Engking Civil Law Review Case Digests

7/25/2019 Engking Civil Law Review Case Digests

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Engking Civil Law Review Case Digests

UMALI V. ESTANISLAO [209 S ! "#992$%

Reiterating Tanada v. Tuvera, The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of eectivity and not to threquirement of publication itself which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator mamake the law eective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fteen !#$ daperiod shall be shortened or e%tended.

&ct '(', entitled "&) &*T &+-T/)0 T12 3&/* P2R4)&5 &)+ &++/T/4)&5 2627PT/4) &5548&352 T4 /)+/9/+-&5:4R /)*472 T&6 P-RP42 T4 T12 P492RT; T1R2145+ 52925, &72)+/)0 :4R T12 P-RP42 2*T/4) <P&R&0R&P1 !5$, /T27 !$ &)+ !<$ !&$ 4: T12 )&T/4)&5 /)T2R)&5 R292)-2 *4+2, & &72)+2+, &)+ :4R 4T12P-RP42."

The said act was signed and approved by the President on = +ecember == and published on > anuary ==< "7alaya" a newspaper of general circulation.

4n <( +ecember ==, respondents promulgated Revenue Regulations )o. ?=<.@Pursuant to ections <># and '< of th)ational /nternal Revenue *ode in relation to Republic &ct )o. '(', prescribing the collection at source of income ta% ocompensation income paid on or after anuary , ==< under the Revised 8ithholding Ta% Tables !&))26 "&"$ which takinto account the increase of personal and additional e%emptions.

4n <' :ebruary ==<, the pet led a petition for mandamus *47P25 the respondents to implement Rep. &ct '(' wi

respect to ta%able income of individual ta%payers earned or received on or after anuary == or as of ta%able yeending A +ecember ==.

4n <B :ebruary ==<, the pets in 0.R. )o. C>C(= likewise led a petition for mandamus and prohibition to compel th*ommissioner of /nternal Revenue to implement the mandate of Rep. &ct '(' adDusting the personal and additione%emptions allowable to individuals for income ta% purposes in regard to income earned or received in ==, and to enDothe respondents from implementing Revenue Regulations )o. ?=<.

/ssues @!$ whether or not Rep. &ct '(' took eect upon its approval by the President on = +ecember ==, or on A anuary ==<, i.e., after fteen !#$ days following its publication on > anuary ==<<$ assuming that Rep. &ct '(' took eect on AC anuary ==<, whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applieto compensation income earned or received during calendar year ==.

:irst issue was resolved based on the case of *alte% which involves the questioning of the eectivity of the R& (=(#

approved on eptember =, ==C. /t was published on eptember <C, ==C. Pursuant to the &ct, an implementiregulation was issued by the *ommissioner of /nternal Revenue, Revenue 7emorandum *ircular B#?=C, stating that R.&(=(# took eect on 4ctober #, ==C. Petitioner argued that the law took eect on eptember <C, ==C instead.

Pertinent is &rticle < of the *ivil *ode which provides@

5aws shall take eect after fteen days following the completion of their publication either in the oEcial 0aFette or innewspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. . . the Gotherwise providedG phrase also discussed in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera where the court held that it refers to the date of eectivity and not to threquirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator mamake the law eective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

/n the case at bar, Rep. &ct '(' took eect on AC anuary ==<, which is after fteen !#$ days following its publicatioon > anuary ==< in the "7alaya."

&s regards the second issue, since the law took eect on an AC, ==< and the last ling of income ta% for ta%able ye== is &pril #, ==<, those ling from when the law took eect to &pril # can still be able to avail of the e%emptioprovided by the law for the == income.??????????

&e'(le v D'nat' !case of Rebellion, accused led for 8rit of 1* but later on withdrew and agreed to be in legal custodwhich is a waiver of right to 3&/5$

:&*T @ alas aka )P&Hs IJa 3ilogK was arrested and was charged for rebellion. 1e was charged together with the spous*oncepcion. alas, together with his co?accused later led a petition for the 8o1*. & conference was held thereafter hear each partyHs side. /t was later agreed upon by both parties that alas will withdraw his petition for the 8o1* and thhe will remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The * then, basing on thstipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case led by alas. 3ut later on, alas led to be admittefor bail and udge +onato approved his application for bail. udge +onato did not bother hearing the side of t



prosecution. The prosecution argued that alas is estopped from ling bail because he has waived his right to bail whehe withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.

