Equally without merit is the suggestion that the action of

HOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED STATES. 457

Opinion of the Court.

say that this court could not amend the record, but if amendedby the court below, the question would. still remain whetherthe objection referred to could be considered by this court.

Equally without merit is the suggestion that the action ofthe court below in disposing of the writ of error to the Crimi-nal Court of Cook County, in the absenc6 of the accused, wasnot in conformity to "due process of law." This questionwas determined in Sckwab v. Berggren, just decided, and wedo not deem it necessary to add anything to what is theresaid.

Judgment affrmed.

CHURCH OF THE HOLY TRINITY 'v. UNITEDSTATES.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 143. Argued and submitted January 7,1892.-Decided Februaiy 29, 1892.

The act of February 26, 1885, "to prohibit the importation and migrationof foreigners and aliens under contract .or agreement to perform laborin the United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia," 23Stat. 332, c. 164, does not apply to a contract between ap alien, residingout of the United States, and a religious society incorporated under thelaws of a State, whereby he engages to remove to the United States andto enter into the service of the society as its rector or minister.

THE case is stated in the opinionl

.Ar. Seaman .Miller for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General .Maury for defendant inerror submitted on.his brief.

IMR. JusmF BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in error is a corporation, duly organized and incor-porated as a religious society under the laws of the State ofNew York. E. Walpole Warren was, prior to September,

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.


1S87, an alien residing in England. In that month the plain-tiff in error made a contract with him,.by which he was toremove to the city of New York and enter into its service asrector and pastor; and in pursuance of such contract, Warrendid so remove and enter upon such service. It is claimed bythe United States that this contract on the part of the plain-tiff in error was forbidden by the act of February 26, 1885,23 Stat. 332, c. 164, and an action was commenced to recoverthe penalty prescribed by that act. The Circuit Court heldthat the contract was within the prohibition of the statute,and rendered judgment accordingly, (36' Fed. Rep. 303;) andthe single question presented for our determination is whetherit erred in that conclusion.

The first section describes the act forbidden, and is in thesewords :: " Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representativesof the United States of America in. Congress assembled, Thatfrom and after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful forany person, company, partnership, or corporation, in anymanner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in anyway assist or encourage the importation or migration of anyalien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the UnitedStates, its Territories, or the District of Columbia, under con-tract or agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made

,previous to the inportation or migration of such alien oraliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service ofany kind in the United States, its Territories, or the Districtof Columbia."

It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is withinthe' letter of this- section, for the relation of rector to, hischurch is one of service, and iniplies labor on the one sidewith. compensation on the other. Not only are the generalwords labor -and service both used, but also, as it were toguard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize abreadth of meaning, to them is added "of any kind;" and,further, as noticed by the Circuit Judge in his opinion, thefifth section, which makes specific exceptions, among them

'professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers and domestic



servants, strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor andservice was intended to be reached by the first section. Whilethere is great force to this reasoning, we cannot think Con-gress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction likethat in the present case. It is a familiar rule, that a thingmay be within the letter of the statute and yet not within thestatute, ,because not within its spirit, nor within the intentionof its makers. This has been often asserted, and the reportsare full of cases illustrating its application. This is not thesubstitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator,for frequently words of general meaning are used in a stat-ute, words broad enough to include an act in question, andyet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circum-stances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd resultswhich follow from giving such broad meaning to the words,makes.it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intendedto include the particular act. As said in Plowden, 205:"From which cases, it appears that the sages of the law here-tofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter insome appearance, and those statutes which comprehend allthings in the letter they have expounded to extend to butsome things, and those which generally prohibit all peoplefrom doing such an act they have interpreted to permit somepeople to do it, and those which include every person in theletter, they have adjudged to reach to some persons only,which expositions have always been founded upon the intentof the legislature; which they have collected sometimes byconsidering the cause and necessity.of making the act, some-times by comparing one part of the act with another, andsometimes by foreign circumstances.'!

