COLUMBIALAWSCHOOL

WHITEPAPER CENTERFORCLIMATECHANGELAW

EPA'sImpendingGreenhouseGasRegulations:DiggingthroughtheMorassofLitigation

GregoryE.WannierNovember23,2010

ExecutiveSummary

As theU.S.Congresshas failed topassmeaningful climate legislation, the EPAhas initiatedaseriesofregulationsdesignedtorecognizegreenhousegasesasendangeringhumanhealthandwelfare,andsetgreenhousegasemissionstandardsforvehiclefleetsandformajorstationarysources.

UnsurprisinglytheseeffortshavebeenchallengedintheDCCircuitCourtofAppeals.ChallengestotheEndangermentFinding(whichfocusonEPA’srelianceontheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange)and to theTailpipeRule (whichclaim that it is redundant,and that EPA improperly failed toconsideritseffectsonotherregulations)relyonclimateskepticismmorethantheydoonlegaldoctrine.ThecaseagainstEPA’sTimingRule,whichjustifiesapplicationofGHGregulationstostationarysources,centersonrealambiguitiesintheCleanAirAct,thoughitmayfairlyclaimjudicialdeferenceviaChevronv.NRDC.Thismakesthe“Tailoring”Ruleclaim,thatitdisregardsexplicitstatutoryregulationguidelines(inordertoaccomplishthe“broaderintent”ofthestatute),thestrongestchallengetoEPA’sactions. Onestriking factabout thesesuits is thepurenumberofclaims:over80distinct claimswerefiledby35differentpetitionerstothesefourrules.Thishasnecessitatedextensivesimplificationofthelitigation, including consolidation into three major cases (and a minor sub‐case). Petitioners havesoughtfurthertohaveallthreeconsolidatedcasesheardbythesamepanel,perhapsinanefforttolinkall regulations together as one set of illegal activity. However, the three cases cover threedifferentTitlesoftheCleanAirAct,socoordinationheremaynot improvejudicialefficiencytotheextentthathasjustifiedcoordinationofcasesinthepast. Thepetitionershavealsomoved tostay implementationofEPA’s rules,due to take effectonJanuary2,2011.Themostrelevantquestionhere,apartfromapreliminarydeterminationofthemeritsofthecase,willbewhethertheywouldsuffer“irreparableharm”ifregulationsweretomoveforward.This argument will focus around the economic harm to national industries that could come withincreasedcosts, specificallywhether it could lead to immediate loss of economicactivity;andaroundthepossibilityofavoidingadebilitatingbacklogofbuildingpermitsoncetheserequirementstakehold.The case against staying vehicle regulations looks strong; that against stationary source permitrequirementswilldependsignificantlyoneconomicanalyses. ThereisalsosomequestionofwhatremedymightbeappropriateiftheDCCircuitrulesagainstEPAinthesecases.Thetwo‐pronganalysisusedinsuchcaseswillconsidertheextentofEPA’sdeviationfromthelawandthedetrimentaleffectof immediatelyoverturningexistingregulations.Treatmentofsimilar rules in the past suggests that a strong detrimental effect to an established existing permitstructure willmake courts hesitant to step in with a heavy hand, instead remanding to agencies formodificationinlinewiththeirdecision.Thus,theoutcomeofmotionsforstaymaywellaffectthefinalremedyevenbeyonditsobviouspredictivepoweroftheultimaterulingonthemerits:itwilldeterminewhetherEPAwillalreadyhaveaworkingregulatorystructureinplace. This litigationactivitymeritsattention. In theabsenceofviableclimatelegislationforat leasttwoyears,thesedecisionswillhaveimportantbearingontheextenttowhichtheUnitedStatesisabletoaddressitsgreenhousegasemissionsgoingforward.

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Contents I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 2

II. LegalOverview............................................................................................................................................ 2

A. EndangermentFinding ........................................................................................................................... 3

B. TailpipeRule............................................................................................................................................ 3

C. TimingRule ............................................................................................................................................. 4

D. TailoringRule .......................................................................................................................................... 5

E. ProceduralChallenges............................................................................................................................ 5

F. Synthesis ................................................................................................................................................. 6

III. ProceduralOverview.............................................................................................................................. 6

IV. ConsolidationandCoordinationPossibilities ....................................................................................... 7

A. Petitioners’Arguments .......................................................................................................................... 8

B. Respondents’Arguments....................................................................................................................... 8

C. Synthesis ................................................................................................................................................. 9

V. MotionstoStayImplementationoftheRegulations............................................................................. 10

A. Petitioners’Arguments ........................................................................................................................ 10

B. Respondents’Arguments..................................................................................................................... 11

C. Synthesis ............................................................................................................................................... 12

VI. LookingForward:RemedyOptionsfortheCourt .............................................................................. 12

A. SeverabilityofRules ............................................................................................................................. 12

B. TheRuleforRemandvs.Vacatur ........................................................................................................ 12

C. Synthesis ............................................................................................................................................... 13

VII. Conclusion............................................................................................................................................. 14

AppendixA:SummaryofStayMotions'LegalArgumentsagainstEPAGreenhouseGasRegulations ...... 15

AppendixB:SummaryofEPA'sandIntervenors'SubstantiveResponsestoStayMotions........................ 16

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I. Introduction

IntheabsenceofclimatelegislationintheU.S.Congress,partiesintheUnitedStatesseekingmeaningfulaction on climate change mitigation have turned to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) foraction.However,despiteexpressSupremeCourtauthorizationtoconsiderregulatinggreenhousegases

(GHGs)inMassachusettsv.EPAin2007,EPA’seffortstoregulateGHGshavebeenheavilycontested.This report givesapreliminarysummaryof thestateof litigation today, includingadescriptionof the

major cases and arguments that havebeen raised thus far. Itsmain focus, however, is to provide aproceduralbackgroundonthe litigationprocess, includingconsolidationandcoordinationprocedures,motionsforstayofjudgment,andpossibleremedies. II. LegalOverview

FourseparateEPArulemakingsareunderreview:(1)the“EndangermentFinding,”whichconcludesthatcarbonemissionfrommovingvehiclesare“reasonablylikely”tothreatenpublichealthandwelfare;(2)the“TailpipeRule,”which,basedontheEndangermentFinding,setsGHGemissionstandardsforLight

DutyVehicles;(3)the“TimingRule,”or“ReconsiderationDecision,”whichbuildsoffoftheTailpipeRule,interpretingtheCleanAirAct’s(CAA’s) languagetoauthorizeregulationofstationarysources;and(4)

the“TailoringRule,”whichexemptssmallemittersfromstationarysourceregulations.1

Asoutlinedbelow,threedifferentgroupshavefiledmotionstostayEPA’srulemakingpowerpendingafinal decision in theDCCircuit. Thebriefs filed in support andopposition to these staymotions can

providethefirstglimpseintothelegalargumentsbothsidesexpecttopursue.2Ananalysisofthelegalarguments on both sides suggests that petitioners’ claims against the Endangerment Finding and

