Enhancing Trust and Federal Horizontality in Crown - First ...Enhancing Trust and Federal Horizontality in Crown - First Nations Fiscal Relationships John Lees and Caitlin McCulloch

EnhancingTrustandFederalHorizontalityinCrown-FirstNationsFiscalRelationships

JohnLeesandCaitlinMcCullochOrbisRiskConsultingInc.

December2017

ThisdiscussionpaperisintendedtoinformtheFirstNations-CanadaJointCommitteeontheFiscalRelationship.Thestatementsinthisdiscussionpaperreflectthefindingsandconclusions

oftheauthorsandnottheGovernmentofCanadaorIndigenousstakeholderswhoparticipated.


3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSWearegratefultotheAssemblyofFirstNationsandtheGovernmentofCanadaforsupportingthisstudy.WesincerelythankDanielWilsonandKenMeddoftheAssemblyofFirstNationsandGonzague Guéranger, Renetta Siemens, Martha Sharl, and Kate Harrison of Indigenous andNorthernAffairsCanada,allofwhomspentagreatdealoftimepatientlyansweringourquestionsandprovidingguidance.Wethankallstakeholderswhoagreedtobeinterviewed,sharedtheirknowledgeandprovidedfeedbackonthepaper.We also acknowledge the contributions of Andrée Loucks for her work in researching andsummarizingthehistoryofCrown–FirstNationsrelationsandtreatymaking,KristinMacraeforherresearchandsynthesisofMiawpukekFirstNation’sexperiencewithagrantagreement,andAinsleeKent forher general editorial contributionsand thoughtful commentson thepaper’scontentandpresentation.


4

TABLEOFCONTENTSExecutiveSummary..............................................................................................................................................5

1. Introduction..............................................................................................................................................13

2. Approach...................................................................................................................................................17

3. ChallengesofDeliveringFirstNationsProgrammingwithinCanada’sFederalSystemofGovernment...18

4. ImprovingCoherenceofFederalPoliciesandPrograms...........................................................................20

5. CallstoReducetheAdministrativeBurdenonFirstNationsGovernments.............................................21

6. RethinkingHowthePolicyonTransferPaymentsisAppliedtoFirstNationsTransfersandEnhancingFlexibilityinFirstNationsFundingAgreements.................................................................................................22

7. IncreasingtheUseofFlexibleFundingApproaches..................................................................................24

8. DiminshingtheRoleoftheFederalGovernmentbyEnsuringthatFirstNationsGovernmentshaveSufficientFunding..............................................................................................................................................26

9. OpportunitiestoEnhanceFederalHorizontality.......................................................................................31

10. ConsiderationsfortheCreationofNewFederalDepartments................................................................36

AnnexA–ImportantHistoricalContext.............................................................................................................42

AnnexB–ParticipationofTribalLeadersintheU.S.FederalBudgetProcess...................................................49

AnnexC–StatutoryProgramsandAppropriations,aNecessaryConditionforBuildingTrustinCrown–FirstNationRelationships..........................................................................................................................................50

AnnexD–SupportingFirstNationsInstitutionBuilding....................................................................................53

AnnexE-OverviewoftheMiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement.............................................................57

AnnexF–EnhancingFederalProgramsandSupportsforFirstNationsGovernance,Administration,CapacityDevelopmentandNation-Rebuilding.................................................................................................................62

AnnexG–JointEvaluationsofFirstNationsProgramming...............................................................................65


5

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

ImagineaCanadawhereFirstNationshavecleanwater,equalaccesstoservices,educationandhealthoutcomesthatarecomparabletootherCanadians,healthyhomes,strongemploymentandsecurecommunities.ACanadafreeofFirstNationsstereotypesandsystemicbiasestowardFirstNationspeople.ACanadawhereallordersofgovernmentdoeverythingpossibletoenhancelife chances for First Nations people. This Canada requires resolve of all Canadians andcollaborationamongFirstNations,federal,provincial,territorialandmunicipalgovernments.Inthis Canada, FirstNations governmentswould set local programpriorities andmake difficultdecisionsonallocatingscarceresources.WhiletheroleofthefederalpublicservicewouldbegreatlydiminishedinthisCanada,theGovernmentofCanadawouldhaveastrongandunitaryrelationshipwitheachFirstNation,arelationshipwhereallfederalofficialsworkcohesivelytosupportandenablethesuccessofaFirstNationgovernment. InthisCanada,therewouldbedeep trust in the capabilities and character of First Nations governments, and Crown - FirstNationsrelationshipswouldbecharacterizedbymutual-trust.Introduction

ThisdiscussionpaperisintendedtoinformtheFirstNations-CanadaJointCommitteeontheFiscalRelationship.Thestatementsinthisdiscussionpaperreflectthefindingsandconclusionsof the authors and not the Assembly of First Nations, Government of Canada or otherstakeholderswhoparticipated.Thisdiscussionpaperexploresandexamineshowfederaltransferpaymentregimescanbestrengthenedthroughmorehorizontalapproaches.Toensurethatourresearchandsuggestedsolutionsareusefulandpractical,itwasnecessarytoestablishacommonunderstandingofwhatweseektoachievethroughenhancedfederalhorizontality.Basedonourinterviewsandresearch,wedevelopedthefollowingdefinition:

EnhancingfederalhorizontalityinthedeliveryofFirstNationstransferpaymentsistheactofintegrating, coordinating and streamlining policies, administrative regimes and transferpaymentmechanismsto:

► reduce federal government involvement in FirstNations programmingwhere FirstNationsgovernmentsarecapableandwillingtoassumeresponsibility;

► improvetheeffectivenessofFirstNationsprogramminginachievingdesiredresultsandcontributingtoimprovedsocio-economicoutcomes;

► harmonize and streamline the funding relationships between First Nationsgovernmentsandthefederalgovernment;

► reduce administrative burdens on FirstNations governments andother recipients;and

► support First Nations governments and other First Nations institutions in


6

strengthening their governance and management capabilities and accountabilityrelationships.

ImportanceofPromotingTrustinCrown-FirstNationsFiscalRelationships

Wewerenotaskedtowriteadiscussionpaperontheimportanceoftrust,butourstakeholderinterviewsandresearchmadeitclearthatanyeffortstoimprovefederalhorizontalityneededtopromote trust in Crown - First Nations relationships. Indigenous stakeholders consistentlypointedoutthattheexistingfunder-recipientrelationshipsoffederalgovernmentdepartmentsandIndianActbandcouncilsobstructthebuildingoftrust.IfIndigenousandnon-IndigenousCanadiansaretocreateandembarkonapathwaytowardaharmonious and shared future, there will need to be mutual trust in Crown - First Nationsrelationships. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) remarked that a lack ofunderstandingabout Indigenoushistories, rightsandconflicts “reinforces racistattitudesandfuelscivicdistrustbetweenAboriginalpeoplesandotherCanadians”.TrustbetweenFirstNation,federal, provincial and territorial governments can create space for good faith negotiations,cooperation, experimentation and shared achievements. Sadly, the policies, rules andapproaches devised to administer First Nations fiscal transfers over the last 150 years werecreatedduringtimeswhenCanadahelddeepdistrustinthecapabilitiesandcharacterofFirstNationsgovernments.AnyeffortstoenhancefederalhorizontalityinthedeliveryofFirstNationsfiscal transfersmust avoid promulgating federal policies, administrative regimes and fundingapproachesthatimpedethebuildingoftrust,orbreeddistrust.Buildingtrustisanythingbutsimple.Choosingtobeloyal,respectfulandfaithfulareconsciouschoices,butthesamecannotbesaidfortrust.AsauthorStephenCoveydescribesit,“trustisequalpartscharacterandcompetency”.Trustisnotsomuchachoice,itisearnedandbuilt,andoncelost,ishardtoregain.Courtsandhumanrightstribunalscanenforcerespectforlegal,treatyandfiduciaryobligationsandIndigenousrights,buttrustcannotbeenforced.Forperfectlyvalidreasons,FirstNationspeopleandtheirgovernmentshavegrownsuspiciousofthewordsandintentionsofprovincial,territorialandfederalgovernments.RebuildingtrustofFirst Nations peoples and governments will require time, thoughtfulness, hard work andpersistence.Removingthebarrierstotrustisanessentialfirststep,onethatfederalofficialshavegreat influence over. This includes replacing federal transfer payment regimes with fiscalrelationshipsthataretrulygovernment-to-government,includingpracticesthatpromotestrongandcapableFirstNationsgovernmentsandreinforcetrustinCrown-FirstNationsrelationships.


7

It iseasytoarguethat“trustbuilding”beplacedaboveotherobjectiveswhendesigningFirstNations fiscal relationships and related transfers. However, for federal bureaucrats whosecareersbridgemanygovernments,itcanbedifficultandscarytomakebolddecisionsthatmightbeunpopularwithafuturegovernment,particularlywherelegalandpolicyframeworksremainunclear.Decisionstoflowfundingtoorganizationswithoutdemonstratedcapabilitiesareeasilycontortedintoirresponsibleinvestmentsbyauditorsandcanbecomefodderforopportunisticindividualsbentonshowcasing“mismanagement”ingovernment.Totemperthepublicservice’stendencytowardcautionandincrementalism,governmentsmustbeclearabouttheirobjectives,expectedresultsandrisktolerances.Thisincludesbeingopenandtransparentabouttheneedfor trade-offs, including thewillingness to accept negative consequences (e.g. willingness toaccept less influence over programs and targeted results to achieve improved relationships,strongerpartners,andimprovedsocio-economicoutcomes).SpeakingattheLaFontaine-BaldwinSymposiumin2002,GeorgeErasmus,co-chairoftheRoyalCommission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) remarked that “public discourse with AboriginalPeopleshasbeenovertakenwithinertiainrecentyears”.FirstNationspeopleknowfirst-handthatthehumanconsequencesofthisinertiacanbedire,includingtragicandirreversiblehumanconsequences.Formanyyears,thisinertiahasbeenfueledbydistrust.Distrustoffederalofficialsin First Nations governments and distrust of First Nations people in federal politicians andbureaucrats.Thecurrentgovernmenthassentstrongsignalsthroughitswordsandactionsthatitunderstandstheneedtobuildtrust intheimmediateterminordertoadvancelongertermobjectives.Anexcellentexampleofthisisthefederalgovernment’sJuly2017decisiontoplaceamoratoriumon the consideration the own source revenues of First Nations under Self-GovernmentAgreementswhencalculatingtheirfiscaltransfers.Bytemporarilyhaltingtheconsiderationof“ownsourcerevenues”incalculatingtransfers,thefederalgovernmentmadeclearthatbuildingtrustintheimmediatetermwasnecessarytoadvancelongertermobjectives.In highlighting opportunities to enhance federal horizontality in Crown - First Nations fiscalrelationships we have been mindful that any measures taken must be compatible with theobjectiveofrebuildingtrustinCrown–FirstNationsrelationships.Challenges of Delivering First Nations Programming within Canada’s Federal System ofGovernment

In policy settings where governments look to program-specific results as the standard fordiagnosingproblems,drivingprogramdeliveryandevaluatingexecutiveperformance,thereisanintrinsicbiastowardpolicyandprograminterventionsthatfavourprogram-specificoutputs,


8

attheriskoffocusingtoolittleonenhancingoutcomesforindividualsandcommunitiesservedby these programs. Strategies to counterbalance these potential biases are explored in thisdiscussionpaper.Theseincludeenhancementstoprogramevaluationapproaches, changestothefederalbudgetprocess, shiftingawayfromcostingtowardlonger-termcost-benefitanalysis, enhancing the coherence of programs and policies and designing programs that are moreintegratedandinteroperable.Within Canada’sWestminstermodel of federal government, FederalMinisters, theHouse ofCommons,TreasuryBoardandtheMinisterofFinanceallplayimportantrolesinensuringthattaxdollarsareprudentlyspentandresultsareachieved.Tomeettheiraccountabilityobligations,thesefederalofficialsneedcomfortthatgovernmentprogramsandinvestmentsaresoundandassurancesthatresultsarebeingachievedinacost-effectivemanner.Theseassurancesrequireinformation and this information creates heavy administrative burdens on First Nationsgovernments.

The2006BlueRibbonPanelonGrantsandContributions concluded that, “notonly is itpossible to simplify administration while strengthening accountability, it is absolutelynecessarytodothefirstinordertoensurethelatter”.1TheHarvardProjectonAmericanIndianEconomicDevelopment,withitshundredsofresearchprojectsovermorethan30years,foundthatlocalgovernmentcontrol,capableandculturallyappropriategovernmentinstitutionsandaccesstoadequatefunding,areallnecessarytotacklepoverty.Inthearenaofinternationaldevelopment,Canadaandotherdevelopednationshavecometorealizeandacceptthatdevelopingnationsmustsettheirownpovertyreductionpriorities,developtheirowncapabilitiesandrelyontheirownaccountabilityregimesiftheyaretoachievemeaningfulandsustainedprogress.Thebodyofresearchmakesclearthatlocalcontrolandaccess to adequate funding are necessary pre-conditions to build capable Indigenousgovernments.Forfearoffailingtomeettheiraccountabilityobligations,federalofficialsremainreluctanttorelinquishcontroloverprogramdesignandspendingdecisionstoFirstNationsgovernmentsthathavenotalreadydemonstratedthenecessarycapabilities.

DiminishingtheNeedforFederalHorizontality

Withadequatefiscalsupportandautonomy,FirstNationsgovernmentswillgrowstrongerandescapethecycleofmanagingpovertyandcrises.WithstrongandmorecapableFirstNationsgovernments,therewouldbelessneedforfederalgovernmentinvolvement.Putanotherway,therewouldbe less imperative todevelop complexhorizontal approacheswithin the federalgovernmentifFirstNationsgovernmentshadthefinancialmeansandautonomytogovern.


9

Toachieveastateofgreatercapacity,FirstNationsgovernmentsneedadequatefundingfortheirinstitutions,programsandservices,andgeneralgovernmentcosts(e.g.financialmanagement,communications, human resources management, information technology, planning andreporting,employeebenefits,accommodations,counciloperatingcosts,rightsresearch,bylawdevelopment, community engagement, enforcement of community bylaws, among manyothers).FirstNationsleadershavelongadvocatedforincreasedfederalfundingtosupportthecosts of local First Nations governments and First Nations institutions that provide capacitysupportstolocalgovernments.Thecommonargumentisthatchronicunderfunding(i.e.bothfordirect programdelivery and administration and governance) has gutted the capacity of theirgovernmentsandimpairedtheirabilitytoproactivelyengage,plan,overseeandimprove.

Tobetterunderstandthefederalgovernment’sroleinfundingthegeneralgovernmentcostsofFirstNationsgovernments,therearesomekeyquestionsworthyofexamining,including:

o WhatwoulditcostforaFirstNationgovernmenttoproperlyresourceitsgovernanceandadministrationfunctions?

o WhatistheFederalGovernment’sroleinsupportingthesecosts?o What funding do First Nations governments currently have access to for core

administration and governance functions (i.e. contributions from all funders andcontributionsfromtheownsourcerevenuesofFirstNations)?

o How might the federal government improve its approaches to calculating anddistributingfundingforcoreadministrationandgovernancefunctions?

o How can the Federal Government indirectly support the capacity of First Nationsgovernments(e.g.throughsupportstoFirstNationsinstitutions,etc.)?

Whilethescopeofthisdiscussionpaperdidnotincludeafullexaminationofthesequestions,theyarebrieflyexploredtohelp informconversations,andpossibly,supportamore in-depthstudyatalaterdate.

OpportunitiestoEnhanceFederalHorizontalityandTrustinFirstNationsTransferPayments

Ourreviewofliteratureandtheexperiencesoftheindividualsinterviewedforthisstudypointtosomeopportunitiestoenhancefederalhorizontalityinthedeliveryoftransferpayments,whilealso promoting strong and capable FirstNations governments. The solutions thatweremostprominentaresummarizedbelow.

► Coordinate and Increase Federal Investments in Planning Capacity and Results

Frameworks: Investments incommunity-basedplanningandresults reporting forFirstNations governmentswould help thembuild consensus andmomentum in advancinglocalprioritiesandallow funders tobetter react toandsupport communitypriorities.Whilesomefederalprogramsalreadyprovidecontributionsforplanningactivities,amore


10

consistent and coordinated federal approach is needed. To monitor achievement ofcommunity-based priorities and plans, First Nations governments also need strongperformancemeasurement regimes, including capacity tomeasure and report on theresults achieved. Enhancing planning and reporting capacities would require directinvestmentsinFirstNationsgovernmentsandindirectinvestmentsthroughFirstNationsinstitutionsthatcanprovideknowledge-sharing,materialsandadvice.

► Increase Flexibility in Programs and Funding Approaches: First Nations often lack

opportunities to set their own strategies for local programs and services, as federalprogramming is generally tied to specific program activities. Additionally, somecommunityneedsarenotcoveredbyexisting federalprogramming.Harmonizinghowandwhenfederalfundersprovideflexibilityforlocalprioritysettingandbudgetdecisionsisnecessarytoachievegreaterflexibility.Additionalmeasurescouldincludeharmonizingprogram terms and conditions, increaseduseof flexible funding approaches, and lessprescriptiveprogrammingwouldallowFirstNationsgovernments todevelopprograminterventionsthatbetteraddresscommunityneeds.Moreflexible fundingapproaches(e.g.grantfundingorstatutorytransferswithfewconditions)couldreduceconditionalityandincreaseflexibilityinintergovernmentaltransferstoFirstNationsgovernmentswithproven governance and program delivery capabilities. Thismay requiremore gradualtransferofcontrolforprogramswhereriskstohumanhealthandsafetyarehighest.

► HarmonizeProgramTermsandConditions:Thereareoveronehundredsetsofprogram

terms and conditions for Indigenous programming, most of which only apply to onefederaldepartment.ManyrestricttheabilityoffederalandFirstNationsofficialstobecreativeinhowprogramsaredeliveredandsomeestablishadministrativerequirementsthatarenotrisk-based.Anopportunityexiststostreamlineandharmonizeprogramtermsand conditions for Indigenous programming to ensure that they reinforce a fundingrelationship and administrative regimes that are consistent with a government-to-governmentrelationship.Anopportunitytoincreaseflexibilitywouldbetoincludebroadpovertyreduction,capacitybuildingandotherauthoritiesinall,ormost,programtermsandconditions(i.e.thiswouldalloweachprogramtosupportinnovativestrategiesandinitiativesthataligntocommunityneeds).

► InvestinDataandResearch:Alackofevidence-basedresearchanddataimpairspolicy-

makingandprogramdesignforalllevelsofgovernment.IncreasedfundingforresearchanddataanalyticscoulddrawattentiontotheprogrammingneedsofFirstNationsandgapsinexistingprogramsandservices.ThisknowledgewouldsupportenhancementstoFirstNations,federal,provincial,andmunicipalprogramming.Aconcertedapproachto


11

establishingandfundingIndigenousresearchprioritiesinCanada,asisalreadydoneforinternationaldevelopment,healthandsocialresearch,couldhelptoenhancethebreadthand relevance of research. While the First Nations Information Governance Centre(FNIGC) is funded to gather and disseminate some data and knowledge, additionalinvestments to improve access to quality data are necessary to support research andanalysis.ThereissomecoordinationofIndigenous-focusedresearchinCanada(e.g.forhealth research), but not a central Indigenous-focused research, collections andpublishingorganization.SuchanorganizationexistsinAustralia,theAustralianInstituteof Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), which had a budget of$25.7Millionin2016-172.

► Simplify Accountability Relationships for the Federal Cabinet and First Nations

Governments:Accountability for Indigenouspoliciesandprograms isdividedbetweenmanyFederalMinistersandfederaldepartments.Collaborationoccurswhentherearecrises or political imperatives, but it is more difficult to sustain collaboration on anongoingbasis.ReducingthenumberofFederalMinistersanddepartmentsresponsiblefordeliveringFirstNationsprogrammingwould reduce thenumberandcomplexityofaccountabilityrelationshipsbetweenFirstNationsgovernmentsandtheGovernmentofCanada.

► Reduce Administrative Burden on First Nations Governments to Strengthen

Accountability: Each federal department, and in some cases, each departmentalprogram, establishes distinctive administrative requirements and conditions for FirstNations governments. Few of these funding relationships emulate intergovernmentaltransfersthatapproachfederal-provincialfiscalrelationshipsorCanada’sdevelopmentassistance transfers todevelopingnations. Further,manyadministrative requirementsattachedtofederaltransfersarenotrisk-based,despitethisbeinganexplicitrequirementoftheTreasuryBoardPolicyonTransferPayments(PTP).Streamliningandharmonizingthewebofrulescouldbeachievedthroughacommonfederaltransferpaymentcontrolframework. (e.g. directive to ensure consistency in selection of funding approach,mandatoryconsiderationofcommunity-basedprioritiesandplans,commoncapabilitiesassessmentforallfederalfunders,commonfundingagreementtermsandconditionsthatreflecttheintergovernmentalnatureofFirstNationstransfers,commoncomplianceandmonitoringregimes,andaminimalistapproachtosettingreportingrequirements,etc.).