/-2@ 8hether or not alas can still validly le for bail.

125+@ The * ruled that alas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the issuance of the 8o1*. Thcontention of the defense that alas merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of hright to bail is not tenable. 1is waiver to such right is Dustied by his act of withdrawing his petition for 8o1*

)ote@ !p v +4)&T4$/n une =B' Pres issed 24 B' which repeal among others P.+. )os. ==(, =>< restoring in full force &rt A#. 3ased o

this the Dudge approved the pet for 3ail . Pet opposed and later on asked for increase in the 3&/5 &74-)T and later oled to deny the pet for 3ail and said and that while he is entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of 24 L .B' whicrestored the original penalty for rebellion under &rticle A# of the Revised Penal *ode, yet, when the interest of the tatconMicts with that of an individual, that of the former prevails for Ithe right of the tate of self?preservation is paramouto any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the 3ill of Rights of the *onstitution.K

Petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right to bail, having e%pressly waived it in 0.R. )'(CC= when he agreed to Iremain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody of his personK consideration of the recall of the warrant of arrest for his co?petitioners osena *ruF and ose *oncepcionN and the righto bail, even in non?capital oenses, is not absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a seriouthreat to the very e%istence of the tate, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to present evidence for the denof bail.

/-2 @ 84) -dge +4)&T4 erred in granting 3&/5

Ruling@ 8e agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with thcrime of rebellion as dened in &rticle A> of the Revised Penal *ode to which is attached the penalty of prision mayand a ne not e%ceeding P<C,CCC.CC. AC /t is, therefore, a bailable oense. Therefore, before conviction bail is eithermatter of right or of discretion. /t is a matter of right when the oense charged is punishable by any penalty lower thareclusion perpetua. A To that e%tent the right is absolute.

3ut if the oense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. /t shall be denied if thevidence of guilt is strong. The courtHs discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. AA3once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.

Though rebellionGs penalty has been increased from Prision 7ayor to reclusion perpetua, the act was committed prior such amendment and therefore it must not be applied to the accused.

o the 3&/5 in the case at bar falls under those matter of right which the court do not have discretion also to e%amine wo

the guilt is strong as its not one of those oense penaliFed with rec perp yet. 1owever since the accused waived his righto bail in 0.R. )o. '(CC= when he withdrew his petition for the issuance of the 8rite of 1*. 3ail being one right that can bwaived which has been waived is no longer avail to the person who waived it.

&rticle ( of the *ivil *ode e%pressly provides@

&rt. (. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, preDudicial to a third person with a right recogniFed by law.

& v Li)e*a " se)*et agent )+a*ge, wit+ illegal ('ssessi'n '- *ie /ase, 'n Ma(a *le in #9!1 /t t+e Li)e*sai, +e is ee3(t /ase, 'n Ma)a*an,ang Rle #949. Sin)e t+e a)t was in #9!4 an, Ma(a 'nl5 #9!16 Li)e*still ee3(t an, s+'l, n't /e )'nvi)te, -'* ill ('s '- 7A

4n +ecember A, =(#, Rafael 5icera was charged with illegal possession of a 8inchester riMe by the *hief of Police on th

municipal court of &bra de /log, 4ccidental 7indoro. /n &ugust >, =(B, the court acquitted 5icera on the charge oassault upon an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of rearm under the 7apa ru!=('$. /n ='>, 5icera appeal to the *ourt of &ppeals invoking his legal Dustication to posses the 8inchester riMbecause he was appointed as secret agent by 0overnor :eliciano 5eviste on +ecember , =( pursuant to the uprem*ourt decision in People vs 7acarandang. People vs 7acarandang !=#=$ O I the appointment of civilian as O secret ageof whom section B'= of the Revised &dministrative *ode e%empts from the requirements relating to rearm licenses.

/ssue@ 8hether or not the trial court erred in the application of 7apa rule retrospectively

1eld@ ;es. &t the time of 5iceraHs designation as secret agent in =( and at the time of his apprehension for possession the 8inchester riMe without the requisite license or permit thereof in =(#, the 7acarandang rule formed part of th Durisprudence and, hence, of this DurisdictionO Q s legal system. 7apa revoked the 7acarandang precedent only in =(*ertainly, where a new doctrine abrogates and old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only and should nadversely aect those favoured by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof.