TailpipeRulearetheweakerchallenges,andtheirTailoringRuleclaimisthestrongestchallenge.1EndangermentandCauseorContributeFindingsforGreenhouseGasesunderSection202(a)oftheCleanAirAct,74Fed.Reg.66,496(Dec.15,2009);Light‐DutyVehicleGreenhouseGasEmissionStandardsandCorporateAverageFuelEconomyStandards,75Fed.Reg.25,324(May7,2010);ReconsiderationofInterpretationofRegulationsThatDeterminePollutantsCoveredbyCleanAirActPermittingPrograms,75Fed.Reg.17,004(Apr.2,2010);PreventionofSignificantDeteriorationandTitleVIGreenhouseGasTailoringRule,75Fed.Reg.31,514,Att.A(June3,2010).2Petitioners’MotionforPartialStayofEPA’sGreenhouseGasRegulations,D.C.Cir. (Sep.15,2010),availableathttp://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/16/document_gw_02.pdf (hereinafter NAM Stay Motion); State ofTexas’sMotionforStayofEPA’sEndangermentFinding,TimingRuleandTailpipeRule,D.C.Cir. (Sep.15,2010),available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2010/091610motion_to_stay_ett.pdf (hereinafterTexasStayMotion1);StateofTexas’sMotionforaStayofEPA’sGreenhouseGasTailoringRule,D.C.Cir.(Sep.15,2010), available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2010/091610motion_to_stay_tailoring.pdf(hereinafter Texas Stay Motion 2); Motion for Stay, D.C. Cir. Doc: 1266030 (Sep. 15, 2010), available athttp://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/16/document_gw_03.pdf (hereinafter CRR StayMotion); EPA ResponsetoMotions to Stay, D.C. Cir. (Oct. 28, 2010), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=a896cdb9‐6166‐4202‐be03‐b9bfaf12bf30 (hereinafter EPA Response to Stay Motions);State and Environmental Intervenors’ Joint Response to Motions to Stay, D.C. Cir. (Nov. 1, 2010), available athttp://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/11/02/document_gw_01.pdf(hereinafterStatesResponsetoStayMotion).

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Forafull listingof legalargumentsmadeagainstthefourdecisions,andwhichpetitionergroupsmadewhich challenge, see Appendix A. For a list of EPA’s and state and environmental intervenors’

argumentsinresponsetothechallenges,seeAppendixB.

A. EndangermentFinding ThemaincaseagainsttheEndangermentFinding isthatEPAillegallydelegated itsdutiestounreliable

outsideparties(specificallytheUNIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,orIPCC),andthatitwasimpermissiblyvagueinitsrulemakings.Theseargumentsfaceanuphillclimb:EPAhasalonghistoryofrelyingonoutsidepeer‐reviewedscientificreports,anditsscientificconclusionsaregenerallyentitledto

strongjudicialdeference.3Notably,EthylCorp.v.EPAallowedendangermentfindingstobemadeatthe

discretionoftheAdministrator,evenwithoutspecificnumericaldeterminations.4

AnotherargumentfocusesontheunreliabilityofEPA’ssourcesandattacksthecredibilityoftheIPCC,inpartbasedon thewell‐publicized “Climate‐gate” controversy. Thisdisbelief inanthropogenicclimatechangereflectsaminorityviewinthescientificandinternationalcommunity.Itssuccesswilldependon

thecourt’sreadingoftheevidence;althoughitisalsoworthnotingthatEPAisalsoentitledtoChevrondeference in certifying the authenticity of scientific conclusions. Petitioners also complain that IPCCreportswerenot inEPA’srecordandsowerekeptfromthepublic;butasEPApointsout, itwouldbe

impracticaltoreprintIPCCreportsthatarealreadypubliclyavailable.Finally,petitionersarguethattheEndangermentFindingwas incompletebecauseitdidnotdetermine

exactlywhat levelofGHGemissionswouldquantify asendangerment;and it failed to considerpolicychoicesinitsruling.BothoftheseargumentsmisconstruethestructureoftheCAA;theendangermentfinding requirement as established in §111 tasks the EPAwith listing anypollutantwhich “causes, or

contributessignificantlyto,airpollutionwhichmayreasonablybeanticipatedtoendangerpublichealthor welfare.” 5 This language does not appear to explicitly require the policy considerations or

quantificationofdangerthresholdsthatpetitionershaverequested.

B. TailpipeRule Petitioners’primaryargument againsttheTailpipeRuleisthattherulefailstoproperlycalculateitsfullcosts and benefits. Specifically, they argue that EPA should have considered this rule’s impact on

stationary source regulations because EPA had already determined that regulation of vehicle GHGemissions would automatically trigger regulation of stationary‐source GHG emissions. However, thisassertionmisstatesEPA’sfindinginitsTimingRule(below):whileastationarysourcemayberegulated

nosoonerthanwhenthefirst“controlrequirement”takesplace(inthiscase,theTailpipeRule),itonlyallowsfor,andexplicitlydoesnotmandate,stationarysourceregulationsoncethiscontrolrequirement

3ThisprincipleismostfamouslycodifiedinChevronU.S.A.Inc.v.NRDC,467U.S.837(1984).474Fed.Reg.66,496,66,507.542U.S.C.§7411(b).

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is in place.6 Respondents further argue that evaluating the effects of unknownpotential future ruleswouldbeinfeasible,whichmayultimatelyunderlieanycourtdecisionhere.7

OtherargumentsagainsttheTailpipeRule includethat itsbenefitsaretootrivial to justifyaction,andthat it is duplicative of already‐existing Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards under the

NationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration(NHTSA). However,EPArespondsbypointingoutthatcarbon emissions are not redundant to the emissions of various ozone‐causing gases (they impose adifferenttypeofobligation,whichallowsmorenimbleregulatoryoptions),andthatthereisnomandate

intheCAAthatregulationsmeetanyminimumeffectiveness thresholdso longasthebenefitsexceedthecosts.8EPA’spointsherelargelymirrorthosemadebytheSupremeCourtinMassv.EPA.

