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Peter Stastny Head of Safety Regulation Unit EUROCONTROL [email protected] ICAO Montreal, Thursday 29 March 2007 Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

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Overview A Performance-based Approach to Safety Monitoring Safety Performance Performance Measurement – the essential tool Measuring Safety Maturity Performance-based Approach to Managing Risk Risk management – part of SMS Safety oversight aspects – the role of ESARR 1 Risk classification methodology – defining tolerable safety Conclusions

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Page 1: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Peter StastnyHead of Safety Regulation [email protected]

ICAO Montreal, Thursday 29 March 2007

Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Page 2: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Overview A Performance-based Approach to Safety

Monitoring Safety Performance

Performance Measurement – the essential tool

Measuring Safety Maturity

Performance-based Approach to Managing Risk

Risk management – part of SMS

Safety oversight aspects – the role of ESARR 1

Risk classification methodology – defining tolerable safety

Conclusions

Page 3: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Risk Assessment New Systems

Recruitment/Selection

Training

CompetencyChecks

Refresher/Advanced Training

Procedures Operational Processes

Interface ATS CNS, AIM, Airports

CNS /AIMMaintenance Procedures

Emergency Procedures

Risk Assessment ATM Procedures

Risk Assessment Airspace Changes

Risk Assessment Software Changes

Incident Reporting

Incident Investigation

Lessons Learnt

Safety Surveys

and Follow-up

A systematic approach to the A systematic approach to the management of safetymanagement of safety

Proactive Reactive

“Historic” Safety Performance Measurement

Performance – part of SMS

Safety Maturity Measurement

Page 4: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Performance – part of Safety Oversight

ESARR 1….

Defines minimum arrangements/ processes for ATM safety oversight:

with certification

or without certification

A unique basis for harmonising and reinforcing the role and operation of national regulatory bodies

Requires monitoring of safety performance as part of safety oversight

II N TN T HH E FE F UU

TT UU RR E . . .E . . .

ESARR 1ESARR 1

SAFETY OVERSIGHT IN ATM

EUROCONTROL SAFETY REGULATORY REQUIREMENT(ESARR)

EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION

EDITION : 1.0EDITION DATE : 27-02-2002STATUS : RELEASED ISSUECLASS : GENERAL PUBLIC

Page 5: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

KPIs

PerformanceIndicators

Information

ManagementMeasurement Metrics

Laws Incidents

Accidents Culture

Audit Compliance

SMS ProceduresResourcesAIB Recommendations

Public/Industry

States/Industry

Interested Parties

OrganisationalLevel(Service Providers)

Key Principles

• Information to public/stakeholders• Call to action by stakeholders

• Facilitates identification of scope of action required

• Facilitates management of improvement of service

The whole process needs to be a continuous improvement activity

Safety Performance Measurement

Page 6: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Occurrence-based performance measurement

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Runway Incursions(occurrence per million aircraft movements and severity)

A

B

C

E

D

Not classif ied

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Near Controlled Flight Into Terrain(occurrence per million flight hours and severity)

A

B

C

E

D

Not classif ied

EUROCONTROL has developed safety data reporting to identify key risk areas at European level…

Page 7: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

GrossGrossnegligencenegligence OmissionsOmissions SlipsSlips

LapsesLapses MistakesMistakes ViolationsViolationsCriminal Criminal OffencesOffences

unintentionaldeliberate deliberateManagement Statement in

Safety Policy

Procedures

Proactive

Management

Procedures

Proactive

Management

LAWSLAWS

Establishing a Just Culture

Page 8: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

ATM Safety System Maturity in ECAC States

Independent maturity assessment system Applied across ECAC Region Now being expanded to

neighbouring States

ANSP Global Maturity

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Normalised State Count

Mat

urity

Sco

re

ASP 2002ASP 2004ASP 2006

Regulator Global Maturity

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Normalised State Count

Mat

urity

Sco

re

Reg 2002Reg 2004Reg 2006

Page 9: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Performance-based Approach to Managing Risk

Risk Assessment New Systems

Recruitment/Selection

Training

CompetencyChecks

Refresher/Advanced Training

Procedures Operational Processes

Interface ATS CNS, AIM, Airports

CNS /AIMMaintenance Procedures

Emergency Procedures

Risk Assessment ATM Procedures

Risk Assessment Airspace Changes

Risk Assessment Software Changes

Incident Reporting

Incident Investigation

Lessons Learnt

Safety Surveys

and Follow-up

A systematic approach to the A systematic approach to the management of safetymanagement of safety

Proactive Reactive

Risk Assessment and Mitigation

Page 10: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Risk Assessment and Mitigation - 1

Empirical methods of risk assessment no longer sufficient

Systems more complex – failure modes more difficult to identify

Mitigation methods are more complex too – and more costly

Performance-based approach to mitigation is needed – what are the design targets to be met?

