Epistemology Returns to Its Roots

72 Constructivist Foundations 2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/

Epistemology Returns to Its Roots

Introduction

Ernst von Glasersfeld (2005, p. 10) wants togo to the roots of epistemology, of “the prob-lems of knowledge and knowing” (Glasersfeld1995, p. 1), by examining the subjects’ ele-mentary operations for structuring experi-ence. He replaces the ontology of Westernphilosophy by a “functional fit” (or “viabil-ity”) of concepts. He sees his work as indebtedto that of von Uexküll, Piaget (Glasersfeld1995, Ch. 3), Bridgman, Ceccato, von Foer-ster, Maturana, Varela, and others; it is also inaccordance with earlier studies, for instanceby Vico, Berkeley, Bentham, the critical andposthumous work of Kant (1936; Glasersfeld1985a, pp. 18ff; 1991, [5]; 1995). As Riegler(2005) points out, there is a plurality of con-structivisms with a common basis; the field isdeveloping and presents conceptual and prac-tical opportunities and challenges.

I became aware of epistemological RadicalConstructivism (RC) in 1999, while searchingto access the mind–brain relation puzzle, andwas glad to find authors who wanted an episte-mology without traditional metaphysics, whichcoincided with my need. They have made thiseffort a central feature of their work. As von Gla-sersfeld has pointed out, much of what one cansay about these matters has been said before – itmay now be a question of clarifying one’s think-ing, of seeing the wood for the trees.

Here I want to contribute (from my point ofview

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) to the understanding of von Glasers-feld’s work, and constructivism in general, inthe context of the development of epistemol-ogy. My aim is not to repeat his historical sur-veys (such as Glasersfeld 1995, Ch. 2), but toevaluate his work, and some of what I think isimplied in it, within this development, elabo-rating on aspects which have struck me asimportant. This is my personal bias; I have alsoincluded a few of my own ideas for discussion.

A. Knowledge: Two options in occidental thought

Epistemology has as main purposes todevelop and strengthen our stance (epi-histanai = stand above; under-stand = standbelow; ver-stehen = stand in front of); and toget a handle or grip (com-prehend, grasp,can; be-greifen, er-kennen, können). Of andon what? There are two main possibilities forthis largely language-determined functionallayer of “knowledge,” which influences per-ception and action in addition to the genetic-instinctual layer:

(i) The constructivist option of usingworking-entities (working-structures),

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inprinciple ad-hoc and temporary, structuredwithin otherwise not-structured experience(of mind-and-world) and invested withtrust; and

(ii) the traditional metaphysical-ontolog-ical option of postulating pre-structured,persistent, and usually also mind-indepen-dent, and indeed mind-exclusive, reality(MIR) and truth.

The metaphysics puzzle

Many people prefer the pre-structured option(ii), in the belief that it provides an outsidesource of certainty; however, it implies tran-scending one’s experience to an imaginedmind-independent source. This is a form ofwishful thinking: before it can provide cer-tainty, one must first postulate the MIR-source, and then certify it as real or true by aleap of faith. In the words of Heinz von Foer-ster: “Objectivity is a subject’s delusion thatobserving can be done without him. Involv-ing objectivity is abrogating responsibility –hence its popularity.” (Glasersfeld 1995,p. 149) It implies an inversion of thinking,

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inwhich agency, including goal-setting, is dis-placed from the subject onto postulatedexternal entities, a circular procedure whichactually reduces option (ii) to option (i). Butview (ii) is commonly maintained by exclud-ing the circularity from awareness, and often

Herbert F. J. Müller

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McGill University, Montreal (Canada) <[email protected]>

Purpose: Understanding the place of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Radical Constructivism (RC), and some of its implications, in the development of epistemology. Design: Characteriza-tion of two main options for the content of “knowledge” (without and with belief in mind-independent structures), sketch of their history in occidental thought; comparison of their properties concerning subjectivity, objectivity, second-order cybernetics, reliability of mental tools, and the needs and mechanisms for certainty and overall structures. Results: Awareness that we structure mental working tools can, as RC suggests, replace belief in mind-independent reality, and this change dissolves the conceptual problem of metaphysics-ontology, but also eliminates the certainty expected from it, which raises the possibility of relativism. Working-concepts cannot be deconstructed because they imply no ontological claims. Subject(s) are necessarily included in all knowledge (which does not mean solipsism): because subjective experience encompasses all mental tools, including those of objectivity and mathematics, while in contrast the subject itself cannot become an objective system. Practical reliability of mental tools differs from subjective certainty, which requires an ontological leap of faith to positive beliefs: for specific tools including automata, and for positive holistic structures. However, in agreement with the construc-tivist view, holistic views can instead have an unstructured center, with reliability = viability, which prevents relativism. In sum, belief in mid-independent reality is needed for certainty if desired; for all other purposes constructivism is more helpful. Implications: The change in view suggested by von Glasersfeld’s work is of relevance for a number of fields of study with conceptual problems (such as the mind-brain relation). However, due to their generality, the implications will need evaluation in specific instances. The question of certainty needs attention for practical reasons. Key Words: Subject-inclusiveness, cybernetics, back-up function.

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also the outward leap of faith. This has a longhistory.

