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Focus on... Epistemology Epistemology of Science vs. Epistemology for Science ROSEMARY S. RUSS Department of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706, USA Received 2 October 2013; accepted 27 January 2014 DOI 10.1002/sce.21106 Published online 19 March 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE The field of science education has long been enamored with understanding, and enacting, the characteristics and practices of professional science (e.g., Dewey, 1910; Schwab, 1962). Fortunately for the field, there are a range of scholars—historians, sociologists, philoso- phers, and even scientists themselves—whose work aims to uncover the rules, norms, interactions, and practices of professional science as they vary by context and over time (e.g., Dunbar, 1995; Kuhn, 1977; Nersessian, 1992; Salmon, 1984; Thagard, 1993). Al- though our motives for understanding professional practice are different from the scholars in these fields, the accounts they provide have given science education a rich and nuanced picture of the discipline. In particular, science educators have used this work to understand what has been called the epistemology of science (Lederman, 2007). That is, this work has helped us develop a conception of how knowledge is constructed within science. For example, as a field we know that scientists use models (e.g., Windschitl, Thompson, & Braaten, 2008), that science is inherently a social endeavor (e.g., Ford, 2008), and that diversity exists within scientific practice (e.g., Rudolph, 2003). I do not mean to imply that all scholars in science studies or science educators agree on what constitutes the “epistemology of science,” or how to enact that epistemology in teaching and learning of science. Quite the contrary; within science Correspondence to: Rosemary S. Russ; e-mail: [email protected] C 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Epistemology of Science vs. Epistemology for Science

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Focus on...Epistemology

Epistemology of Science vs.Epistemology for Science

ROSEMARY S. RUSSDepartment of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Wisconsin, Madison,WI 53706, USA

Received 2 October 2013; accepted 27 January 2014DOI 10.1002/sce.21106Published online 19 March 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com).

EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE

The field of science education has long been enamored with understanding, and enacting,the characteristics and practices of professional science (e.g., Dewey, 1910; Schwab, 1962).Fortunately for the field, there are a range of scholars—historians, sociologists, philoso-phers, and even scientists themselves—whose work aims to uncover the rules, norms,interactions, and practices of professional science as they vary by context and over time(e.g., Dunbar, 1995; Kuhn, 1977; Nersessian, 1992; Salmon, 1984; Thagard, 1993). Al-though our motives for understanding professional practice are different from the scholarsin these fields, the accounts they provide have given science education a rich and nuancedpicture of the discipline.

In particular, science educators have used this work to understand what has been calledthe epistemology of science (Lederman, 2007). That is, this work has helped us developa conception of how knowledge is constructed within science. For example, as a field weknow that scientists use models (e.g., Windschitl, Thompson, & Braaten, 2008), that scienceis inherently a social endeavor (e.g., Ford, 2008), and that diversity exists within scientificpractice (e.g., Rudolph, 2003). I do not mean to imply that all scholars in science studies orscience educators agree on what constitutes the “epistemology of science,” or how to enactthat epistemology in teaching and learning of science. Quite the contrary; within science

Correspondence to: Rosemary S. Russ; e-mail: [email protected]

C© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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education there are a range of disagreements about what exactly scientists do, think, andsay, what is most important for learners to do, think, and say, and what the nature and formof learners’ knowledge and practice of scientific epistemology should ultimately be.

However, despite the differences in the content of their claims, the form of almost allclaims about the role of the epistemology of science for science education is the same:Professional scientists do X and think like Y; therefore, learners of science should also doX and think like Y. That is, these claims adopt the following tacit model of epistemologyand learning that is manifest throughout the literature:

Theoretically, this model gives rise to a phenomenon of interchangeability within theliterature; the constructs of epistemology and nature of science often seem to be unprob-lematically substituted for one another (e.g., Carey & Smith, 1993; Deng, Chen, Tsai, &Chai, 2011; Havdala & Ashkenazi, 2007; Lederman, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2012). Such asubstitution is only appropriate for researchers who are working from the above model ofepistemology and learning.

The model is also manifest in the types of questions used to probe learners’ espoused,or formal epistemologies (e.g., Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Lederman, 1998; Davis, 2003;Havdala & Ashkenazi, 2007; Smith & Wenk, 2006). For example, in her study of third-grade students’ epistemologies, Kittleson’s (2011) interview protocol includes questionssuch as “How do scientists know for sure if they are right about something?” and “Whydo you think scientists do tests?” (p. 1032). Other studies similarly articulate dimensionsof epistemological understanding such as “source of scientific knowledge” and “nature ofscientific methods” (Brickhouse, 1990; Lederman et al., 2002, emphasis mine).