In 3fargate Pier Co. v..Hannam, 3 B. & Ald. 266, 270,Abbott, C. J. quotes from Lord Coke as follows: "Acts of Par-liament are to be so construed as no man that is innocent orfree from injury or wrong'be, by a literal construction, pun-ished or endamaged." In the case of the State v. Clark, 5Dutcher, (29 N. J. Law) 96, 98, 99, it appeared that an act hadbeen passed making it a misdemeanor to wilfully break downa fence in the possession of anotlier person. Clark was indicted

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.


under that statute. The defence was that the act of breakingdown the fence, though wilful, was iif the exercise of a legalright to go upon his own lands. The trial court rejected thetestimony offered to sustain the defence, and the SupremeCourt held that this ruling was error. In its opinion thecourt used this language: "The act of 1855, in terms, makesthe wilful'opening, breaking down or injuring of any fencesbelonging to or in the possession of any other person a mis-demeanor. In what sense is the term wilful used . In commonparlance, wilful is used in the sense of intentional, as distin-guish-ed from accidental or involuntary. Whatever one doesintentionally he does wilfully. Is it used in that sense in thisact? Did the legislature intend to make the intentional open-ing of a fence for the purpose of going upon the land ofanother indictable, if done by permission or for a lawful pur-pose? . . .We cannot suppose such to have been theactual intent. To adopt such a construction would put astop to the ordinary business of life. The language of the act,if construed literally, evidently leads to an absurd result. Ifa literal construction of the words of a statut be absurd, theact must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity. The courtmust restrain the words. The object designed to be reachedby the act must limit and control the literal import of theterms and phrases employed." In United States v. Eirby, 7Wall. 482, 486, the defendants were indicted for the violation-of an act of Congress, providing "that if any person shallknowingly and wilfully obstruct or retard the passage ofthe mail, or 6f any driver or carrier, or of any horseor carriage carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction,for every such offence pay a fine not exceeding one hun-dred dollars." The specific charge was that the defend-ants knowingly and wilfully retarded the passage of oneFarris, a carrier of the mail, while engaged in the performanceof his duty, and also in like manner retarded the steamboatGeneral Buell,'at that tinie engaged in carrying the mail. Tothis indictment the defendants pleaded specially that Farrishad been indicted for murder by a court:oT competent author-ity in Kentucky; that a bench warrant had been issuedI and



placed in the hands of the defendant Kirby, the sheriff of thecounty, commanding him to arrest Farris and bring himbefore the court to answer to the indictment; and that in obedi-ence to this warrant, he and the other defendants, as his posse,entered upon the steamboat General Buell and arrested Farris,and used only such force as was necessary to accomplish thatarrest. The question as to the sufficiency of this plea wascertified to this court, and it was held that the arrest of Farrisupon the warrant from the state court was not an obstructionof the mail, or the retarding of the passage of a carrier of themail, within the meaning of the act. In its opinion the courtsays: "All laws should receive a sensible c6nstruction. Gen-eral terms should be so limited in their application as not tolead to injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. Itwill always, therefore, be presumed that the legislatureintended exceptions to its language which would avoid resultsof this character. The reason of the law in such cases shouldprevail over its letter. The common sense of man approvesthe judgment mentioned- by Puffendorf, that the Bolognianlaw which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streetsshould be punished with the utmost severity,' did not extendto the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell downin the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts theruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II.,which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guiltyof felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out whenthe prison is on fire, 'for he is not to be hanged because hewould not stay to be burnt.' And we think that a like com-mon sense will sanction the ruling we make, that ihe act ofCongress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of thepassage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a caseof temporary detention of the mail caused, by the arrest of thecarrier upon an indictment for murder." The following casesmay also be cited. Hen'y v. Tilso&, 17 Vermont, 479; Bye-gate v. Wa,5dsboro, 30 Vermont, 746; Exp arte Ellis, 11 Cali-fornia, 222; Iizgraham v. Speed, 30 Mississippi, 410; 7aekson v.Collins, 3 Cowen, 89; People v. Jinurance Com any, 15 Johns.358; .Butck v. .Yewbury, 10 N. Y. 374; People v. -. .