Page 11: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Risk Assessment and Mitigation - 2

Transparency is also required by those who will: Own and operate the system Ultimately rely on the safety of the system Bear liability if the system fails

A formal, structured and visible approach is the only answer

It is required by ESARR 4 and the EC’s Common Requirements for ANS provision

A risk classification scheme is a necessary start point for the decision-making that must follow

Page 12: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

This is the approach being implemented inThis is the approach being implemented inAir Traffic Management in EuropeAir Traffic Management in Europe

Risk Management

Risk Management is primarily… …a task for the service provider

The provider / operator manages the system and its hazards

Risk management processes are conducted as part of a Safety Management System

Legal requirement for service providers to conduct risk assessment and mitigation in relation to the

implementation of changes to the ATM system

Page 13: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

DETERMINATION& SPECIFICATION

DESIGN ANDDEVELOPMENT

INSTALLATIONAND TRANSITION

OPERATIONOPERATION

PROJECT

‘‘SAFETY CASE’SAFETY CASE’

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION ACTIVITIESRISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION ACTIVITIES

ACCEPTANCEACCEPTANCEREVIEW OF THE RISK ASSESSMENTREVIEW OF THE RISK ASSESSMENTAND MITIGATION DOCUMENTATIONAND MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION

This is the sort of process required in ESARR 4 ...This is the sort of process required in ESARR 4 ...Risk Management

Page 14: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

This has to be done by the provider...This has to be done by the provider...

DETERMINATION& SPECIFICATION

DESIGN ANDDEVELOPMENT

INSTALLATIONAND TRANSITION

OPERATIONOPERATION

PROJECT

‘‘SAFETY CASE’SAFETY CASE’

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION ACTIVITIESRISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION ACTIVITIES

ACCEPTANCEACCEPTANCEREVIEW OF THE RISK ASSESSMENTREVIEW OF THE RISK ASSESSMENTAND MITIGATION DOCUMENTATIONAND MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION

DETERMINATION & SPECIFICATION

DESIGN ANDDEVELOPMENT

INSTALLATIONAND TRANSITION

OPERATIONOPERATION

PROJECT

‘‘SAFETY CASE’SAFETY CASE’

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION ACTIVITIESRISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION ACTIVITIES

ACCEPTANCEREVIEW OF THE RISK ASSESSMENTAND MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION

Risk Management

Page 15: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

But what about this ?But what about this ?

DETERMINATION & SPECIFICATION

DESIGN ANDDEVELOPMENT

INSTALLATIONAND TRANSITION

OPERATIONOPERATION

PROJECTPROJECT

‘‘SAFETY CASE’SAFETY CASE’

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION ACTIVITIESRISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION ACTIVITIES

ACCEPTANCEREVIEW OF THE RISK ASSESSMENTAND MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION

DETERMINATION& SPECIFICATION

DESIGN ANDDEVELOPMENT

INSTALLATIONAND TRANSITION

OPERATION

PROJECT

‘SAFETY CASE’

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

Risk Assessmentand MitigationDeliverables

RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION ACTIVITIES

ACCEPTANCEACCEPTANCEREVIEW OF THE RISK ASSESSMENTREVIEW OF THE RISK ASSESSMENTAND MITIGATION DOCUMENTATIONAND MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION

WHO ACCEPTS THE WHO ACCEPTS THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW INTRODUCTION OF NEW

SYSTEMS AND CHANGES ?SYSTEMS AND CHANGES ?

Risk Management

Page 16: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Acceptance of new systems and changesAcceptance of new systems and changes

In some cases, the provider In some cases, the provider decides about the change…decides about the change…

… … uusing risk assessment and sing risk assessment and mitigation process to support its mitigation process to support its

internal decision-making.internal decision-making.