Finally, studies that explore nonexplicit epistemologies (e.g., implicit, tacit, or enactedbeliefs) and epistemological practices in situ (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Metz, 2011) in-evitably use professional science as the benchmark for comparison with student practice.For example, Sandoval’s (2005) “broad epistemological themes” that should be evident ininquiry include aspects of “scientific knowledge” or “scientific method” defined by pro-fessional science practices. The underlying assumption that pervades science educationresearch on epistemology is that science learners need to understand—either tacitly orexplicitly—and enact—either individually or collectively—the epistemology of science asembodied in the work of professional scientists.

Value of This Model of Epistemology and Learning

There are a variety of reasons we as a field have adopted this model. First, the idea thatlearners of science should develop a sophisticated epistemology of professional science isintuitively appealing. After all, who knows better how to be successful in science than thosewho are actively engaging in it? Second, placing scientific practice at the center of sciencelearning honors the established expertise of the scientific community that has been devel-oped through a process of continuous refinement and change. Learners should capitalizeon that expertise. Third, using professional science as a model for science education pro-vides us with recognizable norms. We assume that learners are doing well in science whenthey engage in practices that resemble professional science (Berland & McKneill, 2010;Gotwals & Butler Songer, 2013). These norms and assumptions are particularly appropriateif we believe the purpose of science education is to teach students professional science.Finally, a focus on professional science allows us to make claims about the authenticity

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of our science learning activities in relation to professional practice (Chinn & Malhotra,2002). Such claims are powerful in light of learning theory that stresses the importanceof creating and engaging in communities for learning (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989;Wenger, 1998).

Limitations of This Model of Epistemology and Learning

Despite the affordances of this model, here I suggest that there are some problematicaspects of accepting this model as our default. Some of these issues have been raisedby other researchers in other contexts or in regard to other constructs, but here I seekto present a coherent argument of the limitations of our field’s current model of epis-temology and learning. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that every particular in-stantiation of this model of epistemology of science suffers from all of these limitations.Instead I mean to point out that as a group, the tacit assumption of the direct relation-ship between scientific practice and learning leaves them in danger of these potentiallimitations.

Encourages a Unitary Description of a Multifaceted Construct. A model that relates“what scientists do” and “what learners should do” encourages a unitary, singular descrip-tion of both scientific practice and learning. However, a range of work highlights thatthere is not a single epistemology of science (Rudolph, 2000, 2003). This plurality is evenmore pronounced when we expand our notions of science beyond modern, Westernizedscience (Bang & Medin, 2010; Carter, 2010). In addition, research suggests that it isnot appropriate to view students as having a single epistemology (Leach et al., 2000;Rosenberg, Hammer, & Phelan, 2006; Roth & Roychoundhury, 1994; Wickman, 2004). Atthe very least, our models of epistemology tacitly cover the epistemological diversity thathas given rise to the past and current scientific landscape both in learning environments andin professional laboratories.

Highlights Discontinuity. The default model of epistemology and learning can be seenas parallel to expert–novice models in which experts and novices are seen as inherentlydifferent (Chase & Simon, 1973; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). In the case of epis-temology, the experts are the scientists and the novices are the learners of science (e.g.,Hogan & Maglienti, 2001; Samarapungavan et al., 2006). Much of the work in the field hasbeen in highlighting discontinuity between scientists’ and learners’ epistemologies, therebyreinforcing a deficit model of learners.

When coupled with the common unitary characterizations of scientific expertise (seeabove), highlighting discontinuity fails to account for nascent expertise that learners alreadypossess when it comes to reasoning about the natural world (Callanan & Oakes, 1992;Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 1999; Metz, 1995; Warren et al., 2001). People, includinglearners of all ages, regularly act and engage in the world and thus must possess someknowledge and skills for thinking and reasoning about that world. In addition to intuitivecontent knowledge (e.g., diSessa, 1993; Hatano & Inagaki, 1999), learners must also haveways of understanding knowledge and knowledge construction (i.e., epistemologies) thatthey employ to help them make sense of the world around them (Elby & Hammer, 2001;Hammer & Elby, 2002; Louca et al., 2004; Metz, 2011; Smith et al., 2000).

When we highlight discontinuity, learners may come to view their own attempts atsense making as “nonscientific” and instead attempt merely to emulate the practices ofthe authoritative science experts. Evidence that students do in fact adopt this stance comes

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from research that indicates that learners’ views of their own learning (either espoused orevident in practice) do not align with their views of the work of scientists (Hogan, 1999;Sandoval, 2005). Thus, by highlighting discontinuity between professional scientists andlearners, we in fact undermine our own efforts to have students take on the epistemologiesof science themselves.