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Commissioners of Taxes, 95 N. Y. 554, 558; People v.Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43, 49; Canal Co. v. Railroad 0o., 4 G. &J., 1,152; Osgood v. Breed, 12 Mass. 525, 530; Wilbur v. Crale,13 Pick. 284; Oates v. NationaZ Bank, 100 U. S. 239.

Among other things which may be considered in determin-ing the intent of the legislature is the title of the act. We donot mean that it may be used to add to or take from the bodyof the statute, Hadden, v. The Collector, 5 Wall. 107, but itmay help to interpret its meaning. In the case of UnitedStates v. Fisher, 2 Granch, 358, 386, Chief Justice Marshallsaid:' "On the influence which the title ought to have in con-struing the enacting clailses much has been said; and yet it isnot easy to discern the point of difference between the oppos-ing counsel in this respect. Neither party contends that thetitle of an act can control plain words in the body of thestatute; and neither denies that, taken with other parts, itmay assist in removing ambiguities. Where the intent isplain, nothing is left to construction. Where the mind laborsto discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everythingfrom which aid can be derived; and in such case the titleclaims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of con-sideration." And in the case of United States v. Palmer, 3Wheat. 610, 631, the same judge applied the doctrine inthis way: "The words of the section are in terms of unlimitedextent. The words - any person or persons' are-broad enoughto comprehend every human being. But general words mustnot only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the State,but also to those objects to which the legislature intended toapply them. Did the legislature intend to apply these wordsto the subjects of a foreign power, who in a foreign ship maycommit murder or robbery on the high seas ? The title of anact cannot control its words, but may furnish some aid inshowing what was in the mind of the, legislature. The titleof this act is, 'An act for the punishment of certain crimesagainst the United States.' It would seem that offencesagainst the United States, not offences against the humanrace, were the crimes which the legislat-re intended by thislaw to punish."



It will be seen that words as general as those used in thefirst section of this act were by that decision limited, and'theintent of Congress with respect to the act was gathered par-tially, at least, from its title. ""Now, the title of this act is,"An act to prohibit the importation and migration offoreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to performlabor in the United States, its Territories and the District ofColumbi'b." 'Obviously the thought expressed in this reachesonly to the work of the manual laborer, as distinguished fromthat of the professional man. No one r ading such a titlewould suppose that Congress had in its mind any purpose ofstaying the coming into this country of ministers of the gos-pel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is that of the brain.The common understanding of the terms labor and laborersdoes not include preaching and preachers; and it is to beassumed that words and phrases are used in their ordinarymeaning. So whatever of light is thrown upon the statuteby the language of the title indicates an exclusion from itspenal provisions of all contracts for the employment of minis-ters, rectors and pastors.

Again, anothei guide to the meaning of a statute is found inthe evil which it is designed to remedy; and for this the courtproperly looks at couternporaneous events, the situation as itexisted, and as it Was pressed upon the attention of the legis-lative body. United States v. Uiom Pacific Railroad, 91U. S. 72, 79. The situatioil 4hiclr called for this statute wasbriefly but fully stated by Mr. Justice Brown when, as DistrictJudge, he decided the case of United States v. COraig, 28 Fed.Rep. 95, 79: "The motives and history of the act are mat-ters of common knowledge. It had become the practice forlarge capitalists in this country to contract with their -agentsabroad for the shipment of- great nurribers ol an ignorant andservile class of foreign laborers, under contracts, by which theemployer agreed; upon the one hand, to prepay their passage,while, upon the other hand, the laborers agreed to work aftertheir arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages. Theeffect of this was to break down the labor-marlnet, and toreduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to the level

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.


of the assisted immigrant. The evil finally became so flagrantthat an appeal was made to Congress for relief by the passageof the act in question, the design of which was to raise thestandard of foreign immigrants, and to discountenance themigration of those who had not sufficient means in their ownhands, or those of their friends, to pay their passage."