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Pre-Socratic thinkers did not share a com-mon opinion on the question of whether real-ity needs our structuring or is found pre-structured (see also Glasersfeld 1985a,pp. 24ff; 1995, Ch. 2). A long-term commit-ment to option (ii) was the result of the meta-physical-ontological teachings of Plato andAristotle of pre-existing but inaccessible truthand reality. This required an ontological leap-of-faith, and became a leading theme of occi-dental thought, transmitted from the Greeksto Arabic, scholastic-theistic, and later to nat-uralistic epistemology. It helped to achievestability and collective unity of structuredthinking, secured by faith in a postulatedmind-external certainty, for about 1500years. The price was incomprehensibility,particularly when there was an attempt toinclude the central subjective and holisticaspects of mind (cf. Glasersfeld 1991, [5];2001, [41]; and part J of this paper). The pos-tulated MIR structures get in the way of criti-cal thinking.

Still, modern science originated fromhere; but the leap-of-faith procedure waslargely maintained, and merely transferredfrom MIR-God to MIR-Nature. Correctionwas therefore difficult even after sciencebecame independent of theism, and relapsesinto some type of MIR-belief resulted almostinvariably, including by those who set outexplicitly to abandon metaphysics (cf. Gla-sersfeld 1995, pp. 25ff). The ontological sub-ject-object split persisted, because it was notclearly changed into a pragmatic one, andthus the desire for MI-certainty (ii) contin-ued (cf. Glasersfeld 1991, [16]).

Post-Cartesian (enlightenment) episte-mologies were largely motivated as efforts toovercome such obstacles to the correction,but the attempts remained incomplete,

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andsome thinkers missed even that incompletechange. The so-called “Copernican Revolu-tion” of Kant (who showed that the subject’sactivity is needed for objective reality) wasignored or denied by many realists. Attemptswere often made (e.g., by logical positivists)to eliminate metaphysics, for instance bydeclaring metaphysical questions to be mean-ingless, or pseudo-problems. But this missedthe point that something similar is needed forthinking, as Kant had observed. Everyoneuses metaphysics-ontology.

The obstructive nature of MIR-belief isillustrated by the fact that even those verybright people who used it as the basis of theirthinking (and implied it to be the generalbasis of thought) were stymied by their wishto exclude the subject in studies that includedthe mind. At the present late stage of the revi-sion, we are trying to re-gain access to theoriginal structuring process (i) within experi-ence, and to make it work reliably when con-fronting uncertainty and ambiguity.

B. Radical constructivism

Von Glasersfeld’s work comes in at this point.He proposes replacing the search for postu-lated already-structured MIR-entities (ii) byshowing that structures are results of humanactivity (i). This change has re-opened theway for studies of basic structures. “Re-pre-sentations” point not to mind-independententities but to structures previously formedwithin experience. A typical example is the

construction of the concept of plural (the“awareness of having recognized [an item]more than once”; Glasersfeld 1985b [19]ff;1995, pp. 93f).

RC replaces metaphysics-ontology by“viability” of mind-and-world structures (a“tremendous shock for believers in represen-tation”; Glasersfeld 1995, p. 14). This meansbeing aware of the subject-inclusive opera-tional origin of concepts, and reflects theneeds of various scientific and practical disci-plines (such as linguistics, mathematics, edu-cation); it gives RC a broader than purelyphilosophical base. Constructivism is “amethod for knowing” (Glasersfeld 1995,p. 22); it requires a continuous effort of struc-turing and testing. Constructivism meansmore responsibility (Glasersfeld 1985a, p. 27;1991, [37]), both individual and collective. Itmeans creating working-structures asneeded; MIR-assumptions are redundant.

An epistemological view cannot be theresult of empirical findings, the latter alreadypre-suppose an opinion on where the struc-tures in experience come from. “[T]he theory

Ernst von Glasersfeld at the Douglas-McGill Symposium on “Mind-Construction-Brain”, organized by the author, Herbert Müller, on 28 September 2001 at Douglas Hospital in Montreal (Canada). (Photo by Douglas Hospital).

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of knowing does not depend on […] more orless empirical findings. […] It is based on thesimple realization that, as our thinking, ourconceptualizing, and our language are devel-oped from and in the domain of our experi-ence, we have no way of incorporating any-thing that lies beyond this domain”(Glasersfeld 2005, p. 11). “We can, of course,use metaphors to grope beyond our limits,but as these metaphors are not redeemable inthe experiential domain to which we haveaccess, they can never shed their status of ‘asif ’” (Glasersfeld 2001, [16]).

RC concerns fundamental aspects of epis-temology; it is not the same as “social con-struction,” although both have points in com-mon (Glasersfeld 1995, p. 141). Mostconcepts are socially shared, and dealing withsocial questions pre-supposes an epistemo-logical point of view.

C. Working metaphysics-ontology

To address the metaphysics difficulty moredirectly, one can go a step further by general-izing from the well-accepted scientificmethod of creating working-hypotheses: to“operational” or “working-” (or “as-if”-)metaphysics-ontology (working-reality and -truth). Re-interpreting inaccessible type (ii)mind-independent metaphysics-ontology asa type (i) working-tool gives it a status likethat of the language- and number-tools; themetaphysics puzzle dissolves. But the cer-tainty expected from type (ii) ontology-meta-physics dissolves as well (cf. parts G and Hbelow).