ConsiderationsfortheEstablishmentofNewFederalDepartments

OnAugust28,2017,theGovernmentofCanadaannouncedplanstorealignaccountabilitiesandprogrammingforIndigenousandnorthernprogramming,includingthedissolutionofINACand


12

thecreationoftwonewfederaldepartments.ThePrimeMinisteremphasizedthe“needtoshedtheadministrativestructuresandlegislationthatwereconceivedinanothertimeforadifferentkindofrelationship”4andemphasizedthat“theleveloftheambitionofthisgovernmentcannotbeachievedthroughexistingcolonialstructures”.5Whilethepotentialchallengesandsolutionshighlightedthroughoutthispaperareallrelevantconsiderationsfortheshapingofthesenewdepartments, this discussion paper examines three additional questions related to the newdepartment:

► howtodovetailandalignthemanyparallelconversationsaboutaFirstNation’spursuitofnationrebuilding,self-determinationandself-governance;

► howtoachievetruegovernment-to-governmentrelationships;and

► which programs to merge into the new Indigenous Services and Crown IndigenousRelationsdepartments.

The discussion paper examines the many parallel conversations that exist between federalofficials and First Nations governments about self-determination and self-governance, andsuggests harmonizing these into one unitary conversation. To this end, an open-ended andexploratory conversationwould replace rigid negotiation processes and scripted approaches.TheseconversationswouldoccurwitheveryFirstNationgovernmentandnationgroup,notjustthose opting into the existing self-government process or the handful of other legislativeprocessestodraw-downjurisdictioninspecificsectors.On thequestionofhow tomove towards truegovernment-to-government relationships, thisdiscussionpaperexploresopportunitiestointegrateandstrengthenthefederalapproachesforworkingwith FirstNations governments. This includesopportunities to reduce thepoints-of-entry into the federal government for First Nations, harmonize federal messaging andinteractionsandelevatetheprimarycontactwithFirstNationsgovernmentstotheexecutive-level,asamatterofcourseandnotonlyduringtimesofcrisisorpoliticalimperative.On thequestionofwhich FirstNationsprograms tomerge into thenew Indigenous ServicesDepartment, we examine the importance of considering the many small federal programs,including the potential for these programs to unlock new opportunities for First Nations. Inconsidering where to position the larger First Nations programs, the paper examines theAustralian andU.S. experiences and concludes that thoughtful considerationof thepotentialimpactsofmovingmajorprogramsintothenewIndigenousServicesDepartmentisnecessarytoavoidunintendedconsequences.


13

1. INTRODUCTIONThisdiscussionpaperisintendedtoinformtheFirstNations-CanadaJointCommitteeontheFiscalRelationship.Thestatementsinthisdiscussionpaperreflectthefindingsandconclusionsof the authors and not the Assembly of First Nations, Government of Canada or otherstakeholderswhoparticipated.ImagineaCanadawhereFirstNationshavecleanwater,equalaccesstoservices,educationandhealthoutcomesthatarecomparabletootherCanadians,healthyhomes,strongemploymentandsecurecommunities.ACanadafreeofFirstNationsstereotypesandsystemicbiasestowardFirstNationspeople.ACanadawhereallordersofgovernmentdoeverythingpossibletoenhancelife chances for First Nations people. This Canada requires resolve of all Canadians andcollaborationamongFirstNations,federal,provincial,territorialandmunicipalgovernments.Inthis Canada, FirstNations governmentswould set local programpriorities andmake difficultdecisionsonallocatingscarceresources.WhiletheroleofthefederalpublicservicewouldbegreatlydiminishedinthisCanada,theGovernmentofCanadawouldhaveastrongandunitaryrelationshipwitheachFirstNation,arelationshipwhereallfederalofficialsworkcohesivelytosupportandenablethesuccessofaFirstNationgovernment. InthisCanada,therewouldbedeep trust in the capabilities and character of First Nations governments, and Crown - FirstNationsrelationshipswouldbecharacterizedbymutual-trust.

1.1.OurDefinitionofFederalHorizontality?This discussion paper explores and examines how federal transfer payment regimes can bestrengthenedthroughmorehorizontalapproaches.Toensurethatourresearchandsuggestedsolutionsareusefulandpractical,itwasnecessarytoestablishacommonunderstandingofwhatwe seek to achieve through enhanced federal horizontality. Based on our interviews andresearch,wedevelopedthefollowingdefinition:

EnhancingfederalhorizontalityinthedeliveryofFirstNationstransferpaymentsistheactofintegrating, coordinating and streamlining policies, administrative regimes and transferpaymentmechanismsto:

► reduce federal government involvement in FirstNations programmingwhere FirstNationsgovernmentsarecapableandwillingtoassumeresponsibility;

► improvetheeffectivenessofFirstNationsprogramminginachievingdesiredresultsandcontributingtoimprovedsocio-economicoutcomes;

► harmonize and streamline the funding relationships between First Nationsgovernmentsandthefederalgovernment;

► reduce administrative burdens on FirstNations governments andother recipients;and


14

► support First Nations governments and other First Nations institutions instrengthening their governance and management capabilities and accountabilityrelationships.

1.2.HistoricalContext

Understanding the historical context, including how we arrived here, is necessary to find apathwayforward.The1996reportoftheRoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoplesandthe2015FinalReportoftheTruthandReconciliation(Vol.1Part1),provideabalancedperspectiveonhistoricaleventsWerecognizethatnoteveryonehasthetimeforanin-depthreviewoftheseworksandhaveincludedanabridgedaccountofthehistoryoftreatymakingandCrown-FirstNationsrelationshipsinAnnexA.WeplaceemphasisoneventsthathaveinfluencedCrown–First Nations fiscal relationships and the legal and political organization of present-day FirstNationsgovernments.OuraccountiswrittenbasedontheperspectivesandunderstandingoftheOntario-basedauthors. Asimilaraccountfromadifferentauthor(e.g.BritishColumbian,Northerner,etc.)wouldincludeadditionaleventsandcourtdecisionsthataremostrelevanttotheirrespectivecontexts.1.3.ImportanceofPromotingTrustinCrown-FirstNationsFiscalRelationships

Wewerenotaskedtowriteadiscussionpaperontheimportanceoftrust,butourstakeholderinterviewsandresearchmadeitclearthatanyeffortstoimprovefederalhorizontalityneededtopromote trust in Crown - First Nations relationships. Indigenous stakeholders consistentlypointedoutthattheexistingfunder-recipientrelationshipsoffederalgovernmentdepartmentsandIndianActbandcouncilsobstructthebuildingoftrust.IfIndigenousandnon-IndigenousCanadiansaretocreateandembarkonapathwaytowardaharmonious and shared future, there will need to be mutual trust in Crown - First Nationsrelationships. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) remarked that a lack ofunderstandingabout Indigenoushistories, rightsandconflicts “reinforces racistattitudesandfuels civic distrust between Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians”. Trust between FirstNations, federal, provincial and territorial governments can create space for good faithnegotiations,cooperation,experimentationandsharedachievements.Sadly,thepolicies,rulesandapproachesdevisedtoadministerFirstNationsfiscaltransfersoverthelast150yearswerecreatedduringtimeswhenCanadahelddeepdistrustinthecapabilitiesandcharacterofFirstNationsgovernments.AnyeffortstoenhancefederalhorizontalityinthedeliveryofFirstNationsfiscal transfersmust avoid promulgating federal policies, administrative regimes and fundingapproachesthatimpedethebuildingoftrust,orbreeddistrust.


15

Buildingtrustisanythingbutsimple.Choosingtobeloyal,respectfulandfaithfulareconsciouschoices,butthesamecannotbesaidfortrust.AsauthorStephenCoveydescribesit,“trustisequalpartscharacterandcompetency”.Trustisnotsomuchachoice,itisearnedandbuilt,andoncelost,ishardtoregain.Courtsandhumanrightstribunalscanenforcerespectforlegal,treatyandfiduciaryobligationsandIndigenousrights,buttrustcannotbeenforced.Forperfectlyvalidreasons,FirstNationspeopleandtheirgovernmentshavegrownsuspiciousofthewordsandintentionsofprovincial,territorialandfederalgovernments.RebuildingtrustofFirst Nations peoples and governments will require time, thoughtfulness, hard work andpersistence.Removingthebarrierstotrustisanessentialfirststep,onethatfederalofficialshavegreat influence over. This includes replacing federal transfer payment regimes with fiscalrelationshipsthataretrulygovernment-to-government,includingpracticesthatpromotestrongandcapableFirstNationsgovernmentsandreinforcetrustinCrown-FirstNationsrelationships.It iseasytoarguethat“trustbuilding”beplacedaboveotherobjectiveswhendesigningFirstNations fiscal relationships and related transfers. However, for federal bureaucrats whosecareersbridgemanygovernments,itcanbedifficultandscarytomakebolddecisionsthatmightbeunpopularwithafuturegovernment,particularlywherelegalandpolicyframeworksremainunclear.Decisionstoflowfundingtoorganizationswithoutdemonstratedcapabilitiesareeasilycontortedintoirresponsibleinvestmentsbyauditorsandcanbecomefodderforopportunisticindividualsbentonshowcasing“mismanagement”ingovernment.Totemperthepublicservice’stendencytowardcautionandincrementalism,governmentsmustbeclearabouttheirobjectives,expectedresultsandrisktolerances.Thisincludesbeingopenandtransparentabouttheneedfor trade-offs, including thewillingness to accept negative consequences (e.g. willingness toaccept less influence over programs and targeted results to achieve improved relationships,strongerpartners,andimprovedsocio-economicoutcomes).SpeakingattheLaFontaine-BaldwinSymposiumin2002,GeorgeErasmus,co-chairoftheRoyalCommission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) remarked that “public discourse with AboriginalPeopleshasbeenovertakenwithinertiainrecentyears”.FirstNationspeopleknowfirst-handthatthehumanconsequencesofthisinertiacanbedire,includingtragicandirreversiblehumanconsequences.Formanyyears,thisinertiahasbeenfueledbydistrust.Distrustoffederalofficialsin First Nations governments and distrust of First Nations people in federal politicians andbureaucrats.To illustratehowchanges toCrown - FirstNations fiscal relationships can reinforce trust,weexaminea recentactionof theGovernmentofCanada. In July2017, the federalgovernmentagreedtotemporarilypauseitspracticeofreducingfiscaltransferstoself-governingFirstNations


16

by a portion of their own source revenues. The calculations for determining a First Nationgovernment’sownsourcerevenuesinvolvepoint-in-timeestimatesoftherevenuesthatagivenFirst Nation government “should be able to collect” into the future. Considering that theunderlying calculations are often historical and open to debate, and considering thatmyriadunforeseenconditions couldnegatively impact the revenuesactually realizedbyagivenFirstNation, these own source revenue calculations are very contentious. The ability to raiserevenues, unbeholden to others, is a hallmark of strong democratic governments. Taxationregimes promote strong accountability relationships between a nation of people and theirgovernment. As the Chief Commissioner of the First Nations Tax Commission, Manny Jules,remarked,“taxationisacornerstoneofanautonomous,responsiblegovernment”.WhilemostCanadiansandmanyFirstNationspeoplewouldagreethatitishardtoenvisionasharedfutureinwhichFirstNationsgovernmentsarenotincentedandexpectedtoraisetheirownrevenuesand contribute to their own government costs, by placing a “near-term”moratoriumon theconsiderationofownsourcerevenues,thefederalgovernmentmadeclearthatbuildingtrustinthe immediate termwas necessary to advance over the longer-term. By removing this trustbarrier,thefederalgovernmentcreatedspaceforconversationsabouthowthefiscalcapacityofself-governingFirstNationsshouldbeconsideredwhencalculatingfundinglevelsinthefuture.In highlighting opportunities to enhance federal horizontality in Crown - First Nations fiscalrelationships we have been mindful that any measures taken must be compatible with theobjectiveofrebuildingtrustinCrown–FirstNationsrelationships.

1.4.LessonsfromInternationalDevelopmentInexploringopportunitiestoenhancefederalhorizontalityinFirstNationstransfers, includingthequestionofhowtransferpaymentregimescanenhancetrustinrelationships,itishelpfultolook at best practices for international development assistance. Through the 2005 ParisDeclaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action (Paris Declaration), donornationscommittedtochangehowaidisprovidedtodevelopingnations.9TheParisDeclarationsetsoutfiveAidEffectivenessPrinciples,including:

► Ownership:Developingcountriessettheirownstrategiesforpovertyreduction,improvetheirinstitutionsandtacklecorruption.

► Alignment:Donorcountriesalignbehindtheseobjectivesanduselocalsystems.► Harmonization:Donorcountriescoordinate,simplifyproceduresandshareinformation

toavoidduplication.► Results:Developingcountriesanddonorsshiftfocustodevelopmentresultsandresults

getmeasured.► Mutualaccountability:Donorsandpartnersareaccountablefordevelopmentresults.10


17

By adopting the Aid Effectiveness Principles, donor countries emphasized the importance ofcapacitybuildingforrecipientgovernments,understandingthatthiscouldmeanreducedcontrolandvisibilityoverresultsandfinances.Tobeclear,adoptingtheAidEffectivenessPrincipleshasnot meant that conditionality and oversight are not present in international developmentassistancetransfers.Rather,donorcountrieslookforopportunitiestofunddevelopingnationsinmannersthatreinforcetheprinciples.

2. APPROACHThisstudywassponsoredbytheGovernmentofCanadaandtheAssemblyofFirstNations(AFN).Officials from various federal government departments, the AFN and other Indigenous-ledorganizationssupportedandguidedthestudy.Theproposedtermsofreferenceandresearchquestionswerepreparedbythestudy’sauthorsandfeedbackwassoughtfrommembersoftheNewFiscalRelationshipWorkingGroup(NFRWG).ThefeedbackwasconsideredandthetermsofreferencewererefinedandapprovedbyrepresentativesoftheNFRWG.InterviewswereconductedwithofficialsfromIndigenousandfederalgovernmentorganizationstogainanunderstandingofchallenges,experiencesandpotentialsolutions.IntervieweeswereidentifiedinconsultationwiththeofficialsparticipatingintheNFRWGanddirectlybythestudyteam.EmphasiswasplacedonselectingintervieweesinpositionsofinfluenceintheGovernmentofCanadaandstakeholderswithdeepknowledgeandexperienceinthesubject.Thestudyteamconductedinterviewsindependently.Standardquestionswereaskedofeveryintervieweeandadditionalfollow-onquestionswereaskedtobetterunderstandeachinterviewee’sexperiences,knowledgeandperspectives.Intotal,forty-oneintervieweeswereinvitedtoparticipateinthestudy,andthirtyinterviewswereconducted.An extensive review of literature was performed, drawing on documentation provided byinterviewees and documentation gathered through searches of the internet and researchdatabases.Targetedresearchwasperformedoneachpotentialsolutiontoidentifyandexploreexperiences,bestpracticesandlessonslearnedfromthedomesticandinternationalcontexts.Toensureobjectivityandcredibilityofthestudy,emphasiswasplacedonresearch,factsandfiguresfromauthoritativeandreputablesources.Initialinternetanddatabasesearcheswerebroadinnatureinordertoobtainanunderstandingoftheinformationthatwasavailable.AlistofsourceswasprovidedtomembersoftheNFRWGtoensurethatallimportantdocumentswereincluded,andallsuggestionsforadditionalresearchmaterialswereprocuredandreviewed.Intotal,overtwohundredsourceswereconsideredandoverfiftystudies,initiatives,papersandreportsfrom


18

various sources were examined in detail, covering Canadian, U.S., Australian, New Zealand,Norwegian,LatinAmericanandinternationaldevelopmentcontexts.Theliteraturereviewandinterviewswithstakeholdersprovidedthefoundationforanalysisandsynthesis.Preliminaryhypothesesweredevelopedbasedontheresearchandanalysisandthesewere further examined and discussed through follow-up discussions with a number of theinterviewees.

3. CHALLENGESOFDELIVERINGFIRSTNATIONSPROGRAMMINGWITHIN

CANADA’SFEDERALSYSTEMOFGOVERNMENTStakeholderinterviewsandresearchhighlightedtwoprinciplechallengesforfederalhorizontalityin Canada’s system of federal government often referred to as a Westminster model ofgovernment.Thesechallengesaresummarizedbelow.

3.1.PluralityofAccountabilityRelationshipsInCanada’sfederalsystemofgovernment,executivepowersrestwiththeGovernorinCouncil(i.e.theGovernorGeneralactingontheadviceofthePrimeMinisterandtheFederalCabinet).TheFederalCabinetincludesCabinetMinistersdesignatedasMinistersinchargeofgovernmentdepartments.Ministersaregrantedpowersto implementfederalprogramsfortheirportfoliodepartments.CabinetMinistersareaccountabletotheHouseofCommonsfortheiractionsandtheactionsoftheirdepartmentsandarealsoexpectedtotakecollectiveresponsibilityfor,anddefend,allCabinetdecisions.Effective 2012, the concept of the Chief Accounting Officer role was added to the FinancialAdministrationAct(FAA)anddeputyheadsoffederaldepartmentsweremadeaccountabletocommittees of the Senate and House of Commons on matters such as resource allocationdecisions, internal controls and public accounts reporting. This new dual accountability, theMinistertotheHouseofCommonsandthedeputyheadtocommitteesoftheSenateandHouseofCommons,reinforcedtheneedforMinistersanddeputyheadstomaintaincontrolofprogramdelivery decisionswithin their portfolio. This principle is further reinforced through the FAA,whichrestrictsoneMinisterfromdeliveringprogrammingonbehalfofanotherMinister.Section29.2oftheFAAallowsonedepartmenttodeliverinternalsupportservicesonbehalfofanotherdepartment,11butdeliveryoftransferpaymentsisnotincludedinthescopeofthisprovision.ThepluralityofaccountabilityrelationshipsbetweenFederalMinistersandParliamentforFirstNationsprogrammingactsasabarriertoachievingaunitaryCrown–FirstNationsrelationship.FirstNationsprogrammingisfragmentedacrossmorethan30federaldepartmentsandagencies,


19

andeachofthesedepartmentsandagencieshasacorrespondingaccountabilityrelationshipwithevery First Nations government it funds. Typically, these accountability relationships areunidirectional,withFirstNationsaccountabilityobligationsprincipallycraftedthroughafundingagreement.While some stakeholders have called for changes to the FAA and reduced accountabilityexpectations forFederalMinistersanddeputyheads,changesof thisnatureseemunlikelyastheywould require changes to the federal system of government (i.e. these are notmerelyadministrativechangesthatcouldbe implementedfor Indigenous-specificprogramming,theywouldbefundamentalchangestohowParliamentfunctions).

3.2.FundingUncertaintyCausedbyVotedAppropriationsandtheFederalBudgetProcessAll expenditures made by the federal government require the authority of Parliament.Parliamentary authority is provided in two ways: annual appropriation acts that specify theamounts and broad purposes forwhich funds can be spent; and other specific statutes thatauthorizepaymentsandsetouttheamountsandtimeperiodsforthosepayments.Theamountsapprovedinappropriationactsarereferredtoasvotedamounts,andtheexpenditureauthoritiesprovided through other statutes are called statutory authorities. Estimates documents arepreparedtosupportappropriationacts.Assuch,theestimatesprovideadditionalinformationonvotedamounts included in theappropriationact. Forecastsof statutoryamountsarealsopresentedtogiveamorecompletepictureoftotalparliamentaryauthoritiestobeusedduringthefiscalyear.12Most First Nations programming is funded through voted appropriations. Indigenousstakeholdersandmanagersoffederalprogramscallforincreaseduseofstatutoryauthoritiestoenhance predictability and stability of federal transfers to First Nations, similar in nature totransfersprovidedtoprovincesandterritories(i.e.FirstNationsexperiencefundinguncertaintybecause voted appropriations are either time-limited or subject to change at any time).Indigenousstakeholderspointedoutthatthefederalpolicy-makingandfederalbudgetprocessesarenotidealmechanismsforallocatingnewfederalinvestmentsormakingbudgetcutsduringtimesoffiscalconstraint(i.e.amorenuancedcommunity-orregion-levelapproachisneededintheir view).Also, FirstNationsgovernmentspointout that fundinguncertainty restricts theirability to hire permanent staff, whichmakes it very challenging to attract and retain skilledcommunitymembersbacktotheirhomecommunities(i.e.thereareplentyofstablepermanentjobsforqualifiedIndigenousworkersoutsideoftheirrespectivecommunities).While the federal budget process includes inputs from federal departments, the StandingCommitteeonFinance,provincialFinanceMinisters,andsome limited input from Indigenous


20

stakeholders, final decisions on where to allocate new investments are made by the PrimeMinister andMinister of Finance. FederalMinisters have somediscretion tomake allocationdecisionswheretheirpolicyandspendingauthoritiespermitsuchflexibility,butmostsignificantpolicydecisionsaremadebytheFederalCabinet(i.e.itischallengingfortheFederalCabinettoconsiderandaccommodatetheneedsandprioritiesof600+FirstNationswhenmakingdecisionsaboutprogramsandnewinvestments).Some Indigenous stakeholders interviewed for this study expressed a need for greaterconsiderationof FirstNations needs anddistinctions, includingdifferentiated investments byregionornationgroup.Anapproach likethisexists for IndianHealthServices in theU.S.andcouldbeausefulmodelforCanada.AnnexBexamineshowtheparticipationofTriballeadersenhances the effectiveness of the U.S. federal budget. Annex C includes a more in-depthexamination of how statutory programs and appropriations might be used to enhance FirstNationsprogrammingandstrengthenCrown–FirstNationsrelationships.

