty-, rights- or virtue-based appeals to

the business oten remain unanswered, the bottom line argument appearsto be a good, workable alternative. CSR is associated with the sot (asopposed to hard, i.e. legally orced), sel-binding and sel-perpetuatingregulations driven by the market itsel. Te need or market-t ethicsis described by Heath (2007), who criticizes existing business ethics orbeing ineective, anti-capitalist and too demanding (2007: 360). Heathcalls or another kind o business ethics that would be compatible withthe logic o ree market competition. His adversarial ethics (Heath, 2007)aims to stay within this logic, but to arrive at the greater good result. Tebusiness case approach to CSR seems to be in line with Heaths objectiveo aligning goals o competitive players with the greater, common good.

CSR should work like this: once the market recognises that CSR pays oand there is money on the table, companies will compete to be the mostresponsible and a race to the top-eect will be triggered. As a result, eve-ryone benets.

As we can see, CSR rests on a premise that goals o the market andsocial responsibility are compatible. However, critics o CSR stress thatbusiness interests and the interests o society can converge, but may alsoclash. For example, in his book on CSR and virtue, David Vogel describesthis relation as ollows: CSR is sustainable only i virtue pays o. Tesupply o corporate virtue is both made possible and constrained by themarket (2005: 23). o illustrate, when corporate social or environmental

impact suggests doing x, but the imperative o prot maximisation pointsto the opposite, y, a corporation is obliged to do y by its shareholderduty. As Duska puts it, when good ethics is not good business, so muchthe worse or good ethics (2007: 57). He explains that CSR warrants ethi-cal behaviour as long as it makes a prot. What is more, the interests andclaims o stakeholders are clearly not weighed equally to those o share-holders. I would like to point out that this is opposed to the concept oCSR as suggested in our denition, initially proposed by Neal (businessesneed to integrate the economic, social, and environmental impact in their

operations). In this light, the concept o CSR seems contradictory: on theone hand it contains a normative claim or respect o other stakeholdersinterests, but on the other hand it is based on the primacy o one groupover others. One could argue that integrating social impact doesnt neces-sarily imply equating shareholder and stakeholder interests.5 Tat brings us

back to the shareholder theory. Tis situation opens up a difcult questionor contemporary business ethics: or how much do certain stakeholdersinterests count in the absence o the incentive o prot (Marcoux, 2008)?

In this section I have shown how the business case or CSR leads to spe-cic moral challenges. I also brought up CSRs paradoxical nature. CSRsdenition asks or the impossible to satisy both the duty to shareholderand stakeholder interests. In the next section I present a brie discussion osome areas o concern. By doing this, I will t ry to show that CSR does notensure sustainable commitment to social responsibility rom businesses.

5. Problems with CSR

5.1 Empirical research

I will start with the problem o empirical research into the benets o CSR.Since the business case is at the core o CSR, the data that supports it iscrucial. However, over the years the research results change, new studiesare published and previous assumptions are alsied.6 Tis makes the busi-ness justication or social responsibility unstable. What i in the uturesome or all o the currently accepted business benets o CSR are over-thrown? Te business incentive or responsible behaviour would then beempirically unsupported. Unortunately, the history o empirical research

into CSR perormance is ull o studies which question the positive cor-relation between the CSR perormance and nancial perormance.

Interestingly, a study by Bird et al., exploring which CSR practices arerewarded by the market, concludes that only certain CSR activities resultin market value increase (e.g. doing the minimum in areas o diversityand the environment, but being proactive in employee relations), whilesome result in market value decrease (e.g. being proactive in communityand environmental protection) and other dont have any eect (2007:



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201204). As we can oresee, a manager wanting to maximise shareholderrevenue would ollow certain CSR activities, while neglecting or activelyavoiding others. In such a case, ollowing the logic o the popular approachto CSR, corporations implementing CSR are unlikely to undertake anaction that only has moral advantages. Tereore, CSR can have a neg-

ative eect on actions which lack bottomline justication, but do haveethical value.

I would like to emphasise here not only the possible negative conse-quence, but also the risk o changing recommendations both o whichindicate that the business case or CSR provides no sae ground or socialresponsibility.

5.2 Shareholder interest

Secondly, I would like to illustrate the supremacy o shareholder inter-

est over stakeholder interest in a situation where CSR is believed to beimplemented. It is generally recognised that employee diversity is parto good corporate responsibility. Te competitive advantage o having adiverse workorce is discussed in CSR literature, but there is no soundempirical data proving that it brings tangible prots (anis et al., 2010).However, on top o the advantage o having diverse teams, a corporationis encouraged to employ members o minorities who may help them totarget customers rom that same minority. Tis commercial gain is otenmentioned in CSR argumentation or diversity.

In 2005 a case study was conducted in one o the Dutch banks wheremanaging diversity was implemented (Subeliani & sogas, 2005). Find-

ings show that diversity management has been used primarily to attractethnic customers to the bank, rather than to advance the quality o work-ing lie and career prospects o ethnic minority employees (Subeliani &sogas, 2005: 831). Tis example shows that corporations might decide touse the CSR ndings and its rhetoric to advance only their interests andnot necessarily the interests o the stakeholder the employees.

In another situation, a company can choose to ignore the possiblenancial gains rom CSR, i those are outweighed by the gains romother strategies. Tis can be observed when a company weighs the costs

o lawsuits or nes and reputation loss amongst a population that valuesresponsible behaviour in companies against these gains. CSR is treatedhere as one o the actors in the cost-and-benet-analysis, perormed romthe shareholder perspective (Vogel, 2005).