C. TimingRule TheTimingRuleChallengefocusesonanambiguity in interpretationsofSections161,165,and166inthe Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Chapter of the CAA. §165 bans construction of afacility“inanyareatowhich[PSD]applies”unless,amongotherrequirements, thefacilitymeetsBest

Available Control Technology (BACT) standards “for each pollutant subject to regulation” under theCAA.9Thus,therearetworestrictingvariables:areaandpollutant.Forthefirst(area),§161appliesPSD

toareasthat“satisfy”10anEPA‐determinedNaturalAmbientAirQualityStandard(NAAQS).Petitioners

arguethatanareamustsatisfyaNAAQSforaparticularpollutanttobesubjecttoPSDrequirementsforthatsamepollutant.TheydrawsupportfromAlabamaPowerv.Costle,11whichtheysayimposedthisrequirement.EPAdisagrees,arguingthatsatisfyingNAAQSforanypollutantcansubjectanareatoall

PSDrequirements.12ItinterpretsAlabamaPowerasonlyprecludingPSDrequirements“outsideofcleanairareas”(i.e.areaswhichhavenotsatisfiedtheirNAAQS,ornon‐attainmentareas);andthatbecausetherearenonon‐attainmentareasforGHGs,EPAhascompliedwiththeAlabamaPowerholding.

For the second limitation (pollutant), petitioners interpret a provision in §166(a), which requires PSDstandardswithintwoyearsonceapollutantissubjectedtoaNAAQS,asbeingtheonlyavenuetoaddto

the list of pollutants eligible for PSD regulation. Respondents instead argue that the “subject toregulation”languagein§165isthetrueindicatorofwhenBACTguidelinesmustbecreatedunderPSD.13

675Fed.Reg.17,004,17,0197NAMStayMotion,supranote2,at33‐39;TexasStayMotion1,supranote2,at20‐22;EPAResponsetoStayMotions,supranote2,at44‐47;StatesResponsetoStayMotions,supranote2,at14‐15.8TexasStayMotion1,supranote2,at22‐24;CRRStayMotion,supranote2,at43‐47;EPAResponsetoStayMotions,supranote2,at41‐44.942U.S.C.§7475(a)(4).10AnareamaysatisfyaNAAQSeitherbybeinginactualcompliancewith,orif,foroutsidereasons,itisimpossibletosaywhetherornotitisincompliancewith,theNAAQSairqualityrequirementsforanygivenpollutant.11636F.2d323(D.C.Cir.1979).1242U.S.C.§7471;seealsoNAMStayMotion,supranote2,at18‐19;TexasStayMotion1,supranote2,at26‐27;EPAResponsetoStayMotions,supranote2,at50‐53;StatesResponsetoStayMotions,supranote2,at17‐19.1342U.S.C.§7476(a);seealsoNAMStayMotion,supranote2,at15‐17;CRRStayMotion,supranote2,at49‐53;EPAResponsetoStayMotions,supranote2,at53‐55;StatesResponsetoStayMotions,supranote2,at18‐19.

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Petitioners’readingofthesethreesectionsislogical,andparticularlyonarealimitationstheymayhavethemost straightforwardanalysis. However, EPA’s readingalsohasmerit,and is supportedbya 30‐

year‐oldagencyinterpretation.EPAisempoweredunderChevrontopickanyreasonableinterpretation

ofanambiguousstatutoryprovision.14Thefateofpetitioners’challengeherewillthereforedependonhowambiguoustheDCCircuitreadstheCAAtobeinthiscase.

D. TailoringRule Thefourthcase(nowconsolidatedwiththeTimingRulecase;seebelow)challengestheTailoringRulefordirectlyviolatingclearandunambiguousrequirementsintheCAA.TheCAAlaysoutclearnumeric

guidelinesforwhenstationarysourcesmustbesubjecttoPSDpermittingrequirements,requiringthatEPAregulateanyemitterof100tonsperyearofanylistedpollutant.15Forpracticalreasons,EPAraisedthesethresholdsto75,000ormoretonsperyear,toavoidbeingputinthepositionofregulatingminor

carbonemitters.Onitsfacethisruleviolatesthestatute’splaintext.16EPA justifies this statutory deviation under three separate doctrines: that strict adherence to this

inflexibletextwouldleadto“absurdresults”byimposingexcessiveadministrativeburdensonallparties;that“administrativenecessity”requiresthisforEPAtoregulateGHGsatall;andthatEPAcanproceed“one‐step‐at‐a‐time” toward full statutorycompliance,and it is choosing tostartwith larger emitters.

Petitionerschallengeall three justifications. First, theyargue that EPAcould easilyavoidany“absurdresults”withamorenaturalreadingoftheCAA:namely,EPAcannotdistorttheCAAandthenusethisdistortion tooverturndirect requirements elsewhere. Next, theyargue that EPA’sdeviationsare too

severetobeadministrativelyjustified;andthatEPAcannotusethe“one‐step”doctrinebecauseitisnotputtingitself“onthetracktocompliance.Finally,theyquestionthefoundation(andlegitimacy)ofthe“administrativenecessity”and“one‐step”doctrines.Inresponding,EPAemphasizesthelargerintentof

theCAAasbeingmoreimportantthanspecificandoutdatedproceduralpoints.17Thispartofpetitioners’challengeisprobablytheirstrongest;EPAwillnotgetdeferenceinitsattemptto

bypassstatutorytext,andthedoctrinalissuescouldgoeitherway.

E. ProceduralChallenges PetitionersalsoraiseanumberofproceduralchallengestoEPA’sregulatoryprocess.Mostnotably,they

accuse EPAof avoiding considerationof certain required factors by shuffling complaints around suchthat they are never directly addressed. If EPAdid not in fact respond to every complaint then theirrulemakingwillbecalled intoquestion. Acourtmaychoose to examine thisargumentmore closely,

althoughnothingimmediatelyjumpsout.PetitionersalsoaccusetheEPAofusurpingstatesovereignty

14Chevronv.NRDC,467U.S.at837.1542U.S.C.§§7479(1),7602(j),7661(2)(B).1675Fed.Reg.31,514,31,567.17NAMStayMotion,supranote2,at28‐32;CRRStayMotion,supranote2,at53‐56;TexasStayMotion2,supraNote2,at9‐13;EPAResponsetoStayMotions,supranote2,at61‐65.

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by micromanaging states’ SIP processes and giving insufficient time to come up with independentsolutions. TheyfurtheraccuseEPAoffailingtoproperlyconsidertheruleseffectsonenergysupplies,

minorities, andpossible information requests under certain other laws. This paper does not seek toresolvetheseadditionalclaims.

F. Synthesis Undeniably, theCAA is imperfectly tailored to theproblemof regulatingcarbonemissions. However,

EPA’s interpretationsof itsfourrulesdostandareasonablechanceofsurvivingDCCircuitreview. Asabove,bothsides’specificarguments(andwhomakeswhich)arelaidoutinAppendicesAandB. III.ProceduralOverview

Over80individualcaseshavebeenfiledagainstthefourruleslistedabove,from35distinctparties.Just

twoofthesepartieshavecalledformorestringentregulation(thosefromtheSierraClubandtheCenter

for Biological Diversity).18 The cases split roughly evenly among challenges to the four major EPAregulations(listedabove),asdetailedbelow.