It appears, also, flom the petitions, and in the testimonypresented before the committees of Congress, that it was thischeap unskilled labor which was making the trouble, and the in-flux of which Congress sought to prevent. It was never sug-gested that we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers,and, least of all, that the market for the services of Christianministers was depressed by foreign competition. Those werematters to which the attention of Congress, or of the people,was not directed. So far, then, as the evil which was soughtto be remedied interprets the statute, it also guides to anexclusion of this contract from the penalties of the act.

A singular circumstance, thr6wing light upon the intent ofCongress, is found in this extract from the report of the SenateCommittee on Education and Labor, recommending the pas-sage of the bill: "The general facts and considerations whichinduce the committee to recommend the passage of this billare set forth in the Report of the Committee of the House.The committee report the bill back without amendment,although there are certain features thereof which might wellbe changed or modified, in the hope that the bill may not failof passage during the present session. Especially would thecommittee have otherwise recommended amendments, sub-stituting, for the expression 'labor and service,' whenever itoccurs in the body of the bill, the words ' manual labor' or'manual service,' as sufficiently broad to accomplish the pur-poses of the bill, and that such amendments would removeobjections which a sharp and perhaps unfriendly criticismmay urge to the proposed legislation. The committee, how-ever, believing that the bill in its present form will be con-strued as including only those who3e labor or service is manualin character, and being very desirous that the bill become alaw. before the adjournment, have reported the bill without



change." 6059, Congressional Record, 48th Congress. And,referring back to the report of the Committee of the House,there appears this, language: "It seeks to restrain and pro-hibit the immigration or importation of laborers who wouldhave never seen our shores but for the inducements and allure-ments of men whose only object is to obtain labor at the lowestpossible rate, regardless of the social and material well-beingof our own citizens and regardless of the evil consequenceswhich result to American laborers from such immigratiq!.This class of immigrants care nothing about our institutions,and in many instances never even heard of them; they aremen whose passage is paid by the importers; they come hereunder contract to labor for a certain number of years; theyare ignorant of our social condition, and that they may remainso they are isolated and prevented from coming into contactwith Americans. They are generally from the lowest socialstratum, and live upon the coarsest food and. in hovels of acharacter before unknown to American workmeff. They, asa rule, do not become citizens, and are certainly not a desir-able acquisition to the body politic. The inevitable tendencyof their presence among us is to degrade American labor, and,to reduce it to the level of the imported pauper labor." Page5359, Congressional IRecord, 48th Congress.

We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which-was intended to be'-remedied, the, circumstances surround-ing the appeal to Congress, the reports of the committee ofeach house, all concur in affirming that the intent of Con-gress was simply to stay the .influx of this cheap unskilledlabor.

But beyond all these matters no purpose of action against.religion, can be imputed to any lgislation, state or national,because this is a religious people. This is historically true.From the discovery of this continent to the present hour, thereis a single voice making this affirmation. The commission toChristopher Columbus, prior to his sail westward, is from"Ferdinand and Isabella, by the grace of God, King andQueen of Castile," etc., and recites that "it is hoped that byGod's assistance some of the continents and islands in the

VOL. CXLMU-30

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.


ocean will be discovered," etc. The first colonial grant, thatmade to Sir Walter Raleigh in 1584, was from "Elizabeth, by

-the grace of God, of England, Fraunce and Ireland, queene,defender of the faith," etc. ; and the grant authorizing him toenact statutes for the government of the proposed colony pro-vided that "they be not against the true Christian faith noweprofessed in the Church of England." The first charter ofVirginia, granted by King James I in 1606, after reciting theApplication of certain parties for a charter, commenced the.grant in these words" "We, greatly commending, and gra-ciously accepting of, their Desires for the Furtherance of so

•noble a Work, which may, -by the Providence of AlmightyGod, hereafter tend to the Glory of his Divine Majesty,' inpropagating'of Christian Religion to such People, as yet livein Darkness and miserable Ignorance of, the true Knowledgeand Worship of God, and may in time bring the Infidels andSavages, living in those parts, to human Civility, and to asettled and' quiet Government; DO, by these our Letters-Patents, graciously accept of, and agree to, their humble andwell-intended Desires."