C' v CA " bouncing check, at the time of its issuance it was not yet criminal because of the circular containing thinterpretation of no less than the lawyer of the 0overnment. The reversal that took eect a year after the act of issuancshould not operate to the disadvantage of the accused$

&greement to salvage and reMoat asunken vessel and in payment of his share of the e%penses of the salvagoperations therein stipulated petitioner &lbino *o delivered to the salvaging rm on eptember , =BA a check drawagainst the &ssociated *itiFensG 3ank, postdated )ovember AC, =BA in the sum of PA(,#<B.CC. The check wadeposited on anuary A, =B> but was dishonored two days later, the tersely?stated reason given by the bank bein"*542+ &**4-)T."

RT* convicted him under 3P 3lg <<. Relied on Sue v. People !=B'$" that a check issued merely to guarantee thperformance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by 3.P. 3lg. <<".*& ? aErmed RT* decision

*o said that upon the issuance of check in =BA, there was a *ircular of the 7inistry of ustice !=B$ that provides th"8here issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of 3.P. 3lg. <<". uch was reversed a year after *issued check.

/ssue@ 84) *o liable under 3P 3lg <<.

Ruling@ )o, because of prospective application of law which also applies to circulars. The act was done in =BA whethere was a circular saying it is not an oense ? issuance of bouncing checks. &lthough it was reversed in ==>, will not bapplicable to *o because of the prospective application of the law. Retroactive only when favorable, in this case its not sprospective application. &t the time of the act, what was applicabe was the circular.

/n the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer bupon an oEcial pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the 0overnment, the ecretary of ustice, whose opinionthough not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reMective of thcorrect interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provisionN this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the venature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation. ' enarillos vs. 1ermosisimsupra, relied upon by the respondent *ourt of &ppeals, is crucially dierent in that in said case, as in -.. v. 0o *hicsupra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the *ourt on the law invoked.

Nati'nal Ma*keting C'*('*ati'n v Te)s'n " Lea(5ea*$

There was a Dudgement in favor of Price tabiliFation *orporation ordering Tecson and co accused to pay the forme)ational 7arketing *orporation, as successor of P* led a revival of Dudgement. Tecson moved for dismissal on thgrounds of lack of uris and prescription. RT* dismissed because it has prescribed already. *ase became nal o

+ecember <, =## and a case to reopen was made +ec < =(# and since there was a leap year in =(C and (>, the laday to le within the C year period is +ec =, =(#. Pet led +ec < so prescribed.

Pet appeals to *& saying it T* erred and insisted that the law provides A(# days for year and not otherwise.

/ssue@ 8hether or not the term year as used in the article A of the civil code is limited to A(# days.

Ruling@ &rt. ' of said *ode, "whenever months ... are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are oAC days," not the "natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which case "theshall be computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was later, modied in the Philippines, by ectioA of the Revised &dministrative *ode, Pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month." > the language of this *ourt, in People vs. +el Rosario, # with the approval of the *ivil *ode of the Philippines !Republic &AB($ ... we have reverted to the provisions of the panish *ivil *ode in accordance with which a month is to be considereas the regular AC?day month ... and not the solar or civil month," with the particularity that, whereas the panish *odmerely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added thereto the term "years" and e%plicitly ordains that "it shabe understood that years are of three hundred si%ty?ve days."

&lthough some members of the *ourt are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to conform witordinary e%perience or practice, the theory of plainti?appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifyin&rt. A of our *ivil *ode, and reviving ection A of the Revised &dministrative *ode, thereby engaging in Dudicilegislation, and, in eect, repealing an act of *ongress. /f public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied the Revised &dministrative *ode, this may be done through legislative process, not by Dudicial decree.

8i'n v :altaa* "O*al ,e-a3ati'n )ase at MTC.. &et sai, (*es)*i/e, na$

This is pet for certiorari to declare null and void 7T* Dudgement denying petsG motion to quash criminal complaints baseon prescription of 4ral defamation which they were charged.



4n 7ay , =(> led 4+ case against Pet commited on )ovember , =(A. uch crime prescribes ( months. Pet said prescribed on 7ay =, =(> so it was led out of time. They invoked the computation in P v +el Rosario which providfor specic number of days in a month. *ourt overruled and made computation based on AC days per month.

