Villegas vs. Pao HoFacts:The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.Issue:Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.Held:The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC95 SCRA 392
L-52245January 22, 1980

Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that .Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation.

Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.

Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

Ormoc Sugar vs. Omoc CityFacts:In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all productions of centrifuga sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States and other foreign countries. The company paid the said tax under protest. It subsequently filed a case seeking to invalidate the ordinance for being unconstitutional.Issue:Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.Held:The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enacted, the company was the only sugar central in Ormoc City. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as the present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the company as the entity to be levied upon.

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2.Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights."The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987] Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

x x x

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.


Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.


Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that:Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.HELD: No.The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

Phil Jugde Assoc vs PradoFacts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354.

Issues: (1) Whether or not its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose

(2) Whether or not it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage;

(3) Whether or not it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary

Held: Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith." The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.

(2) It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill).

(3) It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. The withdrawal of the franking privileges was indeed discriminatory. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The classification was not based on substantial distinctions.

Sison vs AnchetaFacts:Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer, alleged that its provision (Section 1) unduly discriminated against him by the imposition of higher rates upon his income as a professional, that it amounts to class legislation, and that it transgresses against the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.Issue:Whether BP 135 violates the due process and equal protection clauses, and the rule on uniformity in taxation.Held:There is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to a conclusion that there was a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses. Absent such showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the differentitation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity, similar to the standards of equal protection, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of the clause and is therefore uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories, such as recipients of compensation income as against professionals. Recipients of compensation income are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes as there is no practically no overhead expense, while professionals and businessmen have no uniform costs or expenses necessaryh to produce their income. There is ample justification to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income.

Tiu v Ca G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999 J. Panganiban

Facts:On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227. This was for the conversion of former military bases into industrial and commercial uses. Subic was one of these areas. It was made into a special economic zone.

In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized. There was also tax incentives and duty free importation policies under this law.

On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. It said that On Import Taxes and Duties. Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ

On All Other Taxes. In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.

Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative.

Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free.

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. This was due to the limitation of tax incentives to Subic and not to the entire area of Olongapo. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.

The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to include the "entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law.

Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A confining the application of R.A. 7227 within the secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside of the secured area is discriminatory or not owing to a violation of the equal protection clause.

Held. No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, they claimed that the E.O. narrowed the application to the naval base only.

OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification.

Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses. This was really limited to the military bases as the law's intent provides. Moreover, the law tasked the BCDA to specifically develop the areas the bases occupied.

Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers. The target of the law was the big investor who can pour in capital.

Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured area" are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to extend the tax incentives in RA 7227.

It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause.

Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always channel their capital into it.

RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center. There will really be differences between it and the outside zone of Olongapo.

The classification of the law also applies equally to the residents and businesses in the zone. They are similarly treated to contribute to the end gaol of the law.LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, anorganizedcrime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligenceTask Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman AnianoDesiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accusedfiled separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office ofthe accusedPNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.

RULING:Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law mustpresentproof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which arepresentin this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and under the transitoryprovisionin Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitoryprovisiondoes not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court.

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not apenal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being apenal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, uponexaminationof the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties aspolice officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense whichthe accusedis alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, forfailureto show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions ofthe accusedPNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

LOONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest LOONG vs. COMELEC216 SCRA 760, 1992

Facts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.

Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petition.

Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law.

Held: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

International School vs. QuisumbingFACTS:Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.ISSUE:Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.RULING:NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work. These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.