The operational or working-structures,including theories, do not exist outside struc-turing and (individual and collective) use,and thus remain in principle within reach andcomprehensible. They imply no (“ontic”)claims of mind-independent validity, andserve either circumscribed tasks, or else holis-tic purposes such as unity and communalityof experience. They can compete with eachother, but are mutually exclusive only in anoperational sense.

All reality needs structuring (deliberate ornot), and some of it requires inventing: art,language, or self-image need our invention;hurricanes and toothaches are structured butnot invented by humans; this opinion differs

from that of von Foerster (1992), and vonFoerster and von Glasersfeld (1999), whoappear to equate construction with invention.

The subject–object and subject–other dis-tinctions become structured too duringdevelopment (Jean Piaget; see Glasersfeld1991, [27]ff, 1995, Ch.3). Structures, and thedistinctions between them, originate inreflection, a pause in experience (Wilhelmvon Humboldt; Piaget; von Glasersfeld (2001,[25–36]).

Deconstruction-proofing, and back-up versus MIR-fallback

Working-structures cannot be deconstructedontologically (in the sense of Heidegger andDerrida) because they claim no ontic (pre-structured) base.

This enables the constructivist method toback up type (ii) views, which can be de-con-structed (for instance by showing that thenotion of fictitious inaccessible MIRs is notneeded for them, since they are extrapolatedfrom mental tools). This back-up function(that is, the working-structure is used toreplace the abandoned MIR-structure) mightbe a useful conceptual tool, for instance in sci-entific theory-building.

Since (ii) cannot back up (i), the relationbetween (i) and (ii) is asymmetrical. Whilebacking-up or replacing (ii) by (i) serves con-ceptual clarification, a move from (i) to (ii) isa fall-back – by default and/or by design –from responsible agency onto assumed mind-independent certainty provided by postu-lated guarantors.

The number of possible practical actionpatterns is increased in working-ontology:they are created as needed rather than deter-mined by fixed dogmata that pre-determineand restrict the choice.

Working-science

MIR-science (type (ii)) can be transformed toworking- (or as-if-)MIR-science (type (i)).Science neither needs, nor can it produce, tra-ditional metaphysics-ontology. “Science is thecollection of recipes and procedures thatalways work […] Our faith [in it] restsentirely on the certainty of reproducing orseeing again a certain phenomenon by meansof certain well-defined acts” (Paul Valéry,quoted by von Glasersfeld 1995, p. 117).

The physicist Percy Bridgman proposed(1927), like Piaget, that all concepts result

from subjects’ operations: however, he stilltalked about external nature, though he had“little to say about it,” and added “what thismeans we leave to the metaphysician todecide.” von Glasersfeld wrote that he isagnostic about a mind-external reality (1991abstract, [17]ff; 1995; etc.). It may be moreconsistent, I want to suggest, to define reality-structures (ontology-metaphysics) in princi-ple as ad-hoc working-tools only, even if theyare used on a permanent basis (Note 1 andpart C, above). Like words, numbers, trian-gles, and dimensions, they are there becausewe need and structure, posit, and use them:that solves the puzzle. Assumption of things-in-themselves that cannot be proved or dis-proved is redundant.

D. The encompassing: Subject-inclusiveness is fundamental

The inclusion of subjective experience in allknowledge is a central aspect of constructiv-ism (but does not imply solipsism = exclu-sive subjectivity without objectivity). “Allcognitive activity occurs within the experi-ence of goal-directed consciousness” (Gla-sersfeld 1985a, p. 31; but in principle at leastone needs to include all aspects of experi-ence; see below). There is no way of gettingout of subjectivity, either individually or col-lectively: the subject is an intrinsic compo-nent of all mental structures, such as con-cepts and theories. This is, in myunderstanding, a defining aspect of con-structivism, and needs to be kept at the cen-ter of efforts to deal with it.

In theories that exclude the mind (such astype (ii) exclusive objectivity) the subject(s)are likely to re-surface at some point. Exam-ples are the ad-hoc addition of “conscious-ness” in particle physics, or the “anthropicprinciple” in cosmology. But subject(s) mustbe included from the outset. If they areadded to a type (ii) view at a later time, as inthese instances, a return to a type (i) view isneeded in order to deal with an aura of arti-ficiality and an ontological subject–objectsplit.

This subject-aspect of experience too hashad a historical development in epistemol-ogy: in phenomenology and related efforts.

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Constructivist development beyond phenomenology

Subject-inclusiveness is a theme (“existential-ism”) of phenomenology since Kierkegaard(1843/2005). He rejected claims of mind-independent pre-structured truth and realityas not relevant for individual experience –Hegel’s (1807/1949) notion of the absolutespirit as well as science’s claim of the universalvalidity of exclusive MIR-objectivity.Nietzsche (1888) wrote that the idols of MIR-metaphysics were vanishing (“Götzen-Däm-merung”). Jaspers emphasized that experi-ence is “encompassing” (“the encompassingin which we are and which we are ourselves”;1991, p. 39). On the other hand, existential-ism without specialization can amount tofuzzy generalities;

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also, phenomenologistshave often suffered MIR-relapses.