RulingN * granted petition applying the +el Rosario case.

imilarly we hold that in view of the e%press provisions of &rticle A of the new *ivil *ode the term "month" used in &rtic=C of the Revised Penal *ode should be understood to mean the AC?day month and not the solar or civil month.

/f specic ang month daw kay use the AC days ana nga month. o based from what / have understood since the granted the pets and ordered dismissal of the case against pet kay miprescribe na lagi daw !this part made me confus

because if we use the AC day rule then it has not actually prescribed yet , still led on time but..$ &mbot /Hll ask. This simple and im Dust making it complicated , well no time to read full te%t ..so small te%t ..hahahaha

:ellis vs. :ellis "Tean w+' 3a,e tw' wills w+' (*'vi,e, t+e*ein t+at it s+all /e g'v /5 &+iL Law /t s)+ invali, /e)ase t+e int*insi) vali,it5 s+all /e g've*ne, /5 t+e nati'nal law '- t+e ,e)ease,. T+e law in Tea,' n't (*'vi,e -'* legiti3es t+e*e-'*e t+e (ets ,' n't +ave legiti3e$

:&*T@&mos 0. 3ellis was a citiFen of the tate of Te%as and of the -nited tates. 1e had ve legitimate children with his rwife !whom he divorced$, three legitimate children with his second wife !who survived him$ and, nally, three illegitimatchildren.( years prior &mos 3ellisH death, he e%ecuted two!<$ wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to hseven surviving children. The appellants led their oppositions to the proDect of partition claiming that they have beedeprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. &ppellants argued that th

deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

/-2@8hether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate childrenHs successionrights

R-5/)0@*ourt ruled that provision in a foreignerHs will to the eect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance witPhilippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of thosmatters that &rticle C now &rticle ( of the *ivil *ode states said national law should govern.8here the testator was a citiFen of Te%as and domiciled in Te%as, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by hnational law. ince Te%as law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of thlegitimes, is valid. The upreme *ourt held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the te%as law, which is th

national law of the deceased.

;LO:E MAC<A= CA:LE AND RADIO COR&.6 an, >ER:ERT C. >ENDR=6 (etiti'ne*s vs. T>E >ONORA:LE COURO7 A&&EALS an, RESTITUTO M. TO:IAS6 *es('n,ents.

:&*T@ Private respondent Restituto 7. Tobias was employed by petitioner 0lobe 7ackay in dual capacity as purchasinagent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. /n ='<, the respondent discovered frauduleanomalies and transactions in the said corporation for which it lost several hundred thousands of pesos. The privatrespondent reported to his superiors including 1enry, the petitioner. 1owever, he was confronted by 1endry stating tha Tobias was the number one suspect. 1e was ordered to take a one week forced leave. 8hen he returned to work, 1endcalled him UcrookH and UswindlerH, and left a scornful remark to the :ilipinos. The petitioners also charged si% criminal caseagainst the respondentve cases of estafa and one for violating &rticle <=C of the RP* !+iscovering ecrets througeiFure of *orrespondence$. The petitioner also sent a poison letter to R2T25*4 causing the respondent to bunemployed.

/-2@ 8hether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondent.

125+@ Petitioners invoked the right of damnun absque inDuria or the damage or loss which does not constitute a violatioof legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. !e%ample opening a burger stand near someone else, thougcauses damage to the other but it does not inDure them$ 1owever, this is not applicable in this case. /t bears repeatinthat even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in whicthat right was e%ercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must be held liable.

The court awarded Tobias the following@ Php BC, CCC as actual damages, Php <CC, CCC as moral damages, Php <C, CCCC e%emplary damagesN Php AC, CCC as attorneyHs feesN and, costs. Petition was denied and the decision of *& is &::/R72+.??????

&N: v CA ! Tapnio used her sugar crops about to be harvested as security of her loan with P)3. 7eanwhile she deawith TuaFon and had an agreement at <.#C per picul but bank manager did not approve saying minimu is <.B V all agree



and bank ref to 3oard but latter want A and TuaFon disagrees resulting to Tapnio losing her income an unable to pacreditors including the bank$

Rita Tapnio owes P)3 an amount of P<,CCC.CC. The amount is secured by her sugar crops about to be harvested includinher e%port quota allocation worth ,CCC piculs. The said e%port quota was later dealt by Tapnio to a certain acobo TuaFoat P<.#C per picul or a total of P<,#CC. ince the subDect of the deal is mortgaged with P)3, the latter has to approve i The branch manager of P)3 recommended that the price should be at P<.BC per picul which was the prevailing minimuamount allowable. Tapnio and TuaFon agreed to the said amount. &nd so the bank manager recommended the agreemeto the vice president of P)3. The vice president in turn recommended it to the board of directors of P)3.