IMAPORO V. HRETFACTS:This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo seeking tonullify the twin Resolutions of the HRET which denied his Motion forTechnical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in theVoters Registration Records and Motion for Reconsideration of ResolutionDenying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting Records.Pursuant to the 1998 HRET Rules Congressionalcandidate Mangotara Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking thetechnical examination of the signatures and thumb the protested precinctsof the municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged thatthe massive substitution of voters and other electoral irregularitiesperpetrated by Dimaporos supporters will be uncovered and proven. Fromthis and other premises, he concluded that he is the duly-electedrepresentative of the 2ndDistrict of Lanao del Norte.Noting that the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questionedballots because there are no ballots but only election documents toconsider HRET granted Mangotara's motion and permitted the latter toengage an expert to assist him in prosecution of the case, NBI conductedthe technical examination.ISSUE:1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal Protection whenthe latter denied his motion for technicalexamination.2. W/N Dimaporo was deprived of procedural due processor the right to present scientific evidence to show themassive substitute voting committed in counter protested precincts.RULING:1.Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protectionclause. Equal protection simply means that all persons and thingssimilarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferredand the liabilities imposed.It follows that the existence of a valid andsubstantial distinction justifies divergent treatment.According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of hispetition and that of Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, hismotion, like Mangotaras, should be granted.The argument fails to take into account the distinctionsextant in Mangotaras protestvis--visDimaporos counter-protest whichvalidate the grant of Mangotaras motion and the denial of Dimaporos.First.The election results in SND were the sole subjects ofMangotaras protest. The opposite is true with regard to Dimaporoscounter-protest as he contested the election results in all municipalities butSND.Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the election recordsof SND are determinative of the final outcome of the election protestagainst Dimaporo. The same cannot be said of the precincts subject ofDimaporos motion.It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion fortechnical examination is subject to the sound discretion of the HRET.In this case, the Tribunal deemed it useful in the conduct of therevision proceedings to grant Mangotaras motion for technicalexamination. Conversely, it found Dimaporos motion unpersuasiveand accordingly denied the same. In so doing, the HRET merely actedwithin the bounds of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all,the Constitution confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of theHouse of Representatives and the Senate as thesole judgesof allcontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of theirrespective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.2. Anent Dimaporos contention that the assailedResolutionsdenied him the right to procedural due process and to present evidence tosubstantiate his claim of massive substitute voting committed in thecounter-protested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself mayascertain the validity of Dimaporos allegations without resort to technicalexamination. To this end, the Tribunal declared that the ballots, electiondocuments and other election paraphernalia are still subject to its scrutinyin the appreciation of evidence.It should be noted that the records are replete with evidence,documentary and testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. Dimaporosallegation of denial of due process is an indefensible pretense.The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit

Guzman vs Commission on Elections GR 129118 19 July 2000Facts: Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters registration act. The act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or municipality for more than 4 years. Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the prohibition. Petitioners contend that RA 8189 Section 44 is unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause enshrined in the constitution; that it violates constitutional guarantee on security of civil servants; that it undermines the constitutional independence of comelec and comelecs constitutional authority; that it contravenes the basic constitutional precept; that it is void for its failure to be read on 3 separate readings Issue: Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional Ruling: No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has not violated the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality. G.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000) FACTS: Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act provided that no election officer shall hold office in a particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argued that the provision was not expressed in the title of the law, which is An Act Providing for a General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing Registration, Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Fund Thereof.HELD: The contention is untenable. Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the Comelec to follow in the reassignment of election officers.