This is possible if:This is possible if: The provider’s process isThe provider’s process is demonstrated to be effective,demonstrated to be effective,

Enough safety oversight isEnough safety oversight is focused on these processesfocused on these processes (e.g. by means of audits)(e.g. by means of audits)

Regulators may identify new Regulators may identify new systems and changes…systems and changes…

… … to be directly accepted by the to be directly accepted by the regulatory authority through a regulatory authority through a

formal acceptance (or approval)formal acceptance (or approval)

The Regulator makes the final The Regulator makes the final decision on the acceptability of decision on the acceptability of the system to go into operationthe system to go into operation

The review of the ‘safety case’ The review of the ‘safety case’ provides the Regulator with provides the Regulator with evidence to support his decisionevidence to support his decision

EUROCONTROLEUROCONTROL

The provider…The provider… The regulator…The regulator…

Page 17: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

WHO ACCEPTS THE WHO ACCEPTS THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW INTRODUCTION OF NEW

SYSTEMS AND CHANGES ?SYSTEMS AND CHANGES ?The ESARR 1 Approach

The ESARR 1 ESARR 1 process for the safety oversight of changesprocess for the safety oversight of changes to the ATM system:

Is implemented by the Regulator by considering results from the risk assessment and mitigation process conducted by the provider Defines a minimum category of changes, whose safety case must be reviewed by the Regulator…

…Based on the severity of the hazards identified by the provider in relation to the change

Provides the regulator with discretion to review other changes

EUROCONTROLEUROCONTROL

Page 18: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

WHO ACCEPTS THE WHO ACCEPTS THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW INTRODUCTION OF NEW

SYSTEMS AND CHANGES ?SYSTEMS AND CHANGES ?

Accepted throughATM provider’s procedures(which are subject toregulator’s auditing)

Implementationby the provider of the change (as accepted

by the regulator)

REGULATORREGULATORCONDUCTSCONDUCTS

SAFETYSAFETYREGULATORYREGULATORY

AUDITSAUDITS

REGULATOR APPLIES

DIFFERENT APPROACH DEPENDING

ON THE CHANGE

MajorMajor

MinorMinor

Provider conducts risk assessment

and mitigation and produces a

‘safety case’

Planned Change

(new system or change to

existing system)

Yellow = provider Red = regulator

REGULATOR REVIEWS REGULATOR REVIEWS SAFETY CASESAFETY CASE

Acceptanceby the

regulator

Additional Safety

Conditions imposed

MAJOR = 1. Those changes whose assessment of the potential effects of hazards on

the safety of aircraft, conducted by the provider in accordance with ESARR 4, identifies hazards with potential to lead to an accident or serious incident

2. Other changes that the Regulator considers appropriate to review

The Role Of OversightEUROCONTROLEUROCONTROL

Page 19: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

European ATM service providers are required to implement risk assessment and mitigation as part of their SMS:

Risk assessment and mitigation processes are subject to regulatory auditing as any other safety-related process

In addition, the Regulator will specifically review the results of these processes in relation to, at least, the most critical safety-related changes

The implementation of these changes will be subject to regulatory acceptance based on the results.

Summarising the Approach to Risk Management

Page 20: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Risk Classification Scheme

We now have a severity classification scheme for the identification of the effects of ATM/CNS related hazards on the safety of aircraft. (EC law)

We also have a risk classification scheme with a maximum tolerable probability for ATM directly contributing to accidents in the

ECAC region (severity class 1) ….but

maximum tolerable probability for the severity classes 2 to 5 have still to be developed.

States, EC and EUROCONTROL acting together to complete and update those probabilities,

Development of regulatory material for the establishment of a quantified risk classification scheme at regulatory level .

Page 21: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Tolerable?

Continue the design

54321

Severity of the effect

CatastrophicMajor Average Minor No effect

likelihood

I

II

IIIIV

V

VI

effects

Hazard identification.

Likelihood

Severity

Mitigation

Risk

noyes

Safetytarget

Identifying Tolerability of Change

Safety objectives

Page 22: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Performance-based ATM framework… We are on the way…good progress being made. Experience so far…

A performance-driven approach requires: -

Data (occurrences, maturity etc.)

“Just Culture” – overcoming inhibitors to progress

A measurement system, harmonised globally

Analysis capability

Key Performance Indicators (ultimately)

Conclusions - 1

Page 23: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

We’ve had a risk-based approach to the management of safety for decades, but….

The risks are more difficult to identify now

Move from “historic” to “predictive” risk assessment

A formal, visible assurance methodology

We need systems to measure the risks before and after changes to the system (was mitigation successful?)

A fully functioning SMS will provide the tools to do the job

Conclusions - 2

Page 24: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Global needs in safety: -

A common approach to safety – management and regulation

Common minimum levels of safety

Availability of information on which to base a performance-driven approach

Common safety “language” – terms, taxonomy and appreciation of risk

The correct balance between State functions and those of other stakeholders

Conclusions - 3

Page 25: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Peter StastnyHead of Safety Regulation [email protected]

ICAO Montreal, Thursday 29 March 2007

Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments

Page 26: Ensuring the Safety of Future Developments