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Constructivism is, inter alia, a furtherdevelopment of phenomenology, mainly intwo respects. Firstly, it examines how struc-tures (including goal-structures) are createdwithin experience; they are not (as phenome-nologists implied) discovered – there or else-where – in ready-made form. Secondly, it canaccommodate objective studies: theories andobjective methods develop within experienceas working- (or as-if-) MIR; this leads to ajoint subjective-objective (working) view.

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With its back-up ability (part C, above) con-structivism can combine both methods.

In principle, all other aspects of experi-ence (qualia, feeling and emotions, others,world, universe, the whole, the unstructuredcenter) must also be included in discussionsof experience, even when they are difficult tocommunicate, or at present not conscious;they can become conscious experience.

E. The subject is not observable

The subjective aspect of experience (or con-sciousness) has “to remain empiricallyinscrutable”; it cannot become objectivebecause “the reflecting self […] becomes thegovernor and cannot contemplate itself fromthe outside” as an object (Glasersfeld 2001,[32]). There is no subject in exclusively-objective studies. The unobservability of thesubject is a fundamental fact which is in prin-ciple recognized in constructivism, but usu-ally neglected in MIR-views. This point will

need consideration in the discussion of “sec-ond-order cybernetics” (below).

The mind-brain question cannot beapproached by MIR-views, because mindcannot be made into an object; as von Gla-sersfeld puts it (2001, [41]): “In order to dothat [understand consciousness objectively],I would have to step out of [consciousness],and at the same time remain conscious, inorder to face my own consciousness.” Brainfunction studies take place within theencompassing mind but cannot in turn reachthe mind. This does not mean that objectivestudies have no value, quite the opposite; butit means that subjective experience is pri-mary.

The relation of objective studies (forinstance of brain function, or of quantumphysics) to subjective experience (conscious-ness, observer, mind) is asymptotic, not oneof identity (notions like “the embodiedmind” or “the mind-brain” attempt to renderthe mind objective and thus imply a misun-derstanding of this relationship). Objectivefunctions can approach but not reach subjec-tivity, and in contrast to geometry, the differ-ence cannot be neglected without eliminat-ing ourselves, as happens in MIR-views.Words can become MIR-objects (for instanceas elements of grammar and syntax, inprinted form, etc.), and word-concepts too,but the ongoing experience which theyexpress cannot.

To accommodate experience, scientistsmust acknowledge that all working-struc-tures (and the distinctions between them)happen within mind or experience; keepingexperience at the center, without solipsism.When maintaining this awareness, one cansafely alternate between working-objectivity,working-idealism, working-subjectivity, etc.

The inverted thinking

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of MIR-belief is atypically human problem. Animals too struc-ture their own worlds (see Horvath 1997), butthe human capacity for distancing (reflec-tion) is greater, in part related to languageuse, i.e., the large-scale association of specificcommunicable sounds to images (Glasersfeld1995, Ch. 7; a classical example is Archi-medes, who was so distant from eventsaround him that he did not notice that aRoman soldier was going to kill him while hereflected on geometric problems).

The aim of the objective method is toeliminate observer-bias, not the observer.

F. Cybernetics, subjectivity, and objectivity

As a general principle, MIR-objectivitybecomes as-if-MIR-objectivity in construc-tivism. But there are some conceptual diffi-culties when goal-directedness is studied,which can be viewed objectively as well asdeveloped subjectively. This question comesup in second-order cybernetics, which isendorsed by a number of constructivists.

The information-mechanisms of von Foe-rster, Maturana, and others support the con-structivist view, but do not describe mind;they are mental structures within mind, likeall theories. Von Foerster’s “Principle ofUndifferentiated Encoding” (derived fromwork by the 19th century physiologist J.Müller on “nerve physics” and “specific senseenergy”; Glasersfeld 1995, p. 115; Riegler2005) says that neural activity encodes quan-titative information, not external reality. Thisis a negative statement about mental struc-tures, which still have to be created by a sub-ject. In positive terms: during dreaming,mental structures, including their meanings,are activated centrally rather than by periph-eral input (Ceccato, quoted by von Glasers-feld 1995 pp.97–98); the same applies for freeassociations, and pathological functions suchas hallucinations.

Systems in cybernetics and physics

The objective study of goal-directedness is thetopic of cybernetics, the work of NorbertWiener in physics, and of Heinz von Foersterin psycho-physiology, and their collabora-tors. Von Glasersfeld remarks (1995, p. 148)that cybernetics understands reality as aninteraction between observer and observed.“Cybernetics of cybernetics” (or second-order cybernetics), wants to introduce thesubject (mind) as an autonomous agent-sys-tem into cybernetics of biological systems (cf.Umpleby 1991, 2002). This is clearly animportant aim, but its conceptual aspect pre-sents difficulties that need discussion.

I as a subject can observe an observing sys-tem as an object. But what I observe is not thesubjective experience of the (observed)observing system, whether that refers to ananimal, another person, or even to myself inthe case where I can study my brain function


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as needed while (or after) I have various sub-jective experiences.

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(In contrast there aremany “autonomous” biological systems,including bee-hives and ant-colonies, thatcan be objectively studied but do not imply“subjectivity” or “consciousness” in the senseof the present discussion.)