Seventeen petitioners filed challenges to EPA’s Endangerment Finding by the February 16, 2010deadline. These cases were consolidated on February 18, under the name Coalition for Responsible

Regulationv.U.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(CRRv.EPA),andgivenadocketnumberof09‐1322.Tenmore caseswere consolidatedwith this grouponNovember 15 that challenged EPA’s refusal toreconsider theEndangermentFinding (originallyCRR v.EPA,docket10‐1234),bringing the total to26

(minusoneenvironmentallawsuit,seebelow).Similarly, seventeen (separate)caseshavebeen filedso farchallengingEPA’sTailpipeRule,andwere

consolidatedunder the caseCRR v. EPAonAugust20,2010andassigned todocket10‐1092. The44remaining suits challenging EPA’s Timing Rule and Tailoring Rulewere consolidated intoone caseonNovember 15, 2010, as CRR v. EPA (docket 10‐1073). This consolidation, requested by the EPA,

combined17(alsoseparate)suitsfiledchallengingEPA’sTimingRule(samename);with25challengestotheTailoringRule(originallyconsolidatedasSoutheasternLegalFoundationv.EPA,docket10‐1131).

ThreechallengestoEPAregulationsfromenvironmentalgroups(urgingfurtheractivity)wereremovedfromthemaingroupofcasesonNovember15andconsolidatedwithSierraClubv.EPA(docket09‐1018)toformagroupoffiveenvironmentalcases.Theconsiderationofthisconsolidatedgrouphasbeenheld

inabeyancependingtheresultsofmotionstostay(seebelow).

18Much of the information compiled here and below can be accessed from the CCCL Climate Litigation Chart,availableathttp://www.climatecasechart.com.

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However, DC Circuit internal procedural rules hold that even after a case is consolidated, individual

litigants stillmaintain the ability to file separatemotions.19 Petitioners have taken advantageof this

fact.OnSeptember15,2010,threedifferentcoalitionsofpetitionersfiledmotionstostayallorpartofEPA’s climate regulations.One suchmotionwas filed by Texas. A secondwas filed by a coalitionofinterestgroups ledbyCRR,SLF, theCompetitiveEnterpriseInstitute,LandmarkLegalFoundation,and

theOhioCoalAssociation,andalsorequestsastayofallEPAaction.AgroupoftradeassociationsledbytheNationalAssociationofManufacturersfiledthethirdmotion,butasksonlytostaytheTimingandTailoringrules,andtheEndangermentFindingas it couldbeapplied tostationarysources.Thisgroup

doesnotrequestastayofthecoreoftheEndangermentFindingortheTailpipeRule.

Finally, a coalition of businesses, interest groups, and U.S. Representatives20have filed a motion for

coordinationofrelatedcases,allegingthatbecausethefourEPAregulationsaresocloselyrelatedtheyshouldbeheardasagroupbythesamepanel.EPAdisagrees,andhasfiledaresponsetothismotion,

as has a coalition of 19 states and the City of New York.21Other motions, including one request forexpandedpagelimits,arelargelyprocedural,althoughtheyonlyaddtothemassoflitigationactivity. IV. ConsolidationandCoordinationPossibilities

Tomanagethemultitudeof lawsuits,theU.S.CourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbiaCircuithasconsidered consolidation and coordination procedures to combine more than 80 cases into a more

manageable number. Industry‐affiliated groups and individuals generally favor some form of casecombination. On the other hand, environmentalist‐affiliated groups intervening on the EPA’s side

(“stateintervenors”)andtheEPApreferseparatehearingsforreasonsexplainedbelow.22

19UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbiaCircuit,HandbookofPracticeandInternalProcedures23(AmendedMay10,2010).20Chamber of Commerce; CleanAir Implementation Project; Competitive Enterprise Institute; FreedomWorks;Science and Environmental Policy Project; Energy‐IntensiveManufacturers ‟Working Group onGreenhouseGasRegulation”; Mark R. Levin and Landmark Legal Foundation; Portland Cement Association; Southeastern LegalFoundation;TheLangdaleCompany;GeorgiaMotorTruckingAssociation, Inc.;Collins Industries, Inc.;KennesawTransportation, Inc.; J&M Tank Lines, Inc.; Southeast Trailer Mart, Inc.; Georgia Agribusiness Council, Inc.;Langboard, Inc.;and14Representatives[NathanDeal (GA‐5th); JohnShadegg(AZ‐3rd)andDanBurton(IN‐5th);John Linder (GA‐7th); Dana Rohrabacher (CA‐46th); John Shimkus (IL‐19th); Phil Gingrey (GA‐11th); LynnWestmoreland (GA‐3rd); TomPrice (GA‐6th); Paul Broun (GA‐10th); Steve King (IA‐5th); Jack Kingston (GA‐1st);MicheleBachmann(MN‐6th);KevinBrady(TX‐8th)].21The19statesinthiscoalitionare:California,Massachusetts,NewYork,Arizona,Connecticut,Delaware,Illinois,Iowa,Maine,Maryland,Minnesota,NewHampshire,NewMexico,NorthCarolina,Oregon,RhodeIsland,Vermont,Washington,andPennsylvania.22 See Motion for Coordination of Related Cases, D.C. Cir. Doc.: 1262772 (Aug. 26, 2010), available athttp://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/13/document_gw_06.pdf; Respondent’s Opposition to Motion forCoordinationofCasesand Cross‐Motion forConsolidationofConsolidatedCaseNo.10‐1131withConsolidatedCase No. 10‐1073, D.C. Cir. Doc.: 1265175 (Sep. 10, 2010), available at http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/13/document_gw_01.pdf;ResponsetoPetitioners’MotiontoCoordinateCasesbyIntervenerStates,D.C.Cir.Doc.:1265212(Sep.10,2010),availableathttp://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/09/13/document_gw_02.pdf.

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Thefirst,simpler,fix istoconsolidateclaims,essentiallymakingthemonelargecase.Consolidation isallowed “[i]n order to achieve the most efficient use of the Court’s resources,” for “all petitions for

reviewof agencyorders entered in the sameadministrative proceeding.”23This has alreadyoccurredamong the challenges to each individual EPA rule and between the challenges to EPA’s Timing andTailoringRules,asdetailedabove.

Petitioners have also moved to “coordinate” the four separate cases. Case coordination involveshearingmultiplecasesbeforethesamepanel,withagoalofyieldingcomplementarydecisionsincases

wherechallengescoverrelatedactivities. Intheirmotionforconsolidation,petitionersarguethatcase

coordinationunderasinglepanel isstandardprocedure,citingfourcasesthatmakethispoint.24ThecourtruledonNovember15,2010that immediatecoordinationofthecaseswasnotjustified,buthas

leftthedooropentoeffectivelycoordinatecasesafterthemotionsforstay(below)aredecided.