4. IMPROVINGCOHERENCEOFFEDERALPOLICIESANDPROGRAMSIn policy settings where governments look to program-specific results as the standard fordiagnosingproblems,drivingprogramdeliveryandevaluatingexecutiveperformance,thereisanintrinsicbiastowardpolicyandprograminterventionsthatfavourprogram-specificoutputs,attheriskoffocusingtoolittleonenhancingoutcomesforindividualsandcommunitiesservedby these programs. Canada’s Westminster model of federal government, with its firmlyentrenchedministerial accountabilities, is suchapolicy setting. FederalMinistersanddeputyheadsaremorelikelytoemphasizetheresultsthattheycandirectlyinfluenceandmeasure(e.g.graduationrates,numberofchildrenincare,levelofhousingstock,numberofbedsinshelters),overamoreholisticemphasisonhigh-leveloutcomes.For the sakeof clarity,whileprogramresults invariablycontribute to improvedoutcomes,bureaucratsmaynotbeencouraging thebest program interventions in all situations. In such a context, program evaluation, policydevelopmentandprogramdesignprocessesarecriticaltoensuringfocusontheresultsthattrulymatter.Thehealthsectorisagoodillustrationofwhycoherentpoliciesandprogramsarenecessarytoimprove outcomes. In its research on the social determinants of health, the World HealthOrganization(WHO)hasconcludedthatmedicalcarehasarelativelysmall influenceovertheachievement of health outcomes. It is accepted that an individual’s behaviours, socialcircumstancesandgeneticshavemuchgreaterinfluenceoverhealthoutcomesthanaccesstoqualitymedicalcare.Inits2008report,theWHOCommissiononSocialDeterminantsofHealth(CSDH) examines how health outcome gaps are influenced by inequalities in the access to


21

resourcesandpower.13TheWHOresearchfoundthataccesstoeducation,socialprotectionandinfrastructureprogrammingstronglyinfluencedtheachievementofhealthoutcomes.14Tohelpgovernmentsmakepolicytrade-offsinanenvironmentofscarceresources,theWHO’sresearchstudyentitledTheEconomicsofSocialDeterminantsofHealthandHealthInequalitiesidentifies methods for evaluating the investment worthiness of specific policy and programinterventions.15Thisresearchconcludesthat,whilemanygovernmentstendtobasepolicyandprogramdecisionson an assessmentof the cost-effectivenessof specific policy andprograminterventions(i.e.levelofexpendituretoachieveacertainprogramresult),thistypeofanalysistendstoresultinanarrowfocusonhealtheffects,ratherthanlonger-termhealthoutcomes.16TheWHOarguesthatthemorefruitfulapproachforadvancinghealthoutcomesistoconsiderthebroadercost-benefit17(i.e.comparingtheprojectedbenefitsofbetteroutcomesovermanydecadesorgenerations,totheforecastedcostsalongthesametimeline).

5. CALLSTOREDUCETHEADMINISTRATIVEBURDENONFIRSTNATIONS

GOVERNMENTSMoststakeholdersinterviewedforthisstudyseesuccessinmovingforwardwithtwodistinct,butparallel,directions.Thefirstdirectionisthesteadyevolutionoflegalandpolicyframeworksthat recast Crown – First Nation relationships, including the fiscal relationship. The seconddirectionisthesimplificationofadministrativeregimesforfederalFirstNationstransfers.Whiletheseconddirectionmayseemtopaleinsignificancetothefirst,itsimportancemustnotbeunderstated.The2006BlueRibbonPanelonGrantsandContributions (BlueRibbonPanel)hadthreeconclusions,thesecondwasasfollows:

“notonlyisitpossibletosimplifyadministrationwhilestrengtheningaccountability,itisabsolutelynecessarytodothefirstinordertoensurethelatter”.18

To paraphrase themessage of the Blue Ribbon Panel,we can create space for First Nationsgovernmentstofocusonwhatmatterstotheircommunitiesifweeliminaterulesthatobstructgooddecisionmakingandwereduceadministrativetaskswithlowmarginal-value.Indoingthis,the federal government would also respect and support the inherent right of Indigenousgovernments toself-determine localprioritiesandsupport strengtheningof theirgovernanceandmanagementcapabilities.Through practice and good decision making, First Nations governments will become more


22

capableand,ultimately,moresuccessful indeliveringontheprioritiesoftheirnation. ItmayseemreasonabletosomeCanadianvotersandfederalbureaucratstoaskhowitisthatwecanplacetrustinFirstNationsgovernmentswhentheyhavenotyetdevelopedthecapabilitiestoeffectivelygovern.Itisaverycleardilemmaforsome,whatcomesfirst,trustorcapability?WhatwecanlearnfromtheboththeBlueRibbonPanelandTRCisthat,whenstartingfromaplaceofdistrust, where existing conditions breed distrust in relationships, we need to focus onestablishing the conditions necessary for trust to grow and flourish.19 Put more simply, thefederalgovernmentneedstoleanmoreheavilyonrespectandloyaltyuntiltrustinFirstNationsgovernmentscanbebuilt.

6. RETHINKINGHOWTHEPOLICYONTRANSFERPAYMENTSISAPPLIEDTOFIRSTNATIONSTRANSFERSANDENHANCINGFLEXIBILITYINFIRSTNATIONSFUNDINGAGREEMENTS

TheTreasuryBoardPolicyonTransferPayments(PTP)establishesbroadauthoritiesfortheuseofcontributionsandgrantsinthedeliveryoffederaltransfers.AppendixKoftheTreasuryBoard’sDirectiveonTransferPayments(Directive)establishesadditionalfundingapproachesfortransferpaymentsto“Aboriginalrecipients”.20TheseauthoritiescanbefurtherlimitedintheProgramTerms and Conditions established for each program. Oftentimes, the limitations built intoProgramTermsandConditionsaretheirbecausepastCabinets,TreasuryBoards,MinistersandDeputyMinisterswantedvisibilitytoprogramresults,andneededinformationtomeettheirownaccountabilityreportingobligations.Some Indigenous stakeholderswhowe interviewedwere harsh in their criticism of the PTP,drawingourattentiontothefactthatCrown-FirstNationsfiscalrelationshipsarediminishedtoafunder-recipientrelationshipinthePTPanditsaccompanyingDirective.Somefederalofficialsstruggle to see how the PTP conditions on First Nations transfers are much different frompurpose-built transfers provided to provinces and territories. One First Nations stakeholderobserved that Appendix I of the Directive, which deals with transfers to “other orders ofgovernment”, characterizes a very different relationship with provinces and territories, arelationshipbasedontrust,whileAppendixKmakesclearthat“Aboriginalrecipients”mustmeetahostof conditions tobe considered for themore flexible contribution fundingapproaches.Appendix K of the PTP permits flexibility, based on an assessment of recipient capacity (e.g.governancestructures,programdeliverycapacities,managementcapacities,financialhealthandpublicaccountabilitymechanisms)21,butfederaldepartmentsseemtointerpretandapplythedirectivedifferently.


23

ViewedfromtheperspectiveofFirstNationsgovernments,theemphasisofthePTPonrisk-basedapproachespresentsaquandary.Wherethepoorfinancialhealthanddiminishedcapacityofagiven First Nation government has been caused by chronic underfunding of programs andservices,theFirstNationgovernmentisoftencaughtinaviciouscycleofmanagingpovertyandreacting to crises. In such circumstances, it isunfair to label that FirstNationgovernmentashavinglowcapacitybecausetheyhavenotbeengiventhechancetomanagewithautonomyandadequateresource levels.Further,wherefederaldepartmentsconstructfundingregimesthatseeflexibilityasabinarychoice(i.e.allornothingapproachtoflexibility),lowcapacitybecomesverydifficulttoovercome,aself-fulfillingprophecyofsorts.In summary, the Indigenous criticism of the PTP is that it exudes distrust in Indigenousgovernments and stifles the ability of Indigenous governments to learn on the job, despiteconventionalwisdomthatgoodgovernanceandmanagementrequirepractice.Ifaccesstomoreflexibilityandautonomyintransfers(e.g.accesstoblockcontributions,grantsandothermoreflexibletransfers)wassomehowlinkedtotheriskofnegativehumanorfinancialconsequences,theapplicationofconditionsmightbemorepalatable.Forexample,alogicalargumentcouldbemadeforlimitingtheuseofflexibletransferswhereprogramriskisveryhighandarecipient’scapacityislow,whilestillpermittingflexibilityinotherareas(e.g.aFirstNationmighthaveBlockorgrantfundingforlowerriskprogramsbutnotforprogramsrelatedtochildprotection,violencepreventionandshelters,administrationofprescriptiondrugsortheconstructionofmajorwatersystems).Theargumentforincreasinglocaldecision-makingiswellsupportedinresearchandexperience.TheHarvardProjectonAmericanIndianEconomicDevelopment(HarvardProject),foundedbyProfessorsStephenCornellandJosephP.KaltatHarvardUniversityin1987,hasbeenstudyingthepathwaysto improvedsocio-economicoutcomesfordecades.22 TheHarvardProject’s30yearsofresearchincludeshundredsofresearchprojectsthatcollectivelypointtofourconditionsnecessarytoovercomepovertyandimproveconditionsonindigenousreserves,theseinclude:

► Freedomtomakedecisionsaboutwhatdevelopmentapproachestotake,referredtoas“tribalsovereignty”intheUnitedStates;

► Capableinstitutionsofgovernancethatensurestabledecisionrules,establishfairandindependentmechanismsfordisputeresolution,andseparatepoliticsfromday-to-daybusinessandprogrammanagement;

► Emphasis on culture in the governing structure, economic system, policies, andprocedures;and

► Leaders who inspire people to take action by introducing new knowledge andexperiences,challengingassumptions,andproposingchange.23


24

AnevaluationofthePTPanditsprovisionsforIndigenoustransfersagainstthepoverty-reductionconditions identified by the Harvard Project could prove to be a fruitful way of identifyingpotentialimprovements.

7. INCREASINGTHEUSEOFFLEXIBLEFUNDINGAPPROACHESOneapproachenhancefederalhorizontalityinthedeliveryofFirstNationstransfersistoreducefederalrulesandreportingrequirementsbyadoptingmoreflexibletransfers,transfersthatimplyand promote trust in First Nations governments. The Government of Canada only providescomprehensive grant funding to one First Nation outside of a Self-government Agreement,MiawpukekFirstNation(MFN) inConneRiver,Newfoundland. Joint IndigenousandNorthernAffairs Canada (INAC)-MFN evaluations find that MFN has been able to leverage its uniquefundingflexibilitiestocreateopportunitiesandimproveoutcomesforitscommunitymembers.Notsurprisingly,MFNboastssocio-economicsuccessaboveneighbouringcommunities,nearfullemploymentandanadequatestockofqualityhousing24.MFNleveragesitsflexiblegrantfundingto deliver innovative programs and advance community priorities. For example, MFN iscommittedtotheprincipleoffullemploymentforadultsinthecommunitywhichpromotespart-timeemploymentforallcommunitymembersoverfull-timeemploymentforsome25.Thispolicyincreases labour force participation, increases community involvement in government andreducesrelianceonincomesupports.ThejointINAC-MFNevaluationsarecompletedattheendof every multi-year agreement cycle and consistently conclude that increased flexibility andautonomyhavebeeninstrumentalinenhancingoutcomes,buildinggovernancecapabilitiesandenhancingmanagement effectiveness. These gains are reflected in the community’s housingstock,localinfrastructureandemploymentlevels.AnnexEincludesamoredetailedexaminationoftheMFNgrantagreement.

Turning to the experience of Canada’s Self-Governing First Nations, a 2015 study by RaviPendakur (University ofOttawa) andKrishnaPendakur (Simon FraserUniversity) included ananalysisofoutcomesachievedbyFirstNationscommunitieswithSelf-GovernmentAgreements(SGA)andComprehensiveLandClaimAgreements(CLCA).Fromthelate1980sandleadinguptothemandate of the current federal government, the Government of Canada promoted self-governmentagreementsforFirstNationsinuncededterritoriesbylinkingthecompletionofaComprehensive Land Claim to Self-government Agreements. The CLCA typically includedmaterial cashpayments that couldbeused toacquire landandadvance the self-determinedprioritiesofanation.ThePendakurstudyfoundmarginalgainsinincomelevelsforFirstNationsthathadonlyconcludedaSGA(11%formenandnoeffectforwomen),butsubstantialgainsforcommunitiesthathadconcludedbothanSGAandCLCA(26%formenand38%forwomen).26


25

Interestingly, the study also found that having an SGA increased the CommunityWell-Being(CWB)scorebyabout4pointsforIndigenousresidents,butwhencombinedwithaCLCA,thisdropped to a 3-point gain.27 CWB is an index measuring socio-economic well-being in FirstNations that leverages data on education, labour force activity, income and housing. Thesefindings also reinforce the conclusions of the Harvard Project, including the conclusion thatIndigenousgovernmentsneed“genuinedecision-makingcontrolovertherunningoftribalaffairsand the use of tribal resources”28 in order to achieve improvements in social and economicoutcomes.The“genuinedecision-makingcontrol”comesfromhavingbothauthorityandaccesstofundsnecessarytoexercisethatauthority.TheCLCAprovidestheadditionalfundsnecessarytoexerciseauthoritythroughpolicyandprograminterventions.

Increasing theuseof flexible transferpaymentapproaches (e.g. grant,block contributionsorothernewcreations)doesnotnecessitatefederalrecognitionofanation’sdecisiontoexerciseits inherent right to self-governance, rather, the grant provides conditions necessary for theeffectivedeliveryofprogramsandachievementofoutcomes.TheflexibilityofgrantscanprovideFirstNationsgovernmentsthespacetosettheirownprioritiesanddevelopcapabilitiesnecessarytogainthetrustoftheirpeopleandpartners,therebyimprovinganation’schanceofachievingself-governance.Bylimitingtheuseofmoreflexiblecontributionsandgrants,westiflecreativeprogrammingandrestrictaFirstNationsgovernment’sabilitytofocusonwhatmattersto itspeople. This impairs the accountability relationships between FirstNations governments andtheirpeople,therebyunderminingtrustinthatrelationship.Whiletheself-governmentcontextteachesusthatsuccessisenhancedwhenanationhas“catch-upfunding”obtainedthroughaCLCA, and greater access to land and resource revenues, the MFN experience shows thatmeaningful improvements to socio-economic outcomes can also be realized with flexibleintergovernmentaltransfersoutsideofaSelf-GovernmentAgreement.Onthequestionofgrants,weconcludethatthisfundingapproachcouldbeaneffectivewayofachieving gains in socio-economic outcomes and building the capabilities of First Nationsgovernments. To be clear, the grant would not resolve important issues about jurisdictionalpowers, law-making authorities and access to lands and resources. The grant instrumentpromotestrustbuildingbetweentheCrownandFirstNationsgovernments.IftheMiawpukekexperienceandresearchoftheHarvardProjectarenotcompellingenoughtojustifyexpandedautonomyandflexibilityforFirstNationsgovernments,athoroughcost-benefitanalysisofthelong-term benefits and long-term costs could help federal officials better understand thepotentialfiscalimpactsofincreasingtheuseofgrants.Insuchananalysis,thefinancialbenefitsof improved socio-economicoutcomes (e.g. lower cost to federal government for Indigenousprograms and services, potential growth in FirstNations tax bases, revenue generation from


26

increaseddevelopmentactivity,etc.),wouldbecomparedtothepotentialadditionalcostsorinefficienciesofhavingFirstNations“learnonthejob”.

8. DIMINSHINGTHEROLEOFTHEFEDERALGOVERNMENTBYENSURINGTHATFIRSTNATIONSGOVERNMENTSHAVESUFFICIENTFUNDING

FirstNationsgovernmentsneedaccesstosufficientfundingfortheirgovernment institutions,programsandgeneralgovernmentfunctionsiftheyaretoenhancelocalprogramsandservices,advance their self-determined priorities, rebuild their nations and institutions, and progresstowardgreaterself-determination.Thegeneralgovernmentfunctionsincludethingslikefinancialmanagement,communications,human resources management, information technology, planning and reporting, employeebenefits and pensions, accommodations, council operating costs, rights research, bylawdevelopment, community engagement, enforcement of community bylaws, among manyothers). Whenthefundingforthesefunctions isconstrained,FirstNationsgovernments lackbasiccapabilitiesneededtoengagewiththeircommunitymembers,establishaclearvisionthattheircommunitycanbuyinto,setcommunitypriorities,developintegratedplans,engagewithpotentialfundersandpartners,anddemonstrateaccountabilitytocommunitymembers.WhenFirstNationsalso lack funding forbasicprogramsandservices, these issuesarecompoundedbecausethereisastrongtendencytoforegoadministrativecapacitiestofundchronicprogramdeficits(e.g.cutadministrationjobsandgovernancefunctionstoshoreupeducationandsocialservicesdeficits).With stronger and more capable First Nations governments, there would be less need forcomplexandcostlyfederalgovernmentoversightregimesandinterventions.Putanotherway,therewouldbe less imperative todevelop complexhorizontal approacheswithin the federalgovernmentiftheroleofthefederalgovernmentwasgreatlydiminished.FirstNationsleadershave longadvocated for increased federal funding to support the costsof local FirstNationsgovernmentsandFirstNationsinstitutionsthatprovidecapacitysupportstolocalgovernments.A common argument is that chronic underfunding (i.e. both for direct programdelivery andadministration and governance functions) has gutted the capacity of their governments andimpairedtheirabilitytoproactivelyengage,plan,overseeand improve.Tobetterunderstandthis issue and the federal government’s role, there are some important questions that areworthwhileexamining,including:

o What are the funding related needs of First Nations governments in respect of coreadministrationandgovernancefunctions?


27

o What is the Federal Government’s role in funding governance and administrationfunctionsofFirstNationsgovernments?

o What are the existing funding levels available to First Nations governments for coreadministrationandgovernancefunctions(i.e. includingbothfundingfromfundersandtheirownsourcerevenues)?

o Howmightthefederalgovernmentimproveitsapproachestoensurethatfederalfundinglevelsforthesecorefunctionsaresufficient?

o ShouldFirstNationsgovernmentsbeexpected tocontribute to thesecosts fromtheirownsourcerevenues,andifso,howmightthesecontributionsbecalculated?

o How can the Federal Government indirectly support the capacity of First NationsgovernmentsthroughsupportstoFirstNationsinstitutions?

8.1 What are the funding related needs of First Nations governments in respect of core

administrationandgovernancefunctions?Wherestudiesofthecostsofthesefunctionshavebeenperformedtheyareoftenspecifictoonenation’ssituation.Thereareanumberofcomplicatingfactorsthatimpactthesecosts,suchasgeography,localpurchasingpower,availabilityofqualifiedlocalstaff,relativeefficiencyofthegovernmentstaff(i.e.consideringexperienceandtraininglevelsofexistingstaff),degreeofneedinthecommunity,amongmanyothers.TheCanadaRevenueAgencyestablishesthatcharitableorganizationscanspend20%oftheirrevenuesonadministrationandgovernanceoverheads.Awell-known U.S. charity watchdog, CharityWatch, rates organizations as having “excellent”efficiencyiftheiroverheadcostsareunder25%and“good”efficiencyoftheiroverheadcostsareunder35%.32Thecostofnationalandlocalgovernmentmustcertainlybehigherthanacharitableorganization.Itisnotuncommontoseefederalcrowncorporations,agenciesanddepartmentsspendmorethan25%onadministrationcosts(i.e.asaproportionoftotalprogramdeliveryandoverhead costs, but excluding the value of transfer payments). A thoughtful and objectiveanalysisofthetruecostofFirstNationsgovernmentisnecessarytoadvancethisissue.

8.2 What is the Federal Government’s role in funding governance and administrationfunctionsofFirstNationsgovernments?

AfundamentalquestioniswhethertheGovernmentofCanadashouldberesponsibleforfundinglocal governance and administration costs, or whether such costs should be funded fromproperty and other taxes collected by local First Nations governments. At the heart of thisquestionisadeeperideologicalquestion,onethatdivideselectoratesinmanydemocraticstates,about whether to favour low taxation and individualism over community and socialresponsibility.While these ideologies exist in Canada, Canada’s constitution provides strongdirection to all levels of government. Section 36 of the Constitution Act (1982) affirms acommitment on the part of the federal and provincial governments to promote equal


28

opportunities for all Canadians and essential public services of reasonable quality to allCanadians.33Respectofthisconstitutionalcommitmentisevidentintheapproachtoterritorialtransferswherefederalfundingcontributionsvaryfromoneterritorytothenext(e.g.in2016the Government of Nunavut drew 80%34 of its funding from Federal transfers while YukonTerritorial Government drew 84%35 of its funding from federal transfers) and equalizationpayments toprovincesaimedatensuring“reasonablycomparable levelsofpublic servicesatreasonablycomparablelevelsoftaxation”.36FirstNationsreceivebothdirectfederalfundingsupportsforthesefunctionsandotherindirectand time-limited supports (i.e. administration allocations attached to program funding andcapacitydevelopmentsupports).Anopenand truthfuldialogue isneededon thequestionofwhether and how the fiscal capacity of First Nations (i.e. non-self-governing nations) shouldimpactthecalculationoffederaltransferstoFirstNationsgovernments.Thisdialoguewillneedtoexploreimportantissuesandquestions,someofwhichinclude:

• IsFirstNationstaxationandrevenueraisingimportantenoughtomakeitaconditionofeligibilityforcertainprogramfunding?Asanexample,aFirstNationsgovernmentisnoteligibletoreceivefundingfromINACforincomeassistanceshelterpayments(i.e.housingcostsforincomeassistancerecipientslivingincommunity-ownedhousing)ifitdoesnotcollect rental revenues from its other members who reside in community-ownedhousing.Areotherpoliciessuchasthis,includingpossiblyonethatlinksincreasedcoregovernance and administration funding to the existence of revenue raising regimesnecessarytopromoterevenueraisingandtaxationregimesinFirstNations?