Prepared by: Mary Louise M. Ramos SORIANO v. CA G.R. No. 123936 March 4, 1999 Payment of civil indemnity is not violative of the equal protection clause as this is imposed by law as a consequence of the commission of a crime FACTS: Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property after being involved in a vehicular accident which killed Isidrino Daluyong. His application for probation was granted and among the terms and conditions imposed were: (a) he shall meet his family responsibilities; (b) devoting to a specific employment or pursuing a prescribed secular study or vocational training; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim Daluyong in the amount of P98,560. A motion to cancel his probation was filed due to his failure to indemnify the heirs of the victim and a supplemental motion alleging petitioners commission of another crime while he was awaiting arraignment. The trial court denied the motion and instead directed petitioner to submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed on him. Based on the information provided by the heirs of Daluyong, petitioner still failed to satisfy his civil liability. Soriano was made to explain his non-compliance and to submit his program of payment immediately otherwise he would be cited for contempt. For continuous failure to comply with the orders, his probation was revoked on October 1994 for his failure to: (a) meet his family responsibilities; (b) engage in a specific employment, (c) satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and (d) cooperate with his program of supervision. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals claiming that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner contempt and revoking his probation. The CA dismissed the petition holding that Sorianos stubborn unwillingness to comply with the orders of the trial court shows his refusal to reform himself and to correct a wrong.A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the revocation of petitioners probation is lawful and properRULING: YES. Revocation of probation is lawful and proper. Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the trial court subject to certain terms and conditions. Having the power to grant probation, the trial court also has the power to revoke it in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances. Since petitioner admitted in violating the terms and conditions of his probation, he cannot anymore assail the revocation of his probation. Soriano claims that his non-compliance was due to his poor financial condition and that it was impossible for him to formulate a program as he only relies on his parents for support and he was in no position to comply with the same. He even questioned the constitutionality of the requirement imposed as this harped on his alleged poverty. This requirement is NOT violative

Summary of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).FactsPlessy (P) attempted to sit in an all-white railroad car. After refusing to sit in the black railway carriage car, Plessy was arrested for violating an 1890 Louisiana statute that provided for segregated separate but equal railroad accommodations. Those using facilities not designated for their race were criminally liable under the statute.At trial with Justice John H. Ferguson (D) presiding, Plessy was found guilty on the grounds that the law was a reasonable exercise of the states police powers based upon custom, usage, and tradition in the state. Plessy filed a petition for writs of prohibition and certiorari in the Supreme Court of Louisiana against Ferguson, asserting that segregation stigmatized blacks and stamped them with a badge of inferiority in violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments. The court found for Ferguson and the Supreme Court granted cert.IssueCan the states constitutionally enact legislation requiring persons of different races to use separate but equal segregated facilities?

Holding and Rule (Brown)Yes. The states can constitutionally enact legislation requiring persons of different races to use separate but equal segregated facilities.

Thirteenth Amendment issueThe statute does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime. Slavery implies involuntary servitude and a state of bondage. The Thirteenth Amendment however was regarded as insufficient to protect former slaves from certain laws which had been enacted in the south which imposed upon them onerous disabilities and burdens and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was devised to meet this exigency.Fourteenth Amendment IssueAll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are made citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, and the States are forbidden from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.The proper construction of this amendment involves a question of exclusive privileges rather than race. Its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of former slaves, to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of the States, and to protect the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States from hostile legislation of the states.It was intended to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but it was intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting and even requiring their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race. Such laws have generally been recognized as within the scope of the states police powers. The most common instance involves the establishment of separate schools, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of blacks have been longest and most earnestly enforced.DispositionJudgment for Ferguson (Plessy loses).NoteThis case is often cited incorrectly as Plessey v. Ferguson.This case was later overruled by Brown v. Board of Education. Justice Warren wrote the opinion for a unanimous court, holding that separate facilities which segregate based on race are inherently unequal.

Summary of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954).FactsThis case is a consolidation of several different cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. Several black children (through their legal representatives, Ps) sought admission to public schools that required or permitted segregation based on race. The plaintiffs alleged that segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.In all but one case, a three judge federal district court cited Plessy v. Ferguson in denying relief under the separate but equal doctrine. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs contended that segregated schools were not and could not be made equal and that they were therefore deprived of equal protection of the laws.IssueIs the race-based segregation of children into separate but equal public schools constitutional?

Holding and Rule (Warren)No. The race-based segregation of children into separate but equal public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional.