A. Petitioners’Arguments Petitioners’mainargumentisthatthecasesaresubstantivelyinterrelatedsoasto“amount[]toasinglepolicy approach,” and should be decided by the same panel to avoid “duplicative briefing” and“conflicting decisions.” The duplication would come from the DC Circuit’s consideration of “core

questionsofEPA’slegalauthoritytoregulateandrecordsupportforthatauthority.”25Tosupporttheircontentionthattherulesareinterrelated,petitionersquoteEPAitself:“Inrecentmonths,EPAhastakenfour related actions that, taken together…will subject GHGs emitted from stationary sources to PSD

requirements,andlimit[]theapplicabilityofPSDrequirementstoGHGsourcesonaphased‐inbasis.”26Petitioners furtherargue thatcombining the cases intoonecasewillpreventEPA fromattempting to

dismiss challenges to its rulesbasedon jurisdictionalprinciples (particularly standing, in the injury‐in‐factandcausationinquiries).Theycontendthatseparatereviewcouldresultinanattempttocallfor“a

moreappropriateforum”ineverycase,andtherebydenyallforumsforreview.27

B. Respondents’Arguments EPAandstateintervenorsdisagree,andstronglyopposecoordinatingthesecaseswiththosereviewing

the EndangermentFindingandTailpipeRule.EPAargues that combining thesecaseswill confuse thecourtswithlargelyirrelevantpilesofdocumentsandcauseaproliferationoflawsuits,inviolationofCAA

23UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheDistrictofColumbiaCircuit,HandbookofPracticeandInternalProcedures23(AmendedMay10,2010).24MotionforCoordinationofRelatedCases,supranote1,at14;casesdiscussedindetailbelow.25Id.at2,11,16.26ActiontoEnsureAuthoritytoIssuePermitsunderthePreventionofSignificantDeteriorationProgramtoSourcesof Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Finding of Substantial Inadequacy and SIP Call, Proposed Rule (Aug. 10, 2010),availableathttp://www.epa.gov/airquality/nsr/documents/20100810FinalGHGSIPCallProposal.pdf.27MotionforCoordinationofRelatedCases,supranote1,at16‐19.

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rules.28To support this, it and state intervenors point out that the EPA regulations deal with entirely

differentadministrativerecordsandlegalquestions,andinvolve“anentirelyseparatesetofissues.”29

Furthermore,EPAarguesthatseparating thecaseswillnotpresent justiciability issueswithrespectto

parties,ortoindividualarguments.ItpointsoutthatDCCircuitrulesallowpetitionerstouseevidence

outsidetheadministrativerecordtoestablishstanding.30

C. Synthesis Petitioners’showingthatEPAviewstheregulationsasfourpartsofaninterrelatedblockofregulationgives strong support to their claim. Beyond that, however, their arguments are incomplete. The

fundamental linkingquestionsaid to justifycoordination (whether EPAhas“authority to regulate”) is

vague,andtheguidelinesfor thefourregulationsare inthreeentirelydifferentsectionsoftheCAA.31Also,standing,asaconstitutionaljusticiabilityissue,isnotbeholdentoadministrativerecordsandlooks

to the final resultsofagencyaction.Thus,petitioners’ standingcaseshouldnotbeweakened if theirchallengesareseparated.

NeitherEPAnorstateintervenorsrespondtopetitioners’casesupport.However,ananalysisofthefour

casesrevealslittle.Inthefirstcitedcase,Davis v. DOJ,twopetitionswereheardanddecidedbythesame panel on the same day – but they both involved the very narrow question of retroactive

applicationofattorneys’feesunder2007amendmentstotheFreedomofInformationAct.32Similarly,in

Noramco of Del. v. DEA two petitions were coordinated, but both involved DEA approval ofspecialized importers under §823(a) of theControlled SubstancesAct.33For the In re TMI Litigation,the quote relied on in petitioners’ text34refers to consolidation (as opposed to coordination) of thecases at issue, and the issue in common (application of a particular evidentiary rule) was similarly

particular.35

28“[J]udicial review for any agency action is to be based ‘exclusively’ on the administrative record for thatparticularaction.”Idat11;seealso42U.S.C.§7607(d)(7)(A).29For two different arguments laying out the different questions, see Respondent’s Opposition to Motion forCoordinationofCases,supra note1, at12‐14,16;andResponse toPetitioners’Motion toCoordinateCasesbyIntervenerStates,supranote1,at2‐5.30D.C.Cir.R.15(c)(2),28(a)(7).31TheendangermentfindingwouldturnlargelyontheadequacyofthescientificbasisforclimatechangeandrulesestablishedinTitleIPartA;thetailpiperuledealswithTitleIIFederalEmissionStandardsforMovingSources,andtheTimingandTailoringRulescoverPreventionofSignificantDeterioration(PSD)concernsinTitleI,PartB.32Davisv.DOJ,610F.3d750(D.C.Cir.2010);JudicialWatchv.BLM,610F.3d747(D.C.Cir.2010).33NoramcoofDel.v.DEA,375F.3d1148,1153,1155‐57(D.C.Cir.2004).34The“purposeofsimilardeviceunderFederalRuleofCivilProcedure42(a)isto“avoidduplicationofeffort”and“preventconflictingoutcomes”ininterconnectedcases.”MotionforCoordinationofRelatedCases,supranote1,at14).35Thiswasanuclearradiationexposurecase,wheretwoclaimswere identical (appealingdismissalofevidence),andthethirdwassimilar (appealingmanipulationofevidencefines). InreTMILitig.,193F.3d613,622‐629,724(3dCir.1999).

10

Themost similar situation to the claims above comes from theNew York v. EPA cases,where thesamepartieschallengedtwodistinctrulesinterpretingCAA’sNewSourceReview(NSR)program.36Thecourt here denied consolidation but granted coordination, similar to what petitioners ask forhere. However, even here both cases involved NSR guidelines, thereby looking substantially more

similarthanEPA’sregulationshere.Thebattlelinesonthisissueappeartobeclear‐cut:petitionersseesomeadvantagefromconsolidation,

EPA some disadvantage. It is possible that petitioners hope to sully EPA’s Endangerment Findingdefensebylinking itdirectlytootherpartsofEPA’sregulatoryregimethatare less legallysupportable(andmorepoliticallycontroversial).However,coordinationherewillbedifficultforpetitionerstojustify

givenpriorpracticeinthisarea. V. MotionstoStayImplementationoftheRegulations

AsthecomplexoflitigationmovesforwardintheDCCircuit,opponentsofEPAregulationshavevoicedconcernsthatrulesduetotakeeffectinJanuary2011mayseverelyharmtheireconomiesbeforethey

haveachancetobeoverturnedincourt.Toavoidthis,threedifferentgroupsofpetitionersmovedonSeptember15tostayallorpartofEPA’sregulations.Asoutlinedabove,twomotions,oneheadedbytheCoalitionforResponsibleRegulation(CRR)andonefiledsolelybytheStateofTexas,seektostayall

regulations. The thirdmotion, froma coalitionheadedby theNationalAssociation ofManufacturers(NAM),asksonlytostaytheportionoftherulesthatwouldallowGHGregulationofstationarysources