One may compare these efforts with theearlier one of John von Neumann (cf. Baggott2004, p. 243), who found that to understandthe statistical nature of quantum-mechanics(QM) he had to re-introduce the subject intoQM, in terms of a “system III” (observer or“consciousness”) in addition to system I, theobject under study, and system II, the measur-ing device. But system III is not identical with,nor a part of, system II, and he concluded that“the probability wave collapses when it inter-acts with a consciousness.” An opaque con-clusion of this type may follow if one startsfrom naturalistic MIR-belief (that exclusiveobjectivity describes “the reality”); but since itis not comprehensible, it has not made QMunderstandable. The word “consciousness”not withstanding, the “system III” is likely tobe understood in MIR-terms, because sys-tems are objects of thinking. The difficultiespersist in that field (quite “officially” inexpressions like “quantum weirdness” –uncertainty, wave-particle duality,Schrödinger’s cat, etc. – ; cf. for instance Lind-ley 1996; constructivists might counter thatthe weird aspect is the MIR-view; see also thesection on gestalt-tools, below).

The same conceptual difficulty emerges insecond-order cybernetics and might interferewith its acceptance. Experience is primary,theories and observations occur within it.The problem is the incomprehensibility ofMIR-belief (objectivity) itself, which vonNeumann retained because he did not explic-itly abandon it, and which is also implied instudies of cybernetic systems.

G. Reliability of mental tools

With the change from type (ii) to type (i)epistemology, the questions of reliability andcertainty become prominent, since the pos-tulated external guarantor dissolves. Ernstvon Glasersfeld has presented descriptionsof how some mental tools are created, and oftheir properties. Since mental structures are

the nuts and bolts of mental function, I willbriefly discuss a few of them here, followingvon Glasersfeld’s procedures, with emphasison the question of their reliability.

Regularities, laws, and the method of reason

Outside of religion and politics, certaintyrefers mostly to natural laws (“regularities”in nature), which we experience and struc-ture, in the same way as object-constancy insubject-inclusive operations (Glasersfeld1985a, pp. 31ff; Glasersfeld 1995, p. 128).Natural laws are reliable, not dependent onMIR-theistic beliefs, and are commonlybelieved to result from type (ii) MIR. But itturns out that they can be modified whenneeded; this shows them to be type (i) as-if-MIR laws.

After abandoning MIR-ontology, itremains that “only reason can protect manfrom fanaticism and superstition” (Kant).Reason still means clarification of thinking,sorting out helpful from unhelpful mentalstructures. The reasoning method “de-con-structs” non-viable structures and makes uslook for better ones. – As von Glasersfeld hasmentioned, Kant himself came close to atype (i) view in his opus postumum. Relatedto this question is von Glasersfeld’s work onthe operational analysis of the basic steps inmathematics and abstraction.

Arithmetic tools

In a recently “revisited” study, von Glasers-feld (1995, Ch. 5, Ch. 9; 2006) discussed theoperational foundations of structures inarithmetic. After structuring the concept of“plural” (see part B, above), a simple arith-metical statement like 3 + 4 = 7 can be“unpacked” into the operations of countingtwo collections of items. Then by coordinat-ing a number-word sequence with them, andconsidering the two collections as one, onearrives at the same result every time.

The mathematical reliability is based onwhat von Glasersfeld calls (2006, p. 68) a“hypothetical trick,” a non-mathematicalprocedure that is “abstracted.” “The cer-tainty of the results […] springs on the onehand from the fact that one operates in ahypothetical mode and therefore obligesoneself not to question what one has hypoth-esized; and on the other hand, on implicitfaith in one’s memory of meanings attrib-

uted, of operations carried out, and of resultsthey produced.”

This analysis shows the operational originof arithmetic procedures and other algo-rithms, and consequent reliabilities that onetends to take for granted; it also epitomizesthe RC-method. The “hypothetical trick” canbe taken as a prototype of type (ii) MIR-pos-tulates and beliefs, as well as of their type (i)“working” equivalents.

Geometric tools

Von Glasersfeld (2006, pp. 66–67) also offersan operational basis for geometric conceptssuch as point (“the center of attention”), line(“drawing”), or plane (“moving a line side-ways”).

Like numbers, the geometric entities arenot found; they are human mind-and-worldworking-tools structured and used for deal-ing with experience, and for stabilization.The mentioned reasoning for “point” in par-ticular is of the mental-operation type anddoes not even involve motor action; in theorya point “has zero dimensions.” They are ele-ments of the gestalt-operation in geometry.(However, if one physically draws a point, aline, or a plane, the result always has proper-ties that in principle require treatment asthree-dimensional objects, though the addi-tional ones are usually “neglected”; Glasers-feld 1995, p. 185; drawings are imperfect,though still effective, means to communicatemental structures, which are implied to bethe same for all.)

But then, how real are points, or lines?They are in the mind, like all mathematicalstructures (cf. Lakoff & Núñez 2000); objec-tive aspects are their working derivatives thatcan for many purposes be handled as-if theywere MIR units. The visual system has objec-tive mechanisms to detect objective points,lines, and edges.