• Wouldconditionsbyfederalfundersthattiefundinglevelstotheexistenceoftaxationregimes encourage more communities to adopt taxation? Many First Nationscommunities in Canada believe their treaties entitle them to not pay taxes. Oneindigenous stakeholder interviewednoted that, inmanyFirstNations communities, achieforcouncilmemberwhoraisestheideaoftaxationriskneverbeingre-elected.

• Conversely,isitreasonableorfairtoexpectaFirstNationsgovernmenttocontributeaportion of its revenues to core governance and administration costs when its basicprogramsandservicesareunderfundedandcommunityoutcomesremainwellbelowtarget?

• Whatistherolefinancialrestitution,includingsettlementofpastclaimsandpaymentoflumpsumamountstocatch-upforpastunderfunding.Asnotedpreviously,thePendakurstudy found that The Pendakur study foundmarginal gains in income levels for FirstNationsthatachievedstrongersocio-economicgainswhentheyhadreceivedlargecashsettlementsuponenteringaself-governmentagreement.37


29

• IsitreasonableforthefederalgovernmenttoexpectFirstNationsgovernmentstoraisetheirownrevenueswheretherearemanyunresolvedlandclaim,jurisdiction,resourcerevenue sharing andother issues impairing their ability to activate community lands,resourcesandassets?

• What is the social impact and cost of chronically underfunding First Nationsgovernments?

8.3 WhataretheexistingfundinglevelsavailabletoFirstNationsgovernmentsforcore

administrationandgovernancefunctions?Unfortunately, the total amount of funding available to First Nations governments for coregovernanceandadministrationfunctionsisnotwellunderstood.Thedirectcontributionsfromthe Government of Canada include Band Support Funding and other direct Indigenousgovernmentsupportcontributions.For2016-17thesedirectsupportsamountedtoapprox.3%of total federal Indigenousprogramming(i.e.$400Million38 ofanestimated$14billion39 for2017).Otherfederalprogramsalsoprovidefundingforprogramadministration,butnottypicallyfor core governance and administration functions. As noted previously, it is common to seeadministrative overheads topping 20% of total revenues in non-profit and governmentorganizations.

8.4 Howmight the federal government improve its approaches to ensure that federal

fundinglevelsforthesecorefunctionsaresufficient?IftheGovernmentofCanadaadoptedaconsistenthorizontalapproachtofundinggovernanceandadministrationcosts,itwouldknowhowmuchadministrationandgovernanceitprovidestoFirstNationsgovernments.HavingknowledgeofthefundinglevelsisanecessaryprecursortoensuringthatsufficientfundingisavailabletoFirstNationsgovernments.SomepossiblesolutionstothischallengeareexploredinAnnexF.

8.5 How can the Federal Government indirectly support the capacity of First NationsgovernmentsthroughsupportstoFirstNationsinstitutions?

FirstNationslackaccesstoinstitutionalfunctionsandsupportsthatarewellestablishedinmostmoderndemocraticgovernments.Duetotheirsmallpopulationsandlimitedrevenuebases,itisdifficulttoimagineatimewherealloftheseinstitutionalfunctionsexistwithineachFirstNationsgovernment in Canada. RCAP pointed out that there are broad needs when it comes toIndigenous institutional functions, including nation-level institutions,multi-nation institutionsandnationalinstitutions.InstitutionalfunctionscitedasbeingrequiredbyRCAPincludehousingmanagementauthorities,post-secondaryeducationinstitutions,astatisticaldataclearinghouse,independentauditcapacity,andstandardssettingandaccreditationbodies,amongothers.40


30

Others have also reinforced the importance of institution building, including then AuditorGeneralofCanadaSheilaFraserinherJune2011capstonereport.41 LimitedprogresshasbeenmadeinexpandingFirstNationsinstitutionsinthelast20years(i.e.sincethecreationoftheFirstNationsStatisticalandFinancialManagementActinstitutionsintheearly1990s).Shapingpan-FirstNationssafeguardsandinstitutionsisanimportantchallengeforCanada’sFirstNationsPeoplesandtheirgovernments.WhiletheGovernmentofCanadahasavestedinterestinstableIndigenous-ledinstitutions,it’sveryinvolvementinshapingandbuildingIndigenous-ledinstitutions can be perceived as imposing Canadian ideals, beliefs and motivations. RCAPrecognizedthisprecariousrole,butalso thepowerand influenceheldby theGovernmentofCanadawhenitremarked,“bytheiractions,ifnottheirwords,governmentscontinuetoblockAboriginalnationsfromassumingthebroadpowersofgovernancethatwouldpermitthemtofashiontheirowninstitutionsandworkouttheirownsolutionstosocial,economicandpoliticalproblems.Itisthisrefusalthateffectivelyblocksthewayforward”.42 Thepresentgovernmentappearswillingtoentertainproposalsontheshapingofpan-FirstNationinstitutions, but limited federal investments have been made in funding the capacity andconditionsnecessarytospuroninstitutionbuilding(e.g.research,discussionpapers,forumsfordiscussing the issues, innovativepilots and initiatives, and core funding for the incubationofinstitutionalfunctions,etc.).AnnexDincludesanoverviewofsomeoftheinstitutionalfunctionsthatarenecessarytosupportand protect Indigenous governments, service delivery organizations and institutions. TheabsenceofimportantinstitutionalfunctionsisaseverethreattothestabilityandexistenceoftheseIndigenousorganizations.Anyeffectivegovernmenthasembeddedchecksandbalances,includingoversightbyindependentandcredibleinstitutionalbodiesandelectedorappointedofficials.InthecontextofFirstNationsgovernments,mostoftheseinstitutionalfunctionsareeithernotfulfilledatall,orareverysuperficiallyconducted(i.e.theyarelimitedintermsoftheirscopeanddepthofoversight).TheabsenceoftheseinstitutionalfunctionsintheFirstNationscontextincreasesopportunityforpoordecisionmakingandincreasesriskofprogramminggaps,mismanagement,non-legal,non-compliance,andrightsviolations.Sadly,butunderstandably,whenimproprietiesareidentifiedbyfederalfundersorcommunitymembers,thereactionsoftheGovernmentofCanadaareoftenharsh.Federalbureaucratshaveahistoryofrevokingfundingordecision-makingauthorityfromIndigenous-led institutions thatmakemissteps, principally because there are no institutionalfunctionsresponsibleforoversightandinterventioninrespectofgovernance,programdeliveryand financial management issues. When funding is cut-off, the impacts on First Nations


31

communitiesandindividualscanbedirebecausetheyrelyheavilyontheprogramsandservicesdeliveredbytheseorganizations.ExamplesofsituationswherefundingandprogramshavebeencutforreasonsnotedaboveincludetheManitobaFireFightersAssociation’smismanagementofflood evacuation funding,43 the failure of the First Nations Statistical Institute to make“measurableprogress towardstheachievementof itsoutcomes”,44 theexistenceof“ongoinginternalgovernanceissues”45 attheMetisNationofSaskatchewan,andthefailureoftheFirstNations University to resolve its “systemic problems related to governance and financialmanagement”,46 tonamebutafewexamplesinalonglist.sHadstrongandstable Indigenous institutional functionsbeen inplacetosupportandprotectthese Indigenousorganizations,manyof these crisesmighthavebeenaverted throughearlydetection, supportand intervention,ordeterrence. Further,whencorruption is suspectedorconfirmed,FirstNationsPeoplesandtheirgovernmentslackmechanismstopursueitoutsideofthe Canadian criminal justice system.While INAC has attempted to fill this void through itsInvestigation and Assessment Services Branch,more robust and independent Indigenous-ledfunctions are needed (e.g. ombudsman(s) with appropriate powers, accountabilities andresourcestoinvestigateandpursueallegationsofcorruption).

9. OTHEROPPORTUNITIESTOENHANCEFEDERALHORIZONTALITYThroughourresearchandinterviews,wehaveidentifiedmanyotheropportunitiestostrengthenfederalhorizontality inthedeliveryofFirstNationstransferpayments.Thesearesummarizedbelow.

9.1 Federal Investments inPlanningCapacityandResultsFrameworks forFirstNationsGovernments

FirstNationslackopportunitiestosettheirownstrategiesforpovertyreductionbecausefederalprogrammingisgenerallytiedtospecificprogramactivitiesandmanyrestrictionsexisttolimitinvestmentsincommunity-specificstrategiesandpriorities.Somenoteworthyprogresshasbeenmadeinenhancingcommunity-basedprioritysettingandplanninginIndigenoushealth, landsmanagement and infrastructure programming, but remains limited for most other federalprograms.Toachievemorecommunity-centricprogrammingandservices,direct investmentsareneededtoenhancetheplanningcapacityofFirstNations,thisincludesthecapacitytoengagewith community members and stakeholders, set priorities and develop plans. The lack ofpredictability implicit within INAC’s current approach of providing time-limited funding forComprehensive Community Plans is unlikely to solve the longer-term challenge of improvingplanningcapacity.Stakeholdersinterviewednotedthattime-limitedfundingismostoftenusedto hire external consultants rather than enhancing the community’s permanent planning


32

capacity. Health Canada provides some permanent planning funding for its programs. Somestakeholderswhowereinterviewedforthisstudynotedthatsomecommunitieshaveleveragedthis funding to partially subsidize the salaries of permanent community planners. A morehorizontalfederalapproachtofundingplanningcapacityisneeded,movingawayfromadhocinvestments toward permanent and sufficient funding for planning and other governancefunctions.Strong performancemeasurement regimes will also be needed to ensure that First Nationsgovernmentsareheldaccountable forachieving results. Thebackboneof theseperformancemeasurementregimeswillberesultsframeworksthatclearlydescribethetargetedresultstobeachieved. Ideally, joint-results frameworkswill beestablished in collaborationwitheachFirstNationand/ornationgrouptoensurethatfederalinvestmentsaretargetedatcommunityneedsand priorities. Exclusively using community-focused results frameworks would not permitmeasurementofsocio-economicgapclosureatregionalandCanada-widelevels,soacoregroupofindicatorsthatareacceptedbyallFirstNationsgovernmentsandtheGovernmentofCanadawouldalsobenecessary.Coupled with strong performance measurement regimes, results frameworks such as thesewould provide federal funders, Treasury Board, Finance Canada and parliamentarians withassurancethatfederalinvestmentsarefocusedonimportantcommunityprioritiesandachievingresults.Moreimportantly,clearresultsandstrongreportingwillenhanceaccountabilitybetweenFirstNationsgovernmentsandtheirmembers,strengtheningthebondsoftrustnecessaryforFirstNationscommunitiesandgovernmentstoadvancetheirself-determinedgoals.

9.2 FlexibleProgramFundingManyfederalprogramsprovide littleopportunity forsetting localprogrampriorities.Further,there is typically misalignment between a given community’s needs and available federalprogramming.While investments in community planning and community results frameworkswouldmakealignmentpossible, federalprogramsalsoneedtobemoreflexible inpermittingprogram interventions that can be tailored to unique community circumstances. This can beachievedthroughmorebroadProgramTermsandConditions,increaseduseofflexiblefundingapproaches,andlessprescriptiveandrestrictiveresultsreportingrequirements.Somefederalofficialsinterviewedforthisstudyindicatedthatadvancementshavealreadybeenmadeinsomeprogram areas (e.g. community-based health promotion, primary healthcare, home andcommunity care, and income assistance preventive measures). While flexibilities have beenincreasedinsomeprogramareas,Indigenousstakeholdersnotethatmanyoftheircommunityprogrammingneedsarenotfunded,soincreasedflexibilitywithineachfederalprogramisnotacompletesolutiononitsown.


33

9.3 HarmonizedProgramTermsandConditionsThereareoveronehundredsetsofProgramTermsandConditionsforIndigenousprogramming,andonlyahandfulareopentomorethanonefederaldepartment(e.g.theProgramTermsandConditionsoftheStrategicPartnershipsInitiativeareusedby16federalfunders).47TheseTermsandConditionsestablishuniqueflexibilitiesandconditionsforeachfederalprogram.Indoingso,theyoftenrestricttheabilityoffederalandFirstNationsofficialstobecreativeinhowprogramsare delivered. They also create many parallel and incompatible program and administrativeregimesthatincreaseburdensonFirstNationsgovernmentsandobstructcollaborationbetweenfederal funders.Anopportunityexists tostreamlineandharmonizeTermsandConditions forIndigenousprogrammingtoensurethatthefundingrelationshipmaximizesflexibility,minimizesadministrativeburden,promotesprogram integrationandenhancesopportunities for federalcollaboration.Anoptiontoharmonizeandexpandauthorities,whilerecognizingtheneedfordifferentiationbetweenprograms,istoharmonizesimilarProgramTermsandConditionsintoasmallernumberofcommonProgramTermsandConditionsthatallfederalfunderscanaccess(e.g.communityengagement and planning, institution-building, capacity building and nation-rebuilding,economic development programming, infrastructure and other capital investments, etc.).Anotheropportunity to increase the flexibilityofProgramTermsandConditionswouldbe toincludebroadpovertyreductionandyouthinterventionauthoritiesineveryprogram’stermsandconditions.Forexample,theUrbanProgrammingforIndigenousPeoples(UPIP)programtermsandconditionsallowgreatflexibility,recognizingthatneedsandstrategiesdiffergreatlyfromcommunitytocommunity.TheUPIPProgramTermsandConditions48includebroadauthoritiesto:

► providecorefundingtoIndigenousservicedeliveryorganizations;► investinlocalprogramsandservicesnotcoveredbyotherfederalprograms;► promote and fund local coalitions involving all levels of government, community

serviceprovidersandstakeholders;and► fundresearchandinnovationandpilotinnovativeprograms/services.

9.4 DataandResearchonNeedsandProgrammingGaps

FirstNationscommunitiesrelyheavilyonlocalandprovincialdeliveryagenciesforthedeliveryoflocalprogramsandservices(e.g.hospitalsandhealthcentres,familycaringagencies,socialservices, on-reserve and provincial schools, emergencymanagement response organizations,amongmany others) but provincial programs and federally funded on-reserve programs are


34

generallymisalignedwiththespecificneedsofthecommunities.IncreasedfundingforresearchanddataanalyticscouldprovideIndigenousgovernmentstheinformationtheyneedtodesignandmanageeffectiveprograms.ThisinformationcanalsodrawattentionofothergovernmentstotheneedsoftheirIndigenouspopulations,forexample,toensurethatprovincialprogramsmeetthespecificneedsofIndigenousresidents.While some sector-specific data-collection and research is undertaken in Canada to betterunderstandhowtoovercometheoutcomegapsexperiencedbyIndigenousCanadians,thereareverysignificantgapsinbothdataandresearch.Thelackofevidence-basedresearchanddataimpairspolicymaking.Acoordinatedandintegratedapproachtoresearchwouldhighlightbestpractices andopportunities to improve federal policy andprogram interventions. ThiswouldnecessitateaccesstodataonIndigenousprogrammingandtheneedsofIndigenouspeoples.TheFirstNationsInformationGovernanceCentre(FNIGC)receivesfederalfundingtohousetheFirstNationsRegionalHealthSurveyandtheFirstNationsRegionalEarlyChildhood,EducationandEmploymentSurvey.While theactivitiesandsupports.While theFNIGCoffersdataaccess toindividuals pursuing academic research, policy development, and program planning, it is notfunded to collect and disseminate all relevant data. Additionally, FNIGC data is available toresearchersandpolicymakersonapay-per-usebasis,asopposedtoanopendatabasis.The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Canadian Institutes of HealthResearch (CIHR) and the Australian Institute of Health andWelfare (AIHW) are examples ofresearchanddevelopment-focusedresearchinstitutionsthatoperateinanintegratedfashiontoadvanceandsupportpolicymakingthroughcredibleinformation.IDRCisaCanadianCrowncorporationthat“fundsresearchindevelopingcountriestopromotegrowth,reducepoverty,anddrivelarge-scalepositivechange”.49IDRCseekstouseresearchasatoolforaddressingchallengesthroughfundingresearch,encouraginginformationsharingwithpolicymakers,andensuringthatinformationisinthehandsofthosewhoarebestsuitedtouseit.50 The IDRC employs a collaborative and regionally based approach to working withresearchers, development practitioners, policymakers, orders of government, researchinstitutes,andglobalfunderstoincreasetheimpactofdevelopmentinitiatives.51Thisapproachrepresents a coordinated and collaborative approach to research and development as IDRCforgespartnershipswithrelevantactorstoincreaseavailableresourcesandtheirrelatedimpact,inordertostrengthenlocalcapacities.ThesuccessoftheIDRCmodelcouldbeappliedtoaFirstNations focused research agency to leverage funding of governments, corporations,philanthropistsandgrantingagenciesandbetterdirectscarceresourcestoresearchimperatives.


35

CIHRisaresearchinvestmentagencythatcollaborateswithvariouspartnerstostrengthenhealthandtheCanadianhealthcaresystem.52CIHRfundsanddirectshealth-carerelatedresearchtoimprovehealthcareservicesandproducts.53Thisgoalisachievedthroughfundingexploratoryand targeted areas, building capacity to conduct health related research, and disseminatingresearch information toensure itsuse in futurepolicies, practices,procedures,products andservices.54CIHRconsistsofthirteen(13)researchinstitutesthatconnectwiththelocalresearchcommunitytoensureaharmonizedand interdisciplinaryapproachtoresearch isemployed.55OneoftheinstitutesismandatedwithIndigenoushealthspecifically.TheInstituteofAboriginalPeoples’Health(IAPH)seekstopromoteIndigenousresearchcapacityandimproveoverallhealthoutcomesforIndigenouspeoplethroughsupportsandpartnershipsbetweencommunitiesandresearchersatthe local, regionalandnational levels.56CIHRand IAPHrepresentcollaborativeapproaches to health research through connecting with partners, including government,universitiesandresearchcentres,andleveraginglocal,regionalandnationalresearchdomainsto improve theCanadianhealth care system.Other program sectors could also benefit fromfocusedresearchonchallengesfacingCanada’sIndigenouspopulations.AIHWisanAustralianinstitutethatseekstoprovideresearchersandpolicymakerswithaccesstosecureandreliabledatatoexaminekeyhealthtopicsandimprovethedeliveryofhealthcareservicestoAustralians.57AIHWcollaborateswithvariousgovernmentdepartments(atthenational,state,territory,andlocallevels),universitiesandresearchcentrestoensuretheavailabilityoftrustedinformationtoimprovehealthservices58.Inadditiontoresearch,AIHWhasanimportantrolein“providingaccuratestatisticalinformation,developingandcollectingcomprehensivedata,analyzingandreportingondata,anddatalinkageservices(i.e.comparingonedatasettoanother)”.59AIHWprovidesaccesstodatainanopenandaccessibleformat,allowingforaccesstodatathatcanbeleveragedinthedevelopmentofhealth-relatedpoliciesandprograms.AIHWrepresentsacoordinatedandhorizontalapproachtoinvestinginhealth-relatedresearchtodriveprogrammaticandpolicydecisions,whilepromotingcollaborationamongstpartners.

9.5 Simplifying Accountability Relationships for the Federal Cabinet and First NationsGovernments

Aspreviouslyexamined,accountabilityforIndigenouspoliciesandprogramsisdividedbetweenmany FederalMinisters and federal departments. Federal officials interviewed for the studynotedthatcross-departmentcollaborationhappenswhenthereisacrisisorpoliticalimperative,butitismoredifficulttosustaincollaborationonanongoingbasis.Further,whilepoliticalwillandcooperationamongFederalMinistersanddepartmentscanhelpalignpoliciesandpriorities,it is generally unsuccessful in harmonizing delivery of programs across federal departments.Reducing the number of Federal Ministers and departments responsible for delivering FirstNationsprogrammingwouldhelptoensurethataccountabilityrequirementsonFirstNations


36

governmentsareclear,consistentandachievable.Asimplifiedandcoherentsetofaccountabilityrequirements would also contribute to program effectiveness and enhanced Crown – FirstNationsrelationships.

9.6 Reduce Administrative Burden on First Nations Governments to StrengthenAccountabilityRegimes

As previously explored, the Blue Ribbon Panel reinforced the importance of reducingadministrative burden on First Nations recipients. Presently, each federal department has adistinctiveadministrativeregimeformanagingitsFirstNationstransferpaymentprograms,andmanyofthesedepartmentsplaceundueadministrativeburdensonFirstNationsrecipients.Fewof these funding relationships emulate intergovernmental transfers that resemble federal-provincialtransfersorCanada’sdevelopmentassistancetransferstoforeigngovernments(i.e.characterizedbytheAidEffectivenessPrinciplesoflocalownership,alignmentoffundersbehindlocalsystems,harmonizationofadministrativeandreportingrequirements,andfocusonlocalresults).Further,mostadministrativerequirementsattachedto federal transfersarenot risk-based,despitethePTPemphasizingtheimportanceofthis.In many departments, the risk and control posture varies from program to program, andsometimes, region to region (e.g. INAC’s Post-Secondary Education Program deliverymodelswerefoundtovaryfromregiontoregion).60Streamliningandharmonizingthewebofrulesandprogramcontrolframeworkscouldbeachievedthroughthedevelopmentofacommonfederaltransferpaymentcontrolframework.Suchaframeworkcouldinclude:

► a directive for selecting an appropriate funding approach (i.e. preventwithholding offlexibilitieswithoutcause);

► a common capabilities assessment that replaces INAC’s existing General Assessmentprocessandtools;

► common funding agreement terms and conditions that seek to reinforce theintergovernmentalnatureofFirstNationstransfers;

► commoncomplianceandmonitoringregimesthatminimizeunnecessaryreportingandplacerelianceonandreinforceFirstNationsaccountabilityregimeswhereverpossible;and

► mandatory consideration of community-based priorities and plans, and minimalistapproachestorecipientreporting,etc.).