(includingmanufacturingplants).EPAfiledaresponseonOctober28,2010.37Inrequestingastayofdefendants’activities,petitionersmustshowfourthings:1)thattheyarelikelyto

prevailonthemeritsofthecase;2)thattheywillsufferirreparable injuryifdefendantsareallowedtopursuetheiractivitiesduringlitigation;3)thatenforcingthisstaywillnothurtotherinterestedparties;

and4) that a stay is in thepublic interest.38TheDC Circuit has noted that “If the arguments for one

factorareparticularly strong,an injunctionmay issueeven if thearguments inotherareasare rather

weak.”39A preliminary analysis of the merits of these challenges is given above, though it is worth

notingthatthemovantshere“byaclearshowing,carr[y]theburdenofpersuasion.”40

A. Petitioners’Arguments

36 One case challenged procedures for calculating emissions, special treatment of certain plants, andrecordkeepingunderNSR.NewYorkv. EPA,413F.3d3(D.C.Cir.2005).Theother challengedtheexemptionofcertain‐sizedprojectsfromNSRReviewaltogether.NewYorkv.EPA,443F.3d880(D.C.Cir.2006).37Thebriefsanalyzedherearethesameasthoseanalyzedabove.Seethelistofbriefs,supranote2.38Nkenv.Holder,129S.Ct.1749,1757(2009);seealsoSeronoLaboratories, Inc.v.Shalala,158F.3d1313,1318(D.C.Cir.1998)(relieduponbyNAMetal.).39CityFedFin.Corp.v.OfficeofThriftSupervision,58F.3d738,746(D.C.Cir.1995);seealsoSeronoLaboratories,Inc.v.Shalala,158F.3d1313,1318(D.C.Cir.1998)(ReliedonbyTexas).40Mazurekv.Armstrong,520U.S.968,972(1997).

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Petitioners claim irreparable injury by discussing a wide range of potential harms. NAM points tobusinesslossesfromcarbonrequirementsandanexpensivepermittingprocess,aswellasconcernswith

uncertainty for small emittersprotectedby theTailoringRule. CRRechoes these economic concerns,while Texas focuses more on administrative harms (including the lost right to implement its ownregulatory program, and administrative costs imposed). All three complain that, permits will be

immediately required, theywill be impossible to acquire at theoutset, which could cause a de factomoratoriumonconstructionwork.

Inarguing thatastaywillnotharmotherparties,petitionersarguethatameredelaycouldnotharmEPA’s regulatory purpose. CRR and NAM particularly point out that because the benefits of permitswerenotquantified,therecanbenolossofbenefits;andTexassaysthat,“subjecttojudicialreview,”

otherstatesarefreetorevisetheirownlawstocomplywiththeseregulations.NAMgoesontoarguethattherewillbenolost“immediate”environmentalbenefit,andindeedtherecouldbealossifcarbon“leakage” sends manufacturing to more carbon intensive countries. NAM also emphasizes that the

TailpipeRuleasappliedtovehiclescouldstayinplace,achievingEPAgoals.Finally, petitioners argue that a stay is in the public interest in many ways. CRR argues that it is

necessarytogiveCongresstimetospeakonthematter.NAMagrees,andaddsitspreviouspointsthatenforcement would harm the economy and possibly lead to carbon leakage. Texas, meanwhile,emphasizestheneedforregulatorycertaintybeforebeginningactualregulation.

B. Respondents’Arguments Afterrespondingtothemeritsofpetitioners’claims,EPAturnsfirsttoirreparableinjury.Itsresponseis

thorough,andfollowssixmainlinesofargumentinchallengingafindingofirreparableinjury:

1. Economicloss,evenifreal,cannotbeconsideredirreparableharm;2. The chain of causation leading to economic stagnation is exaggerated, based on faulty

predictions,andspeculative(noinjunctionisavailableforspeculativeharms).3. EPAregulationsdecrease,ratherthanincrease,regulatoryuncertaintybyestablishingrules;4. PSDandTitleVpermitcostsareregulatoryburdens,whichcannotbeirreparableharm;5. Permit availability concerns are mostly false: EPA’s implementation process is eminently

workableandtherewillbenodefactoconstructionban.Texas’implementationconcernsthuswouldbeduetoTexas’ownirresponsibleactions,socannotbeblamedontheEPA;and

6. TexashasnosovereignrightnottoregulateGHGs,sothereisnofederalismconcern. EPA’sresponsestotheharmtootherinterestedpartiesandtothepublicinterestareinterrelated.EPA

firstmentions environmental harms thatwill result with anydelay of implementation, pointing to its

EndangermentFindingandMass v. EPA toargue that itsfailure toquantifydamagesdoesnotmean

therearenone.EPA thenpointsoutspecifically thattheVehicleRulehasbeenpartially implemented(includinginCalifornia),andrelieduponbytheautoindustry,andsostayingthatrulewouldparticularlyharmotherparties.

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C. Synthesis TheDCCircuit’sdecisionwillbe influencedbyhowconvincing itfindstherespectiveargumentsaboutthecertaintyandseverityofharmscausedbyEPAregulationstobusinessandtheeconomy.EPA’spointthatmerelyeconomicharmscannotqualifywillstrengthenitscase,butpermanentclosureoffactories

andlossofeconomicactivity,ifpetitionersaredeemedcorrectinthisprediction(bynomeanscertain),wouldstillberelevanttoanydecision.EPA’sargumentsaroundpermitcostsandavailabilityaremoresolid. EPA’s structure for issuingpermitsprovidesa federalbackstop that statesmayopt into if their

ownplansaredelayed.Statesmayoptnottousethisbackstop,butanyargumentfocusingonpoliticaleventualities would seem to violate DC Circuit Rules against preventing speculative damages. EPA’sargumentslookthestrongestagainstastayoftheVehicleRule,particularlysinceonepetitionergroup

agrees with them. They look the weakest when they minimize the possibility of economic upheavalthese regulations may bring as companies adhere to new BACT standards, though the point about“purelyeconomicharms”notqualifyingasirreparableinjurywillhelp.