1owever, the 3oard of +irectors wanted to raise the price to PA.CC per picul. This TuaFon does not want hence he backe

out from the agreement. This resulted to Tapnio not being able to realiFe prot and at the same time rendered her unabto pay her P<,CCC.CC crop loan which would have been covered by her agreement with TuaFon.

2ventually, Tapnio was sued by her other creditors and Tapnio led a third party complaint against P)3 where she allegethat her failure to pay her debts was because of P)3Hs negligence and unreasonableness.

/-2@ 8hether or not Tapnio is correct.

125+@ ;es. /n this type of transaction, time is of the essence considering that TapnioHs sugar quota for said year needs tbe utiliFed &&P otherwise her allotment may be assigned to someone else, and if she canHt use it, she wonHt be able e%port her crops. /t is unreasonable for P)3Hs board of directors to disallow the agreement between Tapnio and TuaFobecause of the mere dierence of C.<C in the agreed price rate. 8hat makes it more unreasonable is the fact that thP<.BC was recommended both by the bank manager and P)3Hs 9P yet it was disapproved by the board. :urther, the P<.Bper picul rate is the minimum allowable rate pursuant to prevailing market trends that time. This unreasonable stanreMects P)3Hs lack of the reasonable degree of care and vigilance in attending to the matter. P)3 is therefore negligent.

& corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts, because Igenerally speaking, the rulegoverning the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether thprincipal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or articial perso&ll of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which it e%pressly directs or authoriFes, anthis is Dust as true of a corporation as of a natural person, a corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act committed by an oEcer or agent under e%press direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting as a bodor, generally, from the directors as the governing body.K

LA;UN?AD vs.VDA. DE ;ON?ALES @ CA " ag*ee3ent /etween s+'wing t+e 3'vie '- t+e li-e '- a 3a5'*)an,i,ate a (/li) g*e6 +ei*s n't (ai, s' se, in )'*t. Res( sai, (/li) g*e s' *ig+t t' -*ee,'3 /la/la+.. )'*t sai, alt+'g+ (/ g*e6 ,'es n't 3ean n' *ig+t t' (*iva)5 an53'*eB$

:&*TPetitioner 7anuel 5agunFad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The 7oises Padilla torportraying the life of 7oises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the )acionalista Party for the 7unicipality of 7agallo)egros 4ccidental and for whose murder, 0overnor Rafael 5acson, a member of the 5iberal Party then in power and hmen were tried and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was on the public life of 7oises Padilla, there were portiowhich dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, 7aria oto, privatrespondent herein, and of one "&uring" as his girl friend. PadillaHs half sister, for and in behalf of her mother, 9da.d0onFales, obDected to the "e%ploitation" of his life and demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletionin the movie. &fter some bargaining as to the amount to be paid 5agunFad and 9da. de 0onFales, e%ecuted a "5icensin&greement" whereby the latter as 5/*2)4R granted 5agunFad authority and permission to e%ploit, use, and develop thlife story of 7oises Padilla for purposes of producing the picture for consideration of P<C,CCC.CC.5agunFad paid 9da. d0onFales the amount of P#,CCC.CC. ubsequently, the movie was shown indierent theaters all over the country. 3ecaupetitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the &greement, 9da. de 0onFales instituted the present suagainst him praying for Dudgment in her favor ordering petitioner $ to pay her the balance of P#,CCC.CC, with leginterest from of the *omplaintN and <$ to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay t

corresponding <?W<X royalty there from, among others. Petitioner contended in his &nswer that the episodes in life 7oises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about the same time that thdeceased became and was a public gureN that private respondent has no property right over those incidentsN that th5icensing &greement was without valid cause or consideration and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional righof freedom of speech and of the pressN and that he paid private respondent the amount of P#,CCC.CC only because of thcoercion and threat employed upon him. &s a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullication of the 5icensi&greement, 3oth the trial court and the *& ruled in favor of 9da. de0onFales.