10. CONSIDERATIONSFORTHECREATIONOFNEWFEDERALDEPARTMENTSOnAugust28,2017,theGovernmentofCanadaannouncedplanstorealignaccountabilitiesandprogrammingforIndigenousandnorthernprogramming.ThiswillincludethedissolutionofINAC


37

andthecreationoftwonewfederaldepartments,onefocusedonCrown-Indigenousrelationsand northern affairs, and a second focused on Indigenous program delivery. In hiscommunication,thePrimeMinisteremphasizedthe“needtoshedtheadministrativestructuresandlegislationthatwereconceivedinanothertimeforadifferentkindofrelationship”61andemphasized that “the level of the ambition of this government cannot be achieved throughexisting colonial structures”.62 While the potential challenges and solutions highlightedthroughoutthispaperareallrelevantconsiderationsfortheshapingofthesenewdepartments,wefeltitwouldbehelpfultoexamineafewquestions,including:

► howtodovetailandalignthemanyparallelconversationsaboutaFirstNation’spursuitofself-determinationandself-governance;

► howtoachievetruegovernmenttogovernmentrelationships;and

► whichFirstNationsprogramstomergeintothenewIndigenousServicesDepartment.

10.1 Dovetailing and Aligning Federal Policies and Frameworks for Self-determination,NationRebuilding,CapacityStrengtheningandSelf-governance

When establishing the mandates and resource levels of new federal departments, theGovernmentofCanadahasanopportunity toharmonize themanypoliciesand regimes thatsupport self-governanceandself-determination. Ideally, therewouldbeoneunitaryCrown–FirstNationsconversationaboutself-determination,nationrebuilding,capacitystrengtheningandself-governance.Toharmonizeconversationsaboutself-determinationandself-governance,thediscussionsoccurringat exploratory tables and self-government tableswouldneed tobemelded into a much broader conversation about community plans and priorities, self-determination and self-governance. Such an approach would also require that the manyprogram-specificconversationsandtoolsaimedatenhancingcontroloverlocalprogramming,resources and land be dovetailed into a coherent and complementary set of tools andapproaches.OngoingconversationswouldneedtooccurwitheveryFirstNationandnationgroup,notonlythoseexpressinginterestinself-governanceandself-determination.Inthisway,theexistingself-governance conversationswould flow naturally frommore nascent discussions about a FirstNation’s community priorities, strategic initiatives, capacity building needs and fundingrequirements.Under such an approach, therewouldbenomotivation to favor sectoral self-governance agreements (e.g. the recent Anishinabek Nation Education Agreement) overadministrativeagreementstoenhanceFirstNationscontrolofprograms(e.g.B.C.FirstNationsHealthAuthorityandmoretherecentpushforeducationgovernanceagreements).Thefocuswould shift to working with First Nations and nation groups to choose the right tools andapproachestoallowthemtoachievetheirself-determinationandself-governancegoals.


38

10.2 Moving Towards Government to Government Relationships through an

IntegratedFederalApproachPresently, there are many parallel and disconnected relationships between First Nationsgovernmentsandthefederalgovernment,thesearedescribedbelow.

► One relationship for exploring pathways to self-determination and self-government.TheserelationshipsareprincipallycoordinatedbyTreatiesandAboriginalGovernmentSectorofINAC,andtheB.C.TreatyCommissionintheProvinceofBritishColumbia,andincludemanyotherministriesandagencies.

► Several potential relationshipswith federal programs and institutions that administerprocesses to draw-down jurisdiction outside of the Indian Act and outside of self-government negotiations (e.g. oil and gas, health, education, lands management,taxation,financialborrowing,elections,etc.).Presently,theserelationshipscanconflictoroverlapwiththepursuitofself-government.

► Many funder relationships with federal programs officers and funding officers whoadminister transfer payment programs and agreements, including some that providesupportsforself-determinationandcapacitystrengthening.Therecanbeupwardsof50of theseparallel relationships in a FirstNation,with federal officials spreadacross34federaldepartmentsandagencies.63

A First Nations government’s points-of-entry into the federal government are typically atpositions well below the executive-level. There are some exceptions to this rule, includingsituationswhere INAC has taken a different approach to engagingwith and supporting FirstNationsduringa crisesor timeofpolitical imperative (e.g.Attawapiskat FirstNationhousingcrisis, Kashechewan First Nation flooding recovery efforts, Ontario Ring of Fire communities,MashteuiatshFirstNationadministrativereductioninitiative,RossRiverDenaCouncilhousingcrisis,LakeSt.Martincommunityreconstruction,Pangnirtungyouthsuicidecrisis,andahandfulofdistresssituationsinFirstNationsfromB.C.andtheMaritimes).Inallofthesecases,federalrelationships revert back toprogramofficers and administrativeofficers once the immediatecrisis orpolitical imperativepasses. Our interviewsand researchhighlight that,while strongprogressisgenerallymadeduringthecrisisorpoliticalimperative,longer-termgovernment-to-governmentrelationshipswiththeCrowngenerallydegradewhenexecutive-levelfocuswains.Achieving strong government-to-government relationships will require a complete shift inculture and approach. We recommend a shift toward an integrated federal approach thatincludesspaceforprovincialandterritorialinvolvement,andopportunitiesforleadersoutsideofthebandcounciltobemeaningfullyengaged(e.g.schoolprincipals,corporateleaders,healthcare leaders and professionals, spiritual leaders, independent program agencies, elders and


39

youth, hereditary leaders, community activists, etc.). Such a relationship cannot be achievedwithinexistingfederalresourcesanddeliverymodelsandwouldrequireinvolvementofboththenewIndigenousRelationsandIndigenousServicesdepartments.This would include one approach for relating with each First Nation and nation group, arelationship necessarily led by federal officials at the executive-level. These executives couldserveastheambassadorandclientrelationshipmanagertotheFirstNationsgovernmentsandnation groups. Secondary assignments could also be made to ensure some continuity ofrelationshipsintheeventualityofturnover.Suchanapproachcouldlikelybeachievedwithoutcreatingnewexecutivepositions,byrefocusingexistingresourcesinvestedinEXpositions.Forexample,existingdirectorpositionsinregionswithresponsibilityforfundingservices,economicdevelopment, and various other programs would be primarily responsible for coordinatingprogramwith5-10FirstNations,withadditionalorsecondaryrolesasthesubject-matterexpertforcertainprograms(i.e.tomaintainstronglinksbetweenregionsandcentralprogramleads).Resourcespresentlyassignedtofederalregionaldevelopmentagenciesandotherdepartmentsthat deliver Indigenous development programmingwould need to be re-profiled to the newIndigenous service delivery organization or an entity outside of the public service (e.g.development bank, special operating agency or Crown Corporation) to ensure that theaccountabilitiesofMinistersdonotimpedeeffectiveCrown–FirstNationsrelationships.SuchamodelwouldstillrequireprogramleadsinthenewIndigenousservicesdepartmentandsomeotherfederaldepartmentswherelinkagestooff-reservefederalprogramingareimportant(e.g.fisheries,unemploymentinsurance,immigrationandborderprotection,Indigenousjusticeandcourts,policing,justice,etc.).Further,anintegratedapproachofthisnaturewouldonlybeeffectiveifthenationalprogramleadsrelinquishedsubstantiallyalloftheprogramdeliveryandfundingdecisionstoregionalofficialsresponsibleforprogramdelivery.Amodelofthisnaturewouldrequiresafeguardscommontoabureaucracywherepowerisdistributed,includingstrongprogramevaluation,programperformancereviews,knowledgesharingactivities,strongtraininginprinciplesandapproaches,independentauditandoversightfunctions,andstrongcomplaintand dispute resolutions mechanisms. To ensure that regional practices and nation-specificprogram strategies remain effective, a model of this nature would benefit from jointly-ledevaluations (i.e. federal,FirstNationsandprovincial)of regionalprogrammingstrategies (e.g.regionalhealthauthorities,localeducationboards,community-specificprograminterventions,etc.).AnnexGfurtherexplorestheopportunityforincreaseduseofjoint-evaluations.

10.3 Which First Nations Programs should be Merged into the New IndigenousServicesDepartment


40

A First Nations stakeholder interviewed for this study advised that their community mustcompleteover100governmentauditscheduleswiththeiryear-endauditedfinancialstatements.Interestingly,onlyahandfuloftheseauditrequirementswereforINACandHealthCanada,withthelargemajoritybeingobligationstootherfederalandprovincialfunders.ManyfederalofficialsinterviewedforthisstudybelievethatenhancementstoCrown-FirstNationsrelationshipsandprogramapproacheswillbeachievedbyconsolidatingandharmonizingtheprogrammingandapproaches of the largest funders of First Nations programming (i.e. INAC programs, healthservices, labourparticipationprograms,policing,etc.). Unfortunately,manyofthepolicyandprogramleversneededtoadvancethemorechallengingissuesfacingFirstNationsrestoutsideofthesedepartments(e.g.housingloans,forestryprograms,labourmarketprograms,regionaleconomicdevelopment,mining,connectionstooff-reserveinfrastructure,connectionstopowergrids,etc.).Ifconsolidationwerelimitedtothelargestportfolios,therewouldlikelycontinuetobemanyparallelprogramrelationshipsand lowerachievementofresults.Wearguethat it isequallyimportant,ormoreimportant,toharmonizeandconsolidateprogrammingofthesmallerfundersbecausetheseprogramshavethegreatestpotentialtounlocknewopportunitiesforFirstNations.In considering whether to merge the larger government programs into the new IndigenousServicesDepartment, it is beneficial to consider theAustralian andU.S. experiences.Bothofthese countries have taken steps at one point to consolidate a large number of Indigenous-focusedprogramsintoasmallernumberoffederaldepartments.Australiachosetoconsolidatevirtuallyallofitsprogrammingintoonedepartmentintheearly1980sandlaterdeterminedthathealthprogrammingneededtobeseparate.TheU.S.chosetoconsolidatemostofitsIndigenousprogramsintoBureauofIndianAffairs(BIA),butdecidedtoleavehealthservicesandhousinginotherdepartments.ThelessonthatcanbelearnedfromtheU.S.andAustralianexperiencesisthatthoughtfulconsiderationofthepotentialimpactsofmovingprogramsinIndigenousServicesCanada (e.g. policing, forestry, fisheries, housing, etc.) could help to avert unintendedconsequences.Below,weexaminetheU.S.andAustralianhealthservicesexamples,whichisnottosuggestthattheseexamplesdirectlyapplytoFirstNationshealthprogramminginCanada.In1984,theDepartmentofAboriginalAffairs(DAA)inAustraliaassumedresponsibilityforthedeliveryofhealthcareservicestoAboriginalandTorresStraitIslanders,therebyamalgamatingallAboriginalprogramsandservicesintooneportfolio.64Itwasthoughtthatthisapproachwouldbebeneficial,asAboriginalControlledHealthServices(ACCHS’s)wouldreceiveprimaryhealthcarefundingdirectlyfromtheDAA,whichwouldincreaseAboriginalcontrolandprovidemoreculturallyappropriatehealthservices.65Thedirectfundingapproachwasmeanttosupplementhealthservicesprovidedthroughmainstreamhealthcaresystems.Thisapproachhadnegativeandunintendedconsequences,includingreducedfocusontheneedsofIndigenousAustralians


41

in the mainstream health systems.66 The effects of the failed consolidation of the healthdepartmentare stillbeing felt today,as thehealthoutcomes forAboriginalandTorresStraitIslanders are well below that of other Australians (i.e. life expectancy is 10.6 years less forAboriginalmalesthannon-Aboriginalmales).67ThishasledtothedevelopmentoftheNationalAboriginalandTorresStraitIslanderHealthPlan(2013-2023)thatfocusesonclosingthehealthdisparitiesgapthroughacoordinatedapproach.68IntheUS,IndianHealthServices(IHS)istheagencywithprimaryresponsibilityforthedeliveryofhealthcareservicesforfederallyrecognizedAmericanIndiansandAlaskaNatives.69Thegoalof the IHS is to raise the physical, societal, mental and spiritual health to the highest levelpossible, throughcomprehensive,culturallyappropriatehealthservices thatareaccessible toAmericanIndianandAlaskaNatives.70TheIHSishousedwithintheDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices,whichhasresponsibilitytoimproveandprotectthehealthandwell-beingofnon-Indigenouspeoples.Assuch,thereisacleardivisioninresponsibilitybetweentheIHSandthe BIA, allowing for similar portfolios to reside togetherwithin the same agency. AmericanIndiansandAlaskanNativesdoexperiencehealthdisparitiesincomparisontoothernon-IndianAmericans(i.e.lifeexpectancyis4.4yearslessthanotherUSpopulations).71Itshouldbenotedhowever,thatlifeexpectancygapsinU.S.arelowerthanthoseinAustraliaandcomparabletolifeexpectancygapsforCanada’sFirstNationsPeoples(i.e.FirstNationsPeopleslive4yearslessthanotherCanadianpopulations,whileCanadianInuitlive13.5yearsless).


42

AnnexA–ImportantHistoricalContext

European-FirstNationsRelationshipsinCanadaTheperiodfromfirstcontact(i.e.mid-1600s)totodaycanbedividedintotwoprinciplesegments:Pre-Confederation,whenEuropeansettlersformedrelationshipswithFirstNationsandforeignimperialgovernmentssetpoliticalandeconomicpolicies,andPost-Confederation,whenmodernCanada established its own political bodies, independent from Britain, and continued to setpoliciesasitexpandedwestwardandnorthward.Pre-ConfederationRelations between First Nations and early European settlers were as complex as relationsamongstFirstNationsthemselves.WhentheEuropeansarrivedinNorthAmerica,theyoperatedundercertaincolonialistassumptions,notleastofwhichwerethelegalconceptof“terranullius”and the “discovery doctrine”. Together, these two concepts meant European explorers andsettlers assumed that the territory they landed on belonged to no one, that they couldlegitimatelyoccupythe landswithoutanyone’sconsent,andthattheactof“discovering”thelandgavethemlegaltitleoverit.72However,thenewEuropeanarrivalslackedboththenumbersand the experience to thrive in North America independently. For pragmatic reasons, theyformedrelationshipswithFirstNations. Theearliestexamplesof treatiesbetweenEuropeanSettlersandFirstNationsweremutuallybeneficialoralagreements.Europeansrequiredsecurityfor their still small andvulnerable communitieswhile theFirstNations sawmanybenefits totradingandworkingtogetherwiththeirnewneighbours.Theirtreatiesweremainlyforeconomicandmilitarygain,andthetermswerelargelywellunderstoodandrespectedbytheEuropeans.73TherelationshipreachedapivotalpointwiththeissuanceoftheRoyalProclamation(1763)andsubsequentTreatyofNiagara(1764).TheRoyalProclamationwasissuedbyKingGeorgeafterEngland’svictoryoverFranceintheSevenYearsWar,theaftermathofwhichresultedinFrancecedingmuchoftheircontroloverNorthAmericatoEngland.TheProclamation“establishedabasis for government administration in the North American territories” and “established aconstitutionalframeworkforthenegotiationoftreatieswiththeAboriginalinhabitantsoflargesectionsofCanada”.74TheRoyalProclamationestablishedandupheldtheexpectationofmutualrespect between First Nations and what would later become the Canadian Government.75According toVenne (1997), “theProclamation recognized Indigenouspeoplesas ‘Nations,’asdistinctsocietieswiththeirownformsofpoliticalorganization,withwhomtreatieshadtobenegotiated”.76However,thewordingoftheProclamationislargelyseenasbeingcontradictory(orat leastconfusing), inthat itseemstostateatoncethatthe landwaswithintheCrown’scontrolwhilealsoreinforcingIndigenousautonomy.


43

TheTreatyofNiagarabetweentheBritishandFirstNationsrepresentativesinNiagarain1764can be understood as the first andmost concrete implementation of the spirit of the RoyalProclamation,inmanywaysmakingitscontradictoryandconfusingstatementsmoretangible.AsBurrows’writes,theTreatyofNiagaraaffirmedthe“nation-to-nationrelationshipbetweensettlerandFirstNationpeoples”andthe“multinationallianceinwhichnomembergaveuptheirsovereignty”.77TheTreatyofNiagaraincluded,fromtheIndigenousperspective,severalpromises:“respectforthesovereigntyofFirstNations, thecreationofanalliance, freeandopentradeandpassagebetween the Crown and First Nations, permission or consent needed for settlement of FirstNationsterritory,theEnglishprovisionofpresentstoFirstNations,mutualpeace,friendshipandrespect”.78TheeraimmediatelyfollowingtheRoyalProclamationwascharacterizedbyadramaticincreaseinthenon-IndigenouspopulationoftheEasterncoloniesunderBritishcontrol,andashiftawayfromfur-tradingandexplorationtowardpermanentsettlementsandagriculturaldevelopment.ThesephenomenacontributedtothedeclineofIndigenouswellbeingandprosperity,especiallyintheEasternandNortherncolonies,astheirlandbegantobelegallyandillegallyremovedfromtheircontrol,theirwayoflifebegantobeseenasunproductiveintheEuropeanindustrialsense,and their populations continued to be ravaged by disease.79 Ongoing negotiationswith FirstNationsbegantoheavilyfeaturereliefpaymentsfromtheCrowntoFirstNations,creatingamoredependentandlessequalrelationship.Furthermore,astheEnglishcontinuedtoemergeasthemainpowerintheCanadiancoloniesandstabilizedrelationswiththenewlyformedAmericanstates to the south, they graduallybecame lessdependenton FirstNations for theirmilitaryalliances. The relationship between First Nations and Europeanswas less and less based onmutualbenefitandrespectandthetoneofsubsequenttreaties,agreements,andinteractionscontinuedtoreinforcethisgoingforward.AsRCAPpoignantlyputit,manypolicieswereputinplacewhich effectively “displaced” Indigenous populations physically, culturally, socially, andpolitically.80At the same time, competition between the Hudson’s Bay Company and newNorthwesternCompanyreducedtherelianceofbothfurtradingcompaniesonFirstNations intermediaries,causingaperiodofviolenceandconflict (but thiswaseventually resolved, for themostpart,when the two companies merged and relations normalized). Interaction and close contactbetweentheEuropeantraders/voyageursandtheFirstNationshunters,asthefur-huntspreadwestandsouthintotheprairies,wasamajorcontributortotheestablishmentoftheMetisgroupinManitobaandelsewhere.


44

Inthe1780s,AmericanIndependencebecameamorelikelyreality.Finally,in1783theTreatyofVersailles81(nottobeconfusedwiththe1919TreatyofVersaillesattheendofWorldWarI),resultedinFirstNationsloyalistsandwarveteransseekingrefugeandcompensationinCanadiancolonies,whichtheBritishobligedtoacertaindegree.TheydidthisalsoinpartbecauseBritishmilitary leadersvaluedmilitaryallianceswithFirstNations,duetofearofwarwiththenewlyindependentAmericans.Tokeeptheallianceshealthy,andtomakeupforpreviousgrievances,morelandsetasideforFirstNationsandrelativelyequitabletreaties/agreementswerestruck.As an example, the Six Nations of the Grand River was formed of displaced Indigenouscommunities from the present-day northern United States, most of which originated fromIroquois and Delaware nations. The Six Nations community signed the Haldimand Treaty in178482andwasgrantedlargeamountsoflandborderingtheGrandRiverinpresent-daysouthernOntario.Bymanyaccounts,approx.95%oftheoriginallandgranthasbeensoldbyorlostbytheSixNationscommunityintheyearssince.TheFirstNationsalliancesprovedbeneficialtoBritainduringtheWarof1812.However,afterthe war, when the British relationship with Americans became more peaceful, “BritishAdministratorsbegantoregardFirstNationsasdependents,ratherthanallies”.83TheEuropeanpopulation of Canadian colonies continued to grow still. The attitude towards First Nationsshifted and they began to be viewed as an “impediment to growth and prosperity”.84 FirstNationslostcontrolandaccesstothemajorityoftheirlands.

Eventually,thisnewperspectiveledtoashiftinfocus,ontheEuropeanside,fromengaginginmilitaryandtradingalliancesto“civilizingtheIndian”,(intheBritishtradition,“civilization”wassynonymouswithaChristianagriculture-basedcommunity)andaseriesofpoliciesensued.Earlyexperimentswerebadlyunderfundedandmismanaged.Anotherturningpointin1830,whenanewsetof‘civilization’policieswereintroduced“designedspecificallytohelpIndigenouspeopleadjusttotheneweconomicandpoliticalrealities”85(namely,thedeclineofthefurtradeinfavourofagricultureandindustry,andthedeclineofcolonialistwars).Theuseofreservesbecamemoreprevalent,especiallyinthesouthernregionsofthecolonies.Reserveswerecreatedthroughavariety of legal instruments and types of agreements, with and without the consent of theIndigenouspopulationsaffected.Furthermore,thosenegotiatingtreatiesandagreementsbothon the Indigenous sideand theEuropean sideoften lacked theauthorityorpower to followthroughonpromisesortoproperlyrepresenttheirpopulation.Thisresulted intreatiesbeingbrokenorleftnotimplemented.