AdecisionbytheDCCircuithereislikelyinlateNovemberorDecember(anystaymustbeissuedbefore

January2,2011topreventallagencyaction). VI. LookingForward:RemedyOptionsfortheCourt

Assumingthecasemovesforward,questionsremainastowhat,exactly,theDCCircuitwilldoifitrulesin favor of the challengers on themerits of their cases. The two primary options here are: absolute

vacatur (removing all force of law from the regulations), and remand of the case without vacatur(maintainingtheregulationsuntilEPAissuesvalidreplacements).

A. SeverabilityofRules The first question to ask is if remedies should apply to all regulations together, or to individualregulations.Here,theseverabilityofanagency’ssetofrelatedactions“dependsontheissuingagency’s

intent.” 41 In the present cases, language petitioners have cited showing that EPA considers its

regulations thus far tobe“four relatedactions”maybedamaging to the EPA if thecourtdeterminesthat oneof the four rules is unlawful. However, EPA’s regulations likely fall short of being a “single,regionalprogram”thatjustifiedunifiedtreatmentofCAIR.Giventhatsomepetitionershaveaskedfor

partial staysof EPAaction,EPAwillhavea strongcase that its regulationsdonotamount toa singleprogram,inatrainofargumentmirroringthatinpendingcasecoordinationmotions(above).

B. TheRuleforRemandvs.Vacatur Some precedent on these tradeoffs comes from the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which wassuccessfully challenged in the DC Circuit asNorth Carolina v. EPA. At issue in that case was an EPArulemakingthatestablishedacapandtradesystemtoreduceupwindstates’abilitytointerferewithair41NorthCarolinav.FERC,730F.2d790,795‐96(D.C.Cir.1984).

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qualityforfineparticulatematter indownwindstates.TheCourtultimatelyruledthatacapandtradesystem improperly interfered with National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) obligations in

violationof theCAA, but allowedEPA’s program to continueuntil it issued a replacement42(EPA justreleasedareplacementProposedTransportRuleinJuly2010withthefinalruleexpectedspring2011).43

InNorth Carolina, the court runs a two‐part test to determine whether to vacate EPA’s rules: “‘the

seriousnessof theorder’sdeficiencies . . . and thedisruptiveconsequencesofan interim change.’”44For the first, the court has justified a vacatur by saying that very little of overturned EPA regulations

wouldsurvive in“anythingapproachingrecognizable form.” Incurrent litigation,theEPA’sruleshavebeen challenged as being completely invalid (not merely incorrect), which would seem to support avacaturifEPAlosesonthemerits.

However, the firstquestionmaynotbe thedetermining factorhere. Evenanunjustifiable regulationmay remain in place depending on consideration of the other prong, which looks at disruptiveconsequences;andthisprongmaybeofmoreusetotheEPA.IntheNorthCarolinalitigation,thecourt

initiallyvacatedtherulingwithajustificationthatregulationactivityoverfineparticulatematterwould

continuethroughtraditionalchannels.45Thesamepanellateroverturnedthisinitialdetermination:

Theparties’persuasivedemonstration,extendingbeyondshort‐termhealthbenefitstoimpactsonplanningbystatesandindustrywithrespecttointerferencewiththestates’abilitytomeetdeadlinesforattainingnationalambientairqualitystandards. ..shows

that the rule has become so intertwined with the regulatory scheme that its vacaturwouldsacrificeclearbenefitstopublichealthandtheenvironmentwhileEPAfixestherule.NCv.EPA,550F.3dat1178‐79.

Thisdescribestherequirements toavoidvacaturfairlyclearly:EPAwillhavetoshowthatvacating itsGHG regulations would harm clear benefits to the environment (so it must justify its EndangermentFinding),inawaythat interfereswithanexistingregulatoryscheme(suchthatdisruptingthatscheme

wouldconstituteamajorsetbackforregulatoryefforts).Thecourthasdemonstratedparticularconcernwithdisruptingalready‐existingandwellestablishedtradingmarkets.

C. Synthesis Interestingly, thisdeterminationmaythusbeaffectedbytheoutcomeinthependingmotions tostayenforcementofEPAregulations: ifEPAisprevented fromregulatingduring litigation,therewillbeno

42Twoseparate rulingsarediscussedhere. TheDecember2008decision,NorthCarolinav.EPA,550F.3d1176(D.C.Cir.2008),overturnedtheJuly2008vacaturissuedinNorthCarolinav.EPA,531F.3d896(D.C.Cir.2008).43FederalImplementationPlansToReduceInterstateTransportofFineParticulateMatterandOzone,75Fed.Reg.45,210(Aug.2,2010).44Here,thecourtquotesAllied‐Signal,Inc.v.NuclearRegulatoryComm’n,998F.2d146,150‐51(D.C.Cir.1993).45Notably, the court was comforted that State Implementation Plan (SIP) Calls could continue to be issued inconjunctionwithNonattainmentArea (NA)andPreventionofSignificantDeterioration(PSD) requirementsunderTitleIoftheCAA.NCv.EPA,531F.3dat930.

14

regulatory structure to interrupt, as there was in North Carolina (though delay in carbon regulationcouldstilljustifyavoidingavacaturifEPAregulatoryactivitiesarestayed).Thisprongmayalsoaffect

remediesinapartialvictoryforchallengers:theTailoringRulehasbeensaidtofacethestrongestlegalchallenges,butitalsoreducestheregulatoryburdenimposedbytheotherrules.Realistically,thecourtmayhavetoperceiveastronglegalchallengetoboththeTailoringandTimingrulesinordertovacate.

EPA may claim further support from language suggesting that “it is appropriate to remand withoutvacatur inparticularoccasionswherethevacatur ‘wouldat least temporarilydefeat . . .theenhanced

protectionoftheenvironmentalvaluescoveredby’theEPAruleatissue.”Thislanguagecouldbeusedto argue against suspending carbon regulations, assuming the Endangerment Finding is supported.However,petitionersmayrespondbypointingoutthat“thethreatofdisruptiveconsequencescannot

save a rule when its fundamental flaws ‘foreclose EPA from promulgating the same standards on

remand.’”46

Scholars generally note that remand without vacatur is normally reserved for procedural flaws and

inadequateexplanations:“theD.C.Circuitdoesnot[waivevacatur]whereitfindsthattheagency’srules

violatethestatutetheagencyisadministering.”47Thisplain languagelooksbadforEPA,whichisafteralldefending its interpretationof theCAA. However, thecomparisontoNorthCarolina isparticularly

instructivehere:bothcaseswillpotentially involvemisapplicationofCAARules inevolving regulationactivities,andsotheleniencegrantedtoEPAinthefirstrulingshouldhelpEPA’schancesinthesecond.