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They are the physiologicalbasis for the corresponding mind-and-world-tools of the structuring subject, ele-ments of gestalt-formations. With points andlines, one can draw a tree, a house, or ahuman face; but these objects are not made ofpoints or lines, nor of gestalt entities; evenless of the underlying physiology. Extrapolat-ing from here, one can draw triangles, circles,cubes, asymptotes, etc., tools for exploratorytasks in structuring and handling visualexperience, together with other visual toolssuch as color, or tactile ones such as solidity,

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etc. The tools are elements of subject-inclu-sive working-reality, just as numbers orworking-metaphysics (and indeed all mind-and-world structures) are.

Gestalt-tools and MIR-reference

Our notion of the world is predominantlyvisual. Visual gestalt formations have a qual-ity of permanence and definition that is lack-ing in probabilistic reliability. With thegestalt-tools we can package experience intoitems suitable for handling and communica-tion. When words are attached to them, theycan become metaphysical entities, becausewords, as communication tools, have a built-in supra-individual aspect: the word-gestaltconcepts lend themselves to a mis-interpreta-tion of universality and absoluteness, ifdesired. In that way, type (i) statistical reli-ability can give way to a leap to type (ii) cer-tainty of MIR-knowledge. The Pythagoreansnot withstanding, numbers are less likelythan gestalt-formations to be consideredidentical to or referring to a fictitious MIR-world.

But evidently the reliability of gestalt-tools is limited: on TV a forward moving carmay show its wheels turning backward. How-ever, we see what we know (“it isn’t so”), andthat corrects the problem. Gestalt-tools arealso used in trying to interpret the double-slitexperiment of QM (cf. Baggott 2004; Lindley1996). One may ask whether macroscopicgestalt-notions such as “corpuscle” and“wave” are valid (viable) here (and mutuallyexclusive). Physicists tell us that QM has reli-able mathematical procedures, but is difficultor impossible “to understand” (presumablyin visual gestalt terms). In using a visualimage of reality, one needs to remain aware ofthe limitations of visual gestalt tools.

H. Probabilistic reliability versus leaps of faith to certainty, and the question of relativism

The procedures are more reliable for countingthan elsewhere: the operations of arithmeticare simple (“digital,” even if you do not counton your fingers) and can be repeated by any-

one, with identical results if procedural mis-takes are avoided. But, as von Glasersfeld hasshown (see above), in mathematics too thereis a difference between reliability of procedureand certainty of faith. Certainties are derivedfrom posited and certified (MIR-) structuresthat are no longer scrutinized and may evenbe out of awareness. That can facilitate lifemuch, at variable risk.

One posits an ad-hoc working-hypothesis(or accepts an intuition, revelation or, mostcommonly, an authority’s opinion or com-mand at face value), certifies it as reliable(true, real) by leap of faith, and/or by aban-doning critical thinking, and in turn derivescertainty from the certified – and often exter-nalized – structure. The certainty procedureinvolves forgetting and/or excluding fromawareness (1) the circularity of the operation,(2) the MI-step, and often also (3) the leap-of-faith. These steps mark the differencebetween reliability of procedures and cer-tainty.

Knowledge is probabilistic except for suchleaps of faith; numbers can sometimes makethe probability more precise. In contrast, cer-tified structures are the only available sourceof persistent certainty, including in mathe-matics. They are results of human postulates,leaps of faith, circular reasoning, and forget-ting. In some instances, the name of the trickought to be self-deception. The constructiv-ist insight undoes the forgetting; thereaftercertainty retains awareness of its risk (i.e.,doubt).

For certainty, type (ii) knowledge (leap toMIR-belief) is effective, but it may interferewith critical thinking; for all other purposestype (i) knowledge (such as constructivism)is more helpful.

The rejection of MIR-belief may evoke afear of relativism – that reality and truthdepend on arbitrary opinions. But working-structures cannot remain arbitrary, sincethey can be maintained only if they are viable.Social structures can be more varied, butdepend on consensus, such as concerningexpected effectiveness. For instance, UnitedNations decisions may at times be inade-quate, but they are probably not arbitrary;another example is the confidentiality of pro-fessionals toward their clients, an expectationand standard that is documented in rules ofconduct, but does not have to imply MIR-belief.

I. Automata and inversion of agency

The use of automata is closely related to theleap of faith to an MIR-view.

Von Glasersfeld quotes Gottlob Frege(who triggered the development of analyticphilosophy) on mathematical abstractions(2006, p. 65): “the things that we numbermust be distinguishable, whereas the[abstract] units of arithmetic are not.”

Since the subject is omitted, this statement(“are not”) omits the operational aspect.Frege appears to have seen the result of “abs-tracting” (= “taking away” from the eventsthat gave rise to it) as pre-structured, notoperational. It would then not only be extrap-olated from a specific procedure and general-ized (a “placeholder” with some flexibility ofconcept-images, Glasersfeld 1995, pp. 91ff),but also be mind-independently automated,taken away from the subject’s activity.

If the acts of counting are considered oneat a time, the arithmetic units are not identi-cal. Each can be made distinguishable by pay-ing attention to it, but they are usually treatedas identical. The operational question is: howmuch can and should we distinguish? Treat-ing numbers and numerical relations as iden-tical, as mind-independent and trustworthyalgorithms or automata, can be our (the sub-jects”) view, deliberately or by default. Com-puters are used on that basis: the subject s’ actis delegated to trusted automata (Glasersfeld2006, note 15). The automation can haveramifications that, even in mathematics, areat first unexpected, such as infinity, imaginarynumbers, or negative probabilities. But thesubject-agent remains, in principle, a constit-uent part of the process (Glasersfeld 1995,pp. 96ff).