/-2

• 8hether or not the ctionaliFed representation of 7oises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to privanotwithstanding that he was a public gure.

• 8hether or not 9da. de 0onFales., the mother, has any property right over the life of 7oises Padilla considerinthat the latter was a public gure.



• 8hether or not the 5icensing &greement constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom ospeech and of the press.

125+ ;2, being a public gure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a personGs right to privacy. The right to invadas personGs privacy to disseminate public information does not e%tend to a ctional or noveliFed representation ofperson, no matter how public a gure he or she may be. /n the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner e%erted eorts present a true?to?life story of 7oises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the lm because withoit, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. ;2, 5agunFad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicepisodes in said deceasedGs life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. &s held in chuyler v. *urtis"

privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege e%ists for thbenet of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory othe deceased.")4, 5agunFad claims that as a citiFen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to e%press his thoughts in lm on thpublic life of 7oises Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of e%pression, indeed, occupies a preferreposition in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." /t is not, however, without limitations. 4ne criterion for permissible limitatioon freedom of speech and of the press is the "balancing?of?interests test." The principle requires a court to take consciouand detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."/n the case at bar, the interestHs observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of ?freedom oe%pression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, and considering the obligatioassumed in the 5icensing &greement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheparticularly because the limits of freedom of e%pression are reached when e%pression touches upon matters of essentialprivate concern.

A=ER &RODUCTIONS VS. CA&ULON; [#!0 SCRA !# ;.R. NO. L2F0 29 A&R #9% "a/'t a 3'vie *e t+E,sa Rev.. En*ile ,isa((*'ve t+at +is li-e will /e in)l,e, t+e*e s' +e was ,elete, -*'3 t+e s)*i(t /t late'n le, a )'3(laint w+en inv'king +is *ig+t t' (*iva)5 6 s' RTC '*,e*e, -'* ,esistan)e '- t+e 3'v (*' an3aking '- an5 )titi's )+a*a)te* in lie '- (laintiGH7*ee,'3 '- S(ee)+ vi'late,. En*ile /eing a (/g*e +ave l'st t' s'3e etent at least6 t+ei* *ig+t t' (*iva)5.$

:acts@ Petitioner 7c2lroy an &ustralian lm maker, and his movie production company, &yer Productions, envisionesometime in =B', for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle the :ilipinos at 2+&. The proposed motion picture entitled "The :our +ay Revolution" was endorsed by the 7TR*3 as another government agencies consulted. Ramos also signied his approval of the intended lm production.

/t is designed to be viewed in a si%?hour mini?series television play, presented in a "docu?drama" style, creating fouctional characters interwoven with real events, and utiliFing actual documentary footage as background. +av8illiamson is &ustraliaGs leading playwright and Professor 7c*oy !-niversity of )ew outh 8ales$ is an &merican historiahave developed a script.

2nrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction andWor e%hibition of his name, or picture, that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, lm or other medium for advertising commercial e%ploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of 2nrile was deleted from the movie scripand petitioners proceeded to lm the proDected motion picture. 1owever, a complaint was led by 2nrile invoking his rigto privacy. RT* ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plainti or his famand from creating any ctitious character in lieu of plainti which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or markeresemblance to 2nrile. 1ence the appeal.

/ssue@ 8hether or )ot freedom of e%pression was violated.

1eld@ ;es. :reedom of speech and of e%pression includes the freedom to lm and produce motion pictures and e%hibit sucmotion pictures in theaters or to diuse them through television. :urthermore the circumstance that the production

motion picture lms is a commercial activity e%pected to yield monetary prot, is not a disqualication for availing freedom of speech and of e%pression.

The proDected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not e%hibited to any audience. )either privarespondent nor the respondent trial udge knew what the completed lm would precisely look like. There was, in othwords, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. ubDect matter is one of public interest anconcern. The subDect thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.

&t all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to lm wertaking place, 2nrile was a "public gure@" uch public gures were held to have lost, to some e%tent at least, their right tprivacy.



The line of equilibrium in the specic conte%t of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and e%pression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture mube fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.