Language of similar, import may be found in the subsequentcharters of that colony, from the same king, in 1609 and1611; and the same is true of the various charters granted tothe other colonies. In language more or less emphati6 is theestablishment of the Christian religion declared to be one ofthe purposes of the grant. The celebrated compact made bythe Pilgrims in the Mayflower, 1620, recites: "Having under-taken for the Glory of God, and Advancement of the Chris-tian Faith, and the Honour of our King and C6untry, a Voy-age to plant the first Colony in the northern Parts of Virginia;Do by these Presents, solemnly .and mutually, in the Presenceof God and one another, covenant and conibine ourselves to-gether into a civil Body Politick-, for our better Ordering andPreservation, and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid."

lThe fundame'tdl orders of Connecticut, under which a pro-visional government" was instituted in 1638-1639, commencewith this declaration: "Forasmuch as it hath pleased the All-mighty God by the wise disposition of his diuyne pruidence

466,



so to Order and dispose of things that we the Inhabitants andResidents of Windsor, Hartford and Wethersfield are now co-habiting and dwelling in and vppon the River of Conectecotteand the Lands thereunto adioyneing; And well knowingwhere a people are gathered togather the word of God re-quires that to mayntayne the peace and vnion of such apeople there should be an orderly and decent Gouermenkestablished according to God, to order and dispose of thpaaffayres of the people at all seasons as occation shall require;doe therefore assotiate and conioyne our selues to be as onePublike State or Comonwelth; and doe, for our/selues andour Successors and such as shall be adioyned to vs att anytyme hereafter, enter into Combination and Confederation to-gather, to mayntayne and presearue the liberty and purity ofthe gospell of our Lord Jesus weh we now prfess6 as also thedisciplyne of the Churches, wch according to the truth of thesaid gospell is now practised amongst vs."

In the charter of privileges granted by William Penn to theprovince of Pennsylvania, in 1701, it is recited: "Because noPeople can be truly happy, though under the greatest Enjoy-ment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of theirConsciences, as to their Religious Profession and Worship;And Almighty God being the only Lord of Conscience, Fatherof Lights and Spirits; and the Author as well as Object ofall divine Knowledge, Faith andWorship, who only doth en-lighten the Minds, and persuade and convince the Understand-ings of People, I do hereby grant and d66fare, ' r etc.

Coming nearer to the present time, the Declaration of Inde-pendence recognizes 'the presence of the Divine in humanaffairs in these words: "We hold these truths to be self-evi-dent, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed bytheir Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that amongthese are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." "We,therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America,in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the SupremeJudge of the world for the rectitude of, our intentions, do, in.the Name and by Authority ofthe good Peo le-of these Colo-nies, solemnly publish and- declare, etc,; "And for the sup-

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.


port of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Protectionof Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other ourLives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."

If we examine the constitutions of the various States wefind in them a constant recognition of religious obligations.Every constitution of every one of the forty-four States con-tains language which either directly or by clear implicationrecognizes a profound reverence for religion and an assump-tion that its influence in all human affairs is essential to thewell being of the community This recognition may be inthe preamble, such as is found in the constitution of Illinois,1870-, "We, the people of the State of Illinois, grateful toAlmighty God for the civ.il, political and religious libertywhich He bath so long permitted us to enjoy, and looking toHim for, a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmitthe same unimpaired to succeeding generations," etc.