Requires an A Priori Definition of “Science.” This model also creates a potentiallyartificial discontinuity between the contexts of science and nonscience by requiring apriori definitions of those contexts and problems that constitute science—in which casean epistemology of science is appropriate and useful—and those contexts and problemsthat do not. The model assumes that before beginning work to make sense of a situation,learners must first evaluate whether it constitutes a “science” situation in which they shouldinvoke their epistemologies of science.

This model for how learners can or should reason about the natural world is problematicfor two reasons. First, what constitutes “science” is not clearly or cleanly demarcated(Gieryn, 1983). If we wish to persist with a model of epistemology and learning thatrequires learners to decide on the scientificness of the context or problem first, then weeither have to limit ourselves to the very clearest cases of science (e.g., how rainbows areformed) or we have to, in addition to teaching epistemology of science, also teach studentshow to identify science contexts. In light of the ever-growing list of socioscientific issuesthat exist on the borders of traditional (and potentially arbitrary) disciplinary lines, both ofthese options seem undesirable.

Second, this model of epistemology and learning also assumes that people’s knowl-edge is organized along disciplinary lines. That is, it assumes that learners have contentand epistemological knowledge that is stored under a disciplinary marker for “science,”and when they enter “science” situations they call up and use that knowledge. However,research suggests that knowledge is organized by the specific contexts of use (e.g., restau-rants, chess) and not disciplines (diSessa, 1993; Rumelhart, 1980; Russ & Sherin, 2008;Schank & Abelson, 1977). Given that research, the strategy of having learners createknowledge that is organized by discipline creates artificial contexts that do not integratewell into existing knowledge structures, thus rendering the knowledge potentially useless ormeaningless.

AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: EPISTEMOLOGY FOR SCIENCE

In this work, I suggest a shift away from thinking about learners adopting epistemologiesof science toward thinking about learners as adopting epistemologies for science. I proposea model in which the motivation for and value of particular learner epistemologies is theproductivity of those epistemologies for constructing knowledge of the natural world. Thismodel contrasts our default model in which the measure of an epistemology is its fidelitywith epistemologies of professional science.

The model presented here is based in Elby and Hammer’s work (2001) that articulatesthe idea of productive epistemologies. My purpose here is to make that model, its as-sumptions, and its implications explicit by highlighting its generic form (see below) andsystematically contrasting it with the alternative predominant approach. It is my hope thatthis abstracted form and subsequent comparison will encourage researchers within the fieldto explicate their tacit assumptions about the place of professional science practice in theirstudies of science learning, and provide a language for conversations about the purpose ofepistemology for science education and science education research.

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This new model is grounded first in thinking about what practices and knowledge areuseful for constructing knowledge of the natural world. Doing so removes the directrelationship between professional science and learning science and replaces it with anindirect relationship that is mediated by the utility of the epistemologies for knowledgeconstruction:

This shift in the directness of the relationship with professional science cannot be reducedto distinguishing between scientists “doing science” and learners “learning science.” Themodel elaborated here is precisely not suggesting that learning science is different fromdoing science and thus requires a different epistemology (epistemology for learning sci-ence vs. epistemology of science). Instead, it is meant to highlight that science—for bothprofessional scientists and for learners—is equivalent to constructing knowledge of andmaking sense of the world around us; scientists and learners are engaged in the same task.As such, both scientists’ and learners’ epistemologies should support (and be evaluatedbased on their abilities to support) situated attempts to do so.

At first glance, this model may seem largely rhetorical. Of course what we mean whenwe say we want learners to adopt epistemologies of science is that we want them to adoptthose epistemologies that are productive for constructing knowledge. That is why we can allagree that we do not want learners to engage in the scientific practice of going to afternoontea (a common cultural practice in science departments) and colloquia; those practices donot help learners construct explanations for phenomena in the world. Isn’t this model justmaking that more explicit? To answer that question below, I describe three ways in whichthis alternative model would transform our research on epistemology.

Changing Our Metrics of Epistemological Sophistication

First, adopting this new model would require decentralizing the role of professionalscience as the arbiter of “correct” epistemologies for learning science. No longer would webe able to justify examining or promoting particular epistemologies or practices in scienceclass merely because “scientists do it.” Instead, our justifications for valuing particular waysof thinking or doing in science learning would have to be based on whether and how suchepistemologies are productive—both for learners and from the perspective of learners—as they attempt to make sense of the physical and natural world (Lising & Elby, 2005).This measure of epistemological productivity may be consistent with the work of Lidar,Lundqvist, and Ostman (2005) on practical epistemologies in which epistemologies areevaluated based on whether they are “fruitful in the sense that the students could continuetheir learning process” (p. 161). For example, researchers and educators would need tomake the case for how and in what ways treating knowledge as tentative (Lederman et al.,2002; McComas, 1996) is productive for making sense of the world. In that sense, shiftingto this model of epistemology actually embodies the very epistemological stance we wantlearners to adopt. That is, we as researchers would not merely take professional science asthe authority on what constitutes productive science learning, but instead we would requiresome explanation or model for why practice X or knowledge Y support and/or constrainscience learning.