The next few decades were marked by a series of treaties, policies, and formal Acts ofgovernmentwhichembodiedthisnewattitude.Inthe1850s,theRobinsonHuron86andRobinsonSuperior87treaties“becamethetemplatefornegotiatedtreatiesintheWest”88andforthepost-


45

confederationNumberedTreaties.TheDouglasTreaties89onVancouverIsland,meanwhile,werehaltedin1854whenBritishColumbiarefusedtorecognizeIndigenoustitle.In1857,theGradualCivilizationAct (1857)90 reinforced these less formal attitudes andpenchants in law. TheActallowedsomeIndigenousindividualstovoluntarilytradetheir“IndianStatus”fortherightsofsettlerandasmalltractofland.91ThispolicywaslargelyrejectedbyIndigenouscommunitiesatthetime,asitdividedtheirpopulation,reducedtheirland,andcreatedasenseofdisconnectionandotherness.Post-Confederationto1969ShortlyafterConfederation,CanadabegannegotiatingaseriesofLandSurrenderTreatiesknownas the Numbered Treaties. Beginning in 1871 these treaties were intended to fulfil therequirementsunder the transfer, secureCanadian sovereignty,open land for settlementandexploitation,andreduceconflictbetweenIndigenouspeoplesandsettlers.In1876,anewCanadianGovernmentpassedtheIndianAct,92whichbolsteredpreviousactssuchastheGradualEnfranchisementActandothers.TheRCAPfinalreportwroteofthetimeoftheimplementationoftheIndianAct,

“thenegotiationoftreatiescontinued,butsidebysidewithlegislateddispossession,throughthe Indian Act. Aboriginal peoples lost control andmanagement of their own lands andresources,andtheirtraditionalcustomsandformsoforganizationwereinterferedwithintheinterestofremakingAboriginalpeopleintheimageofthenewcomers”.93

TheIndianActremainstothisdayoneofthemostcontentiouspiecesofCanadianlegislation.Overthedecades,theCanadianGovernmenthasalternatelyattemptedtoreinforcetheActandtriedtorepealit,whileFirstNationsadvocateshaveanuneasyrelationshipwithalawtheyseeasatonceprotectingtheirinherentrightswhileatthesametimerelegatingthemtotheinferiorpositionofdependants.Still inplacetoday,the IndianActwasdesignedtoregulatethemanagementof Indian lands,resources, moneys, access to intoxicants, promote civilization, determine membership andIndianstatus,etc.“[TheCrown]wouldcarryoutthisresponsibilitybyactingasa“guardian”untilsuch time as First Nations could fully integrate into Canadian society”.94 The UN SpecialRapporteurwroteinhis2014reportthattheIndianActexecutedorenabledtheexecutionofanumberofhumanrightsviolations,including

“thebanningofexpressionsofindigenouscultureandreligiousceremonies;exclusionfromvoting,juryduty,andaccesstolawyersandCanadiancourtsforanygrievancesrelatingto


46

land; the imposition, at times forcibly, of governance institutions; and policies of forcedassimilation through the removal of children from indigenous communities and“enfranchisement” that stripped indigenous people of their aboriginal identity andmembership”(pg.4).95

1883markedthebeginningofaparticularlydarkperiodintherelationshipbetweenFirstNationsand Canada, a period which continues to have significant impacts on those involved. TheResidential Schools policy, instituted in 1883, established a number of church-run residentialschools for Indigenous children and mandated forcible attendance. Over this period, anestimated150,000IndigenouschildrenwereremovedfromtheirhomesandsenttoresidentialschoolswiththeexplicitgoalofassimilatingthechildrenintoEuropean-Canadianculture.The2015finalreportoftheTruthandReconciliationCommissiontaskedwithinvestigatingtheIndianResidentialSchoolhistoryandimpactonCanadiansfoundthattheResidentialSchoolsystemleftalegacyofsocialissuesthatcontinuetoaffectFirstNationstothisday.96Theera followingWorldWar IImarksanotherturningpoint in therelationshipbetweenFirstNationsandCanadians.RecognizingthecontributionsmadebyFirstNationstothemilitaryeffort,in1946Parliamentundertookanefforttoreviewits“IndianPolicies”throughajoint-committeeandaseriesofhearings.Thisprocessresultedinmanyrecommendations,howevermostwerenot enacted until much later. For example, the policy of involuntary enfranchisement wasrepealedin1951,97alongwithanumberofchangestorequirementsforIndianstatus,andin1960,98FirstNationswontherighttovoteinfederalelections.However,onlyafewyears later,theGovernmentpubliclyespousedanewsetofcontentiousprinciplesputforthinTheWhitePaperonAboriginalPolicy(1969)(theWhitePaper).TheWhitePapersetoutanumberofwell-intentionedgoals, includingtheremovalof theconstitutionalbasisofdiscriminationandthereturnof“Indianlands”.99However,italsopromotedanendtoall special treatment by the federal government and the placement of individual rights overcollectiverights.AccordingtotheRCAPfinalreport(1996):

“the white paper sought to end the collective rights of Aboriginal people in favour ofindividual rights. Included were plans to eliminate the protection for reserve lands, toterminate the legal status of Indian peoples, and to have services delivered to them byprovincialgovernments”.100

Indigenouscommunitiesacrossthecountryrejectedthisdocumentfortwomainreasons:first,the complete lack of consultation and Indigenous involvementwas contrary not only to thesupposedspiritoftheWhitePaperitselfbuttotheinterestsofIndigenouscommunitiesaswell;


47

andsecond,theprinciplesunderminedtheirownconceptionofIndigenousrightsanddidawaywithwhatlittleprotectiontheycurrentlyenjoyed.ThisledtoasignificantriseinthenumberofIndigenousrepresentativegroupsandassociationsaimedatprotectinginterestsandrights(i.e.NationalIndianBrotherhood,whichlaterbecametheAFN,andmanyregionalgroups).Despiteitsgoodintentions,theWhitePapercreateda“legacyofbitterness…andsuspicion”.1011970toPresentThemodernhistoryofFirstNationsinCanadaismarkedbynumerouslegalcasesconfirmingandconferringrightsandrecognitiontoFirstNations.Asanexample,a1973SupremeCourtdecisionconfirmedCreeandInuittitletolargeportionsofNorthernQuebec,markingthebeginningoftheeraofthenegotiationofModernTreaties.102The1973Caldercase103ledtotheestablishmentof the first Land Claims Policy, however, the policy was at odds with the ongoing policy of“extinguishment” (meaning that land and resource rights are extinguishedwith a land claimsettlement”).Over 20modern treaties havebeen signed since this timeandmanymore areundernegotiation.

TheConstitutionActof1982104wasanimportantlandmarkforIndigenouspeoplesinCanada.IndigenousrepresentativeorganizationshadbeenexcludedfrommostConstitutionaldiscussionsleadingupto1982,butsucceededinaddingtwoclausestoSection35which“recognizedandaffirmed”“theexistingandaboriginaltreatyrightsofaboriginalpeoplesinCanada”.105WhiletheConstitutionAct1982doesnotdefinetheserights,manylegalcaseshavefollowedthatseektoaddressthisquestion.Thesecasesaretoonumerousandcomplextobegintodescribehere.TheUNSpecialRapporteurontheRightsofIndigenousPeopleswrote:“Canada’s1982Constitutionwasoneofthefirstintheworldtoenshrineindigenouspeoples’rights,recognizingandaffirmingtheaboriginalandtreatyrightsoftheIndian,InuitandMétispeopleofCanada”.106

Indigenouscollectiverightsweresometimesfoundtobeatoddswiththefocuson individualrightsintheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,tothepointthatthetwotypesofrightsaresometimesseenasmutuallyexclusivetoacertaindegree.Section25guaranteedthattheCharterofRightsandFreedomswouldnot“abrogateorderogate…anyrightsorfreedomsthathave been recognized by the Royal Proclamation... and any rights or freedoms thatmay beacquired…bywayof land claims settlements”.107 TheConstitutionwasamended in1983 toclarifythesesections.TheConstitutionalprocesshelpedtogalvanizeFirstNationstoacertaindegreeanddemonstratedpan-nationalcooperationtowardscommongoalsforthefirsttime.

In1987,anIndigenousleaderfromManitoba,ElijahHarper,effectivelyblockedratificationoftheMeechLakeAccord,demonstratingthepowerandinfluenceof Indigenousleaders inCanada.Among other concerns, Indigenous leaders saw the Meech Lake Accord as recognizing and


48

acceptingthenotionofQuebecasadistinctsociety,whilerejectingthesamerecognition forIndigenous nations. Indigenous concerns also included a lack of involvement of Indigenousnationsinfutureamendmentsandtherelegationofterritorialgovernments.Thewordingof the failedCharlottetownAccord (1992) included recognitionof the “inherentrightofAboriginalSelf-Government”.RCAPholdsthatwhiletheCharlottetownAccordfailed,itwouldbedifficulttowithdrawthisassertion.Notably,

“Canadarecognizesthattheinherentrightofself-governmentisanexistingaboriginalrightundertheConstitutionwhichincludestherightofindigenouspeoplestogovernthemselvesin matters that are internal to their communities or integral to their unique cultures,identities,traditions,languagesandinstitutions,andinrespecttotheirspecialrelationshipwiththeirlandandtheirresources.Thisrightofself-governmentincludesjurisdictionoverthedefinitionofgovernancestructures,FirstNationmembership,familymatters,education,healthandpropertyrights,amongothersubjects”.108

The2008“Statementofapologytoformerstudentsof IndianResidentialSchools”markedanimportantshiftintheGovernmentofCanada’spositiontowardCanada’slegacyoftransgressionsagainstIndigenouspeoples.109In2016,theGovernmentofCanadaremovedits“objectorstatus”fromthe“UNDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples”,consistentwithitscommitmenttopursenation-to-nationrelationshipswithFirstNations,builtonrecognitionandrespect.The long evolution of the relationship between First Nations and Canada, regardless ofintentions,hasundeniablyresultedinaproblematicsituation.TheSpecialRapporteurtotheUNhascalledthesituationinCanada“acrisis”,referringtothegapinhumandevelopmentindicatorsbetweenIndigenousandnon-IndigenousCanadians.TheTruthandReconciliationCommissionhas also called attention to the long-standing humanitarian issues stemming from Canada’spoliciesandpracticestowardsIndigenousPeoples.TheAuditorGeneralofCanadahasfoundthatthelackoffundingforsocialservicesinIndigenouscommunitiesisimpedingprogressandtheclosingofthesocio-economicgap.110


49

AnnexB–ParticipationofTribalLeadersintheU.S.FederalBudgetProcess

Explicit involvement of Indigenous governments in the federal budget process can reinforcegovernment-to-governmentrelationships,buildtrustandhelpensurethatscarceresourcesaretargeted on areas where they are most needed. The budget process of the U.S. federalgovernmentincludesspecificmechanismtoincreasetheinvolvementofTriballeaders.ExamplesofthesemechanismsincludetheTribal-InteriorBudgetCouncil(TIBC),theBudgetFormulationWorkgroup(BFWG)forIndianHealthServices(IHS)andtheNationalIndianHealthBoard(NIHB).TheTIBCresideswithintheUSDepartmentoftheInterior(DOI),IndianAffairs,andconsistsofseniorofficialsfromIndianAffairsandelectedorappointedtribalofficialsfromeachofthe12IndianAffairsareaoffices.111TheTIBCisoverseenbytwoTribalco-chairs,andprovidesaplatformfor tribal governments to engage and collaborate with federal government officials in thedevelopmentofbudgetrequeststhatdirectlyimpactIndianprograms.112Similarly,BFWGforIHSisanannualforumbetweengovernmentofficialsandIndiantribesandorganizations to discuss budget formulation.113 Senior officials within IHS and two TribalrepresentativesfromeacharearesideovertheBFWG.114Thisintegratedengagementallowsforthe inputof relevant informationon tribalhealthpriorities (fromboth the regional levelandnational level) to be incorporated into budgetary recommendations put forth to House andSenateCommitteesonAppropriations.115TheNationalIndianHealthBoard(NIHB)issimilarinnaturetotheTIBCandBFWG,howeveritisaTribalorganizationthatrepresentsall federally recognizedtribes.116TheNIHB isadvisory innature,andconsistsoftwelveboardmembers,whoareselectedbythetwelveareaIndianHealthboards.TheNIHBprovidesinputintotheIHSannualbudgetcyclebyprovidingsupporttotheIHSTribal BudgetWorkgroupwhich then puts forth recommendations on tribal priorities to theIHS.117


50

AnnexC–StatutoryProgramsandAppropriations,aNecessaryConditionforBuildingTrustinCrown–FirstNationsRelationships

InherJune2011capstonereport,thenAuditorGeneralofCanadaSheilaFraserhighlightedtheimportanceofalegislativebaseforimportantFirstNationsprogramsandprovidedsomeofthemoreobviousexamplessuchaseducation,healthanddrinkingwater.118Argumentshavealsobeen made for legislative bases in other important program areas such as child welfareprogramming, violence prevention programming, income support and labour marketprogramming,policing,andsocialsupports fordisabled,elderlyanddependentadults. Morerecently, legislationhasbeenintroducedtosupportregulationofsafedrinkingwaterforFirstNations communities (2013) and considerable effort has been expended in the pursuit oflegislation for FirstNationseducation, including thehigh-profile failureofBill C-33andmorerecentengagement,exploratorydiscussionsandco-developmentwork.WhiletheSafeDrinkingWaterforFirstNationsActcameintoforceonNovember1,2013,119theprocessofdevelopingsupportingregulationsisnotyetcomplete(i.e.thisactidentifieselevenessentialcomponentsthatneed tobeaddressed in regulationsand theGovernmentofCanada is in theprocessofengagingwithFirstNations).ThesetwoexamplesreinforcethatachievingalegislativebaseforimportantFirstNationsprogramscanbeanarduousandlengthyprocess.There are three broad approaches to establishing a legislative base for programming. Theseapproaches are characterized by different levels of commitment and certainty in programstandardsandfundinglevels.Asummaryofeachisincludedbelow.

LegislativeBasewithoutProgramStandards:Thisapproachincludesnamingprogramsthataretobedeliveredwithoutarticulatingprogramstandards,andistypicallyaccompaniedbya caveat that investmentsare subject toappropriationsbeingmadeavailableat thediscretionofthegovernment.AgoodexampleofthistypeoflegislationistheSnyderActof1924intheU.S,officiallynamedtheIndianCitizenshipAct.TheSnyderActestablishedalegislative base for certain programming120 (i.e. education, health, policing, justice,infrastructureandwater,amongothers)andwasupdatedovertimetokeeppacewiththetimes (i.e. “higher education” added in 1965121 and “housing improvement” added in1989).122Whileonemightarguethat legislationofthisnaturewouldbear littlefruit forFirstNationsinCanada, itcouldbeanimportantsymbolicfirststeptoacknowledgetheimportance of many important programs if it were complemented with permanentmechanismsorforumstofurtheradvancethelegislativebase.

LegislativeBasewithaCommitmenttoDevelopProgramStandardsandRegulations:Thisapproachgenerally involvescreatinga frameworkforthedevelopmentofprogramming


51

standards and supporting regulations. It can also involve legislating a process bywhichlegislation and supporting regulations will be developed. Until the regulations aredeveloped and implemented, the legislationhas limited impact. Canada’s SafeDrinkingWaterforFirstNationsActisanexampleoflegislationofthisnature.Whilethedownsideofthisapproachtoestablishingalegislativebaseisclear,immediatelackofenforceablestandards and regulations, it may be the only reasonable approach in complexprogrammingareas(i.e.jurisdictionalquestions,variedperspectives,highlyvariantneedsfrom one region to another, challenges in agreeing politically). The Kelowna AccordImplementationActcouldbeviewedasanotherexampleoflegislationofthisnature.

LegislativeBasethatDefinesProgramStandards:Thisformoflegislationishighlydesirableinthatitprovidesclarity,tovaryingdegrees,onprogramstandardsand/orfundinglevelsandgenerallyestablishesameanstoreviewandadjustovertime.Itprovidesmaximumcertaintyduringtheeffectiveperiodofthelegislationandcanbeverydifficultforfuturegovernments to unwind (i.e. without considerable public backlash and alternativeprogramming). Naturally, it is also themost challenging to develop and concludewithstakeholders.Examplesofthistypeoflegislationincludelegislationforhealth,educationandhousingintheU.S.Attemptsattomovedirectlytothisformoflegislationarehighlyrisky,asevidencedbythe2014failureofBillC-33(i.e.theproposedFirstNationsControlofFirstNationsEducationAct).

EvolutionofUSIndigenousHealthLegislation–LessonslearnedfromtheUSThere are potential lessons learned from the U.S. experience in establishing and evolvinglegislationforIndigenoushealthcarefor“AmericanIndians”and“AlaskaNatives”.AgraduatedapproachtoimplementingalegislativebaseforhealthcarewastakenintheU.S.between1924and 2010. A legislative base for health care was first introduced through the Snyder Act of1924.123Thislegislation,whichprovidednosetstandardsorguaranteedfundinglevelsforhealthcarewascomplementedbythe1976IndianHealthCareImprovementAct(IHCA).TheIHCAwassubject to a “reauthorization” process and supported by a national steering committeeestablishedforthispurpose.124Someoftheprogrammingsupportedbythislegislationevolvedover time from“demonstration”projects to fullprograms.Effective2010, the legislationwasmadepermanentandtheneedfor“reauthorization”waseliminated.125LessonsLearnedfromtheKelownaAccordTheKelownaAccordwasanagreementbetweenIndigenousrepresentativeorganizations,theGovernmentofCanadaandprovincialand territorialofficials.At thecoreofKelownawasanopen-minded and respectful “without prejudice” dialogue among indigenous, federal andprovincial/territorialofficialsabouthowtoreducesocio-economicoutcomesgaps.126Kelowna


52

explicitlydelinkedgap-closing investments fromdiscussionsaboutrights,onthepremisethatnationscannotobjectivelyoreffectivelyrebuildtheirgovernmentsortheirrelationshipswiththeCrownwhile their people aremired in poverty and distress.127 Despite some pressure fromoppositionparties,the$5.1billionofnewinvestmentspromisedatKelownawerenotfollowedthroughandtheaccordisviewedashavingbeenafailure.WhilethepartiesinvolvedweregenerallypositiveabouttheprocessandapproachemployedfortheKelownaAccord,itdrewsomecriticismfromregionalandnation-grouporganizationswhobelievedthatthenationalIndigenousrepresentativeorganizationsengagedintheprocessdidnot adequately represent their interests or rights.128 The Liberal Prime Minister behind theKelownaAccord, PaulMartin, later described the approach and framework thatwere to beestablished through the Kelowna Accord in his remarks to the House of Commons StandingCommitteeonAboriginalAffairsandNorthernDevelopmentinNovember2006.Atthistime,PaulMartinwasleaderoftheoppositionandtheConservativePartyofCanadaledwithaminoritygovernment.

“Anewforumoffederal,provincial,andterritorialministers,andaboriginalleaderswouldensureprogressandkeepusontrack.Theaccordspecifiedthisforumwouldmeetannuallyandthatitwouldbemandatedtotakecorrectiveaction.Thisforum,Mr.Chairman,shouldbemeetingnow.Thedaysofemptypromiseswereover,tobereplacedbyafocusontheresultsachievedandthesuccesseswon.Whatallofusbelievedisthatwehadtoestablishanaccountabilityframework,andthatthesettingofgoals,thereportingofdata,andthecourtofpublicopinionwouldensurethateachgovernmentandeachorganizationwouldchallengeitsrespectiveofficialsandinstitutionalpartnerstomakeprogress.Inthatway,realresultswouldbenchmarkthetrackthatwewereon,tosharethebestpracticesbasedonwhateachjurisdictionwasdoingbetterthananother,tobringprogresseverywhere,andtoensurethatnoonewasleftbehind.”129PaulMartin,November9,2006


53

AnnexD–SupportingFirstNationsInstitutionBuilding

Whyaresystemicsafeguardsandinstitutionsimportant?Institutions hold various roles and functions, some safeguard government institutions andmarketsthroughsupervisorymandates,whileothersrepresent,educateandenable.Takentogether,theseinstitutionalfunctionsensurethatlawsandregulationsareenforcedandthatrisktakingdoesnotjeopardizetheintegrityandstabilityofgovernments,theirinstitutionsandthebroaderpoliticalandeconomicsystems.Systemsofsafeguardsalsoensurepreservationofrights,equalityandfreedoms.Astrongsystemofsafeguardsincludeslaws,regulationsandstrongsupervisory institutions.Thesesupervisory institutionsproactively identifyproblemstoallow for proactive intervention, reducing impacts on governments, economies, otherinstitutionsandpeople.Strongsupervisorybodiesarecharacterizedby:

► clearmandates;

► powersnecessarytofulfillthemandate;

► compatibilitywithotherinstitutionsandpoliticalsystems;

► independence;► comprehensiveandclearstandardsand/orregulations;

► sufficientresources;► monitoringregimesthatensureconsistentlyhigh-qualitywork;and

► oversight and feedback loops to identify and correct weaknesses in governance, riskmanagementandcontrolprocesses.