It may be only in the familiar requisition that all officersshall take an oath closing with the declaration "so help meGod." It may be in clauses like that of the constitution ofIndiana, 1816, Article XI, section 4: "The manner of admin-istering an oath or affirmation shall be such as is most con-sistent with the conscience of the deponent, and shall beesteemed the most solemn appeal to God." Or in provisionssuch as are found in Articles 36 and 37 of the Declaration ofRights of the Constitution of Maryland, 1867: "That as it isthe duty of every man to worship God in 'such manner as hethinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitledto protection in their religious liberty,; wherefore, no personought, by any law, to be molested in his person or estate onaccount of his religi6us persuasion or .profession, or for hisreligious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shalldisturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shallinfringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural,eivil or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelledto frequent or maintain or cofttribute, unless on contract, tomaintain any place of worship, or any ministry; nor shall anyperson, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a wit-ness, or juror, on account of his religious belief: Provided, He

468



believes in the existence of God, and that, under His dispensa-tion, such person will be held morally accountable for his acts,and be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this world orthe world to come. That no religious test ought ever to be re-quired as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in thisState other than a declaration of belief in the existence ofGod; nor shall the legislature prescribe any other oath cf-office than the oath prescribed by this constitution." OrAkethat in Articles 2 and 3, of Part 1st, of the Constitution ofMassachusetts, 1780: "It .is the right as well as the duty ofall men in society publicly and at stated seasons, to worshipthe Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of theuniverse. . . As the happiness of a people and the goodorder and preservation of civil government essentially dependupon piety, religion and morality, and as these cannot be gen-erally diffused through a community but by the institution ofthe public worship of. God and of public instructions in piety,religion and morality: Therefore, to promote their happinessand to secure the good order and preservation of their govern-ment, the people of this commonwealth have a right to investtheir legislature with power to authorize and require, and thelegislature shall, from time to time, authorize and require, theseveral towns, parishes, precincts and other. bodieszpolitic orreligious societies to make suitable provision, at their ownexpense, for the institution of the public worship of God andfor the support and maintenance of public Protestant teach-ers of piety, religion and morality in all cases where such pro-vision shall not be made voluntarily." Or as in sections 5 and14 of Article 7, of the constitution of Mississippi, 1832: "Noperson who denies the being of a God, or a future state ofrewards and punishments, shall hold any office in the civildepartment of this State. . . . Religion, morality andknowledge being necessary to good government, the preserva-tion of liberty, and the happiness of mankind, schools and themeans of education, shall forever be encouraged in this State."Or by Article 22 of the constitution of DelaWare, 1776, whichrequired all officers, besides an oath of allegiance, to makeand subscribe the following declaration: '" I, A. B., do profess

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.


faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son,and in the Holy Ghost, one Goa, blessed for evermore; andI do acknowledge th6 Holy Scriptures of the Old and NewTestament to be given by divine inspiration."

Even the Constitution of the United States, which is supposedto have little touch upon the private life of the individual, con-tains in the' First Amendment a declaration c(rnmon to theconstitutions of all the States, as follows: "Congress shallmake no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-hibiting the free exercise thereof," etc. And also provides inArticle'1, section 7, (a provision common to many constitutions,)that the Executive shall 'have ten days (Sundays excepted)within which to determine 3vhether he will approve or veto abill.

There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a uni-versal language pervading them all, having one meaning; theyaffirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation. These ar6not individual sayings, declarations of private persons: theyare organic utterances; they speak the voice of the entirepeople. While because of a general recognition of this trut)the question has seldom been presented to the courts, yet w('find that in Updegrah "& The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394,400, it was decided that, "Christianity, general Christianity,is, and always has been, a part of the common law of Penn-sylvania; . - . not Christianity with an-established church,and tithes, and spiritual courts; but Christianity with libertyof con-science to all men." And in The People v. Ruggles,8 Johns. 290, 294, 295,,Chancellor Kent, the great commen-tator on American law, speaking as Chief Justice of the Su-preme Court of. New York, said: "The people of this State,in common with the people of this country, profess the gen-eral doctrines of Christianity, as the-rule of their faith andpractice; and to scandalize the duthor of these doctrini isnot only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious, but,even in respect-to the obligations due to society, is a gross vio-lation.of decency and -good order. . . . The -free, equaland undisturbed enjoyntent -of religious opinion, whateverit may bq, and free and decent discussions on any religious