Implied (mind-independent) automatismof logical-mathematical symbols, withimplied completeness-in-themselves, seemsto be a feature of analytic philosophy in itspursuit of truth. This aspect disappears whenit is acknowledged that the mind encom-passes these tool-structures; then the com-pleteness is in the mind, but its center cannotbe structured (see part J, below).

Delegation of responsibility to automata ofvarious kinds (including airplanes, the postalservice, governments, but also to some wehave not invented, like the functions of ourown bodies) is inevitable: because we have no


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choice, for instance, and/or because our atten-tion has limits. But this trust and inversion ofagency may become counter-productive if theautomata fail or develop unexpected func-tions and place us in the position of a sorcerer’sapprentice, who tries to re-gain control.

In view of the ever-increasing amount ofobjective (actually how-to) information, it isperhaps the most difficult aspect of the con-structivist view to remain aware of the pri-macy of ongoing (subjective) experience. Inpractice we can delegate agency (and respon-sibility) on a temporary (or as-if) basis, butsimultaneously acknowledge that in principlewe remain responsible throughout.

9

J. Holistic structures

Belief systems are also used for certainty bytrying to structure experience as a whole, withthe help of postulated overall structures.Indeed, if the whole is not included in someway (at least in principle) the view is incom-plete.

Mystery, rationalism, and the unstructured center

Holistic structures include the subjective cen-ter of ongoing experience, which cannotbecome structured; that would require animpossible objectivity and packaging of sub-jective experience. Positive holistic structuresare consequently inevitably paradoxical ormystical, but may be adopted by means ofabsolute belief, in order to obtain overallmeaning and stability via a leap of faith(“credo quia absurdum,” Tertullian). The par-adoxes may, however, prevent some peoplefrom accepting theism and other positiveholistic beliefs. But constructivism canaccommodate holism, and may offer a way todissolve the paradoxes.

For one, constructivism can back up posi-tive holistic structures (which are put onhold). This consideration does not make mys-ticism rational (cf. Glasersfeld 1995 pp. 24ff),and does not justify irrational behaviour, butit provides a rational understanding of thepresence and irrational function of mysti-cism. Namely, that the irrationality is a conse-quence of the unstructured origin withinwhich all rational thinking takes place.

And secondly, holism and the objectivemethod can both be tools in experience with

a negative center. Non-theistic (and non-positive) stability practices are used success-fully in some cultures, with the help of med-itation. They have an unstructured (nega-tive) center-point such as nirvana (which isfree of paradoxes). Seen from there, positivetheistic structures appear as imperfect pre-liminary tools, a temporary convenience onthe way to the goal of dealing more directlywith the unstructured center (cf. Percheron1958, pp. 38–40).

The reliable rational logical (language)and mathematical (counting) methods onthe other hand cannot offer the overallcoherence of a holistic view with inclusion ofsubjective experience, nor can the objectivemethod (which usually implies the gestalt =reality view) do this. The ex-positivist PaulFeyerabend wrote (1999, pp. 32–33) “[i]fdiscourse is defined as a sequence of clearand distinct propositions […] then dis-course has a very short breath indeed, […] Ifthe history of thought depended on a dis-course of this kind, then it would consist ofan ocean of irrationality interrupted, briefly,by mutually incommensurable islands ofsense.” But just that is the start-point of con-structivism: we do not try to find senseready-made, we have to make sense withinthe unstructured.

10

K. Conclusion: Constructivism in the history of epistemology

Constructivism restores to epistemology theunstructured origin of thinking, and the sub-ject(s) as agent(s) of all structure-formationand -use. The pre-structured reality view isthen no longer an end-point for epistemology(Whitehead had suggested that all occidentalphilosophy is a footnote to Plato), instead ithas been a long-term but nevertheless tempo-rary means for obtaining certainty from pos-tulated (mostly mind-external) authorities:the viability concept of Ernst von Glasers-feld’s Radical Constructivism is a step beyondthis stage. Rather than maintaining MIR-belief for certainty, it helps to de-constructontology; one can then use viable experience-structures and achieve stability of stance andreliability of grasp by operational (and co-operational) means.

In this way, constructivism can offer acomplete view (of “life,” of “reality”).

Many conceptual aspects of constructivism(some of which have been briefly discussed inthis paper) will need further scrutiny. Exam-ples are, among others, the relation of struc-turing to inventing; of constructivism andphenomenology to cybernetics; the relevanceof constructivism for science and teaching; theoperational basis of basic concepts; reliabilityof mental tools versus certainty by circular rea-soning plus forgetting where it comes from;the differences between “Anglo-American”and “Continental” opinions on the need toinclude ongoing experience; agnosticism ver-sus redundancy of ontology; the back-upfunction of constructivism. One would, ofcourse, also want to consider the work of otherconstructivists, and of non-constructivists, intheory formation. These are important –though not easy – questions; but dealing withthem could, besides increasing responsibility,also make life more interesting.