VII. Conclusion

Theresolutionofthisandothersimilarcaseswillbeimportanttowatch,becauseEPA’sregulationshere

present the strongest source of national GHG mitigation activity in today’s politicalclimate. Furthermore, successful regulation may also catalyze legislative action: because suchregulations would likely be preempted by Congressional action, regulated entities may see a market

mechanism as superior to the command‐and‐control type of regulation that has characterized EPA’seffortsthusfar.

46Thislanguagecomesfromthelater‐reversedNCv.EPAdecision,butquotesastill‐validrulingfrom2007,NaturalRes.Def.Councilv.EPA,489F.3d1250,1261‐62(D.C.Cir.2007).47 Kristina Daugirdas, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: a New Judicial Remedy for Defective AgencyRulemaking,80N.Y.U.L.REV278,283(2005).Furthersupportforthiscomesfromcases:seeEDFv.EPA,898F.2d183(D.C.Cir.1990)(remandinganEPAdecisionforinadequateconsiderationoffactors);Allied‐Signal,Inc.v.U.S.NRC,988F.2d146(D.C.Cir.1993).

Appendix A: Summary of Arguments against EPA Regulations

Legal Argument CRR Texas NAM

Endangerment Finding Challenge X X

EPA unlawfully delegated its judgment to others (IPCC) x x

The IPCC is an unaccountable body, and does not consider the policy-relevant

risk/harm issues that EPA is obligated to consider

x

The IPCC has also shown itself to be unreliable in its assessments x x

Relying on the IPCC keeps relevant facts from the public record x x

EPA understated uncertainty and ignored alternative explanations x

EPA misconstrued endangerment finding by not defining at what level GHGs are

dangerous; that they are a "risk" is not enough

x x

EPA must consider policy choices in determining "endangerment" x

EPA invalidly considered GHGs not emitted by vehicles in its finding x

Tailpipe Rule Challenge X X

Any benefits from tailpipe reductions are too trivial to justify regulation because

they are a tiny fraction of global emissions

x x

This rule has no rational basis; it is redundant to NHTSA CAFE Standards x x

EPA invalidly failed to consider all impacts of the tailpipe rule - particularly its

role in allowing stationary source regulation

x x

Timing/Triggering Rule Challenge X X X

"Subject to regulation" covers pollutants listed when CAA was passed x x

EPA must issue a NAAQS to institute a PSD program and add to this list x x x

Alabama Power clearly says location must be the basis for PSD; areas must show

attainment of GHG NAAQS to be subject to PSD GHG rules

x x

Linking moving source emissions regulation to stationary source regulation

makes no sense within CAA structure

x

EPA's interpretation here would lead to absurd results x x x

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EPA's interpretation here would lead to absurd results x x x

EPA's interpretation differs from Congress' presumptive intent x

Tailoring Rule Challenge X X X

EPA directly violates clear, numerical regulation rules in the CAA x x x

"Absurd results" doctrine cannot be used because a natural reading of the CAA

would more easily avoid such results

x x

"Absurd results" doctrine cannot be used because CAA guidelines are specific

and numeric, not "words of general meaning"

x

"Administrative necessity" doctrine cannot be used because CAA's standards are

clear and allow no deviation

x x

"Administrative necessity" doctrine is little more than dicta x

"One-step-at-a-time doctrine" cannot be used because EPA is not putting itself

"on the track to compliance" - so it does not qualify here

x x

Also, EPA's regulations are industry-changing, not merely procedural x

"One-step-at-a-time" doctrine is EPA-created and not valid x

EPA usurps state sovereignty, violating EPA-state partnership rules x x

EPA's new state requirements followed improper procedure by requiring

reinterpritation of SIPs instead of new issued SIPs

x x

Even if proper, states are entitled to more implementation time x x

General Challenges

EPA ducked oversight by bouncing comments between rules and not considering

any directly; these actions were arbitrary and capricious

x

EPA failed to consider effects on minorities, energy supply, information requests,

and the economy as required by various laws

x

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Appendix B: Summary of Responses in Support of EPA Regulations

Legal Argument EPA States &

Envtls.

Endangerment Finding Response X X

EPA did not delegate its judgment: it vetted reports in Notice and Comment x x

The IPCC is reliable and uses stringent peer review: weak isolated attacks on alleged

misconduct do not undermine its conclusions

x x

The IPCC is well respected even by the IAC (cited by petitioners) x x

EPA need not reprint reports in the public record; it is impractical x

EPA also relied on USGCRP/NRC, whose validity is not at issue x

EPA did evaluate uncertainties and consider other explanations x x

Finding Endangerment does not require quantitative data; a rational discretionary

judgment that there is risk is sufficient

x x

Regardless, EPA did define endangerment thresholds x

Finding endangerment does not require consideration of policy implications x

Petitioners' demands here contradict the mandate in Mass v. EPA x

All six gases act together, so were considered together; the endangerment finding need

not be limited to the four GHGs emitted by vehicles

x

Tailpipe Rule Response X X

CAA requires EPA to regulate sources that contribute at all to endangerment x

Regardless, vehicle emissions are non-trivial contributors to climate change x

Mass v. EPA directly says that NHTSA regulation cannot replace CAA action x

Further, the CAA allows more targeted, effective EPA regulation x

EPA need not consider the Tailpipe Rule's role in enabling other regulations x x

Considering costs/benefits of derivative rules is disfavored, and impractical x

Timing/Triggering Rule Response X X

A pollutant can be subject to regulation for PSD even without a NAAQS: CAA §7476

requires a PSD finding after a NAAQS, but not only after a NAAQS

x x

Area is the basis for applying PSD; but being in attainment for any pollutant (not just

GHGs) will subject an area to PSD regulations: see Alabama Power

x x

PSD regulations and permits must consider all CAA-regulated pollutants x x

Title V permits are a separate issue, and must be issued even without PSD because

other greenhouse gas regulations will still apply to major sources

x

As Mass v. EPA notes, Congress wanted CAA to be flexible for new threats x

These PSD policies have been in place for years; review is no longer available x

Tailoring Rule Response X X

"Absurd Results" doctrine values intent and larger purpose over specific text x

A natural reading of the CAA support's EPA's conclusion. EPA hews closely to the text

while preserving Congress' intent to regulate dangerous pollutants

x

"Administrative necessity" doctrine values substantive over regulatory laws x x

CAA requires GHG regulation, so EPA can justify regulatory deviations here x x

"One-step-at-a-time doctrine" is usable: EPA's Four-step regulatory process notes, and

some petitioners agree, that EPA will cover all sources eventually

x x

The tailoring rule is critical to the viability of EPA's other regulations. Petitioners

confirm this fact when challenging the other three rules

x x

Note: no response to allegations that EPA improperly mandated state actions - these

issues were primarily addressed in the "irreparable harm" discussion

General Responses X

EPA's interpretive regulations are non-discretionary; economic, other effects must be

considered when issuing individual rules (particular BACTs, etc.).

x

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