470'1

HOLY TRLNITY CHUR (H v. UNITED STATES. 471

Opinio. of the Court.

subject, is granted and ie ii-td; but to revile, with maliciousand blasphemous cont~inptp the religion professed by almostthe wh6le community; is -i abase of that- right. Nor are webound, by a-ay expressions in the Oonstitution as some havestrangely supposed, eith? riot to punish at all, or to punishindiscriminately, the like tacks upon the religion of -Mahometor of the Grand Lzma; and for this plain reasen; that thecase assumes that we are a Christian people, and the moralityof the country is deeply ingrafted u'pon Christianity, and notupon the docirifies or worship of those impostors." And inthe famous case of Vidol v. -Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127,198, this court, whil sustaining the will of Wr. Girard, withits provision for the-dcreation of a college into which no minis-ter should be p~rmitted to -enter, observed: "It is also said,and truly, that the Christian religion is a part of 'the commonlaw of Pennsylvania."

If we pass beyond tIse reatters to a view of American lifeas expressed by its lais, its business, its customs and its soci-ty,we find everywhere a clear recognition of the same truti.Among ofher matters note the following: The form of" oa .universally prevailing, concluding with an appeal to theAlmighty; the custom of .opeining sessions of all deliberativebodies and most conventions with prayer; the prefatory wordsof all wills, "In the name of God, amen;" the laws respectingthe observarice.of the Sabbath, with the general cessation ofall secular buginess, and the closing of- aourts, legislatures, andother similar public-assenblies on that day; the churches andchurch organizations .which abound in every city, townand hamlet; the multitude of chiritable organizations exist-ing everywhere under Christian auspices; the gigantic mission-ary associations, with general-suppgrt, and-aiming to establishChristian .missions in every quarter of -the globe. These, andmany other-matters which might be n-oticed, add a volume ofunofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances thatthis is a Christian nation. In the face of all these, shall it bebelieved that a Congress of the United States intended to make4. a misdemeanor for a church of this -ountry to contract forthe services of a Christian minister residing in another nation?

OCTOBER TERM, 1891.

Syllabus.

Suppose in the Congress that passed this act some memberhad offered a bill which in terms declared that, if any RomanCatholic church in this country should contract with CardinalManning to come to this country and enter into its service aspastor and priest; or any Episcopal church should enter intoa like contract with Canon Farrar; or any Baptist churchshould make similar arrangements with Rev. Mr. Spurgeon;or any Jewish synagogue with some eminent Rabbi, such con-tract should be adjudged unlawful and void, and the churchmaking it be subject to prosecution and punishment, can it bebelieved that it would have received a minute of approvingthought or a single vote? Yet it is contended that such wasin effect the meaning of this statute. The construction in-voked cannot be accepted as correct. It is a case where therewas presented a definite evil, in view of which the legislatureused general terms with the purpose of reaching all phases ofthat evil, and thereafter, unexpectedly, it is developed thatthe general language thus employed is broad enough to reachcases and acts which the whole history and life of the countryaffirm could not have been intentionally legislated against.It is the duty of the courts, under those circumstances, to saythat, however broad the language of the statute may be, theact, although within the letter, is not within the intention ofthe legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.

The judgment will be reversed, and the case remanded forfurther proceedings in accordance, with, this opinion.

In re COOPER, Petitioner.

ORIGINAL.

Nfo. 6. Original. Argued November 9, 10, 1891.-Decided February 29,1892.

The District Court for the District of Alaska has jurisdiction in admiraltyto forfeit vessels for violating the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 1956 onany of the navigable waters of the United States which were acquiredby the treaty with Russia, concluded March 30, 1857, 15 Stat. 539.

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Equally without merit is the suggestion that the action of