In the context of Canadian First Nations, greater influence, involvement and control overinstitutions would increase opportunity for the exercise of inherent rights (e.g. self-determination,self-governmentandland/resourcedevelopment).ThisisnottosaythatexistingCanadian institutions cannot and will not continue to play a meaningful role in protectingIndigenousrights,orthatIndigenous-ledinstitutionsarenecessaryinallareas.Inmanyinstances,theobjectivemaybe increased Indigenousparticipation infederalandprovincial lawmaking,regulationandpolicymaking.InstitutionalFunctionsCommontoDemocraciesandMarketEconomiesThetablethatfollowsdescribesthetypesofinstitutionscommontoastatewithademocraticgovernmentandamarketeconomy.


54

Role Function Purpose Examples

PoliticalRepresentatives

Politicalrepresentation,rightsrepresentation,lawmaking,policymaking,taxation,budgetallocation

Representrightsandinterestsofindividuals,protectionofrights,equalityandfreedom.

FederalandProvincialgovernments,FirstNationsgovernments

Supervisors Systemicoversight,enforcementoflawsandregulations,resolutionofdisputes,protectionofindividualandcommunityrights

Enforcementoflawsandregulations,protectionofrights,equalityandfreedoms,ensurestableandresponsiblegovernments,ensurestablemarkets,monitoringsystemicrisks,regulatorylicensing,accreditationandcertification.

Courts,Tribunals,AlternativeDisputeResolutionMechanisms,RedressMechanisms,Ombudsmen,AuditorsGeneral,SectoralReviewCommittees,CentralBanks,FinancialOversightMechanisms,WaterBoards,EnvironmentalReviewBoards,LandCommissions,DevelopmentBoards,IndustryRegulators,etc.

AdvocacyandInterestGroups

Representspecificintereststhroughadvocacy,lobbyingandthoughtleadership

Advocateforchangestolaws,regulations,policiesandbudgets.

Representativeorganizations,anti-povertyorothercoalitions,lobbygroups,industrylobbyists,etc.

EducatorsandAdvisors

Training,professionalization,thoughtleadership,creatingforumsforpractitioners

Enhancecapabilitiesandcapacitiesofindividuals,governments,businessesandinstitutions.

ProfessionalAssociations,Post-SecondaryInstitutions,TradeAssociations,SkillsDevelopmentOrganizations,Apprenticeship/CertificationOrganizations,etc.

EconomicEnablers

Marketstimulus,marketcreation,marketliquidity,financing,insuring,investingandbanking

Createmarketconditionsandmechanismsthatpromotepublicandprivatesectordevelopmentandtrade

Markets/Exchanges,FinanceAuthorities,TradeDevelopmentCorporations,BusinessDevelopmentCorporations,DevelopmentBanks,CommercialBanks,Investors,SurveyInsurance,MortgageInsurance,PensionFunds,etc.

SomeimportantquestionsthatwillneedtobeconsideredbytheGovernmentofCanadainthedesignofitsinstitutionbuildingprogrammingfollow.

1. WhatinstitutionalfunctionsdoFirstNationsthinkareneededandwhichofthesearemostimportanttothem?


55

2. IsthereaneedforapermanentforumorcounciltoadvancethinkingaboutFirstNationsinstitutions?Alternatively, should institutional development be entirely organic andgrass-roots?Isapan-FirstNationscouncilnecessarytostudy,reviewandadviseonneedsandpriorities for Indigenous institutionaldevelopment inCanada? If so,does suchanorganizationrequirealegislativebaseandpermanentfunding?Further,whatwouldbetheroles,functions,mechanismsandexpectationsforsuchanentity?Ifthereisnodesiretopromoteandfundsuchaninstitution,howwilltheGovernmentofCanadareceiveandreacttoproposalsforIndigenousinstitutionaldevelopment?

3. What Indigenous-led institutional roles and functions is the Government of Canadawilling andable to support? It is important to pin-pointwhich institutional roles andfunctions the Government of Canada is intending to support and/or promote.WhenspeakingaboutpossiblefunctionsforIndigenous-ledandIndigenous-focusedinstitutions,itisimportanttounderstandthebroadvarietiesofinstitutionalrolesandfunctions(seetableabovewhichlistsexamplesofinstitutionalrolesandfunctions).

4. AretheresomeinstitutionalfunctionsthattheGovernmentofCanadaisnotpreparedto supportor fundnow?Forpolicy, financialorother reasons, are there institutionalfunctionsthattheGovernmentofCanadaisnotyetpreparedtofundandsupport?

5. Whatprinciplesshouldguidefederalfundingdecisionsforpan-FirstNationinstitutions?

Asasimplisticexample,thefollowingareofferedasnotionalprinciples:► institutionalfunctionsmustbepan-FirstNation(i.e.benational,regionalornation-group

focused);► Indigenousdesignedandledwhereverpracticable;► backedbyIndigenousgovernmentsandrepresentativeorganizations;► ledbycapableandprovenleaders;► interoperablewiththebroadersystemofFirstNationsinstitutionsandsafeguards;► interoperable with the Canadian legal system, and where appropriate, parliamentary

system;► subjecttoappropriategovernanceandaccountabilityrequirements;► bedesignedtoevolveastheneedsandcircumstancesofFirstNationschange;► supportthecomplexformsoflegalandpoliticalorganizationofFirstNations;► protected by oversightmechanisms and accountability regimes built into the broader

system;► includelonger-termrevenuegenerationstrategiestoenhanceself-sufficiency;and


56

► includepathwaystohigherlevelinstitutions(e.g.certificationthatincludespathwaytoBachelorprogram, linkagestoCanadianparliamentandpolitical institutions,meanstoescalatethroughCanadiantribunalsandcourts,etc.).

6. HowshouldtheGovernmentofCanadafundIndigenousInstitutions? Institutionscan

befundeddirectly,indirectlyorthroughahybridapproach(e.g.providetheAboriginalFinancialOfficersAssociation(AFOA)withastablefundingbaseforitscoregovernance,membershipandcertificationactivities,butfunditsprogrammingindirectlybyfundingIndigenous governments to take professional training courses and participate inprofessionalconferences).

7. Are institutional surrogates or incubators necessary as interim measures? As anexample,AFOAoffersHumanResourcesandLeadershiptraining/certificationbecausenootherorganization ispresentlyproviding them.AnotherexamplemightbeanexistingCanadianinstitution,suchastheAuditorGeneralofCanada,beinggivenamandatetoperformevaluationsandauditsofIndigenous-ledinstitutions.


57

AnnexE-OverviewoftheMiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement

ThisAnnexprovidesabriefoverviewoftheMiawpukekFirstNation(MFN)includingitshistoryandhow it came to receiveagrant, the resultsof the recentevaluation,and flexibilitiesandeffortsandcostsassociatedwiththeGrantAgreement.MFN,locatedatConneRiver,Newfoundland,isanexampleofaFirstNationthathasbeenabletoemployitsuniquefundingsituationtocreateopportunitiesforitscommunity.Ithasanon-reservepopulationof833people,andanoff-reservepopulationof2,198.130Itboastseconomicsuccessaboveneighbouringcommunities,andfullemployment.MFN’sfederalfundingisuniqueamongFirstNationsthatoperateundertheIndianActbecauseitreceivesmuchofitsfundingthrough a flexible grant,with amuch smaller proportion being funded through contributionagreements.MFNhasleverageditsgrantfundingtosupportcommunityprojects,contributingtoacommunitythatisthrivingcomparedwithneighbouringnon-Indigenouscommunities.HistoryofMiawpukekanditsMovetoGrantsWhenNewfoundlandjoinedconfederationin1949,therewasaMi’kmaqsettlementatConneRiverdatingback to the late1800s.Whilehistorical Indigenous communitiesexistedprior to1949,NewfoundlandPremierJoeySmallwooddidnotincluderecognitionofIndigenouspeoplein the province. Rather than applying the Indian Act to settlements in Newfoundland, cost-sharingarrangementsweremadewithmanycommunities,butthecommunityatConneRiverwasnot included inthesearrangements.131 Inthe1970sthe Indigenous inhabitantsatConneRiverbegantoassertthemselvesanddemandrights,leadingtoaccesstofundsfromthefederalgovernmentin1974.ThesefundsflowedthroughNewfoundland’sprovincialgovernment,withtheprovincewithholdingafeeformanagingfunds.TheprovincialgovernmentdisputedConneRiver’sexpendituresin1982,whichledtoafreezeoffundingandaconflictoveraccountability.Thedisputeescalated,withcommunitymemberstakingovergovernmentofficesinSt.John’s,andahungerstrikebyConneRiver’sChiefMi’sel.132FundamentalchangesintherelationshipbetweentheFirstNationspeoplelivingatConneRiverandtheCanadiangovernmentresultedfromtheactivism.In1985,MiawpukekwasrecognizedasabandandbegannegotiationswiththeCanadiangovernmentforagrant.Thesenegotiationsled to the signature of the first Grant Agreement between theMiawpukek First Nation andCanadain1986.Thefollowingyear,SamiajijMiawpukekIndianReservewasestablishedonthesiteofthecommunityatConneRiver.133


58

In the1990s,MFNbegan todiscussworking towardself-government. In2004, theMFNSelf-Government Agreement was accepted for negotiation, and the self-government FrameworkAgreementwassignedin2005.134MFNcreatedaSelf-GovernmentSteeringCommitteetoallowforcommunityinput,andmadeagreatdealofprogressinnegotiationswhileensuringthattheyrespectcommunityinput.135InNovember2014,MFNandGovernmentofCanadasignedaSelf-GovernmentAgreement-in-Principle. This is essentially a “roughdraft” of a Final Agreement,while the details of a final agreement have yet to be finalized.136 In early 2016Miawpukekwithdrewfromits12-yearself-governmentnegotiationsanditisunclearwhetherandwhytheirgrant funding relationship was more attractive to them than seeking increased jurisdictionthroughself-government. MFN is the only grant recipient community among Canadian First Nations that is not self-governing. Since the recognition ofMiawpukek First Nation as a band, there have been sixconsecutiveGrantAgreements.ResultsofEvaluationsAsaconditionoftheGrantAgreement,evaluationsareundertakenpriortotheendofeachGrantAgreement.Theseevaluationsprovideaccountabilityinensuringthatgrantfundingistherightarrangementmovingforward.Theevaluationsareconductedbyindependentevaluationfirmswith an aim to determinewhether the objectives of the funding agreement have beenmet.Eighteenmonthspriortotheendofthefundingcontracttheevaluationprocessbegins,whichincludesdelegatingateamcomposedofMFNcouncilmembersandrepresentativesofCanadadrawinguptheTermsofReferenceoftheevaluation,andrecommendingthepersonorfirmwhowillcarryouttheevaluation.137EvaluationshavebeenconductedpriortotheendofeachoftheGrantAgreements.Themostrecentevaluationwasconducted in2011.ThereportconcludedthatMFN isperformingverywell,with a comparatively high score in theCommunityWellbeing Index and strong internalprocesses(planning,programming,administration).138Thegrantallowsforincreasedefficiencyfor both INAC and the community, and has helped to bring economic prosperity to thecommunity. The evaluation highlights the need to continue the Grant agreement for MFN.Recommendations in the report include the need to further consolidate funding, withmorefundingflowingthroughthegrantagreementandlessthroughcontributionapproaches,andtoexpandtheuseofgrantfundingtootherFirstNations.139FlexibilitiesthattheGrantOffersMiawpukekGrantfundingallowsMFNtoenjoyanumberofbenefitsthatarenotavailabletoFirstNationswithcontributionagreements.


59

FundingAllocationFlexibilityMFNhasastrongplanningprocessandconsultswiththecommunitytoensurethatcommunityprioritiesaremet.As longas INACstandardsaremet,MFNcandesign itsownprogramsandallocate funds in alignmentwith their communityplans.140 Thegrant fundingallows them tofocusfundsinareasthatmightnotbecoveredbyacontributionagreementsuchasjobcreation,justiceandpolicing,naturalresourcesandrecreationandculture.141MFN is “committed to the principle”142 of full employment, with everyone living on reserveguaranteedajoboncetheyturnnineteen.Oncetheyareemployedbythecouncilfor14weeksperyear,theyareeligibletoacceptEmploymentInsurance(EI)fortheremainderoftheyear.143InadditiontotheemploymentofferedbytheCouncil,thereareseveralbusinessesonthereservethatofferemploymenttocommunitymembers.144Housing on reserve is ample and well maintained. There are 300 houses available forapproximately900people,andimprovementsaremadeannually.145Theon-reservepopulationisgrowing,sotheinvestmentinhousingisimportanttothecommunity.LeveragingAdditionalFundsMFNcanuse thegrant funding tohelp secureadditional funding from federalandprovincialgovernmentswhereanequitycontributionisrequired.Thegrant isnotsubjecttoregulationsagainstprogramstacking(whichprohibittheuseoffundsreceivedunderonefederalprogramasanequitycontributionwhenapplying foranotherprogram).MFNsecured$18.3million inexternalfundingfromApril2005toDecember2010.146AccountabilityMFN is accountable to the community for service delivery and quality of governance andadministration.147Anannualreportdemonstratinghowminimumprogramrequirementsweremet is presented to members, including audited financial statements. The audited financialstatements are also provided to INAC.148MFN’s accountability regime includes the followingspecificelements:

► policyontransparencyanddisclosure;► terminationofagreement(Self-GovernmentAgreementoroff-ramp);► PolicyonRedressforCitizens;► fair, open accessible, equitable regimes for political, management, and financial

accountability;► evaluationto informfuturediscussions (18monthsprior: jointTermsofReferencefor

evaluationandselectteam);


60

► deficitcan’tbegreaterthan8%ofrevenue;► default:branchagreement,health,safety,wealthcompromised;and► default remedy: remedial management plan, Co-management, Third Party

Management.149DataCollection Instruments (DCIs)areusedtocollectdata forprogramfundingunder INAC’scontributionagreements.BecauseMFNonlysubmitsauditedfinancialstatementstoINAC,INACdoes not have access toMFN’s program data. In the rare circumstancewhen INAC requiresprograminformation,MFNhasprovidedthisdatatotheDepartment.150EffortsandCostsAssociatedwiththeGrantAgreementThe Grant Agreement leads to different efforts and costs than a Comprehensive FundingAgreementforboththerecipientandINAC.UndertheGrantAgreement’sin-depthevaluation,alargeburdenisplacedontheFirstNation.Inthe2011evaluation,MFNworkedwiththeINACevaluationteambytakingpartininterviews,leadingacommunitysurvey,andsupportingfocusgroupsessions.TheevaluationalsocomesatalargefinancialcosttoINAC,whooutsourcestheevaluationtoanevaluationfirm.151The administration of MFN Grant Agreement uses fewer INAC resources for ongoingadministration than most funding agreements. The 2011 Evaluation done by Goss Gilroyestimated that 40 days are required annually by a Funding Services Officer to administer aComprehensiveFundingArrangement,andonlyfourdaysarerequiredtoadministertheMFN’sGrantAgreement.152


61


62

AnnexF–EnhancingFederalProgramsandSupportsforFirstNationsGovernance,Administration,CapacityDevelopmentandNation-Rebuilding

All First Nations governments need stable governance and administration funding andmanyrequire targeted capacity supports. Every federal department has different approaches tosubsidizing and directly funding these costs, with some allocating administrative costs to allprogram funding (e.g. 10% of project funding eligible to cover project administration costs).Outlined below are some opportunities for enhancing horizontality and effectiveness in thefundingofcoregovernanceandadministrationcosts.1. EnhanceFundingforFirstNationsGovernanceandAdministration,includingadelinkingof

fundingforgovernanceandadministration.Thedelinkingofgovernanceandadministrationfundingwouldrecognizethecomplexandvariedformsoforganization,bothpoliticallyandadministratively, among First Nations. Existing programs, formulas and approaches forfunding First Nations governance and administration costs would need to be completelyoverhauledtoensurethatsufficient,predictableandstablefundingisprovided,including:1.1. AnewNationGovernanceAllotmentthatprovidesFirstNationsgovernmentswitha

base funding level and additional incremental funding based on total bandmembership.FirstNationsgovernmentscouldchoosetoallocatesomeoralloftheirgovernanceallotmentstoanationgrouporanotherdesignatedrepresentative.

1.2. New Approach for Administration Allotments could be devised through a simpleformula that considers the level of programming controlled by the First Nationsgovernment(e.g.15%to20%ofaFirstNationstotalfederalprogramfunding,withaminimumthresholdtoensurethatsmallerFirstNationsareadequatelysupported).This funding should have no reporting obligations outside of the Annual AuditedFinancialStatements.Itwouldnaturallyescalateforremoteness,growthandotherescalatorsaccountedfor inprogramfunding levels.Torecognizeandpromotetheimportanceofaggregationinprogramdelivery,whereprogramfundingispaidtoaprogramdeliveryorganizationotherthanaFirstNationsbandcouncil,aportionoftheadministrationfundingcouldbepaidtotheFirstNationsBandCouncilandtheremainingtotheprogramdeliveryorganization(i.e.recognizingthatbandcouncilsincurcoststooverseetheactivitiesofservicedeliveryorganizations).

1.3. AComprehensiveReviewofFundingRequirementsforFirstNationsGovernanceandBand Administration, including broad studies and engagement with Indigenousnations and stakeholders could be performed to adjust the governance and


63

administrationfundingregimesatapre-definedfuturedate(e.g.2-3yearsintothefuture).

1.4. New Capacity Development Program Terms and Conditions could be created, or

embedded intoevery setof IndigenousProgramTermsandConditions, toenabletargetedinvestments,includingfundingfor:a) Governanceimprovementinitiatives;b) Nationrebuildingactivitiesandrightsandhistoricalresearch;c) Communityengagement,communityvisioningandgoalsetting,andcommunity

planning;d) Financialmanagementcapacitydevelopmentsupports;e) Human resources development, training and learning supports for band

executivesandadministrators;f) Capacity development supports for leadership development for political

leadership;g) Data governance, performance measurement, information management and

informationtechnologycapacitysupports;h) Communityreportingcapacitysupports;andi) Programcomplaintanddisputeresolutionprocesses.

2. Adequate program funding for all First Nations programs, including rethinking program

evaluationapproachesandadjustingfundinglevelsonaprogram-by-programbasisthroughprogramreforminitiatives.Ongoingreviewmechanismsforevaluatingprogrameffectivenessandrelevanceandfundingsufficiencyshouldbedeveloped,flowingfromdiscussionswithFirstNationsonthenewfiscalrelationship.

3. Newpolicies,approachesandmechanismsforrespondingtoFirstNationsgovernmentsandcommunities in distress situations, moving away from default and intervention focusedapproaches,including:

3.1. An integratedmultilateral approach to engaging with and working with FirstNationsthatarefacinganactual,imminentorpotentialdistresssituation.Suchanapproachnecessitatesanintegratedapproachbyexternalstakeholders(i.e.federal,provincial,municipal,keyserviceproviders,othersupportagencies,etc.)andan integratedapproachwithintheFirstNation(i.e.political leaders,bandexecutives, program executives, community service providers, nation grouprepresentatives, first responders, other community leaders, communitypartners,etc.).


64

3.2. Update Policies, Approaches and Supports for strengthening financial health,financialmanagementcapacityandaccesstocapital.


65

AnnexG–JointEvaluationsofFirstNationsProgramming

In 2011, INAC fundeda joint-evaluationof theMiawpukek FirstNation (MFN)Grant FundingAgreement,spanningtheperiodfromApril2005–December2010.TheevaluationisaconditionoftheGrantAgreementthatoutlinesthatanevaluationmustoccur18monthspriortotheendofthemulti-yearagreement.TheevaluationwasundertakenjointlybyINACandMFNthroughaco-development process that involved creationof an evaluationworking group composedofboth INAC and MFN representatives.153 The Working Group co-developed an evaluationmethodologyreportandtheevaluationTermsofReferencetoensurethattheneedsofbothpartieswouldbemet.154Lookingtotheinternationalcontext,theUnitedNationshassetguidelinesforitselfinordertoensureIndigenousparticipationinallaspectsofprogramming,includingevaluation.TheUnitedNationsGuidelinesonIndigenousPeoples’Issuescallsfor“soundmonitoringandevaluationthatis participatory and adapted to capture Indigenous perceptions through their own analyticalperspective”.155Thisisbasedontheprinciplethat,becauseIndigenouspeopleshavetherighttodefine their own development priorities, they inherently have the right to participate in the“evaluationofplansandprogrammes fornationaland regionaldevelopment thatmayaffectthem”.156Joint-evaluationsarebecomingcommonintheinternationaldevelopmentrealm.AnexampleisthejointreviewoftheofficialdevelopmentassistancefordisasterreliefprovidedbyJapantothePhilippines.AnevaluationteamwascreatedthatcomprisedmembersofboththeEmbassyofJapaninthePhilippines,andtheNationalEconomicandDevelopmentAuthority157(NEDA),whichisanagencyofthePhilippinegovernment.158Theevaluationteamwasalsosupplementedwiththeinclusionofanindependentconsultant.WhiletheevaluationwasguidedbytheEvaluationGuidelinesoftheMinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan(MOFA),theframeworkfortheevaluationwasjointlydevelopedbyMOFAandNEDA.159


66

1Canada.RoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples.PeopletoPeople,NationtoNation,HighlightsfromtheReportoftheRoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples.RoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples,1996.http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014597/1100100014637.