Segregation of children in the public schools solely on the basis of race denies to black children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the physical facilities and other may be equal. Education in public schools is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the role of public education in American life today. The separate but equal doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, which applied to transportation, has no place in the field of public education.Separating black children from others solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The impact of segregation is greater when it has the sanction of law. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law tends to impede the educational and mental development of black children and deprives them of some of the benefits they would receive in an integrated school system. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority and any language to the contrary in Plessy v. Ferguson is rejected.DispositionJudgment for the plaintiffs.See Allen v. Wright for a constitutional law case brief involving an issue of whether the parents of black children had standing to bring claims for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the tax-exempt status of segregated private schools.

Craig vs Boren429 U.S. 190SyllabusAppellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws. Recognizing that Reed v. Reed,404 U. S. 71, and later cases establish that classification by gender must substantially further important governmental objectives, a three-judge District Court held that appellees' statistical evidence regarding young males' drunk-driving arrests and traffic injuries demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was substantially related to the achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads.Held:1. Since only declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the gender-based differential was sought, the controversy has been mooted as to Craig, who became 21 after this Court had noted probable jurisdiction. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard,416 U. S. 312. P. 429 U. S. 192.2. Whitener has standing to make the equal protection challenge. Pp. 429 U. S. 192-197.(a) No prudential objective thought to be served by limitations of jus tertii standing can be furthered here, where the lower court already has entertained the constitutional challenge and the parties have sought resolution of the constitutional issue. Pp. 429 U. S. 193-194.(b) Whitener in any event independently has established third-party standing. She suffers "injury in fact," since the challenged statutory provisions are addressed to vendors like her, who either must obey the statutory provisions and incur economic injury or disobey the statute and suffer sanctions. In such circumstances, vendors may resist efforts to restrict their operations by advocating the rights of third parties seeking access to their market. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird,405 U. S. 438. Pp. 429 U. S. 194-197.3. Oklahoma's gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Appellees' statistics (the most relevant of which Page 429 U. S. 191show only that .18% of females and 2% of males in the 18-20-year-old age group were arrested for driving while under the influence of liquor) do not warrant the conclusion that sex represents an accurate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving. Pp. 429 U. S. 199-204.4. The operation of the Twenty-first Amendment does not alter the application of equal protection standards that otherwise govern this case. The Court has never recognized that application of that Amendment can defeat an otherwise established claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the principles of which cannot be rendered inapplicable here by reliance upon statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups. Pp. 429 U. S. 204-210. 399 F.Supp. 1304, reversed.

PEOPLE V. FAJARDO (1958)

Reyes, J.B.L.

FactsAug. 15, 1950 - Juan Fajardo was the mayor of Baoo, Camarines Sur. During his term the municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7 whichprohibited the construction or repair of any building without a written permit from the mayor prior to construction or repairing.

1954 - Fajardo and Babillonia (Fajardos son-in-law) applied for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gas station, still on Fajardos private land, separated from public plaza by a creek.Jan. 16, 1954 request denied because it would destroy the view of the public plaza.
o Applicants appealed but were turned down again on Jan. 18, 1954.

Fajardo and Babillonia proceeded to construct even without a permit because they claimed that they needed a residence badly due to a typhoon destroying their previous place of residenceFeb. 26, 1954 Fajardo et at., were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for violating Ordinance no. 7o CFI Affirmedo CA forwarded the case to the SC because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

Issue/Held: W/N Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of property.NO. Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.

Ratio: The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or control the discretion vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING IN THIS CASE.o Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant/deny construction/repair permits Legislation may validly regulate property in the interest of general welfare Prohibition of offensive structures. HOWEVER, the state may not under the guise of police power permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.o IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own beauty and regardless of the fact that they are built on private land are condemned by the ordinance appellants constrained would be constrained to leave their land to idle without receiving just compensation for the virtual confiscation of their private land Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised Administrative Code Sec. 2243 C that municipal council shall have authority to exercise discretionary powers regarding establishing fire limits in populous centers empowers municipal government to require construction/repair permits, to charge fees for such permits

o IN THIS CASE: there were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal council promulgated in order to set a standard in the type of building that can be safely constructed in the public plaza