EPC Power Convertersand the Linac4/PSB Beam Interlock System

B. Mikulec, B. Puccio & J-L. Sanchez

BCC 2

PS ringBIC

( not yet

defined )

Source RFMaster

BICChoppers

MasterBIC

EJECTION Master

BICL4 & L4T

BIC PSBOK (2)

BIC

913

710

LINAC 4

TRANSFER LINE

PSB

12

RFCtrl

PreChop.

Chopper

RFCtrl

Kicker

Disable ramping of

PSB RF

PSBOK (1)

BIC7

BT line

S i m p l i fi e d l a y o u t( V e r s i o n 1 )

Previous BIS Proposal

10.11.11

BCC 3

PS ringBIC

( not yetdefined )

Source RFMaster

BICChoppers

BIC

EJECTION Master

BIC

PSB Master

BIC

L4 Tr.(2) Master

BIC

L4 Tr.(1) Master

BIC

PSB Injection

BIC

1211

12 14

1110

LINAC 4

TRANSFER LINE

PSB

12

RFCtrl

PreChop.

Chopper

RFCtrl

Kicker

Disable ramping of

PSB RF

BT line

New draft BIS Proposal

S i m p l i fi e d l a y o u t( V e r s i o n 2 )

10.11.11

BCC 4

Previous vs. New version

V e r s i o n 1 :5 8 C h a n n e l s

&3 + 3 C o n t r o l l e r s( M a s t e r / S l a v e B I C s )

V e r s i o n 2 :8 2 C h a n n e l s

&5 + 2 C o n t r o l l e r s( M a s t e r / S l a v e B I C s )

10.11.11

BCC 5

EPC Power Converters for ‘Master BIC Source RF’

• 3 central chopper quadrupoles

critical for correct chopper

action; now 3 individual user

permits

10.11.11

BCC 6

EPC Power Converters for ‘Master BIC Linac4 Transfer (1)’

• All main bendings of transfer

line; dependence on

destination now through BIC

truth table

10.11.11

BCC 7

EPC Power Converters for ‘BIC PSB OK (1)’

• For PSB injection beam

permit need to combine

individual ring user permits of

power converters for BI.SMV

and for BI.BSW

10.11.11

BCC 8

EPC Power Converters for ‘Master BIC PSB OK (2)’

• Status information of

MPS, BE.BSW and

BE.SMH

10.11.11

BCC 9

EPC Power Converters for ‘Master BIC PSB Ejection’

• Destination dependence

through BIC truth table

10.11.11

BCC 10

Conclusions

• Modified BIS design will comply with EPC wish to avoid

dealing with destinations at the power converter level.

• If the limit on the current acquisition is relaxed to a level

where equipment damage can occur, the beam interlock

system can obviously no longer guarantee equipment safety.

(concerns TL(1) BIC and PSB injection BIC)o A decision has then to be taken if the risk is considered

acceptable for example in combination with survey via software

interlocks (SIS).

10.11.11