2https://docs.education.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/aiatsis_budget_statements_2016-17.pdf4JustinTrudeau,PrimeMinisterofCanada.NewMinistertoSupporttheRenewedRelationshipwithIndigenousPeoples.August

28,2017.http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/08/28/new-ministers-support-renewed-relationship-indigenous-peoples.5Ibid.9Ibid.10Ibid.11FinancialAdministrationAct.StatutesofCanada,c,F-11.Canada.DepartmentofJustice.1985.DepartmentofJustice.12GovernmentofCanada.HowGovernmentWorks.June20,2017.AccessedOctober10,2017.

https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system.html.13CommissiononSocialDeterminantsofHealth(CSDH).Closingthegapinageneration:HealthEquitythroughActiononthe

SocialDeterminantsofHealth.FinalReportoftheCommissiononSocialDeterminantsofHealth.Geneva:WorldHealthOrganization,2008.

14Ibid.15WorldHealthOrganization.TheEconomicsofSocialDeterminantsofHealthandHealthInequalities–AResourceBook.

Luxembourg:WorldHealthOrganization,2013.http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/84213/1/9789241548625_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1.

16Ibid.17Ibid.18TreasuryBoardSecretariatofCanada.FromredtapetoClearResults-TheReportoftheIndependentBlueRibbonPanelon

GrantsandContributionsPrograms.Ottawa:TreasuryBoardSecretariatofCanada,December2006.19Ibid.20Canada.TreasuryBoardSecretariatofCanada.DirectiveonTransferPayment.GovernmentofCanada,2008.21Ibid.22TheHarvardProjectonAmericanIndianEconomicDevelopment.AboutUs.AccessedOctober10,2017.

https://hpaied.org/about.23Ibid.24Canada.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada.Evaluation,PerformanceMeasurement,andReviewBranch.Evaluationofthe

MiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada,2011.25Ibid.26Pendakur,Krishna,andRaviPendakur.AnAnalysisoftheSocio-economicOutcomesofAboriginalPeopleslivingin

CommunitiesAssociatedwithSelf-GovernmentAgreements,1991-2011.2015.27Ibid.28Cornell,Stephen,andJosephP.Kalt.“ReloadingtheDice:ImprovingtheChancesforEconomicDevelopmentonAmerican

IndianReservations.”JointOccasionalPapersonNativeAffairs.UdallCenterforStudiesinPublicPolicyandTheHarvardProjectonAmericanEconomicDevelopment,2003.

32CharityWatch.CharityWatchCriteriaandMethodology.2017.https://www.charitywatch.org/about-charitywatch/criteria-methodology/3113/3147.

33ConstitutionAct.StatutesofCanada.DepartmentofJustice.1867-1982.DepartmentofJustice,http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/

34PublicAccountsoftheGovernmentofNunavut2015-16,http://www.gov.nu.ca/sites/default/files/files/Finance/Public%20Accounts/public_accounts_ye_march_2016.pdf

35GovernmentofYukonFinancialStatements2015-16,http://www.finance.gov.yk.ca/pdf/public_accounts/2015-16pub_fs.pdf36ConstitutionAct.StatutesofCanada.DepartmentofJustice.1867-1982.DepartmentofJustice,http://laws-

lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/37Ibid.38Canada.PublicServicesandProcurementCanada.PublicAccountsofCanada2016-17,Section6TransferPayments.

https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/recgen/cpc-pac/2017/pdf/2017-vol3-ds6-eng.pdf.39GovernmentofCanada.Budget2017–BuildingaStrongMiddleClass.March22,2017.

http://www.budget.gc.ca/2017/docs/plan/toc-tdm-en.html.40Canada.RoyalCommissionofAboriginalPeoples.TheReportoftheRoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples.5vols.Ottawa,

1996.https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/aboriginal-heritage/royal-commission-aboriginal-peoples/Pages/final-report.aspx


67

41OfficeoftheAuditorGeneralofCanada.“Chapter4–ProgramsforFirstNationsonReserve-2011JuneStatusReport”

(Ottawa:AuditorGeneralofCanada,June2011).42Canada.RoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples.PeopletoPeople,NationtoNation,HighlightsfromtheReportoftheRoyal

CommissiononAboriginalPeoples.RoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples,1996.http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014597/1100100014637.

43CTVWinnipeg.FedscutFundingtoMANFF.November7,2014.http://winnipeg.ctvnews.ca/feds-cut-funding-to-manff-1.2092938.

44Canada.AboriginalAffairsandNorthernDevelopmentCanada.ReporttoParliamentontheLegislativeReviewoftheFirstNationsFiscalandStatisticalManagementAct.AboriginalAffairsandNorthernDevelopmentCanada,March2012.http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/rpt_1334170066792_eng.pdf.

45CanadianPress.FedstostopfundingMetisNation–Saskatchewan.October2,2014.https://globalnews.ca/news/1596085/federal-government-will-stop-funding-metis-nation-saskatchewan/.

46CBCNews.OttawacutsfundingtoFirstNationsUniversity.February8,2010.http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/ottawa-cuts-funding-to-first-nations-university-1.920542.

47IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.StrategicPartnershipsInitiative:Overview.November22,2016.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1330016561558/1330016687171.

48 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. Urban Programming for Indigenous Peoples. September 18, 2017.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1471368138533/1471368161152.

49InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre.AboutIDRC.AccessedSeptember20,2017.https://www.idrc.ca/en/about-idrc.50InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre.WhatweDo.AccessedSeptember20,2017.https://www.idrc.ca/en/what-we-

do.51InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre.PartnersandInitiatives.AccessedSeptember20,2017.

https://www.idrc.ca/en/what-we-do/partners-and-initiatives.52CanadianInstitutesofHealthResearch–GovernmentofCanada.AboutUs.May26,2017.AccessedSeptember21,2017.

http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/37792.html.53CanadianInstitutesofHealthResearch.HealthResearchRoadmapII:CapturingInnovationtoProduceBetterHealthand

HealthCaseforCanadians:StrategicPlan:2014-15–2018-19.CanadianInstitutesofHealthResearch,2015.http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/documents/CIHR-strat-plan-eng.pdf.

54Ibid.55Ibid.56CanadianInstitutesofHealthResearch–GovernmentofCanada.AboutIAPH.August31,2011.AccessedSeptember21,

2017,http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/8172.html.57AustralianInstituteofHealthandWelfare.CorporatePlan2017-18to2020-21.AustralianInstituteofHealthandWelfare,

2017.https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/d51793a2-4ff8-4299-b442-433045869d7e/aihw-corporate-plan-2017-18-to-2020-21.pdf.aspx?inline=true.

58Ibid.59AustralianInstituteofHealthandWelfare.Whatwedo.August24,2017.AccessedSeptember20,2017.

https://www.aihw.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do.60Canada.IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.AuditandAssuranceServicesBranch.AuditofPost-SecondaryEducation

Programs-Recommendation#1.IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada,February2015,https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1443534849990/1443535018045#chp4.

61JustinTrudeau,PrimeMinisterofCanada.NewMinistertoSupporttheRenewedRelationshipwithIndigenousPeoples.August28,2017.http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/08/28/new-ministers-support-renewed-relationship-indigenous-peoples.

62Ibid.63IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.AboutIndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.March9,2017.AccessedOctober

10,2017.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100010023/1100100010027.64AustralianInstituteofAboriginalandTorresStraitIslanderStudies&TheLowitjaInstitute.ChangingtheNarrativein

AboriginalandTorresStraitIslanderHealthResearch:FourCooperativeResearchCentresandtheLowitjaInstitute:Thestorysofar.TheLowitjaInstitute,Melbourne,2017.

65NationalAboriginalControlledCommunityHealthOrganizations.TheNeedforNaccho.2016.AccessedSeptember17,2017.http://www.naccho.org.au/about-nacho/naccho-history/.

66Ibid.67AustralianGovernment,DepartmentofthePrimeMinisterandCabinet.Lifeexpectancyatbirth.AccessedOctober3,2017.

https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/indigenous/Health-Performance-Framework-2014/tier-1-health-status-and-outcomes/119-life-expectancy-birth.html.


68

68AustralianGovernment,DepartmentofHealth.NationalAboriginalandTorresStraitIslanderHealthPlan2013-2023.

CommonwealthofAustralia,2013.AccessedSeptember17,2017.http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/natsih-plan.

69IndianHealthServices–USDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices.AgencyOverview.AccessedOctober3,2017.https://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/overview/.

70Ibid.71IndianHealthServices–USDepartmentofHealthandHumanServices.Disparities.AccessedOctober3,2017.

https://www.ihs.gov/newsroom/factsheets/disparities/.72Venne,Sharon.“UnderstandingTreaty6:AnIndigenousPerspective”.Asch,Metal.AboriginalandTreatyRightsinCanada:

EssaysonLaw,Equality,andRespectforDifference.Vancouver,BC:1997.173-207.73Canada.RoyalCommissionofAboriginalPeoples.TheReportoftheRoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples.5vols.Ottawa:

1996.https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/aboriginal-heritage/royal-commission-aboriginal-peoples/Pages/final-report.aspx.

74Hall,A.J.RoyalProclamationof1763.(G.Albers,Editor)July23,2015.AccessedOctober25,2016.http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/royal-proclamation-of-1763/.

75TruthandReconciliationCommissionofCanada.Canada'sResidentialSchools:TheFinalReportoftheTruthandReconciliationCommissionofCanada,Volume1,Part1.Montreal:McGill-Queen'sUniversityPress,2015.

76Venne,Sharon.“UnderstandingTreaty6:AnIndigenousPerspective”.Asch,Metal.AboriginalandTreatyRightsinCanada:EssaysonLaw,Equality,andRespectforDifference.Vancouver,BC:1997.173-207.

77Borrows,John.“WampumatNiagara:TheRoyalProclamation,CanadianLegalHistory,andSelf-Government”.M.Aschetal.AboriginalandTreatyRightsinCanada:EssaysonLaw,Equality,andRespectforDifference.Vancouver,BC:1997.155-172.

78Ibid.79Canada.RoyalCommissionofAboriginalPeoples.TheReportoftheRoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples.5vols.Ottawa:


80Ibid.81TheLibraryofCongress.DefinitiveTreatyofPeace,BetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandhisBritannicMajesty.

September3,1783.https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=008/llsl008.db&recNum=93.82SixNations:LandsandResources.TheHaldimandTreatyof1784.2008.

http://www.sixnations.ca/LandsResources/HaldProc.htm.83IndigenousandNorthernAffairs.FirstNationsinCanada.IndigenousandNorthernAffairs,2013.https://www.aadnc-

aandc.gc.ca/eng/1307460755710/1307460872523.84Ibid.85Canada.RoyalCommissionofAboriginalPeoples.TheReportoftheRoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples.5vols.Ottawa:


86IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.TreatyTexts–OjibewaIndiansofLakeHuron–CopyoftheRobinsonTreatyMadeintheYear1850withtheOjibewaIndiansofLakeHuronConveyingCertainLandstotheCrown.Reprintededitionof1939byRogerDuhamel.Ottawa:Queen’sPrintedandControllerofStationary,1964.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028984/1100100028994.

87IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.TreatyTexts–OjibewaIndiansofLakeSuperior–CopyoftheRobinsonTreatyMadeintheYear1850withtheOjibewaIndiansofLakeSuperiorConveyingCertainLandstotheCrown.August30,2013.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028978/1100100028982.

88IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.TreatieswithAboriginalpeopleinCanada.September15,2010.AccessedOctober27,2016.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100032291/1100100032292.

89IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.TreatyTexts–DouglasTreaties.August29,2013.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1370373165583/1370373202340.

90TheGradualCivilizationofIndiansAct.StatutesoftheProvinceofCanada.1857.http://caid.ca/GraCivAct1857.pdf.91Ibid.92TheIndianAct.StatutesofCanada,cI-5.Canada.DepartmentofJustice.1985.DepartmentofJustice,http://laws-

lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-5/page-1.html#h-1.93Canada.RoyalCommissionofAboriginalPeoples.TheReportoftheRoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples.5vols.Ottawa:


94IndigenousandNorthernAffairs.FirstNationsinCanada.2013.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1307460755710/1307460872523.

95Anaya,J.ReportoftheSpecialRapporteurontherightsofindigenouspeoples,JamesAnaya,onthesituationofindigenouspeoplesinCanada.UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,2014.


69

96TruthandReconciliationCommissionofCanada.Canada'sResidentialSchools:TheFinalReportoftheTruthand

ReconciliationCommissionofCanada,Volume1,Part1.Montreal:McGill-Queen'sUniversityPress,2015.97Giokas,J.TheIndianAct:Evolution,OverviewandOptionsforAmendmentandTransition.LibraryandArchivesCanada.

Ottawa,Canada:March22,1995.http://data2.archives.ca/rcap/pdf/rcap-68.pdf.98ElectionsCanada.AHistoryoftheVoteinCanada–Chapter3–Modernization,1920-1981.ElectionsCanada.

http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=his&document=chap3&lang=e99Chretien,J.StatementoftheGovernmentofCanadaonIndianPolicy,1969.Ottawa:Queen'sPrinterCat.No.R32-2469,1969.100Canada.RoyalCommissionofAboriginalPeoples.TheReportoftheRoyalCommissiononAboriginalPeoples.5vols.Ottawa:


101Ibid.102Kanatewatetal.v.JamesBayDevelopmentCorp.etal.1S.C.R.48.SupremeCourtofCanada.1973.SupremeCourtof

Canada.https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/5300/index.do.103Calderetal.v.Attorney-GeneralofBritishColumbia.S.C.R.313.SupremeCourtofCanada.1973.SupremeCourtofCanada.

https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/5113/index.do.104ConstitutionActs.StatutesofCanada.DepartmentofJustice.1867-1982.DepartmentofJustice,http://laws-

lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/.105Ibid.106Anaya,J.ReportoftheSpecialRapporteurontherightsofindigenouspeoples,JamesAnaya,onthesituationofindigenous

peoplesinCanada.UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,2014.107CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms-ConstitutionAct.StatutesofCanada.DepartmentofJustice.1867-1982.

DepartmentofJustice,http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-15.html.108Anaya,J.ReportoftheSpecialRapporteurontherightsofindigenouspeoples,JamesAnaya,onthesituationofindigenous

peoplesinCanada.UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,2014.109IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.StatementofApologytoFormerStudentsofIndianResidentialSchools.Indigenous

andNorthernAffairsCanada.Ottawa,Ontario:June2008.http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/rqpi_apo_pdf_1322167347706_eng.pdf.

110OfficeoftheAuditorGeneralofCanada.May2006StatusReport:Chapter5-ManagementofProgramsforFirstNations.Ottawa:2006.

111BureauofIndianAffairs.Tribal/InteriorBudgetCouncilProtocol.USDepartmentoftheInterior,IndianAffairs,November2013.https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/ocfo/pdf/idc1-030544.pdf.

112Ibid.113IndianHealthService.AnnualBudget.AccessedSeptember8,2017.https://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/annualbudget/.114IndianHealthServices.IndianHealthManual–CircularNo.2006-01.DepartmentofHumanandHealthServices,January

2006.https://www.ihs.gov/IHM/index.cfm?module=dsp_ihm_circ_main&circ=ihm_circ_0601#12.115Ibid.116NationalIndianHealthBoard.AboutNIHB.AccessedSeptember8,2017.https://www.nihb.org/about_us/about_us.php.117NationalIndianHealthBoard.IHSTribalBudgetFormulation.AccessedSeptember8,2017.

https://www.nihb.org/legislative/budget_formulation.php.118Canada.OfficeoftheAuditorGeneralofCanada.Chapter4–ProgramsforFirstNationsonReserve-2011JuneStatus

Report.Ottawa:GovernmentofCanada,June2011.119SafeDrinkingWaterforFirstNationsAct.StatutesofCanada,c.21.Canada.DepartmentofJustice.2013.Departmentof

Justice.http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/S-1.04/page-1.html#h-3.120IndianCitizenshipActof1924.Pub.L.175.43Stat.253.2June1924.TheLibraryofCongress.

http://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/68th-congress/c68.pdf.121HigherEducationActof1965.Pub.L.89-329.XXStat79.8November1965.USGovernmentPublishingOffice.

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79-Pg1219.pdf.122H.R.2788–MakingappropriationsfortheDepartmentoftheInteriorandrelatedagenciesforthefiscalyearending

September30,1990,andforotherpurposes.Pub.L101-121.103Stat.714.23October1989.TheLibraryofCongress.https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/house-bill/2788/text.

123IndianCitizenshipActof1924.Pub.L.175.43Stat.253.2June1924.TheLibraryofCongress.http://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/68th-congress/c68.pdf.

124IndianHealthcareImprovementAct.Pub.L.94-437.90Stat.1400.30September1976.USHouseofRepresentatives,OfficeoftheLawRevisionCouncil–USCode.http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/94/437.pdf.

125CongressionalResearchServices.TheIndianHealthCareImprovementActReauthorizationandExtensionEnactedbyACA:DetailedSummaryandTimeline.CongressionalResearchServices,2014.https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20140103_R41630_c6dd5aae052d1aec279ef345318b83d22fb7e634.pdf.


70

126Alcantara,CandZacSpicer.LearningfromtheKelownaAccord.PolicyOptions,2015.

http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/clearing-the-air/alcantara-spicer/127Ibid.128Patterson,L.AboriginalRoundtabletoKelownaAccord:AboriginalPolicyNegotiations,2004-2005.LibraryofParliament,

PRB06-04E,2006.https://lop.parl.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0604-e.pdf.129Canada.Parliament.HouseofCommonsStandingCommitteeonAboriginalAffairsandNorthernDevelopment.Minutesof

Proceedings.39thParl.,1stsession.MeetingNo.25,2006.ParliamentofCanada.http://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/391/AANO/Evidence/EV2499050/AANOEV25-E.PDF.

130Canada.IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.FirstNationsProfiles–RegisteredPopulation-MiawpukekFirstNation.GovernmentofCanada,March2017.AccessedOctober17,2017.http://fnp-ppn.aandc-aadnc.gc.ca/fnp/Main/Search/FNRegPopulation.aspx?BAND_NUMBER=47&lang=eng.

131Mackenzie,David.TheIndianActandtheAboriginalPeoplesofNewfoundlandattheTimeofConfederation.NewfoundlandandLabradorStudies,2010.

132Jeddore,J.GettingRecognized–TheStoryofaCommunity’sStruggleforRecognition.TheIndependent,October2011.AccessedOctober17,2017.http://theindependent.ca/2011/10/21/getting-recognized/.

133Canada.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada.Evaluation,PerformanceMeasurement,andReviewBranch.EvaluationoftheMiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada,2011.

134IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.GeneralBriefingNoteonCanada’sSelf-governmentandComprehensiveLandClaimsPoliciesandtheStatusofNegotiations.GovernmentofCanada.August2016.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1373385502190/1373385561540.

135MiawpukekFirstNationSelf-GovernmentNegotiations.GovernmentofNewfoundlandandLabrador–Canada–NewsReleases.AccessedOctober17,2017.http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2005/laa/0428n10back1.htm.

136Canada.IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.MiawpukekFirstNationSelf-GovernmentAgreementinPrinciple.GovernmentofCanada,2013.https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1402322568771/1402322859715.

137Canada.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada.Evaluation,PerformanceMeasurement,andReviewBranch.EvaluationoftheMiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada,2011.

138Ibid.139Ibid.140DonnaCona.SpecialStudy:EvolvingFundingArrangementwithFirstNations.PreparedforEvaluation,Performance

Measurement,andReviewBranch,IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada,2011.141Ibid.142Canada.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada.Evaluation,PerformanceMeasurement,andReviewBranch.Evaluationofthe

MiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada,2011.143Ibid.144Ibid.145JeffOrretal,.SocialImpactsofAboriginalEconomicDevelopment:ThreeCaseStudiesfromAtlanticCanada.TheAtlantic

AboriginalEconomicDevelopmentIntegratedResearchProgram,AAEDIRP,2011.146Canada.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada.Evaluation,PerformanceMeasurement,andReviewBranch.Evaluationofthe

MiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada,2011.147Canada.IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.MiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement.GovernmentofCanada,2005.148Ibid.149Ibid.150Canada.IndigenousandNorthernAffairsCanada.MiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement.GovernmentofCanada,2013.151Canada.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada.Evaluation,PerformanceMeasurement,andReviewBranch.Evaluationofthe

MiawpukekFirstNationGrantAgreement.IndianandNorthernAffairsCanada,2011.152Ibid.153Ibid.154Ibid.155SecretariatoftheUnitedNationsPermanentForumonIndigenousIssues.PartneringwithIndigenousPeoples:Experiences

andPractices.UnitedNations.http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/LibraryDocuments/partnering-with-ips.pdf.

156UnitedNationsDevelopmentGroup.GuidelinesonIndigenousPeoples’Issues.UnitedNations,February2008.http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/UNDGGuidelines.pdf.

157MinistryofForeignAffairs.JointEvaluationofJapan’sOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)totheDisasterRiskReductionandManagement(DRRM)SectorintheRepublicofthePhilippines.MinistryofForeignAffairs,March2016.

158RepublicofthePhilippines–NationalEconomicandDevelopmentAuthority.AboutNEDA-NationalEconomicandDevelopmentAuthority.September3,2017.http://www.neda.gov.ph/about-neda/.


71

159MinistryofForeignAffairs.JointEvaluationofJapan’sOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)totheDisasterRiskReduction

andManagement(DRRM)SectorintheRepublicofthePhilippines.MinistryofForeignAffairs,March2016.