Herbert F. J. Müller, born 1924 in Cologne, studied medicine at the University of Cologne (Dr. med., 1951). Medical intern-ship and postgraduate training (psychiatry, neurology, electroencephalography) in New Jersey, New York, Rio de Janeiro, Düs-seldorf, and at McGill University in Montreal (Associate Prof. of Psychiatry). Now retired from clinical work at Douglas Hospital, Montreal. – Studying the mind-brain rela-tion, it became clear to me in 1994 that to access this question the notion of pre-struc-tured mind-independent reality must be abandoned. As this requires a more general review of concept use and epistemological questions, I started editing the Karl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca/ in 1997. In 1999 I became aware of radical constructivism (chiefly the work of Ernst von Glasersfeld), which has many features in common with my present work. A symposium on the mind-brain relation, in which von Glasers-feld participated, took place at the Douglas Hospital (McGill University) in September 2001. My present work concerns the con-ceptual basis of this point of view – which I label “structuring with zero-derivation” or “zero-reference” – and its relation to other areas.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

2007, vol. 2, nos. 2–3 79

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Notes

1. A recent description of my position ofzero-derivation (0-D) of mind-and-worldstructures and of the inversion of thinking(i.e., relegation of agency to outside thesubject) can be found in Müller (2005). Asmentioned in various contexts in thepresent paper, it differs in some respectsfrom von Glasersfeld’s opinion, and Ihope this can be understood as a contribu-tion to discussion rather than criticism.

2. I employ the term “entity” or “structure”here as a general expression for mentaltools, for instance concepts, theories, butalso more basic ones such as words, num-bers, gestalt-formations, objects, and in-cluding qualia as well.

3. In case they are understood as workingstructures, the two possibilities interactand complement each other. – Similar isthe Chinese distinction (3rd century BC)between (i) the dark weak force (Yin), and(ii) the bright strong force (Yang), andtheir interaction.

4. Empiricists, positivists, and realists havetended to continue using traditional type(ii) metaphysics-ontology (“every idea isthe idea of a being,” wrote Hume – proba-bly a mind-independent being); but mostalso insisted that they did not use meta-physics, because it had “no meaning.”Kant claimed that things-in-themselvesare “necessary for reason,” not experi-enced (as noumena). Phenomenologistswanted to discover structures withoutmaking ontological assumptions, but fellback onto ontological positions of one oranother type. Heidegger even declaredthat “phenomenology is ontology” (1953,p. 37); this actually implies that phenom-ena = noumena, apparently without giv-

ing up the idea of absolute validity ofnoumena; and furthermore that thesenoumena can be known.

5. The mathematician Kurt Reidemeister(1954) saw existentialism as non-objective(“unsachlich”), avoiding obligations(“unverbindlich”), and (p.24) includingmystical thinking. These features resultfrom dealing with subjectivity, which can-not become objective. But he criticized thephenomenologists without mentioningthe views of his fellow-mathematician andphenomenologist Edmund Husserl, whoadvocated a view of essences (“Wesens-Schau”).

6. A switch to working-ontology helps to ad-dress the mind-brain relation question:knowledge of brain activity develops with-in the mind, not vice versa (see my TargetArticle 45 in the Karl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca/).

7. Let us say that in some years from now itwill be possible for you to undergo a brainscan which simultaneously measuresblood flow, electrical and chemical neu-ronal activity, and informational aspectsof brain activity. If that gives a reasonablycomplete assessment of what your braindoes (the functions of many interactingbrain systems in fact) while you are in var-ious subjective activities (experiences) ofperceiving, thinking, feeling, remember-ing, meditating, alertness, drowsiness,etc., is any of this, or some mathematicalexpression of a combination of the mea-sures, the same as what you experience? Topose this question is to answer “no” – Iwould think. But there are some realistswho claim that brain, or brain activity,equals mind.

8. The philosopher Alva Noë (2006) ob-serves that the work of Hubel and Wiesel

has been conducted on the erroneous as-sumption that vision is a passive event inthe brain.

9. This can lead to a correction procedure forinverted thinking. As one example ofmany: when it is suggested that the mind(subjective experience) has to originate ina theory, it is readily shown that this is im-possible because theories originate in themind, and not vice versa.

10.Holistic structures (of instrumental “rea-son”) cannot without self-contradictionbridge irrationality, which is an essentialaspect of theism (“credo quia absur-dum”). The Pope has recently (2006)pleaded for a connection between faithand reason, mainly by referring to the in-fluence of the Hellenistic “logos” on theGospel according to St. John (“In princip-io erat verbum, et verbum erat apudDeum, et Deus erat verbum”, Nestle &Aland 1963). He hoped for a widening ofthe concept of scientific reason, so as to in-clude faith. But he did not explain how todo that; and the Vatican has in the pastemphasized that, to believe in God, an“ontological leap of faith” is required. Thetwo requirements (coherent reason andontological leap of faith) are not mutuallycompatible. – This type of difficulty is notconfined to theisms; it supervenes also inMIR-naturalistic views which are extend-ed to holisms, such as when the block-uni-verse is said to render free will impossible(cf. TA91 in the Karl Jaspers Forum http://www.kjf.ca/). The use of the block-uni-verse notion usually implies a type (ii) be-lief that “physical reality has fourdimensions,” rather than “can in some re-gards best be handled using four dimen-sions,” as one would say in a type (i)constructivist view.

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Received: 1 July 2006Accepted: 2 March 2007

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Epistemology Returns to Its Roots