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Changing Our Search Space

Such a shift would also require researchers to look in different places to identify po-tentially productive epistemologies for learning science. Rather than looking only at howprofessional scientists construct knowledge, we would also look in other domains to seehow people engage in the task of making meaning of the world around them. What I suggesthere involves more than just looking in other places (e.g., everyday life, museums) to findevidence for nascent versions of professional science (Eberbach & Crowley, 2009). InsteadI am suggesting that we look in other places to find evidence for epistemologies that arefruitful for constructing knowledge of the natural world. Pockets of research both within andoutside our field have begun this task (Bang & Medin, 2010; Crowley et al., 2001; Tenen-baum et al., 2002; Zimmerman, Reeve, & Bell, 2010), and in some sense we would expectto find overlap with research exploring general, rather than domain-based, epistemologies(Hashweh, 1996; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kang, 2008; Zeidler et al., 2013). However, wecould imagine the field as a whole taking a more systematic survey of epistemologies usedin a range of contexts and using those epistemologies as clues about productive stancestoward knowledge to use in science learning, even if those epistemologies are not found inprofessional science.

Changing Our Timescale of Interest

Finally, shifting to thinking about epistemology for science would mean defining norma-tive epistemologies on a moment-to-moment basis. There would be no “best epistemology”that would hold for all time and all contexts. Instead, “best” epistemology would be definedand constrained heavily by the local learning context (e.g., Hammer and Elby, 2002; Scherr& Hammer, 2009). What stances toward knowledge and learning are most productive forthe students to construct knowledge in this moment in this situation? At times, these localepistemologies might be consistent with those of professional science, but at other timesthey may be inconsistent but none-the-less productive.

For example, the notion of scientific knowledge as tentative can be locally problematicin science learning. Imagine a high school chemistry class in which students are translatingbetween descriptions of the macro- and microworld using Avogadro’s number. In thatcontext, it would be unproductive for students to treat Avogadro’s number as tentative.Instead, we would want students to treat that number as a fact or tool that can be used forreasoning about microworld. In this case, and many others, the local context demands adifferent epistemology than the global epistemology of science. This approach embodiesmore than just looking at learners’ epistemologies as manifest in local practice (Metz,2011; Sandoval, 2003, 2005). It suggests that not only must we look locally to find theepistemology (Lundquist, Almquist, & Ostman, 2009), we must also look locally to definewhat the epistemology should be.

CONCLUSIONS

For many decades, our field has unproblematically assumed that those who are learningscience should adopt stances toward knowledge and learning that align with those embodiedin professional science practice. In the arguments above, I have raised some concerns aboutthat model and used them to motivate an alternative model of epistemology and learning forour field to consider. At its core, the model of epistemology for science involves examininglearners’ interactions with knowledge about the natural world and making sense of whetherand how those interactions are productive for constructing knowledge in the moment.

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Two points deserve further clarification. First, despite these seemingly divergent modelsof epistemology and learning, it is important to note that there is likely overlap in thetypes of things that will fall into each model. No doubt some aspects of the epistemologyof science will also be found in epistemologies for science. However, as a field we havedone very little work to map the potentially fruitful territory outside of the overlap. Evenif we wish to continue with the model of epistemology of science in science education, weshould at least be able to say something about the epistemology for science that we areeither tacitly or explicitly disregarding.

Second, the model I have proposed is intended to decentralize the role of professionalscience in our understanding of what science learning should look like. I admit that such adecentralization is somewhat alarming (particularly for those of us trained as professionalscientists!). Under what circumstances is such a strong move appropriate?

The answer to whether the field, or individual researchers, should adopt one model orthe other depends, like many things, on our goals for science education. If we believethat the purpose of science education is to train people to understand the discipline ofprofessional science, to understand the claims that are made within that discipline, and toevaluate the appropriateness of those claims, then encouraging learners to adopt, enact,or practice the epistemology of science is critical. In that case, decentralizing the roleof professional science would be both imprudent and disastrous. If on the other hand,we believe that science education serves the goal of helping learners become better atconstructing knowledge about the world around them, then explicit ties to the disciplinarypractices of science become less important. For this goal, professional science shifts frombeing the desired end product to being one of many tools that support sense making. Assuch, encouraging an epistemology for science may be more appropriate when constructingknowledge is the goal. In this way, the models of epistemology and learning that we adopt,either an epistemology of science or an epistemology for science, are ultimately statementsabout what we believe constitutes science learning.

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Science Education, Vol. 98, No. 3, pp. 388–396 (2014)