CASE DI;EST ON MENDO?A V. ALCALA

Y< CA< !=($Z ? 8here the accused in a criminal case for estafa is acquitted on the ground that the prosecution hanot proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action based on the same transaction may prosper. !$ Thconclusion that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt is equivalent to one of reasonable doubt. Thus, civil action may prosper. !<$ -nder the Rules of *ourt, the e%tinction of the penal action does not carry with it e%tinction civil unless there is a declaration that fact from which civil is based did not e%ist. !A$ &l[though no reservation was made

the declaration in the criminal case that the obligation is purely civil amounts to a reservation of the civil action in favor the oended party. !>$ :urthermore, since estafa involves fraud, an independent civil action may prosper under &rt. AA the *ivil *ode.

Men,'a v. A**ieta0.R. )o. 5?A<#==, une <=, ='=7elencio?1errera, .

:acts@& three? way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven bypetitioner 2dgardo 7endoFa, a private Deeowned and driven by respondent RodolfoalaFar, and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent :elipino Timbol andriven by:reddie 7ontoya. &s a consequence of said mishap, two separate /nformations for Reckless/mprudence *ausin+amage to Property were led against Rodolfo alaFar and :reddie7ontoya with the *:/ of 3ulacan. The trial *ouabsolved Deep?owner?driver alaFar of anyliability, civil and criminal, in view of its ndings that the collision betweealaFarHs Deepand petitionerHs car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by thetruck driven b7ontoya. )either was petitioner awarded damages as he was not acomplainant against truck?driver 7ontoya but onagainst Deep?owner?driver alaFar. &fterthe termination of the criminal cases, petitioner led a civil case againrespondentsalaFar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involvingtheir vehicles.

/ssue@ whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitionerHs complaint for damagesbased on quasi?delict againprivate respondents

1eld@ /nsofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent udge wrongfullysustained TimbolHs allegatiothat the civil suit is barred by the prior Doint Dudgment in acriminal case led against him, wherein no reservation to le separate civil case was madeby petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried provedamages against alaFar only. :or petitionerGs cause of action against Timbol in the civilcase is based on quasdelict. Respondent udge committed reversible error when hedismissed the civil suit against the truck?owner, as said casmay proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. &rticle A of th

*ivil*ode provides that, I8hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the actor omission complained as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of thecriminal proceedings and regardless of the result of thlatter.K TimbolHs submission thatpetitionerGs failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to anindependent civil action, as required under section <, Rule , Rules of *ourt, bars theinstitution of such separate civaction is untenable. :or inasmuch as &rticle A !in relationto &rticles <'( and <''$ of the *ivil *ode creates a civliability distinct and dierent fromthe civil action arising from the oense of negligence under the Revised Penal *odnoreservation is required to be made in the criminal case. &nd so, to reiterate, the civil caseled against Timbol is nobarred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminalaction, his right to le an independent civil action baseon quasi?delict.3ut insofar as alaFar is concerned the answer is no. /nasmuch as civil liability co?e%ists withcriminresponsibility in negligence cases, the oended party has the option between anaction for enforcement of civil liabilibased on culpa criminal under &rticle CC of theRevised Penal *ode, and an action for recovery of damages based oculpa aquiliana under&rticle <'' of the *ivil *ode. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpacriminunder section of Rule of the Rules of *ourt is deemed simultaneouslyinstituted with the criminal action, unlese%pressly waived or reserved for separate application by the oended party. The circumstances attendant to the crimincase yieldsthe conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against alaFar on culpacriminal and noon culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and interventionin the prosecution of the criminal suit againssaid alaFar. The latterGs civil liabilitycontinued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. uch being thcase,there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to le a separate civil action ashis action for civil liabilitwas deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.alaFar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained bpetitionerHs car forconsidering that the collision between the Deep driven by him and the car owned and drivenby 7endoFwas the result of the hitting on the rear of the Deep by the truck driven by7ontoya, it cannot be said that alaFar was fault. 1ence, the right of petitioner to claimdamages from alaFar did not arise. &ccordingly, inasmuch as petitionercause of action asagainst Deep?owner?driver alaFar is e%? delictu, founded on &rticle CC of the Revised Penal*ode, thcivil action must be held to have been e%tinguished in consonance with ectionA!c$ which provides that, I2%tinction of thpenal action does not carry with it e%tinction of the civil, unless the e%tinction proceeds from a declaration in a n Dudgment that the factfrom which thecivil right arise did not e%istVK



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