Tis can be illustrated with the issue o the number o women oncorporate boards (Doldor et al., 2012). Even with the business case sup-porting gender diversity in the boards, companies still dont decide toollow suit. More is at stake the interests o current board members,training costs, etc. Responsible behaviour is not given any priority justbecause o its moral value. Companies estimate the revenue on sociallyresponsible behaviour and consider it against other, non-ethical issues.

5.3 Consumer preerences and public opinion

Now I will discuss the issue o consumer preerences. In the CSR-businesscase motivation model, companies pursue CSR because it increases theirprots. Companies can increase prots in a direct way, or example bysustaining or increasing the natural resources that they exploit. A shingcompany, or instance, would have a long-term interest in keeping the

waters clean, so that the sh population remains stable or grows. Here, thestate o natural resources presents an operational risk. But CSR literaturealso gives a lot o attention to another source o prots, namely reputa-tional gain or risk. Here, a companys good name and image are at stake, inother words its goodwill. Since prots come rom consumers choicesthat are inuenced on the image o companies, the perceived moral char-acter o a business is thought to translate into material gains or losses. TisCSR model is dependent on consumer preerences.

Te obvious shortcoming is that the dependency on goodwill doesntapply to corporations with no visible brands and most business to busi-ness companies. Tese organisations are less susceptible to public pressurebecause they do not sell directly to consumers, who, in turn, are not awareo or have less interest in the social perormance o the latter organisations.

Tis, however, could still be remedied in part by transparency o asupply chain, so that the suppliers o known companies are visible to thepublic. Various CSR standards and best practices introduce such trans-



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parency, so that more and more companies are in the public eye.

But there is another problem with the reputational risk model: eveni consumers had enough inormation to judge that certain companysactions are against their collective interests, it might be that consumers

just dont care or dont want to identiy themselves with interests o thecommunity that transcend their group or country. In a similar vein, peo-ple disagree about acts and solutions to environmental and social issues.Tereore, their consumer choices would send dierent messages to thecompanies.

A way to tackle these issues could be to agree with Hausman andMcPherson that preerences that are shaped by mistaken popular beliesshould be conronted by eliciting preerences based on our best-supportedestimates o acts and consequences o activities (2006: 286). Tere arehundreds o active watchdog organisations, governmental or non-govern-mental, trying to yield this preerence change by providing inormation

that customers might lack and trying to explain collective interests (e.g.Bankwijzer in the Netherlands, or Clean Clothes Campaign worldwide).Bankwijzer in its mission statement writes:

Te aim o the tool is to initiate a race to the top between banks on thesubject o corporate social responsibility (CSR). Ideally, a sel-reinorcingprocess will develop in which social, environmental and economic

standards are raised continuously.7

However, the non-prot sector aces obstacles to the real race to the top,such as the reporting quality, lack o corporate transparency, incompatibledata or biased answers submitted by corporate CSR departments.

Moreover, CSR competition (via indexes, comparisons, public sham-ing) doesnt guarantee that the responsible behaviour is internalised.First o all, there are problems inherent to the competition mechanism,described in the next section (trying to only appear responsible and score

well). Secondly, it is not proven that an organisation will internalise themoral principles ater a certain time o external pressure. Tis means that

watchdogs would always need to keep guard over businesses to provide themissing incentive or CSR perormance.

In this section I have shown that CSR perormance depends on cus-tomer preerence, inormation and willingness to enact customers choice.Tis adds yet another variable to the unstable justication o social respon-sibility based on the business case.

5.4 Free market competition

Another group o issues that CSR may ace stems rom CSRs dependencyon ree market competition. Tis set o problems is generic to the competi-tion mechanism. Free riding strategies are the collective action problemsimmanent to competition. Tis is because rational decision entails nding

ways to increase prot and ree riding ts into the model. Competition orCSR will have the same side-eects as competition in any other unregu-lated market.

Frank (2008), Heath (2006) and Wells & Graaand (2012) describea big range o instances where competition goes wrong. I will mention

just a ew relative to CSR: gaming the regulations means that competi-tors are prone to doing the minimum and/or nding loopholes. Moreover,competition in protable CSR can result in a whole range o competition-related side eects, like lying, window-dressing, and dishonesty (see Wells& Graaands, 2012 discussion on virtues distortion).

Here I would like to recall Friedmans statement that even the ree mar-ket needs to adhere to some basic rules o the game, which () engages inopen and ree competition without deception or raud (Friedman, 1970).However, the problem here is that these extrinsic rules dont ollow romhis market competition logic, which assumes rational choice. Sometimes itis rational to act dishonestly, i there is a gain. Friedman assumes a minimal

legal ramework, but it doesnt prevent gaming the rules. Te same couldbe said about the business case approach to CSR in the rst place, com-panies are encouraged to involve in actions benecial to them.

What are the alternatives? Robert Frank (2011), or example, arguesthat intervention in competition is necessary or good unctioning ogroups or societies. Competition mechanism can drive groups againsttheir collective interest (collective action problems). Tereore, a groupmust steer the competition in an all-beneting direction by means o



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laws or incentives. Certain regulations are necessary to solve collectiveaction problems that are likely to occur in a competitive environment.

Conclusion

By presenting the our types o problems above, I have tried to show thatCSR based on a business case doesnt always work in the best interest osociety. Initially, CSR seems to promise that businesses will always pursuesocial goals, because in the long run, they all pay o. However, not all socialinterests pay o. Sometimes other commercial pursuits would be moreprotable than ethical ones, unethical business can appear responsible tothe public, or certain ethical behaviour can be proven to be unprotable.

Why is this problematic? Even i CSR doesnt cater to all the socialneeds, arent there other mechanisms that take care o them?

Te limitations o CSR are indeed not problematic, so long as there

Documents

Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy #2 (December 2012)